Unrealized promises: the subject of postcolonial discourse and the new international division of labor

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Chapter Three

Of Other Strategies:

Self-reflexivity and the New International Division of Labor

The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place … But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position I occupy.

Michel Foucault 1986 (1967): 24

The same bourgeois consciousness which celebrates the division of labour in the workshop, the lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial operation … denounces with equal vigour every conscious attempt to control and regulate the process of production socially.

Karl Marx 1990 (1873): 477

In the Introduction, I have defined self-referentiality as the degeneration of self-reflexivity into an empty gesture. In previous chapters, I have analyzed the epistemic and political foreclosures that such empty gestures can bring about. At this point, I wish to turn to a more constructive mode of criticism by concentrating on a text that I deem highly self-reflexive, “More on Power/Knowledge” (1993a), by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.

As I argued in the Introduction with reference to Chakrabarty (1989), self-reflexive writing is not about the author, but about the relationship between the two entities involved in writing history. To focus on the relationship between the situated writer and his equally situated object of study is to focus on the historical realities by which their difference is produced. In this way, self-reflexivity can be performed as a political act and as a political statement about that act. Furthermore, to the extent that it implies taking into account all elements involved in the historiographical act of interpretation, self-reflexive writing increases methodological accuracy. Hence, as I concluded earlier, self-reflexivity can be of major epistemological importance, while also enabling circumscribed yet crucial political commentary.

To determine the limits and possibilities of that circumscription, in this chapter I contrast Spivak’s essay with a book by Néstor García Canclini. Spivak’s piece, a classic in postcolonial theory, finds a provocative counterpoint in Diferentes, desiguales y desconectados (DDD), a book
that lies outside the limits of the corpus that is traditionally considered postcolonial criticism. Nevertheless, *DDD* only offers a different approach to what is an old concern of postcolonialism: the unequal configuration of the West and the rest as proper sites of enunciation and subject constitution. Since the problem approached by both authors coincides, while their ideological presuppositions and methodologies differ, the comparison between them will allow me to discern the perspectives from which the subject of postcolonial discourse can be defined.

Subjects can be distinguished according to their ontological status, i.e., actual, discursive, or systemic subjects; according to their access to power/knowledge, i.e., the postcolonial-as-subaltern or the postcolonial-as-intellectual; and according to their textual status, i.e., the author, the addressed other or the represented other. In all these cases, the degree and mode of self-reflexivity in which they participate is always a central criterion for defining them. Hence, I address the different subject positions Spivak and Canclini discuss, yet focus on the forms of self-reflexivity in which they engage themselves.

As Spivak comments in a “Translator’s Preface” she wrote in 1996, the root sense of “reflection” is “a folding back upon” (270). By extension, the self-reflection that I am concerned with in “More on Power/Knowledge” can be understood as a folding back of the text upon itself, producing a superposition of layers that increases depth. I explore the ways in which the different layers of Spivak’s “More on Power/Knowledge” relate to each other. Taking into account that textuality and discursive content are two of such layers, I define a self-reflexive form as one in which the formal constitution can be held accountable for the meaning produced. Yet, the self-reflexivity that characterizes “More on Power/Knowledge” is largely achieved through a relationship (and a form of accountability) that in principle exceeds the text: that between the author and her readers.

Spivak offers her readers the “critical intimacy” she advocates. As Mieke Bal explains, “[c]ritical intimacy points to a relationship blatantly opposed to (classical academic and pedagogical) ‘distance’ … And it points to subjectivities – in the plural” (2002: 289). Bal also observes that Spivak’s writing may be best described as “an utterly responsible ‘second-person’ discourse” (2002: 322). In her “Translator’s Preface,” Spivak addresses the question: “when we engage profoundly with one person, the responses come from both sides: this is responsibility and accountability” (1996: 269-270). Her description of responsibility exposes the proximity between response as “observable reaction” and responsibility as “the state or fact of being liable to be called
to account.”

When considering a text as the place where the inter-subjective encounter occurs, one may find a corresponding proximity between author and reader as “observable” traces in the text, and the actual social agents that do not literally appear there, but who are “liable to be called to account.” Therefore, the articulations that the text sets up with these agents may be viewed as an integral part of its formal mechanisms of meaning-making. If the traces of author and targeted readers are thus ontologically constitutive of the text’s structure, then they also participate in the text’s capacity to fold back upon itself, in its self-reflexivity.

“More on Power/Knowledge” has had a wide readership since its first publication eighteen years ago. It first appeared as a contribution to Thomas E. Wartenberg’s edited volume *Rethinking Power* (State University of New York Press, 1992). Since then, it has been re-published in *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (Routledge, 1993) and in *The Spivak Reader* (Routledge, 1996). But it was the 1993 publication of “More on Power/Knowledge” as a chapter of *Outside in the Teaching Machine* (*OTM*) that gained the essay its widest audience. Throughout this study, the version of “More on Power/Knowledge” I refer to is that which appears in *OTM*.

*OTM* is Spivak’s second book. Since then, she has published a number of other individually authored, full-length volumes. Despite the large amount of more recent work by Spivak, I choose to center my attention on *OTM* because the book marks not only the consolidation of her place as an Indian migrant at the heart of U.S.A. academic venues, but also of her endeavor to address this position, speaking back at the privileged space she and her readers occupy. Because *OTM* performs and discusses the infiltration into and reconfiguration of this privilege, the question of strategy,

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208 The definition of “response” I employ is the second entry given by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*). The definition of “responsibility” is the first entry, which reads: “The state or fact of being responsible.” I have substituted the word “responsible” with its first definition still in use: “liable to be called to account.” (*OED*)

209 For an introduction to semiotics as a process of meaning-making, see Bal 1994: 1-20.

210 Because the relationship between Spivak and her academic reader is one of the central tensions around which the text is constructed, I will refer to both frequently. Yet my usage of the name “Spivak” in this sense would be, according to her own terminology, “catachrestic,” since it is not meant to designate a person, but rather its conflation with the way the text itself produces effects of intentionality. When I write “Spivak” I mean the principle of coherence that holds the text together, and gives it sense as a situated and material whole. Likewise, my usage of the term “academic reader” (or, shortly, “reader”), is meant to account for the way the situated text presupposes a generic target and structures a relationship with it. For Spivak’s definition of “catachrestic” see 1993a: 26. I employ “effects of intentionality” loosely in analogy to Bleeker’s (2005) notion of the “truth effect.”

211 In theory, all three versions of “More on Power/Knowledge” are exactly the same. Nonetheless, it is crucial to specify my source because the essay’s place as part of a wider whole as well as edition-specific typographic errors are relevant for my analysis.

which Spivak characterizes as “an artifice or trick designed to outwit or surprise the enemy” is central in it (1993c: 3).213

As Robert Young points out: “The paradox of being ‘outside in the teaching machine’ summarizes for Spivak her own paradoxical role within the academic institution as a professional outsider, a marginal who now finds herself at the center of academic power. Spivak makes her reader share in her discomfort” (1996: 230). Chapter Two of OTM is particularly concerned with the reader’s discomfort. It focuses on the complicities between knowledge and power in which scholars participate when they access legitimate positions of enunciation, or even the canon of Western philosophy. Spivak demonstrates the risks of trying to soothe that discomfort through facile solutions, concentrating instead on the strategic possibilities that discomfort may open up.

Young also indicates that, while the structural organization of Spivak’s earlier book, In Other Worlds, “reflected something of the trajectory of Spivak’s own interests,” OTM is more concerned with reflecting on the academy as a point of arrival (1996: 229). Similarly, in contrast to Spivak’s renowned piece, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, the second chapter of OTM does not focus on the (im)possibility of representing the (postcolonial) subaltern from a Western academic vantage point, but centers on the privileged vantage point itself.214 The text’s heightened consciousness of its site of production and reception foregrounds not only the issue of strategy, but also touches on a central question of my study, namely, the location of “the subject of postcolonial discourse.”

I put Spivak’s essay in dialogue with Canclini’s book to explore the relation between the discursive and the geo-economic markers of such a location. While “More on Power/Knowledge” is useful for locating the subject positions at stake in a text, DDD is useful for locating the subject understood as the structuring principle of a field. As I suggest in my Introduction, the discursive subject position designates the author of a particular text. Meanwhile, “the structuring principle of a field” refers to the collective subject by which a given discursive practice is structured in a wider sense. This collective subject position is constituted by the institutional, economic and ideological surroundings that inform or restrict the author, to her awareness or not.

Therefore, in staging an encounter between Spivak and Canclini, I set in dialogue the discursive place and the systemic place that, in their respective realms, define the subject position(s)

213 Although Spivak announces she cites the OED definition for “strategy,” she actually cites the definition for “stratagem.”
214 For Spivak’s elucidation of the term “(im)possibility,” see 1987: 263, and 308, n. 81.
of postcolonial discourse. The question of the plural is dubious here because, while Spivak’s emphasis on the dialogic structure of a text foregrounds the multiplicity of subject positions involved (at the least those of writer and reader), Canclini’s more panoramic approach foregrounds the fact that all agents involved occupy a relatively homogeneous subject position once the geo-economic aspect of their demographics is taken into account. In my title for this chapter I refer not only to these two different strategies, but also to my own turn towards a more nuanced observation of that which I had hitherto criticized. Rather than denounce self-referentiality, here I distinguish between that and self-reflexivity to investigate viable tactics from within the dominant logic. In so doing, I take my cue from Spivak’s conception and enactment of strategy.

Spivak’s strategic appropriation of Foucault is what gives name to “More on Power/Knowledge.” I have taken up that usage by alluding to Michel Foucault’s “Of Other Spaces” (1986) in “Of Other Strategies.” In the posthumously published lecture, Foucault recognizes that while “[t]he great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history, … [t]he present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space” (1986: 22). Not unlike Fredric Jameson in Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991), Foucault elaborates on the links between the spatialization of culture and dominant contemporary ideology. Unlike Jameson, however, he does not advocate the reintroduction of history, but focuses on “heterotopias” as spaces that are “other,” yet reside within the system. Spivak’s coming to terms with Foucault in “More on Power/Knowledge” strongly relies on this typically Foucauldian move of contesting from within, for, in his view, there is no “without” to power. Spivak’s appropriation of Foucault as one that recuperates the value of strategy emerges in this maximization of a given terrain, in this employment of the mechanisms of the reigning order, and in this usage of the force of the opponent.

The first two sections below offer a close-up view of Spivak’s essay, exploring formal self-reflexivity and her take on strategy. In the first section, I account for Spivak’s strategy in general; in the second one, I focus on a particular strategy. Reconsidering canonical continental philosophy and associated contemporary theory, Spivak’s strategy relies on relating a work’s theoretical premises

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215 Here I am referring to the discursive and systemic subject positions at the level of the human sphere of action. In Chapter One I referred to those at the level of what Lacan (1977a) terms “the letter.” Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe pointed to the close association between the subject and the signifier (1992: 27-28). Silverman affirmed that while syntagm determined a signifier’s discursive place, paradigm determined its systemic place (1983: 103-104). While there she was referring to syntagm and paradigm as axes at the level of the letter, her statement can be extrapolated. If we understand syntagma as “a regular or orderly collection of statements,” and paradigm as “a conceptual or methodological model underlying the theories and practices of a science or discipline at a particular time; (hence) a generally accepted worldview,” then we may associate each with the discursive and the systemic subject positions at the level of the human sphere of action respectively (OED).
with its qualities as an object. These object-like qualities are twofold. First, the textual materiality of the works: Spivak does not approach them as ideas, but as written artifacts conveying ideas through the particular use of specific languages. Second, the limits imposed on the texts by their context. Spivak exposes them as framed – and at times fragmented – by the time, place and culture of their site of production and reception. With this approach, Spivak opens-up productive and critical possibilities, which would have remained obscure if the material dimension of the theory had not been taken into account. I contend that Spivak’s own text must be read from the same perspective: her text, a written discourse in a particular language, situated in a particular framework of production and reception, cannot be separated from its theoretical premises. This move does not only make Spivak more “readable” by liberal humanist standards of academic writing, but also develops the theoretical implications of her essay.

After dealing with the textual subject positions of author and addressed other as constructed at the performative level of Spivak’s text, in the third section I introduce the question of the phenomenological subject. As I suggested in the Introduction, self-reflexivity, as constitutive of the meta-position in language or theory, is correlated with the self-reflexive act that, outside texts, constitutes the subject as an ontological entity. In “More on Power/Knowledge,” Spivak addresses this mode of subject constitution and, critical of how that discussion has taken place within the Euro-centric philosophical tradition, she offers an account of the ways in which historical specificity intervenes in the ontological act of self-reflection. Her politicization involves her re-reading of the work of Foucault. My discussion focuses on how geo-economics participates in the constitution of differentiated subject positions outside texts and on the political relevance of Spivak’s approach to ontology. By contrasting Canclini’s work to Spivak’s, and with the aid of Foucault in the background, I distinguish between actual, discursive and systemic subject positions.216

In the last two sections, I focus on DDD and on “More on Power/Knowledge” respectively to explore how each deploys distinct subject positions according to their use of two parallel but significantly different analytical categories: the new international division of labor (NIDL) and the epistemic divide. The different methods of Canclini and Spivak point to their distinct foundational categories and ideological outlooks. I will explore the possibility of allowing the diversity of these positions to productively complement each other for the benefit of the problematic they both

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216 Here I distinguish between discursive and actual subject positions, but it is not until the following chapter that I will fully address the question of the relation between the two.
address and that is also of my concern. Stimulated by the idea of critical intimacy, I close by rethinking my provisional conclusions in light of Foucault’s words on self-reflexivity and Marx’s words on the division of labor in the epigraphs above.

Spivak, Strategist

“More on Power/Knowledge” is structured around three questions, the answer to each being the focus of the different subsections that make up her essay. The questions are: “What is it to use a critical philosophy critically? What is it to use it ethically? Who can do so?” (1993a: 25).217 Addressing the first question, Spivak distinguishes critical from dogmatic philosophies, critical philosophies being those that are aware of the limits of knowing (25).218 Reading the work of Foucault through that of Derrida, and with a reconsideration of Heidegger as a common background, Spivak embarks on an analysis of the usage of the word “power” in Foucault’s œuvre. She argues that a naturalized referent for the word “power” is tacitly presupposed and attributed to Foucault within the North-Atlantic philosophical tradition, as if he had “an ontological commitment to a thing named ‘power.’” But, argues Spivak, “power” for Foucault is not a structure, not an institution, but “the name that one lends to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” The act of naming this complex strategic situation “power” “produces power ‘in the general sense’” (27, 26, 28; emphases added).

In “More on Power/Knowledge,” power in the general sense is envisioned as a magnetic field of force. As such, it is “traced with irreducible struggle structures,” composed by the play of antagonistic forces (32). This antagonistic free-play reaches its term, the field polarizes and stable relations are deployed; the mechanism is sustained by its inner tensions. Power in the general sense is virtual rather than ontological: it has visible effects and structures the workings of power in the world, yet it cannot be constituted as an object of study. In the U.S.-Anglo episteme, however, “power” has only been conceived in its empirical dimension, so Foucault has been (mis)read as a functionalist (32-33).

Also concerning Anglophone (mis)readings of Foucault, Spivak argues that the everyday sense of the French doublet, pouvoir-savoir, has been ignored. This everyday sense allows for an

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217 My account of the essay is inevitably reductive. The intricate relationship between wording and meaning in “More on Power/Knowledge” makes it particularly difficult to disentangle one from the other. For the same reason, I frequently take recourse to paraphrasing.

218 Technically, this partial answer precedes the question. However, as I will later demonstrate, this inversion does not nullify the relationship I have posed between the two.
understanding of *pouvoir-savoir* as: being able to do something only as one is able to make sense of it (34). While the subject is enabled by her capacity to do and to make sense of that doing, the particular way in which she can do things and in which she can make sense of things is culturally determined. The implications of the common usage of the French doublet explain Foucault’s understanding of power in the general sense: “Power as productive rather than merely repressive resolves itself in a certain way if you don’t forget the ordinary sense of *pouvoir/savoir*” (35). Power in the general sense implies that power and resistance are not opposites, but constitutive elements of a system, which tends towards self-perpetuation. Participating in the image of the system as a magnetic force-field, the everyday tactics of *pouvoir-savoir* can be envisaged as day to day actions that find their support in terminals of resistance that, despite the particular uses to which they are put, are constitutive of the power structure or force field in which they are inserted (35).

In response to her second question, “What is it to use it [a critical philosophy] ethically?”, Spivak resorts to *The Care of the Self* (1990). She reads Foucault’s piece as an unfinished project, focusing on the placement of *pouvoir-savoir* within a Heideggerian framework (25). Foucault’s work suggests to her that the subject is not only ontologically, but also ethically constituted (37-46). Since the ethical aspect of a subject’s self-relation is historically specific, Spivak’s recuperation of *The Care of the Self* may be described as a historization – or even a politicization – of ontology; an issue that will be discussed below. For now, I turn to the final question that structures her essay.

Spivak’s answer to: “Who can do so?”, that is, “Who can [use a critical philosophy critically and ethically]?” is the most ambiguous (25). On the one hand, she suggests methodological paths by which the academic subject can read ethically and critically. On the other hand, she implies that the position of power held by the academic subject is epistemically disadvantageous. In contrast, the postcolonial subject position, which she describes as situated at a clash of epistemes, allows for a wider perspective and a strategic use of the dominant episteme (46-51). As I elaborate in the next section, the subject position that emerges at the clash of epistemes plays a key role in Spivak’s theory. Here, however, I focus on the subject position of the reader. With Spivak’s third question, it is this position that is foregrounded.

Addressing the two initial questions, Spivak foregrounds the aspects of theory that I have described as object-like qualities. The first question leads Spivak towards an explicit discussion.

\[\text{219 The inconsistency between the use of the slash and the hyphen in the French doublet will be addressed below.}\]

\[\text{220 As I wrote in the introductory section, these object-like qualities are twofold: first, the textual materiality and linguistic specificity of the works concerned; and, second, the ways the texts’ theoretical possibilities are confined by their historical specificity.}\]
of the question of language in the reception of Foucault’s theory: she touches on nominalism, paleonymy, narrow and general senses, the different subtleties in apparently equivalent words in English or in French. The exploration of the second question emphasizes the limits that are imposed on philosophy by its culturally and historically determined sites of production and reception. Spivak’s response to the last question is where her strategic use of the place of enunciation she occupies takes center stage.

Only in answering the third question does Spivak address the reader directly. The author insistently uses the second person pronoun “you,” and frames it in the conditional imperative: “If you are actually involved in changing state policy ..., you cannot choose ... And if, like Derrida and Foucault, you are a scrupulous academic ..., you stage the crisis relationship ...” (51). Spivak’s address to the reader does not build from the presupposition of a reader’s fixed identity, but provokes him by deploying two elements: position and agency. Opening up alternative methodological paths to approach critical philosophies, she stirs her academic reader into an awareness of the possibilities available for his agency. Yet, Spivak’s emphasis on the epistemological limits of the academic position indicates the strategic and self-critical awareness through which such an agency can actually become effective.

Spivak’s dual response to the third question resonates with the procedures of Jacques Derrida, whose success as “a strategist” she attributes to his capacity to confound by juxtaposing “the hope of success and the fear of failure” (44). While Spivak’s recuperation of Foucault concerns content, her appropriation of Derrida is at the methodological level. Spivak recognizes that Derrida devised “a philosophical strategy” to “oppose reason from the inside.” I contend that in “More on Power/Knowledge” Spivak herself construes a discursive strategy to oppose Western power/knowledge from the inside. In that strategy, the medium (language) and the target (the reader) acquire central importance.

Spivak’s description of Derrida as a “strategist” and a “trickster,” who is “always rusing on the track of ruses,” admits this view (43, 39). As to the particular kind of strategy deployed by Derrida, Spivak’s understanding of it is not phrased out in her own words, but is implicit in her acceptance of Boyne’s formulation: “When he reads Derrida as ‘invent[ing] a philosophical strategy which opposes reason from the inside,’ Boyne cannot see that the importance of this invention is in its confounding of the hope of success with the fear of failure” (44). Thus, Spivak questions Boyne’s understanding of the importance of this invention but admits the invention itself without literally phrasing-out her stance. Here, as elsewhere, Spivak’s position, though clear, is difficult to assert. Such a move is strategic: her position being constantly implied, she is able to get her point through but remains ungraspable, a target difficult to pinpoint.

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222 Spivak announces this strategy herself in the “Foreword” to OTM: “as the margin or ‘outside’ enters an institution or teaching machine, what kind of teaching machine it enters will determine its contours. Therefore, the struggle continues, in different ways, after the infiltration” (1993d: ix, emphasis in text). Citing Derrida, Spivak further clarifies that she has “long held that in the arena of decolonization proper, the call to a complete boycott of so-called Western male theories is class-interested and dangerous. For me, the agenda is to stalk out the theories’ limits, constructively to use them …
The notion of strategy weaves her text together. In an interview with Ellen Rooney in *OTM*, Spivak defines the notion in contrast to theory: “Strategy works through a persistent (de)constructive critique of the theoretical. ‘Strategy’ is an embattled concept-metaphor and unlike ‘theory,’ its antecedents are not disinterested and universal” (1993c: 3). Hence, “strategy” for Spivak may be understood, firstly, as ingrained in the semantic field of the political; secondly, as taking place in the realm of the theoretical but without pretensions of universality; and, thirdly, as a non-linear motion, which at once constructs and deconstructs the theoretical. Those three aspects operate throughout “More on Power/Knowledge,” but become more relevant in relation to the question that motivates the last section, since that alone addresses a critical starting point for any strategy: the question of the strategist’s position.

French cultural theorist Michel de Certeau (1925-1986) points to the importance of position in the definition of strategy:

I call *strategy* the calculation … of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject … can be isolated. It postulates a *place* that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which relations with an *exteriority* … can be managed. As in management, every “strategic” rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish its “own” place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an “environment” … [I]t is an effort to delimit one’s own place in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other. (1984: 35-36, emphases in text)

While the foundation of autonomous space is central to strategy, tactics is characterized by its lack. De Certeau asserts that “a tactic is a calculated action *determined by the absence of a proper locus*. No delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for autonomy” (36-37, emphasis added).

As de Certeau suggests, tactic is to strategy what trajectory is to map. A trajectory is a temporal movement in space. It draws a figure that can only be apprehended at a single glance once it is mapped out, thus turning

the *temporal* articulation of places into a *spatial* sequence of points. A graph takes the place of an operation. A reversible sign (one that can be read in both directions, once it is

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[A]ll my work is a forcing of deconstruction(s) into ‘an impure, contaminating, negotiated, bastard and violent … filiation.’” (1993d: x)

223 In the same interview, Spivak states: “I have, then, reconsidered my cry for a strategic use of essentialism. In a personalist culture, even among people in the humanities, who are generally wordsmiths, it’s the idea of a strategy that has been forgotten.” (1993c: 5)
projected onto a map) is substituted for a practice indissociable from particular moments and “opportunities,” and thus irreversible ... It is thus a mark in place of acts, a relic in place of performances: it is only a remainder, the sign of their erasure. (35, emphases in text)

Like trajectories in course, tactics are “indissociable from particular moments and ‘opportunities’” and can only “maneuver ‘within the enemy’s field of vision.’” In contrast, strategies are like mapped-out trajectories because they offer the possibility of “viewing the adversary as a whole within a distinct, visible and objectifiable space” (37).

The institution of the strategist’s place is “a triumph of place over time,” because it gives “a certain independence with respect to the variability of circumstances.” Moreover, it permits a “panoptic practice,” in which “foreign objects can be observed and measured, and thus control[ed].” Since “to be able to see (far into the distance) is also to be able to predict, to run ahead of time by reading space,” this panoptic practice entails “a mastery of places through sight” (36, emphases in text). Another consequence of the establishment of the strategist’s place pertains to the intricacies of power and knowledge. De Certeau proposes that,

It would be legitimate to define the power of knowledge by this ability to transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces. But it would be more correct to recognize in these “strategies” a specific type of knowledge, one sustained and determined to provide oneself with one’s own place. (36, emphasis in text)

Because of this, de Certeau clarifies, power is not only an “effect” or an “attribute” in the knowledge entailed by strategy, but also its “precondition” (36, emphasis in text).

These distinctions between strategy and tactic also operate in Spivak’s essay. The canonical author Jacques Derrida is described as “a strategist,” in contrast to the common, “homely tactics” at play in “everyday pouvoir/savoir” (44, 35). The latter are conceived as operating at terminals of resistance that cannot be distinguished from (and are even constitutive of) power in the general sense, or what de Certeau would call “the invisible powers of the Other” (36). Furthermore, Spivak’s description of the relation between theory and strategy in the interview with Rooney is akin to de Certeau’s conception of “‘strategies’ as a specific type of knowledge” (36). Yet, while for de Certeau the intricacy between power and knowledge is characteristic of strategy alone, Spivak’s account in “More on Power/Knowledge” implies that the association persists in both strategy and tactics. She suggests that tactics do imply power/knowledge, even if this power/knowledge is different from the one at stake in strategy. Tactics imply power, but only in the everyday “sense of
‘can-do’-ness” and they also imply knowledge, but only in the everyday sense of *pouvoir* rather than that of *connaissance* (34).

Spivak advocates the everyday tactics of *pouvoir-savoir*. Yet, due to the geo-economic, institutional and discursive *place* that she occupies, and due to the configuration of power/knowledge that comes with that place, I start by taking her position to be, like Derrida’s, that of a strategist, not a tactician. Spivak places herself at a historical site of legitimation of power (theoretical discourse), fracturing and reconfiguring it from within. Among her ruses is the exacerbation of traces of the unwritten, the un-English, and the non-linear in written, Western, academic discourse. As Mieke Bal argues, an oral, spoken logic seems to structure Spivak’s long, “convoluted sentences” (2002: 322). Rhythm is also styled according to the rhetoric of orality, rather than that of writing. In “More on Power/Knowledge,” movement occurs along lengthy and saturated paragraphs, interrupted by sudden one-sentence paragraphs. Spivak stages the placement of additional emphases as they are made in oral discourse: by reiteration. For example: “The homology I am about to draw is, strictly speaking, an imperfect homology ... I repeat, it is an imperfect homology” (36).

With regard to her use of English, Spivak confronts the language with its limits by making use of French. She inverts the usual order of clauses and deploys English syntax in such a way that an alien, subtextual logic seems to structure the sentences. This subversive logic at times fractures the surface, producing accidents such as an adverb in the place of an adjective, as in “a merely pragmatic nominalist” (29). At another point, it breaks through the surface as Foucault “writed”

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224 In “More on Power/Knowledge” Spivak is only openly concerned with Foucault’s *savoir*, not with his use of *connaissance*. However, the latter is operative in her distinction of the former. Foucault contrasts both terms: “whereas the history of ideas finds the point of balance of its analysis in *connaissance* (and is thus forced, against its will, to encounter the transcendental interrogation), archeology finds the point of balance in *savoir* – that is, in a domain in which the subject is necessarily situated and dependent, and can never figure as titular (as either a transcendental activity, or an empirical consciousness)” (2002: 202. See also 16 [translator’s n. 2]).

225 Bal associates this oral-like rhetoric to Spivak’s teacherly qualities: “And Spivak? Read her as if you hear her *teach* and all difficulty fades away”; and: “Technically, teaching is oral; the teacher talks” (2002: 316, 317; emphases in text). Bal further associates Spivak-as-teacher to the dialogic style of her writing: “Indeed, the many parentheses, the long footnotes, and the convoluted sentences can be absorbed as the painstaking efforts of a teacher committed to … being responsive to the many ‘second persons’ who follow her class.” Meanwhile, Spivak associates her role as teacher to her experience as strategist. Questioned by Rooney on the need to deal with the essence/anti-essence dilemma as a classroom topic, Spivak answers: “rather than talk about it constantly make the class a proof of this new position. If we’re talking strategy, you know as well as I do that teaching is a question of strategy. That is perhaps the only place where people like us actually get any experience in strategy.” (1993c: 18)
instead of Foucault “wrote” (33). In this last accident, English is exposed in the arbitrariness of its own conventions.  

Spivak calls the reader’s attention to the particularity of French conventions as she allows the English translation of “pouvoir-savoir” to preposterously modify the French original by frequently – but discriminately – referring to the doublet as “pouvoir/savoir,” with a slash rather than a hyphen (34-37, 44-46; cf. 34, 39 41, 42, 45, 48, 49 ). The first to translate Foucault’s “pouvoir-savoir” as “power/knowledge” was his former research assistant at the Collège de France, Colin Gordon, who also edited and translated Foucault’s *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (1980). Gordon writes:

> I translated *pouvoir-savoir* as “power/knowledge” in the title of the volume of that name (which I also chose). I said I had done that in my Afterword to that volume (233), which Foucault read before publication. Whether it’s a better translation than “power-knowledge” as Robert Hurley renders it in *Discipline and Punish* (27-28), … is for others to judge … I think my reasoning was, and is, that the hyphen has different semantics in French and English, and that use of the slash connective in English is slightly more likely to make it evident that this was a neologism, an original conceptual assemblage, and not (the easy and obvious misreading, which has of course still inevitably occurred) a term affirming that power and knowledge are one and the same. I may have thought a distant echo of the then recent *S/Z* would tilt understanding towards the sense of a differential coupling rather than an equivalence relation. (2006)

Following Gordon’s logic, Spivak’s retroverse infiltration from the translation into the original would appear to be contrary to Gordon’s attempt to distinguish the relation of pure equivalence from that of a differential coupling. In her interchangeable use of both hyphen and slash to connect the French doublet, it is as if she were foregrounding the fact that equivalence and difference are two aspects of the same relationship. Yet, the collapse is not complete. Spivak not only respects the usage of “pouvoir-savoir” when quoting Foucault directly (38), but also persists at times in the

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226 “writed” appears in OTM. I have only been able to consult one of the two other editions of “More on Power/Knowledge.” The version included in *The Spivak Reader* does not feature “writed.” I do not aim to argue either for or against Spivak’s subjective intentionality here. I am also not regarding the text as an autonomous whole, and thus, not justifying an interpretation of “writed” by way of New Critical criteria. Rather, viewing the text as a situated, interdependent whole, my position is that the subversive logic that moulds Spivak’s deployment of the English language is such that actual “mistakes,” whether deliberate breaking of grammatical rules or typographic errors, may easily slip in revisions (be it that of the author or others).

227 This text first appeared in 2004 as part of a discussion in an online forum. I corroborated its authority by email communication with Colin Gordon, 16 May 2006. See Gordon 2004 for the follow up discussion. (Above, Gordon refers to the publication of Roland Barthes’s *S/Z* in 1970.)
employment of “pouvoir-savoir” when giving her own argument (34, 39, 41, 42, 45, 48, 49). This foregrounds the very existence of the two versions and thus the intermediation of translation itself.

As Gordon notes, the different semantics of the hyphen in the two languages have contributed to the misreading of Foucault. Yet, as Mieke Bal argues, in Spivak’s work acts of misreading also function as a “pre-condition for … productivity” (2002: 292). Bal cites Spivak’s declaration that her reading of Hegel in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason is “the kind of ‘mistake’ without which no practice can enable itself,” and proposes that the affirmation is applicable to Spivak’s analyses generally as well as providing a useful way to approach the book of the postcolonial theorist herself (Spivak 1999: 39 qtd. in Bal 2002: 286). The same holds true for “More on Power/Knowledge.” While Spivak’s text as a whole is a critique of how Foucault has been misread from what she calls the North-Atlantic philosophical tradition, and a proposal to re-read him by way of Derrida, unlike Gordon, Spivak does not simply avoid “the easy and obvious misreading … that power and knowledge are one and the same” (Gordon 2006). Rather, she exposes how Foucault’s theory has been retroactively constituted through its Anglophone appropriations. The intervention of the French couplet with the corresponding Anglophone graphic convention is the mark that traces that history.

Because Spivak’s infiltration of the French doublet “is not simply a postmodern act of quoting the past,” but rather an exhibition of how the past (of a given body of knowledge) is not stable, but actively rewritten from the (linguistic) specificity of the present, it is akin to Bal’s notion of preposterous history (1999: 267). The latter is a “challenge to ordinary logic” and to “the merciless chronology that dominates history,” yet operates under the awareness that “suppressing the contingency of our own historical position impedes the understanding of history that is an indispensable supplement to history as we practice it ordinarily” (104, 267). Spivak incorporates traces denoting a misreading of Foucault insofar as they expose the preposterous reality of the corpus that, from the Anglophone academic tradition, we term Foucault’s theory.

Besides the strategies that call attention to the written and English specificity of her discourse, Spivak advances a third strategy. The following section is dedicated to an analysis of that strategy; one in which the author resorts to a non-linear (rather than un-English or un-written) form of disruption. Let me illustrate the strategy briefly. Spivak’s frequent double negations could be converted into a simple affirmation without apparently altering the meaning. However, this would leave out the deferral, the postponement, the intricate path that takes the reader from the first negation to the second, to the articulation of both, to their resolution, and finally back to the
paradoxical tension that holds them together, and which is, in fact, the point of the phrase. Spivak’s constant double negations are an example of how she destabilizes and thus foregrounds linearity.

Having illustrated the three major strategies operating in “More on Power/Knowledge,” I close this section by pointing to the insight that the unwritten, alien, and non-linear prevail to such an extent that the readers may not feel comfortable enough with the text’s language to disregard language itself as a transparent medium. In this way, the targeted readers are led to recognize that their field of battle, as academics, begins with the very presuppositions of knowledge, power and discourse that are concomitant with and legitimize the exertion of power “out there.” In these ways, then, Spivak lands the addressed others in relation to the limits of their historical role as First-World academics. This historical grounding is also an enablement. By confronting her presupposed readers with their position, Spivak confronts them with the complicities of power and knowledge in which they participate. This prompts their discomfort and the desire to gravitate toward the more disquieting (yet more productive) subject position that emerges at the clash of epistemes, which, by definition, only the postcolonial subject can inhabit.

**Weaving, Citing, Slashing**

I now focus on Spivak’s third strategy: her simultaneous use and fracturing of linearity. In written discourse, linearity is what Spivak would call “a violating enablement,” analogous to the way she reveals teleological change as a violating enablement (44). More on Power/Knowledge” is saturated with punctuation marks and typographic emphases that have two functions: first, to call attention to the materiality of writing; and, second, to disrupt the easy, linear flow of reading. In the essay, italics proliferate, particularly in places where they are unusual, confounding or difficult to emphasize, most commonly prepositions. This gesture forces the reader to pause, to re-read the sentence and to reflect on the possible implications of the emphasized word. But, as a preposition has no referent, the reader is led to reflect on its function within a larger whole. It is significant that

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228 Spivak’s characteristic double negation is the phrase “cannot not want,” which, in purely logical terms, would equate “want” yet actually denotes a much more complex relation with its object (42, 45, 46).

229 Spivak does not specifically describe teleological change as a violating enablement, but does so with respect to “liberal individualism” and implies it concerning liberal humanism in general (44; see also 44-51). It is as an ideal of liberal humanism that I speak here of teleological change. The idea of progress and the teleological conception of history being complicit – through what Fabian (1983) has described as the “denial of coevalness” – with the exertion of power in postcolonial contexts, it is a violation. But, Spivak argues, liberal humanism is the dominant episteme. Hence, one can only be enabled by strategically partaking in its power/knowledge. As part of that dominant knowledge, the belief in teleology must be cited if one is to be enabled by its concomitant power.
Spivak emphasizes prepositions, the function of which is to express a relationship between words. Overemphasizing relationality, she turns connections into obstacles along the otherwise smooth path of linear discourse.\textsuperscript{230}

While italicized prepositions disrupt linear logic by provoking the reader to pause and move backwards to recapitulate, one of Spivak’s most characteristic punctuation choices, the slash, introduces simultaneity. Though occupying different places on the printed line, words that are slashed together occupy the same place at the levels of syntax and logic. Confronted with the juxtaposition of linearity at the levels of print and progressive reading, and with simultaneity on the logical plane, the reader is constantly trained in a reading-through of teleological discourse. In cases such as “Power/Knowledge” (25), this contrivance, merely by indicating that the two words are held in a relationship that cannot be accounted for by a conjunction in linear discourse, makes Spivak’s reader responsible for the articulation he establishes between them. In cases such as “and/or” (26), this device establishes a logical indeterminacy, again, to be determined (or not) by the reader herself.

Spivak does not only use punctuation as marks on the printed page, but also uses the words denoting these marks figuratively, as where she writes: “[to] bracket problems” (28). Again, one of the most prolific cases is the word “slash.” Spivak writes: “to slash her with an ‘ism,’ even feminism, puts her singularity at risk”; “[t]he slash between these two proper names … marks a certain nonalignment”; “Foucault is not in Derrida, but Foucault slashed with Derrida prevents him from being turned into a … pragmatic nominalist or a folk hero of American feminism” (46, 26, 29; emphases in text). These instances indicate the discontinuity produced by the slash: it disrupts singularity (“puts her singularity at risk”), disrupts linear ordering (or “alignment”), and is not concomitant with liberal humanist ideals (as implied in “pragmatic nominalism” and the usage of Foucault as a “folk hero”).\textsuperscript{231} They also destabilize the distinction between the formal elements of writing and the power/knowledge complicities that are being addressed. The importance of the slash as a figure of speech in the essay is such that, after extensively discussing affinities between Foucault and Derrida, Spivak places a rare single-sentence paragraph that reads: “And yet the slash must be honored” (39). Moreover, these examples bring into play the non-typographic sense of

\textsuperscript{230} Conjunctions, particularly “and,” are scarce in the text.

\textsuperscript{231} My association of the above with liberal humanist ideals is due to the fact that Spivak discusses such interpretations of Foucault as limited to a narrow sense understanding of the word “power” (26-29). However, “liberal humanism” in the essay is not reduced to its unquestioned usages. Spivak describes the view of Foucault as a pragmatic nominalist as articulated “from within the North-Atlantic philosophical tradition” (27).
“slash” as poignantly expressed in Spivak’s most prominent use of the metaphor: “reading Foucault slashed in Derrida” (28). To slash is “to strike violently,” “to cut or wound with a sweep[ing] stroke,” to tear cloth apart and expose underwear (OED). In Spivak’s writing, and in her reading of Foucault, the slash is a “violating enablement,” which tears apart linearity, which tears apart Foucault, exposing what could not otherwise be seen (Spivak 1993a: 44).

Spivak is attentive to the materiality and thereby to the limits of writing as a site of power/knowledge. She examines “how Foucault’s language is bending” and goes as far as analyzing the placement of “a curious comma” in the author’s work (33). By acknowledging the limits of Foucault’s knowledge, Spivak opens up further possibilities in his work. Her interpretation is also enabled by the fact that she conceives his work as fragmented, as an unfinished project. She does not approach his work as an autonomous whole, but slashes out a fragment and exposes its constitutive logic. When placed back in context, this fragment re-signifies its surroundings. Hence, Spivak signals the open-endedness of the corpus and of her own intervention in it. Slashing emerges as a methodology that exposes not only the “undergarment” of the texts that are analyzed, but also leaves unadorned Spivak’s own gestures of intervention.

Parallel lines of thought co-exist throughout the essay, expressed by the proliferation of long comments and even by full sentences in-between parenthesis. The discontinuity entailed by the slash is a refusal to pre-determine modes of articulation at the level of discourse. Another break with continuity is the irruption of quotes. Yet, rather than another form of foregrounding and destabilizing linearity, Spivak’s citation is, like her slash, also a form of “wound.” The form of citation that she practices can be described with the same words she employs to convey Derrida’s use of quotation in Glas: “This is not postmodern practice. There is none of that confident, absolute citation where what is cited is emptied of its own historical texting or weaving. This is a citing that invokes the wound of the cutting from the staged origin” (1992: 795). Spivak is as eager to express the importance of “historical texting or weaving” as she is to emphasize her understanding of “origin” as “staged.” This vigilant use of both deconstruction and teleology is eminently strategic. The notion of history as a staged origin invoked in the textual present that Spivak narrates in her account of Glas is the kind of politicization that she performs in “More on Power/Knowledge.”

Her essay is characterized by the proliferation of quotes and intertextual allusions that are not explicitly introduced. More significantly, after the insertion of a quote, Spivak rarely takes the

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232 As a noun, a slash is: “A cutting stroke delivered with an edged weapon … A long and deep or severe cut … A vertical slit made in a garment in order to expose to view a lining or under garment.” (OED)
reader step by step from an observation in the quote, through an argument leading to a conclusion. Rather, she confronts the reader with the unmediated extract and her own already elaborated deductions. To grasp these deductions, the reader must diverge his attention from the linear course of reading and move back-and-forth between her words, the reader’s original impressions of the quote, and the quote itself.

Frequently, pointers in Spivak’s elaborations are not to be found by straightforward referentiality but through the equivocity of language, its accidental and polysemic qualities. It strikes me that a significant point in Spivak’s argument is made by a quote from *Finnegans Wake*, a book that represents the modernist thrust to take formal exploration to the limits of understandability (40). Although the unexplained allusion to James Joyce (1882-1941) is seemingly disconnected, Spivak takes full advantage of the Irish writer’s onomatopoeic word-play to comment on Foucault’s exploration of the ethical constitution of the subject.

The quotation nonetheless operates as a response to what Spivak had been discussing in the preceding paragraphs. After arriving at the climax of her reading of Foucault’s work as an investigation into the ethical constitution of the subject, she states: “Undoubtedly, this sort of stage-talk on my part is to impose a continuity. But this imposition becomes strategically necessary when … philosophy is seen as a private enterprise” (39, emphases added). Spivak associates this view of philosophy with neocolonialism, liberalism and the view of Foucault as “pushing for the poet’s desire for autonomy as a general ethical goal” (40, emphasis in text). Thus, after declaring that she has made a calculated use of continuity, she immediately breaks with it through the insertion of this unexpected element that she does not quite integrate into the explicit progression of her discourse. Furthermore, that break is caused by placing philosophy and literature on the same plane, a move that is not concomitant with the liberalist conception of either discipline and which allows literature to perform what she will later describe as its unique capacity to simultaneously inhabit the private and the public realms (48).

“Literature,” a word which Spivak places between inverted commas (48), is a sub-textual theme in the essay. It emerges into explicit discourse at the point when Spivak declares that literature, despite its stigmatization by some “‘Euro’-teleology” as “a ‘less developed stage,’” straddles the epistemic divide between the public and the private (48). Thus, she establishes an implicit analogy between the vantage point of the postcolonial subject position, emerging at a clash of epistemes, and literature. Each straddling two epistemes, literature and post-colonial subjectivity are positions that may be used strategically. Inhabiting the dominant episteme they are in a position
of enablement; simultaneously inhabiting something other than the dominant episteme they are in a position of relative exteriority.

If the everyday tactics of *pouvoir-savoir* are, as de Certeau comments, enacted “within the enemy’s field of vision” and, therefore, “the art of the weak,” then they gravitate towards what Spivak conceives as the subaltern episteme (de Certeau 1984: 37). As “More on Power/Knowledge” suggests, while the canonical theorist strategizes from his place in the dominant episteme, the placeless subaltern must co-opt already existing power structures (1993a: 49). The postcolonial intellectual, situated at the point of collision of both epistemes, is in an uncertain position between strategy and tactics, which proves to be strategically advantageous. His or her exteriority from the dominant power/knowledge allows for a critical distance, while his or her complicity allows for its vigilant use. Possible only because of a *clash* of epistemes, it is not only an attitude directed towards a particular object, or towards a particular configuration of power, but a way of thinking the world and of being in the world.

While the clash of epistemes inhabited by the postcolonial subject is violently at odds with the epistemic simultaneity that is opened up by literature, Spivak comments on both realms when she discusses the postcolonial writer Mahasweta Devi (48-51). Literature and the postcolonial subject position, two different yet analogous epistemic vantage points, are woven together so that each, in turn, surfaces as the explicit subject matter of her discourse, and then plunges back again into the subtext. At one point, when the most recent explicit subject-matter is epistemic violation in decolonized space, Spivak quotes an author who she regards as a liberal humanist, Richard Rorty. Spivak’s only remark on Rorty’s quote is an exceptionally short one-sentence paragraph that simply reads, “O brave new world” (48). If the reference to the British novelist Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) is taken-up, the reader is forced to re-think the previous words, referring to postcoloniality, with reference to literature. Literature and the postcolonial subject position differ from academic discourse in the range of their epistemic multiplicity. The fact that they are further juxtaposed here exposes discourse in its rhetoric dimension, and thus insists on the rift between theory and practice. The recognition of this rift is important for Spivak insofar as “stag[ing] the crisis relationship between theory and practice” prevents the legitimation (through disavowal) of “the polarization between the academic world and the real world” (51).

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233 This feature also foregrounds the fact that Spivak’s discourse, like human liberalist academic writing (which favors transparency and linearity), is also a construct exploiting its formal constitution towards the attainment of a particular effect (see Bleeker 2005). The difference lies in the fact that Spivak’s writing acknowledges itself as writing, i.e., it is self-reflexive.
Besides literature, history is another figure straddling the divide between form and content in “More on Power/Knowledge.” History and literature, in the general senses, are interdependent figures. History is also a form of “texting or weaving,” while literature is also a correlation (and thus a politicization) of the past in the present. When slashed into each other, we could say that history and literature perform “a citing that invokes the wound of the cutting from the staged origin” (Spivak 1992: 795). When Spivak discusses the tactical citing of the history of the Enlightenment episteme from within postcolonial space, she contrasts the teleological conception of history with history as a political act of citation in the present. While the first is associated with imperialist power, the second is associated with postcolonial subjectivity. While arguing that history is tactically cited in the present, Spivak actually cites the word “cited”: it is placed in-between inverted commas (1993a: 48). Thus, the referential present and the present of reading converge.

Spivak’s citing of canonical theoretical discourse is analogous with the postcolonial citing of the history of the Enlightenment episteme: an invocation in the present and a strategic act of legitimation. Spivak’s text is saturated with quotes. She assimilates the vocabulary of the quoted authors to the point of disorientation. She constantly invades citations with square brackets, to the point of leaving only the roots of many words. She infiltrates and reconfigures from within. She cites not only words, but also the logic holding them together. Her arguments are supported by structural homologies between the discursive constructs of the authors she discusses and her own. While being a strategic move, however, this entangled, ceaseless citation is also the establishment of responsibility towards her legacy as a Western academic. In this way, Spivak performs the vigilant “assent to the dominant” power/knowledge that she “cannot not want” (45). The gesture echoes that of postcolonial subjects generally, who must engage in the “productive unease of a persistent critique” of values that are at once an urgent political claim and “coded within the legacy of imperialism” (48, 46).

The slash conveys that double-edgedness that characterizes Spivak’s strategy. It also conveys a sense of limit, particularly an epistemic one. As Barthes writes in his analysis of Honoré de Balzac’s Sarrasine, a slash may be imagined as “the blade of antithesis, the abstraction of limit, the obliquity of the signifier, the index of paradigm, hence of meaning” (1970: 113). Spivak’s concern with the limits that connect and separate subaltern and dominant epistemes, as well as her equation between the dominant symbolic order and the symbolic order as such come to mind. Yet,
for Spivak limits are perhaps predominantly of an ethical importance. In 1996, she writes that capitalism, a system “based on remote-control suffering,” one that profits from the passivity of its subjects, works under the illusion that ethical responsibility is a choice (1996: 277). To be human, implies Spivak, is to be always-already inserted in a structure of responsibility (277). “More on Power/Knowledge” suggests that the first step towards one’s effective insertion back into this structure is the acknowledgement of one’s own limits – those limits that, in historically defining the space of the self, define the space of the actual other. For Western academics, argues Spivak, these limits are to be defined in terms of the global-capitalist configuration of power/knowledge of which they are an active part (51).

Beginning with its title, “More on Power/Knowledge” positions itself as a response to an always-already existing other before the “More.” With Spivak’s first sentence being a question, with her whole text structured around questions, and with none of them having straightforward answers, the text asks the reader to respond, to enter the structure of responsibility that Spivak has activated between Foucault, Derrida and Heidegger, between them and Mahasweta Devi, and between all of them and herself.

While staging this dialogic responsibility, Spivak is also opening up an actual structure of response with her reader. The dialogues between the various authors is, at the time of the confrontation between reader and text, recorded history, actually brought forth, enabled, through Spivak’s performative use of language. The strategy explored in this section reduces all modes of syntactic and discursive articulation to a minimum, making the reader responsible for establishing the relationship between one element and the other. This strategy slashes self-fulfilling, linear time, and opens up shared, simultaneous time. History and the present time of reading violently enable each other, that is, they slash each other, as Spivak writes: “The critical exit is in liberal individualism, if that is our dominant historical moment, even as we are in it by reading and writing this book” (44, emphases in text). That is how Spivak points to the “historical texting or weaving” that articulates her text with the reader’s contextual reality (1992: 795). She cites the historical present to wound the suspension of disbelief that operates outside texts.
Relations between Self and Self, Self and Other, Self and Object

I have already discussed the three questions that structure Spivak’s essay. I now address the author who helps her answer them, Michel Foucault.235 “More on Power/Knowledge” can be seen as Spivak’s coming to terms with Foucault. The critical distance from him in her earlier work here becomes a “critical intimacy.” She recuperates the possibilities opened up by Foucault, making his theories productive by reading his work through Derrida’s, a philosopher with whom she has greater affinity. With the help of Foucault and Spivak’s rereading of him, in this section I explore the self-reflexivity of phenomenological subjects. My focus is on how that self-reflexivity is mediated by history. By incorporating Canclini’s views on similar questions, I then address the way in which such historical mediation can be taken as a tool to approach that other who is the object of study as an actual, autonomous subject. The relations between the subject, the other, and the object are the central targets of my inquiry.

Spivak employs the work of Foucault to allow the variable of history to participate in one of the most abstract philosophical discussions in the wake of Heidegger, namely, the question of subject constitution. In her reading of The Care of the Self, Spivak links the quintessential ontological act to historical realities through Foucault’s concern with the ethical aspect of self-reflection. Her analysis of the ethical relation of the subject to himself in Foucault’s work takes place against the backdrop of two other relations, that between the subject and the other, and that between the subject and the object. These two relations address the two main terms in Spivak title, power and knowledge respectively.

In a critical monograph on Foucault, the Australian-Pakistani philosopher Ali Rizvi describes “self to self, self to other and self to object” as the three types of relation prominent in the work of the French philosopher (2001: 34). The “self to self” relation is of an ethical nature, the “self to other” relation is one of power, while the “self to object” relation concerns knowledge. Rizvi elaborates:

Foucault mentions three fundamental relations that we come across in human societies. Knowledge relations, which Foucault term as “relations of control over thing” (which includes truth relations). Power relations, or what Foucault calls “relations of action upon actions of others” (including state and institutional relations). Ethical relations or the relation

235 Spivak writes that she “will attempt to consider these questions with reference to the word ‘power’ in the famous opening of ‘Method’ in History of Sexuality, volume one.” (25)
between self and self, “relations with oneself.” These relations do not exist separate from each other but are necessarily connected to and enmeshed in each other … (23) 236

In the endnotes, Rizvi clarifies:

Knowledge relationship is the relationship between the knowing subject (self) and object. Power relation is a relation between self and other. Ethical relation is a relation between self and self. (102)

Each of these corresponds to a level of Foucault’s relational regime, and so “every society has its truth regime, its power regime and its regime of individuation (of which subjectivisation is a particular form)” (78). In her analysis of The Care of the Self, Spivak is highly aware of the entanglement of ethics with power and knowledge; yet, her focus is on the self to self relation, the place of subject constitution. Power and knowledge are relevant in that analysis only insofar as they contaminate, condition and/or provoke that self-relation.

Spivak is critical of the Heideggerian tradition that informs Foucault, because it proposes the existence of a (universal) subject that is constituted by a mere self-reflexive act, regardless of ethnicity, gender or historicity. Nonetheless, she finds in The Care of the Self a possibility to conceive of the subject’s ontological constitution as culturally mediated. Spivak argues that, if Foucault’s exploration of the care of the self in ancient Greece is only understood as a reflex activity, a bodily action, then it remains in the sphere of the ontic, of things in the world. However, if it is understood as a coded activity, in which the subject relates to himself, as a self, through his body, then it enters the realm of the pre-ontological, where the subject has a tacit understanding of himself as a subject. Thus, concludes Spivak, Foucault’s project may be understood as a first step in the investigation of the ethical constitution of the subject.

Because he points to the ethical constitution of the self as culturally and historically specific, Spivak considers that Foucault’s work may serve to push the universal subject into visibility and specificity. Furthermore, by way of Derrida, she reminds her readers of the importance of the “responsibility to the trace of the other” that is involved in the ethical relationship to the self (40). In this way, Spivak resituates the (Heideggerian) ontological question in the vicinity of two classic

236 Rizvi’s quotes here are from Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, London: Penguin, 1977, 27. I approach Foucault by way of Rizvi since the latter names three types of relation that are central to Foucault’s work yet dispersed throughout different volumes. Below, I keep to Rizvi’s definition of those relations, although I vary his phrasing.
concerns of postcolonial theory: cultural specificity, and the relation between the self and the other. While clearly distinguishing her own trajectory from that of “the existentialist position,” Spivak still points to the productivity of its insights for the postcolonial field (45).

As I hope my literary analysis in the previous sections has shown, self-reflexivity and an ethical concern are also prominent traits in Spivak’s formal handling of discourse. The ethical concern is enacted in the structure of response and responsibility through which she opens herself up to her readers. In Spivak’s case, this action is politically productive, even if in a circumscribed manner, because it frames her theoretical production in historical terms. However, in other works of postcolonial theory, such an endeavor has at times degenerated into mere simulation.

As I argued in Chapter One, the realm of the ethical – as concerned with what Rey Chow refers to as “the ‘other’ within” – has been used to displace the political realm, which is concerned with external rather than internal otherness, with the difference constitutive of the self rather than the actual, geo-political other (1998: 5). Chantal Mouffe argues that this trend, shared by many contemporary discourses, serves to legitimize the present hegemony. With the incontestable discourse of human rights as its basis, this hegemony eludes questioning and forecloses the possibility of changing existing power structures, a possibility relegated to the apparently obsolete adversarial mode of politics (2005: 5, 10, 29, 72-76). As Arif Dirlik suggests, while the ethical emphasis within postcolonial theory can be associated with its repudiation of large scale structures (such as capitalism) as foundational categories, it still “ends up not in an affirmation of historicity, but in a self-referential, universalizing historicism that reintroduces through the back door an unexamined totality” (1994: 345).

Dirlik’s comment on self-referentiality in postcolonialism brings me back to one of the most prominent characteristics of Spivak’s text: self-reflexivity. It is important to recall here that both tendencies presuppose a gesture away from, followed by a return to the same. Yet, as the quintessential act of subject constitution, self-reflexivity implies a qualitative change, a return to the ontic as the ontological. Self-referentiality lacks this qualitative change; in the act by which the self points to the self, that self remains unaltered. Hence, the formal gesture, as suggested in Spivak’s reading of The Care of the Self, does not suffice. It requires the mediation of an actual externality – which in Spivak’s reading of Foucault is cultural specificity – for the qualitative change to take place.

\[237\] Mouffe does not differentiate these two approaches to alterity in terms of ethics and politics respectively, but, more precisely, describes her own approach as an “ethical-particularistic” one, in opposition to the “moral-universalistic” approach that is “widespread among some ‘postmodern’ thinkers.” (2000: 129)
place. In other words, the meta-position characteristic of self-reflexivity is achieved through an always already historically specific form of (self)relating.

When one considers language as an abstract, foundational category, the historical specificity involved in gestures of self-relating is not taken into account. Hence, they become empty gestures. Enacted primarily as reifications of rhetorical strategies, such gestures engage with no externality so that no actual relation can emerge. This is not the case with Spivak in “More on Power/Knowledge.” While methodologically committed to deconstruction, she constantly alludes to the limits imposed by her historical site of enunciation and thus positions herself as a responsible subject behind the text.

But regardless of the deconstruction of her own subject position, Spivak continues to occupy a universal subject position as the text’s author. As Foucault argued, the author is a “rational entity” and “this construction is assigned a ‘realistic’ dimension” by conflating the writer (a social agent) and the “author-function” (the organizing principle of the text, as perceived by the reader) into a single figure (1977: 127). In the conflation of her role as the universal site of enunciation and her existence as an actual subject, Spivak hegemonizes the subject position. This observation may at first sight appear self-evident. It is clearly justified by Spivak’s own worldview, which emphasizes the indivisibility of power and knowledge and the paradoxical, yet inevitable fact that one must play by the rules of the present hegemony to be able to subvert it at a local scale.

However, as Foucault elaborates, the author, as we understand it, emerged after the Renaissance in close association with the entrance of literature into the circuit of property values (1977). In other words, the conception of the author as inevitably occupying the universal subject position of a text is a historically specific construction. In Chapter Five, I will approach a text that does not rely on the same understanding of authorship that we have inherited from the Renaissance: *Mabepari wa Venisi* (1969), a translation of William Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice* by Julius Nyerere.

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238 As I wrote in Chapter One, self-referential discourses do imply an understanding of the need for otherness as a logical requirement in self-definition. But while otherness as an abstract function is acknowledged, there is no actual external referent to delineate their finitude.

239 As may be appreciated from my earlier analysis, through her constant self-inscription as the text’s author, Spivak acknowledges not only the limits imposed by her situated medium of expression but also her own limits as a First-World academic. At the textual level, self-reflexivity emerges through the reference to something beyond language.

240 Here, the move I make, by way of Foucault, from actual to textual subject positions is rather fast. In the following chapter, I elaborate on the relation between textual subject positions and the social agents with which they are identified.
Nyerere does not displace the Elizabethan playwright. He takes great care in achieving a faithful translation of *The Merchant*, and Shakespeare appears as sole author in the credits. Yet, Nyerere cannot be reduced to a mere translator either, in the modernist understanding of the term. As I will argue, Nyerere’s inscription of his ideological interests in *Mabepari* by means of elaborate literary devices, together with his position as Tanzania’s head of state and the historically specific associations of authorship and authority that that situation triggered, all position him as the author of *Mabepari*. Furthermore, the Swahili literary tradition allows for a conception of Nyerere as legitimate author not only despite of, but also due to, his role as translator. In modernist terms, it could be said that Nyerere co-authored *Mabepari*. In the local configuration, however, for Nyerere to achieve a subject position concomitant with the “author” status does not require the erasure of any other subject position as the articulating principle of *Mabepari*, but instead thrives on the dialectic between them.\(^\text{241}\)

I rely on this example and on my previous chapters to claim that the strategic appropriation of the universal site of enunciation by First-World authors of Third-World origin, and even the discursive and performative deconstruction of that position, is insufficient. This holds true even for one of the most critical theorists within the field, as I consider Spivak to be. Her approach is both epistemically and politically productive, especially when considering the sought-for effect in her audience. But Spivak continues to rely on sources categorized as Western as the single intellectual authority, while the postcolonial other slashes and interrupts that corpus but does not provide a positive intellectual contribution in its own right. Hence, the self-reflexivity that defines the subject position is conceived of here as inevitably Western, lacking a positive externality.

My discussion of *DDD* is motivated by the fact that its frame of reference differs from that of postcolonial theory, in which Western discourse persists as the foundational referent. The unequal possibility to access the subject position is an undeniable fact in the current world order, one that requires urgent address. But to conceive that inequality in terms of the opposition between West and Other, and in this way to persist in the conflation between the self to other and the self to object relations is a *methodological* choice. In *DDD*, the equation between the West and the universal subject position is taken into account but not reaffirmed. The West vs. Other axis is only one of three analytical axes in Canclini’s work.

\(^\text{241}\) The same holds true for Nyerere’s writings on political theory. In those, Nyerere is the articulating principle not only at the formal, inter- and extra-textual levels of the texts, but also the sole voice at the discursive level. Yet, the whole corpus of his political writings is conceived from abroad as a translation of Marxism to the African context.
Diferentes, desiguales y desconectados (Different, Unequal, Disconnected) is a study of interculturality. Canclini approaches the phenomenon through a triple affiliation to anthropology, sociology, and communication studies (García Canclini 2004: 13-15). Each of these disciplines accounts for one of the words in his title. Referring to anthropology, he addresses interculturality in terms of difference (Diferentes); referring to sociology, he addresses it in terms of inequality (desiguales); and referring to communication studies, in terms of disconnection (desconectados).

Hence, “difference,” which, as discussed in earlier chapters, is exacerbated in some works of postcolonial theory to the point that it becomes a rhetorical wild card, standing in for and yet foreclosing actual difference, is relativized in DDD. The two other operative principles in the book impede such a reification of the concept.

Declaring the need for a “post-metaphysical conception of the subject,” Canclini considers that the subject must be recuperated not as an “egocentric” entity, but as a concept “capable of designating a place, at once conditioned and creative” (163, 157; emphasis added).Partly defining the subject in relation to its geo-economic and historically conditioned place allows Canclini to investigate who can and who cannot access the subject position in the contemporary world order. He sets out to investigate the role of the subject in terms of its relationship to market interests as well as its contemporary intellectual, artistic and cultural reconfigurations (25).

Canclini, like Spivak, accepts the impossibility of representing the subaltern (García Canclini 2004: 166). Yet, he does not take language to be the only place of subject constitution, although he does see it as the only place of its legitimation. Taking social interaction as a place of subject constitution, he does not so much seek to understand what the subaltern says, but rather seeks to refine Spivak’s question of why she cannot speak. In contrast to the postcolonial critic, Canclini does not attempt to exploit the double-edged potential of the paradoxical enclosure, but seeks to make more accurate the question itself through an exploration of the socio-historical, intellectual and economic forces that determine that foreclosure in specific cases. He writes:

The reduction of the subject to a mere “support,” “carrier” or “effect” of structures seems to forget that which in each one [subject] is raised or driven back in social conflicts, the personal and collective nuclei where we elaborate what structures do to us. If we do not allow this interactive space to occupy its place within theory, it is not possible to comprehend the contradictions between system coercion and the attempts to contest it.

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243 The epigraph to DDD is a quote from Clifford Geertz that reads: “If you do not know the answer, discuss the question.” “Si no conoces la respuesta, discute la pregunta.” Translations from DDD are mine.
Idealism has withheld that psychosocial interaction in the intimacy of the solitary consciousness, but it is actually the site where we suffer objective determinations and these intersect with our efforts to supersede them. (160)

I have previously argued – by way of Spivak – that the self-reflexivity that constitutes subjects is mediated by historical specificity. I suggested that self-reflexivity is different from self-referentiality insofar as it is a situated form of self-relating. The specificity of social conflicts that Canclini points to determines the epistemic accessibility of differentiated places, in relation to which individual or collective subjects constitute themselves. Since his methodology deems the subject positions (as opposed to the subject status) of marginalized subjects to be epistemically accessible, he finds plausible ways to engage with these sites as sites of enunciation, taking into account the historical particularity that defines any subject (whether individual or collective), while acknowledging the epistemic gap that is marked by the analyst’s lack of access to the other’s actual enunciation.

Canclini’s distinction between subjects and the positions through which they are co-constituted disentangles the problematic conflation faced by much postcolonial criticism today: that between the self to other and the self to object relations. While the focus on the externality through which the self to self relation of a marginalized subject is accomplished is insufficient to account for that relationship in itself, I find that Canclini’s project offers a key contribution to postcolonialism’s concern with the question of the other as subject. His emphasis on concrete, external differences by which the other constitutes herself does not allow external difference to be subsumed as internal difference. Furthermore, in acknowledging the connections, yet distinguishing the epistemic foreclosure from the foreclosure brought about by objective power relations, he opens up the field of the political.

In the quote above Canclini also argues for the necessity of a theoretical endeavor that takes into consideration the incidence of the particular in the universal. In line with his view that the dialectic of structure and history co-constitutes the subject, he is concerned with putting theory back into its historical condition. In his seventh chapter, “Who Speaks and in which Place: Simulated

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244 “La reducción del sujeto a ser ‘soporte’, ‘portador’ o mero ‘efecto’ de las estructuras parece olvidar lo que en cada uno se levanta o se repliega en los conflictos sociales, los núcleos personales y colectivos donde reellaboramos lo que las estructuras hacen con nosotros. Si no dejamos que ocupe su lugar en la teoría este espacio interactivo, no es posible entender las contradicciones entre la coerción del sistema y los intentos de responderle. El idealismo recluyó en la intimidad de la conciencia solitaria esa interacción psicosocial, pero en realidad es el sitio donde padecemos las determinaciones objetivas y estas se cruzan con nuestros esfuerzos por superarlas.”

245 For Dirlik’s account of subjectivity as the paradigmatic concern of postcolonial theory see 1994: 336, 332.
Subjects and Post-Constructivism,” he examines the place of the subject in the context of globalization that, bringing about the increase of reciprocal dependencies between societies, modifies the prior modes of configuring subjects (161). Having assessed the contributions of the Marxist, psychoanalytic and structuralist deconstructions of the subject, Canclini flags their limits (149). After the last of these discussions, concerning structuralist anthropology, he summarizes: “Anti-subjectivism, anti-historicism, anti-humanism: it could no longer be said that man spoke or thought, but that he was spoken and thought by language” (154).246

Canclini questions the pertinence of the conception of language as a foundational category precisely by historicizing it:

“Estos ataques corrosivos fueron útiles en países donde la subordinación de la objetividad científica a las filosofías de la conciencia (Francia, Alemania y los latinoamericanos influidos por ellos) quitaba rigor a la fundamentación del saber. Pero el carácter reactivo, reduccionista, que a menudo tuvieron estos movimientos críticos los llevó a excluir, con la problematica del sujeto, el estudio de la constitución singular del mundo humano, la diferencia entre naturaleza e historia, la génesis y la evolución de las estructuras sociales. La negación del sujeto fue cómplice de la subestimación de la historia: si no hay sujeto, la posibilidad de que haya una acción que transforme el orden vigente y dé un sentido responsable al devenir.”247

The last sentence suggests the mutual constitution of subject and history. Hence, the author’s emphasis on the external factors that condition the subject is not deterministic; those external conditions are, in turn, configured by agents and thus subject to change. While the particularity of the relation between the self and the self can be conceived as a response to given conditions, it also exceeds them and can bring about change precisely, though paradoxically, because of a sense of responsibility awakened by those historical givens.248

246. “Quién habla y en qué lugar: sujetos simulados y posconstructivismo” (147). “Antisubjetivismo, antihistoricismo, antihumanismo: ya no podía decirse que el hombre hablaba o pensaba, sino que era hablado y pensado por el lenguaje.” (154)

247. “Estos ataques corrosivos fueron útiles en países donde la subordinación de la objetividad científica a las filosofías de la conciencia (Francia, Alemania y los latinoamericanos influidos por ellos) quitaba rigor a la fundamentación del saber. Pero el carácter reactivo, reduccionista, que a menudo tuvieron estos movimientos críticos los llevó a excluir, con la problematica del sujeto, el estudio de la constitución singular del mundo humano, la diferencia entre naturaleza e historia, la génesis y la evolución de las estructuras sociales. La negación del sujeto fue cómplice de la subestimación de la historia: si no hay sujeto se evapora la posibilidad de que haya una acción que transforme el orden vigente y dé un sentido responsable al devenir.”

248. Above, I translated “devenir” as “process of becoming.” However, the Spanish word can also be translated as “future.”
So, it may be said that Canclini, like Spivak in “More on Power/Knowledge,” conceives of the subject not as a situated historical configuration, but as a response to and a responsibility towards that place. However, this same conception is played out in drastically different ways because of their different foundational categories. While Canclini employs the insight to draw out a situated historical analysis of the epistemic foreclosure at stake, Spivak seeks strategic outlets by dramatizing her inner entrapment as the universal site of enunciation of her text. Spivak’s strategy is enacted at the level of her authorial subject position. This position emulates the self-reflexivity that defines actual subjects. In the following section, I will discuss the systemic subject position that Canclini prioritizes and which also emulates the self-reflexivity that characterizes actual subjects.

The Systemic Subject

Strategy finds its limits in being a terrain-specific approach. Hence I have begun to pursue Spivak’s endeavor from another front, bringing the work of Canclini, another contemporary cultural analyst with similar concerns, into the discussion. The different ideas and different forms of writing of Spivak and Canclini allow me to understand how actual, discursive and systemic subject positions participate differently in the strategies advanced by each author. While Spivak offers a strategy to destabilize the universal subject position at the level of discourse, Canclini offers what may be conceived as a strategy that addresses the subject position at the level of system.

In DDD, differentiated sites of enunciation and subject constitution are described as correlative to historically specific mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. This analysis also returns in the way in which Canclini, as the subject of enunciation, situates himself. This strategy can be deduced from the comparison of his discourse with his implied actions as a publishing author. He investigates how “[d]ata bases like the Citation Index tend to over-represent the books and journals published in English” (186), while the editorial in Spain that control the market of books written in the Spanish language conceive Latin America as a producer of [fictional] literature and as an opportunity to expand the clientele in Spain. They almost never publish cultural, sociological or anthropological studies by Latin-Americans and, when they do, their branches in Argentina, Chile, Colombia or Mexico, restrict the circulation of those books to the country of origin. Except for a few, middle sized editorials … like Fondo de Cultura Económica and Gedisa, the international image of Latin-America has been constructed as that of a provider of narrative fiction, not of social and
cultural reflection, and it is attributed a domestic interest, only for the country that generates it. (García Canclini 2004: 121)

Canclini’s choice of publishing house (Gedisa), his bibliographic selection (including lesser known Latin-American authors and unpublished dissertations from universities in the continent), his continued publication in Spanish, and even his choice to embark on the socio-cultural reflection of these topics can be appreciated as a performative response to the unequal circulation of cultural capital that he discusses. Thus, Canclini’s self-reflexivity as an author is not brought about by the alignment between the discursive and the performative dimensions of the text, as is Spivak’s. Rather, it concerns the alignment between the discursive dimension of the text and the text’s material existence as a social act in dialogue with particular sources, and as a commodity destined for particular audiences and distributed through particular means. Its self-reflexivity consists in how the text articulates its outside rather than itself alone.

Benefiting from the work of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), Canclini stresses the need to examine the correlation between verbal constructs and empirical referents, and departs from the assumption that every reference is in fact a co-reference (150). A co-reference necessarily presupposes a social pact. Hence, an analysis from this perspective cannot reduce the conventionality of language to its epistemic traits, but must constantly relate them to socio-historical conditions, interests, and agencies. Hence, at stake in the self-reflexivity of DDD’s author is not the gap between signifier and signified, nor that between the realms of the referential and the referred, but the dialectic between signs and their use, between texts and their conditions of emergence.

Canclini attempts to give credibility to the text by being consistent in relation to its extra-discursive articulations rather than by foregrounding the arbitrariness of language as his means of expression. Reflecting on the experiment of educational researcher Bon Bonza, who wrote three papers under false names, which included plagiarisms and racist insults hidden in German quotes, and managed to get published by major universities, he writes:

249 “Las bases de datos, como el Citation Index, tienden a sobrerrepresentar los libros y revistas publicados en inglés” (186); “… como creador de literatura, y como ampliación de las clientelas españolas. No publican casi nunca estudios culturales, sociológicos o antropológicos de latinoamericanos, y, cuando lo hacen, sus filiales de la Argentina, Chile, Colombia o México, limitan la circulación de esos libros al país de origen. Salvo pocas editoriales de tamaño medio … como el Fondo de Cultura Económica y Gedisa, se ha construido la imagen internacional de América latina como proveedora de ficciones narrativas, no de pensamiento social y cultural, al que sólo le atribuyen interés doméstico, para el país que lo genera.” (121)

250 I frame those aspects as choices because since his Hybrid Cultures (first published in Spanish in 1990), Canclini’s work has come to be widely recognized internationally.
In a certain sense, it is useful to detect that identities are the product of narratives and staging. But the postmodern enthusiasm with this fictionalization of subjects, with the constructed character of identities, may not be justified in the same way in recreational or risk contexts … Can there be a society, that is, a social pact, if we never know who is talking to us, or writing, or presenting a paper? It is possible to live in society insofar as there are subjects that make themselves responsible. It is not a question of returning to easy certainties of idealism nor to those of empiricism … It is a question of inquiring whether, to a certain degree, it is viable to find empirically identifiable forms, not only discursively imagined ones, of subjectivity and alterity. (150)

While pointing to the subject’s deconstruction as useful in some occasions, Canclini affirms that a social pact cannot be achieved if there aren’t responsible subjects behind language. Thus, he asserts the importance of site specificity in the questioning of the subject.

Canclini continues his reflection by remarking that the deconstruction of the subject is an enterprise that has deep historical roots and not the exclusive venture of postmodernism. Moreover, he asserts, the traditions which have sought to deconstruct the subject ultimately sought to give consistency to citizenship and verisimilitude to social interactions (151). Hence, the author emphasizes the place of the constitution of the subject as an epistemically accessible site for addressing the other as an implied subject. His operative question is not Spivak’s “Can the subaltern Speak?”, but rather: “What is it to have a place in [the contemporary process of] world-ization? Who speaks and where from?” (24). While Spivak’s question focuses on an epistemic foreclosure, Canclini’s points to the historical surroundings that determine the epistemic foreclosure. At this juncture between the position of enunciation and the socio-historical forces that configure access to that position emerges what I have called the systemic subject.

Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe (N&L-L) discuss a similar subject in the work of Jacques Lacan. In their analysis of “The Agency of the Letter,” they elaborate on that subject position with reference to strategy. N&L-L affirm that “strategy is one of the major elements of Lacanian systematics,” suggesting that Lacan uses the word “to indicate the possible status of a non-subjective subject – that is to say a plural, combinatory subject, neither present to itself (it is without

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251 “En un sentido, es útil detectar que las identidades son producto de narraciones y actuaciones. Pero el entusiasmo postmoderno por esta ficcionalización de los sujetos, por el carácter construido de las identidades, no se justifica del mismo modo en contextos lúdicos o de riesgo … ¿Puede existir sociedad, es decir pacto social, si no sabemos quién nos está hablando, ni escribiendo, ni presentando ponencias? Convivir en sociedad es posible en tanto haya sujetos que se hagan responsables. No se trata de regresar a certezas fáciles del idealismo ni del empirismo … Se trata de averiguar si en cierto grado es viable hallar formas empíricamente identificables, no solo discursivamente imaginadas, de subjetividad y alteridad.”

252 “¿Qué es un lugar en la mundialización? ¿Quién habla y desde dónde?”
consciousness) nor in a definite place (since it is reduced to a calculus of odds)” (1992: 87-88). I extend the definition of strategy that N&L-L reach in reading Lacan’s essay to refer to a subject position beyond it. As in Chapter One, here I rely on the fact that “Lacan confessed unreservedly to his faith in the ideal of mathematical formalizations, because he considered them to be transmitted without the interference of meaning” to justify my extrapolation of Lacan’s formulations outside psychoanalysis (Nobus 2003: 65).

If we understand the words of N&L-L as referring to a subject position brought into play by the mere fact of the formal logistics of a system, independently of what that system may be, then we can say that, in contrast to Spivak’s strategy, which addresses the foreclosures brought about by the hegemony of a particular discursive subject position, Canclini’s strategy targets that of a systemic one (García Canclini 2004: 160). In other words, Canclini is concerned with the extra-discursive, impersonal and economic collective logic that structures the field of postcolonialism as a whole, rather than with any particular (actual and subjective) subject position that it may comprise. Hence, the strategy (i.e. the non-subjective subject position) which he adopts and advocates is one that, seeking to destabilize that other – hegemonic yet unlocalizable – subject, cannot be performed (as can Spivak’s) at the level of the author, since the latter reifies subjectivity in the conflation of a social agent and the author-function. Instead, and because it is characteristic of strategy to retaliate against the hegemonic subject position that it contests with its own weapons, Canclini’s contestation is enacted at the level where access to the discursive subject position is granted or foreclosed to begin with, the level of operative correlations between the geo-economic status quo and the possibility to write and publish.

Canclini addresses the short-sightedness of endeavors that ignore the extra-discursive organizing principles of texts in chapters four and five of DDD. At the beginning of the fourth chapter, he writes:

Here I will try to show the limits of the postmodern epistemological and political debates that situated the conflicts of interculturality in the construction of ethnographic texts. In the next [chapter], I will propose a parallel effort regarding cultural studies. (103)253

253 “Aquí intentare mostrar los límites de los debates epistemológicos y políticos postmodernos que situaron en la construcción de los textos etnográficos los conflictos de la interculturalidad. En el próximo [capítulo], propondré un trabajo semejante con los estudios culturales.”
He comments that, when focusing on ethnography as something more than a textual problematic, the analyst finds not only data, but also the possibility to address the organization of a field, its mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Anthropological authority, for example, is not only a question of the distance established in relation to the studied other, nor only of the coherence of the discourse produced, but also something that is established “by the way in which the organization of the anthropological field establishes what should be studied and what will be left out” (111). In the fifth chapter, he engages in a similar critique of Latin-Americanist cultural studies in the U.S.A. He argues that, however critical an analysis of a cultural object may be, if the scholar does not take into consideration the conditions that structure her access to and choice of the object in the first place, she is most likely to perpetuate the epistemic foreclosure and fetishistic reduction of the other.

Furthermore, as Murat Aydemir, a Dutch cultural analyst at the University of Amsterdam, illustrates, self-criticism at the discursive level may serve to obfuscate the perpetuation of epistemic violence at the level of the systemic subject position. In his analysis of the Royal Museum for Central Africa (Tervuren, Belgium), he describes the two narratives offered by the exhibition, “the one colonial, the other self-reflexive” (2008: 82). While the first of this is constituted by the original exhibition, the second is a series of comments in the guide and an alternative tour which “may also well function as a tokenistic gesture, supplying the required excuse to keep the permanent exhibition intact.” This contemporary addendum,

serves as a convenient way to offer the visitor some temporal distance from the main exhibit, so that it can then be consumed nostalgically: “Look! That’s how we used to display the ‘primitives’ (but wasn’t that a lot of fun!).” Viewers initially put off by the exhibition may be sufficiently reassured by the marginal critical commentary to go on and enjoy the show. (82, emphasis in text)

Aydemir reveals how “the critical ‘asides’ offered by the visitor’s guide and the supplementary tour matter less than the disciplinary order that organizes the exhibition’s main rooms” (82). The disciplinary order that Aydemir locates is equivalent to what I have described as the organizing principle of a field, the systemic subject position that determines what is included and what is excluded in the first place.

254 “por la manera como la organización del campo antropológico establece lo que debe ser estudiado y lo que quedará excluido.”
Taking into consideration such implicit organizing principles in the analysis of specific discursive practices, Canclini transcends the West vs. Other enclosure at which ethnographic discourse exerts itself. Since he criticizes ethnography from a different ideological and operative framework, he is able to distinguish between the epistemic foreclosure (the relation between self and object) and the political one (the relation between self and other). Rather than with the West vs. Other opposition, Canclini is concerned with the singularity of global capitalist culture. In this sense, he shares the approach of World Systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein.

As Patrick Wolfe reports:

Wallerstein held that the two [the singularity of the international division of labor and the multiplicity of cultures and nations] were … different ways of representing the same indivisible phenomenon, the capitalist world economy. On this basis, the unit of analysis ultimately becomes the world itself, a level at which there is no separating internal from external factors … since all factors are internal to the system. (404)

Like Wallerstein, Canclini works on the presupposition of a single system, prevalent over its constitutive internal differences. Canclini’s combination of this large-scale framework with attentiveness to discursive detail may be read along the lines of Wolfe’s characterization of diasporan postcolonial theorists:

Rather than viewing the incompatibility between Marxism and poststructuralism as necessitating a choice between them, diasporan postcolonialism has derived much of its disruptive energy from a strategically provisional grounding of the two (408).

In principle, this is the case not only for Canclini, but also for Spivak. Yet only in principle, for, as suggested earlier, strategy is always ground-specific.

What distinguishes the strategy of Canclini from that of Spivak is largely the outcome of their respective locations or, more accurately, their respective systemic subject positions. If strategy is “a plan for successful action based on the rationality and interdependence of the moves of the opposing participants,” place would be, according to de Certeau, what conditions the specific rationality and interdependence of those moves *(OED)*. Spivak’s vigilant awareness is tailored to the dangers of representational realism that have long accompanied the appropriation of authors like

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255 Wallerstein is a U.S. sociologist at Yale University (U.S.A.); Wolfe is a historian at the University of Melbourne (Australia).
Foucault from within the First-World Anglophone academy. Canclini’s vigilance, addressing this same site of power but from a different one, is directed not at the dangers of the good-willed practices taking place inside, but at the mechanisms that regulate entrance.

Hence, we could push this distinction further and argue that, whereas Canclini gravitates towards strategy, Spivak gravitates towards tactics. To recall de Certeau, strategy is defined by the establishment of a place of one’s own, in clear distinction to that of the enemy, while a tactic is “a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delimitation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for autonomy” (36-37). Canclini operates from a place that is in a relative, yet more clear, position of exteriority in comparison to the place of Spivak’s infiltration.

Spivak’s selection of audience, theoretical sources, publishing medium, and institutional place of enunciation is in principle a choice contradictory to her stated aims. Yet this contradiction is legitimized by her conception of resistance as imbricated with power, by her occupation of the same systemic subject position that she targets. She chooses to critique from within, while Canclini deems an articulate structural externality both possible and necessary. Yet, the systemic subject position or the structuring principle of a field that Canclini targets is seldom taken into account in deconstructions of discursive subject positions within postcolonial theory. Partially explaining this fact may be the intangibility of the systemic subject, with its non-subjective status and lack of reliance on any actual individual subject.

Discursive and systemic subject positions come into view or are blurred out of the picture according to whether we focus either of two axes: the epistemic divide or the new international division of labor (NIDL). Spivak and Canclini respectively employ each of these analytical categories. Neither names them explicitly; yet, the NIDL is as foundational to Canclini’s approach as the epistemic divide is to Spivak’s. In this section, I have focused on Canclini’s modus operandi. In the following, I return to Spivak in order to contrast the how of their procedures and the implications of prioritizing either one or the other axis to structure a totality inhabited by unequal subjects. While Canclini’s implicit prioritization of the NIDL foregrounds systemic subjects, Spivak’s concern with the epistemic divide is crucial to distinguish enunciating from represented subjects and, consequently, to distinguish between the postcolonial-as-intellectual and the postcolonial-as-subaltern. All of these distinctions are decisive in addressing one of the central questions that motivates the present study: who is the subject of postcolonial discourse?
Subalterns, Intellectuals and the Axes that Divide

In my exploration of the question as to who the subject of postcolonial discourse is, I am interested in how the postcolonial who is shaped in terms of its where. Therefore, in this section I examine how the postcolonial subject position is configured by the NIDL and the epistemic divide.256 The crucial issue is not whether critics discuss either of these axes, but the roles that these axes play as structuring principles within their methodology. Hence, at the heart of my concern for how the who and where of postcolonial discourse structure one another in the work of Spivak and Canclini lies an interest in the how of their procedures. It is the how of Canclini’s work that most clearly marks his exteriority in relation to postcolonialism.

Like Spivak in “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, in DDD Canclini is concerned with the constitution of the subject across the epistemic divide. Compare these two quotes:

The subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with “woman” as a pious item. Representation has not withered away. The female intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disown with a flourish. (Spivak 1994: 104)

Insofar as the specialist in cultural, literary or artistic studies is willing to carry out a scientifically consistent job, his final objective is not to represent the voice of the silenced but to understand and name the places where her demands or her everyday life enters in conflict with others. (García Canclini 2004: 166)257

Spivak and Canclini converge in their appraisal that to represent the voices of subalterns is a methodological impossibility. They both point to the fact that attempts at their representation implies simulation rather than an actual solution. Yet, the manner in which they confront this impossibility differs. While Spivak’s analysis can be described as an attempt to deepen the question of representation, to find a paradoxical solution from within, Canclini expands rather than fine-tunes the perspective, analyzing the conditions that give rise to epistemic foreclosure to begin with.

256 The New International Division of Labor (NIDL), as opposed to the classic IDL, refers to the change from the period of colonial rule, when First-World economies were based on industrial capital and Third-World countries had plantation agriculture and were basically exporters of raw material, to the period during and after formal de-colonization in the 1960s, in which Third-World countries became industrialized and thus became the place for the valorization of capital. See the Introduction for a full account of this process, with reference to Fröbel et al. 1980.

257 Recall that the possessive pronouns in Spanish are gender neutral; here and throughout, my translation of “su” as “his” or “her” is arbitrary. “En la medida en que el especialista en estudios culturales o literarios o artísticos quiere realizar un trabajo científicamente consistente, su objetivo final no es representar la voz de los silenciados sino entender y nombrar los lugares dónde sus demandas o su vida cotidiana entran en conflicto con los otros.”
Hence, Spivak’s approach presupposes the cause to be intrinsic to representation, while Canclini views it as extrinsic.

Continuing the quote above, Canclini describes his procedure as follows: “The categories of conflict and contradiction are thus at the nucleus of this mode of conceiving research; not to see the world from the single point of view of contradiction, but to understand its present structure and its possible dynamics” (166).\(^{258}\) This argument leads him to take the NIDL as his operative principle, where Spivak favors the epistemic divide. This is not to say that Spivak does not reflect on the historical conditions within which representation is politically embedded, but simply that her procedure is de facto committed to the presupposition of incommensurability rather than contradiction.

In “More on Power/Knowledge,” Spivak returns to the Foucauldian notion of 

\[\textit{pouvoir-savoir}\]


to propose that “an \textit{episteme} can be taken, loosely, to be one level of social \textit{pouvoir savoir}” (1993a: 42; emphasis in text).\(^{259}\) Furthermore, “on a certain layer [of \textit{pouvoir-savoir}], the word ‘episteme’ can stand in for ‘assent to the dominant’” (45). Epistemes, she implies, are “historically determined (or determining of history)” (44). Within this framework, she defines the dominant contemporary episteme as associated with liberal individualism and “Anglo-U.S.” forms of appropriation of knowledge (27-37; esp. 33).

As I have indicated, Spivak distinguishes the dominant episteme from that of the subaltern, describing them as mutually exclusive spaces. She then focuses on their place of collision, understood as a subject position:

\[
\text{The subject position of the citizen of a recently decolonized “nation” is epistemically fractured. The so-called private individual and the public citizen in a decolonized nation can inhabit widely different epistemes, violently at odds with each other yet yoked together by the everyday ruses of \textit{pouvoir-savoir}. (47-48)}
\]

Partaking in the dominant episteme, the postcolonial subject is enabled; simultaneously inhabiting something other than the dominant episteme, he or she gains critical distance. The result is a vigilant use of the dominant power/knowledge (45-48). Hence, “[i]t is hard to acknowledge that liberal individualism is “a violating enablement” (44).

\(^{258}\) “Las categorías de contradicción y conflicto están, por tanto, en el núcleo de este modo de concebir la investigación. No para ver el mundo desde un solo lugar de la contradicción, sino para comprender su estructura actual y su dinámica posible.” (166)

\(^{259}\) Here, and on page 39, Spivak exceptionally writes “\textit{pouvoir savoir}” without any mark between the terms.
Although she describes the clash of epistemes as associated with “the postcolonial subject,” Spivak actually only refers to intellectuals as occupying that space, exemplified by the cases of Kenyan writer and activist Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o and Indian writer and activist Mahasweta Devi (45-47). The position of the postcolonial-as-subject is only occupied by professional writers, while the position of the postcolonial-as-subaltern is only occupied by fictional figures (45-51, esp. 46). Since the subaltern episteme forecloses the possibility of accessing the subject position, it is only inhabited by narrated rather than narrating agents, such as those that appear in Mahasweta’s stories.

On one such character Spivak comments: “Child of violation, Mary Oraon is the very figure of postcoloniality, displaced to the subaltern level” (50). Mahasweta must work “actively to move the subaltern into hegemony,” toward “that other episteme, where the ‘intuitions’ of feminism become accessible” (49). While Mahasweta, in her capacity as author, inhabits the clash of epistemes that defines her position as that of a “postcolonial subject,” the site of the subaltern is a displacement further removed.

In “More on Power/Knowledge,” the subaltern episteme, in contrast to the place where subaltern and dominant epistemes clash (i.e. the postcolonial subject position), is characterized by inarticulateness, the consequence of its inaccessibility to the site of enunciation of the dominant episteme. Therefore, “[t]hese women of Mahasweta’s fiction are almost like unconnected letters in a script ... They are monuments to the anxiety of their inevitable disappearance as ‘justice is done’ and the episteme is on the way to regularization” (51).

In an implicit reference to her affirmation elsewhere that “[t]he subaltern cannot speak,” in “More on Power/Knowledge” Spivak insists that those fictional characters cannot be “spoken for,” and that Mahasweta Devi “does not speak as them, or to them. These are singular, paralogical figures of women (sometimes wild men, mad men) who spell out no model for imitation” (1994: 104; 1993a: 49, emphases in text). The inarticulateness associated with subaltern space is staged at two levels: as a lack of relationship to language (they cannot “spell out,” cannot “speak,” cannot be spoken “for,” “to” nor “as”) and as a lack of logical articulation within language (i.e. “paralogical,” “unconnected letters”).

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260 As I analyzed in Chapter One, Spivak’s paradigmatic figure of the subaltern, Bhuvaneswari Bhaduri, is also characterized by this impossibility to access the signifying chain that constitutes the (legitimized and legitimizing) symbolic order. As a result, she cannot access the subject position. Spivak defines the subaltern as an “identity-in-differential” (1994: 79). It can only be defined negatively, as that which precedes or exceeds the dominant power/knowledge.
I speak of a “subaltern episteme,” yet is a contradiction in terms because such an episteme could only defined by its lack of access to the (hegemonic) symbolic order. Spivak does not employ the term, but merely implies its existence as it surfaces at the clash of epistemes. Inhabiting the “clash of epistemes,” the postcolonial subject position stages the fact of an insurmountable “epistemic divide.”261 Therefore, the postcolonial subject position and the postcolonial subaltern position outline two distinct spaces as responses to the question of where the postcolonial may be located. While the first of these delineates historically specific subjects, the second can only point to repressed or imagined subjectivities. The latter can emerge only as a symptom and taken as a repressed substratum of the hegemonic symbolic order, while failing to articulate an actual subject position.

For Spivak, then, subaltern space is defined by the epistemic foreclosure. Beyond Spivak’s work, however, the place of the postcolonial intellectual and that of the subaltern have been conflated. An example can be found in the first three paragraphs of Robert Young’s *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction*:

It has been said that there are two kinds of white people: those who have never found themselves in a situation where the majority of people around them are not white, and those who have been the only white person in the room. At that moment, for the first time perhaps, they discover what it is really like for other people in their society, and, metaphorically, for the rest of the world outside the west: to be from a minority, to live as the person who is always in the margins … the person who is not authorized to speak.

This is as true for peoples as for persons … Have you ever felt that the moment you said the word “I”, that “I” was someone else, not you? That in some obscure way you were not the subject of your own sentence? … Or that when you hear others speaking, that you are only ever going to be the object of their speech? That you live in a world of others …?

How can we find a way to talk about this? That is the first question which postcolonialism tries to answer … If you are someone who does not identify yourself as western, or as somehow not completely western even though you live in a western country, or someone who is part of a culture and yet excluded by its dominant voices, inside yet outside, then postcolonialism offers you a way of seeing things differently, a language and a politics in which your interests come first, not last. (2003: 1-2)

Young’s conflation between internal and external difference, as well as his celebration of it are guided by a didactic impulse: the need to awaken an interest in the field in his young readers by means of identification. But precisely because of its didactic nature, the quote is a perfect example

261 Although Spivak mentions the “epistemic divide,” it is more often staged and only latent as subtext. Her stated emphasis is rather on the clash of epistemes (48). See 46-51.
of how nuanced critical positions within postcolonial theory, such as Spivak’s, can lose their nuance and edge through popularization.262

Young not only equates the personal experience of someone circumstantially in a room with the experience of colonialization at large but, in doing so, erases from view any other possible problematic than that of (the feeling of) difference. Furthermore, this difference is, at its most historically grounded, ethnic; otherwise, it is simply existential. Young’s second paragraph points to the experience of being a subject in its contemporary psychoanalytic and philosophical understandings (i.e. “Have you ever felt … [that] you live in a world of others …?”; “Have you ever felt that the moment you said the word ‘I’, that ‘I’ was someone else, not you?”).263 In that sense, Young’s account of subjective postcolonial experience is an account of subjectivity as such, and would perfectly fit Žižek’s description of the individual subject as “noncoincidence-with-itself” (2006a:45). Young’s second paragraph stages the non-coincidence with the self as mediated by language, regardless of the historical conditions in which this problematic is framed. Furthermore, at the beginning of the third paragraph, the author declares this to be “the first question which postcolonialism tries to answer.”

Young’s last paragraph rhetorically performs the gradual, metonymic displacement from a situated problematic to an existential dilemma. Notice the sentence that begins: “If you are someone …”. In the first clause, the condition is “who does not identify yourself as western.” The next clause offers another option, which deems the NIDL as of secondary importance: “or not completely western even though you live in a western country.” The third clause expands the condition to include a feeling of exclusion, for whatever motive, in whatever culture: “or someone who is part of a culture and yet excluded by its dominant voices.” The last conditional clause requires merely a sense of self, a feeling of non-absolute coincidence with one’s own context: “inside yet outside.” If any of the above conditions are fulfilled by his readers, “then,” Young declares, “postcolonialism offers you a way of seeing things differently, a language and a politics in which your interests come first, not last.”

262 I have catachrestically employed the term “popularization” since it remains within the academy. Furthermore, as Bal’s analysis of the teacherly qualities in Spivak’s writing illustrates, didactics is not always reductionist but can also operate through a radically different mode: “Spivak, like Lacan, perhaps dramatizes her excellence as a teacher in order to compensate for the difficulty of her writing. Perhaps she doesn’t. It doesn’t matter. As more than just a compensation for a lack, this strategy turns her writing into a superb form of teaching (teaching-to-teach).” (Bal 2002: 322)

263 Compare Young’s words, alleging to account for the specificity of postcolonial subjectivity, with these words with which Aydemir accounts for subjectivity per se in Lacanian theory: “The subject only finds his or her ‘signifying place’ in the dimension of alterity. / Because of the subject’s necessary recourse to, or reliance on, this ‘elsewhere’, s/he is no longer even the grammatical subject of her or his own speech: it is not an ‘I’ that speaks, but an ‘it […]’ that speaks through ‘me’.” (2002: 128)
Young’s concluding remark evidences the collapse between the subject position of the subaltern and that of the postcolonial intellectual. He has staged the problem faced by the postcolonial subaltern by establishing an analogy with the problems his reader might be likely to face or have faced. That analogy, though problematic, is still an analogy. But then Young solves the problem of the subaltern’s lack of access to the place of enunciation, through the reader herself who, entering the field of postcolonial theory, will gain access to “a language and a politics in which your interests come first, not last.” Young’s figurative illustration has now usurped the place of reality. Through the resolution of the figurative plane (the “interests” of the reader, probably young students in First-World academic circles), the reality it was supposed to address (the interests of the postcolonial subaltern) is foreclosed and perpetuated. Postcolonial theory, it would seem, is the final realization of subaltern speech: it stands in for and simulates the resolution of that lack.

Criticizing the postmodern tendency that leaves no space for the distinction between simulacrum and reality, Canclini writes,

But, as Boltanski and Chiapello observe, this [lack of] distinction leaves us without a place from which to construct a critical point of view. The postmodern critical position invalidates itself: “If everything, without exception, is no longer anything more than construction, code, spectacle or simulacrum, from which position of exteriority could the critic situate himself to denounce an illusion that is confused with the totality of the existing?” (162).

Faithful to this insight, DDD does not stop at difference as a single analytical category, nor take language as the foundational organizational principle of the intercultural experience. The critique of the unequal access to language, which concerns much postcolonial criticism, would require the incorporation of an exterior anchorage to expose its conditions of emergence. However, it is not enough to acknowledge those conditions in historical terms. Young’s Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction offers extensive anecdotic accounts of the history of colonialism. Yet, if a study is to resist either naturalization of the hegemonic order or co-optation, it is necessary to integrate historical variables as part of the methodology.

264 “Pero como observan Boltanski y Chiapello, esta [falta de] distinción nos deja sin lugar desde dónde construir un punto de vista crítico. La propia posición crítica postmoderna se invalida: ‘Si todo, sin excepción, ya no es más que construcción, código, espectáculo o simulacro, ¿desde qué posición de exterioridad podría situarse el crítico para denunciar una ilusión que se confunde con la totalidad de lo existente?’” Read in context of the preceding paragraphs, the absence of the words “falta de” (“lack of”) in this quote is clearly a typographic error. Hence, I have inserted them in-between square brackets.
This happens with the inclusion of NIDL as an analytical category, as in Canclini’s case.\textsuperscript{265} Methodologically, the NIDL can be compared to Spivak’s epistemic divide, despite the fact that the foundational a priori of each category is radically distinct. Still, it could be said that while Spivak departs from the later in dialogue with the former, Canclini works in the opposite direction. He phrases his general concern as follows:

The new strategies of artistic and intellectual division of labor, of accumulation of economic and symbolic capital through communications and culture, concentrate in the United States, some European countries and Japan the profits of almost all the planet and the capacity to co-opt and redistribute diversity. How to reinvent criticism in a world where cultural diversity is something to be administered: by corporations, by States, by NGOs? (23)\textsuperscript{266}

Thus, Canclini is concerned with the incidence of the NIDL as setting the conditions of emergence of the epistemic divide.

As I have indicated, Canclini focuses on the economic and historical conditions that restrict access to the position of enunciation. Not only his objects of analysis but also the choices he makes about language of publication, type of audience, site and politics of editorial, geo-institutional affiliations and bibliographic selection, all position his work in relation to the NIDL. These choices operate as a self-reflexive response to the issues he addresses: the Third World’s exclusion from theory, its reduction to a particular, and the co-constitution of the West as universal. Both discursively and performatively, his emphasis is on the necessity of acknowledging responsible subjects behind language and of correlating epistemic limits and linguistic possibilities with socio-historically specific conditions, interests, and agencies.

Canclini attempts to bridge the epistemic divide between the postcolonial subject position, which he structurally occupies, and the postcolonial subaltern position, occupied by his objects of study. As I mentioned, for him the subaltern other is epistemically accessible, even if in a circumscribed manner, because the historical place against which she constitutes herself as a subject is epistemically accessible. Historically specific place functions as a co-reference in subject constitution. While Spivak accounts for a strategic outlet within the epistemic givens of hegemony, Canclini focuses on the external conditions that make epistemic hegemony appear as given.

\textsuperscript{265} Canclini does not use the exact term NIDL, only proximate categories. However, the concept itself is operative in his work in the same sense that I have given the term in my general Introduction.

\textsuperscript{266} Las nuevas estrategias de división del trabajo artístico e intelectual, de acumulación de capital simbólico y económico a través de la cultura y la comunicación, concentran en Estados Unidos, algunos países europeos y Japón las ganancias de casi todo el planeta y la capacidad de captar y redistribuir la diversidad. ¿Cómo reinventar la crítica en un mundo donde la diversidad cultural es algo que se administra en corporaciones, en los Estados y en las ONG?"
Ultimately, Spivak addresses the same division of labor as Canclini does. However, Spivak focuses on the given-ness rather than the constructed-ness of the conditions at stake. For all practical purposes, in Spivak’s work, the hegemonic symbolic order and the symbolic order per se are identical.

Since for Spivak the hegemonic symbolic order and the symbolic order are synonymous, the only way out is further into hegemony, through a strategic use of the “regulative political concepts” that the status quo offers (48). This is why Spivak endorses the way in which Mahasweta Devi “works actively to move the subaltern into hegemony” (49). Here, the epistemic inaccessibility of the subaltern other is absolute. To be able to communicate from the other side of the epistemic divide is to have access to (hegemonic) language; hence, to cease to be subaltern. In contrast, by focusing on the external conditions that make epistemic hegemony appear as a given, Canclini emphasizes the plausibility of bridging the epistemic divide between the postcolonial subject position – that is, his own incidence in the text as author – and the postcolonial subaltern position. He stresses that the (relative) accessibility of the subaltern other resides in the objective place she occupies, which, while not being informative of the subaltern’s actual subjectivity, is epistemically accessible as an actual subject position in conflict with other sites of interest. If we take into account Spivak’s proposition in her reading of Foucault, that the relation of the self with itself that guarantees the subject status is historically mediated, Canclini’s analysis of the historical place in which that relation occurs must be, to some degree, indicative of it.

While both Canclini and Spivak advocate responsibility and self-reflexivity, they are of a different kind. Spivak exercises her responsibility as an author in the Foucauldian sense of the term, at the place where the self as a social agent and the articulating principle of the text collapse. Since the subaltern other has no possible place at this juncture, Spivak responds to her by luring the reader – the only other entity that finds a place at the juncture of the social and the textual – into the structure of responsibility that she offers. Quite differently, Canclini is not concerned with the juncture between the performative and discursive dimensions of the text, but rather with the way in which his discursive and actual subject positions are ethically aligned. For him, it is not a question of how his actual subject position works into the textual one, but of how these two mirror each other as if along parallel lines.267

267 Recall Canclini’s call for the need of responsible agents behind their discursive subject positions: “Can there be a society, that is, a social pact, if we never know who is talking to us, or writing, or presenting a paper? It is possible to live in society insofar as there are subjects that make themselves responsible. It is not a question of returning to easy
Due to her methodological choices and analytical interests, Spivak offers precedence to the epistemic divide over the NIDL. While, in her own writing, this procedure allows for a distinction between the critic’s position as a postcolonial intellectual and subaltern foreclosure, that distinction relies on her own intricate handling of language and concepts. Hence, appropriations of her propositions are liable to a collapse of categories, as I exemplified by way of Young’s text. Conversely, Canclini gives precedence to the NIDL and so accounts for the epistemic divide in terms of its historically situated conditions of emergence.

This contrast could be tangentially associated with the geo-historical areas with which both authors are mostly concerned and in which they work most. The intellectual tradition to which Spivak belongs is paradigmatically postcolonial. A migrant from a recently decolonized nation, she writes for an Anglophone audience and works at a major university in the U.S.A; she engages with feminism and Marxism but is methodologically most close to deconstruction, primarily through Derrida. Conversely, Canclini does not categorize himself as a postcolonial theorist; neither do his critics. An Argentinian migrant in Mexico, he writes for a Spanish speaking audience; his work is deeply informed by French sociology, particularly by Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Marxist analytical frameworks and other humanist theoretical traditions are historically contextualized in his work, but not flagged as “foreign.” Perhaps because of the profound historical links between those theoretical traditions and social movements of resistance in Latin America, the central questions at stake are not as readily frameable in terms of Euro-centrism.268

A mode of resistance that is critical of, yet remains articulated in and through the West/Other opposition, does not hold sway so easily in Latin America as it does in recently decolonized space. The cultural clash that the West/Other opposition describes took place on the continent over 500 years ago.269 In its 200 years of independence from Portuguese and Spanish rule,

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268 As an example of the interconnectedness between so-called Western theoretical traditions and Latin American political history, see Gandler (2007). Stefan Gandler, German philosopher and political scientist at the Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro (Mexico), traces the relation between political history and the development of an endogenous critical Marxist philosophy in Latin America, focusing on the continent’s rupture with Stalinism and dogmatic versions of Marxist theory, starting with the work of Peruvian journalist José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930), but focusing on the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, especially on the work of two contemporary Mexican thinkers: philosopher Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez and critical theorist Bolívar Echeverría.

269 Furthermore, the Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors mixed in with the local population (through rape or otherwise), and settled in Latin America to a far greater degree than the British, Germans, Belgians and Dutch who governed Asia and Africa mostly through policies of indirect rule (with scarce and segregated settler populations). The French colonizers were exceptional in their interest to impose their language and culture in Africa, while their more pragmatic counterparts (paradigmatically the German colonizers) were cautious to invest on or hand out these tools.
Latin America has been subjected to less candid modes of imperialist domination by a different power. This long subjection to (economic and military) neo-colonialism, and the 500 years of distance from an allegedly pure, non-Western identity, tilts the emphasis towards questions of inequality and of how inequality produces difference. Hence, the geo-historical specificity of the objects of Spivak’s and Canclini’s respective analyses function as a co-reference to the approach they assume. Similarly, their respective geo-institutional locations determine their distinct strategies.270

But even if historical conditions may lead particular authors to feel affinity with specific theoretical frameworks, historical place and ideology cannot be conflated. In terms of ideology, the approaches of Spivak and Canclini can be respectively associated with one of the two logics that Žižek describes and which I mentioned earlier:

the opposition of two logics, that of antagonism and that of difference, is the deployment of a logically preceding term, of the inherent “pure” difference, the minimal difference which marks the noncoincidence of the One with itself. This noncoincidence, this “pure difference” can either unravel into a multitude of entities forming a differential totality, or split into the antagonistic opposition of two terms. (2006a: 36)

Žižek describes the mediating term between these two logics in the same way as he elsewhere defines what is constitutive of the individual subject: “minimal distance, noncoincidence-with-itself” (2006a: 45).

The breach between historical place and ideology is ultimately mediated by the subject. Yet, the subject is not only “a lack,” as argued by the Slovenian philosopher, but a lack in relation to a positive content, as suggested by Canclini’s approach (Žižek, 2006a: 44). Canclini also points to the following fact:

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270 The relationship between these differentiated positions of power and the strategies and ideologies to which they are respectively correlated may be appreciated in the following example. In 1990 Canclini published Culturas híbridas: estrategias para entrar y salir de la modernidad (Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity). The book was published in Spanish four years before Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture (1994), but its English translation appeared only a year after Bhabha’s book. The two books, discussing similar issues but from radically different perspectives, were written in roughly the same time frame. Although Canclini was the first to publish, the concept of hybridity has been attributed to Bhabha in the Anglophone academy and popularized through his work within postcolonial studies. Canclini’s perspective on the subject differs from Bhabha’s in that his is a critique of how the hybrid ethnic and cultural condition in Latin-America has been exploited by the ruling elites to legitimize their positions of power. While Canclini opens hybridity up to the logic of contradiction, Bhabha opens it up to that of difference.
The negation of the subject was accomplice to the underestimation of history: if there is no subject, the possibility of there being an action that transforms the ruling order and gives a responsible sense to the process of becoming evaporates. (154)\textsuperscript{271}

The subject is a process of becoming, a response conditioned by history, and yet a responsibility conditioning of history. The author, as an individual with access to publishing venues, as the text’s universal site of enunciation, and as a self-reflexive entity, occupies the position of the subject. But that position is equally constituted through conventionalized forms of dialogue: intersubjectivity being what makes language meaningful, what allows knowledge to grow and transform and, finally, what makes subjectivity differential.\textsuperscript{272} The dialogue each author stages and enacts, with whom, and for what purpose is a historically and institutionally conditioned choice.

**Conclusion**

In the introductory section, I exemplified self-reflexivity in postcolonial theory with reference to Dipesh Chakrabarty. After having analyzed Spivak’s “More on Power/Knowledge,” it is pertinent to add that she not only continues Chakrabarty’s endeavor, but furthers it. In foregrounding the relationship between the analyst and his or her object of study, Chakrabarty historicizes that relationship. But in foregrounding the crucial third entity involved in the act of writing, the addressed other, Spivak actualizes that history and in that way politicizes it. The author’s presupposed reader, whom she foregrounds, is a historically specific (even if generalized and implied) other that infiltrates the author’s discourse and plays a crucial role in the latter’s mode of self-relation, bringing about a qualitative change in the text. Spivak thus brings the analyst-object relationship (always already a question of the past) to bear upon the present of writing. This also applies to the present of reading. Hence, Bal points out that “[i]f there is any writer of what is broadly called ‘cultural studies’ who has been successful in arguing that, and how, reading can be activist and politically effective, it is Spivak” (2002: 319).

The presupposed readers influence the act of writing and situate the writer historically insofar as they shape both the mode and content of the writer’s production according to the specificity of the external historical, socio-cultural, geo-economic and institutional conditions under which the author writes and publishes. Because of this, the presupposed readers share some of the

\textsuperscript{271} “La negación del sujeto fue cómplice de la subestimación de la historia: si no hay sujeto se evapora la posibilidad de que haya una acción que transforme el orden vigente y dé un sentido responsable al devenir.”

traits of the Other in Lacanian theory. Žižek characterizes the big Other with reference to Lacan (1972) as “properly virtual, in the sense that its status is that of a subjective presupposition.” The virtual character of the big Other is so central to it that “[o]ne can even say that the only letter that fully and effectively arrives at its destination is the unsent letter – its true addressee is not the flesh-and-blood others, but the big Other itself” (Žižek 2006b: 10, emphasis in text). Yet, Spivak’s “letter” does arrive at its destination. She is centrally concerned with the cultural and historical specificity of those “flesh-and-blood others” that she addresses. In this way, Spivak’s presupposed reader is informative of both her actual readers and of the virtual Other. Yet, it is informative of the latter only in the strict sense that Silverman characterizes as “a culturally and historically determinate Other …, a particular symbolic order,” in opposition to the Other as “a universal or absolute” (1983: 192, emphasis added).

Therefore, the different forms of otherness produced by Spivak’s text are far from the conflation of internal and external difference discussed in Chapter One. “More on Power/Knowledge,” returning the reader’s attention once and again to the formal dimension of the text, to the actual social agents involved in its reading, and to the cultural, social, and institutional realities in which it is inserted, constantly hinders the possibility of substituting internal for external otherness. Although Spivak confronts the postcolonial and subaltern others with the addressed other, she stresses the incommensurability, not the interchangeability, between the otherness at play in her text and the subaltern.

Besides the subject positions of author and reader, Spivak is concerned with three other differentiated subject positions, occupied respectively by canonical Western voices, the West’s excluded others, and postcolonial intellectuals. Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida occupy the place of enunciation. Fictional, inarticulate characters in a story as well as those who have not been incorporated into the dominant episteme of Western liberalism occupy the subaltern position. Finally, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o and Mahasweta Devi occupy the paradigmatically postcolonial position at the clash of epistemes, fraught with contradiction and susceptible to strategic appropriation. If the place of the Western intellectual is the site of enunciation, and if that of the subaltern is characterized by a lack of access to the (dominant) symbolic order, then the place of strategic appropriation of the site of enunciation by the postcolonial subject may be best defined as the site of citation par excellence. In the next chapter, I will develop this insight about the place of citation as a key subject position.
Pointing to the ways in which representation and citation participate in history, Spivak also indicates how history participates in the act of writing. In her performative critique of her own discursive subject position, “Outside [yet] in the Teaching Machine,” Spivak exploits the mutuality between author and reader that constitutes the text. Foregrounding the formal traces of these social agents in the text, she claims a structure of response as a structure of responsibility. She puts the present continuous act of writing and reading into relationship with a wider historical present to actualize and thus politicize the task. Both Spivak and Canclini acknowledge that theory requires a certain degree of the same suspension of disbelief that governs fiction. But while Canclini does so by aggrandizing stylistic gestures that reveal the literary aspect of his text, Spivak takes the opposite direction, foregrounding the literary and the linguistic conventions that sustain theory by deconstructing them. This applies not only to her own text, but also to her analysis of the theorist she comes to terms with in “More on Power/Knowledge,” Michel Foucault.

That brings me back to the epigraph for this chapter. In “Of Other Spaces” (1986), Foucault describes heterotopias as the paradigmatic sites of self-reflexivity for the system as a whole. After characterizing the contemporary paradigm as one that foregrounds space, envisioned as a series of interconnected sites, he focuses on sites “that have the curious property of being in relation with all other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror or reflect” (24). Such sites are the utopia and the heterotopia. The latter is best exemplified in the motif of the mirror:

The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place … But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality … The mirror … makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there. (24)

I benefit from this image of (self-)reflection to elaborate on the forms of self-reflexivity I have discussed. Let me begin by pointing to the fact that the self-reflexive act that constitutes actual subjects, like Foucault’s mirror, enters the dialectic between a virtual point of reflection and a historically situated surface against which to reflect.

Above, with reference to Spivak, I arrived at the conclusion that the self-reflexive relation that defines the subject is always already culturally mediated. Since in that case, as in Foucault’s metaphor, “this space that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass” is not only
interceded by a “virtual point which is over there,” hence “absolutely unreal,” but also “absolutely real, connected with all the other space that surrounds it,” Spivak is able to denounce the incompleteness of traditional accounts of subject constitution in philosophy. Because the subject is not a mere relation between the self and itself in the abstract, but shaped by the place from which she relates to herself, it follows that cultural analysts can indeed address other subject positions as constituting an implied self to self relation. In DDD, Canclini enters into contact with the specificity of the material support against which the self-reflexive gesture of the other bounces off. In this way he is able to discern and address relatively marginal others in the particularity that defines them as actual subjects. Although he does not represent the other as an actual subject, the procedure allows him to engage with the other’s subject position in an analytical manner. Rather than focusing on access to the subaltern other as an inevitable epistemic foreclosure, his work offers the possibility to break down the problem of otherness and representation into its constituent parts, thus allowing for a nuanced discernment between the epistemic aspects (i.e., the self to object relation), and the political aspects (i.e., the self to other relation).

Heterotopias do not reflect themselves alone but are the surface for self-reflection of society as a whole. As Foucault points out, they

function in relation to all the space that remains. This function unfolds between two extreme poles. Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory … Or else, on the contrary … their role is to create a space that is other, another real space … not of illusion but of compensation. (27)

Foucault’s definition of heterotopias as spaces that, in being either more real or more illusory than surrounding space, comment on the status of the latter, allows us to view these spaces as symptoms, in the sense established in Chapter Two. This is to say that they reveal the constitutive contradictions that govern the status quo outside the spaces of exception.

In this way, the factory in a capitalist society could be taken as a heterotopia in Foucault’s sense. On the factory as such a place of exception, Marx writes:

The same bourgeois consciousness which celebrates the division of labour in the workshop, the lifelong annexation of the worker to a partial operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as an organization of labour that increases its productive power, denounces with equal vigour every conscious attempt to control and regulate the process of production socially, as an inroad on such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom, and the self-
determining “genius” of the individual capitalist. It is very characteristic that the enthusiastic apologists of the factory system have nothing more damning to urge against a general organization of labour in society than that it would turn the whole of society into a factory. (1990: 477)

The division of labor here is the axis around which the mutual reflection of factory and society is structured: “in the society where the capitalist mode of production prevails, anarchy in the social division of labor and despotism in the manufacturing division of labor mutually condition each other” (477). In a footnote, Marx adds that,

the less authority presides over the division of labour inside society, the more it is subjected there to the authority of a single person. Thus authority in the workshop and authority in society, in relation to the division of labour, are in inverse ratio to each other. (477, emphasis in text)

Here Marx’s conclusions are the result of the comparison between two types of society. He discusses the development from societies that were dominated by the separation of trades as spontaneous forms of social division of labor, when each tradesperson participated in the different stages of the production process and so there was no division of labor within the workshop, to nineteenth century manufacturing, in which the factory assigned the worker to a partial operation in the line of production, instituting the division of labor inside the factory, and having as a consequence the disappearance of spontaneous trade group organization on the outside.

In other words, the more visible the manufacturing division of labor is, the more invisible the social one. The erasure of the social division of labor that the apologists of the capitalist mode of production advocate is only a question of visibility. As a heterotopia, the factory reveals the correlation between the two forms of division of labor, allowing them to reflect on each other. The factory is a heterotopia in that it is the sine qua non space of exception to the freedom advocated by capitalist ideology, revealing the freedom in remaining space “as still more illusory” (Foucault 1986: 27). But while the factory could be conceived as a heterotopia, unlike Foucault, I have not been concerned with “sites” in this chapter (nor with the contemporary conception of space as one that foregrounds sites), but with the “relations by which a given site can be defined” (Foucault 1986: 23). Hence, I have centered on the epistemic divide and the new international division of labor as axes producing specific sites of enunciation, representation and subject constitution.
Moreover, my emphasis has not been on dispersed sites, but on the global unit of analysis. Both Spivak and Canclini give predominance to the singularity of the worldwide capitalist culture in the production of site specificity. The epistemic divide and the NIDL structure a spatial totality. For Spivak, the epistemic divide, which is the subject position occupied by the postcolonial intellectual, is the place from where “the history of the Enlightenment episteme is ‘cited,’” just as “the script is cited for an actor’s interpretation” (48). Therefore, it is fair to say that the epistemic divide is the axis along which the mutual reflection of Enlightenment and subaltern epistemes is produced, revealing, as “Of Other Spaces” suggests, the illusoriness of that which, from a single episteme, is taken as “real” (Foucault 1886: 27). Similarly, Canclini foregrounds the First World’s reliance on the NIDL to achieve economic and epistemic articulation. He correlates the possibilities offered by the system with the foreclosures on which it rests. As a consequence, he dismantles the illusion of First-World self-sufficiency through which First-World privilege is legitimated.

In those ways, the epistemic divide can be imagined as a surface of reflection. So can the slash, which, according to Barthes, may be envisaged as a “mirror,” or more accurately, as “the specular surface” (“la surface spéculaire” 1970: 113). Spivak’s graphical and metaphorical commitment to the slash is not far removed from Barthes’s description of it, insofar as it is employed to throw back a reflection that, like Foucault’s portrayal of the mirror image, is never self-identical. Like the slash, the division of labor, if envisaged as a specular surface, portrays a catachrestic relation between the thing and its reflection. As indicated by Marx above, that axis can correlate a space of “normality” with that of its exception.

One such exception, the factory as a heterotopia in nineteenth-century England, translates only catachrestically into the contemporary global economy. The integration of economies into a single one has tended to redistribute manufacture from enclaves in First-World nations to the other side of the NIDL, making the latter the axis along which specialization into manufacturing, service and intellectual workforce occurs. The inverse ratio by which the division of labor as either one of manufacture or of society acquired visibility at the time of Marx’s *Capital* finds its correspondence today in the NIDL’s relative invisibility in First-World nations; a situation that is rendered illusory through its reflection in a “virtual point which is over there,” at the other side of the NIDL (Foucault 1986: 24). Because of this, thinking categories that are predominant in the hegemonic ideology (such as space) in a different way, rather than merely advocating the reintroduction of the ones that are excluded (such as history), is crucial to the strategic adequacy of the projects that Foucault, Spivak and Canclini advocate. Although Spivak and Canclini allow for the closer inspection of
power (the relation between self and other) and knowledge (the relation between self and object) as relatively independent foreclosures, the question of approaching the other as a relatively autonomous self-to-self relation in her own right persists. Hence, I devote the following chapter to an analysis of the ways in which Anthony Appiah opens up that possibility.