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SOME REMARKS ON THE ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTION VERB COMPLEMENTS IN MIDDLE ENGLISH: A REPLY*

In an earlier article in this journal, Roman Kopytko suggests that perception verb complements (henceforth PVCs) in Modern English (Mod. E) should be analysed as containing a NP as well as an S argument as follows,

(1) he [yp saw [NP them] [S PRO work]]

on the basis of Middle English (ME) evidence concerning clausal PVCs (the examples are taken from Kopytko 1985: 27).

(2) (a) Egipciens sawen the woman that she was ful fayre (1382 Wyclif Gen. 14).
(b) Se ȝe ȝe ȝonder pore womman how at she is pyned withe twynlenges two (1430 Chev. Assigne 26).
(c) pe knyghtis of Rome saw Vaspasyan at he was a noble man and a redy to counsell (1440 Alphabet of Tales 427).

Kopytko’s hypothesis is that the Mod. E PVCs are structurally similar to the ME PVCs by virtue of what he calls the ‘Diachronic Projection Principle’ or ‘DPP’.

Kopytko also cites ME evidence to show that the rule of COMP deletion (which accounts for the absence of to in most PVCs) was not obligatory in ME, whereas it is in Mod. E, as can be seen from the following example,

(3) And sittinge for to eet, they seen Y-smaelitis weiegoers to komen fro Gallaad (c. 1382 Wyclif Gen. 25, taken from Kopytko 1985: 30).

which cannot be translated into Mod. E as,

(4) And sitting down to eat, they saw them *to come in.

In the following, I would like to show that in general infinitival and clausal PVCs in Middle and Modern English are far more similar than these examples seem to suggest, and also that it is an unnecessary and unwarranted complication of the grammar to assume that in ME the perception verbs subcategorized for a NP as well as a S. But before going into these questions I would first like to briefly consider Kopytko’s proposals in more detail.

* I am grateful to David Denison for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Kopytko has noted the occurrence of NP+\textit{that}-clauses following perception verbs in ME (cf. 2(a) and (c)) and on the basis of these, he analyses ME infinitival complements following perception verbs — which are structurally opaque on the surface\(^1\) — in a similar way, i.e. as \textit{he saw} \[\text{NP, them}][\text{\[S, PRO eat\]}], rather than \textit{he saw} \[\text{\[S, them eat\]}]. It is possible, as Kopytko has done, to derive the subcategorization frame of ME perception verbs from these clausal PVCs. Once this choice is made, it would follow automatically from the Projection Principle (cf. Chomsky 1981: 29) that the ME infinitival complements must also be generated with a NP as well as a \textit{S} argument. However, Kopytko goes one step further. He also argues that the Modern English PVCs should be analysed in this way. The problem is, however, that there is no synchronic evidence in Mod. E for this analysis since in Mod. E 2 (a) and (c) would be ungrammatical. Not deterred by this, Kopytko notes (p. 29) that in the past linguists have sometimes resorted to diachronic evidence in the case of “conflicting or contradictory accounts of a grammatical phenomenon”. His suggestion is, therefore, that diachronic evidence should be adduced in this case too, presumably because there is no consensus of opinion concerning the analysis of PVCs in Mod. E as yet. In the recent past, linguists have suggested quite a number of alternative analyses for Mod. E PVCs. Kopytko here adopts the analysis by Equi NP Deletion, put forward by among others Rosenbaum (1967) and Fiengo (1974). In the Government and Binding framework (cf. Chomsky 1981), the Equi NP Deletion Rule has been replaced by an Object Control Rule but the analysis itself is essentially the same. In both cases, the NP argument is part of the matrix clause (as can be seen in (1)). Under the Object Control Rule, however, the NP in the infinitival complement, which was deleted before by the Equi Rule, has become PRO, which is controlled by the matrix NP (shown by means of indices).

The argument that Kopytko puts forward to prove that Mod. E PVCs should be analysed like ME PVCs is, however, circular. He claims that the ME and Mod. E PVCs are syntactically equivalent in accordance with his ‘Diachronic Projection Principle’. This principle “projects the D-, S- and LF representations [...] of ME PVCs on their equivalents in Modern English to assign them proper structure at those levels” (p. 28). The principle itself, however, has no independent status because its validity still has to be shown by the case in question (i.e. the analysis of the PVCs). Kopytko tries to save the principle from being completely vacuous by stating that its operation is constrained by two conditions. He states (p. 28) that “the two syntactic structures involved in

\(^1\) \textit{he saw them go} could be analysed essentially in two different ways, either with \textit{them} as syntactically the object directly dependent on the matrix verb (it receives its \(\theta\)-role from the matrix verb, cf. Chomsky 1981) or with \textit{them} connected with the infinitive where it functions as a subject (i.e. receiving its \(\theta\)-role from the infinitive). The analysis of these constructions, often called accusative and infinitive constructions, is a well-known problem, cf. Fischer (forthcoming).
the process of projection should be (1) identical in LF-representation [i.e. identical at the level of Logical Form, one of the components of grammar, cf. Chomsky 1981: 4]; (2) identical in S-structure”.

With respect to the PVCs, he would then have to show that ME *he herde hem speke* and Mod. E *he heard them speak* are identical in both these respects. I think this is true. However, it should be noted that, although the infinitival PVCs may be structurally the same, the clausal complements in ME and Mod. E are not, in that, according to Kopytko’s data, only ME seems to allow a NP before the clause. Since it is the clausal and not the infinitival PVCs that provide evidence for the presence of NP in the matrix clause in ME, it is the clausal complement structures that should have been compared in the first place. This also indicates that the conditions on the DPP as formulated by Kopytko are not specific enough. He only states that “the two syntactic structures involved in the process of projection” (emphasis added) should be identical. In fact, he would have to check whether all the structures involving perception verbs are identical to their later counterparts because the Projection Principle, from which the DPP is developed (see also below), is concerned with *all* the constructions a certain lexical item can appear in.

To make this claim somewhat clearer, I will illustrate the status of Kopytko’s DPP with another example from the history of English. If the working of the DPP is said to be constrained by the two conditions of identity as given above, we would expect in reverse that the DPP applies whenever these two conditions apply. This seems not to be the case judging from the history of e.g. the modal verbs in English. It has been widely accepted that the modals underwent some change in the history of English from having full verb status to having auxiliary status (cf. e.g. Plank 1984). This reanalysis took place in spite of the fact that the most common construction in which the modal verbs appeared in both Old English (OE), ME and Mod. E, i.e. before an infinitive, has not changed, neither at the level of LF nor at S-structure. Thus, OE *Ne con ic noht singan* and *Hwæt sceal ic singan* (Bede, Whitelock 1967:46, 33-4) is like Mod. E *I cannot sing, What shall (must) I sing.*

Why then did this reanalysis take place at all? Or why, in other words, does the DPP *not* apply in this case? The answer must be because certain other constructions in which modals could appear in OE and ME disappeared, such as their ability to appear as infinitives or participles, to appear consecutively or with a direct object NP (cf. Lightfoot 1979, Plank 1984). Plank shows that all these changes were part of a grammaticization process involving the modals, which process was caused in its turn by, among other things, the loss of the subjunctive mood in late OE/early ME. So, although certain constructions may have remained identical in S-structure and on the level of LF, the syntactic

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2 I ignore the semantic shift that has taken place within some of these modals and also the change in the Negative Rule in the first example because that is not relevant to the point observed here.
rule responsible for the structure or the subcategorization frame may well have changed, due to changes having taken place elsewhere.

There is also an objection of a more general nature to a principle like the DPP. It has often been pointed out (e.g. Andersen 1973, Lightfoot 1979: 147ff) that there is no direct relation between a grammar at point $x$ in time and a grammar at point $y$, because the grammars of individual speakers are internalized entities deduced afresh each time by the language-learning child on the basis of the output of speakers around him. This means in fact that there is no theoretical basis for anything like a DPP, which crucially depends on a notion of grammar as undergoing continuous development, a notion that sees grammar as an entity independent of language output.

Finally, the DPP is a principle that presumably, judging from its name, has developed out of the so-called Projection Principle (cf. Chomsky 1981: 29) current in the EST framework of transformational generative grammar. It is curious that Kopytko has misunderstood, or so it seems to me, the essence of this principle that underlies his own as can be shown from his analysis of the ME perception verbs followed by a that-clause, to which I will now turn.

The ME examples in (2) put forward by Kopytko are interesting and should be taken into account in an adequate analysis of PVCs in ME. However, the examples do not warrant a $V \ NP \ S$ (or $V \ NP \ S$) analysis, even in ME, for two reasons. If we analyse the ME PVCs as ditransitive verbs (i.e. with two arguments), there is no way of distinguishing them syntactically from the persuade type of verbs illustrated in (5)

(5) I rede us to be merye (Chaucer, Kn. T. 3068, Robinson 1957 (Rob): 47).

It is true, on the surface (5) is similar to the infinitival PVC found in (3), but it has often been shown that syntactically the two constructions are not at all alike, at least not in Mod. E (cf. Rosenbaum 1967; Huddleston 1971: 154ff and most TG handbooks). The criteria which have been used to distinguish these two groups of verbs in Mod. E also in general apply to ME as the following discussion will show:

(I) persuade verbs only allow a [+animate] NP in infinitival complements whereas perception verbs allow both [+animate] and [—animate] NPs as can be seen from examples (6) and (7) respectively,

(6) (a) ... yet gan she him biseche, ... For to ben war of goosish poeples speche (Chaucer, T&C III, 582-4, Rob. p. 427).
(b) ... that the lawe compelle you to swere (Chaucer, Pars. T. 590-95, Rob. p. 246).
(c) So graunte you his pardoun to receyve (Chaucer, Pard. T. 917, Rob. p. 154).
(7) (i) (a) Whan the kynge herde hym sey so (Malory (ed. Vinaver) 43, 16).
    (b) And than he herde a cock smyte (Malory 907, 21).
(ii) (a) ... and yet shall ye se hym juste better or he departe (Malory 733, 30)
    (b) ... to seen this flour ayein the somne sprede (Chaucer, LGW 48, Rob. p. 483).

The reason for this is that it is the infinitive, not the matrix verb, that provides the selection restrictions for this NP in the case of the perception verb complements. This accounts for the fact that
(8) I saw the British Museum eat the boy
is anomalous (because the subject of eat must normally be [-animate]), while,
(9) I saw the British Museum collapse in a heap of rubble
is well formed for the same reason; the verb collapse can occur with a [-animate] subject. In the case of the persuade verbs, however, it is the matrix verb that provides the selection restrictions for the NP involved. Since this NP represents what is traditionally called the indirect object, it is always [+animate].

(II) Most persuade verbs can occur in a double NP construction, whereas perception verbs cannot; they only govern a single NP, as can be seen from the examples in (10) and (11) respectively,

(10) (a) o thy ing biseke I yow ...
    (Chaucer, Cl. T. 1037, Rob. p. 112).
(b) I grante thee lyf ...
    (Chaucer, W. of B. T. 904, Rob. p. 85).
(c) In yowthe a maister hadle this emperour To teche hym letterure and ouriteisy
    (Chaucer, Mo. T. 2495-6, Rob. p. 195).
(11) (a) now shul we heere Som deyntee thyng ...
(b) Ne nevere mo he shal his lady see (Chaucer, Kn. T. 1346, Rob. p. 30).

These differences would be accounted for if we recognize two different underlying infinitival structures, i.e. (a) for the persuade verbs and (b) for the perception verbs,

(a) V NP, [S [PRO VP]] (where PRO is controlled by the matrix object NP)
(b) V [S NP VP]

These structures show that there is a difference in the subcategorization frames of these two types of verb, i.e. the persuade verbs take two arguments, one of which can be sentential, whereas the perception verbs take only one argument which can be either NP or S.

Let us now return to the Projection Principle to which the DPP was seen to be linked. The Projection Principle first of all involves the subcategorization properties of lexical items being observed at each syntactic level. This explains why the syntactic structures in which persuade and perception verbs appear differ; it is a natural consequence of the difference in their subcategorization frames given the validity of the Projection Principle. Chomsky (1981) further claims that this principle must also hold in some form at LF level. He states
that there is a clear connection between the syntactic subcategorization frame of a verb and the θ-roles (semantic functions) assigned to each verb at LF level: a position in LF to which a θ-role is assigned is a θ-position and a θ-position is part of the subcategorization frame (Chomsky 1981: 35ff). In other words subcategorization entails θ-marking. This also underlies the so-called θ-criterion formulated in Chomsky (1981: 36): each argument bears one and only one θ-role, and each θ-role is assigned to one and only one argument.

It is with the Projection Principle and the θ-criterion that we run into problems with the ME examples given under (2); some more examples can be found in (13),

(13) Herkneth thise blisful briddes how they synge,
    And se the fresshe floures how they sprynge;
    (Chaucer, NPT 3201-2, Rob. p. 203).

At LF level the perception verbs, unlike the persuade verbs, can only have one argument. In Gruberian terms (Gruber 1976), this argument would be ‘theme’. Consequently, the subcategorization frame only allows one θ-position. (The persuade verbs, according to Gruber, would take two arguments at LF level, i.e. that of ‘goal’ — represented by a NP or a clausal/infinitival complement — and that of ‘theme’ — the indirect object NP; thus, their subcategorization frames provide two θ-positions.) How then do we account for the awkward PVC examples found in ME? Kopytko’s solution to assign them the ditransitive structure \( V \ NP \tilde{S} \) cannot be accepted because it clashes, as I have shown above, with the Projection Principle as well as the θ-criterion.

Given that the object NP which appears before the clausal complement after perception verbs in ME cannot constitute a separate argument, we can look for a solution in two directions; either the NP is a non-argument or quasi-argument (as defined in Chomsky (1981: 325ff.)) or the NP and the \( \tilde{S} \) together form one argument. The first possibility is out since the NPs in question (briddes, flours, woman etc.) clearly have a referential function. Concerning the second possibility, there are in theory a number of analyses possible.

Warner (1982: 91-99) suggests that the NP and S-clause are parallel and

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* This is a very oversimplified picture. The important fact is, however, that all persuade verbs take two arguments. Verbs such as force, induce etc. do indeed occur with the thematic roles of ‘goal’ (second NP or complement clause) and ‘theme’ (first, animate NP). Other verbs, such as grant, permit etc., take ‘theme’ (the second NP or clause) and ‘source’ (the first, animate NP) as arguments (cf. Gruber 1976: 168–77).

* For this reason Chomsky (1981: 33) rejects the analysis of I consider John intelligent as a ditransitive one — \( I [xp \text{ consider } [xp \text{ John } ] [ap \text{ intelligent}]] \) — because it violates the Projection Principle. Instead, he suggests that verbs like consider (which probably also includes the perception verbs; Chomsky (1981) does not discuss these as such, but cf. Radford (1981: 329), who includes them here) should be analysed as exceptional case marking verbs, which take only one argument, NP or S (Chomsky 1981: 66ff.).

* Most OE awkward examples quoted by Mitchell (1985) are dealt with in this way, in Fischer (forthcoming).
that they fulfill the selectional and subcategorizational requirements of a single position in the matrix construction but are closely linked to each other in surface structure (p. 92). He names these constructions CLAN sentences (an acronym for ‘clause and nominal’, which also suggests the close relationship of the two elements). Warner rejects a movement analysis, such as the one I will propose below, on the grounds that “there is probably no restriction on the position within the matrix clause which the nominal may occupy” (p. 93). This is true for the data Warner cites, which includes not only perception verbs but also other montransitive verbs (such as verbs of knowing) and even ditransitive verbs. However, since the perception verbs form a distinctive class in other respects (see below and cf. Fischer forthcoming), it is quite possible that they should be treated separately here. What is important is that the available evidence seems to show that with the perception verbs there is a restriction on the position which the nominal may occupy within the matrix clause. I will return to this below.

If Warner is correct, it should be possible to insert and between the NP and the that-clause. It looks as if this is acceptable for examples (2)b and (13), but it seems distinctly odd in examples (2) a and c. However, it must be clear that even in (2) a and c and-insertion is far more acceptable than it is in persuade verb constructions: and between the NP and the complement clause would definitely be ungrammatical here.

The ‘oddness’ of and-insertion seems to suggest that the NP and S are not in fact parallel but that one is part of the other. When we look at the examples more carefully, it becomes clear that the speaker does not intend the addressee to see some woman or to hear some birds but to notice one particular aspect in connection with the woman, or the birds, i.e. her beauty or their singing. For this reason it is unlikely that the PVCs in (2) and (13) should be structured as V [NP NP S], i.e. with the that/how-clause governed by the NP.

The more likely possibility is that the NP is part of the S-clause and has been moved out of the clause into TOPIC position leaving a resumptive pronoun behind. The structure, therefore, would look essentially as follows, V [S TOPIC [S NP VP]]. This analysis is also preferable for a number of other reasons. First of all, it would explain the occurrence of sentences like the following, attested in ME,

(14) See how he ganeth, lo! this dronken wight (Chaucer, Man. Prol. 35, Rob. p. 224).

(14) is very similar to (13) except that the full NP (this dronken wight) now follows the pronoun and the S-clause. (With perception verbs the position of the nominal (cf. Warner referred to above) seems to be restricted to these two positions).

It would not be difficult to account for (14) under a topicalization analysis. On the other hand, an analysis in which the NP governs the S is unlikely since the NP follows the S. Example (14) also shows that the NP cannot be a separate argument of the perception verb because, whenever there are two arguments NP and S in English, the S is always in final position.
Lastly, Warner's 'parallel' analysis seems impossible here; notice that and-insertion is definitely ungrammatical in (14).

In addition, it should be noted that these particular PVC constructions are very rare in ME (and in OE, cf. Mitchell 1985: 73) and occur in rather special circumstances only, usually when the speaker actually points to an object, which he simultaneously comments on. Not surprisingly, therefore, the NP is often accompanied by a demonstrative pronoun such as thise in (13) or some other demonstrative adverb such as lo in (14) and yonder in 2(b). Also the matrix verb is usually part of an interrogative or imperative structure by which the addressee is invited to share a 'perception' with the speaker. It seems to me that in these special circumstances one can still come across such examples in Mod. E. This means that there would not be much difference between ME and Mod. E in this respect. To most speakers of English, the examples in (15) are perfectly acceptable.

(15) (a) Did you see that bloody pig, how awful it looked?
(b) Did you hear that woman, that she shouted "get him!"

Finally, I would like to make a few tentative remarks concerning the optional versus the obligatory deletion of COMP (=to) in PVCs in ME compared to Mod. E. Kopytko suggests that the rule of to-deletion is a lexical rule on the basis of criteria for lexical rules suggested by Wasow (1977: 331). The most relevant criteria are that a lexical rule (i) does not affect structure and (ii) that it has idiosyncratic exceptions. I believe that this is not true in the main for the rule of to-deletion in ME and the later periods. If the to-deletion rule is considered to be a lexical rule, an important generalization is missed.

It has been frequently noted that there is an important distinction in the way infinitival and clausal complements are used with perception verbs (in contrast to all other verbs that allow so-called accusative and infinitive constructions in English, cf. Fischer (forthcoming)). An infinitival complement...
can only occur in OE, ME and Mod. E when the following two conditions are fulfilled (in Mod. E only the second condition applies) (I) the action described in the infinitive must be physically observable and (II) the activity of the infinitive must be simultaneous with the moment of perception, or, in other words, the infinitive and matrix verb must share the same tense domain. If these two conditions are not fulfilled, a *that*-clause is obligatory. Thus one finds the following infinitival examples in ME, which all convey direct perception,

(16) (a) Whan the kynge herde hym say so... (Malory 43, 16).
(b) And so he herd an horne blowe as it had ben the dethe of a best (Malory 88, 10–11).
(c) ... To seen this flour ayein the sonne sprede (Chaucer, LGW 48, Rob. p. 483)
(d) Thou lookest as thou woldest fynde an hare, For evere upon the ground I se thee stare (Chaucer, Sir Th. Prol. 696–7, Rob. p. 164).
(e) As ye han in this covenaut merde me rede (Chaucer, LGW 2138, Rob. p. 512).

When the activity cannot be perceived (17) and/or is not simultaneous (18) a *that*-clause is used,

(17) (a) Thus may ye seen that wysdom ne richesse... Ne may with Venus holde cham­partie (Chaucer, Kn. T. 1947–9, Rob. p. 36).
(b) Ye felen wel youself that I nought lye (Chaucer, T&C II 1283, Rob. p. 415).
(c) I se wel now that ye mystrusten me (Chaucer, T&C IV 1606, Rob. p. 458).

(18) (a) Thus may ye seen that wysdom ne richesse... Ne may with Venus holde cham­partie (Chaucer, Kn. T. 1947–9, Rob. p. 36).
(b) Ye felen wel youself that I nought lye (Chaucer, T&C II 1283, Rob. p. 415).
(c) I se wel now that ye mystrusten me (Chaucer, T&C IV 1606, Rob. p. 458).

Now it looks as if the distinctions observed above also apply to the infinitival constructions, in that the same conditions (from the ME period onwards, in OE *to*-infinitives after perception verbs do not seem to occur cf. Visser 1973: 2250ff.) determine the presence or absence of *to*. The following examples indicate that *to* tends to be absent when directly perceivable or simultaneous action is implied. + *To* on the other hand, correlates with the use of *that*-clauses discussed above (but cf. note 9 for some disturbing factors at work),

(19) (a) They herden him to have don this signe (Wycl. John 12, 18, Visser 1973: 2282).
(b) Alas hit is shame that evir ye were made knyght to se suche lad to macche you ...
(Malory 305, 38–306, 1).
(c) Therefore, as ye be good jantyll knyghtes, se me nat thus shamfully to dye, for hit is shame to all knyghthode thus to se me dye (Malory 431, 19–21).

In (19)b, the context makes clear that *se* does not convey direct perception — the ‘matching’ in the fight has already taken place when this sentiment is
uttered — but rather that it conveys the *experience* of being matched which is shameful to any knight. The distinction is also fairly subtle in (19)c, but I think it is present. The first infinitive *to dye* clearly refers to a future event as far as the unfortunate knight is concerned, while the second infinitive *dye* expresses that it would be shameful to all knighthood to see him *actually* die in this way.

After the ME period, this distinction seems to become more and more clear. I quote the following examples from Visser (1973: 2252ff),

(20) (a) Hearing her to be sicke, I thether ran (Marlowe, Ovid's Eleg.).
(b) Goodness and true virtue which I hear to abound in you (Ben Jonson, Volp. III, i).
(c) I saw him *carried away* and, which is more, within three days his head to be *chopped off* (Shak. Meas. I, ii, 68).
(d) I feel monotony and death to be almost the same (Ch. Brontë, Shirley).
(e) I feel it to be disloyal (1982, N. Freeling, Love in Amsterdam).
(f) I saw her to have aged (my own example).

Thus, one finds that the use of *to* is not idiosyncratic and that it serves to make distinctions in meaning (tense) between the various PVCs. It must be clear that I cannot quite agree on the basis of the evidence given with Köpkyto's relegation of the rule of *to*-deletion to lexical status. Also, I think he is wrong in suggesting that the rule of *to*-deletion is obligatory in Mod. E, witness such examples as the last three quoted in (20).

Even if one does not find the evidence presented above completely convincing, it is my belief that this account of the absence or presence of *to* is preferable to Köpkyto's account on two grounds. First, Köpkyto's statement that the *to*-deletion rule became obligatory in Mod. E does not take account of all the data: *to* is not always deleted. Secondly, the explanation he puts forward to prove that the rule must become obligatory is theoretically shaky. He believes that the earlier PVCs were ambiguous in that PRO could be controlled by either the subject or the object of the matrix verb, and that this ambiguity is resolved by the *to*-deletion rule "which eliminates the subject control interpretation" (Köpkyto 1985: 32). Ignoring the fact that it is not quite clear to me how the subject control interpretation is eliminated, this account seems to suggest that it is entirely arbitrary whether a particular predicate takes subject or object control. It is far more likely from a pragmatic

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11 I have found a similar development in the case of the verb *find*. In OE, this verb can be followed by a bare infinitive construction only when direct perception is involved as in [he] *funde hienne xenne be wege liegan* (he found him lie (lying) alone along the road) (Ælf. Oros. 128. 11, Visser p. 2251). In Mod. E the verb *find* still functions as a perception verb but normally it does not convey direct physical perception. Interestingly enough, the examples one finds with infinitival constructions after *find* are practically all accompanied by *to*, as in, *He had found the girl to be discreet and sensible* (1961 M. Procter, The Devil Was Handsome, Visser p. 2251). When *see* and *hear* are found in Mod. E with a *to*-infinitive, they always convey indirect perception, but these constructions are not acceptable to all speakers of English. For the idea that *to* serves as a tense marker, see van der Leek & Jong (1982).
point of view that control properties are similar for similar verbs across a wide range of languages. It seems therefore probable that these control properties follow directly from the meaning of the predicate concerned (cf. Radford 1981: 381). How exactly this will be formalized, however, is an entirely different matter. For that we will probably have to wait until a theory of control has been developed within TG, the contents of which were only hinted at in Chomsky 1981.

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