Negotiating the hyphen

Dual identity compatibility among immigrants and their offspring

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Negotiating the hyphen: dual identity compatibility among immigrants and their offspring

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Introduction

How can I be different and still belong? This is a question occupying many immigrants and their (grand-)children (Gharaei, 2022). As minority members who differ from the mainstream due to their migration background, they are exposed to or even socialised in a different country than the heritage country of their (grand-)parents. Identification with their specific minority group – whether this is defined in ethnic, religious or other terms – is often interpreted by majority members as an exclusive orientation towards their minority group as majority members, particularly in Europe, tend to rely on a binary representation of cultural orientations and identifications (Van Acker & Vanbeselaere, 2012). Accordingly, majority members regularly ask ‘Why can’t they just be Dutch?’ (or Belgian, German, Danish, etc. for that matter) when confronted with minority members’ claims to the national identity of their destination country despite maintenance of identification with the minority group. The majority expectation of privileging

1 Throughout this chapter, I use the term ‘minority’ to refer to people with a migration background (irrespective of whether they migrated themselves, i.e., they belong to the first generation, or are born to immigrant parents or grandparents in their family’s destination country, i.e., the second and third generation). Accordingly, ‘majority’ here refers to the population without a migration background. This terminology reflects the dominance of non-migrant populations in defining the content and boundaries of the national identities of migrants’ destination countries rather than expressing numerical group relations. In fact, some cities and neighbourhoods in Europe today are so-called ‘majority minority’ contexts, where persons with a migration background outnumber those without one.
the national over one’s minority identity is particularly challenging for those minority members who are phenotypically different from the majority, or stand out due to particular accents or (religious) attire that marks their minority group membership. They struggle to be recognized as ‘simply Dutch’ (or Belgian, German, etc.) and frequently experience their claims to the national identity being denied through a continued questioning of where they are (really) from, or abundant compliments with their proficiency in a langue that actually is their mother tongue (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Thus, although a sense of identification with their destination country emerges among immigrants with increasing length of stay (De Vroome, Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2014), and for their offspring, during their socialisation in schools and mixed peer networks (Kende et al., 2021; Leszczensky, Stark, Flache & Munniksma, 2016), the membership of immigrants and their children in the national community of the destination country is frequently not validated or accepted by the majority that claims exclusive ownership of the national identity.

The contestation of the boundaries of national identity and the urgent question whether immigrants (or better put: which ones and under what conditions) can become part of the nation of their new residence country points out the fundamentally social nature of group identities, of which immigrants’ dual identities as simultaneous members of the ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983) of their origin country and their destination country are a specific example. As such, the study of immigrants’ dual identity provides an excellent opportunity to emphasize the usefulness of the social identity approach (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010) for understanding the specific identity constructions and identity dynamics among immigrants and their offspring. This emphasis, and the consistent and comprehensive application of the social identity approach to the field of migration studies, is one of the key scientific contributions of Maykel Verkuyten to the social psychological literature on immigration (e.g., Verkuyten, 2018a), the developmental psychological literature on identity formation (Verkuyten, 2016) and to migration studies (e.g., Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2021) and therefore may not be missing in a book honouring his scholarship.

Maykel Verkuyten’s research on migrants’ dual identity builds naturally on his earlier work on ethnic identity (among such divergent groups as the Karen of Myanmar, the Polish Tatars, as well as South Moluccan, Turkish and Chinese minorities in the Netherlands, cf. Verkuyten, 1999, 2005, 2018b), which was followed by an in-depth investigation of national identification among immigrants (e.g. Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012a). What research on these two forms of identification has in common is the question how particular identity constructions and the way they are negotiated in specific social contexts can result in multiple
social identities being perceived as compatible and harmonious – in contrast to scenario’s in which identifying with one’s origin national group is perceived to come at the cost of identification with the destination national identity, and vice-versa. The research interest in the conditionality of social identities experienced by people who could potentially be ‘both’, but are not always interested in, or allowed to be, simultaneous members of two national groups has been a great inspiration for my own research agenda. Starting from one of my first scientific works, written initially as Master’s thesis in the programme Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism under Maykel Verkuyten’s supervision, up until this day I have tried to further the scientific and societal understanding of how minority groups deal with their multiple group identities.

In this chapter, I will review this line of research structured around two core research questions. The first concerns the conceptualisation and measurement of immigrants’ dual identity, and the second concerns the study of identity compatibility, or more specifically the question when and why immigrants’ multiple identities are perceived to be incompatible, and when and why they are experienced as blended or even mutually reinforcing. Thus I approach immigrants’ dual identity focussing on two identities in the same domain, namely the national identity of immigrants’ origin and the national identity of their destination country (e.g. Moroccan and French, Turkish and German, Pakistani and British). As such, the research focus differs from the intersectionality approach (e.g. Cole, 2009; Crenshaw, 1999; Settles & Buchanan, 2014) which emphasises how the combination of multiple identities in different domains (e.g. gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, ability) affects the experience and enactment of these specific identities, as well as the structural disadvantages or privileges resulting from these. The empirical basis of the work reviewed here rests on research conducted primarily in Europe with minorities of non-European origins, and covering several migrants generations and age groups. Given the dual nature of the identity construct under study, I will specifically consider two types of audiences that may affect immigrants’ claims to dual identity, namely the majority in-group and the minority in-group. Finally, I will discuss how the definition of identity contents – both those shared with the majority and those specific to the minority group – may hamper or facilitate ‘being both’.

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2 In the psychological literature on identity multiplicity, the concept of intersectionality is also applied in the social identity complexity approach (Roccas & Brewer, 2002). There, it refers to an exclusive identification with others who share the same two group memberships (e.g. French and Senegalese) without identifying with the larger groups (all French, or all Senegalese).
Researching immigrants’ dual identity

A social identity perspective on dual identity
According to Social Identity theory (SIT), individuals partly define their identities with regard to the social groups they belong to and are emotionally invested in (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When group identities are salient, individuals assimilate their personal self to the attributes and behaviours of the group, thus expressing their group membership and belonging by acting in ways that are expected of group members. How individuals think and feel about themselves thus also depends on the shared representations of their group identities. Group representations refer to group boundaries, i.e., who is (and who is not) considered an in-group member, as well as identity contents such as important group values and behavioural norms. Thinking in terms of group membership (us and them) instead of individual identities (me and you) thus has important repercussions for individuals' orientations towards those who belong to the in-group and various out-groups, involving behavioural expectations, loyalty to the group and its norms and values, as well as a concern for the relative status of the in-group in the wider society.

For immigrants and their children, identification with their origin and destination national groups is particularly important. Indeed, when living in a new country, immigrants can decide to maintain some attachment to the country of origin, while, at the same time, acquiring a connection to the destination country (Berry, 1997). The form of identification that combines immigrants’ membership in both the origin and the destination society communities is defined as dual identity (Verkuyten et al., 2019). Accordingly, the study of dual identity among immigrants and their children concerns three fundamental questions: (1) the way in which they themselves think and feel about their origin and destination national group memberships; (2) how other members of these groups perceive them and behave towards them (e.g., include or exclude them); and (3) the result of the negotiations between the self and the members of their multiple in-groups in terms of how group boundaries and identity contents are defined (Verkuyten, 2018b). Regarding the last question, it is of particular importance whether the component identities are defined in compatible or incompatible ways. Developing dual identification can be difficult when immigrants perceive that the destination and the origin national identities are hard to express at the same time (Sindic & Reicher, 2009; Sixtus et al., 2019). Expressing multiple identities can be cognitively demanding and stressful if the behavioural expectations of the distinct identities do not align (Hirsh & Kang, 2016).
Different approaches to and measures of dual identity

Translating these theoretical questions into empirical research requires the operationalisation of immigrants’ dual identity, which is not straightforward. Indeed, different scholars have used different conceptualisations and measures of dual identity, and this sometimes causes confusion or hinders the integration of scientific knowledge from different fields. In the following, I will first review different empirical approaches to the study of immigrants’ dual identity and their underlying conceptualisation, and subsequently describe research comparing these different approaches.

Three distinct empirical approaches to dual identity can be distinguished in the literature: a first classifies dual identifiers based on the combination of high origin national (or ethnic) and high destination national identification (e.g. Fleischmann, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2013; Klandermans, Van den Toorn & Van Stekelenburg, 2008); the second explicitly measures self-categorisation as dual identifier and the strength of identification with the dual identity (“I [strongly] feel Turkish-German”, cf. Simon & Ruhs, 2008); the third, more indirect, approach considers the associations between immigrants’ origin and destination national identification. In this approach, positive associations are interpreted as reflecting identity compatibility, and negative associations as a situation of identity conflict which imply an either-or choice between immigrants’ identification with the origin and destination national group (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2016).

The first approach is typically adopted in the acculturation literature, where it represents the strategy of integration in the domain of identification, by combining high levels of cultural heritage group identification with high identification with the new society (Hutnik, 1991; Ryder, Alden & Paulhus, 2000). The second was pioneered by Bernd Simon and colleagues who argued that the requirement for ethnic and national identification to be both high might be too restrictive and that “[a]gainst the backdrop of a strong Turkish identification, a moderate level of German identification may already acquire sufficient self-relevance to prompt a sense of dual identity” (Simon & Ruhs, 2008, p.1355). Other researchers assessed how strongly individuals of immigrant origin identify with a blended (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005) or merger identity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), and subsequently related these identifications to the level of identification with the two component identities, to investigate whether dual identity is more than the sum of its parts (Mosaico, 2020; Ng Tseung Wong & Verkuyten, 2013; Verkuyten, 2014). This analytical strategy aims to empirically examine the claim that combined categories of identification (e.g. British Muslim) are qualitatively different from the sum of their parts (i.e., feeling British and Muslim; cf. Hopkins, 2011; Verkuyten et al., 2019). How such merger identities that define a new,
third group can be achieved and socially validated is an important question in contemporary migrant receiving societies.3

In light of existing conceptual and empirical confusion, we compared the distinct approaches to the study of immigrants’ dual identity across two studies. The first included nation-wide samples of six minority groups in the Netherlands, and the other Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016). Specifically, we classified minority members as dual identifiers based on their distinct identification with their origin (e.g. Turkish) and destination (i.e., Dutch) national identity, and we compared this to explicit measures of self-categorisation as equally Turkish and Dutch (in Study 1), and to the strength of identification with a merger (Turkish-Dutch) identity (in Study 2). Moreover, we related these distinct approaches to dual identity to immigrants’ perceptions of intergroup relations and their psychological adjustment. Our findings revealed that, in the context of the Netherlands, dual identity is typically a qualified form of Dutch national identification. This conclusion rests on two findings: first, the level of dual identification is more strongly related to Dutch identification than to origin national (e.g., Turkish) identification. Second, levels of dual identification are significantly predicted by factors that go together with greater Dutch national identification, such as more contacts with Dutch people, better Dutch language skills and more positive feelings towards the Dutch and Dutch society (De Vroome et al., 2014). These results are in line with the argument that any, even a minimal, level of identification with the destination country’s national community, even if lower than the identification with the origin nation, carries a sense of dual identity for immigrants (Simon & Ruhs, 2008). However, when examining the strength of identification with a merger identity and relating this to the identification with its components among Turkish minorities in the Netherlands (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016) and among recent immigrants

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3 In a symposium on dual identity at the General Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology in Grenada, 2017, it was proposed that European national identities would become more inclusive and accessible to their citizens of migrant origin if the dominant group would also systematically be referred to in a hyphenated way (similar to the usage of ‘European Americans’ or ‘Anglo Australians’). This terminology serves to emphasize that, despite their greater numbers and historical dominance, the majority group is also just a subgroup of the wider national category. Appealing as this sounds, most European societies today lack a linguistic repertoire that would allow making such a distinction. Therefore, when people speak of e.g. Germans or French, they implicitly tend to refer only to those with ancestry in the respective country, thus excluding those with of more recent migrant origin. This usage can also be observed among minority members who are motivated to identify with the destination nation but tend to see themselves not as ‘true nationals’ or even use labels such as ‘foreigners’ to describe themselves (Gharaei, 2022). In societal contexts that do not commonly use dual or hyphenated identity labels, it is not clear what is captured by a measure such as “I feel Turkish-Dutch”. Therefore, in European immigrant destinations that typically do not recognize immigrants’ dual identities, the explicit identification as ‘being both’ may be less viable as an object of study, and instead the association between the two component national identities might be a more adequate – though conceptually distinct – approach to dual identity.
from four countries (Mosaico, 2020), we also find support for the notion that dual identification is more than the sum of its parts. This is based on the findings of significant interactions between origin and destination national identification in the prediction of dual identification, such that the association between dual identification and destination national identification was stronger at higher levels of origin national identification, and the other way around. The interaction model fitted the data better than a more simple additive model, in which origin and destination national identity independently predicted dual identification. At the same time, in both studies, the level of Dutch identification was much more strongly related to dual identification than origin national identification, which supports the conclusion that in the context under study, dual identification is a qualified version of Dutch national identification. Taking into account that origin national identification is generally higher than destination national identification (Phinney, Berry, Vedder & Liebkind, 2006), this suggests that immigrants develop dual identities when a sense of identification with their new country emerges on top of an existing identification with the origin national group.

What shapes dual identification? Boundary conditions to (in-)compatibility

For immigrants to experience a sense of ‘being both’, it is thus necessary to achieve a minimal sense of identification with their new society while maintaining a significant identification with their origin group. Particularly in European immigrant-receiving societies, this proves to be a challenge, and I will discuss how majority and minority in-group dynamics can facilitate or hamper dual identification among immigrants and their offspring, as well as the specific identity contents of the categories involved that make for more or less identity compatibility.

Given the social nature of group identities, identity constructions need to be recognized to become viable (Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007). For dual identifiers, two audiences are particularly relevant in recognizing their claims of ‘being both’ – or alternatively denying their membership in one of their (aspired) in-groups based on their simultaneous membership in the other group. I will first review work on the role of the majority in-group, on which much of the previous literature has focused, and its power to define the national identity in ways that can exclude those of migrant origin. Although this perspective is clearly important in understanding dual identity, the role of minority groups is equally important in achieving a socially validated sense of ‘being both’ (cf. Verkuyten, 2018b). I will therefore also review a line of work which relates minority in-group dynamics to dual identification among their members.
**Interactions with majority group members**

Perceived discrimination has repeatedly been identified as a threat to immigrants’ identity compatibility. For instance, across several European societies, Muslim immigrant minorities who reported more instances of perceived discrimination, or perceived more anti-Islamic attitudes in their receiving country, were more strongly identified with their origin national and religious community and displayed lower levels of identification with, or even dis-identification from, the nation of residence (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2016; Kunst et al., 2012; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012b; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). These findings can be explained by the rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999). It has been observed more broadly that perceptions of discrimination are positively related with identification with the target group of the unfair or hostile treatment (e.g., Badea et al., 2011; Jasinskaja-Lahtti et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Moreover, immigrants were found to lower their destination national identification and to evaluate the majority group less positively in response to perceived discrimination, which has been described as rejection-disidentification (Jasinskaja-Lahtti et al., 2009). Empirical studies across a broad range of immigrant-receiving societies found a negative relationship between perceived discrimination and destination national identification (e.g., Bobowik et al., 2017; Mähönen et al., 2010; Wiley, 2013). Extending these findings on destination national identification to identity compatibility, research that simultaneously studies minorities’ origin and destination national identifications found that perceived discrimination goes together with more negative associations between these identities (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2016; Fleischmann et al., 2019).

In addition to experiences of unfair treatment of oneself and one’s minority in-group, a perceived lack of sub-group respect has been identified as detrimental to dual identification (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016). Both are indicative of a hierarchical intergroup context, in which the majority acts as dominant group and appropriates the national identity of which it “feels a particularly keen sense of ownership” (Peña & Sidanius, 2002, p.783), compared to co-nationals with a migrant origin. Proponents of Social Dominance Theory have argued that in situations of strong intergroup hierarchy, identification with a higher-level category that is appropriated by the dominant group also implies the acceptance of the social hierarchy that prevails within this context. Identification with the national identity of the destination country then confirms the high status of the majority group within the social hierarchy, thus providing majority members with a positive in-group identity. In contrast, “for subordinates, the rejection […] of the whole society may be necessary in order to facilitate positive group identity” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p.246). Therefore, the more immigrants and their children experience
their position to be that of a subordinate group within their new country, the more their national identification with the destination country will occur at the expense of identification with their origin national identification.\(^4\) In line with this reasoning about contextual differences in compatibility of destination national with origin national identification, the destination national identification of immigrants tends to be stronger in European societies with more multicultural policies (Igarashi, 2019) where this intergroup hierarchy is attenuated.

**Interactions with minority group members**

Majority members’ unequal or hostile treatment of immigrants can thus be understood as an attempt to maintain their dominant position and exclusive ownership of the national identity. From the minority perspective, such experiences weaken their claim, and motivation, to belong to the national community of their destination country. Yet dual identifiers do not only need to deal with a potential lack of recognition of ‘being both’ from majority members. Their specific identity construction can also be hampered by dynamics within the minority group that interpret a simultaneous identification with the destination and origin national groups as a lack of loyalty to the minority in-group and exert pressure to conform to important in-group norms (Verkuyten, 2018a). Accordingly, across two studies of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands, we found that those who more strongly expressed a dual identity were more often described as “too Dutch” by their minority in-group, illustrating the negative repercussions of dual identification for the acceptance within the minority group by way of identity misgivings (Cárdenas, Verkuyten & Fleischmann, 2021). Similarly, among Alevi (but not Sunni) Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany, dual identifiers were more inclined to support Muslim minority group rights – an important behavioural expression of their identification with and loyalty towards the minority in-group – the more pressure

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\(^4\) The informed reader will recognise a passage here from Fleischmann, Verkuyten & Poppe (2011), which resulted from my 2007 master’s thesis in the programme Migration, Ethnic Relations and Multiculturalism. After following Maykel Verkuyten’s course on social identity in early 2006, I proposed to write a thesis to empirically examine the hitherto untested claim of Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) regarding the contextual variation in the association between group-specific (‘communal’) and shared (‘common’) identities depending on the level of intergroup hierarchy. We examined the proposition that identification patterns of majority and minority groups would be more similar, and the association between communal and common identities more positive, the less strong the intergroup hierarchy (expressed by more equal group sizes and lower levels of perceived threat from the respective out-group) using comparative survey data collected in several republics of the Russian Federation and Ukraine, including Crimea. Since the contexts under study were rather distinct from the situation of immigrant minorities living in culturally diverse European societies, we did not link this research to the work on immigrants’ dual identity back then. Looking back, the notion that dominant groups experience a particularly keen sense of ownership of the national identity, and that they will emphasise their exclusive right to define who is a member of the nation more strongly if they perceive their dominant position to be under threat is clearly applicable to the topic under study here: the question under which conditions immigrants’ minority identity can be included in the representation of national identities.
they experienced to stick to minority group norms (Cárdenas, 2019). In addition, we found that origin and destination national identification were consistently more negatively related at higher levels of perceived minority pressure across six immigrant-origin groups in the Netherlands (Cárdenas & Fleischmann, under review). Pressure to conform to minority group norms and the policing of group boundaries by minority members can thus be equally important obstacles to identity compatibility than discrimination and hostility from the majority group.

**Identity contents**
Similar to the question of who decides whether dual identifiers belong to the destination and origin national in-group, also regarding the question of what group membership means at least two identities need to be examined for dual identifiers: the destination national identity, i.e., what is required to be considered e.g. Dutch, German or Danish, and the origin national identity or related categories of identification that are typically construed to be at odds with national identification in European societies, most importantly Muslims’ religious identification.

**Identity contents: the destination nation**
National identity contents have been described in terms of ethnic versus civic definitions (Brubaker, 1992), and this distinction has more recently been complemented with a cultural definition, such that sharing core cultural traits like the national language, but also the Christian religion, is regarded by a substantial share of European majority populations as a necessary condition to claim national belonging (Reijerse et al., 2013). An ethnic definition of the national identity, or a cultural one that emphasizes cultural traits that exclude (specific) immigrant groups, makes the boundary of destination national identity rather impermeable for immigrants and their children. Yet the perception of greater permeability of the boundaries of national identity can foster immigrants’ dual identification by signalling that membership in the national group is within reach, despite their migrant origin and identification with their minority group. Previous research among ethnic minorities and immigrants indeed found that perceived permeability is associated with higher destination national identification (Mähönen & Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2012; Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008) and greater compatibility between origin and destination cultural orientations (Sixtus, Wesche & Kerschreiter, 2019).

While the majority perspective on what it takes to belong to the nation has been studied widely, there is much less knowledge about the minority perspective on the national identity contents of their receiving societies. Qualitative work among the Moroccan-Dutch second generation revealed that national identity
can have multiple meanings (e.g. participation in society, attachment to specific (local) areas), and does not necessarily relate to positive feelings towards Dutch people (Omlo, 2011). Survey-embedded vignettes presenting profiles of youth who do or do not combine an orientation towards their Turkish origin culture with Belgian national identification and cultural participation moreover revealed that the perception that those who are culturally distinct can be considered as ‘real Belgians’ facilitates minority youth’ identification with the destination national identity (here, feeling more strongly Belgian; Gharaei, Phalet & Fleischmann, 2018). An important avenue for future research will be to examine minority definitions of national identity contents (e.g. in ethnic vs. civic terms) and relating their specific definitions to perceived identity compatibility and adjustment (e.g. in terms of school performance or well-being).

Identity contents: the origin nation and Muslims’ religious identity
Similar to a lack of knowledge on minority perspectives on national identity contents, there is relatively little work on the contents of specific minority identities and how they are contested within minority groups. However, just as the question what it means to be Dutch is important for minorities’ ability to develop and get recognized for their dual identification, being e.g. Turkish or Muslim can be defined in different ways that allow for more or less compatibility with European national identities. For instance, focusing on the complexity of identity representations, it was found that the more Turkish minorities perceived their Turkish identity to be overlapping with their religious identity as Muslims, the less they identified with the destination national identity in Germany and the Netherlands (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012b). Less complex representations of minority group identities, in which origin national and religious group membership are more overlapping rather than being perceived as distinct and separate aspects of one’s identity, therefore seem to undermine compatibility with the destination national identity, and hence the development of dual identification.

This study on the complexity of minorities’ identity representations among Turkish Muslims shows that the religious identity of this group is an important aspect of their identification pattern. Moreover, European public discourses on immigration, diversity and social cohesion tend to problematise Muslims’ religious belonging even more than the different ancestry of immigrants (Brubaker, 2015). Accordingly, Muslim immigrant youth identify even less strongly with their destination national identities than otherwise similar non-Muslim immigrant peers (Fleischmann & Phalet, 2018). In addition to the question of how origin national identities are defined, and whether these definitions allow for a simultaneous identification with the destination national identity, it
is therefore relevant to study the identity contents of Muslims’ religious identity in immigrants and the extent to which they facilitate or hamper compatibility with identification with European nations.

Several authors have created typologies of different ways of being a Muslim, resting on different combinations of high religious identification with specific religious practices and attitudes (e.g. Phalet, Fleischmann & Stojcic, 2012; Huijnk, 2018), resulting in more or less homogeneous profiles of Muslim identity (cf. Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2021). However, research relating these different types of Muslims to national identification or identity compatibility is still scarce. So far, we know that a strong sense of belonging to the ‘ummah’, i.e., the global fellowship of Muslim believers, as a specific definition of Muslims’ religious identity content, together with fundamentalist religious beliefs, goes together with low Dutch national identification and even dis-identification from the Dutch (Maliepaard & Verkuyten, 2018). It has also been argued that, to the extent that Muslims adhere to more orthodox or fundamentalist variants of their belief, these beliefs will be less compatible with destination national identification in Western societies due to the latter’s emphasis on liberal values such as gender equality and sexual minority rights (Eskelinen & Verkuyten, 2018; Maliepaard & Verkuyten, 2018). The counterpart to fundamentalist or literal interpretations of religion is symbolic religiosity (Wulff, 1997; Fontaine et al., 2003; Krysinska et al., 2014). Religious persons who take a symbolic approach to religion emphasize the need to interpret religious texts in their historical context and acknowledge the validity of multiple worldviews. Similar to civic definitions of destination national identities, such more symbolic and non-fundamentalist definitions of what it means to be a Muslim should facilitate the simultaneous identification with (historically non-Muslim) European societies, but this reasoning still awaits an empirical test (Fleischmann, 2022). A closer examination of different religious identity contents among Muslims (but also of other religious minority groups) has the potential to shed more light on the question of how identity compatibility can be facilitated based on more inclusive definitions of specific minority identities.

**Conclusion**

Research on immigrants’ (and their children’s) dual identity always revolves around the question of identity compatibility: who is willing and allowed to claim to be ‘both’? The specific identity construals that immigrants embrace, and the patterns of associations between their identification with their multiple groups, always reflect the social context in which these negotiations take place, and the relative power position of migrant and non-migrant groups to impose their definition of
the nation they jointly inhabit and the origin country they left behind on fellow group members and those who aspire group membership. The emphasis on the social nature of immigrants’ dual identity explains why much research has focused on the position of the powerful majority group. Yet if applied in a one-sided way, this focus limits our understanding of the fundamentally dual nature of dual identity that needs to be recognized and validated (or can be denied) by at least two distinct, only partly overlapping and oftentimes oppositional, audiences. This makes dual identities more complex to develop and maintain, and it renders dual identifiers more prone to identity threats that affect their adjustment and e.g. school achievement (Baysu, Phalet & Brown, 2011; Deaux et al., 2007). Despite this complexity, a better understanding of immigrants’ dual identity and the boundary conditions for identity compatibility contributes to addressing the important societal question of how minority members can be different and still belong.

References


Dual identity compatibility among immigrants and their offspring


