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TWO VIEWS OF ACCENT: A THIRD OPINION

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I. THE THEORETICAL ISSUE

1.1 The discussion between Gussenhoven and Bolinger marks a new phase in 'the debate over determinism and free choice' (Bolinger 1985:79) in accent placement. In the seventies, the controversy was about whether or not accent can be predicted on the basis of syntactic structure (e.g. Bresnan 1971, 1972; Bolinger 1972). Bolinger, who argued that it cannot, carried the day. In the present phase of the debate the 'deterministic' side also acknowledges that 'sentence accents are the expression of the speaker's communicative intentions' (Gussenhoven 1985:125). Moreover, 'no determinism is claimed to exist between linguistic/pragmatic context and the way speakers address the linguistic options' (Gussenhoven 1985:125), i.e. options such as [+focus] and [-focus] (see Keijsper 1985:61-85 for the reasons why such determinism is untenable). Gussenhoven's 'determinism' consists, then, in the claim that the communicative intentions which a speaker chooses to convey cannot be expressed directly, by accenting or not accenting certain words. Instead, 'the speaker is assumed to translate his communicative intentions into choices from a number of linguistic options, most importantly into a focus marking of the semantic constituents in his sentence (fragment). Sentence accent assignment rules translate these choices (again, mainly the focus marking) into sentence accents on particular words' (Gussenhoven 1985:125). The main rule is SAAR, which divides the input material into focus domains and assigns an accent or no accent to a domain (the accent goes to a specific place in the domain). Roughly, SAAR deals with cases where [+accent] corresponds to [+focus] and where [-accent] corresponds to [+focus] or [-focus]. Examples in which the relationships are systematically different are dealt with separately (Gussenhoven 1983:406-15; 1984:45-55, 177-89).

The 'free choice' approach, as always represented by Bolinger, argues that a speaker expresses his intentions directly, by accenting or not accenting certain words, i.e. that no rule-system needs to be postulated.

I think that the discussion is somewhat confusing, because the two approaches tend to be presented as alternative explanations of accent placement. It would be more correct to say, in my view, that Gussenhoven's explanation counts as an observation in Bolinger's approach, and that Bolinger's direct 'highlighting' idea is a part of the explanation of Gussenhoven's observation. The present chapter tries to explain this opinion.

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1.2 As it stands, the 'deterministic' claim that an indirect relation exists between, on the one hand, options such as [+focus] and, on the other hand, [+accent], is hardly worth discussing, in my view, because the claim is undoubtedly correct. However, this fact is in no way an argument for rejecting Bolinger's direct 'highlighting' view (Gussenhoven 1985:126), because the latter view is not that the relation between [+focus] and [+accent] is direct, but that [+focus] is wrong. Bolinger argues that a speaker expresses intentions other than [+focus], say 'x' and 'y', when he chooses to accent or not to accent a word:

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{'+x'} \\
\text{[+accent]} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{'+y'} \\
\text{[-accent]} \\
\end{array} \]

This view can only be refuted by showing that it does not account for the facts. It cannot be refuted by showing that it is possible to propose, instead of 'x' and 'y', other notions, say 'p' and 'q', which ensure that one must additionally propose a rule-system:

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{'+p'} \\
\text{[+accent]} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{'+q'} \\
\text{[-accent]} \\
\end{array} \]

The real controversy is about the choice between "x" and "y" without rules and "p" and "q" plus rules.

1.3 Bolinger starts from the idea that it is preferable to avoid rules in Gussenhoven's sense, i.e. that it is better to have an 'x' and a 'y' than to have a 'p' and a 'q': 'On purely theoretical grounds, the main disadvantage of Gussenhoven's position is that it requires two explanations for a single form' (Bolinger 1985:121). For example:

2. Why don't you come over tonight? - My MOTHER's sick (= Bolinger 1985:Ex. 227)
3. What's wrong with your mother? - My mother's SICK (= Bolinger 1985:Ex. 228)

'Gussenhoven assigns a single explanation to what (226) and (228) have in common (the non-accenting of sink and mother as part of Background) but not to what (226) and (227) have in common (identical items accented and unaccented)' (Bolinger 1985:121). Bolinger's theoretical grounds are that this outcome is undesirable.
I do not think that the outcome is undesirable in Gussenhoven's theoretical framework; rather, it is a necessity for retaining that ('generative') framework. Oakeshott-Taylor (1984:4) has made explicit the crucial point: 'A preliminary question concerns predictability--i.e. the rule-governed nature--of stress location. If stress is unpredictable, then the topic is of little theoretical interest'. Those who subscribe to this view must search for a 'p' and a 'q' rather than for an 'x' and a 'y', because otherwise accent cannot be predicted by rule, so that the topic is deprived of its theoretical interest. As Gussenhoven (1983:378) puts it, in Bolinger's view 'the nucleus is seen as a "highlighter" of particular lexical elements and since speakers are perfectly free to highlight word A rather than word B or word C, it is futile to go on trying to find rules that will predict which one they will choose'. Indeed.

My position is that it is futile to show that accent can be predicted by rule if one chooses primitives of content which ensure that accent must be predicted by rule. The topic is of theoretical interest, in my view, by virtue of the fact that accent need not be predicted by rule, i.e. by virtue of the fact that it can be explained. The theory is then, of course, other than Gussenhoven's.

1.4 Pairs like 'x!/ [+accent] and 'y!/ [-accent], with no rules in between, are signs in the Saussurean sense:

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meaning
  
  form
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If one adheres to the view that the basic units of language are signs, i.e. combinations of a form and a meaning, it is futile to predict accent placement, because there would be a one-to-one relationship between input and output. Also, Gussenhoven's [+focus] and [-focus] cannot be primitive notions of content, i.e. meanings, because they are not correlated directly to [+accent] and [-accent]. Rather, [+focus] and [-focus] belong to what is called interpretation, i.e. the variable readings sentences have. Interpretation is what results if we put together all the pieces of information (signs) contained in a sentence; we use our knowledge of the world and the more specific context of a sentence for arriving at a coherent understanding:
The diagram outlines what may be called a Form-Meaning approach. In such an approach, one does not predict accent placement; [+accent] and [-accent] belong to the input. What one can predict is, as indicated in the diagram, interpretations of given accent placements. The possible interpretations include, in my view, the categories which Gussenhoven uses for predicting accent placement, i.e. [+focus], focus domains, 'eventive', '(adverbs of) proper functioning', etc.

The model does not simply put Gussenhoven's model upside down (cf. Bolinger ms: section II); it contains the additional level of meaning (as opposed to interpretation). As a result, in my view an explanation of accentuation in terms of the model begins at the point where Gussenhoven's explanation ends. For example, Gussenhoven's account of the accent placements in (1)-(3) can be summarized as follows: IF a combination of subject and predicate is entirely [+focus], and IF the feature [+eventive] ensures that the sentence is one focus domain, THEN the sentence will receive one accent, on the subject; IF the subject is [+focus] and the predicate [-focus] (in which case there are always two domains), THEN the sentence will receive one accent, on the subject; IF the subject is [-focus] and the predicate [+focus] (in which case there are always two domains), THEN the sentence will receive one accent, on the predicate. The theoretical background of this account is the opinion that the IF-parts explain the THEN-parts.

In my view, the statements in the IF-parts and those in the THEN-parts must be interchanged, and an additional question must be raised:

1. IF a combination of a subject and a predicate has one accent, on the subject, THEN the accent may, but need not, include the predicate in its scope (the predicate can be interpreted as [+focus] or as [-focus]); IF the combination has an accent on the predicate, THEN the accent cannot include the subject in its scope (the subject can only be interpreted as [-focus]); and

2. Why is this so?

Point 1 here is an observation. The answer to the question in point 2 is an explanation of that observation.
In Keijsper 1985 I have tried to analyze accentuation along the lines of a Form-Meaning model. The main elements of the diagram given above are in my proposal the following.

Whenever a speaker uses an accent (for whatever reason), he presents the item carrying the accent as an alternative to its own negation (cf. Verhagen 1986:88; Keijsper 1986:358). The formal way of stating the \( x \) of the diagram, i.e. the meaning of accent, is, in my view, 'not not'. This is comparable, as far as I understand, to Bolinger's 'highlighting'. The potential sign \( y'/-\text{accent} \) is eliminated altogether in my proposal, i.e. non-accepting has no meaning. The other linguistic ingredients which are relevant to the interpretation of a given accent placement include word order, word-inherent meaning, and what may be called 'linkage', i.e. the way the meanings in a sentence are connected up with each other. Three types of link are distinguished: forward link (symbol: \( \rightarrow \)), backward link (symbol: \( \leftarrow \)), and parallel link (symbol: \( \leftrightarrow \)). Linkage is meaningful; it contributes to the overall interpretation of a sentence. As to word-inherent meaning, an important distinction here is the difference between what I call figure-ground and part-whole organizations. The difference has to do with attention. It can also be introduced under the influence of context/knowledge of the world or under the influence of linkage. The interpretational effect is always the same: if the accented item refers to a part rather than to a figure, accompanying unaccented elements are interpreted in the way called \([-\text{focus}] \) by Gussenhoven. A \([\text{+focus}] \) reading for unaccented elements results if the unaccented item is linked to the accented item and if the accented item does not, for one reason or another, refer to a part.

Since much of the discussion between Bolinger and Gussenhoven is about unaccented elements, my contribution in the next chapter is an attempt to explain how it is possible for non-accepting to be without a meaning and yet be interpreted as \([\text{+focus}] \) or \([-\text{focus}] \) in Gussenhoven's sense.

II. Focus and Focus Domains

2.1 In Gussenhoven's treatment, an unaccented element corresponds to \([\text{+focus}] \) or to \([-\text{focus}] \). Bolinger feels it would be better to have a single explanation for all cases of non-accepting. I think that Gussenhoven is describing an existing interpretational distinction, whereas Bolinger is talking about meaning (in the sense of the diagram given in 1.4 above). Let us try to determine which distinction is captured by Gussenhoven and which other notion Bolinger is invoking. To this end I propose to formulate both opinions in somewhat different terms. First Gussenhoven's \([\text{+focus}] \) for unaccented elements. Consider the following part of Bolinger's example (1985:Ex. 135):
What's that fellow doing?—He's looking for BREAD to eat.

In Bolinger's (1985:103) view, the phrase to eat need not be accented here because 'in our knowledge of the world, the function of bread is to be eaten [...]'; 'bread' can be emblematic of 'eating'! Formulated the other way round, in the given case the non-accenting of to eat conveys that the idea 'to eat' is relatively subsidiary, 'bread' representing the emblem (Bolinger 1985:99). Gussenhoven's [+focus] for to eat, in contrast, says that 'to eat' belongs to the contribution the speaker makes to the conversation, his modification of the Background (Gussenhoven 1983:383). I think that we can satisfy both Bolinger and Gussenhoven if we establish the exact chronology of what happens when the sentence is uttered. First, we have the Background as it is before the sentence is spoken; at that moment, the thought of bread has not yet been evoked, so that the subsidiary idea 'to eat' is absent as well. Next, the speaker focuses on bread (by accenting bread). And at the moment when the idea 'bread' is there, 'to eat' is implied. This chronology may be symbolized as follows:

```
1. 'Background'
2. 'bread' 3. 'to eat'

---3 is there at the moment when
TIME 2 is there
---1 precedes 2 and 3

The conversation develops from bottom to top. The time indicated is 'psychological' time, i.e. the time in which we process the sentence; I have called it 'projection time'. It is the accent on bread which marks the transition from 'the Background as it is before the sentence is spoken' to 'now we are thinking of bread'; this is indicated here by (see Keijsper 1985 for the complete notation). 'To eat' is parasitic on the accent on bread, i.e. at the moment when we are thinking of bread we are also thinking of eating; this is indicated by the placement of 'to eat' in the same horizontal layer as 'bread'.

Stated in these terms, Bolinger stresses the parasitic character of 'to eat', i.e. the fact that it is not introduced separately but together with 'bread'. Gussenhoven says that 'to eat' is 'new' with respect to the Background as it was before the sentence was uttered (just as is 'bread'). Both observations are correct, in my view, because 'to eat' is simultaneous with 'bread' (Bolinger) but follows 'Background' (Gussenhoven). Bolinger's formulation is preferable, in my view, because it also expresses the fact that it is the accent on bread which introduces the whole chunk. Gussenhoven's [+focus] does not distinguish between the emblem and the subsidiary thought. In order to distinguish between unaccented [+focus] and accented [+focus] elements, Gussenhoven introduces the additional notion of a focus domain. Thus, in

(2) Why don't you come over tonight? — My MOTHER's sick
'my mother' and 'is sick' combine together to form one focus domain, i.e., in my terms, they are simultaneous in projection time:

1. 'Background'
2. 'my mother'
3. 'is sick'

---3 is there at the moment when 2 is there
---1 precedes 2 and 3

But

(5) My MOTHER's SICK

consists of two focus domains, i.e. 'is sick' is not parasitic on the accent on mother but introduced separately:

1. 'Background'
2. 'my mother'
3. 'is sick'

---3 is introduced after 2

For Bolinger the difference between (2) (no accent on sick) and (5) (accented sick) is more important than the difference between (2) and (1):


Gussenhoven, in contrast, places the main borderline between (2) and (5) on the one hand ([+focus]), and (1) on the other hand: in (1) 'is sick' is [-focus]. Indeed, in (1) 'is sick' is already 'given' in the Background, INDEPENDENTLY OF WHETHER OR NOT the person who is sick turns out to be my mother; thus, we may place 'is sick' in the same layer as 'Background':

1. 'Background'
2. 'my mother'
3. 'is sick'

---3 follows 1 and 3

---3 is already present in 1

(Note that the diagrams express both the chronology of ideas in projection time (vertical) and the order in which the words are pronounced (horizontal).)

In my terms, Gussenhoven's [-focus] for 'is sick' in (1) says that the idea is present in the conversation before the idea expressed by the accented element is introduced: the former precedes the latter in projection time. Gussenhoven has two focus domains here (just as in (5)); in my view, this is the observation that 'is sick' is not simultaneous with 'my mother'.
2.2 Now, Bolinger's point is that (1) and (2) should be covered by a single principle, because they are expressed in the same way, by not accenting *sick*. Indeed, since non-accenting serves both cases, we cannot hold non-accenting itself responsible for the difference between the two; rather, non-accenting is indifferent between the two. This is not to say that the two possibilities do not exist, in my view, nor that we need not account for them: we must identify the factors which lead to one interpretation or the other. In the example it is obviously the context which determines the choice. More specifically, it is, in my view, the accent which is interpreted in a slightly different way in (1) and (2), and the interpretation of the unaccented elements is a consequence of the interpretation of the accent. The difference pertains to attention. In (2) the accent focuses attention on my mother, but in (1) attention has already been focused on something, viz. on the unknown person who turns out to be my mother; in the latter case the accented item adds information about somebody who is already the focus of attention, viz. the information that the unknown person is my mother. This subtle difference has enormous consequences, because unaccented elements are simultaneous with the thought referring to the thing which is the focus of attention. This is, in my view, the single principle which covers (1) and (2) (as well as all other similar cases).

Let me make explicit that the question *who's sick?* introduces an unknown person into the Background, and that *is sick* applies to that person, whether or not it is my mother:

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1. 'Background, including unknown person' 3. 'is sick'
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Technically, the unknown person functions as a whole, and the property /my mother/ is construed as a part of that whole. If we take an assertive type of accent, the accent says that the part is not absent in the whole; in the example it identifies the unknown person as my mother. In a part-whole organization, the whole is the focus of attention (otherwise, in fact, it would not be a part-whole organization), and accompanying unaccented elements are simultaneous with the thought of the whole, not with the thought of the part. Otherwise, there would be two foci of attention simultaneously, which is impossible.

In (2) there is also a person, of course, because my mother is a person. But here the thought of the person per se and the thought 'my mother' are not distinguished, so that the accented item evokes the thought of the person, i.e. of my mother:

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1. 'Background' 2. 'person' = 'my mother' 3. 'is sick'
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Here the thought of the person per se and the thought 'my mother' coincide. Again, 'is sick' is simultaneous with the thought of the person, but now this implies that it is simultaneous with 'my mother' as well. If, as in (2), the accent focuses attention on my mother, she is perceived as a figure in the Background (and vice versa). In a figure-ground combination the figure is the focus of attention, and accompanying unaccented elements are simultaneous with the thought of the figure. As is illustrated by (1), a part-whole organization results if we spread the thought of the figure over two moments of projection time.

2.3 Nouns, like mother in (1)/(2), mostly refer to figures in figure-ground combinations. Therefore, an accent on a noun is bound to include surrounding unaccented elements in its scope, the unaccented elements being simultaneous with the thought of the figure. But, as we saw in (1), the context may induce us to opt for a part-whole organization instead, in which case the accent has narrow scope (the unaccented elements are interpreted in the way called [-focus]).

Pronouns, in contrast, are often more obviously construed as referring to parts of wholes, although some types of pronoun allow a figure-ground organization as well. Thus, whereas the accent in

(6) Our DOG's disappeared (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 31)

includes the predicate in its scope unless the context makes it clear that disappeared must be interpreted as [-focus], the accent in

(7) SOMEbody's disappeared

does not include the predicate in its scope. This is because the meaning of somebody says that the referent must be construed as a part of a whole (of people). Then, the same principle applies as in (1): 'has disappeared' is simultaneous with the thought of the whole, not with the thought of the part expressed by somebody. In this case we need no context to enable us to arrive at a [-focus] reading for the predicate: the relevant part-whole organization enters automatically when the word somebody is used. This seems to be valid for all indefinite pronouns in English (and Dutch) (Bolinger 1985:92; Gussenhoven 1985:134). Language-specific differences exist, however. For example, Serbo-Croatian nešto differs from English something or Dutch iets: it can be used as in:

(8) Još NEšto (Lit. Still/yet SOMEthing).

The meaning here is approximately: 'there is still another thing'.

Epithets (Bolinger 1985:93-5) must, in my view, be considered separately (Keijsper 1985:265-7).
Personal pronouns are more flexible than indefinites. For *I* and *you* the relevant restriction is that the speaker does not normally focus attention on himself or on the hearer in the immediate speech situation. But as soon as *I* and *you* are used in another way, for example when the speaker refers to himself as he was at another moment, or when the scene is viewed through somebody else's eyes, a broad scope accent becomes possible. For example:

(9) She is rescued by a boat. They are on a lonely beach far from anywhere. And then I appear--the last thing she expects. A doctor!

Here the heroine focuses attention on the person called 'I' (from her point of view the 'I' is a figure in the environment). The accent on *I* then includes *appear* in its scope (cf. Gussenhoven 1983:393; Bolinger 1985:Ex. 55; Gussenhoven 1985:134-5). With third person personal pronouns, we must make sure that the persons or things referred to can indeed be referred to by a pronoun (rather than by, e.g., a name); this may imply that a pointing gesture must accompany the utterance in order for an accent on the pronoun to have broad scope. (See further Keijsper 1985: 32-3, 177-8, 276-7; on *it* see 3.5 below.)

Interrogative pronouns and quantifiers mostly lead to a narrow scope interpretation if they carry the last accent. Thus,

(10) WHO's sick?

suggests, independently of any context, that a thought of somebody who is sick has already occurred (*is sick* is interpreted in the way called [-focus]). Basically, this is because there must be somebody (the whole) before we can know that we do not know who it is. If, in contrast, we are talking about a Chinese called Hu, the accent in (10) may focus attention on this person, so that it includes the predicate in its scope. In their normal use, however, interrogative pronouns do not altogether exclude a broad scope accent; thus, Bolinger's (1985:Ex. 56) rhetorical question seems to be an example. Also, a more subtle distinction within the category of part-whole organizations is relevant here. Bolinger uses it in his (1985:Ex. 58):

(11) Why do you despair? - Everything is ruined! Nothing counts any more! All LIFE is meaningless! WHAT was I ever thinking of! Why oh WHY did I ever let him talk me into this!

The referent of, for example, 'everything' can be opposed either to its complement, i.e. to the referent of 'nothing', or to any other quantity of things (nothing, few things, many things, etc.). Only in the former sense can *everything* carry a broad scope accent, in my view. In Dutch, a whole series of words have different stress positions for the two senses, for example *iedereen* (everybody, opposed to its complement) (cf.
Bolinger 1985: Ex. 53; Gussenhoven 1985:135) versus *iederEEEN (everybody, opposed to any other quantity of people), ALlemaal vs. ALLeMAAL (idem), HEleboel vs. heleBOEL (a lot of), etc. Likewise, in the intended reading of (11) what and why probably correspond to Dutch WAARaan and WAARom, respectively, rather than to waarAAN and waarOM: the latter accents would have narrow scope. Since the issue involves the meaning of word order, it cannot be discussed in detail here. (Gussenhoven's Non-Nuclear Retraction Rule (1984:306-27) allows, e.g., *iedereen only as a non-last accent; *iederEEEN is the only possibility for a last accent, with Gussenhoven. Consistently, his accent placement rules do not cover the [+focus] interpretation of the unaccented elements in such examples as (11).) In English, the two readings of, e.g., nothing (an empty part opposed to its complement or to any other part) are related to the choice between Auxiliary-Subject order and Subject-Verb order (cf. Keijsper 1985:282-312). Both readings must, in my view, be kept apart from the use of nothing exemplified by (12):

(12) Empty NOTHings (a make of underwear for women).

In (12) 'nothing' refers to a figure in a figure-ground combination; in that case the word is indistinguishable from a noun.

As a last example of lexical influence on the choice between a figure-ground and a part-whole organization the word only can be mentioned (Gussenhoven 1985:128, Bolinger ms:section 2). In Gussenhoven's (1985: Ex. 7)

(13) Only JOHN went to that party

went to that party can only be interpreted in the way called [-focus] (unless only is a sentence modifier). This is because the inherent meaning of only urges us to construe John as a part of a whole (of potential party-goers): (13) conveys, roughly, that 'Other people also went to that party' is not true. The involvement of other people is responsible for the fact that only is what Gussenhoven (1985:128) calls a 'focus-governing morpheme'. If in (13) party was accented, the part-whole organization prescribed by only creates a conceptual problem (see Bolinger ms:section 2 and Gussenhoven ms:section 2) because the further accent urges us to construe John as a figure in a figure-ground relationship. This conflict can, in other sentences, be resolved by connecting the elements of the sentence up with each other by means of what I call a parallel link (mentioned in 1.5; for discussion see Keijsper 1985:160-1, 167, 260-312; 1986:282, 293-6, 308-9, 322 ff.). In English, a parallel link is one of the applications of the meaning of Auxiliary-Subject order; therefore, this order appears in Gussenhoven's ms:Ex. 13. There is no reason to postulate an underlying option 'focus' here, in my view, because all possibilities directly derive from the meanings of the 'surface' forms.
In the examples discussed so far, the interpretation of unaccented elements depends on whether the accented element refers to a figure or to a part. In the former case the unaccented elements are interpreted as [+focus], i.e. they are simultaneous with the thought of the figure, the accent focusing attention on the referent involved; in the latter case unaccented elements are interpreted as [-focus], i.e. they are simultaneous with the thought of the corresponding whole, the whole being the focus of attention. But there is yet another distinction which is relevant to the interpretation of unaccented elements.

2.4 In his reply to Bolinger 1985, Gussenhoven points out that a description which does not distinguish between two readings for unaccented elements does not account for the facts: besides sentences like (1)/(2) *My mother's sick*, where the predicate can be [+focus] or [-focus], there are also sentences where unaccented elements can only be interpreted as [-focus]:

(3) *What's wrong with your mother? - My mother's sick*

Here the idea 'my mother' cannot be introduced together with 'is sick', it must be 'given' in the Background independently of whether or not 'is sick' is introduced. Thus only:

1. 'Background'
2. 'my mother'
3. 'is sick'

---3 follows

1 and 2

TIME ---1 and 2

precede 3

Not:

2. 'my mother'
3. 'is sick'

---2 is there

PROJ. at the moment when

TIME 3 is there

---1 precedes

2 and 3

(excluded)

I agree with Gussenhoven that this 'lopsidedness', as he calls it (1985: 130), exists. But I do not think that this fact is an argument in favour of the view that [+focus] is a primitive distinction. The interpretation of *my mother* in (3) as [-focus] follows from the following semantic fact, in my view: the mother who is sick is the same mother as the mother who could have been, or was formerly, not sick. As we will see below in other examples, an interpretation of *my mother* in (3) as [+focus] would have to be accompanied by the idea that two mothers are involved, one sick, the other not sick; the accent on *sick* would specify that the mother
meant is the one who is sick. The latter meaning is excluded in (3) because it is incompatible with the fact that *is sick* is the grammatical predicate of the sentence.

Consider the difference between (3) and (14):

(14) We also offer a club you can JOIN (Bolinger 1985:183).

Here we find the meaning which is excluded in (3): (14) implies that clubs exist which cannot be joined, and the accent on *join* specifies that the club meant by the speaker is a club one can join. The sentence is odd (Bolinger 1985:183) exactly because it conveys this meaning. The fact that more than a single club is involved in (14) can in my notation be expressed as follows:

\[2b. \text{'}club_2' \rightarrow \text{'}you can \text{JOIN}\] \[1. \text{'}Background' \rightarrow \text{'}club_1'\]

The *club_1* in the diagram represents clubs one cannot join; the idea is interpreted as belonging to the Background. The *club_2* represents the club meant by the speaker, a club one can join. The split into *club_1* and *club_2* is a prerequisite for combining *club_2* with *you can join* which follows *club* in the speech chain. In (3), in contrast, we have only the mother belonging to the Background, and *Is sick* is added to the (already present) idea 'my mother'. I use arrows for symbolizing the difference:

(14') We also offer a club you can JOIN

(3') My mother's SICK

The forward link in (14') indicates (see the diagram) that the thought of the club meant by the speaker is combined with the subsequent information. The backward link in (3') indicates that the subsequent information is added to the preceding information. In terms of projection time and negation the difference is the following. In (14) the thought of the club meant ('club_2') is not yet there at the moment when the negation of 'you can join' is there: the 'club' which is there when the negation of 'you can join' is there ('club_1') refers to another club. In (3), in contrast, the thought of the mother meant is already there when the negation of 'is sick' is there. Yet another way of stating the difference is: *a club you cannot join* and *a club you can join* have a referent simultaneously, so that more than one club must be involved (but see Keijsper 1985:231, 248-52). *My mother not sick* and *my mother sick*, in contrast, have a referent at different moments, so that one mother is sufficient. I am proposing that the difference is introduced by processing the elements of a sentence in one way or another.
2.5 The semantic difference symbolized by $\rightarrow$ and $\leftarrow$ can also be detected in the sentences which have figured prominently in the syntax versus semantics controversy of the seventies (see 1.1). Consider, for example, (15) and (16):

(15) Peter had clams for dinner.
(16) Peter had plans for dinner.

In the normal reading of these sentences, the clams Peter had for dinner are the same clams as the clams he could have had for supper or breakfast. The plans he had for dinner, in contrast, are other plans than the plans he could have had for supper or breakfast:

1. 'Background'
2. 'clams'
3. 'for dinner'

versus:

1. 'Background'
2a. 'plans'
3. 'for dinner'

This is, in my view, the relevant syntactic difference between (15) and (16).

Now, the controversy was about whether accent placement can be predicted on the basis of syntactic structure. It cannot: accent placement and syntax are independent options (both meaningful). Scope, however, is in my view not independent of syntax: the type of link chosen determines the maximal scope of a given accent. (Non-maximal scope is the result of construing the referent of the accented element as a part rather than as a figure—see 2.2-2.3 above.) An unaccented element can only be included in the scope of an accent on an element to which it is linked.

Since linkage and accent placement are independent options, my arrows apply with any accentuation. The following examples illustrate the interpretational effect of various combinations of link and accent. Bolinger (1986:125; notation adapted to the present discussion, and my arrows added for the sake of the argument) repeats his 1972 point that accent placement cannot be derived from syntax in pairs like (17) and (18):

(17) John has orders to leave.
(18) John has orders to leave.
Indeed, accent placement remains the same in (19) and (20), although, as Bolinger (1986:125) aptly remarks, 'the syntax takes a 180° turn':

(19) I thought that John was supposed to take his orders with him.
- No, John has orders to LEAVE.

(20) I thought that John was merely obeying a request to leave.
- No, John has ORDERS to leave.

The relevance to the present discussion is that Gussenhoven would probably call orders [+focus] in (17) but [-focus] in (19); to leave is [+focus] in (18) but [-focus] in (20). I would suggest that the 'syntax' indicated by the arrows explains these interpretations.

In (17) the accent on leave specifies which orders John has: orders to leave and not, e.g., orders to stay (orders to leave and orders to stay being different orders). This is the same case as (16) (plans for dinner) (see above). In (19), in contrast, to leave adds information about John's orders, the orders which he must leave being the same orders as the orders which he was first supposed to take with him. This is the same case as (15) (plans for dinner) and (3) (my mother's sick). Sentence (18) exemplifies a combination with a backward link, with an accent on the first element and no accent on the second element. It is the same case as (2) (my mother's sick) (broad scope interpretation), i.e., in (18), the orders are 'emblematic' of leaving, i.e., in my terms, at the moment when we think of orders we also think 'something to leave', the latter being implied in the former:

1. 'Background' 2. 'orders' 3. 'to leave' PROJ, TIME

Example (20), finally, illustrates a forward link, with an accent on the first element and no accent on the second element of the construction, in that case, 'to leave' precedes 'orders' in projection time; in the example, 'to leave' also applies to the request mentioned in the context. (More precisely: the accent on orders negates the absence of orders among the whole of things with the property /to leave/.) The (simplified) diagram is:

1. 'Background' 2. 'orders' 3. 'to leave' PROJ, TIME

Note that in this case the resulting order of the ideas in projection time is the same as in (1) (my mother's sick) (narrow scope interpretation). The result is, however, arrived at in a different way: in (20) it is the
forward link which is responsible for the order in projection time (with the given accentuation); but in (1) the context induced us to construe the referent of 'mother' as a part rather than as a figure. In other words, a part-whole organization is introduced by the syntactic meaning in (20), but by the context in (1); in the examples of section 2.3 it was introduced by word-inherent meaning. The effect on the interpretation of unaccented elements is always the same: they are interpreted in the way called [-focus].

2.6 A hearer who is confronted with a certain utterance must make a decision as to how the given utterance is intended to be processed. I think that accent placement is one of the factors influencing his choice: other things being equal, a sentence tends to be processed in such a way that the given accents have the broadest possible scope. Thus, an accent placement as in (17) \(\text{orders to leave}\) tends to lead to an interpretation according to a forward type of link, and an accent placement as in (18) \(\text{orders to leave}\) tends to lead to an interpretation according to a backward type of link. This basic tendency can always be overruled by the context, as illustrated by (19) and (20). Besides explicit context, our general knowledge may induce us to deviate from the basic tendency. Consider, for example, the following pair (Bolinger ms; Ex. 55 and 56):

What did you see when you looked across the street?

(21) There was a WOMan on a bicycle.

(22) There was a DRUNK on a binge.

Sentence (22) is readily interpreted according to a backward link (so that the accent includes \(\text{on a binge}\) in its scope), because our general knowledge does not resist the idea that thinking of a drunk implies thinking of somebody on a binge (cf. \(\text{orders to leave}\) in (18)). In (21), in contrast, a backward link is odd, because it imposes the uncommon view that thinking of a woman implies thinking of somebody on a bicycle. Therefore, the sentence will probably be interpreted according to a forward link, despite the context and despite the fact that the accent then does not include \(\text{on a bicycle}\) in its scope. With a forward link, the accent in (21) (assuming an assertive type) negates the absence of a woman among persons on a bicycle, the thought of persons on a bicycle being given independently. This is the same case as \(\text{orders to leave}\) in (20), although the appropriate context is now lacking. What is important is that we must choose one combination or the other: we cannot combine the meaning of one type of link with the scope consequences of the other.

Reasoning the other way round we can say, of course, that in the given context it would be better if (21) had the last accent on bicycle. Also, it would be odd to have the last accent on binge in (22), because the obvious choice of a forward link in that case would urge us to
construe a somewhat uncommon world, a world containing a drunk on a binge and other drunks. But it is of little use, in my view, to try and decide on the basis of our knowledge of the world which is 'the' 'normal' accent placement or 'the' 'normal' link, because that would amount to deciding which world is normal. The debate over that question would never finish.

2.7 The semantic difference between forward and backward link is at first sight reminiscent of the customary difference between attributive and predicative constructions, respectively. Therefore, it is not surprising that Gussenhoven (ms:section 5) proposes to call the prepositional phrase in (23) a Predicate:

(23) What are you going on about Planet Earth for?
   - It's that MAN on the MOON!

Indeed, predicative combinations of subject and predicate (in this order) always have a backward type of link: see (1)/(2)/(3)/(5) and, for example,

(24) The MAN is on the MOON (or any other accent placement).

This is because the meaning of a forward link (involving, as we saw in the foregoing, a 'split' into different entities), is incompatible with the fact that a predicate introduces the idea of time. But it is objectionable, in my view, to call the attributive prepositional phrase in (23) a Predicate, because this name reintroduces the confusion between 'grammatical predicate' and 'psychological predicate' which prevailed in the nineteenth century (and since Aristotle). Both the attributive/predicative distinction and the forward/backward distinction have to do with time, but the sort of time is different in the two cases. Predicative constructions REFER to time (the referent is time), whereas an accent on the second part of a construction with a backward link places the two parts of the construction in different moments of what I call projection time, i.e. the time in which we think about the world ('psychological time'). The two sorts of time must be kept apart because attributive constructions can have a backward link (e.g. (23)) and predicative constructions can have a forward link. The latter we find, for example, in combinations Verb - Subject (in this order). There is a relation between the two sorts of time, but they are not identical. In Russian, for example, where many strings of words can be attributive as well as predicative, as a consequence of the fact that no present tense of *to ba* is expressed (normally), the relation is basically the following. The sentence bol'naia bol'naia (The woman is sick), where bol'naia is a verb, can only have a backward link, the inherently predicative meaning of the verb taking precedence over linkage. Bol'naia bol'naia (Lit. Woman sick), however, contains an adjective which is not inherently predicative. In that case we can choose a forward or a backward link. With a forward link, the construction can only be attributive (The sick woman).
With a backward link, the construction can, but need not be predicative (The woman is sick); the attributive backward type is very frequent in colloquial Russian (mostly with an accent on the noun). A construction with a forward link can be predicative only if the first part of the construction is a verb; a verbless construction cannot be both predicative and have a forward link, because the forward link in itself acts counter to a predicative comprehension (Keijsper 1985:213-52). In short, I would suggest that we keep apart attributive/predicative and forward/backward.

2.8 It has been suggested in the foregoing that a [-focus] reading of unaccented elements has a number of sources:

1. Type of link: the accented element is linked to the unaccented element; for example:
   (3) My mother's SICK.

2. Word-inherent meaning: the unaccented element is linked to the accented element (or, rather, to the corresponding whole), but the unaccented element is nevertheless interpreted as [-focus] because the accented element refers to a part rather than to a figure; for example:
   (7) SOMEbody's disappeared.

3. Context/knowledge of the world: the unaccented element is linked to the accented element (to the corresponding whole), but the unaccented element is nevertheless interpreted as [-focus] because the context/our knowledge of the world induces us to construe the referent of the accented element as a part rather than as a figure; for example:

A [+focus] reading of an unaccented element, in contrast, has, in my view, a single source: the unaccented element is linked to the accented element and the latter does not refer to a part.

The possibility of construing the referent of the accented element as a part (which leads to a [-focus] reading for accompanying unaccented elements) is used in other cases as well. It functions as a sort of general emergency strategy, applicable whenever a conflict arises between relationships in projection time and relationships between referents. It may be the complexity of the construction itself which gives rise to the application of the strategy. For example, the accent in

(6) Our DOG's disappeared

more easily includes the remainder of the sentence in its scope than the accent in
(6') Our DOG's mysteriously disappeared (Bolinger 1985:Ex. 195).

This is because the embedded forward link in (24) induces us to expect an additional accent on disappeared, although the superimposed backward link is in principle sufficient for including has mysteriously disappeared in the scope of the accent on dog (Bolinger 1985:114). If an accent which we expect for some reason or another does not turn up, we are inclined to apply the emergency strategy, i.e. to interpret the non-accenting as a signal that the idea involved has already been introduced in the preceding context.

An interesting case of structural complexity arises when the object precedes the subject in English or Dutch. The accent in (25) more easily includes the rest of the sentence in its scope than that in (26):


(26) That HAT you'd better get on the rack (Bolinger ms:Ex. 20).

I agree with Bolinger that a broad scope reading is possible in examples such as (26). For my taste Gussenhoven's original Dutch example (1985: Ex. 16) must be made somewhat longer then, e.g.

(27) Die PET van je moet je nou eindelijk eens een keertje aan de kapstok hangen.

Yet, in general, a broad scope reading for

'Subject - verb - object'

is clearly easier to 'get' than for

'Object - subject - verb'.

Although I am at present unable to explain this fact precisely, I would suggest that the problem has its origin in a conflict between the hierarchy imposed by the links in projection time, and the distribution of subject and object roles over the referent-entities. I think that we arrive here at the borderline between information structure and semantic syntax in a more traditional sense.
2.9 Another borderline which must be mentioned here pertains to part-whole organizations. In the discussion about shine on shoes and rips in trousers (Gussenhoven 1983:394; Bolinger 1985:91, 104-5; Gussenhoven 1985:133; Bolinger ms:Ex. 40-58; Gussenhoven ms:section 5) it has been suggested that the part-whole relations in the examples are relevant to accent placement. This is, in my view, not the case in the examples in question (I would say that the discussion is about linkage, the meaning of word order, the meaning of there, etc.). In (28) non-accenting of the object would be incoherent (given our knowledge of the world); in (29), in contrast, it is fine:

How's your new book going?

(28) I've just written an introduction.
(29) I've just written a chapter.

This is because we can easily imagine that a book consists entirely of chapters (identical 'parts'), but not that it consists entirely of introductions. The accent in (28) is indispensable if the introduction is to be imagined as one 'part' among non-identical other 'parts'. The fact that 'book' has been introduced is irrelevant in (28).

The part-whole organizations involved here must be kept apart from the attention-related organizations mentioned in the foregoing: in (28) and (29) we are talking about an organization of referents in our world, while in, for example,

(30) I've just written something

we are talking about a semantic phenomenon of the English language. Although the mental operation involved in (29) and (30) is evidently the same, the examples are different linguistically. It belongs to the inherent meaning of something that the referent is a part (here of the whole of all things); we need no context, nor knowledge of the world, to arrive at this interpretation (hence the impression that (30), in contrast to (29), can be a sentence spoken 'out of the blue'). Words like chapter and introduction, in contrast, are nouns like any other, i.e., they mostly refer to figures in a figure-ground relationship. The fact that other nouns, such as book, refer to figures which can be understood as collections of other figures, does not affect the noun-status of the collected figures. The difference between (29) and (30) comes to light in the fact that the accent in (31) may easily include the verb in its scope, whereas the accent in (32) cannot include the verb in its scope without affecting the inherent meaning of something:

(31) I've just written a chapter.
(32) I've just written something.
To give another example, Fillmore (1968:23) discusses the difference between (33) and (34):

(33) The car broke the window with its fender.

(34) The car broke the window with a fender.

Example (34) is odd: the car must be interpreted as a so-called 'agent'. Obviously, this is because the thing which directly carries the property of breaking the window, viz. the fender, can be included in the referent of 'car' in (33) but not in (34), where it is a separate entity. Nevertheless, fender remains a noun in both cases, and its 'accentability' does not change. In both cases the fender is an entity on which attention can be focused; technically, this corresponds with the fact that the property /fender/ is the identifying property not of the car (of the whole), but only of a part of the car. Here part-whole organizations lose the relation with attention sketched in 2.2 above, and we enter a new area of linguistic functioning.

2.10 Returning now to the theoretical issue of Chapter One above, I would like to repeat Bolinger's (1985:110) fundamental question: 'But why should the basic decision be "I am going to form this domain and let the accents fall by rule" rather than "I am going to accent these words and let the other constituents connect up as they may"?' The replacement of the former approach by the latter must, in my view, be accompanied by the following measures:

1. We replace a representation like

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\[\text{The man hit the ball} \quad \text{by:} \quad \text{The man hit the ball}\]
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That is, the ideas contained in a sentence are connected up with each other in one direction or the other (the third type of link, parallel, has not been discussed here).

2. We discard the assumption that structure is meaningless. More specifically, different types of links have different meanings correlated to them. Thus,

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\[\text{Peter had plans for dinner} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Peter had plans for dinner} \]
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and

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\[\text{Peter had plans for dinner} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Peter had plans for dinner} \]
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differ semantically as to how many referents 'clams'/'plans' are involved. This semantic fact must be described whether or not we discuss scope, so we may as well use the description for explaining scope.
3. We take into account the influence of context/knowledge of the world and of word-inherent meaning, more specifically the difference between figure-ground and part-whole organizations. Again, the difference which is relevant to scope must be described whether or not we are interested in scope, because e.g. *dog* is what we call a noun, and *somebody* is not, whether or not we are accentologists.

By taking these measures, all accents can be covered by postulating the meaning 'not not', and non-accenting has no meaning: the rest, including Gussenhoven's 'linguistic options', follows from 1, 2 and 3 (plus the meaning of word order).

However, it is impossible to replace 'I am going to form this domain and let the accents fall by rule' by 'I am going to accent these words and let the other constituents connect up as they may' without discarding the idea that explaining accentuation means to predict accent placement: a theoretical framework which 'explains' linguistic phenomena by stating observations must be replaced by a theoretical framework which aims to explain these observations (see 1.4). That is the basic decision.

III. English versus Dutch

3.1 Gussenhoven (1983:106-15; 1984:177-89) has called attention to the fact that accent placements in English and Dutch are sometimes different in circumstances which, according to Gussenhoven, are identical. He adduces these cases as an argument in favour of the view that accent placement is rule-governed (1983:410). Bolinger (1985:116) holds the view that the principles of accent placement are the same in the two languages, and that the 'occasional differences' are due to 'the obstructiveness of some other part of the system, most likely rules of verbal syntax'.

Just as in the case of minimal focus, the disagreement amounts to the question of whether we choose "p" and "q" plus rules or "x" and "y" without rules (see Chapter One). In 'minimal focus' cases, too, the fact that it is possible to propose categories like 'polarity focus' and 'counterassertive focus', a proposal which ensures that the corresponding accent placements in English and Dutch must be specified by rule, is in no way an argument for rejecting Bolinger's view. the latter can only be refuted by showing that the different accent placements are not a consequence of differences elsewhere in the two systems, i.e. by showing that they cannot be explained. As we saw in the foregoing, my opinion on what constitutes an explanation differs from Gussenhoven's; Gussenhoven holds the view that a rule which gives an accent placement as its output is an explanation of that accent placement (Gussenhoven 1983:410) rather
than an observation in which the if-part and the then-part have been interchanged (see 1.4).

I think that Bolinger's claim is correct. Different accent placements in superficially similar circumstances should make us aware of syntactic differences between English and Dutch, and of semantic differences between the 'little words' which are regarded as semantically empty in Gussenhoven's account (Gussenhoven 1983:409). In all known cases where the use of the same forms in the two languages is accompanied by different accent placements, these forms have, in my view, demonstrably different meanings, so that different accent placements are needed in order to arrive at approximately the same interpretations.

Since Bolinger has already given some 'Dutch-style' English examples, I will only add some observations on the Dutch side. My list is a mixture of cases where Gussenhoven has, in my view, overlooked some possibility in Dutch (cf. Bolinger 1985:116) and other semantic differences between the two languages which are brought to light by accent placement/word order; they cry out for further research.

3.2 As Bolinger (ms:Ex. 84-87) remarks, it is more correct to compare (35) with (36) or (37) than with (38), because (38) contains to do, which is absent in Dutch:

(35) Maar ik KIJK geen televisie, vader!
(36) But I WATCH no television, father.
(37) But I don't WATCH television, father.
(38) But I DON'T watch television, father.

As an approximation of (38), substandard Dutch (39) can be mentioned:

(39) Maar ik DOE geen televisie kijken, vader.
     But I DO no television watching, father.

This down also occurs in positive statements and without accent. Further, Dutch has the following possibility of emphasizing 'habitual aspect' (Bolinger ms:Ex. 84):

(40) Maar ik DOE niet aan televisie-kijken, vader.
     But I DO not on television-watching, father (But I don't practise television-watching, father).

Likewise:
But we DON'T eat rabbits (Gussenhoven ms: Ex. 35).

Maar we DOEN niet aan konijnen-eten hier.

But we do not on rabbit-eating here (But we don't practise rabbit-eating here).

3.3 Gussenhoven's observations on the perfective counterparts of the sentence given in 3.2 (Gussenhoven 1985:137; ms: Ex. 34-36) must be complemented by a few other observations, in my view. First, it seems to me that an accent placement such as in

But I haven't WATCHED television, father! You know that!

is normal in Dutch if we add a temporal expression which makes it clear that the event in question was absent on a number of occasions, for example:

Maar ik heb al MAANDen geen televisie geKEken, vader.

But I have already MONTHS no television WATCHED, father.

It would be odd to say

Maar ik HEB al maanden geen televisie gekeken, vader.

If, in contrast, we are talking about a specific occasion, I would say, e.g.

Maar ik HEB gisteren geen televisie gekeken, vader.

But I HAVE yesterday no television watched, father.

We can, of course, also say

Maar ik heb GISTERen geen televisie geKEken, vader.

but here this accent placement suggests that I have watched television on another occasion (opposing yesterday to some other time).

The relevant point is here that Dutch ik heb gekeken and English I've watched do not have the same meaning. This fact is known to all Dutch students of English: the English tense system differs considerably from Dutch usage. In Gussenhoven's discussion the difference comes to light in the fact that Gussenhoven adds the element op- in his ms (Ex. 36), as is normal in Dutch:

Maar we hebben het konijn niet OPGegeten.

But we have the rabbit not 'UPeaten'.
But the *op*-element stresses the final phase of the eating, a meaning which is absent in the English *eaten*. The sentence is an adequate translation of

(49) But we haven't *EATen* the rabbit

only if the sentences are spoken with a fall-rise intonation (suggesting that we did something to the rabbit other than eating it). When we omit the *op*-element in (48) the sentence becomes odd, unless we put *niet* elsewhere:

(50) Maar we hebben *niet* van het konijn ge*GEten*.
    But we have *not* of the rabbit *EATen*.

It seems to me that this is an adequate translation of (49), although *van* adds a quantitative idea: 'we haven't eaten even a part of the rabbit'.

The difference between *We hebben gegeten* and *We've eaten* can also be observed in positive sentences; in negative sentences the position of the negation only adds a further complication, in my view. It seems to me that the difference has something to do with the segmentation of a single occurrence of an event into a number of parts or of a whole of occurrences into individual occurrences. The sentence

(51) *We hebben het konijn geGEten*
    *We have the rabbit EATen*

 tends to be interpreted contrastively (opposing eating to some other action involving the rabbit). This suggestion disappears if we add a reference to the final phase of the eating or if we make sure that the event can be repeated:

(52) (Thank you for sending us your rabbit.)
    *We hebben het konijn OPgegeten* (en het was erg lekker).  
    *We have the rabbit 'UPeaten' (and it was delicious).*

(53) We hebben van het konijn ge*GEten* (en het was erg lekker).  
    *We have of the rabbit EAten (and it was delicious).*

(54) (Thank you for sending us your rabbits.)
    We hebben een konijn ge*GEten* (en het was erg lekker).  
    *We have a rabbit EATen (and it was delicious).*

(55) (Thank you for your letter.)
    We hebben de brief ge*LEzen* (en die was erg interessant).  
    *We have the letter READ (and it was very interesting).*
In (52) a single eating-event is segmented into a number of phases, and in (53)-(55) the event can be repeated, either because only a part of a single rabbit has been eaten (53), or because only a single rabbit has been eaten (54), or because a single object can participate in the same type of event repeatedly (55). In (51) we shift to a part-whole organization in the sense of 2.1-2.2 above.

It is somewhat unnatural, in my view, that Gussenhoven's Polarity Focus Rule isolates one point of this tense/aspect problem (see Keijsper 1986:31ff. for comparable phenomena in Russian). It would be better, in my opinion, to analyze the meanings of, e.g., *we hebben gegeten* and *we've eaten*. The accompanying differences in accent placement will then be explained automatically.

3.4 English does not seem to have a word which exactly translates the meaning of Dutch *wel*, occurring, for example, in Gussenhoven's (1983:Ex. 93):

(56) Het huis staat *wel* in brand

*The house stands (affirmative particle) in fire*

The sentence means approximately 'it is not not true that the house is on fire', where 'not not' is the contribution of the accent (cf. Gussenhoven's 'positive counterassertive mode'). But other uses of *wel* require a somewhat different paraphrase, which suggests that 'positive counterassertive' is an interpretation which results if *wel* carries the last accent. Here are some further examples illustrating the use of *wel* (with rough glosses):

(57) STAAT het huis wel in brand?

'There has been an idea that the house is on fire; please verify whether this idea is correct'.

(58) Het HUIS staat wel in brand, maar...

'Admittedly, the house is on fire, but...'.

(59) Het HUIS staat in brand, dus we kunnen de vaKANTie wel verGEten.

'The house is on fire, so we'd better forget about the vacation'.

(60) Hij heeft wel DERTig BOEken.

'He has as many as thirty books'.

(61) Hij heeft WEL dertig boeken.

'It is not not true that he has thirty books'.


'Contrary to the earlier suggestion, it is not true that we couldn't: the truth is that you didn't want to'.

...
Although it will take some study to say precisely what meaning is expressed by wel, there is no reason to assume, in my view, that these sentences do not consist of various combinations of the meaning of wel and the meaning of accent.

3.5 Dutch *hat* is clearly different from English *it*. The sentence

(65) That's *IT*

is impossible in Dutch. The Dutch (and English)

(66) Dat is 't

does not mean exactly the same. Leaving aside the article *het* (the), accented *het* occurs in the expression

(67) Dat is JE van HET

That is YOU of IT ('that's the best thing there is').

Also, *het* can be accented in the sense 'the well-known thing (you know what we are talking about)', but that *het* is not the *it* we find in cases like

(68) Now the scissors group must play a round among themselves, and so on until one child is singled out as *IT*.

(I have lost the source of this example.)

The *it* of (68) can only be translated into Dutch as (unaccented) 'm (from hem (him)). Elsewhere, Dutch employs a demonstrative where English has accented *it*, for example (Bardovi-Harlig 1983:17):

(69) I saw the glass that Floyd broke, but I couldn't tell what *IT* broke.

In such cases Dutch uses *dat* (that), as is also illustrated by Gussenhoven (1983:Ex. 108).

3.6 As to the possibility or impossibility of distortion in Dutch (Bolinger 1985:86-8; ms:section 10; Gussenhoven ms:section 8), examples
like the following could possibly be brought under this heading:

(70) Maar DAT is precies het omgeKEERde (normally: OMgekeerde).
   But THAT is precisely the oppoSiTE

(71) Een BETter bestand dan op het ogenBLIk van kracht is
    (normally: OGenblik).
    A BETter truce than at the moMEnt in force is.

These are the most recent ones I have heard and remembered. I do not
think that they are exceptional.

Contrary to Gussenhoven's suggestion (ms:section 8), it is perfectly
normal to have an accent on the preposition van, but I am not sure
whether Gussenhoven would call these 'non-counterassertive preposition
stressing':

(72) Hij BLOOST erVAN
    He BLUSHes OF-it ('He BLUSHes beCAUSE of it')

(73) Hij weet er NIKS VAN
    He knows it NOTHING OF ('He knows NOTHING aBOUT it')

(74) Ik word er beROERD VAN
    I become it ROTten OF ('I feel ROTten beCAUSE of it')

etc.

The main point in these examples is that van is at the end of the
sentence. If the accent were absent, the meaning of word order would
lead to a different interpretation of the earlier accent (on bloost, niks,
beroerd) (see Keijsper 1985:337-8). In dependent clauses, where word
order is different, the accentuation is adapted to the other word order:

(75) dat hij ervan BLOOST
    that he of-it BLUSHes

(76) dat hij er NIKS van WEET
    that he it NOTHING of KNOWS

(77) dat ik er beROERD van WORD
    that I it ROTten of beCOME.

In (75)-(77) an accent on van could only be interpreted as a correction
of a mistake.

As to Gussenhoven's (ms:section 8) example with accented van, I do
not think that it is inspired by English. Rather, the relevant point is,
in my view, that the sentence contains zo'n (such a):
En hoe word je dan lid VAN zo'n commissie?
And how become you then member OF such-a committee

The meaning of zo (cf. Bolinger 1985:108) has consequences not only for accent placement but also for word order. The following would be impossible without zo:

De trein is zo GEK nog niet
The train is so MAD yet not ('Travelling by train is less crazy than you thought before this moment'--an advertisement propagandizing the use of the Dutch railways. The corresponding radio ad is pronounced: De trein IS zo gek nog niet; this pronunciation assumes that the written version of the sentence is already known.)

Without zo word order must be as follows (with an entirely different meaning):

De trein is nog niet GEK
The train is yet not MAD (but may become so later).

Dutch te used with infinitives does not have the purpose/direction sense which can be highlighted by accenting to (Bolinger 1985:84-5). As an alternative, om has been mentioned:

Our task is to SOLVE these problems and if you've got the means TO solve them (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 124; Bolinger 1985:Ex. 16)

...en als je de middelen hebt OM ze op te lossen.
The 'directional' sense of to appears in Dutch toe, for example:

Als we naar een oplossing van dit probleem TOE willen. if we (to) a solution of this problem TO want

Now if we want to find a solution TO this problem (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 106; Bolinger 1985:Ex. 217).

Thus, Gussenhoven 1985:Ex. 32a: toe; Ex. 32b: om.

The discussion of preposition stressing suffers from incomplete information on the Dutch side. It is true that

Pattey Grey is nooit IN mijn auto geweest
Pattey Grey is never IN my car been
implies that Pattey Grey HAS been underneath my car, or on top of it, etc., (Gussenhoven 1983:410); in Dutch the verb cannot be included in the scope of the accent here. But the rule which gives Dutch

(86) Pattey Grey is nooit in mijn auto geweest

for English

(87) Pattey Grey was never IN my car (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 111)

suggests that accent placement is arbitrarily different here in the two languages. In my view, the identical wording is deceptive in this case: Dutch ën is not the same as English IN, and the syntax is different as well. In (87) two connections are created, as far as I understand (Bolinger 1971:31ff.): Pattey Grey was never IN, and IN my car, i.e., in my terms:

---

Pattey Grey was never IN my car.

The first link is impossible in Dutch. In order to introduce it, ën must be postposed:

(88) Pattey Grey is mijn auto nooit IN geweest

This is an adequate translation of (87). In this position, ën is regarded as a part of the verb phrase. Gussenhoven treats such cases elsewhere (1984:177-83), but they should also be mentioned in the context of English preposition stressing, in my view. Thus, besides (89'), Dutch also has the possibility exemplified by (89''):

(89') A (soccer fan): I want you to sprinkle my ashes all over the PITCH.

B: Well, you know spectators aren't really allowed ONto the pitch

Je weet dat toeschouwers eigenlijk niet op het veld

You know that spectators really not on the pitch worden TOEGELATEN (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 107; Bolinger are ALLOWed 1985:Ex. 14).

(89'') Je weet dat toeschouwers eigenlijk het veld niet OP mogen.

You know that spectators really the pitch not ONto are-allowed

I would suggest that (89'') is a closer translation of the English part of (89') than Gussenhoven's version.
Accented English prepositions, however, cannot always be translated into Dutch by postposing the corresponding word. Although that word order introduces the relevant link, it also has its own meaning, and the latter may be inappropriate. For example,

(90) The house isn't ON fire (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 92; Bolinger 1985:Ex. 13; Gussenhoven 1985:Ex. 33)

has no adequate translation with an accent on the same word: the word order of (88) and (90) would mean that the fire exists independently of whether or not the house enters into it, which is too odd. On in (90) clearly corresponds, however, with Dutch aan, for example:

(91) Maar het kampvuur is nog niet AAN

But the campfire is yet not ON

(not yet)

Gussenhoven's rules regard (90) and (91) as entirely different cases, which is, in my view, semantically inadequate.

The syntactic difference between, for example, (85) and (87) is reflected in the fact that the phenomenon called 'preposition stranding' is more widespread in English than it is in Dutch.

The other relevant point is inherent meaning. The double link in cases like

(92) (Will you give this to John before he leaves the house?)

John isn't IN the house (Bolinger 1985:Ex. 18; Gussenhoven 1985:137)

implies that the meaning of John isn't IN is a part of the meaning of the whole sentence. But the Dutch translation of John isn't IN uses another word:

(93) Jan is niet BINnen.

InSIDE

Thus, Dutch in does not include the sense of the English in which is relevant here. Other prepositions/particles also systematically have a slightly different meaning in the two languages.

Summarizing, it seems to me that the different accent placements in superficially identical sentences with prepositions is only one aspect of a much larger problem. An adequate treatment would have to take into account the entire systems of phrasal verbs as well; this system is not the same in the two languages (cf. Keijsper 1985:346-56).
3.9 I find it somewhat confusing that the Dutch sentences purporting to illustrate a cultural difference in the area of fishing and playing fathers (Gussenhoven 1983:Ex. 70-71; Bolinger 1985:Ex. 219-22; Gussenhoven 1985:127-28) change the construction together with the activity:

(94) Hij is met zijn zoonje vissen
He is with his son FISHING

(95) Hij is met zijn zoonje aan het spelen
He is with his SON on playing

With the construction of (95) I can perfectly well say

(96) Hij is met zijn zoonje aan het vissen
He is with his SON on fishing

The sentences are ambiguous; (96), for example, can also mean that he is using his son as a fishing-rod (is aan het vissen is a normal sort of discontinuous constituent). But the relevant interpretation has it that, given the idea of 'being with his son', the particular way of doing so needs no separate introduction. This is always easier to imagine when the verb is relatively 'empty', but no discrete classes of verbs exist here. With two accents:

(97) Hij is met zijn ZOONtje aan het Vissen
the sentence conveys that he is with his son and that they are fishing (two separate ideas). As to cultural normalcy, a friend whom I expected to dinner the next day called me up to say that she could not come because:

(98) Ik lig met een GRIEK in bed
I lie with a GREEK in bed

This is what I heard. When asked whether that would take so long it turned out that she had said:

(99) Ik lig met een GRIEP in BED
I lie with a FLU in BED

Replacing a phoneme was easier than computing the accentuation. Instead of (99) one normally says:

(100) Ik lig met een GRIEP in BED
I lie with a FLU in BED

3.10 Gussenhoven (1983:401; 1985:127, 128-29) mentions three problems in the same breath: the position of the verb in Dutch, the use of zijn (to be) or hebben (to have) as a perfective auxiliary, and the difference between temporal, locational and directional expression. The three are interrelated but, in my view, separately meaningful. The issue is too complicated to discuss in a short note, but the following may give an impression.
As is well known, non-finite verbal elements are normally placed in final position in Dutch main clauses. I would not say that this is an obligatory rule (Gussenhoven 1985:127), because a semantic difference exists between two possible positions, the meaning of one being such that it does not often occur. In

(101) Hij heeft gefefst in ZWEden (Gussenhoven 1985:Ex. 127)  
He has cycled in SWEden

there is a boundary of the sort I indicate by means of a backward link:

(101') Hij heeft goffefst in ZWEden

This is to say that the question of whether or not he cycled is settled independently of whether or not he did so in Sweden. The backward link ensures that Gussenhoven has two focus domains here: the verb cannot be included in the scope of the accent on Zweden. The word order is normal, for example, in enumerations, where the boundary in question could in writing be indicated by putting a colon:

(102) Hij heeft gewONnen; een BOEkenbon, een FIETS, een nieuwe  
He was WON a BOOK-token, a Bicycle, a new  
Auto, ...  
CAR, ...

This is, of course, also possible in English, but in Dutch it is the only possibility with this word order. In English, a constituent containing a non-finite verb in this position is normally linked forwards to, for example, the direct object, the verb and the object forming a constituent before they are linked up with the subject together:

(103) He has won a BOOK-token.

If in Dutch we want to link a constituent containing a non-finite verb to, for example, an object, the non-finite verb must be postposed:

(104) Hij heeft een BOEkenbon gewonnen.

Next, the use of hebben or zijn as a perfective auxiliary is not meaningless. Thus,

(105) Hij heeft geSPRONGen  
He has JUMPed
means approximately that he has performed the type of action we call 'jumping' (not specified as to the number of jumps he made). But

\[(106) \text{Hij is gesPRONGen} \]
\[\text{He is JUMPed} \]

means approximately that he has performed a jump to the effect that he arrived somewhere (or several jumps, every time arriving somewhere). The difference between (105) and (106) ensures that we can say both

\[(107) \text{Hij heeft gesPRONGen op de TAfel} \]
\[\text{He has JUMPed on the TAble} \]

and

\[(108) \text{Hij heeft op de TAfel gesPRONGen.} \]
\[\text{He has on the TAble JUMPed} \]

But with \textit{is} the word order of (107) is more uncommon than with \textit{heeft}, because only the order of (108) conforms to the obvious idea that he was first elsewhere, then on the table, and that a jump caused the transition: this obvious idea implies that we cannot settle the issue of whether or not he jumped independently of the issue of whether or not he was on the table. Thus, the meaning of the order of the words in (107) is incongruous with the meaning of \textit{is} (but the order is not impossible if we imagine an appropriate context).

Finally, the difference between \textit{heeft} and \textit{is} ensures that the most obvious interpretation of (107) and (108) is that he has been jumping while he was on the table (jumping being a way of being on the table); with \textit{is} the most obvious interpretation is that he arrived on the table by jumping (so that \textit{op} would have to be translated as \textit{onto} rather than as \textit{on}). Also, instead of (108), where the idea of being on the table and the idea of jumping are merged, one can easily say

\[(109) \text{Hij heeft op de tAfel gesPRONGen.} \]

Here the two ideas are introduced separately. With \textit{is} the accent placement of (109) is less obvious because, as was indicated above, in this case the jump is imagined as the transition between his being elsewhere and his being on the table, so that the two cannot easily be separated.

The semantic distinctions involved here are, to be sure, far more complicated than I have pretended here. Gussenhoven does not cover all possibilities.
3.11 Bolinger (1985:122) calls attention to the no-man's-land between morphology and syntax: 'something has happened when people stop saying Robin Hood and hole in the head and start saying Robin Hood and hole in the head'. What has happened is, in my terms, that a forward link has been replaced by a backward link:

\[\text{'hole in the head'} \rightarrow \text{'hole in the head'}\]

This is, in my view, one step on the road to a compound. The further step is the elimination of the link:

\[\text{'black bird'} \rightarrow \text{'black bird'} \rightarrow \text{'blackbird'}\]

In blackbird the two components are no longer linked together at the moment of speaking; instead, they enter into the speech chain as a single complex (see also the discussion in Gussenhoven 1985:133; Bolinger ms: section 7; Gussenhoven ms: section 6; Keijsper 1986).

Now, whereas English and Dutch seem to behave in the same way in cases like hole in the head (attributive head-modifier combinations, in the traditional terminology), Dutch is more conservative than English in attributive modifier-head combinations. Bolinger's (1985:Ex. 92-8) examples of 'half-compounds' (backward link) are strange to the Dutch ear:

(109) his theatrical manner
(110) their warlike attitude
(111) the crazy streak in him.

I would never say Robin Hood, unless, of course, the accent is intended to be contrastive. Also, although it has become fashionable to say

(112) Het 8 uur journaal (the 8 o'clock news)

the construction is as yet so non-Dutch that a newspaper column recently discussed the issue, condemning the apparent influence of English.\(^6\)

The Dutch solutions seem to be the following:

--We may retain the original forward link, so that an additional accent must be placed on the head unless a contrastive interpretation is aimed at:

(113) Zijn theatrale manier (cf. (109)).
(114) Die GEKke TREK in hem (cf. (111)).

--- We go directly to a full compound:

(115) Hun OORlogshouding (cf. (110)).

When more than one possibility is available, the semantic distinction is the same as that given by Bolinger (1986:116-21) for English.

--- We reinterpret the modifier-head construction as a head-modifier construction. This is normal in 'Genitive-Noun' combinations:

(116) JAN's vrouw → JAN z'n vrouw
    JOHN's wife     JOHN his wife

(117) MArie's boek → MArie d'r boek
    MAry's book     MAry her book

The lefthand examples represent spelling. The normal colloquial pronunciation is as indicated on the right.

--- We postpose the modifier (or, rather, it is there). Thus, the 'Dutch' version of (112) is

(118) Het journaal van 8 UUR
    The news of 8 o'CLOCK.

(in contrast to (112), (118) does not refer to a type of news bulletin.) Likewise:

(119) Die theaTRAle maNIER van hem (cf. (113))
    That of his

(120) Die trék van GEKte in hem (cf. (114))
    craziness

(121) Die OORlogshouding van ze (cf. (115))
    of theirs

(122) De vróuw van JAN (cf. (116))

(123) Het boek van MArie (cf. (117))

(124) Het strijkwartet van TÖkio (The Tokyo String Quartet)

(125) De regéring REAgan (The Reagan administration).
And so on ((124) and (125) are from the column mentioned earlier). Examples as (119) and (121) are, in my speech, less formal than the versions using a possessive pronoun before the noun.

It seems to me that the difference signalled in this section is the nominal counterpart of the verbal syntax issues mentioned earlier.

3.12 The examples given in the foregoing suffice to illustrate, I hope, that the functioning of accent can in my view hardly be fully explained without answering a whole series of questions about lexical and syntactic semantics. It is time to recognize that accent per se is the simplest of our problems.
NOTES

1 I avail myself of this opportunity to correct four serious errors in my book:

   page 207, 1st line down should read: "square" "rectangle".
   page 274, 11th line up should read: ... if he did not lose.
   page 290, 13th line up should read: ... without a final rise.
   page 366, add last line: The simplification came from Prof. Dr.
   F. H. H. Kortlandt in a discus-

2 For simplicity's sake, I omit from the diagrams the contribution of the meaning of word order. In (5) this meaning ensures that my mother becomes a so-called 'topic': the negation of 'mother' (negated by the accent) does not precede 'mother' but is simultaneous with it. In effect, the accent selects mother from among other persons present 'on the scene'. A last ('comment') accent, in contrast, says, in effect, that the referent is not absent in its environment (if the accent is of an assertive type). A last accent in non-final position leads to the interpretation which Gussenhoven calls 'eventive' (e.g. Gussenhoven 1983: 403ff.); a last accent in final position has a so-called 'existential' interpretation. These interpretations result from the interaction of the meaning of accent and the meaning of word order. See Keijsper (1985:313 ff.) for details.


4 The 'prenuclear' accent on club (and on the corresponding words in the further examples) reflects the fact that the sentence is processed in two steps: (we also offer a club) (a club you can JOIN). For simplicity's sake, I omit the first step here (see Keijsper 1985:227, 229, 252-60).

5 This fact was brought to my attention by L. van Buuren; he explicitly instructs his students not to use their Dutch accentuation in English in such cases (see also van Buuren 1981:5).

6 NRC Handelsblad, 7 oktober 1985.
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