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Merja Mahrt

Values of German Media Users

VS RESEARCH

Values of German Media Users
1986-2007

Merja Mahrt

Values of German Media Users

1986-2007

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. D. C. van den Boom
ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties
ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel
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Merja Mahrt

Summary

Values of German media users, 1986-2007

Values have been discussed in connection to the changes brought to the German TV landscape since the introduction of the dual system in 1984. Yet, on such occurrences arguments have rarely, if at all, been based on reliable information about differences in televised values. Nor have values of the *audience* of channels or genres been considered. This study offers a starting point for such an endeavor, focusing on the role values play for people's media choices.

In a theoretical overview, values are situated in a framework of overlapping spheres that influence people in the adoption of values. Social learning is the main mechanism behind this process of socialization. Values define what is desirable or not and how one should behave in a given situation according to the rules of one's society. As stable basic traits close to an individual's personality, values play a part in the building of motives that finally result in behavior. With regard to media, a well-established gratification of media use is the reinforcement of one's own values and worldviews. Based on the finding that mediated value patterns differ across outlets and types of content, I assume that different values should lead people to prefer different media over others.

In a secondary analysis of large annual surveys representative for the German population, relationships between people's personal values (social and materialist ones) and their use of print newsmedia, television channels and genres are studied from 1986 to 2007. I have found hints toward correspondence between values presented in media, use of these media and values of the users. I see these consistencies as due to selective exposure, with people turning to media (contents) that would confirm rather than question their personal values. In particular, I have found small, but systematically recurring effects of individual values on TV genre preferences as well as on use of TV channels and print outlets.

Generally speaking, *social* values tend to lead to reading newspapers and newsmagazines, left-wing ones being a little more preferred than conservative titles. On the other hand, people with strong *materialist* values favor conservative

outlets and commercial television. Education plays a role in this respect as the highly educated seem to be more media-savvy when it comes to choosing outlets that match their values.

As for genres, social values go along a preference for genres that present these same values more often, such as family series and medical dramas, or that offer information for people who like to be up to date about what is going on in the world and in their society. Materialist people were more interested in entertainment and arousing contents. Some of these relationships actually mirror what value patterns are typical of the respective outlets or genres. So values seem to be part of the clear expectations that the audience holds of media genres.

Another focus of this study is the considerable expansion of the German media system over the last 25 years. One could expect to find that a broader offer enables people to choose contents that fit their needs—and also the underlying values—better than in a more limited media environment. However, hardly any systematic trends over time could be observed. At least use of the outlets and genres studied here has not changed much with regard to viewers' values, although competition increased significantly over the period studied.

A possible explanation is that I focused on general interest TV channels and general news outlets, which may not try to accommodate audience niches with special value priorities. As for the relationships of values and genre preferences, during the twelve years under study, the German TV landscape mainly grew in terms of special-interest channels. These need not have affected the general-appeal offer of the four largest stations examined here. The latter continued to exist next to new stations and probably still offered reliable gratifications to viewers used to them. Consequently, the audience may not have selected those stations more according to their values than before. A comprehensive study of televised value patterns within channels and genres could help to investigate these findings further.

In a final step, interactions between genre preferences and TV-channel use were analyzed. Some genres seem to match some channels better than others, at least in the eyes of media users. Thus the relationships between channel use and personal values can be reinforced for people who like genres that are specific to a given channel. I have documented the indirect relationships between values, preference for genres and channel use through path analysis. Here, public-service versus commercial channels were differently related to most genres, and I have illustrated that for some types of content (action/adventure versus arts/culture) even opposite patterns exist.

Use of channels partly depends on genre preferences and seems to reflect what genres are “typical” of a specific channel. But regardless of what content and values channels actually broadcast, viewers hold stable expectations about what to find where. Of course, decisions about exposing oneself to media take place in a variety of settings, moods and for very different reasons. Thus personal values need not be strong determinants of every instance of media use. However, they are still reflected in the audience’s decision to use or to avoid contents. More than situational gratifications, a channel’s value pattern could be the key to explain brand loyalty of TV viewers. And in order to attract specific audiences—and retain them over time—systematic analysis of value patterns within programs could contribute to creating unique channel profiles.

I have found evidence for people selecting media according to, among other factors, their values. In how far consuming value-carrying media *reinforces* value orientations already held by users remains an open question. In this study, values have been analyzed in terms of their influence on individual behavior. But they are also the result of long-term socialization to which media contribute as a result of people’s usage. A feedback process should actually take place between exposure to media and the received contents. Future studies should investigate these interactions in order to clarify how exactly and to what degree media contribute to creating *social cohesion* via offering and thus confirming value patterns that are shared by a mass audience.

Sammenfatting

Waarden van Duitse mediagebruikers, 1986-2007

De discussie over waarden in verband met de veranderingen in het Duitse tv-landschap is al gaande sinds de introductie van het duale systeem in 1984. De daarbij gehanteerde argumenten zijn echter zelden of nooit gebaseerd geweest op betrouwbare informatie over verschillen in de weergave van waarden op tv. Daarnaast is er nooit gekeken naar de waarden van het *publiek* dat door een bepaalde zender of een bepaald genre wordt aangesproken. Dit onderzoek vormt een startpunt voor een dergelijke onderneming door de aandacht voornamelijk te richten op de rol die waarden spelen bij de mediakeuzes die mensen maken.

In een theoretisch overzicht worden de waarden geplaatst in een kader van elkaar overlappende invloedssferen die effect hebben op de waarden die mensen aannemen. Het voornaamste mechanisme achter dit socialisatieproces is sociaal leren. Waarden bepalen wat wel of niet wenselijk wordt geacht en hoe men volgens de regels van de eigen samenleving in een bepaalde situatie moet handelen. Waarden zijn stabiele basiskenmerken die dicht bij de persoonlijkheid van het individu liggen en spelen als zodanig een rol bij het opbouwen van motiveringen die uiteindelijk leiden tot gedrag. Eén voldoening die mediagebruik zoals bekend biedt, is de bevestiging van de eigen waarden en het eigen wereldbeeld. Naar aanleiding van de ontdekking dat waardepatronen binnen de media per medium en genre verschillen, ben ik ervan uitgegaan dat verschillen in waarden zouden moeten leiden tot voorkeuren voor verschillende media.

Bij de secundaire analyse van grootschalige, jaarlijkse onderzoeken onder een representatief deel van de Duitse bevolking zijn de verbanden tussen de persoonlijke waarden van mensen (zowel op sociaal als op materieel gebied) en hun gebruik van gedrukte nieuwsmedia, tv-zenders en genres tussen 1986 en 2007 onderzocht. Ik heb aanwijzingen ontdekt dat er een verband bestaat tussen de waarden die in media worden gepresenteerd, het gebruik van deze media en de waarden van de gebruikers. Ik beschouw die overeenkomsten als een gevolg van selectieve blootstelling – het verschijnsel dat mensen een voorkeur hebben voor media (inhoud) die hun persoonlijke waarden bevestigen in plaats van daar

vraagtekens bij te zetten. Ik heb met name ontdekt dat iemands waarden een klein, maar systematisch terugkerend effect hebben op zijn of haar voorkeur voor bepaalde tv-genres en gebruik van tv-zenders en gedrukte media.

Algemeen gesteld leiden *sociale* waarden tot het lezen van kranten en tijdschriften, waarbij de voorkeur voor linkse kranten en tijdschriften iets uitgesprokener is dan die voor conservatieve. Daar staat tegenover dat mensen met sterk *materialistische* waarden de voorkeur geven aan conservatieve media-uitingen en commerciële tv. Opleiding speelt hierbij een rol: hoger opgeleiden lijken bij het kiezen van programma's en dergelijke die aansluiten op hun waarden meer inzicht in de media te hebben.

Wat genres betreft is er een verband tussen sociale waarden en een voorkeur voor genres waarin die waarden relatief vaak aan bod komen, zoals familieseries en ziekenhuisseries, of die informatie verstrekken voor mensen die op de hoogte willen blijven van de actualiteit in de wereld en hun samenleving. Materialistisch ingestelde mensen blijken meer geïnteresseerd in vermaak en spanning. Sommige van deze verbanden weerspiegelen de waardepatronen die kenmerkend zijn voor de betreffende media en genres. Met andere woorden, waarden lijken deel uit te maken van de duidelijke verwachtingen die het publiek bij bepaalde mediagenres heeft.

Daarnaast wordt in dit onderzoek aandacht besteed aan de aanzienlijke uitbreiding van het Duitse mediastelsel gedurende de afgelopen 25 jaar. Men zou kunnen verwachten dat een breed aanbod mensen beter in staat stelt om media-uitingen te kiezen waarvan de inhoud aansluit op hun eigen behoeften (en de onderliggende waarden) dan een kleiner medialandschap. Er zijn echter in de loop van de tijd nauwelijks systematische trends waargenomen. In ieder geval is het gebruik van media en genres zoals hier onderzocht niet veel veranderd met betrekking tot de waarden van kijkers, hoewel de concurrentie in de loop van de onderzochte periode aanzienlijk is toegenomen.

Een mogelijk verklaring daarvoor is dat ik me met name heb geconcentreerd op algemene tv-zenders en nieuwsmedia, die vaak geen poging doen om kleine segmenten van het publiek, met afwijkende waarden, te behagen. Wat de relatie tussen waarden en genrevoorkeuren betreft is tijdens de onderzochte periode van twaalf jaar het Duitse tv-landschap met name gegroeid door de aanwas van gespecialiseerde zenders. Deze hebben mogelijk geen effect gehad op het algemene aanbod van de vier grootste hier onderzochte zenders. Deze bleven naast de nieuwe zenders bestaan en boden de kijkers die er bekend mee waren waarschijnlijk afdoende voldoening. Als gevolg daarvan is het mogelijk dat het

publiek zijn keuze voor die zenders niet sterker dan voorheen liet afhangen van zijn waarden. Een omvattend onderzoek naar de weergave van waardepatronen op tv per zender en genre zou op dit vlak tot meer inzicht kunnen leiden.

De laatste stap bestond uit een analyse tussen de interactie tussen genrevoorkeur en het gebruik van tv-zenders. Sommige genres leken beter overeen te stemmen met bepaalde zenders dan andere, in ieder geval vanuit het perspectief van de mediagebruikers. Daardoor kan de relatie tussen het kijken naar een bepaalde zender en iemands persoonlijke waarden nog worden versterkt als mensen een voorliefde hebben voor genres die specifiek bij een bepaalde zender horen. Ik heb door middel van padanalyse de indirecte relatie gedocumenteerd die bestaat tussen waarden, genrevoorkeur en zendergebruik. Publieke zenders vertonen hierbij een ander verband met de meeste genres dan commerciële zenders, en ik heb aangegeven dat voor sommige soorten programma-inhoud (actie/avontuur versus kunst/cultuur) zelfs een tegenovergesteld patroon bestaat.

Het gebruik van een zender is deels afhankelijk van genrevoorkeuren en lijkt te weerspiegelen welke genres 'typerend' zijn voor een zender. Maar ongeacht de programma's en waarden die zenders daadwerkelijk uitzenden, blijven de verwachtingen van kijkers over wat waar te vinden is stabiel. Uiteraard wordt de beslissing om zich bloot te stellen aan media genomen in verschillende omgevingen, in verschillende gemoedstoestanden en om sterk uiteenlopende redenen. Daarom zijn persoonlijke waarden niet per se in hoge mate bepalend voor elk mediagebruik. Ze worden dan echter nog wel weerspiegeld in de beslissing van het publiek om bepaalde inhoud te consumeren dan wel te vermijden. Het waardepatroon van een zender is mogelijk veel meer dan situationele voldoening de sleutel tot de merkentrouw van tv-kijkers. Een systematische analyse van waardepatronen binnen programma's zou nuttig kunnen zijn voor het creëren van unieke zenderprofielen, die het mogelijk maken om een specifiek publiek te trekken en dit te behouden.

Ik heb aanwijzingen gevonden die erop wijzen dat mensen media onder andere selecteren op basis van hun waarden. De vraag in hoeverre de consumptie van niet-waardeneutrale media de reeds bestaande waarden van de gebruiker *versterkt*, blijft vooralsnog onbeantwoord. Voor dit onderzoek zijn waarden geanalyseerd als zijnde van invloed op individueel gedrag. Ze zijn echter ook het resultaat van langdurige socialisatie, waartoe ook de media bijdragen die door mensen worden gebruikt. Er zou feedback moeten plaatsvinden tussen de blootstelling aan media en de geconsumeerde inhoud. Toekomstig onderzoek naar deze interacties zou moeten zijn gericht op de vraag hoe en in welke mate de

media een bijdrage leveren aan het ontstaan van *sociale cohesie* via het aanbieden – en daarmee bevestigen – van waardepatronen die aanwezig zijn bij een massapubliek.

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1 Introduction

How people behave within a society is, to a large degree, the product of conventions and norms. Both are actualizations of the society's values that function as guideposts of what is considered desirable and appropriate in a variety of settings. Since values are at the core of what defines a society, it is no surprise that they are central constructs in a variety of disciplines, such as sociology, political science, or ethnology. And they are studied regularly in other fields as well, where scholars are interested in why people buy certain products but not others, how personalities develop, or in what ways one cultural group differs from another—to name just a few questions for which values are part of the answer.

With regard to media and values, scholarly and especially public attention has been drawn to the possibly dangerous effects of mass media on people's values. When Luhmann (2002) discusses how value change across generations takes place, he aligns the impact of mass media with that of disrupting experiences such as wars. He credits mass-media effects as the leading drive behind value change.

While Luhmann refers to the term "value change" in a neutral way, others, scholars and laymen alike, express strong fears about this phenomenon. Currently, two of the most popular fields of this discussion deal with sexually explicit and violent content on different and often "new" screen media (and rightly so, following the overviews in, e.g., Harris & Bartlett, 2009; and G. G. Sparks, Sparks, & Sparks, 2009). "Older" media seem to be exempt from this discussion. But when they were newly introduced to audiences, virtually all media were seen as potentially dangerous, in need of regulation or inadvisable for the malleable souls and minds of, e.g., children, women or the uneducated (for an overview, see e.g., Schoenbach, 2001; Wartella & Reeves, 1983). However, the amount of reliable scientific evidence for such effects on *values* (as opposed to attitudes or behavior) is minimal.

But research on media audiences covers more than the possible *effects* of media exposure. The "active audience" paradigm focuses on how media users' traits and qualities lead to different *uses* of media. With regard to values, a long-

substantiated function of media use is to find reinforcement for one's values (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974). This notion seems widely accepted and can be illustrated by a scene in the British comedy show "The IT Crowd." Nerd *par excellence* Moss, having attended a flamboyantly gay musical, exclaims, "Every value I've ever held has been questioned." And, to show that this first visit to a theatre will not be his last, he adds, "And I'm loving it." The comic effect of the scene arises both from the absurd performance he has watched and his unlikely response. Who, except quirky Moss, would relish having their values put into question and return for another go? Although people may purposefully and for good reasons choose to read controversial books, watch movies or attend live performances they know to be in conflict with their values, this is probably exceptional. Usually, people prefer contents that are in accordance with their own beliefs and values. In a recent experimental study, Iyengar and Hahn (2009; see also Johansen & Joslyn, 2008) found that party preference of media users is a good predictor for choice of conservative versus liberal news. People's political orientations and preferences thus have an impact on their media use, due to what Sunstein (2007), among others, characterizes as people's need for comfort. Likewise, it seems obvious that people's values resonate, in one way or another, with their choice of media channels.

Thus, the relationship between values and media is located between two theoretical poles: On the one hand, media allow people to satisfy a range of different needs (often subsumed under the uses-and-gratifications paradigm), among which is the need to find support for one's views and opinions about the world. So, values come first. But media have often been described as windows onto otherwise unknowable areas outside one's own lifeworld. They teach people about values relevant in contexts that transcend the bounds of their everyday lives. This leads to the second, effect-oriented perspective on values and media, which sees individual values as the result of socialization processes to which mass media are important contributors. Media show people what values are acceptable or prone to heated debate, media *use* thus prepares for a number of situations or encounters in complex societies.

Following the first perspective, one would expect to find that values determine what media offerings an audience chooses or otherwise avoids. The second viewpoint highlights the fact that what media someone uses impacts their values. How these two perspectives can be combined is a central question of the present study.

It is undisputable that media have socially integrative functions in complex modern societies. They are among the most important factors facilitating or even

enabling cohesion and integration that transcend individual lifeworlds (Habermas, 1981; Vlasic, 2004). Media provide information on topics relevant to otherwise hardly reachable groups of people and entertainment that is enjoyed by mass audiences. In sum, mass media have the potential to create links between large, anonymous, and scattered groups of people through shared experiences. In this process, the contents through which integrative effects are achieved reflect cultural values on a daily basis, and these values may even be a decisive factor in the integration of large societies (Vlasic, 2004). This is why some *fear* the loss of power that traditional media are experiencing due to the autonomy that the Internet allows (see, e.g., Schoenbach, 2007; Sunstein, 2007). With a quasi-infinite number of niches for any special interest, taste, or opinion about the world, a more and more fragmented audience could fall apart, and bonds that were formerly created through common media use could become frail.

But how important are values in users' choice of media—compared to other criteria? First of all: To what degree are audience members aware of differences in the value patterns of various media offerings? These questions have remained unaddressed by virtually all scholars in the field of values research. Most scholars outside communication research do not even mention mass media in their theory or research. And within our discipline, no systematic studies of values and media use exist, either from the perspective of socialization by value-carrying media, or with regard to the role values may play in selection behavior.

The most fine-grained attempt to answer to some of these questions to date has been Besley's (2008) approach of linking relatively rough measures of media use to personal values. His study highlights three problems for such an undertaking: First, the relationships between values and media use are mediated by numerous third factors. And two opposing causal relationships probably overlay each other (values lead to media use and media feed back on users' values). This makes it hard to come to reliable conclusions about the exact direction and strength of the relationship between the two concepts. Second, and more importantly, Besley alludes to developments over time in both values and media effects that are impossible to study with existing cross-sectional data. Such dynamics can be expected both on the individual level (in a developmental perspective) and the societal level (commonly referred to as "value change"). And finally, it is unclear whether there is any significant difference of values in the media Besley studied, since content analyses are missing.

The difficulties encountered by Besley put into relief some of the major challenges of studying relationships between values and media. First of all, theories have to be checked for appropriate ways to approach such a subject of

study. Here the interdisciplinary character of communication research comes to the forefront. Values are a prime example of why and on what different levels communication and media relate to very different theoretical traditions. On the intraindividual level, psychological models of motivation and behavior (including media use) can help understand why and to what extent media use should depend upon values. From an interindividual standpoint, socialization and integration are core concepts pertaining to the media's potential to teach and actualize values within a mass society.

Next, taking into account these different theoretical approaches, under what *methodological* conditions can values and media use be studied adequately? Ideally, fine-grained measures of media use should be combined with results from content analyses. And, of course, this should be approached through a panel design that would allow different causal relationships or even feedback loops to be discerned. Lastly, would it not be preferable to study the development of values in children and young people? And to apply the most sophisticated indicators for individual values, possibly checking their validity through experiments requiring value-related decisions and choices? Then, what about value change on the societal level?

While these considerations fall beyond the scope of a single research project, I have attempted to answer a number of open questions: What is the role of media in a theory of the acquisition and transformation of personal values? What values are related to what traits of mass media? What is the relevance of media outlets as opposed to specific contents? And lastly: How do changes in the media landscape and in values affect relationships between audience values and media use?

A mere 26 years ago, Spates (1983) wrote "Values exist, but we do not yet know how they work" (p. 43). I hope to shed some light on this subject. Chapter 2 of this thesis gives an overview of the scattered, yet voluminous literature on values and media. It shows that mass-media theory and research have presented sufficient evidence to include the media into theories of values, their appropriation and change. This study argues for an integrative theory of the socialization of values that counts media among the agents usually examined in the study of values. In my own empirical work, I rely on secondary analysis. Using large representative surveys, I concentrate on how personal values relate to media and genre preferences, whether there is a concurrence with values as presented in preferred media, and how these relationships change over time, while both values and the mediated offer undergo transformations.

2 What Are Values?

Values have been called *the* central integrative concept that could bring all social sciences together (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). They are part of many theories, from psychological approaches to personalities and individual differences, to studies of social learning and socialization, to comparative studies of cultures, to theories of (political) modernization and human development. Subsequently, the literature on values is extensive and stretches across a wide variety of disciplines.

In their review of the sociological literature on individual behavior, Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) observe that values are often referred to matter-of-factly. There is a broad consensus about their importance, but exactly how and why they are linked to other social and individual phenomena is often not explored. Media share a similar fate with respect to value theory. Value scholars tend not to mention mass media in their discussion of values, although two assumptions seem to be accepted by most of them: People are assumed to acquire individual value patterns through socialization, and the media are widely accepted as important agents of socialization. What makes it even more plausible to study media and values are the findings from the media and communication literature that illustrate how distinct value patterns are displayed in the media on an everyday basis. Hence in this chapter, I argue for a theory of values that includes the media, from media contents to media uses and effects. Based on an overview of value theories from the last 60 years and a variety of disciplines, this chapter proposes a model of the relationships between values and media.

Values are considered to be long-term and basic attitudes that serve as guiding principles for individual behaviors and judgments. Once internalized, values prove to be considerably stable over the entire life-span; thus value change is a relatively slow process with few sudden upheavals, as many studies have shown (Duncker, 2000; Gensicke, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klages, 1992; Rokeach, 1974; Schwartz, 1992, 2006). The process by which individuals develop their value system is *socialization*. They become members of a society through *social learning*. They learn about norms and rules of behavior by observing others, mostly through direct contact with family, peers, but also in institutions like

schools, clubs, churches, companies, etc. (see, e.g., Bandura, 1986; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). However, in today's world much of the information necessary to understand the workings of modern societies cannot be learned from direct personal experience. Rather, it is conveyed by media. Inevitably, what values are transported via the media also affects what an individual comes to accept as the rules and principles of his or her society. Television—in many countries the mass medium most frequently and most extensively used by large parts of the population—has been of special interest in the few studies on values and media. But other media, like newspapers and magazines, also display values, or at least value-driven behavior, on a daily basis. Within mass media, values can actually be addressed in much the same ways as, for instance, in schools and churches.

So when studying values and media, one could try to isolate the socializing effects of using possibly value-laden media. On the other hand, it also makes sense to assume that people who already hold certain values will be influenced in their behavior by these same values. This behavior could also include their media choices. The directions of causality between values and related factors (among them media use) will be a recurring theme throughout this chapter.

2.1 Values and Value Change in the Social Sciences

Values are an integral part of individual personalities, but they also constitute, on an aggregate level, the basis of cultures and societies, which can often be distinguished by these same values. Consequently, the concept has been applied in a broad range of disciplines, from sociology and political science to psychology and ethnology, to name just a few. Likewise, there exist hundreds of different definitions of the concept. While an exhaustive discussion of the respective branches of research can be found elsewhere (e.g., Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Kluckhohn, 1951; Lautmann, 1969; Rohan, 2000; Spates, 1983), this chapter will focus instead on three major approaches to values¹ that raise central questions about the origin of values and their relationship to behavior—two pivotal issues in a study on the relationships between values and media use.

¹ Based on the hundreds of citations each of the three main authors has received in the databases "Social Sciences Citation Index" (Thomson & Reuters), "SocIndex," "PsychArticles" (both EBSCO) as well as on thousands of citations listed by Google Scholar, these can be considered the most influential approaches to values across the social sciences.

Interestingly, the starting point of the two most prominent approaches to values coincides with a major shift in the importance of certain values in many Western societies, i.e. the late 1960s and early 1970s. Then civil rights activists marched for equal rights for all ethnic groups in the United States, students in France and Germany protested against societal and university elites, and women in many countries fought for emancipation. At the same time, scholars like Rokeach (1967, 1973) and Inglehart (1971, 1977) laid the foundations for a new wave of research in values that would prove to be highly influential to this day. In the 1990s, a second wave developed that analyzed values from a broader, culturally comparative perspective (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schwartz, 1992, 2006).²

Rokeach's and Inglehart's seminal works from the 1960s and 70s are still included in contemporary introductions and dictionaries of the social sciences and psychology (e.g., Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Graumann & Willig, 1983; Hepp, 1994; A. G. Johnson, 1995; Karp, 2000; Koschnick, 1993; Outhwaite, 1993; Papcke & Oesterdiekhoff, 2001; Stengel, 2001), and they underlie much of the literature to be discussed in this chapter. Inglehart's operationalization of values continues to be replicated in a number of studies (Eurobarometer, ALLBUS), while Schwartz's works constitute a more recent approach that promises to become the third seminal branch of values research (see, e.g., the summary in Besley, 2008; Schwartz (n.d.) claims his value scale is currently the most widely used in social psychology).

In a first step, definitions of values and basic operationalizations will be presented, followed by major findings from the respective approaches. These will illustrate the main delineations of values research, which will provide a framework in which to view the media.

2.1.1 *Definitions and Operationalizations*

Underlying two of the three approaches to values to be discussed (and countless other studies) are Kluckhohn's (1951) seminal considerations about values in the framework of Parsons's theory of action (Parsons & Shils, 1951). Kluckhohn sees a value as "a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or charac-

² Earlier, Hofstede (1980, 2001) had used values as indicators of cultural differences. His work continues to influence a considerable number of scholars especially in culturally comparative studies in economics and management. Compared to Rokeach, Inglehart, and Schwartz, however, his importance is not as central.

teristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action" (p. 395). Values thus have an impact on motivations and actions, and they are central to who a person is or how a group identifies itself. For Kluckhohn, individual values are constituted through the imitation and respect of rules of behavior and goods *valued within a given society*. They are thus "cultural products" (p. 398). Hence individual and group-level values are inextricably linked—for instance through the complex ways in which behavior of others influences the values of an individual, who then expresses his or her values through behavior. Lastly, individual behavior feeds back into a group's values, either confirming them or contributing to their change. In sociology and psychology, group or cultural comparisons of values are an important aspect of values research. But due to the rather large variance between members of a same society, the average value priorities of all members do not necessarily reflect the values of their society or culture as a whole. Schwartz (1992) is one of the few scholars to explicitly state that his approach is centered on *individual*, rather than *collective* values. This takes into account that a person usually can distinguish his or her own values, as a German, for example, from German values in general.

Rokeach's (1968, 1973) approach to values has built upon Kluckhohn's definition and includes a more extended discussion of what values actually are. His definition of the term is commonly drawn upon in the literature (see, e.g., studies in communication as diverse as Beaudoin & Thorson, 2001; B. W. Becker, Brewer, Dickerson, & Magee, 1985; Besley, 2008, May; Gandy, 1984; McCarty & Shrum, 1993; Miegel, 1994; Rosengren & Reimer, 1986; Selnow, 1990). For Rokeach (1968) a value is "a kind of belief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought or ought not to behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or not worth attaining" (p. 124). Thus values can be either *instrumental*, telling individuals what kinds of behavior are acceptable within a given society, or *terminal*, stating what one should strive to achieve in life.

At about the same time, but with a different background and research aim, Inglehart (1971, 1977) was more concerned with the preconditions and change mechanisms of values than with a discussion of the nature of values as such (see, e.g., the somewhat diffuse introduction of the concept in Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 2). For him, individual values are acquired through formative experiences made early in life. He claimed, for instance, that people who had never known existential needs during times of crisis, like war or economic depression, could "afford" to entertain what he called *post-materialist* goals in life instead of *materialist* ones. Underlying this hypothesis, which quickly became

known as the “post-materialism hypothesis,” is Maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs. This theory postulates that individual needs are ranked in an order of exigence, from very basic physiological needs, such as food and sleep, to relational stability and lastly to more abstract and psychological needs, such as creativity and morality. Only when needs on a lower echelon are satisfied do needs of a higher priority come into focus. The implicit suggestion is that needs and the values arising from them have a strong impact on the behavior of individuals.

Already Kluckhohn’s analysis of values illustrates that it is not so easy. His discussion of the relationship of values to *needs* on the one hand and *motivations* on the other puts into question Inglehart’s rather simple tracing of the origins and effects of values. Kluckhohn argues that apart from basic (physical) needs, almost all others can be seen as mere *desires*. These are not as centrally anchored in an individual’s personality, and they are influenced more easily by situational factors. Furthermore, desires may reflect a given society’s values, whereas needs would be more universal. For example, what Maslow called a “medium level” need for “relational stability” could be fulfilled by any number of complex relationships that would vary from culture to culture. Kluckhohn expects that the *desire* for stable relationships would be more or less urgent, relative to the significance of different complex relationships within a culture.

In sum, our understanding of the relationship between needs, motives and values will affect how we define the latter. Needs have a biological connotation, while values are of a more social character (see Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 361). But only the more basic needs clearly derive from absolute necessities, while higher-order needs border on socially relevant or desirable *values*. There is thus a link between needs and values, and both may, through *motives*, impact individuals’ behavior.

For the purpose of this study, I posit the following hierarchy of factors guiding action in a more and more determined way: *Values* refer to long-term and abstract goals in life. They reflect either individual or societal *needs*. Both are considered long-term, underlying patterns, while *motives* are of a more short-term and situational nature. Motives thus precede actual behavioral decisions, while values form a background that may interfere more or less heavily with this relationship. Reiss and Wiltz (2004) argue for a “logical connection between end motives and core values” (p. 367), because people attribute value to things they try to achieve through their actions. This desire is translated into motives for actions and results in behavior. Yet, as Kluckhohn (1951) has illustrated, motives can very well conflict with values. In addition, there are often several ways to

achieve a given aim which can result in a variety of actions that need not be equally compatible with a person's values. Thus, motives are most directly linked to actual behavior. They can be close to values, but possibly reflect many more aspects. Often enough, motives and values are even in conflict (see, e.g., Rohan, 2000).

The nature of values (versus needs and motives) calls for a much more differentiated conceptualization in empirical research than, for instance, Inglehart's two-dimensional scale of materialism versus post-materialism allows for. The Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1967) has employed one of the first multi-faceted instruments to adequately measure the whole scope of values within American society. With the distinction of 18 terminal values (e.g., equality, freedom, inner harmony) and 18 instrumental ones (e.g., ambitious, helpful, obedient), Rokeach has proposed value dimensions that are fine-grained, but concrete. Instrumental values in particular can be easily linked to actual behavior—whether or not there is congruence between the two. This may be why they have been adopted by media and communication scholars more often. The instrumental values which state *how* one should behave can be adapted to codebooks for the analysis of (mainly narrative) media contents.

In the 1990s, the Rokeach values scale was further developed by Schwartz. He proposed a *third* influential approach to values, whose conceptualization of values allows for a broader range of applications than most other definitions. All in all, Schwartz's approach takes into account a broader horizon of neighboring concepts and is thus more systematic and of wider theoretical range than most other works in the field. In addition, his resulting operationalization of values presents a differentiated, yet apparently culturally universal continuum of values. Although his approach is (still) less known than the seminal works of Rokeach and Inglehart, Schwartz's scales are used in large studies such as the European Social Survey. Building on evolutionary theories, Schwartz (1992) has unfolded a systematic and differentiated discussion of values and how they should be related to personality traits, motivations, needs and behavior. For him, values tap three universal requirements of human existence, thus partly reflecting Maslow's hierarchy of needs: "needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction and survival and welfare needs of groups" (p. 4). Hence, values are closely linked to quite specific goals in life. In a more recent article Schwartz presented the following conceptualization of his ideas:

- (1) **Values are beliefs** that are linked inextricably to affect.
- (2) **Values refer to desirable goals** that motivate actions.

- (3) **Values transcend specific actions and situations** (e.g., obedience and honesty are values that are relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and politics, with family, friends, or strangers). [...]
- (4) **Values serve as standards or criteria** that guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events.
- (5) **Values are ordered by importance** relative to one another to form a system of priorities. [...]
- (6) **The relative importance of values guides actions.** The tradeoff among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors. (Schwartz, 2006, p. 143; original emphasis)

Although this list does not constitute a definition in the proper sense of the term, it reflects the core facets of meaning of the term “value,” discussed by Lautmann as early as in 1969. Values are core beliefs about what is “of value,” i.e. desirable. This can motivate behavior, but different values can also come into conflict. As a result, actions are not necessarily compatible with all values a person may hold.

In sum, there is not just one definition of the term “value.” Most authors assume today that values are multidimensional basic attitudes, linked to needs and motivations, on one hand, and to preferences and actions, on the other. Survey instruments currently used to measure values or value scales reflect these assumptions. And empirical research has uncovered many links between values and other individual and societal factors.

2.1.2 *Factors Influencing Values and Their Change*

Value *change* has been of importance for many scholars studying values. Mostly, this term does not refer to a change in a value as such (for example, a change in meaning or the disappearance of a value), but to changes in the relative importance of one value over another. What exactly motivates these changes is the central question that can help distinguish different strands of values research. Some, like Inglehart, take a more macro-economic standpoint; others look at social variables describing how life is organized in different countries (following Schwartz’s conceptualization, for instance). Still, most approaches refer to more than one of these traditions. They differ in the complexity of their catalogs of values, in the sophistication of techniques of analysis and in the extent of their discussions of third variables that influence value change. The role of media in the transformation of values is largely neglected, although some of the relationships studied suggest that media are involved.

It has been the subject of considerable dispute whether value change (mainly between individuals) is due to life-cycle effects, generational replacement (also known as cohort effects) or defining historical experiences (period effects). Age is

a central variable possibly representing all three of these influential mechanisms. But age is also linked to a number of other variables prone to be related to values (such as education and income). The following overview presents findings grouped by how age-related differences were treated.

In his studies of the American population, Rokeach (1974) found correlations between certain values and age, ethnicity and gender. He proposed to assume that value change is connected to life-cycle phenomena, rather than to the succession of cohorts: Rokeach observed that values changed systematically more strongly among younger age-groups. Young Caucasians in their 20s and, to a lesser degree, in their 30s placed less emphasis on tradition and religion, but attributed higher importance to equality, ecology, peace and peace of mind. This finding also supports Kluckhohn's (1951) assumptions about values and life-cycle effects: Older people "whose personalities are both well adjusted and internally harmonious" (p. 400) are far less prone to changing their values than younger people.

Inglehart (1971) related generational differences apparent in his data from six European countries to formative experiences made early in life. The cohort that had grown up after WWII was significantly more inclined to rank "post-bourgeois" or post-materialist items ("protecting freedom of speech" and "giving the people more say in important political decisions") over "acquisitive," in other words, materialist items ("maintaining order in the nation" and "fighting rising prices"). Least partial to post-materialist values were those in the oldest group, born in 1905 or earlier, with a more or less linear decline in preference between the two extremes of the age range. The relationship between value preferences and cohorts was affected in part by the higher education level of the younger cohorts and their (higher) socioeconomic status. The more educated and the wealthier groups showed an even stronger preference for post-materialist goals. However, Rokeach's (1974) findings did not support the importance of either income or education for values.

Some critics have seen the differences between older and younger age groups that Inglehart interpreted as generational effects as merely due to changes in the life-cycle (Klages, 1992; Klein & Ohr, 2004; Pfeiffer & Côté, 1991) or historic periods (Namenwirth, 1973). Others have proposed alternative explanations for differences in values between older and younger people (Betz, 1990; Clarke & Dutt, 1991; Klein, 2005).

Clarke and Dutt (1991; Clarke, Dutt, & Rapkin, 1997) have shown that the four-item index of materialism versus post-materialism used by Inglehart is "very sensitive to short-term changes in economic conditions that alter the public

political issue agenda" (Clarke & Dutt, 1991, p. 918). Thus, the increase in post-materialist value patterns observed by Inglehart since the mid-1970s coincides with the sharp increase of unemployment that took place in several of the observed countries at the beginning of the 1980s. Furthermore, panel surveys conducted in three countries have shown massive individual instability in the ranking of the four items, classing between 38 and 48% of the respondents into the opposite category during the second wave (see Clarke & Dutt, 1991, p. 915).

This criticism lead to the question of whether the adoption of value patterns in the early years of socialization is actually decisive or whether, instead, values are subject to change during the entire lifetime of a person. Indeed, in a re-analysis of Inglehart's data, Klages (1992) points out the dominance of period effects as well as significant life-cycle effects over the mere cohort effects that Inglehart suggested. Namenwirth (1973) and his disciple Weber (1978) even proposed a cyclical model of ever-returning patterns in value priorities. Their analyses are based on American party programs from 1844 to 1964 and British speeches from the throne, 1689 to 1972, respectively. In these large time-frames, they argue, recurring value patterns emerge that follow superposing short- and long-wave cycles. What Inglehart interpreted as a major and unidirectional trend over time would thus be but another phase in a quasi-eternal cyclical movement.

In the 1990s, empirical values research shifted toward a broader, culturally comparative perspective. Inglehart and associates continued their work on values worldwide and extended their surveys to more and more countries. In addition, they developed a more differentiated, two-dimensional measurement of values that forms the basis for a broader theory of modernization and value change as studied by the World Values Survey (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The much more sophisticated value items they now use form a two-dimensional field, one axis representing survival versus self-expression values, the other traditional versus secular-rational values.

These recent studies represent a more differentiated approach to values, however the underlying assumptions strongly resemble those of the post-materialism hypothesis: Changes in values are expected and also observed more frequently in countries where clear economic progress or, in the opposite direction, crises occur. Economic stability furthers the adoption of post-materialist or "modern" values. It is thus the key factor in advancing any society to an assumed (and "enlightened," in the historical meaning) ideal. In addition, changes in value priorities are analyzed mostly by comparison of differences across age cohorts. Thus, the generational interpretation of values and the origin of value change is continued (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Education is identified as

a moderating factor, with educational elites being more in favor of “modern,” i.e. secular-rational and self-expression values (Welzel, 2002). Consequently, the understanding of value change still follows a “Western” model of a unidirectional development toward secularization and rationality as well as an ideal of personal freedoms, be it the (political) freedom of self-expression or freedom from needs. In this process, value change is based on generational as well as on periodic effects (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Inglehart and associates call this the modernization hypothesis of human development.

As in virtually all studies discussed so far, the role of (mass) media in the “modernization” of societies remains largely unaddressed. Although education-related differences in values have been studied by many scholars, media use of the respective groups has been neglected. Educational and intellectual resources, however, influence how people use media or what attitudes they hold toward them. And they could also influence what role media play in the adoption or change of individual values. This touches upon an important and ongoing debate about the media’s role in social change, or in this case, value change: Are media mere platforms that disseminate value patterns from one member or system of society to another, *mirroring* what is already present (as, e.g., results from Emons, Scheepers, & Wester, 2008, suggest)? Or do they actively contribute to the process of communication by shaping messages, and thus as actors or *molders* that take part in ongoing processes (as discussed in Emons, Scheepers, & Wester, 2009)?

Following the latter perspective, would people with more or less education be affected differently by value-molding media? And if, as, e.g., Rokeach (1974) as well as Clarke and Dutt (1991) have shown, values (can) change throughout the entire lifespan of a person, they would then also always be prone to media impact. To study relationships between people’s values (on top of the demographic variables discussed so far), the values media actually carry would have to be elucidated. However, this is rare in values research.

One could argue that studying value change through content analysis of party programs (Namenwirth, 1973) integrates mediated contents into values research. However, the author sees values apparent in these published programs merely as an indicator of people’s values of the time. Which is not to say that parties, by putting certain values on the agenda, could not also contribute actively to changes in the importance of these values among the population (thus not resolving the molder/mirror-issue). Unfortunately, this systematic analysis of historical documents has not been contrasted, in contemporary settings, with survey data, for instance. Thus, it is even unclear how mediated values may differ from or concur with values of the audiences who use them.

The neglect of the media in the modernization paradigm is especially surprising considering that in political communication and theories of the public sphere, mass media are seen as indispensable prerequisites for the development of modern democracies (J. Gerhards & Neidhardt, 1990; Habermas, 1962/1989; Rhomberg, 2008). Inglehart and Welzel (2005) only briefly mention the reinforcing effect a free media system may have on modernization and democratization processes. Yet, upon a closer look their operationalization of modernization at least to some degree *presupposes* the existence of a free press (freedom of self-expression being a major indicator of modernized value patterns). So without a pluralistic media system and freedom of the press no country would be likely to accede to the group of (ideal) modern societies. To come back to the molder/mirror-question, the media's *use* of the freedom of the press should affect how the people think about this value as well.

Taking a very different stance, one last critic of Inglehart's works is psychologist Schwartz, whose analyses are comparable to the literature on values and modernization for their claim of global applicability. Building on Rokeach's works, Schwartz (1992) has proposed a culturally universal approach to value theory. He has tested variants of the Rokeach Value Survey in different cultures and identified a number of underlying value *dimensions* that seem to be more or less culturally invariant. Based on previous research (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990), ten dimensions were hypothesized and most of them confirmed for 20 different countries: stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, benevolence, universalism and self-direction (Schwartz, 1992). In Schwartz (2006), these were further condensed into six overarching dimensions that can be organized as opposites: autonomy, both intellectual (broadmindedness, curiosity, creativity) and affective (pleasure, excitement, variety), versus its counterpart embeddedness (social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, wisdom); hierarchy (social power, authority, humility, wealth) versus egalitarianism (equality, social justice, responsibility, helpfulness, honesty); and mastery (ambition, success, daring, competence) versus harmony (world at peace, unity with nature, protection of the environment).

In his more recent works, Schwartz (2006) has conceptualized values as, among other things, indicators of cultures, and he discusses findings from Inglehart's analyses with regard to his own studies. He addresses major concerns with the underlying assumptions of the modernization hypothesis. Although democratization is related to values, this is not a unidirectional relation, as has been assumed by Inglehart and associates. Other factors, such as average family

size or social attitudes dominant in a country, impact the values of a given culture and moderate the relationships between values and the indicators of modernization (socioeconomic level, democratization).

The first sections of this chapter have presented an overview of the three most influential (i.e., most frequently cited) strands of research of values and value change whose survey scales have been applied by numerous others. All of these studies implicitly or explicitly assume that individual values are the product of or at least depend on the social milieu of a person. They differ in the importance ascribed to various factors, from individual differences (most importantly, age-group or cohort) to social class and lastly national or cultural spheres. But across these different studies values are naturally understood as the result of socializing factors. In the next section, I will complement the findings and assumptions presented above with studies from psychology and family sociology that have looked in more detail at how values are related to an individual's personality on the one hand and to social background on the other. The resulting model of the socialization of values will allow me to clarify the role media play in the adoption and transformation of values.

2.1.3 *Values as Products of Socialization*

The seminal approaches to values, their definitions and operationalizations consider values as basic stable attitudes closely connected to an individual's personality. But values are not only individual, as we have seen, they are heavily influenced by the culture or society in which an individual lives. As a general rule, one could say that the closer a subsystem of this society is to the individual the more influence it exerts on the values of this individual (Hurrelmann, 2006). In the process of *primary socialization*, which usually sets in right after birth, families explicitly and implicitly (e.g., through their behavior) transmit their values to their children (see, e.g., Boehnke, Hadjar, & Baier, 2007; Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Rohan & Zanna, 1996). As the people most closely related to a child they exert the most decisive influence on the development of the child's values. But families are, of course, part of larger contexts, such as religious, ethnic, or other communities (Kohn & Schoenbach, 1993; Whiting, Chasdi, Antonovsky, & Ayres, 1966) or socio-economic strata that also set standards with regard to values (Garbarino, Kostelny, & Barry, 1997; Kasser, Koestner, & Lokes, 2002). Thus other so-called agents of socialization complement the (immediate) family: more distant relatives, friends, peers, and neighbors, as well as

institutions like kindergartens, schools, or clubs contribute to the “education” of the individual in terms of values. On a more global level, large societal institutions and organizations, e.g., constitutional bodies, NGOs, or professional associations, are added. Families are embedded into these larger social groupings and institutions. Thus the influence of parents in the transmission of values interacts with a variety of other formative influences (Goodnow, 1997). Likewise, the ranges of influence of entities contributing to an individual’s socialization overlap, and a broader influence may encompass more minor ones. Figure 1 shows a possible visualization of contexts relevant to the socialization of values.

With this model I propose that the strength of influence on the values of each individual is inversely proportional to the range of influence of an agent of socialization, in terms of people affected. The larger an institution, the less direct its influence on single members’ values. Agents of secondary or tertiary socialization stand behind primary agents who moderate or mediate the influence of other entities. This is symbolized by the decreasing color intensity in the outer areas of the illustration. The outer limit in this figure is marked by the level of the *society*. The society itself is based upon certain norms and values, but also laws and regulations (often, but not necessarily, an expression of values) that set standards for what is considered good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate. Values, as guiding principles or ideals, are the most abstract in this respect. Norms, on the other hand, are implicit or explicit expressions of values that state how one should or should not behave. Lastly, these norms are codified in the generally binding laws and regulations of a society. (For mere reasons of simplicity, larger contexts are omitted here, although they might affect values within a society as well—see, e.g., the discussion of “European values” in connection with Turkey’s application to accede to the European Union.)

Within one society, institutions or social (sub)systems act as agents of socialization (Hurrelmann, 2006). Some primary institutions important in the early years of life have been enumerated above; other institutions include companies, churches, or political parties—and mass media, which will be discussed below. The influence of an institution on the individual can vary in directness, length and intensity. They are represented here by one placeholder to distinguish them from the strictly interpersonal levels of peer groups and family. These impact most heavily what an individual comes to accept and internalize in terms of values. However, as on any other level, it is of course possible to reject the values of others and even adopt opposing values (Kluckhohn, 1951).

Figure 1: Socialization of values

At the core of the overlapping spheres of influence is the individual whose values Vernon and Allport (1931) called an “expression of the individual personality.” The different shape of the hexagon in the center of Figure 1 is meant to illustrate a change of perspective at this point. The outer squares of the model represent a socialization framework of individual and collective actors that influence what an individual internalizes in terms of values. Seen from the psychological rather than sociological direction, scholars have been interested in how the values of an individual are related to this individual’s actions. And while from a meso-perspective we find consistency between the values of an individual and his or her primary agents of socialization, the relationships between an individual’s values and behavior are less congruent.

As stated above, values are closely linked to an individual’s personality. Personality traits equally influence behavior, but they are to a considerable degree inherited (see, e.g., Bouchard & McGue, 2003), while values are socially

acquired. They are derived from the observation of others and thought to steer individual decision-making and behavior (Mischel et al., 1996). How strong the guidance of these values is in concrete situations, however, differs across various types of personalities and circumstances (Triandis, 1980). From the earliest empirical findings (e.g., LaPiere, 1934), inconsistencies between self-reported values and behavior have been noted. For instance, in a study of AIDS volunteers, Omoto and Snyder (1995) found only limited explanatory power in the individual importance of altruistic values.

Different explanations for these inconsistencies have been proposed. With her model of values and attitudinal or behavioral decisions, Rohan (2000, p. 271) distinguishes personal and perceived societal values, which are not necessarily the same, and posits that people may act in accordance with their own *or* with their peers' values. In addition, depending on how aware people are of their actions in a given situation, they may resort to justification patterns that they base on either their own or others' values. This offers four possible paths between a person's value system and their decisions and could lead to as many different behaviors—while one's own values remain unchanged. So, results documenting little or no congruence between *personal* values and behavior may be due to people behaving in accordance with what they perceive as *socially accepted* or to what they think would be a good argument or justification for their actions *in the face of others*.

Maio, Olson, Allen and Bernard (2001) saw lack of cognitive support for values (usually not questioned) as a reason why people do not act according to their value priorities. In a model proposed by Kristiansen and Hotte (1996) the relationship between values and behavior is mediated by action-oriented personal norms and, more concretely still, attitudes. Empirically, the exact relationships between values and behavior are still unresolved, however (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Karp, 2000). This may be partly due to the latent character of value priorities. Maio and associates (2001) found that increasing the awareness and salience of personal values reduces discrepancies between self-reported values and behavior. The scholars argue that lack of cognitive support for values—indicated by the inability to give reasons for them—may explain why people often do not express their values in their behavior. If values are inadequately grounded in people's frames of reference they may still report having these values in, for instance, a survey. Yet the importance of these (allegedly held) values for their actions may be relatively small. Subsequently, when values are *not* made salient, large discrepancies between values and

behavior can be expected, but these could be attributed to e.g. the unobtrusiveness of the situation in which a behavior occurs rather than inner conflict.

Another explanation for these inconsistencies could be methodological in nature, similar to Ajzen and Fishbein's (1977) analysis of attitudes and behavior. They argued that congruence between attitudes and behavior can only be expected when the correspondence between *measures* employed for both entities in a study is high. Often, the scholars argue, items used to gauge attitudes and categories meant to classify observed behavior are not even close matches. For values, this could prove to be even more difficult than for attitudes because values are of a more abstract nature and thus possibly more difficult to record with high validity and applicability for concrete behavior. Yet, as Kristiansen and Zanna (1988) demonstrated, attitudes are often directly related to personal values—or values are used as justifications for certain attitudes.

But additionally, it may simply be the case that many behaviors are indeed only slightly influenced by values while other factors play a more important role. And from Wegner and Bargh's (1998) discussion of automatic versus controlled behavior results the finding that many actions are taken without much thought, especially when the mind is occupied with other things. One could expect that this would lead to a higher prevalence of values in automatic behavior. But bearing in mind the often latent character of values (see above), they may not even be considered in many everyday actions. If, on the other hand, values are strongly present in someone's mind, this person will notice and consider these values more in his or her decisions and actions. This is one of the mechanisms Maio and colleagues (2001) cite as an explanation of higher congruence between values and behavior when reasons for values are made salient.

So, psychology offers a different perspective on values than the sociological literature discussed at the outset of this section. How can the two approaches be combined? I propose that communication and media science can create links to the other disciplines. It bridges the gap between the study of motives leading to individual behavior and societal outcomes of this behavior. However, mass media, which are at the center of this field, are understudied in the others, even in the macro-approaches from sociology and political science.

As the reader may recall, most studies presented in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are concerned with the societal level of values only and neglect psychological aspects. But many of them report great differences in values between members of a given society or even within subgroups of a society. As we have seen, age, as a proxy for place in the life-cycle, and education seem to be of great importance in this respect. Other moderators include socio-economic status, unemployment,

gender and party affiliation. These are the most commonly cited factors that influence an individual's possibilities and liberties to actively choose what values to adopt. Yet, Schwartz (1992) states that even if people do not share the values of their society, they are still conscious of the discrepancy with their own values. So, what is it that helps create this form of collective knowledge?

If values are so strongly dependent on socialization, then the mass media as another important agent of socialization (Hurrelmann, 2006; Rosengren & Windahl, 1989) have been surprisingly neglected by almost all scholars cited so far—except for, e.g., Gensicke (2000), who regards the media as scapegoats for all kinds of, in his eyes, negative developments in society in general and political discourse in particular (negativism, media campaigns and the like). Authors who address the national or societal sphere of influence on individual values tend to quasi automatically name mass media as transmitters of culture-specific values to individual members of a society (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Luhmann, 2002; Schwartz, 1992). Yet, they rarely tackle questions about *how* media are related to other influencing factors and what role the selectivity of media users plays, let alone whether media take an active part in the process as molders rather than mirrors (Hurrelmann, 2006).

So what are the effects of media in the process of the socialization of values? For the study of values and their relationships to media, it is helpful to think about how media use behavior and media contents could be incorporated into the model presented in Figure 1. Of course, media use can be seen as one type of action that, following Schwartz's definition, could be motivated by personal values. On the other hand, the values of one's environment shape individual values and justify individual decisions and actions. Cultural value priorities could be reflected or even actively shaped by mass media contents that should, in turn, influence individual values. Thus, the content of media outlets could play a part in presenting role models or ideas of acceptable values. The norms and values that the media system itself has to obey could be expressed in codes of conduct, but also as laws and regulations. Finally, on the interpersonal level, media use of others (family, peers) and their attitudes toward media could modify media influence on individual values as well. However, there is little systematic research in this area. Do media contain values at all? I will give an overview in sections 2.2 and 2.3.

2.2 Values in Media Content

Strangely enough, whether cultural products such as media contents actually display the values of a given culture is an old question (see, e.g., Albrecht, 1956; Arnheim, 1944; Johns-Heine & Gerth, 1949; Martel & McCall, 1964; Wayne, 1956; White, 1944). Since the early days of the media and communications field, numerous studies have revealed, quite plausibly, that mass-media messages indeed depict values that could resonate or conflict with the values of their recipients. Since the 1970s, a number of US-based studies have analyzed values indirectly through the mediated images of certain groups (women, African-Americans) and the respective norms of their conduct (e.g., Barner, 1999; Douglas, 1996; Drew & Miller, 1977; Elasmr, Hasegawa, & Brain, 1999; Entman, 1994; S. Johnson & Christ, 1988; Licata & Biswas, 1993). Following Gerbner's cultivation approach, many scholars studied the violation of societal values regarding sex and violence, especially on television, thus deriving implicit patterns of TV values (e.g., Estep & Macdonald, 1983; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Gerbner et al., 1977; Greenberg & D'Alessio, 1985; Kunkel et al., 1999; Lowry & Shidler, 1993; Lowry & Towles, 1989; O'Kelly, 1974).

Beaudoin and Thorson (2001) examined values that media made explicit as *cultural indicators*. What values are mentioned in the foreign news reported by American newspapers and what images of countries and continents are thus promoted (see also Schuppe, 1988)? Similarly, what "American values" are ascribed to ABC's "person of the week" (S. G. Larson & Bailey, 1998)? And in advertising research, differences in values displayed in advertisements from different cultural spheres have been studied repeatedly (e.g., Chan & Cheng, 2002; Cutler, Erdem, & Javalgi, 1997; Han & Shavitt, 1994; Lin, 2001).

But most analyses study fictional content, e.g. TV series (Bruns, 1996; Großkopf, 1996; Nitsche, 2000; Skill & Robinson, 1994; Wunsch, Decker, & Krah, 1996), analyzing general value patterns within a show or genre. Another special focus has been directed towards values depicted on children's television (Barner, 1999; Grimm & Horstmeyer, 2003; Heintz, 1992; M. S. Larson, 1989; O'Kelly, 1974; Rosenkoetter, 1999). Many of these scholars motivate their research through the assumption that children in particular learn a lot about desirable and undesirable behavior from watching TV.

Only a few studies examine a broader range of genres (Krüger, 1988; Lukesch, Bauer, Eisenhauer, & Schneider, 2004; Selnow, 1990). For American television, Selnow concludes:

The personal values that are endemic to American culture are deeply embedded in the programming material of its most favored entertainment medium. These values are played out in endless scenarios and in countless dialogues, and range in magnitude from subplot foundations to passing observations. (p. 72)

Media content appears to be permeated with representations of values which vary depending on type of channel (public-service broadcasting (PSB) versus commercial, in Germany, for instance), time of day or genre (Krüger, 1988; Lukesch et al., 2004). This points to the fact that media purposely decide which societal values to present to different target groups.

What do we know about the *effects* the value-carrying media have on their users? In the literature on media and socialization it is commonly assumed, though never tested, that values are learned through media consumption (see, e.g., the summaries in Hurrelmann, 2006; Lukesch, 1999). Or, as Miegel (1994) puts it:

There is no doubt that popular culture and the mass media constitute leading sources from which young people receive the images and ideas they use in their identity and lifestyle work. The mass media, therefore, have an important role as agents of socialization and as transmitters of values, norms and attitudes, something which obviously has considerable impact on the importance of the role of the family in the process of socialization. (p. 238)

However, few studies have actually addressed the *relationships* (be they causal or not) between individual values, values displayed in the media and individual use of these media. I will describe them in the next section.

2.3 Values and Media Use

Studies on values and media use mostly have not pursued a socialization concept, but have regarded media use as a way to reinforce values, beliefs etc. Thus, following the uses-and-gratifications approach to media and their audiences (see, e.g., Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1974; Palmgreen, Wenner, & Rayburn, 1980), media use was operationalized as dependent on users' values. The uses-and-gratifications concept assumes that people tend to select media offerings that promise to satisfy their needs. Over time, users learn which media fulfill their needs best in a variety of situations, and the fit between gratifications sought and obtained improves, especially for heavily consumed media (Palmgreen, 1984; Palmgreen et al., 1980). Yet the gratifications sought need not reflect personal values. It is even possible that people purposefully use media

that go against their values, for example to learn about the arguments of political opponents, let off steam and frustration or escape to a care-free world based upon values that would be incompatible with one's own lifeworld.

Many studies have shown that media users expect, and indeed get, gratifications such as information, advice, entertainment, emotional release, material for conversations and escape from the real world (see, for instance, the summary in R. B. Rubin, Rubin, & Piele, 1996). As early as the 1940s, reinforcement of one's own beliefs about the world was discovered as another major reason to turn to media content (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; see also L. B. Becker, 1979; Ehrlich, Guttman, Schönbach, & Mills, 1957; Freedman & Sears, 1965).

Festinger (1957) explained this phenomenon in his theory of cognitive dissonance: People try to avoid messages that are dissonant with their opinions and tend to use those messages that at least *promise* to stabilize their worldviews. Thus motives for watching or reading certain media also reflect values—at least to some degree (Reiss & Wiltz, 2004). From the 1950s through the early 70s, a number of studies tried to support the idea that selective exposure to media is a means of reinforcing one's own views and beliefs.

These studies procured evidence for the assumption that viewers indeed watch programs that (at least *seem* to) promote their personal values (Ball-Rokeach, Grube, & Rokeach, 1981; Tate & Surlin, 1976; Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974; Wilhoit & de Bock, 1976). For example, people with highly prejudiced worldviews tend to avoid programs featuring egalitarianism and to ignore satire in television shows supposed to ridicule bigotry (Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974). But this evidence rests on case studies about only one specific audience value and how it is related to viewing one specific TV program, respectively. Results of a wider range are missing. In sum, the selective exposure paradigm has produced ambiguous findings, with some studies indeed documenting preferences for information supportive of the individual's opinions or behaviors, others reporting the opposite or no such preference at all (for a recent summary on selective exposure research, see Smith, Fabrigar, & Norris, 2008).

Studies on selective exposure to television have identified channel loyalty, expressed through a clear preference for and frequent use of a given channel, as an important factor guiding media use (see, e.g. Brosius, Wober, & Weimann, 1992; Bruno, 1973; Goodhardt, Ehrenberg, & Collins, 1975; Kirsch & Banks, 1962; Webster & Wakshlag, 1983). Could this choice be based on values? Lin, Atkin and Abelman (2002) found that people searching for certain gratifications through television use had a fairly clear idea about which *channel*, independently from

individual programs, would satisfy their needs best. Apparently, channels can function as brands, fulfilling audience expectations in a trustworthy, reliable way. This may entail expectations about value patterns typical of certain channels. For German television, for example, Krüger (1988) and Lukesch et al. (2004) have shown that value patterns differ between different types of stations—in this instance public-service broadcasting versus commercial channels. Given these differences and people's tendency to seek reinforcement, values can be added to other individual characteristics that guide selective exposure to media (whose values possibly match their users' own values, see below).

In spite of the heterogeneous results on selective exposure in general, I assume that in the majority of cases, media content concurs with the values of the user who made the selection. Even if this choice is based on habits, one may have been implicitly or explicitly taught by family members, peers or others what media are supposed to be enjoyable and appropriate. These standards will also be based upon the values of certain media offerings (most notably for the depiction of sex and violence, but also for sophistication). And even seemingly value-free amusement-oriented media use may reflect one's general value priorities. To take an example of value dimensions from Schwartz (2006), in the aim of entertaining oneself at the end of a workday, media choices may reflect whether people rank "intellectual autonomy" (focusing on broadmindedness and curiosity) over "affective autonomy" (more oriented towards pleasure). The choice to spend one's leisure time with a classic novel rather than a chick flick would issue from value priorities. Media repertoires can be quite varied, but in the long run, habits should reflect users' priorities, including values.

Yet some scholars doubt that approaches centered on an actively choosing audience adequately model the relationships between values and media use. If media carry values on a daily basis should their usage not affect the value priorities of the users? What are the *effects* of this use? Being unable to convincingly disentangle the uses and effects perspectives, some scholars cautiously report correlational patterns. Based on the Schwartz values inventory, Besley (2008, 2008, May) has examined general media use and a broad set of values. His analysis draws on a cultivation framework (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002), assuming effects of media use on the audience's values. But confined to cross-sectional data, Besley interprets his findings as mere concurrences, rather than effects. He finds that a preference for entertainment television and Internet is associated with accepting existing power structures and strengthens a consumerist self-perception (see also Paek & Pan, 2004; Shrum, Burroughs, & Rindfleisch, 2005). Similarly, Sotirovic and McLeod (2001) assume

that habitual use of news versus entertainment media may cultivate attitudes about political participation and ultimately affect participation itself. The scholars see post-materialist and materialist values as antecedents for use of public affairs news and entertainment television, respectively. But again, their cross-sectional data do not allow a distinction between the cultivation effects of media use on values and exposure guided by values (see also Besley, 2006; Holbert, 2005).

Thus the question remains what cultivating effects media use actually has on users' values. Answering this question is challenging, and some approaches cannot adequately study intricate interrelations between a number of relevant variables. As in cultivation research in general (e.g., Hirsch, 1980, 1981), ad-hoc comparison of heavy versus light media users cannot discern whether differences in values are the cause or the effect of media use. Thus, in Potter's (1990) and Rosenkoetter's (1999) studies on the cultivation of values among young television viewers, it is unclear whether differences in value patterns between heavy users of certain TV genres actually have to be attributed to this use.

Likewise, in a study of values depicted on television in the Netherlands and values held by the population, Krijnen (2006) *interpreted* findings as an effect of television. She found that the most salient moral issues on the small screen also occupied its viewers the most. Yet, it is possible that television picked up the most important issues of its viewers, thus inverting the causal relationship.

To escape this ambiguity, advertising scholars have conducted experiments in order to control the direction of causality and single out the effects of values in ads on consumer's attitudes and behavior. Hornikx and O'Keefe's (2009) meta-analysis of this literature documents that ads that are culturally adapted to a target audience, i.e. in terms of the values they display, are more persuasive and result in more desirable behavior outcomes.

A more general approach to influencing values in an experimental setting, for instance through television, has found few followers, although research conducted by and around Rokeach (Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, & Grube, 1984; Rokeach, 1971; Sanders & Atwood, 1979) found that long-term effects on personal values can indeed be observed.

A critical examination of the study of Ball-Rokeach and associates (1984) can illustrate some intricacies of linking media-use behavior and (self-reported) values. Their experiment consisted of a television program that was broadcast on PBS in eastern Washington with subsequent mail surveys of residents in the area versus a control city where the program was not aired. The program was created and promoted to produce maximum impact on viewers' values. These values were measured through a self-administered questionnaire, while behavior

resulting from changed value priorities was operationalized through the willingness to donate time, effort or money to charities campaigning for the values targeted by the TV stimulus. The authors found surprisingly different results between subjects who had seen the program and those who had not. The question remains, however, how these differences in reported values and behavior have to be interpreted. It is possible that the program, rather than really changing values, merely *brought* viewers their value priorities *to attention*. In a survey asking about values (including exactly those the TV show had been about) these may have subsequently been rated higher by people in the experimental group than in the non-viewer group and then led to a change in behavior in the first, but not the second group.

In addition, since the program explicitly and intensely focused on viewers' personal values it may have directed viewers' attention to their personal value *ideals*—especially since the program focused on what “Americans” thought to be important values for society. Viewers perceiving themselves to be different from their own ideal or from an assumed societal one may have put their priorities into question and their *ideal* could have become more salient than the values truly guiding their daily lives. This interpretation would be in line with research reported in section 2.1.3 (e.g., Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Kristiansen & Hotte, 1996; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; Maio et al., 2001; see also Seligman & Katz, 1996; P. Sparks & Durkin, 1987).

Still, Bortz and Braune (1980) report that in a field experiment long-term reading of conservative versus liberal newspapers indeed shifted readers' values toward more congruence with their paper's political stance (see also Boden, Bortz, Braune, & Franke, 1975; Bortz & Leitner, 1979). And recently, Defever, Pandelaere and Roe (2009, February) found that experimentally controlled exposure to advertisements that put forward certain values could lead participants to behave in accordance with those values. The underlying mechanism could be the same as in Maio's et al. (2001) experiments that raised value salience through presenting reasons for values (see chapter 2.1.3). To explain why participants expressed these values more often in subsequent actions, one could follow Wegner and Bargh's (1998) arguments: It is possible that exposure to value-laden advertisements made them conscious of their values which led to more controlled (and value-congruent) rather than automatic behavior. In sum, there are two possibilities of how using media can have an effect on users' values: a) media use changes values, or b) media use makes the audience aware of its preexisting values without changing them.

The relationships between media use and values are unresolved, and valid arguments have been proposed to explain different causalities. In whatever way values and media use are related, some findings indicate that these relationships differ for different kinds of media contents (e.g. news versus entertainment). Thus measures of what media outlets people use globally may be too coarse-grained to study interrelations with values. Instead, *genres* within one medium should be distinguished.

2.3.1 *Values in TV Genres and Their Audiences*

Some of the media-content analyses mentioned in chapter 2.2 investigated the value patterns provided by specific genres and found that values may even define *genres* in fictional entertainment (Nitsche, 2000; Selnow, 1990). Prosocial values are put forward by family and children's programs, for instance (Grimm & Horstmeyer, 2003; Heintz, 1992; M. S. Larson, 1989; Rosenkoetter, 1999). Values in foreign news seem to differ across the nations covered (Beaudoin & Thorson, 2001; see also S. G. Larson & Bailey, 1998).

The function of genres for the selection behavior of the audience has been investigated by numerous studies since Webster and Wakshlag's (1983) and Heeter's (1985) general models of program choice. But only a few studies have examined the relationship between genre preferences and the values of the recipients. These studies have tended to follow the selective exposure paradigm and have examined values as independent variables in the study of program choice. Most of them have looked at the audience of only one genre or one value dimension (C. K. Atkin, Greenberg, Korzenny, & McDermott, 1979; Ball-Rokeach et al., 1981; Gandy, 1984; Prommer, 2008; Tate & Surlin, 1976; Vidmar & Rokeach, 1974; Wilhoit & de Bock, 1976), with the exception of Potter (1990), Hawkins et al. (2001) and La Pastina and Straubhaar (2005) who covered a broader set of values and genres.

In general, Preston & Clair (1994) concluded, somewhat vaguely, that people watch what is "consistent with their self-perception" (p. 280). Only a little more specifically, people who rank the value of accomplishment higher like to watch violent action movies (B. W. Becker et al., 1985). Rosengren and Reimer (Reimer & Rosengren, 1990; Rosengren & Reimer, 1986) found that consuming "heavy," i.e. serious, content, such as news, documentaries and culture, correlates strongly with values such as "inner harmony," "wisdom," "self-respect," and "equality,"

whereas users of “light” material (e.g., entertainment and sport) prefer “a comfortable life” as well as “true happiness” and “mature love” (Rosengren & Reimer, 1986, p. 17).

Conway and Rubin’s (1991) analysis revealed that personality traits are related to motivations to turn to informational versus entertainment TV (see also Reiss & Wiltz, 2004). Other studies have shown that psychotic personalities, rejecting the values and rules of society, prefer deviant genres, e.g. violent and sexually explicit programs (Shim & Paul, 2007; Weaver, 2000; Weaver, Brosius, & Mundorf, 1993; Zillmann & Weaver, 1997; Zuckerman & Litle, 1986) and enjoy violent films more (Bruggemann & Barry, 2002). Psychoticism itself has been shown to be negatively related to values such as “secure and satisfying relationships,” “positive orientation to others,” “propriety in dress and manners,” “traditional religiosity” and “personal growth and inner harmony” (Heaven, 1993, p. 309-311).

In sum, studies on values and the use of media genres examine the explanatory power of personal values for genre choice. The possible *cultivating* effects of exposing oneself more to a given genre than to others have to my knowledge not been studied. And only scarce evidence is available about the importance of audience values in the process of selecting media content—relative to other factors. As we have seen, demographic and psychological variables play a major role in values research, and they are also regularly associated with media use. For instance, research on personality features and media preferences has a comparably long history. Psychological factors have been related to media use as antecedents, competing explanations or mediating factors. Since they are also related to value priorities, the interrelationship of values, media use and third factors come into focus. What mediators, moderators, common causes or effects have been studied? Personality dimensions are certainly not the only important external variables. The next section is devoted to different possibilities of how values, media use and third factors could be related.

2.3.2 *External Variables: Antecedents, Moderators, or Alternative Explanations?*

In the small body of research on values and media use, there are very few studies on third factors in this relationship. One can generally distinguish two approaches. Most of the experimental studies presented in the previous section randomly assign participants to conditions, and many do not control for any

external factors. On the other hand, studies based on non-experimental surveys usually control for demographic variables, following different theoretical assumptions.

In a selective exposure paradigm, which considers values as independent variables, age, gender, regional or cultural origin and education are important (Oliver, 2002). Some of these factors have been discovered by values research as antecedents to specific value patterns (age, gender, life-cycle, education, social, ethnic or regional origin, income; see chapter 2.1.2). Since media use is to a large extent a habitual, long-term behavior (A. M. Rubin, 1983), it is not surprising that research on selective exposure and values should control for these “usual suspects” (e.g., Tate & Surlin, 1976). In the logic of selective exposure, the above-mentioned demographics would be *antecedents* to values, and both values and demographics (directly—and indirectly through values) could have an impact on media use. Situational motivations often complement these factors, making predictions highly uncertain about what media will be used by a given group of people at a given point in time.

These short-term and situational factors are possible *moderators* in the relationships between values and media use. Likewise, age, gender, education and income have been identified as moderator variables in cultivation processes (Gerbner et al., 2002). And they are controlled for in studies that examine the cultivating effects of media use on values, (Besley, 2008; Paek & Pan, 2004; Reimer & Rosengren, 1990; Shrum et al., 2005).

Another strand of research on values, media and third variables focuses on long-term life-cycle related factors. Generational differences are ascribed to typical experiences and common goals at certain ages and are related to typical forms of media-use behavior (Peiser, 2000). The so-called TV-generation—having grown up with television as an established medium—has a more relaxed and distanced approach to watching television than the older generations—for whom TV continues to hold a somewhat special or extraordinary status (Hackl, 2001; Peiser, 1996). It is possible that these different reception modes also imply different importance to values in the selection of media, thus moderating the relationship.

But some scholars give reason to doubt whether the relationships between values and media use are adequately modeled either way. A recent study taking a closer look at cultivation and personality traits identified the latter as *stronger* predictors of cultivation effects than media use (Nabi & Riddle, 2008). With regard to values (as products of socialization and, to a lesser degree, cultivation processes) this finding hints at only weak media effects, but a more extensive

influence of personality traits. And in some experiments that aimed at cultivating value priorities, personality variables were considered important predictors (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984; Bortz & Braune, 1980). Media would thus merely *complement* other factors in the learning of values.

The social context of media use is another focus in this perspective, particularly with regard to the appropriation of media by children and adolescents and media effects on them (Rosengren & Windahl, 1989). Media use of parents and peers exerts an additional influence on children's and adolescents' attitudes as well as their media use (Hackl, 2001; Rosengren & Windahl, 1989). Thus, parental and peer influence are interpreted similarly in media and values research, and age-related effects are at the core of both fields.

This makes it difficult to distinguish the extent to which differences between the media use of older versus younger people and between their value patterns may be related to one another. Instead of different values leading to different media use, it is also possible that both are dependent on the same external factors. Peiser (2003) argues that since formative experiences at a young age and primary socialization are responsible for the emergence of individual value patterns, media use habits and attitudes toward mass media just happen to develop at the same time. Thus differences in values and media use across generations may have parallel causes; yet the relationships between them could be mere artifacts.

These theoretical considerations and findings both support and expand the model shown in Figure 1. Scholars from different backgrounds underline the importance of personality as well as social context for the adoption of values. How does media use fit into this? On the micro-level, it could be seen as a behavior influenced by personality traits and individual values—rather than influencing values. From a meso-perspective, family and peers may be responsible for much of the influence on both values and media use that is otherwise captured by variables such as origin, education or even gender. I do not deny the cultivating potential of the media, but critical acclaim of the literature in the field makes it plausible that media effects on values are much more elusive than the effects of values—acquired through social learning from a multitude of sources—on a person's media choices. Careful consideration of the literature suggests that people, in the first place, select media most of the time that at least do not contradict their values. Of course, what media someone consumes can feed back to, and reinforce (or maybe change), the value patterns that contributed to using these media in the first place. So, values seem a prime example for the phenomenon of reinforcing spirals of influence between selectivity and effects (Slater, 2007).

The review of the literature on values and media use has shown that in spite of this admittedly heterogeneous body of work, McCarty and Shrum's (1993) analysis still holds true to this day and should be expanded to all mass media: "Studies indicate a values-television viewing relationship, [yet] a theoretical framework articulating precisely how and why these relationships occur remains unaddressed" (p. 79). As an answer to this gap, the last section of this chapter will integrate media into the model of socialization of values from section 2.1.3.

2.4 A Model of Values and Media in Socialization

Essentially, both studies on media and socialization and values research are concerned with long-term personal traits and regular patterns of behavior. As we have seen, the same possible preconditions (personality traits, formative experiences and attitudes, gender) and moderators (phases in the life-cycle, education, income) come into focus. In addition, mass media are commonly cited among the most important socializing factors in modern societies—and thus also contributing to individual acquisition of values. Yet, a model of what role media may play on different stages of this process is missing. Based on the model proposed in Figure 1, inclusion of the media could lead to the following extension of this model (Figure 2).

Generally, the term "media" may refer to three different levels: media *use* as a type of behavior, media *outlets* as *content* providers and the media *system* with its norms and regulations as an overarching framework for content production. These norms and regulations can be understood as an expression of (a society's) values, e.g., privacy values, freedom of speech and expression etc. All three aspects are related to individual and societal values—albeit in different ways.

Of course, media law is but one aspect of the general legal system—it is merely spelled out in Figure 2 to highlight the different roles "media" play in the socialization of values. Yet, some areas of media legislation have a direct relation to values, for example regulations about content deemed unsuitable for minors. Consequently, as discussed in chapter 2.2, research on values in the media has focused especially on the area of sex and violence and children's use of these contents. Underlying these studies is a fear of the detrimental influences of media on young people, not yet completely socialized. But in a larger context, all kinds of value-related contents may affect the worldviews or available modes of actions of media users. And since values are ever present in today's mass media, one can

Figure 2: Socialization of values and the media

suspect long-term effects on users' perceptions and attitudes as well as on their values. There are very few long-term studies on the socialization of values (e.g., Kasser et al., 2002), and to my knowledge, none has looked at effects of long-term media use on people's values. With regard to the methodological difficulties experienced for example by scholars researching the use of violent media and the aggressive behavior of users (a recent discussion is provided by G. G. Sparks et al., 2009), media effects on values would be a very challenging subject of study indeed.

As I have argued above, the socialization of individual members of the audience takes place through the learning of values for which media provide additional input. In Figure 2 this is represented by a placeholder for a media outlet that, in this case, spans all interpersonal levels. This could be a key medium for a given society the agenda and/or personalities of which more or less every member of that society would recognize. Of course, most media would be limited to smaller ranges of influence. Furthermore, the influence of values disseminated

by mass media that merely display contents but do not allow direct user-interaction is probably weaker than that of institutions with which individuals have direct contact, such as a place of employment, or a church or association. Nevertheless, media even play a part in these contexts since they give people abundant material to talk about. This is a well known gratification of media use especially for loose relationships (see, e.g., R. B. Rubin et al., 1996). Thus mediated value patterns permeate social interactions and may contribute to cohesion by providing a common frame of reference for people only weakly connected to one another.

Lastly, on the level of close relationships, behavior of family, friends and peers affects what individuals come to accept as values in their society, as we have seen in Figure 1. In addition, what importance parents and peers place on *media* and *mediated value patterns*, is passed on to young people or at least influences them in their adoption of media use patterns and, possibly, of personal values (D. J. Atkin, Greenberg, & Baldwin, 1991; Pasquier, Buzzi, d'Haenens, & Sjöberg, 1998; Robinson & Kim, 2004, May).

But how strong can we expect relationships between media use and audience values to be? In my illustration values are depicted as influencing individual behavior (including media use). The direction of influence is theoretically ambiguous and empirically unresolved. With regard to the literature discussed above (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) the relationship between personality and media use can be assumed to be stronger than that between values and media use. For mere reasons of simplicity the respective arrow has been omitted in the figure, but we can very well assume that a considerable number of behaviors, even those routine or habitual in nature, are only slightly related to an individual's values—if at all.

Values are often not very present to the mind, so behavior can come into conflict with personal values (see above; Maio et al., 2001). And Rohan (2000) suggests that individual worldviews may differ from perceived societal value systems. People can choose which values to follow, thus actions are sometimes consistent with only either individual or societal values. When people conform to values they *imagine* to be socially desirable, this can produce paradoxical situations not unlike the dual climate of opinion as described by Noelle-Neumann (1974, 1993).

For media use, other people's values—and the way a person perceives these—may be especially relevant for media that are often or typically consumed in the presence of others, such as television or cinema, or the use of which is socially desirable. But collective media use is not the only form related to

individual values in indirect and ambiguous ways. Other situational factors (moods, time of the day, multi-tasking, etc.) influence how much attention is paid or how much cognitive effort is applied when choosing certain media offerings over others.

As I have stated above, the uses-and-gratifications framework offers explanations for media use that is, at first sight, not in accordance with personal values. Thus even if personal values contribute to the process of selecting media, I expect to find rather weak effects of specific values on actual behavior (see, e.g., Hornikx & O'Keefe, 2009; Zaller, 1996). Apart from the difficulties in measuring values and behavior with high correspondence (see, e.g., the discussion by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), a variety of situational and other factors can be much more decisive. Indeed, Besley (2008) found only medium to weak relationships between values and media use (operationalized in his study as use of media (television versus Internet) or types of contents (news versus entertainment)). Values are basic traits that usually do not change quickly. In contrast, media use is often heavily situational—although long-term habits or preferences do exist. Plausibly, it is these long-term dimensions of media use that are most likely to be linked to values.

Lastly, relationships between values and media use may be small because of the nature of the mediated offer. So far, content analyses have revealed the commonplace nature of values in media contents. Yet, there is no evidence for *decisive* differences in value patterns across channels or publications. Nor do we find indications for media that propose value patterns radically out of society's bounds. With the exception of a few scandalous programs or special interest publications most media aim at a public in the middle of society and do not wish to repel large parts of their potential audience or readership. This makes eccentric value patterns in mass media highly improbable, but underlines the integrative potential of the mass media. In complex modern societies, media are inextricably linked to other agents and spheres of socialization; and they provide integrative contents and role models for the discussion and the acquisition of values in contexts that go beyond direct and personal experience. Rather than actively participating in the changing of values, media can be assumed to have more reinforcing power, supporting existing and perhaps traditional value patterns.

This section has focused primarily on media use as dependent on personal values. As discussed in section 2.3.2, media may contribute to the development of individual value patterns, while effects of value priorities on the selection of media will be stronger. And the fact that differences between mediated value patterns of channels, for instance, are for the most part not substantial further

complicates the study of media effects on users' values. This study will thus focus on the opposite causal relationship and analyze media use as a type of behavior that is influenced by a person's values.

3 Aim and Scope of the Study

The present study investigates an important aspect of the relationships between individual values and media use: What values lead one to prefer certain media channels or outlets and certain types of content?

This question is not only relevant in order to further describe the typical audience of a newspaper, television channel or program. It also adds to knowledge about the steering power of values in decisions and behavior. And with regard to mass media use especially, it is an open question to what extent users notice the values disseminated by media and how much they orient their selection behavior according to these mediated value patterns. As discussed above, media do carry values, and differences across outlets or genres have been documented from numerous angles. What is unclear is how these differences affect users' media behavior or, more generally speaking, how exactly personal values and use of value-laden media are related.

I will focus on television and print news as the media with the largest audiences in the country that will serve as an exemplar, Germany. This country seems a good choice because of its diverse, yet still manageable TV landscape as well as its well-documented conservative/ liberal print spectrum. It also shares qualities with many other countries, especially in Europe.

In addition, Germany lends itself as an object of study because of the drastic expansion that has occurred within its media system over the last twenty to twenty-five years. Has this led to more choice for the audience—also in terms of values as criteria of selection? In this study, I will investigate historical developments in media use and its relationships to audience members' values. To be precise, I will study values and media use in Germany for the 22 years between 1986 and 2007, the period of the greatest expansion of electronic media to date.

But what are possible consequences of such an increase in media offerings? If people choose media according to their values, what happens once the mediated offer expands? Does more choice lead to a stronger relationship because in a more diverse setting people are better able to select media that are in accordance with their values? Plausibly, and following Festinger (1957), selecting media

content according to one's values starts with *selective exposure*, already at the level of media outlets. Selective exposure could lead to not even *scanning* specific TV stations, magazines and newspapers for articles and programs that seem to agree with one's values. So, some communication channels may actually be avoided completely. Graphic examples could be the *Playboy* and *Playboy Channel* for people with Christian and family values and the *New York Times*, even CNN, for those who think that worrying about politics is a waste of time.

Selective exposure to communication content is the first step in a series of techniques that individuals can use to confirm rather than challenge their personal values. But, clearly, the autonomy of the audience in this respect depends heavily on the availability of a diverse media offering: As long as there were only two or three television channels, for instance, people with liberal values may have had difficulty always finding offers on television that confirmed their worldviews. In other words, as long as the mediated offer for the average person is limited, audience members must make do with content that may not fit their value system very well. The more diverse a media system becomes in what it offers, the more choices people can make, and the closer the match between their values and their media consumption should be.

Of course, there has always been a controversy about how diverse the mediated offer actually becomes once a media system expands (see, e.g., L. B. Becker & Schoenbach, 1989). Do more outlets really mean that the audience has more choice in selecting media according to its expectations, or at least to its general values? Optimists have tended to say that the addition of even just one more movie channel on television means a substantial broadening of the offer now accessible, at least for movie fans—although culture critics may think that this choice is just an illusion (see, e.g., Adorno, 1963/1986). For them it is “just more movies,” thus basically “more of the same.”

Yet, Youn (1994) found that in a multi-channel situation viewers' selection behavior was correlated more strongly with their genre preference than in a situation with only a small number of channels available. Thus, media users today—as opposed to 30 years ago—should be able to construct their media diet at least somewhat more in accordance with the preferences they hold—including their values. So the relationship between one's values and the media content selected should have become closer in recent years. One of the consequences should be an increasing fragmentation of media users into an ever growing number of small publics each with its own homogenous value system (see Holtz-Bacha & Peiser, 1999; Sunstein, 2001, 2007).

3.1 The Country under Study: Germany

Like many other European countries, the German media system has seen a drastic expansion over the last two decades, which makes it possible to study effects of a more diverse offering on relationships between values and media preferences. This chapter provides an overview of values and media in Germany. Results of a content analysis of German TV programs illustrate how values are reflected in the Germans' favorite medium.

Germany is well-covered by values research, not only in comparative analyses (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schwartz, 2006), but also in studies on specifically German particularities (Gensicke, 2000; Klages, 1984, 1988; Klages & Gensicke, 2005; Klein, 1995; Klein & Ohr, 2004; Meulemann, 2001). With its recent history of 40 years of separation into two independent states and the reunification of 1990, it also serves as an example of how value change within societies occurs and how socialization in different ideological surroundings may influence values.

3.1.1 *Values in Germany*

One instrument of value patterns that has been specially developed for Germany is the values inventory of the German Research Institute for Public Administration Research in Speyer (Gensicke, 2000, 2001; Klages & Gensicke, 2005). Building on Klages's (1984, 1988) earlier dichotomy of self-development, hedonism and egalitarianism on the one hand versus obedience, discipline and compliance on the other, the scholars have developed a German values inventory that explores four dimensions (the short version used in Klages & Gensicke, 2005, produces three dimensions): A first dimension (labeled "mainstream") represents the most widely accepted values in Germany, such as a good family life and partnership, obedience, security, industriousness and responsibility. This factor is interpreted as the fundamental basis of "being German" and living a safe and law-abiding life in the cultural middle. Unsurprisingly, this value dimension is linked to the second: tradition—which includes values such as patriotism, faith in God, conformism and respect for tradition. More in accordance with the goal of self-development is a third dimension linking idealism (helping the socially deprived, tolerance, political engagement) with creativity and abundant social contacts. Finally, materialism and hedonism constitute the fourth dimension: power and influence, the fulfillment of needs, a high standard of living and enjoying life.

Apart from the typical cross-sectional analyses based on gender, age or education, values in Germany are usually differentiated by regional origin, contrasting East with West Germany (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schwartz, 2006). This reflects the fact that values are acquired through socialization and that two German states coexisted for 40 years. Thus, two German cultures developed independently before being politically reunited in 1990 (for a summary, see, e.g., Gensicke, 2000; Mochmann, 2002).

One of the major differences between the societal development in the GDR (East) and FRG (West) concerns the changes that set in around the end of the 1960s in many Western countries and also heavily affected West, but not East Germany. Klages (1984, 1988) found that since that time, traditional German values such as discipline, obedience and compliance had decreased in importance in West Germany, while self-development, hedonism and egalitarianism rose to new heights (in principle corroborating Inglehart's (1971, 1977) findings). In public discourse this is mostly discussed as a "post-1968 effect." Unfortunately, no comparative studies on values in both German states were conducted before 1990. But Gensicke's (1998) reconstruction of educational goals in the East and West suggests that traditional values continued to exert a relatively strong influence in the GDR while their importance was already declining in the FRG. Gensicke concludes that there were decisive differences in the value ideals of both countries. These differences should not come as a surprise given the deep ideological rift between socialist and capitalist countries during the Cold War which made both German states bastions of their respective political blocks. Socialist doctrine was much more oriented toward obedience and the greater good while in the West personal freedom and self-development were of more importance. Ironically, being deprived of the necessary freedom to realize these libertarian values, East Germans came to put more emphasis on them. Thus, the difference of importance placed on these values between East and West was not as great as one could expect. But these values apparently had different connotations in both countries. As time passed, after the reunification of 1990, East Germans placed less and less importance on these freedoms (Gensicke, 1998). Today, significant cultural differences are still apparent between East and West Germans. Mostly these are still ascribed to socialization effects from the Cold War era (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Schwartz, 2006), but also to the drastic changes and economic difficulties experienced by the East Germans during the 1990s (Gensicke, 2000).

Comparing East and West German value patterns, the most striking differences concern mainstream and traditional values, which represent the core

of German values (see above, Gensicke, 2000; see also Meulemann, 2001). Mainstream values clearly dominate the East German value patterns while tradition does not play an important role. In contrast, subgroups of the West Germans show strong enough preferences for either tradition or materialism/hedonism to shift the average pattern away from the mainstream dimension. West Germany is thus more diverse in its values than East Germany. Education, as one of Inglehart's most central variables, does not affect mainstream values, but influences traditional values, with the highly educated placing less importance on tradition.

Schwartz (2006) describes egalitarianism (including values such as equality, social justice, responsibility, helpfulness and honesty) and intellectual autonomy (broadmindedness, curiosity, creativity) as the most important value dimensions for both East and West Germany. Embeddedness (social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience and wisdom) is a third, but less important dimension. In East Germany, the latter two sets of values are slightly preferred, while in the Western part of the country, egalitarianism is a little more prominent.

In the World Values Survey's cultural map (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), both East and West Germany are located in the upper right-hand sector, representing a strong orientation towards secular-rational over traditional values and a somewhat less clear preference for self-expression instead of survival values. At the turn of the millennium, East Germans tended to be a little more in favor of secular values. However, the distance between the two parts of the country is not entirely stable. Supporting Gensicke's (1998) observations, around the time of the reunification Inglehart and Baker (2000) mapped very similar value patterns in both societies. But it has to be noted that analyses of subgroups with the East or West German samples (e.g., age groups in Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) reveal large amounts of variance *within* each part of the reunited country. And Klein and Ohr (2004) even come to the conclusion that in an Inglehartian frame of analysis value change in Germany might have changed direction: The younger generations (born after 1965) show much more "materialist" value patterns than older cohorts, thus reversing the direction of change postulated by the modernization hypothesis.

Most authors come to the conclusion that Germany today is still a country with two cultures and two respective value systems. These differences are mostly ascribed to socialization effects and illustrate the powerful effects of group-level

or cultural norms for individual values. Unfortunately, the role of the media has been neglected in research on German values. Likewise, comparative content analyses of East and West German media from the Cold War era are missing.

3.1.2 *Media Offerings and Use in Germany*

Germany's federal structure is well-reflected in many aspects of its media system. Media pertain to the realm of *cultural politics*, which falls under the jurisdiction of the federal states (*Länder*). Broadcasting licenses are granted by the states, and most radio stations as well as some TV stations only broadcast within the limits of these geographical entities or sometimes in two or three states that combine their broadcasting and/or licensing activities. Equally, the newspaper market is characterized by strong regional and local titles. Still, national papers exist and form leading voices in the German public sphere.

The national dailies along with political weeklies and news magazines are published in different large cities across Germany (mainly Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin, and Hamburg), with the capital city, Berlin, being just one among others. The only truly "national," integrative medium in Germany is thus television. Virtually all stations with a noticeable audience share are receivable nationwide. Again, the only exception stems from the federal structure of the broadcasting system, as every PSB provider has a regional channel, and only the two largest channels are broadcast throughout the country (notably *WDR* from North Rhine-Westphalia and *BR* from Bavaria, the two most populated states of Germany).

Continuous and large-scale audience research in Germany documents the relative importance of different mass media for the population. From a point of view of time spent on each medium and proportion of the population reached every day, television, radio and newspapers are the most important media in Germany (Figure 3). Both TV and dailies share an image as providing information of great quality. They are preferred sources for people seeking information, orientation for everyday life and food for thought (Ridder & Engel, 2005). Radio, although as heavily used as television and reaching about the same proportion of the population, serves more as a function of entertainment and often accompanies other activities (in 2005, on average 166 of the 221 minutes of daily radio listening were spent parallel to household chores, meals or other things; Media Perspektiven Basisdaten, 2008). Likewise, with close to 400 stations,

Figure 3: Media use and proportion of population reached, 1985-2005
Source: Van Eimeren & Ridder (2005)

the radio market is much more fragmented than, for instance, that of television. Only a handful of stations have a market share of more than 3-4%, and the two national radio stations practically play no role at all compared to regional ones.³

The increase in time spent on media use as well as the increase in people reached by mass media everyday parallels the expansion of the media system. As in many European countries the German media landscape has seen a considerable expansion since the 1980s, particularly due to electronic media (Figure 4). The number of television stations receivable in an average household has increased since the introduction of commercial channels in 1984 and especially during the 1990s: from three services in 1985 (two national and one regional public-service channel) and 11 in 1990 to 48 in 2005 (SevenOne Media, 2006). The first commercial services (such as *RTLplus* and *Sat.1*), introduced in the mid-1980s, were channels geared as much to general appeal as the already

³ The more recent and much more fragmented (in terms of offers) Internet media will be neglected in the following. Probably due to the sheer vastness of the online world, there are no studies on Internet values or the values of Internet users (apart from Besley (2008) who does not differentiate what types of content people used online). Per country, only very few websites receive general attention and, e.g. in Germany, these are the sites of Internet access and e-mail providers ("ratings" for websites visited by German users can be found at www.ivwonline.de and www.agof.de). Their pages do offer content that could transport values, but they are mostly sought for individual or interactive services, making these pages hardly comparable to older mass media.

Figure 4: Print media and TV stations in Germany, 1985-2007
Source: Beisch & Engel (2006); Media Perspektiven Basisdaten (2005, 2008); SevenOne Media (2006)

existing public-service ones, *ARD* and *ZDF*. But since the mid 1990s, the German TV landscape has increased mainly in terms of special-interest channels, both commercial and public-service—such as children’s channels (*KiKa*, *Nickelodeon*), news stations (*N24*), call-in television (*9live*), or educational (*BR-alpha*) and religious channels (*Bibel TV*). The increase in stations receivable by an average household is thus due to a larger offering, which was enabled by the spread of new receiving technologies capable of transmitting more and more channels, via basic or extended cable or satellite.

The German broadcasting system is marked by the duality of public-service broadcasters (financed through a license fee) and a number of private networks (dependent on advertising revenue). Today, about half of the population receives a wide cable offer of more than 45 channels. However, this large base from which people can potentially choose is only partly reflected in their actual viewing behavior. Even people who receive over 120 channels only regularly watch, on average, 37 of them, five to seven more than those with only 35 to 45 or 45 to 120 channels to choose from, respectively (Beisch & Engel, 2006). The four stations with the largest audience are public-service *ARD* (14% audience share) and *ZDF* (13%), as well as commercial *RTL* (12%) and *Sat.1* (10%). These are the only stations that reach more than ten per cent of the daily German TV viewers (Media Perspektiven Basisdaten, 2008).

In addition to electronic media, the print market has greatly expanded as well, mostly due to general public and special interest magazines. In 2007, it offered about 900 publications, up from 369 in 1985 (Media Perspektiven Basisdaten, 2005, 2008). Although on the magazine market the number of titles has more than doubled during the last two decades (Figure 4), the sector of newsweeklies is still characterized by a small number of outlets, two of which have existed since the late 1940s (clearly left-wing *Der Spiegel* and moderately liberal *Die Zeit*). From 1993 to 2002 *Die Woche* offered a “younger” and more colorful—but still liberal—alternative to the two influential classics, while *Focus* (published since 1993) continues to take a more conservative stance. *Spiegel*, with a circulation of a little more than a million, and *Focus* (circulation: 735,000) are published in magazine format and have the largest readership in a hard news general interest segment. But the more intellectual broadsheet *Zeit* also has an impressive circulation of almost 500,000 copies each week.⁴ *Woche* was equally published in newspaper format and just before being discontinued had a circulation of about 135,000 (Spiegel Online, 2002). Meyn (2004) underlines the pivotal role of these publications for public discourse on matters of political, economic or cultural importance and their role as opinion leaders or *leitmedia*.

The number of dailies (both national and regional) in Germany has decreased slightly during the last 25 years, and the readership has shrunk considerably. In 1985, about three quarters of the population were reached by daily newspapers, a figure that plunged to about 50 per cent in 2005 (Figure 3). This has affected regional as well as national papers, but the national quality newspapers have remained stable, at least in number. The largest papers are liberal *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ; 460,000 daily copies on average), conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ; 396,000 copies) and *Die Welt* (293,000 copies) as well as the smaller liberal *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR; 161,000 copies). These four are complemented by two daily national business papers, *Handelsblatt* (153,000 copies) and *Financial Times Deutschland* (FTD; 109,000 copies).⁵

One type of paper, with a considerable readership, has been neglected so far: tabloids, which, unlike more than 50% of the quality press circulation, are sold at newsstands rather than by subscription. The infamous *Bild*, with the highest circulation of over three million, is one the most well-known media in Germany, widely cited by others and sought by politicians and celebrities alike for its

⁴ All figures relate to average number of copies sold or distributed freely during the last quarter of 2007, following the German audit institution IVW (Retrieved April 30, 2009 from www.ivw.eu).

⁵ Again, all figures give official IVW numbers of average copies sold or distributed freely during the last quarter of 2007 (Retrieved April 30, 2009 from www.ivw.eu).

Meinungsmacht, the power it (allegedly) exerts on public opinion (for a brief characterization, see, e.g., Meyn, 2004).

3.1.3 Values on German Media

Some of the studies presented in chapter 2.2 analyzed values on German media. But almost all of them focus on one specific *genre* rather than draw a comprehensive picture of values in the German media landscape (Bruns, 1996; Grimm & Horstmeyer, 2003; Nitsche, 2000; Wunsch et al., 1996)—with the exception of two more general studies that will be covered below. These two analyses of mediated values focus on television, but for print media, their political orientation can serve as a proxy for values. Eilders (2002; see also Eilders, Neidhardt, & Pfetsch, 2004) has analyzed political positions in editorials of German quality papers between 1994 and 1998. Her work documents that across the entire period, left- versus right-wing orientations are clearly reflected in the papers' contents. And although all papers take stands that contradict their general political standpoints on select topics, a clear cleavage between conservative *FAZ* and *Welt* on the one hand, and liberal *FR* on the other exists. *SZ* is more centrist on many economic issues than the other papers, but still displays a somewhat liberal tendency.

Eilders coded political positions expressed in editorials on a wide range of political, economic and social issues. She organizes these issues into pairs of policy alternatives most of which are closely linked to values. For instance, left-versus right-wing positions differ on the relative importance of economic wealth and of an equal distribution of goods, as well as on how to achieve these goals. Likewise, the autonomy of individuals versus the power of institutions is ranked differently between conservatives and liberals. Finally, opposing positions on cultural identity, societal integration and external security complete the scheme with which newspapers were coded for their political orientation.

Thus although there is no comprehensive analysis of values in the German quality press, their political orientations are well-defined and sufficiently related to values for my purposes here. Unfortunately, comparable analyses of business papers and of newsweeklies are missing, but their political standpoints and foci on issues are as concordantly described as those of German national newspapers (Meyn, 2004; Schrag, 2007).

TV as a medium shows a fundamental difference from print media. While newspapers and magazines can easily be ignored by people who do not share

their viewpoints (and in many cases may not even notice that these views are published), a television set more or less automatically offers all receivable stations. Thus, viewers are much more likely to come across more varied content, just by flipping through channels, for instance. They may never return to many of these randomly encountered programs or channels, but by learning what channels to avoid in the future, viewers still have a wider notion of what is available. Therefore, due to the broadcasting and reception technology alone, TV is potentially more diverse than any one printed periodical. As I have pointed out above, television is also the medium that reaches the largest part of the German population. It is no coincidence that a fair balance of informational TV programs has long been a heavily disputed topic, especially among political parties, while print outlets can follow a politically biased line with much more legitimacy (or may be even praised for their firmness). In Germany, news on public-service broadcasting has to strive to avoid political bias, and non-news programs have to follow a similar ideal of balance (Meyn, 2004). This does not hold, however, for commercial television, which could lead to differences in values between the two kinds of stations. However, locating television stations on a left-right continuum is less intuitive than for print media, further complicated by the fact that television mostly presents entertaining content. Left- versus right-wing orientation is much more connected to news.

Krüger (1988) and Lukesch et al. (2004) studied values on the overall program of public-service versus commercial channels and found differences between the two kinds of channels. But the studies differ a great deal on the range and operationalizations of values. In his pilot study, Krüger explored value patterns on the four largest stations (*ARD*, *ZDF*, *RTLplus* and *Sat.1*) in the winter of 1987. Just three years after the introduction of commercial television, it comes as no surprise that he reports large differences between commercial and public-service programs: In its early years, commercial TV drew attention and quickly gained notoriety through provocative, often amateur-like programs that stood in sharp contrast to the serious and sometimes stiff or uptight contents on public-service television (Husmann & Walter, 2006). Krüger found that while commercial channels showed about the same amount of sexually explicit content as PSB, they showed more violence and emphasized other values, notably values related to law and order as well as aggression. His primary aim was to map mediated value systems and to develop an instrument for their measurement, which is why he only reports exemplary results: Values seem to differ across stations, times of the day and program genres.

In a broader study on the “world according to television,” Lukesch and colleagues (2004) analyzed values on six public-service and nine commercial channels as they were broadcast in 2002, when all of the included commercial programs, and foremost *RTL* and *Sat.1*, had long since acquired a more refined but still popular rather than sophisticated image. Commercial channels offered considerably more sexual content, but differed only on some value dimensions from public-service broadcasters. The dimensions coded by Lukesch et al. represent abstract ideals that people can supposedly follow in their lives. In the overall program analysis, intellectual and political goals are more prominent on PSB, while commercial TV more often displays social values. At different times of the day, however, these contrasts become sharper and other value dimensions differ as well: “Vital” values (relating to health, physical or psychological strength and to life as such) are very prominent on prime-time programs of commercial channels, mostly due to the questioning or violation of these values in crime-related fiction. The same is true for the late evening programming on PSB. During the late afternoon, economic values and ethical considerations are presented more often on PSB, while on commercial channels the late-night program is more strongly characterized by esthetical and political values.

It is important to note that the duality of public-service versus commercial television is not just a categorization common among communication scholars. It also influences the audience’s image of these stations as well as their use. The admittedly sketchy studies of German television (Krüger, 2001) have revealed fairly stable similarities between the profiles of public-broadcasting channels, on the one hand, compared to those of commercial stations, on the other. Typically, public-service TV still follows higher standards in terms of cultural and educational content, information about public affairs, and support of the domestic film industry, for example. Essentially, public-broadcasting in Germany is dedicated to information, education and culture and is praised for its credibility, expertise and up-to-dateness (Ridder & Engel, 2005). In contrast, commercial channels, to a great extent dependent on advertising revenues, specialize more in exciting movies (action, thriller etc.), entertaining series/soap operas and game shows. Viewers consider them entertaining, unceremonious—and therefore a little less inspiring—but also a little more likable than the public-service channels (Media Perspektiven Basisdaten, 2007). The differences between the two kinds of channels seem so clear-cut that, in fact, a considerable portion of viewers in Germany entirely avoids viewing commercial channels, if possible (Reitze & Ridder, 2006).

The two kinds of channels have always differed in the amount of information (more prominent on PSB) and fictional content (higher proportion on commercial channels). What has developed between 1995 and 2000 is an ever-increasing amount of non-fictional entertainment on commercial channels. At the same time, sophisticated content has continued to be more prominent on public broadcasting whereas commercial channels have continued to present more arousing contents. Interestingly, in the context of this study, people ascribe different potentials for the transmission of *values* to PSB and commercial television: With a potential of 70, as compared to 22% for commercial television, public-service broadcasting is clearly seen as better apt to transport societal values and thus to fulfill this important integrative role (Ridder & Engel, 2005).

This study aims to explore the relationships between media users' values and their media choices. This will be based on a long-term secondary analysis of detailed survey data. The data have been polled annually by the *Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach* (IfD), Germany, from 1986 to 2007. The survey will be presented in more detail in chapter 3.3, but the current study's design demands a preliminary analysis. It is simply unclear to what extent media outlets, in particular television channels, differ in terms of values. In order to make maximal use of the information contained in the survey data, the TV representation of the values gauged by the IfD will be studied.

In a content analysis of values on German television Krüger's and Lukesch's et al. general results were both confirmed and refined. It had been commissioned, for the purposes of this study, to the *Institut für empirische Medienforschung* (IFEM), Germany, which, since 1984, annually archives four weeks of German television programming.⁶ For three years, a natural week was deliberately chosen (June 23-30, 1997; March 10-16, 2003; September 24-October 1, 2007) that did not present major biases through public or school holidays, or major sporting events. For these weeks, programs that aired between 1 p.m. and 1 a.m. on the four largest stations (public-service: *ARD*, *ZDF*; commercial: *RTL*, *Sat.1*) were selected, excluding news⁷ and live sports coverage. Programs were segmented into

⁶ I received funding for this study through the department for media research of public broadcaster *ZDF*.

⁷ News was excluded because this type of program is usually segmented into very short news items to which the IFEM's operationalization of values was hardly applicable. In addition, for the purpose of this study, value patterns on TV stations globally were to be compared and the difference in the amount of news on different stations (with possibly very short, but numerous occurrences of values) could have distorted the comparison to an unjustified degree.

Table 1: Sample sizes of a content analysis of programs broadcast between 1 p.m. and 1 a.m. during one week

	1997	2003	2007
total number of programs	466	369	398
total hours of air-time	294	284	295
total occurrences of values	1,111	449	848
programs containing values	275	164	246
% programs containing values	59%	44%	62%
hours of air-time containing values	208	144	198

individual components for which characters or persons that spoke or acted in favor or disfavor of a number of values were coded.⁸ Table 1 gives the sample sizes for each year, aggregated on the level of programs, as well as details on the absolute and relative occurrences of values within programs. These are rather small samples that cannot be considered representative of the total programming of the four main stations—let alone German television in general. Nevertheless, they give insight into how commercial and public-service channels differ in terms of values, thus providing a background to interpret user-based data in a second step.

Eight values that reflect core dimensions of German values were coded. The exact wording was taken from the IfD's survey that forms the basis of my analyses in the forthcoming chapters. The survey holds value items that can partly replicate two of the dimensions that Klages and Gensicke (Gensicke, 2000; Klages & Gensicke, 2005) see as central for the German population. As we will see more extensively in chapter 3.3, four items have a clear *social* orientation (helping people in need, being there for one's family, caring for social justice and a Christian orientation in life), while four are more *materialist* (a high income, wealth, social advancement and willingness to perform). These items were coded individually for characters or persons on TV programs that represented or explicitly referred to these values. In each occurrence, the respective value was rated on a five-point Likert-type scale, from 1 = *strong rejection* to 5 = *strong affirmation* in either the words or actions of that character or person. Table 2 reports the mean ratings for these value items on the four largest TV stations in Germany in 1997, 2003 and 2007.

As can be seen, differences in rating are not substantial; most values are coded on average as being affirmed by TV characters. Likewise, differences

⁸ See appendix A for an extract from the codebook.

between channels and years are only slight and not systematic. Public-service *ARD* and *ZDF* are slightly more in favor of the eight values examined here than are the commercial channels *RTL* and *Sat.1*. This is most pronounced for the Christian orientation. A good family life is presented a little less favorably on *Sat.1*.

Table 2: Mean rating of values on television

Channels		ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Total
n (= number of programs	1997	67	91	78	39	275
containing values)	2003	59	32	26	47	164
Values	2007	60	50	62	74	246
helping other people	1997	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.9
	2003	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.0
	2007	4.1	4.1	4.0	3.7	4.0
social justice	1997	3.9	3.7	3.6	4.0	3.8
	2003	4.3	3.7	3.3	4.0	3.8
	2007	3.7	4.0	3.9	3.8	3.8
a Christian conduct of life	1997	4.0	3.8	3.5		3.8
	2003	3.8	4.0	3.8	4.0	3.9
	2007	3.6	4.0	3.3	2.5	3.5
a good family life	1997	4.2	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.9
	2003	4.0	4.1	4.1	3.4	3.9
	2007	4.1	3.8	3.9	3.6	3.8
a high income	1997	4.1	3.9	3.5		3.9
	2003	4.3		4.0	4.0	4.3
	2007	5.0	4.0	4.0		4.3
wealth	1997	4.1	4.0	3.7	4.0	3.9
	2003	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.2
	2007	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0
social advancement	1997	4.3	3.9	3.8		3.9
	2003	3.9		4.0	4.0	3.9
	2007	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.1
willingness to perform	1997	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.1	3.9
	2003	4.0	3.6	4.0	3.9	3.9
	2007	4.0	4.2	3.9	3.9	3.9

Note: 1 = strong rejection, 5 = strong affirmation

Table 3: Proportion of values in television programs

Channels		ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Total
n (= number of programs in the total samples) Values	1997	116	115	115	120	466
	2003	88	84	101	96	369
	2007	100	90	99	109	398
helping other people	1997	30%	39%	36%	15%	30%
	2003	27%	16%	14%	20%	19%
	2007	29%	23%	25%	10%	22%
social justice	1997	20%	27%	4%	3%	14%
	2003	7%	13%	3%	2%	6%
	2007	9%	6%	11%	8%	9%
a Christian conduct of life	1997	11%	4%	10%	0%	6%
	2003	7%	4%	2%	1%	3%
	2007	13%	1%	1%	2%	4%
a good family life	1997	29%	37%	35%	14%	29%
	2003	28%	7%	12%	7%	14%
	2007	31%	38%	27%	39%	34%
a high income	1997	11%	7%	4%	0%	5%
	2003	7%	0%	1%	1%	2%
	2007	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%
wealth	1997	16%	27%	21%	5%	17%
	2003	8%	6%	4%	10%	7%
	2007	6%	3%	13%	26%	13%
social advancement	1997	3%	8%	7%	0%	5%
	2003	10%	0%	1%	4%	4%
	2007	3%	1%	5%	9%	5%
willingness to perform	1997	16%	36%	30%	6%	22%
	2003	34%	10%	2%	24%	17%
	2007	15%	9%	24%	17%	17%

While the evaluation of values on German television does not seem to differ much between channels, the mere occurrence of values shows a wider range of difference. Relative to the more or less equal number of programs for each channel in the original sample of each year, the frequencies of the value items

show large deviances (Table 3). The *salience* of values thus seems to differ across channels.

The most prominent value on German television is helpfulness, closely followed by a good family life. This matches Gensicke's (2000) observations about social ideals as core characteristics of German value patterns (see above, section 3.1.1). In 2003, however, both social dimensions were distinctly less present on ZDF and RTL. The more abstract value of social justice was most prominent on ARD and ZDF in 1997, but due to a strong decline in importance since 1997 it reached about the same level as on the commercial channels by 2007. Christian values are most present on ARD, but RTL also featured these values comparably frequently in 1997.

As for materialist values, public-service ARD surprisingly presents striving for a high income more frequently than other stations—and does not evaluate it more negatively (see above). Wealth is more frequent on ZDF and RTL, but less prominent on ARD. Its importance increases over time on Sat.1—which seems to have become more materialist, mentioning three out of four materialist items with increasing frequency. Willingness to perform follows no clear pattern: It is among the most frequent values in the programs on ZDF and RTL in 1997. In 2003, it dropped by more than 25% on both stations, while ARD and, to a slightly lesser degree, Sat.1 suddenly featured it more heavily. Four years later, the differences between stations are not as decisive anymore, and willingness to perform is most present on RTL.

All in all, ARD, ZDF and, surprisingly, RTL do not differ much in the frequency with which they bring up given values in their programs (e.g. helping other people and a good family life, most pronounced in 1997 and 2007). For virtually all items, however, commercial Sat.1 presents values markedly less frequently than the other stations, while ARD is most consistent in the values of its programs. For the purpose of this study, it is not essential to search for explanations of these differences. Differences in programming, for example, may account for some of the variance, because, as discussed in chapter 2.3.1, different *types* of programs are prone to different value patterns. What is important at this point, however, is to illustrate the range from which German TV viewers can actually choose.

My analysis presents a mostly coherent picture of values on German television—which should not come as a surprise: In the literature, there is no evidence for *decisive* differences in value patterns across channels for the value dimensions I examined. Nor do I expect the four largest TV stations in Germany to propose value patterns radically out of society's bounds. Like most media, they

mainly aim at publics in the center of society and do not wish to repel large parts of their potential audience. This makes eccentric value patterns in such mainstream media highly improbable.

Also, the clear differences between public-service broadcasting and commercial channels discovered by other scholars are only partly confirmed by my findings. Instead, each channel seems to present a distinct value pattern that has evolved differently over time. This may be partly due to different genres (with typical value patterns) presented on different channels. It thus makes sense to examine differences between values according to channel preference—as between readers of different print media.

3.2 Central Foci of the Current Study

In this study, I will concentrate on the relationships between values and media preferences. Media preferences will be analyzed in terms of both taste for and (self-reported) use of mass media. I will focus on the media with the largest audiences in Germany: newspapers, news magazines and especially television. Radio and Internet will have to be neglected from further considerations because of their extreme fragmentation. And given the survey at hand, I have to focus on media that are available in all parts of the country, so as to enable analyses within samples of a relatively large size. My considerations will thus focus on media with a large audience or media that are at least well-known across the German population: select print news media and national television. I will exclude special interest outlets, which might be well-known, but not widely used. These outlets will also, by definition, exclude a large range of topics and thus limit the possibility of touching upon the complete range of values important in Germany. In addition, the large majority of Germans claim to be at least somewhat interested in news about politics (69%) and the economy (56%), while few other topics are seen as equally relevant (Blödorn, Gerhards, & Klingler, 2005). Thus news media have the largest potential group of users.

Although some regional papers have higher circulations than national ones, their limited availability in large parts of the country does not favor analysis of their readers' values. And for most of these papers, no content data about their orientation in terms of values or other categories exist. The political orientation of the German *quality* press, on the other hand, is well-researched and has been stable for a long time (see, e.g., Meyn, 2004; Schrag, 2007). This allows me to analyze relationships between readers' values and the political orientation (as a

proxy for value priorities) of their preferred paper. The apparent left-right spectrum in the German quality press is easily detected in opinions and commentaries as well as in the coverage of (political) events. Unfortunately however, there are no systematic data on value patterns in German newspapers. Assuming that political conservatism versus liberalism is expressed in different value priorities, I will analyze use of left- versus right-wing dailies and newsweeklies and their relationships to users' values.

I will not study tabloids here, there being only one national title. All others would be too small and locally-bound to analyze their readership in a representative sample. And with only one potential token within a new category of outlets, I will limit my study to quality media.

At the center of my attention are thus general interest TV channels as well as national newspapers (sometimes referred to as "quality" or "elite" press) and newsweeklies—all of which transport the lion's share of information to the public. I am interested in the extent to which audience values resonate with the values presented on and/or political orientation of the media they use or avoid the most.

The function of values studied here focuses on their potential to shape media choice behavior. This is a voluntary choice supposed to underline the point of view of this analysis: I acknowledge that mass media play an important role in socializing users and contributing to the process of acquiring a personal value system. However, I assume that the influence of personal values on one's behavior is more clear-cut than the opposite effect. This study will thus focus on the relevance of personal values for media preferences.

The opposite causal direction is that people's values are shaped by media. This is certainly plausible, but why, in a multi-channel system with press freedom, would (a) people tolerate media content permanently trying to teach them new values? And (b) why would media not want to cater to what their audience finds important and thus, in the end, confirm already existing values? Certainly, as stated above, a spiral process of mutual influences (Slater, 2007) is even more plausible, with value patterns leading to media preferences and media use reinforcing values. However, such a process of overlapping cycles of cause and effect would be hard to operationalize and is certainly impossible to study with existing data.

Lastly, as outlined above, commercial channels were introduced in Germany, as in many European countries, in the 1980s, parallel to a more rapidly expanding mediated offer in general. With more and more media outlets available, it is not only the content but the media offerings themselves that are

more diverse. In a broader television system, for instance, viewers should have less to make do with whatever a narrow televised offer provides, but should be at least somewhat better able to select programs that fit their needs (see above; Youn, 1994). Thus, a more diverse media system could also affect the relationship between values and media use.

3.3 Study Design

If one is interested in the study of historical changes, it is usually necessary to resort to secondary analysis of already existing data. The number of studies that cover values and media use over a longer time span, however, is rather limited. A notable exception is the annual survey of Noelle-Neumann's *Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach*, Germany, that polls information for publishing houses and advertisers. It not only includes hundreds of media use variables, but also a list of values in almost every wave—all in all a one-of-a-kind opportunity to investigate long-term historical developments in the role of individually held values for media use.

3.3.1 The Surveys

Every year, the IfD conducts interviews with, on average, 13,000 respondents, representative of the populations (aged 14 and over) of both East and West Germany.⁹ Respondents are selected via quota sampling and interviewed face-to-face in their homes. The surveys are the basis of the so-called Allensbacher Werbeträger-Analyse (AWA). This annual research report provides information for advertisers and communication companies about where to place ads and commercials for specific products and target groups. The surveys comprise detailed data on media use, of course, but also on a number of individual values, and a long list of demographics of all sorts.¹⁰ Specifically, my analyses are based

⁹ Surveys conducted before 1990 only cover West Germany. In my analyses I have taken into account this fact and only present data that have been controlled for possible differences between East and West Germany.

¹⁰ The only study having used these data so far is Duncker's (1998, 2000), but on an aggregate level: Duncker compared tables of the IfD's time series of values from 1983 to 1999. He observed small differences for conservative and liberal values between women and men as well as between some age groups.

on 15 AWA surveys from the years 1986, 1990-1991, 1993-1999 and 2003-2007.¹¹ The number of respondents varies from 10,230 (1986) to 14,414 (1999).

3.3.2 Measurement

Values

Respondents are shown a list of seven values, accompanied by the following question: “Here’s a list of things one can consider important and desirable in life. Would you please name all items that you find particularly important?”

The wording of four value items was exactly the same in all 15 surveys: social advancement; social justice; a high income, wealth; helping others who are in need. The wording changed somewhat for the other three items: willingness to perform (1986-1999)/delivering a good performance (since 2003); being totally committed to one’s family (1986-1999)/being available for one’s family, committing to one’s family (since 2003); a life determined by Christian faith (1986-1999)/religion, strong faith (since 2003).

These values were, as always in secondary analysis, partly selected for their availability, but they also reflect, as stated in chapter 3.1.3, principal dimensions of German value patterns. Some of Gensicke and Klages’ (Gensicke, 2000; Klages & Gensicke, 2005) mainstream and traditional values can be replicated with the AWA-items; they will be subsumed under the label *social values* in this study. *Materialist* items are available as well. These two overarching orientations allow one to distinguish different groups within Germany (see above, chapter 3.1.1) and they should provide insights with regard to media use as well.

Media use

For television use, the *frequency* of viewing the four largest TV stations, *ARD* and *ZDF* (public broadcasting) and *RTL* and *Sat.1* (commercial channels), is gauged. Respondents are given cards carrying the stations’ logos and are asked to place them on a table with five columns giving the frequency of use, from 1 = *almost never watched* to 5 = *watched every day*.¹²

The frequency of print-media use is measured for two weekly news magazines, the leftist *Spiegel* and the more conservative *Focus*, and two left-wing

¹¹ In 1988, 1992 and 2000-2002, the questionnaire did not contain questions about values; these years are therefore left out of the analyses. The 1987 and 1989 waves are not available for my analyses.

¹² In 1986, only 10% of the sample were able to receive commercial television. For this wave, commercial television viewing will not be included in the analyses.

weekly papers, *Zeit* and *Woche*. Conservative national newspapers (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Welt*), left-wing papers (*Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Rundschau*), and business papers (*Handelsblatt* and *Financial Times Deutschland*) cover the political spectrum of Germany's national quality press. Again, interviewees are asked to sort cards with the papers' logos, according to how frequently they read them or if they know them at all (from 0 = *publication unknown* to 6 = *read every issue*).

Demographics

With the models presented in the previous chapter, I have underlined the importance of the social context in which media choices are made by an individual. The AWAs contain information on regional origin as well as education, which can serve as a proxy for social status. Both have been identified as related to values as well as media use. Likewise, on the individual level, age and position in the life-cycle are important factors that will be controlled for here.

Respondents are asked to state their gender as either male or female. Age is measured in years. To control for life-cycle effects I also include in my analysis two indicators of family status: *living together with a partner* = 1 versus *living alone* = 0 and *living with own children under 18 in the household* = 1 versus *no own children under 18 living in the household* = 0.

For education, respondents are asked which level of schooling they have completed and also if they have completed any higher education or vocational training. The answers to those two questions are then combined into a five-point index representing the different levels of education typical of Germany: up to nine years of schooling, no vocational training completed; up to nine years of schooling, vocational training completed; 10 to 12 years of schooling; 13 years of schooling, no higher education completed; higher education completed.

Only from 2003 onwards, East or West German origin (*place where one had lived before the Berlin Wall came down*) is measured. For the years before 2000, which part of the country a person lived in at the time of the survey will be used as an approximation of actual origin.¹³

¹³ About 10% of the originally East German population moved to West Germany during the 1990s. Therefore origin should be a better indicator of one's socialization than the current location of residence. My analysis of years in which information on both origin and current residence is available, however, has found only negligible differences between the respective coefficients.

3.4 Analytic Strategy

This study is about the relationships between people's values and their media preferences. I am interested in the explanatory power of values, once well-known predictors of both media use and values are controlled for: age, gender, education, and, in this case, East or West German origin (see chapter 2.3.2). I will use multiple regression analysis with individual media use as dependent on values and demographics.

The focus of my analyses does not lie, as one could expect, on the amount of variance explained by an individual value item. As I have discussed above, values and actual media selections are influenced by many factors within a chain determining individual actions (see sections 2.1.3 and 2.4). In addition, as discussed in chapter 2.3, the clear-cut attribution of causal relationships between values and media use remains difficult. And since no panel data are available, this study cannot discern selection effects of values on media choices from effects that use of these media may have on personal values. Instead, my approach focuses on the way values affect behavior, in this case, media use. What value priorities make people prefer certain media?

I will emphasize the direction of this relationship (increased use versus avoidance) rather than absolute size. In this respect, the longitudinal design of this study is a great advantage: Relationships will be tested numerous times across years in very large samples. I will concentrate on consistent patterns in relationships and thus minimize the risk of following mere artifacts of small effects.

3.5 What this Study Explores

My aim in this study is to analyze what role personal values play in the selection of media offerings. It seems likely that the values presented in these media at least to some degree relate to their users' values. This presupposes differences in value patterns across media outlets. For print media, I will use, as outlined above, their clearly delineated political orientations as a proxy for conservative versus liberal value patterns. I will explore how a paper's political conservatism versus liberalism is related to social and materialist values among its readers. For television, my content analysis allows some slightly more precise assumptions. I expect to find, for instance, people with strong social and Christian values more

drawn towards *ARD* than towards *Sat.1*. Strong materialist values, on the other hand, should go along with a preference for commercial television.

Although some assumptions can be made based on the present state of research, it is important to stress that this study is of *exploratory nature*—due to two limitations: On the one hand, this being a secondary analysis, I cannot freely choose an approach that would, for example, integrate all existing research strands. As presented in chapter 2, the literature on values and media preferences or media use is unsystematic. Scholars have used different definitions of values, have identified different value sets, and have approached media preferences in strongly divergent ways. Since the variables available to me differ from these approaches yet again, it is difficult to predict how they are related to one another.

On the other hand, political orientation of a news outlet can only be an approximation of some of its values. In addition the content analysis of televised values did not reveal strong differences in all of the tested values across the four stations covered. Unfortunately, these two factors make it nearly impossible to derive a set of hypotheses that would clearly state expectations about which value will be related to which media outlet. I will try to compensate for this lack by covering the broadest set of values possible as well as a general and diverse set of media. I will begin with a broad question on the role values play for media choices and then unfold, based on the first results, a more detailed analysis. Thus, my first research question is:

RQ1: How do audience values influence the use of media outlets?

As discussed above, both values and media use are influenced by certain external variables. I will control for age and life-cycle indicators, gender and education. Moreover, in Germany, it makes sense to take into account possible differences between East and West Germans. I am thus interested in the *additional* explanatory power of values in the analysis of media use.

As stated above, the last two decades have seen an unparalleled increase in mass media offerings in Germany. This has affected television more than print news media: The first private stations were directed towards the general public, but both commercial and public-service broadcasters soon started to provide special interest channels, with a focus on, for instance, sports and younger audiences (mostly commercial offers) and news or culture (often PSB). Thus, the offerings became more and more specialized, which could have fed back into the general interest programs as well as print media, since, for instance, the

introduction of news channels has created competing sources for hard facts around the clock.

The expansion of media offerings could have affected relationships between audience values and media use in different ways. In my view the most likely development is that more choice, i.e. broader media offerings, leads to closer relationships between individual values and media use:

H1: The greater the number of media outlets becomes, the more their use is determined by the individual values of the audience members.

4 Audience Values and Media Use

Before we turn to the first research question and hypothesis, values as the independent variables will be explored. Figure 5 gives the amount of people who found the seven values tested in this study important in each year. As stated above, these seven items allow to study two important value dimensions for Germans: social values and materialist ones. The items “social justice,” “helping others who are in need,” “being totally committed to one’s family/being available for one’s family,” “committing to one’s family,” and “a life determined by Christian faith/religion, strong faith” tap a social value dimension that is about being there for others and complying with charitable ideals. People who find “social advancement,” “a high income, wealth,” and “willingness to perform/delivering a good performance” important, on the other hand, are more interested in their own (materialist) well-being and advancement. (However, one can very well, and for good reasons, be a caring family-person *and* be interested in a high income.)

The figure documents that the change in wording for some items (see chapter 3.3.2) only affected the actual rating of two of them: The less demanding “being available for one’s family” is continuously more important than “being *totally* committed” (my emphasis) was in the 1990s. The other way around, “willingness to perform” was important to more respondents than the new item “delivering a good performance.” The religious/Christian item remained stable in spite of the change in wording.

The overall most important value in the eyes of the respondents is social justice (around 70% find it important), followed by helpfulness and commitment to one’s family. The performance or achievement-oriented item is the highest ranking materialist item. The least important value with around 20% of acknowledgement is a religious or Christian conduct of life.

Figure 5 also shows that these seven values are mostly stable in rating. Only around 1998 can we observe a decrease that affected all items—except high income and wealth, which was seen as more important than before. (The differences between ratings in 1986 and 1990 will not be discussed here because

Figure 5: Proportion of respondents rating values “important and desirable in life”

they are inevitably intertwined with differences between a West-only and a united sample of Germans. In the following analyses, I control for regional origin, but will neglect it here.)

The next sections report relationships between social and materialist values and media use. These are expressed in standardized regression coefficients that stem from regression models with media use as dependent variables and values as well as demographic control variables as independent variables. In almost all models, the block of seven values explains a significant amount of additional variance, but the proportion of R^2 that is explained by values only rarely exceeds 1%. As stated above, my focus here does not lie on the total explanatory power, but on the consistency of relationships between individual values and use of television, newspapers and newsweeklies. To check for systematic trends over time, all relationships are reported for 15 waves between 1986 and 2007. Control variables include age, gender, family status, education and East or West German origin. Sample sizes for all waves are reported below Table 4.

4.1 Social Values and Media Use

All four social value items show a different pattern in their relationships with media use. The overall most positive and clear connection between a value and use of TV channels and quality press emerges for social justice (Table 4). Holding this rather abstract value leads to more intense use of public-service television. Also for both commercial *RTL* and *Sat.1* some positive coefficients can be noted. But the pattern is less clear, especially since the end of the 1990s. With regard to print media, left-wing outlets are more clearly preferred by those who favor social justice. This value is especially important to readers of *Spiegel*, intellectual *Zeit* and *Frankfurter Rundschau*, the most leftist paper in my study (Eilders, 2002). The more conservative *Focus*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and *Welt* are a little less clearly related to social justice as a reader's value. The only negative relationships can be observed for the business paper *Handelsblatt* between 1986 and 1993.

Slightly more controversial relationships with media use appear for helpfulness (Table 5). Virtually all papers and weeklies are read more often by people who find this value important, regardless of the title's political orientation. Only the business papers *Financial Times Deutschland* and, until the end of the 1990s, *Handelsblatt* are not related to helpfulness. For TV channels, only weak relationships appear, and use of the four channels does not seem to be related to thinking about the value of helping others in need.

Likewise, using TV versus print media is related in distinctly different ways to being available for one's family (Table 6). Television, especially the two commercial channels, is preferred by people who share this value. On the other hand, all print outlets were negatively correlated with this value as long as it was operationalized by "being totally committed to one's family." But after the wording was softened a little in 2003 (to "being available to one's family, committing to one's family"), conservative *Focus*, *FAZ* and *Welt* as well as business paper *Handelsblatt* were preferred by people who acknowledged this ideal. Left-wing papers were hardly related to this value after the change in wording.

The religious or Christian value item shows yet another pattern in its relationships with media use (Table 7). People who hold this ideal tend to avoid commercial television. Some of the largest coefficients overall emerge for avoiding both *RTL* and *Sat.1*. Print media also tend to be negatively related to this value, especially reading the two news magazines *Spiegel* and *Focus*, the left-wing *FR* or the two business papers. Only conservative *FAZ* and PSB channel *ZDF* are favored by people with a religious or Christian orientation. Here the change in

Table 4: Social justice and media use, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			.09***		.06***		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		-.03**
1990 ^a		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.					n.s.					-.03**
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	.05***		.03**		n.s.		.03**	n.s.		n.s.
1993	.03***	.03***	.03**	.02*	.07***	.03***	.05***	.02*	n.s.					-.02*
1994	.05***	.05***	.02**	.02*	.07***	.04***	.06***	.04***	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		
1995	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.02*	.06***	.03***	.04***	.03***	n.s.	.03***	.04***	n.s.		n.s.
1996	.03***	.02*	.04***	.04***	.06***	.02**	.05***	.04***	n.s.	.06***	.03***	.02**		n.s.
1997	.03***	.02*	n.s.	.02*	.05***	.02*	.04***	.03**	n.s.	.05***	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1998	.05***	.05***	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.03**	.05***	.03***	n.s.	.05***	.02*	n.s.		n.s.
1999	.04***	.02*	.02*	.03**	.05***	.04***	.04***	.04***	n.s.	.06***	.03**	.03**		n.s.
2003	.04***	.05***	n.s.	.04***	.05***	.03**	.05***		.04***	.07***	.04***	.02*	.03**	.03***
2004	.05***	.05***	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	n.s.	.05***		.02*	.04***	.02**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	.04***	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.05***	.06***		.04***	.08***	.06***	.05***	.02**	.04***
2006	.05***	.03**	.02*	.02*	.06***	.03***	.06***		.03**	.04***	.05***	.02*	.02*	n.s.
2007	.06***	.04***	n.s.	.02*	.04***	.02*	.04***		n.s.	.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire. Abbreviations: *Spiegel* (Spie.), *Woch* (Woc), *Handelsblatt* (Hbla.).

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Sample sizes: 1986: 10,230; 1990: 12,320; 1991: 12,762; 1993: 13,151; 1994: 13,249; 1995: 13,165; 1996: 13,433; 1997: 13,436; 1998: 13,652; 1999: 14,414; 2003: 14,131; 2004: 13,751; 2005: 14,209; 2006: 14,039; 2007: 14,060

Table 5: Helping people in need and media use, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			.04***		.04***		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1990 ^a	-.03***		n.s.	n.s.					n.s.					n.s.
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	.05***		.06***		n.s.		.04***	n.s.		n.s.
1993	-.02*	-.03**	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.02*	.07***	.06***	.03***		.03**	.03***		n.s.
1994	-.04***	-.05***	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.04***	.05***	.04***						
1995	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.04***	.07***	.06***	.03***	.03***	.06***	.06***		n.s.
1996	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.03***	.06***	.06***	n.s.	.05***	.06***	.03***		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	.04***	.06***	.04***	n.s.	.05***	.04***	.04***		n.s.
1998	.02**	.03***	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.03***	.06***	.05***	.03**	.05***	.04***	.03***		n.s.
1999	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.03**	.06***	.05***	.04***	.05***	.04***	.06***		.02*
2003	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.04***	.06***		.04***	.04***	.03***	.04***	n.s.	.02*
2004	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	.04***	.04***	.03***		.02*	.05***	.03**	.06***	n.s.	.03**
2005	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.04***	.05***		.04***	.05***	.04***	.05***	n.s.	.03***
2006	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.04***	.04***		.04***	.05***	.04***	.06***	n.s.	.03**
2007	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	.04**	.05***		.03**	.05***	.03***	.05***	n.s.	.03**

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

wording that occurred in 2003 only seems to have affected readership of the business paper *Handelsblatt*, for which a slight avoidance developed after the item was rephrased.

Except for the few changes already noted, hardly any systematic trends over time emerge in the data presented so far. The positive correlations between helpfulness and reading either *Spiegel* or *Süddeutsche Zeitung* become smaller over time, reduced to half between the mid-1990s and 2007. Whether this was reflected in the content of the two outlets is an open question. For the rest of the relationships, all coefficients fluctuate a little, but the overall picture remains stable.

4.2 Materialist Values and Media Use

As to materialist values, three items are available. The most shared value in this group is the willingness to perform (Table 8). As gauged in this exact wording (i.e., until 1999), sharing this value led to reading newsweeklies, especially conservative *Focus*, conservative dailies (*FAZ* and *Welt*) and the business paper *Handelsblatt*. Some correlations also appear for watching PSB channels *ARD* and *ZDF*. When the item in the questionnaire was changed to “delivering a good performance,” this pattern disappeared. Commercial television, the weekly *Woche* as well as left-wing dailies throughout seem less popular among those who strive for accomplishment and performance.

For social advancement, media users are a little more divided and some trends over time can be observed (Table 9). Since 1998 (which was, as the reader will recall from the beginning of this chapter, around the time another materialist item, namely a high income and wealth, rose in importance), people who strive for advancement have come to prefer commercial channels *RTL* and *Sat.1*. Over the entire period studied, on the other hand, watching PSB was hardly affected by this orientation. The same is true for the news magazine *Spiegel*, while readers of its competitors were more inclined to social advancement. (Again, an increase can be noted since the end of the 1990s.) Readers of liberal *Zeit* and *Woche* tended to reject this value. This is most pronounced for the second half of the 1990s; since 2004, the negative relationship of this value orientation with reading *Zeit* has dwindled. With regard to dailies, the political orientation of the papers does not seem to make a difference. People who emphasize social advancement in their value priorities tended to avoid *FAZ* and *SZ* as well as, to a lesser degree, *Welt*. Reading *FR* or even the business paper *FTD* is not related to this value.

Table 6: Being there for one's family and media use, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	.05***	.07***			-.04***		-.03**		-.04***		-.04***	n.s.		n.s.
1990 ^a	.06***		.04***	.03***					-.05***					-.03***
1991 ^a	.04***		.05***	.05***	-.05***		-.06***		-.02*		-.05***	-.03**		n.s.
1993	.02*	.04***	.08***	.08***	-.05***	-.03**	-.06***	n.s.	-.03**		-.03**	n.s.		n.s.
1994	.07***	.06***	.11***	.09***	-.04***	n.s.	-.04***	n.s.						
1995	.03***	.04***	.08***	.09***	-.05***	-.03***	-.04***	n.s.	-.02*	-.04***	-.03**	n.s.		-.02*
1996	.02*	.04***	.08***	.07***	-.05***	n.s.	-.05***	-.02*	-.02*	-.05***	-.03**	n.s.		-.03**
1997	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	.08***	-.06***	-.04***	-.07***	-.03**	-.02**	-.04***	-.04***	n.s.		-.04***
1998	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	.07***	-.04***	n.s.	-.06***	n.s.	-.03**	-.03***	-.04***	-.02*		-.03***
1999	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	.06***	-.04***	-.02*	-.04***	n.s.	n.s.	-.04***	-.03***	n.s.		n.s.
2003 ^b	.05***	.04***	.08***	.07***	n.s.	.05***	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	n.s.	n.s.
2004	.03***	n.s.	.04***	.04***	.02*	.05***	n.s.		.03***	n.s.	.02**	.04***	n.s.	.02*
2005	.03***	n.s.	.06***	.07***	.04***	.05***	n.s.		.03***	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	n.s.	.02*
2006	.02**	.03**	.06***	.03***	n.s.	.03**	n.s.		.02*	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	n.s.	.03**
2007	.03**	.03***	.04***	.03**	.02*	.03***	n.s.		.02*	-.02*	n.s.	.03**	n.s.	.02**

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

^b Wording changed from "being totally committed to one's family" to "being available for one's family, committing to one's family."

n.s. not significant; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 7: Religious/Christian orientation and media use, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			-.05***		n.s.		n.s.		.03**	.04***		n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.		-.06***	-.07***					n.s.					n.s.
1991 ^a	-.02*		-.07***	-.06***	-.03***		n.s.		n.s.		.03**	.02*		.03**
1993	n.s.	.02*	-.06***	-.07***	-.05***	-.03**	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1994	n.s.	.02*	-.10***	-.09***	-.02*	-.04***	n.s.		n.s.					
1995	.04***	.04***	-.08***	-.09***	-.04***	-.02*	n.s.		.02*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1996	n.s.	.02**	-.09***	-.08***	-.06***	-.05***	n.s.	-.03***	n.s.	-.04***	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1997	.02**	.03***	-.07***	-.06***	-.03***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	.02*		n.s.
1998	n.s.	n.s.	-.11***	-.10***	-.02**	n.s.	n.s.	-.02**	.02*	-.03**	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1999	n.s.	.02**	-.06***	-.05***	-.03***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.02**	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
2003 ^b	n.s.	n.s.	-.06***	-.07***	-.05***	-.03***	n.s.		n.s.	-.03**	n.s.	n.s.	-.03***	-.03***
2004	n.s.	n.s.	-.06***	-.06***	-.03***	-.04***	n.s.		n.s.	-.06***	-.02*	-.03***	-.02*	-.03***
2005	n.s.	.03**	-.08***	-.07***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	-.02*	n.s.	n.s.	-.03***	-.02*
2006	n.s.	n.s.	-.08***	-.07***	-.02*	n.s.	n.s.		.02*	-.03**	n.s.	n.s.	-.03**	-.03**
2007	n.s.	.02**	-.05***	-.06***	-.04***	-.02*	n.s.		n.s.	-.03***	.02*	n.s.	-.04***	-.02*

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

^b Wording changed from "a life determined by Christian faith" to "religion, strong faith."

n.s. not significant; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Handelsblatt, on the other hand, is read by people who favor social advancement, especially since 2003.

Lastly, the most clear-cut picture emerges for considering a high income and wealth as a desirable goal in life (Table 10). A strong preference for commercial TV can be observed for people who share this value. Virtually all other media, however, are *avoided* by these people or not related. People who do not follow this acquisitive value read left-wing media more frequently, especially *Spiegel*, *Zeit* and *Woche*. *Focus* is not as clearly preferred by this group. The four general newspapers and two PSB channels are all negatively related to striving for a high income, especially since the mid-1990s. Business papers are not related.

All in all, materialist values seem to be more controversial among media users than social values, or at least they go along more distinct media preferences. Those less inclined towards materialist values read newspapers more frequently, especially liberal ones. On the other hand, a materialist orientation seems to further interest in commercial television, but not so much in public-service broadcasting.

4.3 Summary and Discussion

The results so far indicate that values are indeed related to media use, though not strongly. As a first answer to RQ1, liberal papers and magazines are preferred by people who place importance on social justice and helpfulness, but who do not support total commitment to one's family, a religious life or striving for wealth. The other values are related to some liberal papers, but not others. Conservative and business papers overall show weaker relationships. Helpfulness is important for readers of *Focus*, *FAZ* and *Welt*, but not those who read business papers. On the other hand, stressing the willingness to perform leads to more frequent readership of these outlets.

For television use, most relationships are stronger for commercial channels than for PSB, except for social justice which more clearly leads to watching *ARD* and *ZDF*. But commercial *RTL* and *Sat.1* are more compatible with commitment to one's family, striving for a high income and social advancement, while people holding strong Christian values avoid these channels. In sum, all relationships between values and media outlets are rather weak, but there seems to be at least a slight correspondence between mediated values (or, for print media, political orientation) and users' values.

Table 8: Willingness to perform and media use; standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	-.03**	-.03**			.03**		.06***		.06***		.03**	.07***		.06***
1990 ^a		-.03**	n.s.	n.s.					.04***					.06***
1991 ^a		n.s.	n.s.	.02*	n.s.		.05***		.05***		n.s.	.06***		.05***
1993	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	.04***	.04***	n.s.	.05***		n.s.	.06***		.04***
1994	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	.05***	.02*	n.s.						
1995	.03**	.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	n.s.	.02*	.04***		.06***
1996	.02*	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.02*	n.s.	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	.06***		.05***
1997	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.02**	.06***	.03***	n.s.	.05***	.03***	.04***	.06***		.06***
1998	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.05***	.03***	n.s.	.06***	.03**	.03***	.06***		.08***
1999	.02*	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.05***	.03***	n.s.	.04***	.03**	.02**	.05***		.07***
2003 ^b	-.02*	-.03***	n.s.	n.s.	-.02**	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	.02*	n.s.	.02**	n.s.	.02**
2004	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	-.02*	-.02*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.02*		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	.02*
2006	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	-.03**	n.s.	.02*	.02*
2007	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03**

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

^b Wording changed from "willingness to perform" to "delivering a good performance."
n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Table 9: Social advancement and media use, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			-.03**		-.04***		n.s.		n.s.	-.03**		n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04***					n.s.					.04***
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1993	.03**	.03**	n.s.	.03**	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		.02*
1994	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.02**	n.s.	-.04***	n.s.						
1995	n.s.	.03**	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.04***	-.03**	-.02*	n.s.	-.03**	n.s.		n.s.
1996	n.s.	.02*	.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05***	-.03***	-.02*	n.s.	-.07***	-.03***		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.03***	-.02*	-.03***	n.s.	-.03***	-.02*		n.s.
1998	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.04***	.02*	.03**	-.02**	n.s.	-.03**	n.s.	-.02*	n.s.		n.s.
1999	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	-.03***	n.s.	-.02**	n.s.	-.03**	-.02*		n.s.
2003	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	.02*	n.s.	.03**	-.02*		n.s.	n.s.	-.02*	n.s.	n.s.	.03**
2004	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.03***	n.s.	.02*	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	n.s.	.03**
2005	.02**	.03***	.05***	.05***	n.s.	.04***	.02*		n.s.	.02*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03**
2006	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.03**	n.s.	.03**	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03***
2007	.02*	n.s.	.03***	.03**	.02*	.04***	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Table 10: High income/wealth and media use variables, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	.02*	.02*			-.03**		-.03***		n.s.		n.s.	.02*		.04***
1990 ^a	n.s.		.04***	.03**					n.s.					n.s.
1991 ^a	n.s.		.05***	.03**	-.03***		-.03***		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1993	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.04***	-.04***	n.s.	-.04***	-.05***	n.s.		-.02*	n.s.		n.s.
1994	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.03**	-.04***	-.04***	n.s.	-.02*						
1995	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.03**	-.02*	n.s.	n.s.	-.02*	n.s.	-.02*	-.06***	n.s.		n.s.
1996	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.03***	-.02*	-.03**	-.05***	-.04***	n.s.	-.05***	-.03**	-.05***		n.s.
1997	-.03**	-.02*	.06***	.05***	-.05***	-.02**	-.05***	-.05***	-.03**	-.05***	-.05***	-.05***		-.03***
1998	-.03***	-.04***	.02**	.03**	-.05***	-.04***	-.05***	-.03**	-.02*	-.05***	-.05***	-.05***		n.s.
1999	-.03***	-.03***	.03**	.02*	-.05***	-.03***	-.05***	-.07***	-.03***	-.06***	-.04***	-.06***		n.s.
2003	-.03*	-.02**	.07***	.06***	-.03***	n.s.	-.04***		-.02**	-.03***	-.02*	-.03***	n.s.	n.s.
2004	-.03***	-.02**	.04***	.05***	-.04***	-.03***	-.05***		-.03**	-.04***	-.03**	-.04***	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	-.03***		n.s.	-.04***	n.s.	-.02*	n.s.	n.s.
2006	-.02*	n.s.	.05***	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	-.05***		n.s.	-.02*	-.03***	-.03***	.02*	n.s.
2007	n.s.	-.02*	.06***	.05***	-.04***	n.s.	-.05***		-.03**	-.02**	n.s.	-.04***	.02*	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.
n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

One could have expected to find most decisive results for the three least consensual values: religious or Christian orientation, high income/wealth and social advancement. The two first items indeed show clearer patterns, but not for all media. Other items, especially social justice and commitment to one's family are more strongly related to media use, while social advancement is not consistently related to any outlet across the entire time span. So, while outlets have been selected according to what values one prefers, this is certainly not a major criterion for that selection, and not all values are equally important.

In general, some values show positive relationships with more or less all media outlets (most notably social justice and helpfulness, slightly less, willingness to perform). These are among the most consensual values overall. People who do *not* regard these values as important do not use the mainstream media that much, while those who share these values, and thus find themselves in the middle of society, regularly turn to these outlets. For the other values, one can observe clear-cut differences between use of either television or print media (being there for one's family and social advancement) or between watching public-service versus commercial television (religious/Christian orientation and material wealth). These values seem to polarize more, and different types of outlets appear to suit people who place importance on these values as well as those who do not.

My first hypothesis expected an ever stronger relationship between the values of the audience and media use, parallel to a greater range of media offered. The evidence for such a development, however, is not impressive. Leaving aside changes obviously due to different question wordings, only very few coefficients show systematic trends over time, and they do not necessarily corroborate my expectation from H1. Notably helpfulness played an ever *smaller* part in selecting the liberal *Spiegel* and *SZ*. People who find a high income and wealth important, on the other hand, show a stronger preference for both commercial TV channels over time. So the expansion of media offerings has hardly affected relationships between audience values and watching the largest TV stations or reading the quality press.

Still, media known for their conservative or left-wing stances indeed seem to cater to different value systems. But why are the relations so weak? For one thing, the measurement and basic rates of approval of values in the AWA surveys may not carry enough variance to produce large effects. Value items are rated as either important or not, they are thus dummies. And most values are shared, to varying degrees, by all respondents, with around or above 50% of the samples in favor of them. Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) referred to this as the "inherent positivity" that

values carry (p. 363), which can be hardly avoided. Yet in Zaller's (1996) terms, this can lead to only weak effects.

Apart from measurement and statistical effects, an additional explanation could be that a user must have a good overview of the media system and the variety of offerings to be able to select contents and outlets according to their values. This may not be self-evident, given that the IFEM's content analysis has revealed only few cleavages in values on German television. The question is why users' values should then make a large difference for their media preferences.

For television, flipping through channels occasionally will reveal at least some of the diversity in programs—and mediated value patterns. Still, how much a person reflects upon apparent differences could depend on his or her socio-cultural background and/or education. For newspapers and newsweeklies, this could be even more pronounced since readership is usually higher among the highly educated, and some knowledge of the current range of papers available is required to choose the paper most aligned with one's own worldview. If these assumptions are viable, the relationships studied so far should stand out more clearly among people with a better overview or understanding of the media offered. In an attempt to highlight findings from my first step of analysis, education will serve as a contingent condition in the next chapter.

5 Values and Media Use among the Highly Educated

Using media channels selectively should not only depend on the values one holds but also on one's perception of what values different outlets represent. I assume that education could be an important contingent condition here—the more educated an audience member is, the more he or she should be familiar with the intricacies of the media landscape, its diversity and changes, and the more accurate his or her concept of values in the mediated offer should be, at least in principle. More educated people, then, should show stronger relationships between their values and a specific choice of media. My hypothesis is:

H2: The relationship between individual values and media use is more pronounced among the highly educated than in the general population.

5.1 Method and Results

To test my assumption, I combined the two highest education groups in my samples, those with at least 13 years of schooling, and looked at them separately. Due to the smaller sample size, there are of course fewer significant regression coefficients for the subgroup of the highly educated only than for the whole sample (see Note for Table 11 for details). This especially affects relationships with television use which tended to be less closely related to values than print media use. However, most of the remaining significant coefficients are larger in size than the respective correlations for the complete sample.

This is especially apparent for two social value items, being there for one's family (Table 13) and, to a slightly lesser degree, for social justice (Table 11). For the latter, especially relationships of this value to liberal print media (*Zeit*, *FR*, *SZ*) tend to be a little stronger than in the general sample, while the family-oriented value is more strongly related to all media use variables except the two business papers. For religious orientation in life, some larger coefficients emerge that depict the avoidance of commercial *RTL*, liberal *Spiegel* and the two business

papers (Table 14). But numerous other coefficients stay unchanged or are even weaker. Lastly, for helping other people, only very few relationships with media use are even significant among the highly educated (Table 12).

For the materialist value items, the clearest picture emerges for high income and wealth (Table 17). The preference for *RTL* among people who think this value is important as well as their avoidance of *Spiegel*, *Zeit* and *FR* are stronger than in the sample as a whole. For other media, some coefficients tend to be a little larger, too, but all in all only a few are significant. For the willingness to perform, the change in wording of this item clearly affects this value's relationship with media use—as in the general sample. Before 2000, preference for *Focus*, *Zeit*, *FAZ*, *Welt* and *Handelsblatt* was stronger among the highly educated (Table 15). For television, hardly any significant coefficients subsist. Regarding social advancement, stronger negative relationships can be observed during the second half of the 1990s, for liberal *Zeit*, *Woche* and *SZ* as well as conservative *FAZ* and, a little less clearly, *Welt* (Table 16). The preference for commercial television among people placing importance on their own advancement is more pronounced in the subgroup of the highly educated, almost over the entire period studied.

5.2 Summary and Discussion

Social justice, a Christian or religious focus in life, high income/wealth and social advancement are more closely related to at least some media outlets among the highly educated, thus partly supporting my second hypothesis. The highly educated seem indeed to be more aware of differences in the editorial policies of national newspapers and more apt to avoid channels the content of which may not match their own attitudes.

But why is this evidence so weak and why are systematic trends over time still missing? Why would people not select media channels according to their values once they have more choice—particularly if they are more likely to be aware of it?

One reason for the weak effects could be that channels or outlets as a whole are too broad a category to produce strong correlations with users' values. Particularly in the case of general-appeal television stations, the audience may not differentiate that much between *channels* that promise to support the values it holds, but between *genres* or even specific *programs*—wherever they are broadcast. This assumption challenges some of the defenders of the public-service TV system in Germany. They insist that there is a specific quality to public-

service programming as such, attracting considerable parts of the audience to prefer those channels over the commercial ones in general (Berg & Ridder, 2002). But are they right? A next step of my analysis addresses the relationship of audience values and preference for different TV genres.

Table 11: Social justice and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			.10**		.06*		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.					-.07**					-.07**
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.		-.05*		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1993	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	.06**	n.s.			.05*	n.s.		n.s.
1994	n.s.	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	n.s.	.08***	.07**	n.s.					
1995	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	n.s.	.04*	.05*	n.s.	.07***	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1996	.06**	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	-.05*	.05**	n.s.	-.05*	.05*	.05*	n.s.		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	-.04*	.06**	n.s.	.06**	.05*	n.s.	.10***	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1998	.05*	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	.09***	.06**	n.s.	.08***	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1999	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	-.05*	.07**	.05*	.06**	.06**	n.s.	.08***	.05*	n.s.		n.s.
2003	.05**	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	n.s.	.06**		n.s.	.09***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	.05*	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	n.s.	.06**		n.s.	.07***	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	.04*	.06**		n.s.	.09***	.07***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2006	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	n.s.	.08***		n.s.	.08***	.07***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2007	.07***	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	n.s.	.05**		n.s.	.08***	n.s.	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years. Sample sizes: 1986: 1,391; 1990: 2,134; 1991: 2,184; 1993: 2,407; 1994: 2,496; 1995: 2,420; 1996: 2,573; 1997: 2,659; 1998: 2,597; 1999: 2,839; 2003: 2,939; 2004: 2,890; 2005: 3,027; 2006: 3,196; 2007: 3,270.

Table 12: Helping people in need and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.					n.s.					.07**
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		.05*		n.s.		.08**	n.s.		n.s.
1993	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1994	-.07**	-.07**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04*	n.s.	n.s.					
1995	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07**	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	.07**	n.s.		n.s.
1996	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	.04*	.04*	n.s.	.04*	.04*	n.s.		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1998	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		-.05*
1999	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	.07**	n.s.		n.s.
2003	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	.04*		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.		-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.07**	-.04*
2005	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04*	n.s.	n.s.
2006	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2007	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years.

Table 13: Being there for one's family and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.	.08**	.05*	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		-.06*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.	n.s.							-.07**				-.05*	-.05*
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	.07**	-.07**		-.11***		n.s.		-.07**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1993	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	.09***	-.12***	-.06**	-.11***	-.05*	-.06**		-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1994	.09***	.09***	.10***	.11***	-.07**	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.						
1995	.05*	.05*	.08**	.10***	-.10***	-.06**	-.07**	-.06*	n.s.	-.08***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1996	n.s.	.05*	.08***	.10***	-.12***	n.s.	-.12***	-.07**	-.04*	-.10***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	.06*	.10***	-.12***	-.06*	-.13***	-.08***	n.s.	-.08***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1998	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	.08***	-.08***	n.s.	-.11***	-.07**	-.06**	-.09***	-.07**	n.s.	-.05*	-.05*
1999	n.s.	n.s.	.12***	.06**	-.06**	n.s.	-.09***	n.s.	n.s.	-.10***	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2003 ^b	.05**	.05**	.10***	.08***	n.s.	.06**	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	.07***	.04*	.07***	.08***	n.s.	.09***	n.s.		n.s.	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	.09***	n.s.	.06**	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.
2006	.07***	.08***	.09***	.06**	-.04*	n.s.	-.04*		n.s.	-.05**	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2007	n.s.	.06***	.05**	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

^b Wording changed from "being totally committed to one's family" to "being available for one's family, committing to one's family."

n.s. not significant; * p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years.

Table 14: Religious/Christian orientation and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			-.12***		-.07*		n.s.		.11**	.06*		n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.					n.s.					n.s.
1991 ^a	n.s.		-.07**	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		.05*	n.s.		n.s.
1993	n.s.	n.s.	-.07**	-.07**	-.08***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	.06**		n.s.
1994	n.s.	n.s.	-.08***	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	.05**		n.s.					
1995	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	-.07**	-.07**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1996	n.s.	n.s.	-.09***	-.07***	-.10***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07**	n.s.	n.s.	.05**		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	-.07**	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	n.s.	n.s.	.07***		-.06***
1998	-.07**	n.s.	-.04*	-.07***	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1999	n.s.	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	-.05**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05**	n.s.		n.s.
2003 ^b	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	-.04*	-.08***	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	n.s.	n.s.	-.05**	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	-.05**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	-.04*	-.05**	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.	-.05**	-.04*
2006	n.s.	n.s.	-.09***	-.05**	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	-.04*	n.s.	-.04*	-.04*
2007	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.06**	-.04*	n.s.		n.s.	-.07*	n.s.	n.s.	-.05**	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

^b Wording changed from "a life determined by Christian faith" to "religion, strong faith."

n.s. not significant; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years.

Table 15: Willingness to perform and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	.07*	n.s.			n.s.		.08**		n.s.		n.s.	.08**		.07*
1990 ^a	n.s.	n.s.	-.06*	-.08***					.06**					.06*
1991 ^a	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		.07**		.07**			.06**		.06**
1993	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	.09***	n.s.	.12***		n.s.	.12***		.06**
1994	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.09***	n.s.	n.s.						
1995	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	.11***	n.s.	.05*	n.s.		.08***
1996	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	.05*	.06**		n.s.
1997	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	-.04*	.04*	.07**	.06**	n.s.	.09***	n.s.	.06**	.07**		.07***
1998	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	n.s.	n.s.	.08***		.11***
1999	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04*	.08***	.05*	n.s.	.08***	n.s.	n.s.	.08**		.09***
2003 ^b	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	n.s.		.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04*
2005	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	.05**
2006	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2007	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.	.04*

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

^b Wording changed from "willingness to perform" to "delivering a good performance."

n.s. not significant; * p < .05, ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years.

Table 16: Social advancement and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	-.07*		n.s.
1990 ^a	n.s.		.05*	.05*					n.s.					.08**
1991 ^a	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1993	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1994	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.08***	-.05*	-.07**	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.		n.s.
1995	.06*	.05*	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.06**	-.06*	n.s.	n.s.	-.10***	-.07**		n.s.
1996	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.06**	-.04*	-.04*	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	.06*	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	-.06**	-.04*	-.07**	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
1998	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	.08***	n.s.	.06**	-.08***	n.s.	-.07**	-.05*	-.07**	-.05*		n.s.
1999	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	-.08***	-.05*	-.09***	-.05*	-.09***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2003	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.07**		n.s.	n.s.	-.09***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.
2006	n.s.	n.s.	.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2007	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	n.s.		n.s.	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years.

Table 17: High income/wealth and media use among the highly educated, standardized regression coefficients

Year	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1	Spie.	Focus	Zeit	Woc.	FAZ	FR	SZ	Welt	FTD	Hbla.
1986	n.s.	n.s.			n.s.		-.06*		.08*		n.s.	.11***		.10**
1990 ^a	n.s.		.06*	n.s.					n.s.					n.s.
1991 ^a	n.s.		.07**	n.s.	-.07**		-.05*		n.s.		-.06**	n.s.		n.s.
1993	n.s.	n.s.	.08**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.09***	-.05*	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.		.05*
1994	-.05*	n.s.	.06**	n.s.	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.					
1995	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	-.08***	.05*		.06**
1996	-.04*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	-.08***	n.s.	-.05*		n.s.
1997	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	n.s.	-.06**	n.s.	-.08***	-.04*	n.s.	-.06**	-.08***	-.08***		-.05*
1998	-.06**	-.07**	.05*	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*	-.06*	-.07**		n.s.
1999	n.s.	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		n.s.
2003	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.		-.05*	-.05*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	-.05*	n.s.	-.09***		n.s.	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	.05**	n.s.	.08***	n.s.		n.s.	-.06**	n.s.	n.s.	.04*	n.s.
2006	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05*	n.s.	n.s.	-.05*		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	.06**
2007	n.s.	n.s.	.08***	.08***	n.s.	n.s.	-.05**		n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Note: In years where cells are empty, variables were not included in questionnaire.

^a Frequency of using public-service channels ARD and ZDF was gauged in one item.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Analysis includes respondents who attended school for at least 13 years.

6 Values and Genre Preferences

Content analyses of values within certain genres (see section 2.3.1) suggest that what values are presented on one TV channel, for example, may very well differ across types of programs, times of the day, week or even year. “Channel effects” continue to influence users in their choices, which could be due to an editorial policy, principally furthering specific values. But most media outlets are probably not that monolithic in terms of the values they display in their programs or stories. Inevitably, even the most conservative medium has to contain some less conservative content—which then may be sought by those who do not feel as conservative as other members of the audience. So, specific programs within media channels should actually be more closely related to one’s values than one’s channel preference. Maybe the role of values for channel preference is dwarfed by their impact on genre preference. This is why in the third step of the analysis I will leave the use of media *outlets* and its relationship with audience values and turn to a less aggregated level of the mediated offer—content genres within a specific channel.

Individual media are routinely attributed genre-labels such as western (film), R&B (music) or historical novel (literature), by both media professionals and audiences. The definition of the concept “genre,” however, is disputed in scholarly literature (see, e.g., Altman, 1999; Chandler, 1997). Likewise, little is known about *the ways in which* media users effectively and seemingly effortlessly recognize and label media offerings as belonging to a specific genre (Visch & Tan, 2008). Yet genres apparently serve as easily recognizable brands, making sure that a distinct set of “ingredients,” i.e. gratifications, is offered to their audience both reliably and independently from single exemplars within the genre. Given that some genres are by definition prone to certain value patterns (see above, chapter 2.3.1) personal values of audience members may play a part in the selection of genres. Print media will be neglected from the following analyses, since corresponding genre preferences were not recorded in the AWA surveys. Instead, I will investigate the relationship of audience values to genres on television.

RQ2: How do audience values influence preferences for television genres?

The analysis of TV values conducted by the IFEM (see chapter 3.1.3) provides some insight into this question, especially for fictional and/or serial programs, which are relatively numerous in the sample. Findings from other scholars are confirmed insofar as the central topic of a series seems to suggest a typical value pattern: Daily series, soap operas and medical dramas focus on social values, and they are among the genres that most prominently carry values overall. In 1997, about half of the respective shows depicted helpfulness and commitment to one's family, for instance. These values were a bit less frequent in 2003 and 2007, but their representation in these genres was still above average. On the other hand, crime shows surpass most other genres in the representation of material wealth and a high income.

Based on these tentative results and the literature discussed above, some assumptions seem likely: If personalities who reject society's values have a preference for arousing and deviant content (e.g., Shim & Paul, 2007; Weaver, 2000; Zillmann & Weaver, 1997), people with strong social values, on the contrary, should avoid these genres and turn instead to more prosocial media contents, i.e. programs that focus on relationships in accordance with societal norms. This could mean that socially oriented people prefer family series and medical dramas which, according to the IFEM data, account for a large part of all social values broadcast on television. In addition to my general assumption about people choosing what is in accordance with their values, I expect socially oriented people to comply more with society's norms about what responsible citizens *should* watch (news, educational and cultural programs) and what they should avoid (sex and violence).

I further expect that people who strive for materialist goals are more ambitious and open to challenges than others, leading them to prefer arousing content but to avoid high brow programs. The content analysis conducted by the IFEM revealed that materialist values are indeed depicted a considerable amount on, e.g., crime shows.

But even if genres are reliable categories of contents they are not impervious to change. Infotainment, cross-over programs between on- and offline media, as well as new fiction ("24," "Lost") and reality TV formats ("Big Brother," "American Idols") have challenged traditional genre boundaries. Shows on the margins of a given genre could attract viewers who would not have watched this genre before. Or, with the development of new channels specializing on certain genres, viewers should be tied even more strongly to their favorite genres.

How has the introduction of these special-interest channels affected the value patterns of the programming on preexisting general-audience stations? We do not know, but there are three possibilities, in principle: (1) The values broadcast by the general-appeal channels in Germany have not changed much. More plausible, however, is that (2) the general-interest services have either tried to develop a more distinct profile in order to attract their core audience, or (3), on the contrary, they have become even broader in their content (and values?)—in an attempt to serve as many people as possible, also those less selective or even indifferent in their media choices.

In any case, if a broader offering of TV programs leads to more diversity in genres with specific or typical value patterns, relationships between viewers' values and genre preferences should become more pronounced.

H3: All relationships between individual values and genre preferences have become stronger over time.

6.1 Method

For the years from 1996 to 2007, information on preference for eight genres is available in the AWA surveys. Preference for a number of television genres is measured on a four-point scale from 1 = *don't like to watch at all* to 4 = *like to watch very much*.¹⁴ I focus on eight genres that have been gauged in every wave: family series, medical dramas; quiz and game shows; news; news magazines, eyewitness reports, documentaries; action movies, adventure, thrillers, war movies; erotic movies; crime, detective stories; arts, culture.

This list of genres does not present an exhaustive catalogue of what is broadcast every day. But it contains genres that should appeal to different personalities (see section 2.3.1) who should also hold different value priorities.

Following the IFEM data, family series and medical dramas carry comparably many social values, while crime and detective shows present materialist values more frequently. Preference for these genres as well as the other six, for which no specific value patterns can be defined, will serve as dependent variables in analyses that follow the same design as in the previous

¹⁴ "Here is a list of different types of television programs. Please mark for each if you like to watch this type of program very much, a little, less, or if you do not watch it at all."

chapters. Control variables are demographics and preferences for the other genres.

6.2 Results

Although social justice is a social value, it is negatively and only very slightly related to liking family series and medical dramas, a supposedly “social” genre (Table 18). Much stronger are the positive relationships of watching the news and newsmagazines, as well as arts and culture and, surprisingly, crime and detective shows. The two more deviant genres, action etc. and erotic contents, as well as quiz and game shows are not clearly related to social justice.

For helping other people, a strong preference for arts and culture emerges, followed by news and newsmagazines, which show somewhat smaller correlations (Table 19). Suspense- and arousal-oriented genres, on the other hand, are negatively related to helpfulness; crime and detective shows in particular are avoided. Erotic contents are also less preferred, but this relationship became weaker over time. For action, adventure, thriller, war movies, only few (negative) coefficients are significant. This is mirrored by quiz and game shows, while for family series, no clear pattern can be observed.

Table 18: Social justice and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news- mags.	action, thriller	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.07***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.07***
1997	n.s.	-.03**	.05***	.07***	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	.05***
1998	-.02*	n.s.	.05***	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.03***
1999	n.s.	-.02*	.05***	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.05***
2003	-.04***	n.s.	.04***	.05***	-.02*	-.02*	.04***	.08***
2004	-.02*	.02*	.05***	.07***	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.07***
2005	n.s.	n.s.	.06***	.07***	.02*	n.s.	.04***	.08***
2006	-.02*	n.s.	.05***	.07***	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.05***
2007	-.03**	.02**	.04***	.06***	n.s.		.05***	.04***

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

n.s. not significant; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Sample sizes: 1996: 13,433; 1997: 13,436; 1998: 13,652; 1999: 14,414; 2003: 14,131; 2004: 13,751; 2005: 14,209; 2006: 14,039; 2007: 14,060.

Table 19: Helping people in need and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news mags.	action etc.	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	-.03**	-.04***	.03***	.02*	-.03***	-.05***	-.03**	.06***
1997	-.02*	n.s.	.04***	.03**	n.s.	-.04***	-.05***	.07***
1998	n.s.	-.03**	.04***	.05***	-.03**	-.03**	-.04***	.09***
1999	n.s.	-.03***	.02*	.02**	-.02**	-.04***	-.03**	.08***
2003	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	.02**	n.s.	-.02*	-.04***	.08***
2004	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.02*	.06***
2005	.02*	n.s.	.03**	.03*	n.s.	-.03**	-.02*	.08***
2006	n.s.	n.s.	.03**	.03**	-.02**	-.04***	-.03**	.07***
2007	.02**	n.s.	.02*	.04***	n.s.		-.02**	.07***

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

n.s. not significant; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Family series, on the other hand, are clearly preferred by people who favor commitment to one's family, although the relationship becomes weaker over time (Table 20). The same seems to be true of quiz and game shows, but these differences are likely due to the change in wording after 2003, rather than to systematic trends over time. Likewise, a preference for news as well as crime and detective shows only emerges after the change in the questionnaire, while newsmagazines were avoided by people in favor of total commitment for their family. When the wording was changed, this relationship disappeared. Neither erotic content nor high-brow cultural programs are watched by family-oriented viewers. Preference for action etc. is unrelated.

The last social value, a Christian or religious orientation, shows the most distinct pattern of relationships with genres so far (Table 21). Family series and medical dramas as well as arts and culture are preferred by those with strong Christian values, while all three deviant genres are avoided, most clearly action movies etc. The other three genres are not related to this value and the change in wording did not affect relationships with genre preferences. The coefficients for some genres fluctuate a little (e.g., preference for action movies), but stay in the same order of magnitude across the entire period of study.

Table 20: Being there for one's family and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news mags.	action etc.	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	.09***	.07***	n.s.	-.03***	.03***	-.03**	.02*	-.04***
1997	.08***	.08***	.02*	-.04***	n.s.	-.03**	n.s.	-.04***
1998	.06***	.07***	n.s.	-.03**	n.s.	-.03***	n.s.	-.05***
1999	.09***	.08***	n.s.	-.04***	n.s.	-.04***	n.s.	-.03***
2003 ^b	.03***	.07***	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	-.05***	.02*	-.03**
2004	n.s.	.05***	.06***	n.s.	.02**	-.05***	.03**	n.s.
2005	.04***	.04***	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	-.04***	.03***	n.s.
2006	.03***	.04***	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	-.04***	.03**	-.02**
2007	.03**	.05***	.06***	.03**	.02*		.03**	-.03**

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

^b Wording changed from "being totally committed to one's family" to "being available for one's family, committing to one's family."

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 21: Religious/Christian orientation and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news mags.	action etc.	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.09***	-.07***	-.09***	.04***
1997	.03***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.06***	-.05***	-.06***	.06***
1998	.02**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.07***	-.06***	-.07***	.05***
1999	.02**	n.s.	.03***	.02**	-.07***	-.05***	-.07***	.05***
2003 ^b	.06***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05***	-.05***	-.06***	.03***
2004	.03**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05***	-.05***	-.07***	.04***
2005	.03***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.05***	-.05***	-.06***	.04***
2006	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	-.02**	-.06***	-.04***	-.06***	.04***
2007	.03**	n.s.	.02**	n.s.	-.08***		-.08***	.03**

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

^b Wording changed from "a life determined by Christian faith" to "religion, strong faith."

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

As for the willingness to perform, one of the materialist value items, only the two informational genres show a distinct relationship, more strongly pronounced for newsmagazines (Table 22). But both genres are affected by the change in wording after 2003, which led to weaker correlations. For family series, the sign of the coefficient even switched, from negative to positive, after the value item was changed. But as for most other genres, no real connection with a performance-orientation can be observed. Arts and culture, which are often also featured in a magazine format, were slightly preferred by people who shared this value, but after 2003, this relationship disappears.

The results for social advancement are a bit mixed, and some relationships seem so weak that they were not significant in a number of waves, but reappeared in later ones (Table 23). Most clearly, people interested in advancement watch newsmagazines, but looking at the whole picture, no genre seems to be avoided by this group. All significant coefficients are positive, so that we can differentiate them merely by their size. The second most preferred genre after newsmagazines is erotic content, followed by quiz and game shows, which are liked a bit less since 2003. The coefficients for action, news and family series are about of the same size, but not all waves produce significant effects. The patterns for crime and cultural programs are even less conclusive.

Table 22: Willingness to perform and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news mags.	action etc.	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
1997	-.03***	n.s.	.07***	.06***	-.03***	n.s.	n.s.	.03**
1998	n.s.	n.s.	.07***	.06***	n.s.	.02*	.03**	.03***
1999	-.04***	n.s.	.07***	.08***	-.03***	n.s.	n.s.	.02*
2003 ^b	.02**	n.s.	n.s.	.02**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2004	.03**	n.s.	.02*	.03***	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2006	n.s.	.03**	.03**	.04***	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
2007	n.s.	n.s.	.04***	.02*	n.s.		n.s.	n.s.

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

^b Wording changed from "willingness to perform" to "delivering a good performance."

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 23: Social advancement and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news mags.	action etc.	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	.03***	.04***	.03***	.04***	.04**	.05***	.03**	n.s.
1997	.02*	.05**	n.s.	.03**	.03*	.06**	n.s.	n.s.
1998	.05**	.07***	n.s.	.04***	.02**	.06**	.02*	.02*
1999	.04**	.05***	.03***	.05***	.03***	.05***	.04**	.02**
2003	n.s.	n.s.	.03***	.04**	n.s.	.02*	n.s.	.02**
2004	n.s.	.03*	.05***	.05***	n.s.	.02*	.03*	n.s.
2005	n.s.	n.s.	.06**	.05**	.03**	.03***	n.s.	.03***
2006	.03**	n.s.	.04**	.05***	.03***	.02**	.02*	.03***
2007	.03**	.03*	.03*	.05***	.02*		.04**	.03**

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

In a way, relationships between genres and a high income/wealth follow the opposite pattern of willingness to perform (Table 24). All three informational genres are avoided, while the three arousing program categories as well as quiz and game shows are preferred. For family series, some positive relationships can be reported for the first three years under study, after which the relationship disappeared.

Table 24: High income/wealth and TV genre preferences, standardized regression coefficients

Year	family, medic.	quiz, games	news	news mags.	action etc.	erotic prog. ^a	crime, detect.	arts, culture
1996	.03***	.06**	-.06**	-.04**	.05***	.07***	.05**	-.05**
1997	.04**	.06***	-.05**	-.04**	.07***	.07**	.06***	-.07**
1998	.03*	.03**	-.05***	-.05**	.07***	.07***	.07***	-.05***
1999	n.s.	.05***	-.05***	-.05***	.05***	.09***	.05**	-.05**
2003	n.s.	.04***	-.02**	-.03*	.08***	.10***	.05***	-.07**
2004	n.s.	.04***	-.05***	-.04***	.06***	.07***	.04***	-.05***
2005	n.s.	.03*	-.04**	-.03*	.04**	.08**	.03***	-.05***
2006	n.s.	.04**	-.04**	-.03*	.05***	.08***	.04***	-.05***
2007	n.s.	.03***	-.05***	-.02*	.05***		.03*	-.05**

^a In 2007, this genre was not included in the questionnaire.

n.s. not significant; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

6.3 Summary and Discussion

All values are differently related to the eight genres under study. For some, the findings fulfill my tentative expectations. For instance, helpfulness, as a central social value, is indeed related to what one is supposed to watch (and like) in order to conform to the ideal of an informed and educated citizen. But other social values, such as commitment to the family, show no relationship with news and a negative relationship with cultural programs; this specific value is mostly related to entertaining genres, although other variables were controlled for. Social justice seems to be more closely linked to information and resembles some materialist values in this respect—willingness to perform and, partly, social advancement. Two of the materialist values, a high income/wealth and the somewhat indifferent social advancement, are connected to a clear preference for arousing contents.

At the beginning of this chapter, I explored differences in value patterns across TV genres. Unfortunately, most genres were too infrequent in the IFEM samples to allow for more detailed analyses. But for those that were more frequent, it is interesting to verify whether users share the values that are put forward by their favorite genres. Again, not all social audience values are related in the same way to a “social” genre such as family series; only Christian and family-oriented values lead to preferring this type of program. As noted above, family series became less frequent on television over the three waves of the content analysis; this could be why relationships with “being there for one’s family” have weakened over time.

For materialist values, the data show that they are presented more often than average on crime shows. From a use-point of view, only being interested in a high income and wealth leads to watching this genre. But this is exactly the value that was most frequent on crime shows. Thus we can observe, at this point, support for the reinforcement-idea of watching programs whose values match one’s own priorities. But the importance of values for genre preferences seems to be limited, albeit greater than for the selection of television *channels*.

This may be a function of the link between values and personality traits on the one hand (see chapter 2.1.3) and personality traits and genre preferences on the other (see chapter 2.3.1): The influence of personality traits on genre preferences has been well established. And if values and personality traits appertain to the same realm, as is generally assumed, relationships between personality traits and genre preferences should at least partly “trickle down” and be reflected in the relationships between values and favoring genres. These can

then be expected to be stronger than links between values and use of TV channels, which are more diverse in offered value patterns. Thus channel selection can be seen as more distal to values than genre preferences. This could explain why relationships with genres appear stronger in my analyses.

Still, with these results and those presented in chapters 4 and 5, there is evidence for a (small) influence of values on selecting television channels as well as on preferring genres. Again, the sample of the content analysis presented above is too limited to examine whether genres present different values depending on *which channel* they are broadcast on. But there could still be interactions between channel and genre preferences—regardless of whether or not genres actually differ very much between stations. People could have a favorite channel and like to watch, for example, the same person presenting sports programs as well as hosting an evening talk show (a combination not uncommon to German TV viewers). Additionally, if a station specializes in a given genre it would be watched more frequently by fans of this type of program—who also prefer the values typical of it. Thus genre preferences could reinforce the influence of values on channel use.

Lastly, in order to bind viewers to their programs, channels themselves could wish to increase brand recognition through reliable worldviews expressed or depicted. Thus, genres could differ in their value patterns across channels. As I have discussed above, the German audience does hold different images of public-service versus commercial television. Viewers could expect, for instance, that even in a thriller, *ARD* and *ZDF* are more tasteful and will present them with less gruesome details than their commercial competitors, or at least only broadcast deviant contents well after midnight, instead of the late evening. Viewers of PSB channels could thus have a different image of these genres compared to viewers of commercial channels—another way in which channel and genre preferences could interact.

7 Channel Loyalty and Genre Preferences

As the previous chapters have shown, preferences for genres as well as channels are related to viewer's values. This leaves several possibilities in which the preferences themselves could be intertwined with values. Taking up my previous discussion, values could, for one thing, be linked to genre preferences which in turn could be linked to the preference for channels that present these genres more (or less) frequently. So, an additional, indirect effect of values on channel choice can be expected.

In fact, television channels function as brands that offer more or less reliable environments easily recognizable by viewers (e.g., Lin et al., 2002). Within these environments certain genres could play more important roles than others or be attributed to specific time slots within the programs. Therefore the typical afternoon program, for instance, could regularly present value-challenging talk- or court shows on a given channel, while a competitor may present lighter sitcoms or daily series at the same time.

But even within one genre, channels could offer different value patterns to their viewers. To give an example, the cartoon show "The Simpsons" was first aired in Germany on public-service ZDF, with only little success. After three seasons, commercial *ProSieben* acquired the broadcasting rights. Thilo Proff, managing director of *ProSieben* explained that with its anarchical humor and subversive criticism the series seemed to fit this channel's target group much better than that of ZDF.¹⁵ How a program usually addresses values partly defines whether viewers will be appalled by it or whether it will appeal to them. But, as the "Simpsons" example shows, the setting in which such a value pattern is presented matters as well. This specific show may never have been intended to be a children's program and was misplaced in the afternoon program of ZDF that aimed at precisely this group of viewers.

¹⁵ In an interview with [medienhandbuch.de](http://www.medienhandbuch.de/news/mit-den-problemen-der-simpsons-kann-man-sich-weltweit-identifizieren-das-macht-die-serie-so-einzigartig-exklusiv-interview--17860.html) on November 6, 2008 (<http://www.medienhandbuch.de/news/mit-den-problemen-der-simpsons-kann-man-sich-weltweit-identifizieren-das-macht-die-serie-so-einzigartig-exklusiv-interview--17860.html>). Retrieved November 23, 2009).

Table 25: Genre preferences and frequency of TV channel use, 2007, partial correlations

Genres	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1
family series, medical dramas	.10***	.10***	.22***	.19***
quiz and game shows	.16***	.16***	.25***	.21***
news	.28***	.26***	.07***	.06***
newsmags., reportages, documentaries	.22***	.23***	.02*	.02*
action, adventure, thriller, war movies	n.s.	n.s.	.20***	.20***
crime series	.16***	.17***	.17***	.20***
arts, culture	.13***	.14***	-.08***	-.06***

n = 14,060; n.s. not significant; * p < .05; *** p < .001

Note: Controlled for age and education. For the measurement of variables, see chapters 3.3.2 and 6.1.

Based on the results from previous chapters, I posit that values are expressed in both people's use of channels and their genre preferences. But the question remains how values, channel and genre preferences are related to one another. In the previous chapters, we have seen that liking or disliking a genre is more closely affected by personal values than the frequency of selecting a channel is. Yet channel profiles, in turn, depend on what genres are broadcast; thus preference for genres should be related to channel preferences as well. Indeed, as Table 25 shows for the year 2007, most correlations between liking a genre and the channels examined before are considerable, even if controlled for two central demographics, age and education.¹⁶

Most correlations are positive, which is hardly surprising because genre preferences were gauged specifically for television. And favoring a (TV) genre is likely to increase rather than decrease TV consumption and use of individual channels. However, some channels are more closely related to specific genres than others and some are avoided by people with certain genre preferences. In this respect, the two groups of channels, commercial versus public-service stations, are clearly contrasted. Except for crime series, which are about equally related to all four stations, the public-service broadcasters and commercial stations show about the same correlations with genre preferences, respectively. But differences between the two types of channels are clear-cut: People who like

¹⁶ Controlling for the other demographics included in previous chapters (gender, family status, East-versus West-German origin) only minimally changes the coefficients reported in Table 25. The more parsimonious analyses are presented here.

to watch news prefer PSB television over the two commercial stations studied here. For newsmagazines etc., this looks similar, but people favoring this genre seem more or less indifferent towards commercial TV. The contrast between the two types of channels is most extreme for preference for action and other arousing content as well as arts and culture. Action fans have a clear preference for commercial television, but no relationship with watching PSB is apparent. For sophisticated contents, the direction of the relationships with channel preference for either commercial TV or PSB is even reversed: People interested in art and culture watch *ARD* and *ZDF*, but avoid commercial *RTL* and *Sat.1*.

But what role do values play in these relationships? A value such as high income/wealth is linked to both genre and channel preferences, as presented in chapters 4 and 6. I have found that people who share this value have a preference for commercial channels and tend to slightly dislike PSB. And they also like, for example, action, but avoid arts and culture. Taking into account the relationships between preference for these genres and use of the four TV channels, the actual relationships between these and the value item in question could resemble the model presented in Figure 6.

Here, a value would be an antecedent of both genre and channel preferences, and genre preferences would also influence channel use. In this logic, genre preferences would reinforce and thus moderate the relationships between a value and the selection of a TV channel. For instance, the positive relationship between favoring material wealth and watching *RTL* would be reinforced for people who, in addition, like action, adventure, thriller and war movies—because *RTL* is more likely to cater to this genre than *ARD* or *ZDF*. Thus the influence of values on channel preference would have been underestimated by the analyses presented in chapters 4 and 5: Genre preferences typical of certain values would add to these relationships and, indirectly, account for a larger influence of values on selecting or avoiding a channel.

I will therefore analyze how genre preferences moderate the relationship between personal values and television use. With values influencing genre preferences, there should be an indirect effect of values on channel use through genre preferences. In this chapter I test the relationships between select values, genre preferences and use of channels as depicted in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Theoretical path model of relationships between the value high income/wealth and preference for two genres and four TV channels

7.1 Method

My previous analyses have revealed no evidence for clear historical trends in the relationships with values, neither concerning channels nor the more fine-grained genres. With the data available to me, I do not think it fruitful to pursue this direction of research further, and I will concentrate on one exemplary point in time in this last part of my study, the most recent AWA wave, polled in 2007.

Likewise, I will focus on the two values and two genres that are most strongly related to each other as well as to channel preferences. The purpose of this analysis is to explore in more depth how personal values and preferences for media contents on the one and outlets on the other hand are connected. I will thus analyze relationships between two of the most polarizing value items, high income/wealth and religion/strong faith. On the other hand, I will focus on two genres that formed the most clear-cut differences in their relationships with channel preference: action movies, adventure, thriller and war movies as opposed to arts and culture.

Figure 7: Model tested for relationships between a value, genre and channel preferences
Control variables in light gray.

I will control for two demographic variables that were of influence in previous analyses: age and education. Age is highly correlated with use of TV channels (positive relationships with PSB, negative ones with commercial channels) as well as preference for action. Older persons dislike this genre. Higher education leads to avoidance of commercial channels, but to a preference for arts and culture on television. These relationships are accounted for in my analyses. Figure 7 illustrates the structure of the models tested.

For the materialist goal of a high income and wealth, expected relationships have been depicted in Figure 6. For the social ideal of religion and strong faith, relationships of this item with the two genres and four channels should be the inverse of a high income. Finding religion important should lead to preferring arts and culture as well as public-service television, while the action-oriented genre should be avoided and commercial channels ignored. The direction of the other paths should stay the same.

7.2 Results

Figure 8 gives the estimates for the expected relationships between religion/strong faith and media preferences.¹⁷ As can be seen, all coefficients show the expected signs and almost all are significant, many substantial. Thus there are indeed indirect effects between values, genre and channel preferences. A religious orientation leads to preferring arts and culture on television and this in turn makes people choose both PSB channels more often while avoiding the two commercial ones. These indirect relationships reinforce the direct ones between this value and the frequency of watching said channels.

Most coefficients deviate a little from the partial correlations presented in Table 25 as well as from the regression coefficients in previous chapters. This is due to the introduction of values as additional controls in the first case and a different set of demographic control variables in the second. The signs of the coefficients are all consistent, however.

Figure 8: Religion/strong faith as a value, preference for action and arts/culture and watching TV channels: A path model

$n = 14,060$; $\chi^2 = 34,712.990$; $df = 33$; $p = .000$; CFI = .993; TLI = .945;
RMSEA = .064; SRMR = .021; *Maximum Likelihood* estimation; * $p \leq .05$; *** $p \leq .001$

¹⁷ See appendix B, Table B-1 for details on relationships of the core concepts with control variables.

Overall, the positive coefficients between genres and their “matching” channels are among the strongest relationships presented in this study. And the clear-cut links between a religious orientation and the two genres studied here partly extend to the paths between genres and channels.

This is replicated for high income and wealth as a value (Figure 9).¹⁸ Yet here, the direct relationships between this materialist value and the two PSB channels are not significant. On the other hand, the paths leading to and from preference for arts/culture all follow the expected direction and reveal again indirect mechanisms that reinforce relationships between a value and channel preference through the liking or disliking of a genre.

Again, the positive relationships between being interested in arts and culture and watching public-service television as well as those between liking action and other arousing movies as well as commercial channels are considerable. And through these paths, additional effects of values are channeled toward the decisions about what station to turn on or off.

Figure 9: High income/wealth as a value, preference for action and arts/culture and watching TV channels: A path model

$n = 14,060$; $\chi^2 = 34,632.565$; $df = 33$; $p = .000$; CFI = .993; TLI = .945; RMSEA = .064; SRMR = .021; *Maximum Likelihood* estimation; *** $p \leq .001$

¹⁸ See appendix B, Table-B2 for details on relationships of the core concepts with control variables.

7.3 Summary and Discussion

The path analyses presented in this chapter are illuminating with respect to relationships discovered previously in this study. They deepen our understanding about how values and media preferences as well as preferences for contents and outlets are linked. Favoring a TV genre distinctly leads to increased use of a specific channel. Some stations are typically linked to specific genres, while for others indifference or even slight avoidance can be observed depending on what genres someone likes or dislikes.

Public-service broadcasting in Germany is preferred by people who are interested in arts and culture, while commercial television is watched by fans of action, adventure, thriller and war movies, but not by those who like sophisticated contents. Preference for action does not seem to affect use of PSB.

That using outlets depends on what genres or content they typically present should hardly be surprising. As mentioned above, channels seem to have a distinct image as a brand that goes along with audience expectations about genre profiles ("informative" PSB versus "entertaining" commercial channels; Ridder & Engel, 2005). But how do values fit into the relationships between genre and channel preferences? People who hold more conservative, traditional values favor arts and culture on television, but not arousing movies. Likewise, they prefer public-service channels *ARD* and *ZDF* (which devote a larger proportion of their programming to the arts, but less to action and similar films) over commercial *RTL* and *Sat.1* (which show the opposite pattern for these two genres; Krüger & Zapf-Schramm, 2008). Holding a preference for one of these genres alone also is related to frequency of using the two groups of channels.

On the other hand, the *avoidance* of channels among people who prefer specific genres is not as strongly expressed in my models as *preference* for channels. As stated above, liking a television genre probably increases viewership. Disliking one genre, but not necessarily others, may reduce TV watching, but apparently not in a drastic manner. The positive, reinforcing effect of liking a genre on use of a "matching" channel clearly resists control variables. This can be interpreted as a learning outcome: TV viewers know what gratifications to expect from a given type of program (belonging to a genre) and they will also have experience with programming schemes of channels that emphasize certain genres but downplay others.

In sum, values are consistently related to both genres and channels, even if not all values to all channels. But they are factors that help explain media choices. A person's values influence his or her preferences for certain genres, just as

previous studies have shown for personality traits (see chapter 2.3.1). And values also go along with preferences for channels, which, in turn, interact with genre preferences. Relationships between values and genre preferences are stronger than those between values and channel use. Yet, genre preferences in turn influence channel preferences and thus lead to indirect and in sum larger effects on channel choice. Taking into account genre preferences thus helps to reveal the true importance of values for actual media use: Liking of a genre can reinforce (or further reduce) the relationships between values and channel use. For instance, the rejection of *RTL* among people who have a strong religious orientation is stronger for those who are interested in arts and culture. On the other hand, the preference for *RTL* among viewers who think a high income and wealth are important in life is stronger if they also like action.

But can the relationships discussed in this chapter have a different meaning as well? Could the role of *values* (instead of genres) be that of a mediator? Of course with cross-sectional data, it is unclear which of the variables I studied causally influence which others. Figures 8 and 9 depict genre preferences as moderators in the relationships between values and use of TV channels. The (cross-sectional) data in themselves could also be interpreted the other way around. For instance, the negative relationship between liking action and watching *ZDF* could be attenuated by certain value priorities. People who like action and comparable contents *and* who are religious could still watch *ZDF*. And they could have a different view of this genre than viewers of other stations because *ZDF* as one of their favorite channels displays only action movies that respect their religious (and other) values.

Yet my discussion of values in chapter 2.1 has defined them as close to the core of an individual's personality. They are changeable, yes, but should not be affected much by liking a certain genre. Thus, the relationships between, for instance, liking action and placing importance on religion should be rather weak. In my analyses, however, the coefficients between genre preferences and values are of considerable size. They indicate strong links that are more plausibly explained by genre preferences following personal values rather than the other way around.

In addition, my analyses have shown that values are more closely related to genre preferences than to channel use. In my understanding of the data, it is unlikely that the weak links between values and channel use could substantially moderate or even override the ties to genre preferences. Coming back to my example, being religious and liking action would hardly lead to watching *ZDF*. For one thing, *ZDF* does not feature this genre heavily, and liking action usually

does not go along with a religious orientation. It makes more sense to assume that preferences for genres typical of a channel reinforce relationships between values (a)typical of said genre and channel use. Supporting earlier findings on personality and genre preferences, values could influence genre preferences (fitting a person's values) in the same way that personality traits have been shown to do and could in the end contribute to people's actual media use behavior.

8 Conclusion

Values have been discussed in connection to the changes brought to the German TV landscape since the introduction of the dual system (e.g., Husmann & Walter, 2006). Yet, on such occurrences arguments have rarely, if at all, been based on reliable information about differences in televised values. Nor have values of the *audience* of channels or genres been considered. This study offers a starting point for such an endeavor. The systematic analysis of values within genres and among fans of these genres—or even individual programs—could provide a valuable addition to the understanding and anticipation of media use behavior.

This study has looked at the role values play in people's media choices. I have found suggestions of correspondence between values presented in media, use of these media and values of the users. I see these consistencies as due to selective exposure, with people turning to media (content) that would confirm rather than question their personal values. In particular, I have found small, but systematically recurring effects of individual values on TV genre preferences as well as on use of TV channels and print outlets. All in all, people certainly take into account a lot more qualitative traits of mediated offers than I have been able to study in this explorative analysis. But in any case, personal values deserve more than the casual mentioning they sometimes get in theories that model people's choices of media channels and genre preferences.

Generally speaking, *social* values tend to lead to reading newspapers and newsmagazines, left-wing ones being a little more preferred than conservative titles. On the other hand, people with strong *materialist* values favor conservative outlets and commercial television. Education plays a role in this respect as the highly educated seem to be more media-savvy when it comes to choosing outlets that match their values.

As for genres, social values go along with a preference for genres that present social values more often or that offer information for people who like to be up to date about what is going on in the world and in their society. People with materialist values were more interested in entertainment and arousing contents. Some of these relationships actually mirror what value patterns are typical of the respective outlets or genres.

One of the starting points of this study was the considerable expansion of the German media system over the last 25 years. I expected to find that a broader offering enabled people to choose contents that fit their needs—and also the underlying values—better than in a more limited media environment. However, hardly any systematic trends over time could be observed. At least use of the outlets and genres studied here has not changed much with regard to viewers' values, although competition increased significantly over the period studied.

A possible explanation is that I focused on general interest TV channels and general news outlets, which may not try to accommodate audience niches with special value priorities. As for the relationships of values and genre preferences, during the twelve years under study, the German TV landscape mainly grew in terms of special-interest channels. These need not have affected the general-appeal offer of the four stations I examined. The latter continued to exist next to new stations and probably still offered reliable gratifications to viewers used to them. Consequently, the audience may not have selected those stations more according to their values than before. A more comprehensive study of televised value patterns could help to investigate this finding further.

Some of the relationships between values and genre preference were actually weakening, however. Why? Not necessarily the channels in general, but some of their *genres* may have changed in profile during the observation time: As mentioned above, maybe some TV programs went beyond whatever gratifications their genre might have traditionally offered; others may have crossed formerly well-established genre boundaries. Of course, with less defined and changing value patterns in certain genres, relations between use of these genres and viewers' value orientations would become less systematic and, in sum, weaker.

This effect may even be reinforced in an analysis based on self-reported survey data. To take an example, since the end of the 1990s, many new quiz shows emerged, following in the wake of and sometimes clearly emulating the highly popular "Who wants to be a millionaire?" (M. Gerhards, Grajczyk, & Klingler, 2001; Gleich, 2001). This increased offering of quiz shows may have changed people's understanding of the genre "quiz and game shows." Thus what was gauged in one combined item may have represented different things for respondents over the years. Similar developments could easily have affected the way values are related to self-reported preference for changing genres.

In any case, genre preferences and TV-channel use interact. Some genres seem to match some channels better than others, at least in the eyes of media users. Thus the weak relationships between channel use and personal values can

be reinforced for people who like genres that are specific to a given channel. I have documented the indirect relationships between values, preference for genres and channel use through path analysis. Here, public-service versus commercial channels showed clear differences for most genres, and I illustrated that for some types of content even opposite patterns exist.

For instance, being religious is associated with being interested in arts and culture but avoiding action movies. This relationship reinforces the preference for PSB among religious people as well as their dislike of commercial TV. The resulting correlations reflect the frequency with which these two genres appear on the given stations (Krüger & Zapf-Schramm, 2008). A broader content analysis of what values are typically broadcast within genres would be necessary to provide a more clear-cut picture. Likewise, it would be interesting to see whether value patterns *within genres* differ across channels. Maybe action films are not as graphic on ZDF—and thus less repugnant to religious people—as they may turn out to be on RTL?

Although values play an admittedly small role, I have found evidence for an effect on channel choice. But it turned out not as clear-cut as expected. Genres seem to play a greater part in the choice of what to watch, but values do add to these selection decisions. Genre preference obviously modifies the relationships between viewers' values and their use of channels. In other words, selection of channels partly depends on genre preferences and seems to reflect what genres are "typical" of a specific channel.

Regardless of what content and values channels actually broadcast, viewers hold stable expectations about what to find where. So it may matter for individual shows where that content happens to be broadcast. One could expect that sooner or later "channels" or "networks" will no longer play a role for users because television stations closely watch their competitors and imitate successful formats (of which casting shows, court shows, or the above mentioned "Who wants to be a millionaire?" are but a few recent examples). Yet, a specific "channel effect" seems to remain up to today, and it seems unlikely that it will ever completely disappear. The branding of channels will continue to influence viewers in their choices (Lin et al., 2002).

One reason for this phenomenon could be people's persistent need for "reliable surprises" instead of a wish for absolute autonomy of what to watch, independent from any programming schemes, time of day or availability of channels (about the concept of "reliable surprise," see Schoenbach, 2007). "Reliable surprises" could actually still be the major function of outlets that bundle and sort programming. Certainly, every member of the audience wants to

watch *reliably* what seems to closely meet his or her expectations. But the audience also finds *surprises* pleasant, typically provided by somebody else, e.g., as consecutive programming that one can stay with, but also as a programming philosophy—meaning, for instance: The public-service channel ZDF is not boring, on the one hand, but protects me, on the other hand, from encountering nudity or makes sure that family series always have a happy ending. This could be a way in which a channel works as a brand, furthering channel loyalty.

Yet decisions about exposing oneself to media take place in a variety of settings, moods and for very different reasons. Thus personal values need not be strong determinants of every instance of using media. But as this study has shown, they are still reflected in the audience's decision to use or to avoid contents. More than situational gratifications, a channel's value pattern could be the key to explain brand loyalty of TV viewers. And in order to attract specific audiences—and retain them over time—systematic analysis of value patterns within programs could contribute to creating unique channel profiles.

I have found evidence for people selecting media according to, among other factors, their values. To what extent consuming value-laden media *reinforces* value orientations already held by users I do not know. My analyses have been conducted and interpreted following the selective exposure paradigm. Yet, the value patterns people expose themselves to probably feeds back to their own value priorities. The model I presented at the outset of this study describes on the one hand how values come to influence decisions and behavior on the individual or micro-level. But it also locates values in a macro-framework of overlapping private and public spheres that influence people in the adoption of values. A feedback process should actually take place between different spheres of influence, in which media contribute to the long-term cultivation or socialization of people's values as a *result* of their usage. On this aggregated level, the socializing effects of their use underline the media's importance for societal integration. Mass media outlets like the ones studied here are among the institutions that directly reach the largest groups of people. All others have to either seek distribution via the media or remain limited to much smaller arenas. Through their own contents and those provided by others, media contribute to creating social cohesion via offering and thus confirming value patterns for large parts of a population.

Up to this day, media seem important reflectors and providers of common value patterns. People (partly) turn to media to find confirmation for their values. From time to time, they may also encounter challenges that put into question their own priorities. But even when this happens, mass outlets will confront large

audiences with these challenges and again create ties among people who pose themselves the same questions about what is desirable and appropriate or not. Such audiences used to be mostly confined within national borders, since the vast majority of users of a particular medium, as in this study, live in the same country. But more and more individual or special-interest media from around the globe are available today. They can present less mainstream values to their users—or at least values that are not shared by their immediate surroundings. Likewise, people can base their selections on contents rather than channels. In this respect, the closer ties between values and genres (as opposed to channels) may foreshadow future developments. Media use will become more and more specialized and people may encounter fewer contents *en passant*. In tomorrow's digitalized and online world, it will be interesting to observe whether media use will lose (at least some of) its importance as a provider of social glue on the national level. Instead media may help create world-wide virtual communities that gather around one common denominator, e.g., a set of values. An extension of the current study could look into this even broader, but also highly fragmented sphere influencing people in their adoption of values and their reasons for turning to media.

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Appendix A—Codebook for Values on Television (IFEM)

In chapter 3.1.3, results from a content analysis of values within the programs of the four largest TV stations in Germany are presented. This analysis was conducted by the *Institut für empirische Medienforschung* (IFEM) and is based upon an earlier pilot study (Krüger, 1988). Value items were coded to closely match the AWA-survey data used later on in this study.

Within fictional and non-fictional programs of the four largest stations, characters or real-life people who act or speak out in favor or disfavor of values are coded. They are defined as value-carriers. If a program consists of more than one segment, e.g., in a magazine format, value-carriers are coded per segment. One value-carrier can occur in connection with multiple value items. In each occurrence, the respective value item is rated on a five-point Likert-type scale, from 1 = *strong rejection* to 5 = *strong affirmation* in words or actions of a value-carrier.

Social value items	Coding instructions
	Being in favor of a value stands for ... in words or actions
helping other people	Helpfulness, being there for others, also in the context of friendship or camaraderie.
social justice	Equal treatment of people belonging to different cultural, economic, ethnic or other social groups (as opposed to discrimination, unfair treatment of others). Being in favor of compensations for disadvantaged groups, responsibility for the needy.
a Christian conduct of life	Respect for Christian institutions (e.g., church, papacy) and traditions (e.g., matrimony, baptism). Christian core-virtues, such as charity. Behavior or statements that explicitly refer to the Ten Commandments, the Seven Virtues, Cardinal Sins or similar concepts.

a good family life	Being there for one's immediate or more distant family, being committed, loving and caring. Harmonious relationships with immediate family members. <i>Note:</i> Marriage may be important for a good family life, but not necessarily.
Materialist value items	Coding instructions Being in favor of a value stands for ... in words or actions
a high income	Earning a high salary in one's profession. Also: attaining a high status, success, a career, power within the professional realm.
wealth	Material wealth, being/becoming rich.
social advancement	"Climbing the social ladder." Succeeding in one's career, being ambitious, interested in a more powerful, influential, advantageous position.
willingness to perform	Being willing and determined to work hard, to invest in one's (professional) skills. Being arduous, diligent.

Appendix B—Path analysis of values, genre preferences and channel use

Relationships between values, genre preferences, and TV channel use, including control variables that have been omitted in chapter 7.2 in Figures 8 and 9, respectively.

Table B-1: Religion/strong faith as a value, preference for action and arts/culture and watching TV channels, with control variables

	Genre preference		TV channel use			
	action etc.	arts, culture	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1
Value						
religion, strong faith	-.10***	.07***	.02*	.03***	-.03***	-.03***
Genre preference						
action etc.			n.s.	n.s.	.20***	.21***
arts, culture			.13***	.13***	-.08***	-.06***
Control variables						
age	-.36***	.28***	.40***	.41***	-.05***	-.03***
education		.27***			-.16***	-.15***

n = 14,060; $\chi^2 = 34,712.990$; df = 33; p = .000; CFI = .993; TLI = .945;

RMSEA = .064; SRMR = .021; *Maximum Likelihood* estimation;

n.s. not significant; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001

Table B-2: High income/wealth as a value, preference for action and arts/culture and watching TV channels, with control variables

	Genre preference		TV channel use			
	action etc.	arts, culture	ARD	ZDF	RTL	Sat.1
Value						
a high income, wealth	.08***	-.05***	n.s.	n.s.	.05***	.04***
Genre preference						
action etc.			n.s.	n.s.	.20***	.21***
arts, culture			.13***	.14***	-.08***	-.06***
Control variables						
age	-.37***	.29***	.40***	.41***	-.05***	-.03**
education		.27***			-.16***	-.15***

n = 14,060; $\chi^2 = 34,632.565$; df = 33; p = .000; CFI = .993; TLI = .945;

RMSEA = .064; SRMR = .021; *Maximum Likelihood* estimation;

n.s. not significant; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001