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The native as image: art history, nationalism, and decolonizing aesthetics

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Chapter 3
Disciplining Art History: The Hopi, Aby Warburg, and Visual Studies

It is typical of the drawing on such vessels that a kind of heraldic skeleton of natural forms is represented . . . it becomes a hieroglyph, not meant simply as a picture to look at but rather as something to be read.
—Aby Warburg (1939 279)

How can access to writing in general be refused . . . up to what point [is it] legitimate not to call by the name of writing those “few dots” and “zigzags” on their calabashes[?]
—Jacques Derrida (1997 110)

The reconfiguration of Edward Curtis’s photographic archive by contemporary Native artists and scholars, discussed in the previous chapter, stands in contrast to the recent studies done by Western scholars on Aby Warburg (1866-1929), considered one of the founding fathers of art history. Although he was a contemporary of Curtis, his involvement with Native culture was quite different. While Curtis spent most of his life working among Native peoples, dedicated to the visual documentation of a great variety of cultures, Warburg’s engagement is limited to a trip he took to the southwest as curious tourist, intrepid academic, and amateur photographer.

In fact Warburg’s trip to the U.S. would be inconsequential to the analysis of the visual history of Native imagery were it not for the persistent interest in a lecture he wrote based on his travels that examines the drama of the Hopi Snake Dance.¹ The current increase in interest in this lecture, and in Warburg in general, reveals much about the priorities of a certain contemporary approach to art history that,

¹ I will be referring to the three versions of the lecture that have been recreated from Warburg’s notes(cited by the name of the translator): 1) the first English translation by W. F. Mainland; 2) Schlangenritual: Ein Reisebericht, ed. Ulrich Raulff; and Images from the Region of the Pueblo Indians of North America, translated by Michael P. Steinberg.
to a great extent, remains steadfast in its Eurocentrism. While all of these studies emphasize the place of Warburg within Western epistemology, none makes an attempt to follow through on Warburg’s own interests in Native American visual culture. While many of these recent studies on Warburg praise his broad interests in cultural history, most are more focused on an apotheosis of Warburg than on adapting his practice to cultural analysis. An examination of the discursive production of the figure of Aby Warburg and the origins of an iconological approach to art history illustrates how the visual representation of the Native can be so easily overlooked, even when placed so clearly within view.

What follows is an analysis of the current discourse on Aby Warburg in order to consider how his life and scholarship have come to represent, for some, a particular approach to the study of culture, an interdisciplinary approach that disregards the constraints of conventional disciplinary boundaries. Although a study of the recent work on Warburg may lead to insights about the effects that the policing of disciplinary borders may have on the development of new theoretical methodologies, what soon becomes apparent is that often these skirmishes reflect an academic chauvinism—which is often reflective of a national chauvinism—rather than, or in the guise of, humanist interests.

These nationalist/disciplinary wrangles are also revealing for what they elide. In the case of the treatment of Warburg and his engagement with the Native Americans, what is ignored is the historically important place of the snake ritual for the Hopi during the time of Warburg’s visit, a time when the Hopi nation was undergoing a fundamental political and cultural crisis. Despite the vast visual and textual representation of the Hopi in these studies, the Hopi function as props in the development of a narrative about Warburg and his intellectual curiosity. The deployment of these mute Native images within these contemporary texts is a clear instance in which the Native is relegated to a subaltern position.

2 The subject position of the native/subaltern has been of special interest in developments of postcolonial theory. See Guha, Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society and Subaltern Studies II. An essential text for considering the agency of the subaltern subject is Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” For a discussion of the figure of the subaltern in Latin America see the “Founding Statement” of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group in The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America edited by Beverley and Oviedo, and Beverley, Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory.
this process can lead us to consider the role of the academy in the continual pro-
duction of the nation’s other, of the academy as a site for the ongoing production
and dissemination of colonial discourses that continue to (de)contextualize Native
cultures today.

In his intellectual biography of Warburg, published in 1986, Ernst Gombrich
mentions that, regarding discussions about Warburg’s trip to America, “more has
been published in English on this episode in Warburg’s life than on any other aspect
of his work” (90). Gombrich would have been astonished to learn of the number of
publications that have appeared since. The irony is that Warburg himself did not
publish anything directly related to his trip, not even this lecture on the Hopi Snake
Ceremony.3

Much of the fascination with Warburg’s lecture is related to its biographical
significance. Many current interpretations see the preparation and delivery of this
lecture as to signifying Warburg’s triumph over mental illness, his ability to coherent-
ly represent an otherwise uncanny encounter with the other, his mastery of the Na-

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3 During the last twenty years or so there has been a substantial surge of publications
about Warburg. The following is a selection of titles relevant to my discussion. Many more
are found in French, German, and Spanish. In addition to Steinberg’s translation of the lec-
ture cited above these publications include: Burke, “Aby Warburg as Historical Anthropol-
ist,” and Iversen, “Aby Warburg and the New Art History,” both in Bredekamp, Diers and
Schoell-Glass; Ginzburg, “From Aby Warburg to E.H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method,” in
Clues Myths, and the Historical Method; Iversen, “Retrieving Warburg’s Tradition,” (this is an
expanded version of the paper delivered at the Hamburg symposium in 1990); Holly, “Un-
writing Iconology;” Schade, “Charcot and the Spectacle of the Hysterical Body: The ‘Pathos
Formula’ as an Aesthetic Staging of the Psychiatric Discourse--A Blind Spot in the Reception
of Warburg;” Diers, “Warburg and the Warburgian Tradition of Cultural History;” Weigel “Aby
Warburg’s Schlangenritual: Reading Culture and Reading Written Texts;” Forster, “Aby War-
burg: His Study of Ritual and Art on Two Continents;” Rampley, “From Symbol to Allegory:
Aby Warburg’s Theory of Art;” Guidi and Mann, Photographs at the Frontier; Wind “Retriev-
ing Warburg’s Tradition;” Buchloh, “Atlas. Warburg’s Paragon? The End of Collage and Pho-
tomontage in Postwar Europe;” Didi-Huberman, “The Portrait, the Individual and the Singu-
ar;” in The Image of the Individual; Rampley, “Archive of Memory: Walter Benjamin’s Ar-
cade Project and Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas;” Kuspit, “Meyer Shapiro’s Jewish Un-
conscious;” Warburg, The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity; Agamben, “Aby Warburg and the
Nameless Science;” Woodfield, Art History as Cultural History; Didi-Huberman, L’image survi-
vante; Mali, “Aby Warburg: History as Ancient Mythology,” in Mythistory; Michaud, Aby
Warburg and the Image in Motion; Freedberg, “Warburg’s Mask: A Study in Idolatr;” Farago,
“Epilogue: Re(f)using Art: Aby Warburg and the Ethics of Scholarship;” Jonas, The Shape, the
Scent, the Feel of Things; Slovin, Obsessed by Art, Aby Warburg; Russell, Between Tradition
and Modernity; Schoell-Glass, Aby Warburg and Anti-Semitism.
tive as image. The following is a contextualization of Warburg’s epistemic frame of reference informing his engagement with Native America.

**The Warburg Lecture: A Nostalgic Performance**

Although the primary reason for Warburg’s trip to the U.S., which he took during the winter of 1895–6, was to attend his brother’s wedding in New York, he soon extended his itinerary to include trips to Washington, D.C. and then on to the deserts of the southwest. This trip, and particularly his various encounters with the Native peoples of the region, had an immediate and lasting impact on his work. Nonetheless, it was not until April 21, 1923, twenty-seven years later, that he delivered his lecture. The great gap between the time of the events he observed and the performance of his lecture is reconciled for him by the power of the photographic images he projected during his talk. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, photographs are often perceived as having the ability to seal experiences. Warburg relied on his capacity to cull from them the encapsulated memories of his journey to the American Southwest taken so many years earlier.

Despite the extensive details that he was able to reproduce from these photographs—his notes for the lecture are rich with visual descriptions and involved anecdotes—he was not interested in rehearsing the particulars of his trip for this lecture. His stated intent was much broader in scope:

> “I cannot promise you more than a series of reflections on those distant memories. I do so in the hope that the direct evidence of the pictures will carry you beyond my words, and give you some idea of a civilization which is dying out, and of a question which is of such paramount importance in our study of civilization in general:—What elements are we entitled to call the essential characteristics of primitive paganism?” (Mainland 277, emphasis added)

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4 Warburg’s lecture on native rituals was in itself a kind of ritual, a performance given at the Bellevue sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, Switzerland where he had been institutionalized for mental illness since 1918. The performative aspect of Warburg’s lecture is crucial when considering that it was delivered “to prove his self-control and gain release from his confinement . . .” (Gombrich 216). Also see Michaud, 173. The translation of 1939 by Mainland states that the lecture was given on April 25. See Warburg, “A Lecture on Serpent Ritual,” 277.
Warburg’s main interest, then, was to present a study of certain symbols, particularly the snake, that he considered universal in order to justify their diachronic endurance, their reemergence in different periods and at diverse locations.

He clearly believed in the durability of images and their meanings. Warburg’s main scholarly pursuit during the time immediately prior to his trip to the United States was the development of a grand theory of symbols. He sought an explanation for what he perceived to be the psychology that guided the resurgence of ancient Greek symbols during the Renaissance. This trip provided what he thought to be the solution. On January 27, 1896, he wrote:

I believe I have found the formula for my psychological law at last, for which I have been searching since 1888. . . . The ritual acts of Pueblo religion display the essential character of the conception of causality among the “primitives” (that is, of people still incapable of differentiating between their own selves and the external world). (Gombrich 91)

Warburg’s visit resulted in his interpretation of the “pagan cosmology” of the Pueblo Indian as belonging somewhere along the “evolution from primitive paganism, through the highly-developed pagan culture of classical antiquity, down to modern civilized man” (Mainland 277). Within Warburg’s evolutionary schema, the Hopi are living examples of primitive man, whom he believed to be “indestructible . . . [and] who remains the same throughout all time . . .” (Michaud 302).

Warburg’s view of the Native was informed by contemporary scholarly work on primitivism and a universalist perspective on culture. In fact, the sort of thinking that led him to develop his “psychological law” can be found in the earlier work of Edward B. Tylor, the founder of cultural anthropology in Britain. Tylor wrote that, “The classic Greeks had inherited from their barbaric ancestors a doctrine of the universe essentially similar to that of the North American Indian, the West African, and the Siberian” (206).

Although he was operating within a Eurocentric epistemic horizon, what is

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5 This theory would lead to his formulation of Pathosformel, or pathos formulas, artistic conventions used during the Renaissance for portraying intense emotions. These principles, derived from antiquity, were applied “wherever there was an intention to snap the bonds imposed by the Middle Ages on expression.” Warburg, Die Erneuerung der heidnischen Antike, cited in Ginzburg, 20. See also Didi-Huberman, L’image survivante.
curious about Warburg’s observations is that his descriptions of the Natives he encountered do not always locate them at the primordial beginning of time but, instead, place them in a constant state of transition.\footnote{This is not to say that Europe was of one mind about its perception of the constitution of the other during this period, or, for that matter, during any period. It is important to differentiate between Europe and Eurocentrism. As Ella Shohat and Robert Stam emphasize: “The term ‘Eurocentric’ does not have to do with origins but with epistemologies” (Shohat and Stam 57). For a discussion of the contested development of racial theories during the nineteenth century, see Young, “The Complicity of Culture: Arnold’s Ethnographic Politics,” in Colonial Desire.} The epigraph I cited at the beginning of this chapter, quoting Warburg’s description of the drawings produced by the Hopi, is followed by a clarification: the marks on the vessels are “an intermediary stage between image and sign, between realistic representation and script.” While the marks are legible, they are not literary; they are not yet writing. He goes on to describe the Hopi houses as a “cross between a dwelling-place and a fortress” (Mainland 279). In terms of food production, “the Pueblo Indian is not only a tiller of the soil: he is a hunter too.” Warburg summarizes that “the existence side by side of rational cultivation and imaginative magic reveals the heterogeneous state of transition in which the Pueblo Indian lives” (Mainland 282). In their belief systems, their forms of communication, their architecture, and their means of nourishment, the Hopi are, for Warburg, in a state of transformation, between a primitive and civilized existence.

As I mentioned above, Warburg’s conceptualizations of the Native were, to a great extent, a product of many contemporary influences. Gombrich’s biography attempts to distill the vast archive of notebooks, annotations, and correspondence in order to locate some of the major figures in Warburg’s education. He mentions teachers such as Hermann Usener, the scholar of classics who introduced Warburg to the psychological approach to the study of Greek myths, and Karl Lamprecht, the historian who suggested the study of quotidian art as a means of tracing the evolution of periods. He also noted the influence of books such as Tito Vignoli’s Mythus und Wissenschaft and E.B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture, which discuss animism in evolutionary terms and locate “the primitive” as a link in this develop-
ment. Although Gombrich mentions many others, this sample helps us to understand the intellectual appeal of the Hopi snake ritual for Warburg. It provided him with an opportunity to witness the performative use of symbols in animistic religious rituals. He was intimately familiar with depictions of similar rituals figured on ancient Greek pottery and had studied the Renaissance reproduction of these antique images. This was a unique opportunity for him to see the drama of what he believed to be the same kind of ritual come to life.8

Warburg’s interests were many and he was not inhibited in exploring various disciplines in search of connections and influences, no matter how far afield. And it is this unrestrained approach that holds so much appeal for today’s scholars. His pursuit of diachronic relationships between ancient Greece and the Renaissance inevitably led him to the present, and to anthropology.

Warburg’s interdisciplinary approach, which he described as a reaction against the disciplinary Grenzwächtertum (border policing) prevalent at the time, was indeed broad (Ginzburg 1989 26). It is not surprising, therefore, that as a trained art historian he was drawn to anthropology. It is at the end of the nineteenth century that these two fields were undergoing similar transformations in their institutionalization as academic disciplines. Their intersection points not only to some shared methodologies but also to similar consequences in their development of definitions of race and culture. In terms of their engagement with Native cultures, these disciplines played a significant role in the production of “the other,” mainly through their analysis and management of material culture.9

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7 Tylor devotes a section of his work to animism, which includes a comparative study of snake worship among various cultures around the world.

8 In addition to his academic interests in performances, there were other interests that drove Warburg out west. He states that “A will to the Romantic as compounded with a desire to occupy myself in a more manly way than had yet been granted me.” He also seems to be guided by a touristic impulse, at one point thinking of going on to Japan from San Francisco (Mainland 1939 301, 186).

9 Psychology was yet another discipline that was also effective at this time in formulating ideas of culture, civility, and the other. As Robert Young outlines in his analysis of the development of racialist theories, by the middle of the nineteenth century scientific theories of race often involved interdisciplinary approaches that “highlighted essentializing physiological and anatomical dissimilarities as the main basis for analyzing racial differences; comparative psychology then traced the mental differences between the races, often
One of the more influential anthropologists of Warburg’s time was Adolf Bastian, who was convinced that the mission of anthropology was to salvage the last remnants of rapidly disappearing societies:10

The demise of primitive societies is foreshadowed by historical laws which can neither be halted nor diverted. The sole justification for our interference in them can be the goal of salvaging the lingering last survivals of those originals which are now swiftly disappearing, and putting them on paper or in museums. In this way, we can provide future generations with the research materials which they will not be able to gather, but from which they . . . will be able to write a history of mankind. (Koepping 215)

These teleological historical laws, which Bastian adopted from Hegel, predicted the destruction of societies such as the Hopi.

Bastian was the founder of the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin in 1873, whose mission was to comprehensively collect and display the vast global presence of the German empire at the time. The museum intended to “showcase the international reach of the Kaiser’s power in the cultural realm, especially in rivalry with capitals of other imperialistic powers like London and Paris, where simultaneously immense art historical, archeological and ethnological collections were being gathered.” The methodology endorsed by Bastian for the museum was a komparativ-genetische (comparative-genetic) approach, a method that required the collecting of large numbers of objects from which some general observations could be made (Bolz and Sanner 30, 32). This meant the organization of large expeditions at tremendous expense, which the German government and wealthy individuals readily endorsed.

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the myth of the “vanishing Indian,” which worked to detract from the genocidal efforts of the U.S., at the same time justified the massive accumulation of Native material culture. The disappearance combining craniological discussions of brain size with estimates of degrees of cultural advance” (Young 1995 66).

10 Bastian’s influence on Warburg is most apparent in his adoption of the “Ethnologisches Bilderbuch,” which accompanied Bastian’s Die Welt in ihren Spiegelungen unter dem Wandel des Völkergedankens, as a model for his “Mnemosyne” project (Gombrich 285).
of the Native is accompanied by an emphasis on the materialization of Native culture, a reification that allows for the international transaction and accumulation of Native material culture. And it was museums that were at the center of this trafficking of cultures.

The exhibition of Native cultural products, and at times the Native producers themselves, within these institutions was seen as a marker of progress, which, at least in the U.S., coincided with western expansion. It is no coincidence that at the height of Western imperialism the death knell for Native peoples should be struck while their goods were methodically accumulated. By this time, this process had become part of the systematic construction of a nation’s patrimony, an integral part of the historical narration of a nation’s origins. As the anthropologist Virginia Dominguez points out, objects were, and continue to be, collected “no longer because of their intrinsic value but as metonyms for the people who produced them. And the people who produced them are the objects because of their perceived contribution to our understanding of our own historical trajectory” (1986 548).

Although Warburg did not originally intend to go to the southwest to collect Native art, this visit proved to be pivotal in establishing a connection between Bastian’s museum and those white settlers living in the southwest who made a living from selling Native cultural artifacts. Warburg had befriended the Mennonite missionary Henry Voth, who was an expert on Hopi culture and was Warburg’s host during his visit to Oraibi. In addition to his ethnographic work, Voth was also a savvy businessman credited with helping to build the Field Museum’s initial collection (Michaud 368). Another contact that proved valuable was Thomas Keam, whose collection of more than 3,500 Hopi and Navajo objects became part of Harvard’s Peabody Museum (Guidi and Mann 42, 43). Both men eventually sold large quantities of objects to the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin, with Warburg acting as intermediary. Warburg’s own collection of 136 Native objects, most of which he accumulated during this trip, was eventually donated to the Hamburg Völkerkunde Museum (Steinberg 1995, 110).

Voth’s relationships with the Hopi seems to have been strained by his disregard for many of their spiritual protocols. See Lippard, Partial Recall, 21. Also see Steinberg, 110-11. For the role of Voth, Keam, and Warburg in furnishing Hopi materials for the Museum für
The repercussions of Warburg’s brief involvement with collecting in the Southwest continued after his departure. These practices were often deceptive and coercive. The following incident illustrates the attitudes of collector to the communities with whom they did business. In the summer of 1898, Paul Ehrenreich, a researcher with the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin interested in continuing to increase their collection, was referred to Voith by Warburg. Ehrenreich was successful in bringing back a substantial collection of cultural artifacts from the Hopi, including 26 kachina dolls. He recounts some of the problems he encountered: “On another round through the village, I procured some katschina dolls (tihu), which were more trouble than I expected. After all, they belong to the children, who do not part easily with their toys” (Bolz and Sanner 116). Given the impact of Warburg’s involvement in the development of substantial collections of Native objects by German institutions, it is astonishing to consider that it was the result of a trip that appears to have had no premeditated agenda. It is clear, however, that Warburg was exercising collecting impulses that were influenced by scholars such as Bastian, whose ethnographic work articulated the ethos of empire at the end of the nineteenth century.

Curtis and Bastian

I would like to return to Bastian’s methodology, the komparativ-genetische (comparative-genetic) approach to building his museal archive, in order to contrast it to Curtis’s archival project, discussed in the previous chapter. I suggest that these two projects represent two distinct approaches: Bastian’s as part of an imperialist endeavor and Curtis’s as a nationalist undertaking. By establishing these two approaches to the production of the archive, I hope to be able to situate Warburg within this schema. My purpose is not so much to locate Warburg within nineteenth-century Euro-American rhetorics of expansionism, but, rather, to attempt to locate him, and his representation of the Native, within today’s discourses on globalization.

A way to frame this discussion is to consider the methodologies used by Bas-

Völkerkunde, see Bolz and Sanner, “The Older Hopi Collection,” 113-124. Benedetta Cestelli Guidi calculates Warburg’s collection to number 124 objects (Guidi and Mann 1998, 47).
tian and Curtis within a theoretical process outlined by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). While both Bastian’s and Curtis’s works were based on the accumulation of data, their methods of using that data to develop and substantiate theories about Native cultures differs substantially. Peirce’s work can help to differentiate these two approaches.  

Peirce focused on analyzing the ways in which we develop general rules, or hypotheses, about a variety of phenomena. His examination of the logic we can use in gaining scientific insights led him to identify three types of inferences: deduction, induction, and abduction (Peirce 1998 234). While the first two types are simple to define, the last, abduction, is an idea that is more elusive, shifting in meaning within Peirce’s own work (Deutscher 470).

Deduction is the process by which we gain insights by narrowing a general rule to a specific case. Peirce’s example is as follows:

*Rule.*—All the beans from this bag are white.

*Case.*—These beans are from this bag.

*: Result.*—These beans are white. (Peirce 188)

We begin with a firm premise, followed by a related factual condition, which then leads to the conclusion that is, necessarily, truthful. Applying this to our discussion, we could equate this approach to an analysis of Curits’s fundamental general rule: the Native is vanishing. He then documents a variety of subjects that are elaborately and ethnographically inscribed as Native. These are cases that lead him to the “logical” truth: this particular Native group is vanishing. Thus, his deduction method would claim:

*Rule.*—All Native Americans are vanishing.

*Case.*—The “Navaho” are Native Americans, as detailed in his study.

*: Result.*—The “Navaho” are vanishing.

And this deductive reasoning is carried out in volume after volume of his project.

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12 Carlo Ginzburg has carefully outlined the influence of Peirce’s logics on late nineteenth-century thinkers, including Warburg. See Ginzburg, “Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: Clues and Scientific Method” and “From Aby Warburg to E.H. Gombrich: A Problem of Method.”
Curtis's method is merely the application of a theory that he took as his starting point.

Induction, on the other hand, is an inference made from a specific case to generate a general rule, the formulation of a hypothesis. Peirce's example was:

**Case.**—These beans are from this bag.

**Result.**—These beans are white.

**: Rule.**—All the beans from this bag are white. (Peirce 1992 188)

For Peirce, this was a less accurate inference that required some extrapolation. In many respects, this is merely an inversion of deduction that, in terms of scientific veracity, does not always lead to a sound conclusion. (In terms of Peirce's example, the fact that the sample beans are all white does not necessarily mean that all the beans in the bag are white.)

However, there is a third category of inference, a blend of deduction and induction that Peirce called abduction, which he believed was a process that allowed for a more creative approach to seeking truth. His example was:

**Rule.**—All the beans from this bag are white.

**Result.**—These beans are white.

**: Case.**—These beans are from this bag. (Peirce 1992 188)

While the process begins from a solid premise, as with deduction, the next step is already to come up with a hypothesis. The conclusion is then an exemplary case. While the process requires a higher tolerance for improbability, the rewards are the development of innovative and creative propositions. The process requires a jump in logic, what the linguist Guy Deutscher describes as a “conceptual leap from data to an explaining hypothesis” (471). Peirce vividly explains the abductive process:

A mass of facts is before us. We go through them. We examine them. We find them a confused snarl, an impenetrable jungle. We are unable to hold them in our minds. We endeavor to set them down upon paper; but they seem so multiplex intricate that we can neither satisfy ourselves that what we have set down represents the facts, nor can we get any clear idea of what it is that we have set down. But suddenly, while we are poring over our digest of the facts and are endeavoring to set them into order, it occurs to us that if we were to assume something to be true that we do not know to
be true, these facts would arrange themselves luminously. That is abduction. (Peirce 1998 531-532)

What Peirce proposed was an approach to developing hypotheses, what he called a process of conjecturing.

Peirce also proposed a logical sequence among these three inferences that begins with abduction:

Abduction . . . is merely preparatory. It is the first step of scientific reasoning, as induction is the concluding step . . . . Abduction makes its start from the facts, without, at the outset, having any particular theory in view, though it is motivated by the feeling that a theory is needed to explain the surprising facts. Induction makes its start from a hypothesis which seems to recommend itself, without at the outset having any particular facts in view, though it feels the need of facts to support the theory. Abduction seeks a theory. Induction seeks facts. (Peirce 1998 106)\(^{13}\)

If we take these to be two separate operations, we can say that abduction depends on an accumulation of data from which a hypothesis can be distilled while induction begins with the hypothesis that is then proven by the accumulation of supporting data. Either approach depends on the development of an archive, an accumulation of facts. These archives, however, seem to have different natures: the archive demanded by abduction appears innocent while the inductive archive is highly motivated.

If we apply these models to Bastian and Curtis, Bastian’s method would fall into the abductive category. His accumulation of objects “can provide future generations with the research material . . . from which they . . . will be able to write a history of mankind” (Koepping 215). His collection’s historical narrative has not been predetermined but is, for the moment, deferred. Curtis’s project, however, is already guided by a narrative. The hypothesis that “seeks facts” for Curtis is the nation-state; his accumulation of images depicting the last vestiges of Native Ameri-

\(^{13}\) Although Peirce insists that abduction begins without any “particular theory in view,” he does admit that it “is motivated by the feeling that a theory is needed.” It is not clear how thoughtfully this feeling is considered, a feeling that ultimately guides the selection of facts gathered, a feeling that already may be something of a hypothesis in itself.
can life, the dwindling images of vanishing Indians, is a salvaging of Native culture as national patrimony.

We can locate these two projects, and their corresponding methodologies, within a global political context. In order to do this we need to consider the relationship between abduction and induction on the one hand, and empire and nation on the other. Bastian’s abductive process, with its open-ended accumulation of cultural “facts” awaiting the proper opportunity to narrate the submission of the other, can be seen as demonstrating an imperialist impulse, while Curtis’s inductive approach, the gathering of images that substantiate the demise of the Native, could be described as a nationalist project.

However, these operations are not opposites, nor are they discontinuous. In fact, Peirce suggested that abduction, which he believed to be “the only logical operation which introduces a new idea,” could then be followed by induction, which “does nothing but determine a value” (Peirce 1998 216). In other words, one begins by developing an argument and then proceeds to develop a proof. In a similar way, empire and the nation-state are not mutually exclusive. One can even say that the nation-state is an extension, at least in a modular form, of empire. As the Marxist theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have recently observed: “The sovereignty of the nation-state was the cornerstone of the imperialisms that European powers constructed throughout the modern era” (Hardt and Negri xii).14

In suggesting a homology between the workings of abductive/inductive reasoning and imperialism/nationalism, I am not arguing that the ideologies of these methodologies are essential and predetermined. Rather, the comparison is meant as a rhetorical strategy that enables us to map these methodologies within the dynamics of power at the end of the nineteenth century and, thus, allows us to locate the archival projects of Bastian and Curtis within the context of imperialism.

If these two projects are aligned as methodological approaches that seek to represent the other within an imperialist schema, where may we place Warburg’s approach?

14 Benedict Anderson has also considered Hugh Seton-Watson’s concept of a hybrid entity, an “official nationalism,” a “willed merger of nation and dynastic empire” (86).
Working outside of academia, and with the aid of his family’s banking fortune, Warburg had developed an unconventional, inventive, and at times eccentric means of navigating his scholarly pursuits. His unique approach to art history developed despite, or, rather, because of, his being a member of Hamburg’s cultural elite. Access to the family’s wealth greatly facilitated his intellectual mischievousness. The story is often recounted that Warburg gave up the right to his inheritance as the eldest child to his brother Max in exchange for being able to purchase as many books as he wished for the rest of his life. (Michaud 204, 176) Recent scholarship often implies that Warburg took an antagonistic stance to his family’s capitalism. However, it is also possible to conceive of his focus on the cultural as complementing his family’s emphasis on the economic. His work has resisted any simple categorization and is characterized by its disregard for disciplinary borders and uneasiness about arriving at any fixed conclusions.

One thing is clear; he was not tolerant of approaches to art that, like the work of his contemporary Bernard Berenson, emphasized form and style while glossing art’s social function (Michaud 178). In his notes for the snake ritual lecture, Warburg reflects on what drove him on to the southwest from New York. He explains that he:

had developed a downright disgust with aestheticizing art history. The formal contemplation of images—not conceived as a biologically necessary product situated between the practices of religion and art (which I understood only later)—seemed to me to give rise to such a sterile trafficking in words . . . (Michaud 301)

Dissatisfied with contemporary art historical methodologies, he was attracted to other fields that allowed him to pursue what today may be referred to as the performative aspects of art. Thus, he was drawn to disciplines such as archaeology, sociology, psychology, and anthropology, disciplines that took into account the ways in which the meaning of art is inclusive of its cultural function.15

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15 For a brief outline of the major figures in anthropology who influenced Warburg, see Peter Burke, “History and Anthropology in 1900,” in Guidi and Mann, 20-27. On Warburg’s ongoing correspondence with Boas and their thoughts on uniting art history and anthropology, see Michaud, 178-79.
And it was primarily anthropologists working on Native American cultures who enticed him to make his way out west, scholars such as Jesse Walter Fewkes, James Mooney, Frank Hamilton Cushing, and Franz Boas. (Steinberg 1995, 61) Fewkes was particularly influential in arranging Warburg’s itinerary to include a visit the Hopi, a group that he had spent a great amount of time studying and whose writings on the Hopi snake dance must have enticed Warburg. Having met such a range of scholars who willingly shared their work with him, and given his interests to go beyond the confines of art history, it is easy to see why Warburg embarked on such journey.  

Although his trip lacked a clear agenda, it is obvious that Warburg’s pursuits were not altogether whimsical. Intent on finding connections between ancient Greek ecstatic rituals and their resurgence in Renaissance art, he sought to witness a performance of what he believed to be very similar rituals. He was intrigued, as were many of his teachers and peers, with the persistent reappearance of antique forms, what he referred to as das Nachleben der Antike, the survival of classical antiquity (Gombrich 16).

What is different about this project is that while many professional anthropologists, and amateur ethnographers such as Curtis, were attempting to rescue the remnants of what they perceived as disappearing Native cultures, Warburg looked to Native cultures for the survival of antique symbolism. The difference between these projects can be compared to the difference between the nostalgic and traumatic approaches to historiography mentioned in the previous chapter. While a nostalgic historiographical approach seeks to identify the projection onto the past of a vision formulated in the present, those using trauma theory to analyze cultural history look for the resurgence of a particular manifestation of the past in the present. Warburg searched for the traumatic return of antiquity while Curtis nostalgic gaze anticipated the mourning of the Native’s demise.

Another difference in Warburg’s engagement with Native America is that his methodology resisted a straightforward dialectic approach, such as that proposed

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16 Fewkes’s essays on the snake dances have been compiled recently and published as *Hopi Snake Ceremonies* (Albuquerque: Avanyu Publishing, 2001).
by Hegel, which attempts to attain truth by a continual process of synthesizing contradictory positions. Instead of settling discordant hypotheses, Warburg studied the tensions produced by their incompatibilities, dwelling on their state of irresolution. The art historian Margaret Iversen has emphasized that: “because Warburg’s interest was in following the oscillations of culture rather than in establishing an authoritative point of view, he focused on moments that were in a heterogeneous state of transition” (1993 546). This was certainly the case in his observations of the Hopi, as described above. 17

Warburg’s reluctance to determine the significance of cultural differences is contrary to the attempts by many of his contemporaries to resolve these differences. By determining the significance of cultural difference, by producing knowledge about the other in order to better understand the self, scholars at the end of the nineteenth century employed various methodologies, most notably Hegel’s dialectic, in order to assimilate the other.

Hegel posited an explanation of the process by which an individual gains self-consciousness: “Self-consciousness exists in-and-for-itself while (and because) it exists in-and-for-itself for-another; that is, it exists only as something recognized” (Hegel 50). Hegel emphasized that cognition, the coming to self-consciousness of the individual, is dependent on and simultaneous with being recognized by another. This model, often referred to as the master/slave dialectic, is applicable not only to the self-consciousness of the individual but can also be used to think about the ways in which whole communities, including those that at the end of the nineteenth century were developing into nation-states, came to cohere as such. And it is the application of Hegel’s dialectic by Warburg’s contemporaries that I am emphasizing. The postcolonial critic Robert Young notes the similarities between Hegel’s philosophical model, allegorizing the coming into self-consciousness of the individual, and the imperialist drive to absorb the other on a global scale:

Hegel articulates a philosophical structure of the appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge which uncannily simulates the project of nine-

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17 His Mnemosyne project, which consisted of the juxtaposing of images from different periods, media, and cultures in order to consider connections across these differences, is an excellent illustration of his approach.
teenth-century imperialism; the construction of knowledges which all operate through forms of expropriation and incorporation of the other mimics at a conceptual level the geographical and economic absorption of the non-European world by the West. (Young 1990 3)

Warburg’s engagement with Native culture was more tangential than many of his contemporaries, such as Curtis, who focused on Native Americans, and their cultures, as sources for the production of a truly “American” identity.

Although it is difficult to locate Warburg’s methodology within a nineteenth-century framework, his eclectic approach has been of great interest to many scholars today who want to compare it to contemporary interdisciplinary approaches to the analysis of visual culture. Iversen has recommended that, “rather than criticizing, we may choose to enlist him as an ally.” She proposes that “Warburg’s approach anticipates in many ways feminist critiques of science and phallogocentric logic” (Iversen 1993 541). Michael Ann Holly, who has played a key role in the development of the field of visual studies, was an early proponent for reevaluating Warburg’s usefulness today. She saw his work as, itself, a resurgence at the end of the twentieth century of a particular theoretical approach to the history of art. She wondered:

Might we not say in some general way that the new art history could be read as an indication of the return of the repressed—a resurfacing of the early theoretical unconscious of the discipline into the contemporary fascination with critical theory? (1993 24)

The return of the repressed that Holly describes does appear to be the manifestation of a symptom, although it is a symptom of something difficult to diagnose.

The usefulness of Warburg and his enigmatic methodology has been varied. In addition to being enlisted for Iversen’s feminist project and Holly’s critique of art history, Warburg has also been useful to cultural historian Michael Steinberg, whose translation of the snake ritual lecture was an opportunity to discuss Warburg’s Judaism and the parallel Steinberg sees “between the Hopi and the Jews as primitives in an expanding world defined by economic, technological, and cultural modernization” (1995 86). Film historian and curator Philippe-Alain Michaud has also used Warburg to consider the representation of motion and its eventual enact-
ment through the cinematic apparatus at the end of the nineteenth century. Warburg has become a useful figure for a variety of methodological approaches that attempt to unsettle dogmatic disciplinarity.

What gets lost in all these recent treatments of Warburg, most of which emphasize his lecture on the Hopi snake dance, are the Hopi themselves. This is the case even when it is considered, as literary critic Sigrid Weigel has, that “Warburg’s decidedly problematic conceptual structure is a product of his time: the evolutionistic assumptions on which Warburg’s concepts rest lead to his misunderstanding other cultures.” She proposes that “we should take the fact that his texts strike us as strange and cause irritation as the point of departure for addressing his way of thinking . . .” (1995 139). Weigel points out that the Hopi in Warburg’s lecture function as ciphers that are eventually replaced with the Greeks, a movement from “the strange to the well-known, to classical antiquity, which has a stable place in European pictorial memory” (153). Taking Weigel’s lead in questioning Warburg’s inability to acknowledge the Hopi as a historically distinct culture, we should extend this inquiry to include today’s theoreticians who are unable to see beyond Warburg.

Shifting the Third Man

The unwillingness of Warburg scholars to address the complex, and at times conflicting, histories of the various Hopi pueblos, to consider their historical realities during the time of Warburg’s visit, to take into account the impact of tourism and the continuous reproduction of their sacred ceremonies have had on their culture, says much about the resonances between academic work being produced by Warburg at the turn of the twentieth century and that being produced about Warburg at the turn of the twenty-first century.18

18 This chapter, and to a greater extent this study as a whole, resulted from the frustration I felt while attending a symposium on Aby Warburg at Cornell University on April 2, 1995. The event was organized by Michael Steinberg on the occasion of the release of his translation of Aby Warburg’s “A Lecture on Serpent Ritual.” Because Warburg’s lecture deals extensively with his meditations on Native American religions, I had expected to hear something about the historical and sociological situation of the Hopi as part of the panel discussion, particularly since Cornell University has a highly regarded Native American Studies department. Unfortunately, the Hopi were never substantially addressed. The list of luminary scholars in attendance included Michael Ann Holly, Keith Moxey, Hal Fos-
In order to reconsider the function of the Hopi in the current discussion on Warburg, it may be helpful to introduce the philosopher Michel Serres’s notion of “the third man.” It is part of an analysis of how dialogue between two interlocutors succeeds in spite, or, rather, because of, the interference of a third entity. As Serres explains:

Such a communication (dialogue) is a sort of game played by two interlocutors considered as united against the phenomena of interference and confusion, or against individuals with some stake in interrupting communication. These interlocutors are in no way opposed . . . on the contrary, they are on the same side, tied together by a mutual interest: they battle against noise. . . . To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him: a successful communication is the exclusion of the third man. The most profound dialectical problem is not the Other who is only a variety—or a variation—of the same, it is the problem of the third man. (1982 66-7)

It is important to keep in mind that despite the contradictory nature of the third man—as the interference that allows for successful communication—he is nonetheless essential.19

Applying Serres’s schema to the engagement occurring between Warburg scholars today and Warburg’s archive, it seems clear that the Hopi have come to function as the third man, as a kind of interference, as background noise. Despite the inclusion of vast pictorial representations of ceremonies and vivid descriptions by Warburg, and many others on whom he relied for his view of Native America, today’s commentators have gone out of their way not to include information the Hopi, either contemporary or historical.

Another approach to dialoguing across history is to turn to the third man, in this case the subaltern Hopi, to listen for the voice that has been shut out. What I

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19 Jean Fisher has posited the figure of the trickster as a third man “who mischievously creates noise to engender a new pattern of relations” (Fisher 2003 72).
am proposing is an exchange between today’s cultural historian, the figure of Warburg, and the Hopi. It is an engagement that can still maintain our attention with Warburg, not necessarily as a seminal figure—one of the fathers of art history and innovative interdisciplinarian—but as a facilitator of this exchange. What has made Warburg such a useful figure is his eclectic methodology, an analytical approach that defies any easy formulation. It is precisely the slippery qualities of his method that have made him so attractive and that should continue to be emphasized in his role as interlocutor, at least as a means to further consider the relationships between methodology and imperialism.

For this purpose, we should make a distinction between the interdisciplinarity, which has often been ascribed to Warburg’s analysis, and the less goal-oriented, less teleological approach he employed, which helped him to engage in an ongoing process of inquiry. The former, after all, was what allowed for the systematic production of knowledge about the Other essential for the imperialist project. Robert Young has pointed out how, in terms of the development of theories of race during the nineteenth century, academic disciplines came to cohere and reflect the ideology of race:

In the nineteenth century racial theory, substantiated and “proved” by various forms of science such as comparative and historical philology, anatomy, anthropometry (including osteometry, craniology, craniometry and pelvimetry), physiology, physiognomy and phrenology, became in turn endemic not just to other forms of science, such as biology and natural history, to say nothing of palaeontology, psychology, zoology and sexology, but was also used as a general category of understanding that extended to theories of anthropology, archaeology, classics, ethnology, geography, geology, folklore, history, language, law, literature and theology, and thus dispersed from almost every academic discipline to permeate definitions of culture and nation. Imperialistic doctrines of the diffusion of cultures describe equally well the way in which theories based on race spread from discipline to discipline and became one of the major organizing axioms of knowledge in general. (Young 1995 93)

The articulation of racial theory across such a vast array of academic disciplines, so
critical for a comprehensive epistemic production of empire’s other, may make us apprehensive to celebrate it as an instance of interdisciplinarity, at least in the ways in which interdisciplinarity is currently invoked. In fact, today we use the term interdisciplinarity to describe a project such as Young’s—or that of Edward Said’s in his development of the notion of Orientalism—which requires the examination of various disciplines in order to untangle the discursive formation of race or the Orient, respectively. The deconstruction of the interdisciplinary production of the other during the height of imperialism is only possible today through a similarly interdisciplinary approach, such as that developed by postcolonial theory.

Warburg’s method does not easily fit the category of imperialist interdisciplinarity outlined by Young. Although there is no doubt that Warburg employs a Eurocentric perspective, particularly in his collecting of Native artifacts, there is a reluctance on his part to draw any hard conclusions about his engagement with Native Americans. In his notes for the lecture he explicitly states:

I do not want my presentation of images from the life of the Pueblo Indians . . . to be taken as “results” . . . of a supposedly superior knowledge or science . . . I also do not want the slightest trace of blasphemous pseudoscience to be found in this comparative search for the eternally constant Indianness within the helpless human soul. (Michaud 296)

In terms of categorizing his methodology, it may be helpful to consider a similar approach described by the artist and critic Jean Fisher as syncretism. She explains it as,

a contingent affiliation of disparate terms capable of shifting positions or altering relations depending on circumstances, as well as possessing permeable boundaries . . . a dynamic process, syncretism allows that between disparate factors there is no simple translation, but an element of untranslatability which is itself a potential space of productive renewal. (Fisher 1996 36)

In this case, what may be most productive about Warburg’s engagement with Native America is not the psychological formulas he saw exemplified by the performances he witnessed but how Warburg’s syncretic approach can maintain the significance of the Hopi snake dance as untranslatable, and, therefore, constantly productive of historical interpretation.
To my knowledge, no Warburg scholar has discussed the significance of the snake dance for the Hopi, independent of Warburg's observations. Yet, the dance comes to have extra significance during the time of Warburg's visit since its ownership becomes the focus of great contention, leading to civil strife and the complete reorganization of the Hopi community at Oraibi.

In 1887, about ten years before Warburg's sojourn, the U.S. Congress passed the General Allotment Act, or Dawes Act, which was meant to "end the collective ownership of Indian lands and break up traditional tribal governments" (Rushforth and Upham 125). Instead, it encouraged private ownership, which allowed for land acquisition by those outside the tribes. It was a way to break up collectively owned property into parcels that could be easily sold to anyone. The act also compelled Hopi children to attend Western schools, a demand that had a strong impact on the political dynamics within the Hopi groups, particularly the Oraibi Pueblo that Warburg describes.

The passing of this legislation, and general efforts to assimilate the tribe, divided the community into those for and against the plans of the Office of Indian Affairs (Rushforth and Upham 125). In 1891, those hostile to the U.S. government policies "initiated a formal, ceremonial declaration of war against the United States" (126). This upheaval had a direct effect on the significance of the religious ceremonies being performed. Different factions claimed ownership of the various ceremonies:

Through this period [the mid-1890's], members of the rival factions refused to participate in each other's ceremonies . . . This religious or ritual cleavage (that leaders of the political factions fomented) intensified to the point where each group conducted its own complete ceremonial cycle each year. (127)

Clearly, these ceremonies were not the stable, timeless rituals Warburg envisioned. The struggle over the snake dance eventually led to the permanent division of the

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20 One instance within recent Warburg studies in which an attempt is made to provide a historical context of Hopi culture is an essay by the Danish historian of religion Armin W. Geertz, whose cursory overview does not mention the snake dance at all. See A. Geertz, "Pueblo Cultural History."
Peter Whiteley has analyzed the ownership and use of ritual ceremonies at Oraibi. He claims that for the religious leaders of the mesas, knowledge of the meanings of rituals was power and therefore much was kept from the common Oraibi, and, of course, from outsiders (139). Whiteley even claims that the split of the Oraibi was orchestrated by their leaders in order to reinvigorate, by first destroying, rituals they felt had lost their potency (256). Rushford and Upham agree with this conclusion and add that the religious elite at Oraibi “did not use their power over uninformed Hopis to encourage participation in religious movements originating outside Hopi culture. They used their power to destroy Oraibi, as foretold in Hopi mythology” (147).

Of course, these accounts are Western interpretations of events that began to unfold at about the time of Warburg’s visit to Oraibi. My purpose in providing them is to point to the availability of historical materials that help to further contextualize Warburg’s travels in the Southwest. They point to situations that may have been outside Warburg’s purview but that are clearly within the sight of today’s commentators.

Although Warburg makes a point of explaining that he never actually witnessed the spectacle of the snake dance, he attempts, along with those who have translated and reconstructed his lecture, to reproduce a seamless narrative that maintains the ethnographic vividness of a participant observer. The images illustrating the snake dance were supplied by people like Henry Voth. Warburg recounts how Voth had gained the complete trust of the inhabitants of Oraibi: “After many years of associating with the Indians Voth had gained their trust by fulfilling his missionary duty as little as possible” (Michaud 315). This contrasts sharply with a later, more extensive, account by Don C. Talayesva, member of the Oraibi community:

The land was very dry, the crops suffered, and even the Snake dance failed to bring much rain. We tried to discover the reason for our plight,

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and remembered the Rev. Voth who had stolen so many of our ceremonial secrets and had even carried off sacred images and altars to equip a museum and become a rich man. When he had worked here in my boyhood, the Hopi were afraid of him and dared not lay their hands on him or any other missionary, lest they be jailed by the Whites. During the ceremonies this wicked man would force his way into the kiva and write down everything that he saw. He wore shoes with solid heels, and when the Hopi tried to put him out of the kiva he would kick them. He came back to Oraibi on a visit and took down many more names. Now I was grown, educated in the Whites’ school, and had no fear of this man. When I heard that he was in my mother’s house I went over and told him to get out. I said, “You break the commandments of your own God. He had ordered you never to steal or to have any other gods before him. He has told you to avoid all graven images; but you have stolen ours and set them up in your museum. This makes you a thief and an idolater who can never go to heaven.” I knew that the Hopi Cloud People despised this man, and even though he was now old and wore a long beard, I had a strong desire to seize him by the collar and kick him off the mesa. (252)

It is clear from this description of Voth that, given his short time in the Southwest, Warburg had a very limited view of the various situations he encountered.

Because of the exploitation of these ceremonies by outsiders, especially missionaries and tourists, and attempts by the U.S. government to ban them, it is not surprising that the Hopi established a prohibition on the photographing of ceremonies at Oraibi early on. Warburg was aware of this when he visited the area. He relates that: “Because [Voth] possessed their trust to an unusual degree, it was possible to photograph them during their dance, which otherwise they never allow because of their aversion to having their images reproduced” (Michaud 2004, 315). It is important to emphasize that Warburg uses “reproduced” rather than “produced.” The emphasis of the restrictions on photographing ceremonies seems to have much to do with the Hopi’s lack of control over the consequent dissemination and discursive framing of the images. Despite knowing about the Hopi restrictions on the reproduction of ceremonial images, Warburg included
them in his lecture. And many of those same images continue to be reproduced with every publication on Warburg’s lecture. It is possible that Warburg felt there was enough of a distance between him and his subjects of study to disregard their injunctions, a distance that some of today’s scholars of Indigenous cultures continue to perceive.22

Despite the problematic role Warburg played in the representation of Native cultures, his collection of observations, imagery, and artifacts contain the potential, as does the work of Curtis, for a reconsideration of the discourses they have generated. As many other tourists who visited and continue to visit the area, Warburg found what he was looking for in the southwest. However, unlike most tourists, he maintained an intellectual interest in the Hopi that lasted until the end of his life.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have taken Warburg’s lecture on the Hopi snake ritual, and the vast literature it has engendered, as another archival site where a nationalist representation of Native American culture can be located. Unlike Edward Curtis’s project, this archive represents a European perspective, one that may be seen as indexical of the production of the Native at the height of Europe’s imperial expansion.

An analysis of Warburg’s materials has also provided a means of thinking about the ideological implications of academic methodologies. Looking at the work of his contemporaries, particularly that of Adolf Bastian, gives us an idea of how methods that relied on the massive accumulation of data, which would eventually yield “truths” about the other, worked in the hierarchizing of other cultures in the name of empire. In contrast, by categorizing Warburg’s method as syncretic, I hope to defer, as he did, any steadfast conclusions about his engagement with Native Americans.

Much of my concern has been about the invisibility of the history of Hopi in

22 This lack of sensibility is not solely due to the ignorance of those scholars outside the subspecialty of Native art history. Historians of native art, often non-Natives, continually disregard these prohibitions.
Warburg’s lecture, and in the subsequent treatments, despite their high visibility in the photographic representations of their ceremonies. This is the kind of situation the Native art critic Theresa Harlan (Santo Domingo and Jemez Pueblo) refers to as the “absence of an indigenous presence.” However, pointing at this absent presence and, therefore, making their invisibility visible, allows us to appreciate the productive possibilities of an invisibility dictated by the Hopi themselves, an appreciation for the presence of their self-determined absence.  

In the next chapter, I will examine the museum, a space that demands visibility, in order to consider how its location—its site specificity—frames a visitor’s experience. This look at the performative space of the museum will take into account its function as producer of narratives about the Native while also noting the various possibilities for disrupting and supplanting them.

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23 Harlan credits the term to the Yuchi/Creek photographer Richard Ray Whitman (Harlan 1999:135).