UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

The state, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: the cases of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia
Degu, W.A.

Citation for published version (APA):
Degu, W. A. (2002). The state, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: the cases of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia Amsterdam: Thela Thesis

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
5. THE STATE, ITS CRISIS (FAILURE/COLLAPSE) AND REFUGEE MIGRATION

The increasing refugee flows in many parts of the world have been attracting a reasonable number of scholars in the last two or more decades. International organizations like UNHCR, regional organizations like the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and other governmental and non-governmental organizations have also been involved in refugee studies. These scholars and the various organizations have been trying to explain the huge flows of refugees in every part of the world. Some of the explanations are univariate (i.e., take one single factor as the sole cause of refugee migration). Others are multivariate (i.e., take a number of factors together as the causes of the flight). Some focus on domestic while others focus on international factors. By critically pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, I believe that it will be possible to develop a more comprehensive explanation.

With such an objective this chapter will try to consider some of these partial explanations given for the refugee crisis in general and that of Africa in particular. Their strengths and weaknesses will also be discussed. This will be helpful in developing the foundation for the central thesis of this research. At the end of the chapter I will try to develop a structure of a more comprehensive framework of analyzing refugee migration and the failure/collapse of the state in the Horn of Africa, which will be the main thesis of this research project. It should be noted here that the emphasis will be on an historical approach. This is not to legitimize what exists but to understand how it came about. However, before going into the discussion on the various explanations of refugee migration, it will be useful to consider some basic assumptions.

I have indicated in the previous chapters that human displacement and later on refugeeism are a component part of the construction and reconstruction of the state and the states-system. I have also argued that the state is the result of social construction. And the social construction of the state is a process which is never complete, rather it is an ongoing process. It is an ongoing process which involves the (re)division and (re)occupation of political and/or territorial space, and the (re)creation of boundaries. Moreover, it also involves the construction and reconstruction of political community and identity. These practices in turn involve violence, movement of people and human displacement.

The movement of people from place to place not only pre-dated the emergence of any centralized political unit (the state as we know it today), but also contributed to the creation of larger and complex political units. In other words, the movement of people in search of fertile land, water and other resources, and to participate and control long-distance trade had contributed to the emergence of larger and more complex communities. It also contributed to the intermingling of different peoples and cultures. Moreover, it has been the major factor which contributed to the emergence and transfer of civilization between different peoples at various levels of development. For instance, as McNeil and Adams (1978: xi) argue, 'the penetration of all diverse environments of the new world by Paleolithic hunters, between about 30,000 and 3,000 B.C., followed by a massive change in human occupancy since 1500 when Europeans and Africans first began to come across the ocean in significant numbers, constitute two of the most remarkable demonstrations of the importance of human migration to be found anywhere in the world's history'. They further point out that 'the earliest civilizations known to archaeologists seem to have arisen as a result of sea-borne migration of people we know as Sumerians into Mesopotamia from somewhere south, presumably along the shores of the Persian gulf. The newcomers established themselves as rulers of whoever may have lived in the marshy estuaries of
the Tigris-Euphrates before they got there, and soon began to develop new skills and techniques for exploiting the agricultural as well as the fishing and fowling possibilities of that exceptional environment. The result was the emergence of cities and civilization by about 3000 B.C. (Ibid. 5). Two things are important to note. First, the absence of rigid boundaries, as we know them today, has facilitated this relatively free movement of people. Second, defending the home against strangers, on the one hand, and roving to far places in search of food and excitement, on the other, have always been opposing poles of human recorded experience (Ibid.: 3).

Primarily, population growth has been one of the factors behind this free movement of people and the results that followed. However, the further growth of population restricted the movement of people when free land, water and other resources became scarce. The conflicts between different communities for the control of these scarce resources and of trade routes have been the logical outcome of this social development. These conflicts and competitions were partially responsible for the further social development and the emergence of more organized communities. In the process many communities came together, assimilating each other’s culture, language, etc. and created bigger communities. Some communities assimilated others into their cultures or became assimilated into other cultures, in either case some communities gave up their cultural identities. This social process itself gave rise to still further but restricted movement of people and to further centralization of society. As a result, boundaries, identities, socio-political and economic structures have been socially constituted and reconstituted. In other words, different political communities have been created. These communities were and still are what Anderson (1983) calls imagined political communities’. They are imagined because, among other things, the members of even the smallest political communities will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion (Ibid.: 6).

This process, as many other social processes, has been full of ups and downs. There have been suppression, exploitation and domination. However, such gradual social development led to the construction of what we know as the early state and then to the modern territorial-state. If we take the experience of Europe, as Holsti (1996: 42) puts it:

In the year 1200, Europe was curved into a hotch-potch of political forms, a heterogeneous collection of tributary empires, free cities, ecclesiastical proto-states, dukedoms, hereditary kingdoms and Arab tribal organization in parts of Spain… a minimum of 80 distinct political units and a maximum of 500, depending upon how one defines a political organization, dotted the continental landscape. … By 1900 Europe had been reduced to nineteen units that took only two forms: the modern territorial nation-state and the dynastic multinational empire. Two decades later, the multinational empire had collapsed, leaving only the single format of the territorial state until Lenin and Stalin resurrected a new form of multinational empire in the Soviet Union.

In the case of Africa, a similar process may have been responsible for the emergence of early state forms in some parts of the continent (for instance, states in Western Sudan and in Ethiopia) and not in other parts (such as in Somalia), at different times. However, the (re)construction of the existing African state has been influenced by external factors more than internal processes. The European involvement in Africa during the time of the slave trade and later on during colonialism is an excellent example for the role of external factors in the construction of the state.

---

1 The major population movement in the Horn of Africa will be discussed in Chapter 7.
2 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
A more direct impact of external powers is the creation of colonial entities. Colonial powers created artificial but rigid boundaries, and reconstituted different identities which restricted the movement of people. The colonial powers not only created artificial boundaries with their adverse effects but also created states which are not capable of providing even the basic necessities for their citizens. It should be noted here that, though most parts of Ethiopia have not been formally under colonial rule, the country has not been spared from the adverse effect of colonialism. As we shall see in one of the coming chapters, the creation of Eritrea and Djibouti as a separate colonial entity, the Ethio-Somalia conflict over Ogaden and the boundary problems with the neighbouring countries are all related to colonialism.

The European powers, by destroying and/or distorting the pre-colonial political systems and distorting the historical development of the continent (political, economic and social), by constructing a European styled colonial state, and then doing everything possible to maintain the type of state that they have constructed, left behind time bombs which have been exploding and will continue to explode. It is the cumulative effect of these explosions which resulted in the failure of the state.

However, this does not mean that colonialism is to be blamed for all the problems. A variety of post-colonial domestic factors such as: the failure of mainstream development and state theories, the failure of the developmental state, extreme centralization of the state, militarization of politics, inappropriate domestic and foreign policies or no policies at all, poverty, competition for scarce resources and political power, ethnic domination and the resulting conflicts, population explosion, human rights violation have all contributed to the failure/collapse of the state and then to producing human displacement. In addition, post-colonial external factors have also been playing a significant role. The competition of different powers to bring, for instance the Horn of Africa, under their sphere of influence during the cold war years and their intervention in internal and inter-state conflicts contribute to the deterioration of the situation in the region. Moreover, the globalisation and regionalization of the world economy resulted in the marginalization of Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular. The result has been the intensification of the crisis and increasing flows of refugees (the role of both the internal and external factors will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters).

The fundamental assumption, as illustrated in the model, therefore, is not that of first the state and then refugee migration, rather it is human movement interrupted by the state and then a return to human displacement of a new type. In other words, refugee migration has been part and parcel of the (re)construction of the territorial state system and its failure. The state here is taken as an intervening factor in the long human history. The later human displacement (refugee migration), which is the focus of this research, has been one of the unfortunate results of the failure of the territorial state, on the one hand, to meet the basic needs of the society, and on the other hand to permanently prevent human movement. To further develop this fundamental hypothesis as a more comprehensive explanation it is imperative to briefly discuss the different explanations given for the increasing refugee migration in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular. First, the univariate approach will be considered. Then, the multivariate approach will be dealt with. Finally, the (re)constitution of the

3This does not mean that the pre-state human movement is similar to that of the post-state human displacement, and that the society is going back into the pre-state situation. The causes, the objectives, the patterns and the effects, etc. of the former are different from those of the latter. This will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 9.
territorial sovereign state and its crisis as the major explanation of refugee migration will be discussed with the aim of developing the main thesis of this research.

BASIC MODEL
HUMAN MOVEMENTS, STATE AND REFUGEE MIGRATION

5.1 Univariate (Single-cause) approach

Significant numbers of scholars and organizations involved in refugee issues have tried to explain the increasing flows of refugees with the help of a single factor. The factor can be internal or external to the state and society in question. It is not possible to discuss all the single factors which are taken as the sole explanatory variable in refugee migration. I will only consider some of them which I believe are more relevant to the situation in the Horn of Africa.

4 This model is only one among the many possible models that can be constructed to make my argument clearer. It is not presented here as if it is the sole reflection of the reality out there. All remaining models should be understood similarly.
5.1.1 Colonial Legacy, Ethnicity and Related Conflicts

As is indicated at the beginning of this chapter, many scholars start their explanations with the establishment of colonial rule in Africa. According to these scholars, it was the establishment of colonial rule which created refugee migration in the modern history of Africa. Colonialism fundamentally changed Africa, disrupting the existing economic and social relationships and creating new political units that cut across ethnic/religious/regional boundaries. Clearly, thus, some of the preconditions for the continent’s contemporary refugee crisis were established during the colonial period and the first broad movements of refugees in Africa occurred as a result of anti-colonial wars during the 1950s and 1960s (Sorenson, 1994: 176).

As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 8 that will deal with colonial development, colonialism created the preconditions for Africa’s refugee crisis, among others things, by reconstituting the existing political system and replacing it with that of the European styled state. This entailed, notably the redrawing of rigid territorial boundaries, constructing different and competing identities (especially rigid ethnic identities), and creating centralized authoritarian political structures. The boundaries (mostly artificial boundaries) created by colonialism, on the one hand, divided ethnic groups into more than one colonial states, and on the other hand, brought together different ethnic groups under the same colonial state. Colonialism also gave ethnic identities a new significance.

... colonial officials defined tribes as mutually exclusive territorial entities, thereby solidifying hitherto fluid boundaries between groups and often creating new groups. This process usually went hand in hand with the institutionalization of a cultural division of labour founded on an application to the African scene of simplistic group psychology. Administrators identified ‘intelligent’ tribes - usually in the area that had had the longest contact with Europeans - as potential sources of teachers and clerks and located schools accordingly; they made ‘docile’ tribes into bearers and workers; and they recruited more remote ‘martial’ tribes as military auxiliaries (Zolberg, et. al., 1989: 41).

Thus, the more serious impact of colonialism was its creation of ethnic hierarchies. During colonialism existing socio-political groups were sharpened by the uneven impact of social and economic change, as regions suitable for producing exports, ports and intervening routes, became differentiated from the less developed hinterlands. The various groups gained differential access to education and employment, particularly in the public sector. In most territories, thus, there emerged ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ regions, which overlapped more or less with the newly differentiated ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ ethnic groups (Ibid.: 235). These new differentiations were compounded, in addition to the spatial unevenness of economic change, by the dynamics of political mobilization during the struggle for independence. A number of examples can be given here. Colonial Rwanda was founded on a rigid dichotomy between ‘Tutsi lords’ and ‘Hutu serfs’. In Burundi the relations between the Tutsi and Hutu were hierarchical, though it was not like that of Rwanda. The dualism of Sudan (between the Arab north and the rest of Sudan) was crystallized by the British colonial policies. Chad was divided between the non-Muslim southerners and the Muslim northerners. In Uganda the Buganda enjoyed an extraordinary autonomous status and built up an enormous lead in entry into privileged social status, through education and economic change. In Ethiopia, the Italian occupation exacerbated center-periphery tension after the war. Italians exploited ethnic antagonisms to weaken the Ethiopians’ resistance and generally favored the Muslim over the Coptic Christian. First the Italian and then the British colonial powers were responsible for the creation of Eritrea as a separate political entity (on the creation of ethnic/regional hierarchies in these countries see Zolberg, et. al., 1989: 97).
These ‘ranked’ or ‘hierarchical’ ethnic systems, which colonialism created, are social configurations in which social classes usually coincide with ethnic membership. Such systems occur in a variety of forms, of which two are of special interest: ruling minorities that exercise political and military power over a subjected majority, and trading minorities that constitute an exploitative ‘bourgeoisie’ in relation to a peasant-producer majority (which itself may be either ethnically homogenous or diverse) (Ibid.: 236). These hierarchies have been one of the sources of the ethnic tensions in many African countries. Moreover, colonialism also created centralized and hierarchical governments that replaced the existing decentralized and loosely centralized and fluid political structures.

After independence, as a result, ethnic tensions further worsened within the newly emerging state and between two or more countries which generated refugees. Ethnic tensions or conflicts have been taken as causes of refugees for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are highly susceptible to political exploitation. Factions seeking to mobilize support commonly seek to fan ethnic antagonism for their own ends. Ethnic conflict is a likely outcome when control of the state is captured by a single ethnic group that uses its power to further its own interests at the expense of others (UNHCR, 1993: 20). Secondly, despite the fact that most states contain a variety of ethnic groups, the ethnic identity of a single group is all too often made into a defining characteristic of nationality. Some minority groups may be seen as an obstacle for nation-building, incapable of fitting a homogeneous national identity (Ibid.). Thirdly, ethnic tensions are also vulnerable to manipulation by external forces. Irredentism - the attempt to unite all territories occupied by a single ethnic group into one political entity - is the most obvious form, and has played a large part in refugee producing conflicts, in the Horn of Africa and the former Yugoslavia, to cite two examples (Ibid.).

It is true that ethnicity is one important factor in producing refugees in Africa and in many parts of the world. However, it should not be oversimplified and taken for granted. It should rather be considered critically. Ethnicity by itself can not create refugees, for there are many multiethnic countries with few or no refugees. Only some of the numerous differences in language, religion, and social organizations have caused conflicts, and only some of the conflicts have produced significant flows of refugees (Zolberg, et. al., 1989: 235). Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, countries marked by an extreme high degree of heterogeneity - that is, where the population is distributed among numerous groups - may be less likely to experience the types of conflict that lead to major refugee flows. There are other related factors to be considered together with ethnicity and ethnic conflicts as a cause of refugeeeism. In other words, as Kibreab (1983: 39-40) points out, the oversimplified and apparently taken-for-granted explanation (ethnic/tribal conflict as representing the major cause of refugeeeism in Africa), "... is at variance with the empirical data. This erroneous view can obstruct us from focusing on the core of the problem and tempt us to dwell too long on false issues". For Kibreab (Ibid.: 42), present day African societies are not only marked by internal and interstate conflicts but also by the presence of brutal and coercive power. It is these conflicts and the violence unleashed to suppress them by the class or group(s) that has the monopoly of the state power that constitutes the main problem of refugeeeism. This is not to dismiss totally the amputation of the African ethnic/tribal groups by the arbitrary colonial boundaries as irrelevant to the explanation of refugeeeism. Rather, it is only to make clear the fact that:

...there is no direct correlation between multi-ethnicity and refugeeeism, but given the factors that lead to a conflict situation, it is possible that the situation can be exacerbated by cultural and linguistic diversity, especially in the light of the fact that the elite while competing for economic
advantage or political power are likely to seek differential allegiance based upon tribalism. (Kibr-eab, 1983: 43)

In other words, cultural and linguistic diversity cannot by itself become a major cause of conflict and then produce refugees, but in a given ominous situation it can aggravate or serve as a condition to make the causes proper to become operative (this is a very important argument which will be developed in this research). One of the major causes, especially in the Horn of Africa, in which the ethnic card has been used, is the competition for power: competition for the control of political and economic resources, among various ethnic and/or tribes groups. This has been, mainly, a struggle between forces which have been trying to change the existing ethnic/regional/religious hierarchy/ies and those forces which have been fighting to maintain the status quo (this will be elaborated in the coming chapters).

This has also been related to other categories of social conflicts: conflicts of state formation and conflict over social order as a source of refugee migration (Suhrke, 1992: 4). Conflict over state formation typically involved opposing ethnic/tribal or religious or regional groups, or targeted a particular group or region. In extreme forms, violence took the form of pogroms, expulsions or autonomy/secessionist struggles. Rooted in inequality and oppression, conflicts over the social order are struggles between dominant and subordinate classes (or social groups), whose most extreme manifestations are full-scale social revolutions (Zolberg, et., al., 1989: 245). Like full-fledged secessions, revolutions are rare historical events, but the underlying conditions that produce these cataclysms also produce the more frequently encountered limited upheavals (Ibid.: 245-246). All the successful revolutions in Africa since the end of World War II and most of the attempted ones, have resulted in major international population movements. However, it should be pointed out that the historical and theoretical significance of violent confrontation should not be allowed to obscure the fact that protest against the state - the exercise of 'violence' - is only one possible response to oppression, and usually the riskiest. The alternative, for Zolberg (Ibid.), is 'exit' - to get out from under or to vote with one's feet. This has in fact emerged as a major factor, particularly in the case of weak states that cannot confine their population, giving rise to substantial outflows whose status is particularly problematic. One can also add the overthrow of government through violence (armed struggle) in this category. In this respect, it would be important to note that:

The process of state formation and social ordering which produced refugees during the cold war period were familiar from earlier periods in European history, but the international context had changed dramatically. In the new states of Africa, Asia and Latin America, nation state formation proceeded under conditions of extreme international inequality, intense population pressure on national resources, and a cold war that tended to internationalize domestic conflicts. The typical result was frequent and intense conflict, and massive refugee flows. (Suhrke, 1992: 5)

In Africa, the cold war legacy in effect came on top of a debilitating colonial legacy, thereby creating a double burden (Ibid.: 6). One of the major types of refugee producing conflict that is associated with state formation was actually increasing in the past cold war world. As the political structures of the past crumbled, ethnic conflicts and nationality problems multiplied. Many parts of Africa showed signs of resurgence or at least continuity of old ethnic conflicts (Ibid.: 14; see also Zolberg, 1983: 32). In such a situation the measures taken to consolidate state power and to rapidly combat underdevelopment often lead to authoritarian method and severe conflicts, producing refugee generation.
5.1.2. Economic Underdevelopment and Poverty

The refugee problem has also been taken to be inseparable from the problem of economic development (underdevelopment) in Africa, both in preventing situations that create refugee flows and in dealing with either of the permanent solutions available - settlement and repatriation. Unless economic development occurs, neither solution is workable in the long run (Adelman and Sorenson, 1994: IX). It is assumed that some of the nations most economically at risk were also the most responsible for generating refugee flows, whereas in many cases, equally impoverished countries hosted large numbers of refugees from unstable neighbouring states (Gorman, 1993: 4).

The explanation here is that colonialism, by exploiting the resources of Africa and integrating the continent into the international capitalist economic system at a disadvantaged position undermined its economic development. African petty bourgeoisie who took power as the result of decolonization did not meaningfully change the situation. Thus, Africa remained a wider market for the goods produced in the Western world and a source of raw material and cheap labour. Moreover, the imposition of mainstream Western development models further distorted the economic development of the continent. The result has been more poverty and economic deterioration. On the other hand, after the achievement of political independence the people raised economic and political demands but the new governments had not much to offer that could bring about a change in the quality of life. Hence, the independent revolution had been transformed from 'one of rising expectation into one of rising frustration'. Frustration did not in all cases create submission and resignation, but gradually led to resistance, and when the ruling classes set out to liquidate the resistance the responses varied from persevering in struggle to refugeism or mass internal displacement. Moreover, underdevelopment contributes to the generation of refugee flows in that it fosters the adoption of authoritarian strategies of state and nation formation, whose execution entails political persecution of certain categories of the population (Zolberg, 1983: 41).

Attempts have been made to illustrate the connection between the refugee situation and the problem of poverty and underdevelopment. The most obvious attempt is statistical. About fifteen million of the globe's 16.7 million refugees reside in developing countries. Nine of the world's ten poorest countries have produced and/or received substantial numbers of refugees at the same time over the past two decades. These countries include Mozambique, Ethiopia, Chad, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Malawi, Somalia, Zaire, Laos, and Sudan. Seven of these countries - Mozambique, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire - rank among countries either currently most seriously affected by refugee population or as major refugee producers. Severe poverty, in other words, seems to be closely associated with the refugee phenomena (Ibid.). Table 5.1 is used by Gorman to illustrate this association.

It should be noted here that although underdevelopment and poverty are important factors, they do not produce refugees by themselves. Extreme, systematic and sustained economic deprivation typically produces powerlessness. In this case the poorest will be the last to leave (Zolberg, et., al.: 1989: 260). Moreover, there have been and still are poor countries with no significant refugee population. Underdevelopment and poverty create competition for scarce resources among different groups - ethnic/tribal, or religious or regional. The competition either creates a conflicting political atmosphere or exacerbates existing conflicts or both. The political conflicts
in turn worsen poverty in some sort of vicious circle. Mostly, underdevelopment and poverty are the results of government policies (inappropriate policies or no policies at all) and the disadvantaged position of a country in the international economic system.

Table 5.1
Refugee Producing Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugee Produced (In million)</th>
<th>Refugee Produced Rank</th>
<th>GNP Rank 1=poorest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srilanka</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gorman, 1993: 4
Refugee statistics are based on 1991 data.
Data on GNP Rank are as of 1990.

What happened in Africa in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular, in the last three or so decades, was that the state failed to have consistent and appropriate policies to exploit and develop resources available, and rationally distribute them among the citizens. If there were policies, they were mostly influenced or shaped by the rival powers of the cold war and IFIs so that they might serve the interests of international capital. In addition, the countries in the region have been marginalized in the world economic system. As a result, the situation deteriorated and the struggle for the control of the scarce resources, which are mainly under government control, intensified. This created a vicious circle of poverty-conflict-more poverty, in which the state could not provide the basic necessities for the citizens. Finally, this vicious circle resulted in the crisis and/or failure of the state. It is this crisis that has been generating more refugees.

5.1.3. Interstate Conflicts

Another factor which has been associated with refugee migration is interstate conflict. It has two aspects. The first one is the direct confrontation between neighbouring states. The second aspect is the use of refugees as a destabilizing mechanism. However, it does not mean that all interstate conflicts produce refugees. In order to understand which interstate conflicts have been producing refugees we have to look for the factors behind the conflicts both historical and current. The direct interstate confrontations, which have been generating refugees in the Horn of Africa, have their roots partly in pre-colonial and colonial history and partly in the policies of the respective post-colonial states. The pre-colonial, the colonial and the post-colonial factors will be discussed in the coming chapters separately. However, it is important to make one general point here with regard to the post-colonial situation. It is the failure of each post-colonial state in the Horn of Africa to peacefully solve its internal problems that opened the door for the interference of the neighbouring countries, the Arab world and superpowers. A number of cases can be pinpointed.
It is the failure of the Ethiopian state to solve the problem of Eritrea and Ogaden which opened the door for the intervention of Sudan and Somalia, and created a conflict situation between these countries. Similarly, the failure of the Sudanese state to solve the Southern Sudan problem and of Somalia to solve the problem between various tribal groups enabled the Ethiopian government to interfere. The failure of the state in both Ethiopia and Somalia to peacefully solve the Ogaden problem also resulted in the Ogaden War between these two countries. Generally speaking, these failures opened the door for interstate conflicts, directly or indirectly, which in turn worsened the internal conflicts in all these three countries. This situation resulted in the complete collapse of Somalia, in the near collapse of the Sudanese and the Ethiopian states and finally the break away of Eritrea from Ethiopia.

These interstate conflicts, as refugee generating factors, should be understood slightly differently. The conflicts between the Horn of African countries emanate from the process of the (re)construction of the territorial state itself and the respective boundaries, and the (re)constitution of competing identities in each country. The conflict within and between the three countries has mainly been between the forces fighting to maintain the status quo (the territorial integrity of the respective countries) and those forces who have been fighting for a change either towards wider autonomy or a separate state. This can also be understood as a conflict between forces who have been trying to maintain the colonial boundaries and who have been fighting to change them and (re)constitute a new boundary, identity and territorial state (this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9).

With regard to the second aspect, the use of refugees as a destabilizing force, it has been very true in the Horn of Africa that neighbouring states employ or even instigate military activities within refugee communities across their common borders in pursuit of 'security objectives' or 'regional hegemony'. In other words, a number of refugee warriors were created in the region. The three major countries - Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan - have used asylum and assistance as a surrogate for support for rebel movements within the other state. The Eritrean and the Tigrean liberation movements maintained a political base in Sudan for many years, while the Sudanese People's Liberation army was allowed to operate from the refugee-hosting areas of Southwest Ethiopia. Depending on the state of relations between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, Somalia opposition groups have at various times been given assistance and shelter by the Ethiopian Government (Loescher, 1993: 26). The Somali Government also organized and assisted opposition groups and guerrilla forces against the Ethiopian government.

It should be noted that the would be refugees do not normally flee to a country that is at war with their country of origin. In the Horn of African, however, Ethiopian refugees fled to Somalia at the time when Ethiopia and Somalia were fighting, and Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees fled to Ethiopia and Sudan respectively when the relations between the two countries were at their worst. This was mainly because they felt threatened more by their government than by the enemies of their respective countries. In addition, they felt safer with their ethnic/tribal/religious groups across the international boundaries. This may reveal much about the nature of the state and state-society relations.
5.1.4. The Nature of the International System and New Global Developments

The causes of refugee migration have also been attributed to the nature of the international system. As Zolberg (1981: 19) points out, 'much as the international migrations reflect the economic structure and concomitant processes of the international system that produces them, so the flows of refugees largely reflect the political structure of that same system'. Similarly, one can also argue that 'Changes in the role of the state and the process of state-building, and the emerging patterns of conflict resulting from the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes seeking to direct the economic development thus reflect generalized changes in the international system' (Ferris, 1985: 17). Furthermore, Mazur (1988: 47) argues, in Africa refugee flows emanate from emerging nation states in the periphery of the contemporary capitalist world system. In historical perspective, core countries consolidated nation-states as they developed social, legal and economic institutions to strengthen the control of their territories while effectively competing against rival emerging contiguous nation states. Peripheral nation-states emerged from the colonial experience institutionally weak and dependent upon the core. In this respect, African countries obtained independence not only most recently - and thus when core control of the neo-colonial state was most sophisticated - but also when indigenous social, economic and political institutions were most thoroughly undermined. This situation created the ground for refugee-producing crises.

The refugee crises of recent decades have often taken place in areas where local conflicts have been drawn into the broader superpower struggle for global influence. Such struggles for influence have been seen in the Horn of Africa, Indo-China, Central Asia, the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America where millions of refugees have been created (Loescher, 1990: 11). In this respect, refugees have been used instrumentally as so-called 'freedom fighters' and guerrillas to wage wars of liberation on all continents. In regions of intense superpower conflict and competition these refugees have been armed and their movements supported, both materially and ideologically. In the Horn of Africa the West supported a variety of regional secessionist groups, including refugees, in their struggles. For instance, it was in this way that the interests of the West in maintaining pressure on Ethiopia, and through Ethiopia, on the former Soviet Union, were served (Ibid.: 13). Besides, a generous admission policy towards a certain group may in fact encourage to people flee; and this flight can then be used as propaganda to demonstrate that people are 'voting with their feet' or 'choosing sides' in an ideological conflict. Conversely, a decision not to accord refugee status will often imply support for the sending government (Ibid.: 15).

There is another important point to be noted here. The international community, notably big powers and international organizations such as UNHCR, by recognizing certain refugee groups with specific labels or not recognizing refugees from newly emerging political entities reinforced or denied the reconstruction of separate political identities different from the existing national identity. They indirectly confirm the demands of certain ethnic/regional/religious groups for a separate political entity or vice versa. A number of examples can be cited. By categorizing refugees from Ethiopia, even before 1991, as Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees; refugees from Iraq or Turkey as Kurd refugees reinforced or contributed to the construction of Eritrea or Kurd as a separate entity and identity. More recently, the recognition of refugees from Yugoslavia as Kosovo refugees, on the one hand, reinforced the construction of a separate Kosovo political identity, and on the other hand, contributed to the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a unified national identity. Conversely, by not recognizing the emergence of new political entities in Somalia and by recognizing refugees from these entities without referring to the new entities confirmed the existence of Somalia as a unified territorial sovereign state. This is excellent
evidence that refugee migration has been part and parcel of the construction of political identity, political community and state.

In general, as Koehn (1991: 81) argues, the foreign policy actions of the superpowers have exacerbated nationality and interstate conflicts, and contributed to the perpetuation of refugee migration. In particular, the current refugee situation in the Horn of Africa, Koehn concludes, is a legacy of three decades of superpower arms supply (Ibid.). The involvement of external forces, mainly superpowers, in the Horn of Africa and the continuous shift of alliance should also be seen critically. It has not been only the superpowers or other forces which were responsible for their intervention. Leaving aside the colonial legacy, for now, it is the failure of the states in the region which created the fertile ground for foreign power intervention. First, it is their weakness or lack of will to peacefully solve their own internal and common problems that created armed opposition (anti-government) movements. It is these armed opposition movements which were used as an instrument for foreign power involvement - indirect invitation and intervention. Second, it was the individual states, forced by circumstances or otherwise, which invited the foreign powers to come in. It is their policies of solving the problems by force and their ideological alliance which forced them to seek foreign assistance, mainly military, which created the ground for superpower intervention. This does not mean that superpowers have not exploited the situation for their own objectives. They did, effectively.

The points that should be emphasized here are, first, that the states in the region and the external powers, with their respective objectives, created the ground for foreign intervention. The intervention worsened the situation rather than solved any of the problems. Second, the intervention of foreign powers exacerbated both political and economic problems and weakened the states which resulted in the complete crisis of the state. It is this crisis which produced huge human displacement both internal and external.

In a slightly different way, refugees are taken to be a silent witness to a global political and economic crisis, manifested in Africa by political conflict, declining standard of living and widespread hunger. In explaining the interconnection between the global crisis, the crisis of national states and refugee migration in Africa, Schultheis (1989: 4) clearly indicates that refugees:

... are the visible symptoms of deeper problems in the institutions and structures of many countries and of the world system which of they are part ... the causes of forced displacement are rooted in the political economy of poverty and underdevelopment, and that the major refugee flows are the direct or indirect consequences of superpower involvement in the local conflicts and regional wars.

The other and more recent aspect of the international factor in explaining refugee migration is the impact of the end of the cold war and the imposition of political and economic liberalization by IFIs and Western powers. As Suhrke (1992: 18) points out, two political processes marked the opening of the post-cold war world: the seemingly trend towards greater democratization within some states, and the eruption of old nationality disputes threatening others with violent fragmentation. Both processes are of central concern to the international regime. If we look at the first aspect, failure to stabilize a fragile democratization process could result in a return of social order conflicts and the associated refugee flows familiar from the past. In Africa the recent democratization process seems to proceed despite generally worsening social and economic conditions, and ethnicization of multi-party politics. Under these conditions, democratization will remain fragile. If it fails and it seems that it is failing, the consequence is suggested by
recent history. Authoritarian regimes may take root again with brutal and widespread repression, which in turn produces more refugees.

With regard to the second aspect, in a post-cold war world where the permanence of nation-state (national states) is questioned, the nationality problem may progressively worsen. In much of Africa and Asia, ethnic divisions have long been politically significant and showed signs of becoming more so as aspiring nationalities witnessed the changing map of Central Asia, the Balkans and the ex-Soviet Union as a whole. Moreover, conditions of economic underdevelopment can easily exacerbate ethnic disputes. Rapid but uneven growth may threaten ethnic compromises. Where development is stagnating, resource scarcity typically sharpens ethnic divisions. In Africa where the combination of weak states, ethnic hierarchies and the impact of the global crisis have produced endemic conflicts, the result may be fragmentation of existing nation-state (Suhrke, 1992: 20). This may produce far more refugees.

The other related important global developments are the ever increasing debt burden and the imposition of economic and political liberalization through the IMF and the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The impact of these developments should be seen from different angles. First, the repayments of the debt and/or failure to pay have adverse effects on the economic and political development of African countries. The attempt to pay the debt will consume a substantial portion of the national income, which in effect paralyzes national economic and social activities. Failure to pay the debt will create serious problems of getting foreign aid which African political leaders need to maintain their power. Second, privatization of state owned enterprises (mostly profitable ones) and devaluation of national currencies weaken the capacity of the state by diminishing its resource base. Third, opening the whole economy for the strong multinational corporations weakens both the state and the indigenous private sector. Fourth, liberalization of the economy and privatization widens the gap between the rich and the poor within the country. They also create uneven development between the different regions, religious and ethnic groups. Fifth, the abolition of subsidies on the basic necessities causes deterioration in the living standard of the most vulnerable segments of the society, which often resulted in riot and unrest.

The most serious problem which African countries face is the danger which may result from the impossible task of implementing political liberalization (democratization), in which the opinions of the citizens have to be considered, and economic liberalization, in which they have to embark on unpopular policies. Many African countries which attempted to do these two things at the same time ended up doing neither. The cumulative effect of all these have been more poverty, a fierce struggle for mere survival, social unrest and violent conflict, in which refugee flows is one logical outcome.

Therefore, as Loescher (1990: 19) argues, while refugee flows often originate as a result of persecution at the hands of brutal rulers, because of indiscriminate violence and/or other internal problems, external factors can significantly influence the factors which generate these refugees. Thus, Loescher (ibid.) concludes, 'until the international dimensions of the causes of refugee flows are fully recognized, little headway will be made towards a resolution of the refugee problem'.

In addition to all the push factors discussed above studies have also noted the importance of pull factors that may attract additional refugees. It is assumed that quasi refugees are likely to appear
when a relatively generous refugee programme is publicized and when refugee routes overlap with increasingly restricted migration routes (Ferris, 1985: 16).

5.2 Multivariate (Multiple-cause) Approach

Various scholars and organizations have also explained refugee migration as being a result of a combination of different factors, rather than singling out one factor as a sole cause. Astrid Suhurke (1983: 164) argues that some types of conflicts - protracted warfare, international wars, and certain kinds of ethnic tensions - seem to produce major outflows; other conflicts - elite rivalry, coup d'etat, governmental suppression of conflicts - tend to produce a trickle of a few, highly politicized individuals. This means that a change in the types of conflicts produces a change in the type and number of individuals seeking refuge.

The 1979 Arusha Conference on Refugees classified the causes of refugee movements into two groups. The first set of underlying causes includes the manipulation and exploitation of political, religious, ethnic, social and economic differences. The second set of approximate causes includes the failure of political systems and institutions to solve conflicts peacefully (ECA, 1991: 9). The Economic Commission for Africa (Ibid., 1991: 8-9) has categorized the causes of refugee migration in Africa as follows: (1) the exodus of the 1960s has been traced to the colonial period which witnesses the curving out of the continent into various great power zones of influence, with boundaries drawn arbitrarily dividing ethnic and language groups; (2) the outflows of refugees beginning from the mid-1970s have been partly related to the fact that Africa's peripheral nation-states emerged from the colonial experience of balkanization with weak social, economic and political institutions; and (3) the emergence of authoritarian governments as well as fierce inter-group competition for economic and political control have also been producing an increasing number of refugees. Rogge (1988: 83-108) has also presented schematically the causes of refugees as being anti-colonial war, secession, irredentism, political persecution and repression, political factionalism, ethnic confrontation, religious intolerance, ecological disaster, economic repression and racial separation. Moreover, lack of democracy, spread of corruption, military dictatorship, ideological fanaticism, state terrorism have all been taken as standard political practices responsible for an increasing number of refugees (Sorenson, 1994: 177). Overbeek (1994: 4) has explained migration (including refugee migration) as being the outcome of historical processes of different duration. He distinguishes between structural history, conjunctural history and history of events. In these groupings, the demographic and poverty factors are to be located in the structural history with a very long duration, the world restructuring factor in the socio-economic field in the sphere of conjunctural history with a medium-length duration, and the collapse of the state in the sphere of history of events with a short duration. Thus, the present world migration and refugee crisis should be conceptualized as the composite outcome of these processes, which pertain to specific structural layers of the overall historical process (Ibid.).

In reviewing the causal circumstances which led to refugee movements over the past quarter of a century, Weiner (1996: 9) has identified four categories of causes of refugee migration: interstate

---

5 Ferris (1985: 17-18) has also argued that changes in the nature of warfare over the past 30 years have affected the nature of refugee movements. A shift towards guerrilla warfare and involvement of the peasant population has produced a much higher proportion of civilian casualties than earlier wars fought almost exclusively between professional soldiers.
wars (including anti-colonial wars), ethnic conflicts, non-ethnic conflicts, and flights from repressive authoritarian and revolutionary regimes. As Weiner (Ibid.: 11) himself admits, the category of flight as a result of famine or other natural and man-made disasters (because, in many instances, they are the consequences of conflicts among peoples, or between peoples and states), and migrants who are forced to leave the country to which they migrated are omitted from the list. It is crucial to note that this kind of categorization has major problems. For one thing, the nature of conflicts often changes. A particular conflict that started as non-ethnic conflict may change into ethnic conflict, or ethnic conflict may develop into interstate war or vice versa. An authoritarian regime may give rise to different types of conflicts or vice versa. The same may also be true with regard to revolutionary upheaval. However, Weiner's (Ibid.: 29) general conclusion is noteworthy that the increasing flow of refugees is the result of: (1) more civil conflict, including clashes between dispersed ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities, conflict between secessionist movements and the central government, and by warlord-type armed struggles; (2) rising levels of violence as arms and antipersonnel mines have become more easily accessible to all sides in a civil conflict; and (3) neighbourhood effects, with a high probability that violent conflicts within one or more neighbouring countries can spill over into other neighbouring countries. When ethnic groups are divided by international boundaries, large numbers of refugees spill across the borders, and arms move across porous international borders.

Posen (1996: 73-77) has also identified five political-military causes of mass displacement: genocide/politicide; ethnic cleansing; occupation; collateral damage (dangerous environment); and primitive military logistic. For Posen, what started as politicide often evolves into genocide. Saddam Hussein's policy with regard to the Kurdish people is one example. By collateral damage or dangerous environment he meant that people flee from areas of fighting, because the firepower employed does not easily discriminate between combatant and non-combatant. In addition, the widespread employment of land mines adds a variant to this cause. The other factor is primitive military logistics. According to Posen, Africa seems to be the common location of primitive logistic problems. Somalia is probably the textbook case, featuring the extreme of clan gunmen first despoiling countrymen, and then subsisting off the theft of international aid dispatched to ameliorate their suffering. In short, inadvertent excessive expropriation of a society may force the population to flee.

In general, one way (it is not the only way) of regrouping the various separately identified causes for refugee migration in the Horn of Africa, can be as follows:

1. Colonial legacy
   - the creation of artificial boundaries.
   - the creation of rigid ethnic identities and hierarchies.
   - the division of one ethnic group into many colonial entities and bringing together different ethnic groups under the same colonial entity.
   - the imposition of a European styled state which could not solve the problems encountered by the respective society.

*Politicide means the attempt to destroy a political idea, usually by destroying many if not all of those who hold that idea, or at least enough of them to terrorize others into abandoning it (Posen, 1996: 74)
2. Post-colonial development

2.1 Internal factors
- ethnic/regional/religious conflicts
- inappropriate socio-economic and political policies or no consistent policies.
- poverty and underdevelopment accompanied by population explosion, which is the result of both internal and external factors.
- incapacity of the state (the political system) to meet at least the basic needs of the citizens, this incapacity being related with the other factors.

2.2 External factors
- interstate conflicts and the intervention of foreign powers which aggravated the conflicts.
- restructuring of the world economy, globalization and regionalization of the world capitalist economic system, and the resulting marginalization of African countries.
- the imposition of structural adjustment programmes by IFIs and donor countries.
- the end of the cold war and the collapse of the socialist camp.

Though the partial explanations discussed above are important, one has to go deeper to be able to explain refugee migration fruitfully. One has to dig deeper to unearth the factors and the processes which are behind all the factors indicated above in the first place. Possibly one has to understand how the existing territorial state and the states-system have been constituted and reconstituted to explain the ever-increasing refugee migration. It may only be then that it would be possible to develop a more comprehensive explanation and understanding of refugee migration.

5.3 The Social Construction of the Territorial Sovereign State, the Crisis (Failure/collapse) of the Real Existing State and Refugee Migration

I have argued at the beginning of this chapter that refugee migration has been part and parcel of the social (re)construction of the territorial sovereign state system and its failure. In other words, refugee migration has been one of the unfortunate results of the state system and the failure/collapse of the real existing territorial state, on the one hand, to meet the basic needs of the society, and on the other hand, to permanently prevent human movement. Below I will attempt to further develop this basic hypothesis as a comprehensive explanation of refugee migration in the Horn of Africa, and possibly in Africa at large. However, I will first briefly discuss some of the attempts made by different scholars in similar direction.

Gordenker (1987: 62) argues that possibly the only generalization which comes close to covering every refugee incident is one that points to the actions or otherwise of the state as the most likely source of causal factor. This means, in short, that it has been the policy actions of the state which proved to be wrong or the failure of the state to take the necessary actions, which in combination resulted in the failure and in the extreme cases the collapse of the state which has been generating refugee exodus. Overbeek (1994: 19) distinguishes two important dimensions of the internal structure of the state: the dimension of homogeneity/heterogeneity and the question of internal

---

7 According to Overbeek (1994: 19) ‘a relatively homogeneous state, with few and small national minorities if any, is a state where statehood and public coherence are primarily defined by and through the nation. A
hegemony\(^8\), which are crucial in explaining refugee crisis. When we construct a matrix with these two axes, the four resulting cells contain: homogeneous hegemonic, homogeneous Hobbesian, heterogeneous hegemonic and heterogeneous Hobbesian states. In this case, the potentially weakest states which are severely affected by the transformation of the world system are the heterogeneous Hobbesian states. Therefore, it is these states which are the main sources of refugee movements. ‘In short’, as Overbeek (Ibid.: 23) argues, ‘in many cases the Hobbesian state has collapsed or been transformed into a mere instrument of violence in the hands of murderous potentates and criminal gangs which have sprung up from the seeds sown by structural adjustment and disciplinary neo-liberalism. The growing inability of the state to provide safety and subsistence for its people leads to a massive exit from the state, ... , to the disintegration of the state into its (ethnically specific) components, involved in a war of all against all for food. Large-scale refugee movements result’.

With specific reference to Africa, Mutua (1995: 38) argues that civil strife, social decay, and economic collapse pushed the continent towards the abyss. This crisis, which would be fatal and whose bitter manifestation is the plight of Africa’s refugees and displaced populations, is rooted first and foremost in the failure of the post-colonial African State. In short, he concludes that population displacements are the most immediate and visible results of the failure of the state (Ibid.: 43). Similarly, Abdullahi (1994: 562) clearly points out that the crisis in Africa is the crisis of the institutions of the state, which in turn is the product of African states’ inability to attain balance, both in terms of societal satisfaction and juridical viability; coupled with the inability of the state to distribute resources evenly between the various socio-political groups. This creates internal conflicts which in turn break up the institutions of the state. The breaking up of the institutions of the state or the failure of the state generates refugee movements. As Abdullahi (Ibid.: 564) further argues:

"Africa's refugee problem always lasts quite long because the inability that precipitate the escape of its citizens can hardly ever be solved by the state which creates them. Because the refugee problem is the result of fundamental internal contradiction within the African state, it can only be confronted and then rectified if elementary changes of the structures and institutions of the state are initiated and implemented. Unfortunately, since no African state can address these problems or has shown any interest in their long term solution, it is likely to be a future of the African continent for the foreseeable future."

Furthermore, the very legal character of the African state is in doubt, for many fail to meet minimum criteria as an effective political organization of sufficient authority to govern their territory. In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the African states are both an immediate and a future source of refugees (Ibid. 565-566). The nucleus of the problem can be traced to the inability on the part of the African state to construct an institution that not only looks viable, but that also functions and accommodates the diverging and often conflicting interests of the groups within its borders. The absence of such a state, coupled with deliberate

\(^8\) With regard to the question of hegemony versus repression, Overbeek (1994: 19-20) points out, ‘at one pole of the dimension we find the liberal Night Watch state, the type of state Locke wrote about, where civil society is relatively autonomous vis-à-vis the state and self-regulating; in such states, rule is based on hegemony, i.e. power is founded on consent. At the other pole of the axis we find the Hobbesian state, the state where civil society hardly exists, and social relations are directly dominated and regulated by the state, without the mediation of such “civil” institutions as political parties, churches, etc.’.

109
state-instigated human rights abuse against certain sections of the country's population and the
general oppression of its citizens that are the hallmark of most African states which account for
the main sources of refugees in the continent. Thus, the peculiar aspect of the refugee crisis in
Africa is that it revolves around various defects of the institutions of the state; in effect, it is the
creation of the African state (Ibid.: 566-567). Muzuri (1995) not only agrees that the refugee
crisis is the result of the crisis of the African state, he further argues that the state itself is in a
refugee-like situation when he points out:

Partly because of the end of the cold war, the African state and the political refugees its failures are
creating, share a number of characteristics. In global terms, the African states have got increasingly
marginalized, being pushed into the ghetto of the world system. Like African refugees, many
African states were already living, at least partly, on hand-outs before the 1990s. It has become
worse since then. Just as a disproportionate number of the refugees of the world are in Africa, a
disproportionate number of disabled and impoverished states are also in Africa.

Just as individual refugees are in need of human intervention and sanctuary, so the African state in
places like Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia and Angola must either be rescued by international action, or
be destroyed by the monumental bearing down upon such doomed states.

An individual refugee sometimes tries to survive by devouring the rivals on the run - refugee
'eating' refugee, the cannibalism of the dispossessed. The failed state tries to survive by devouring
its own citizens - the rage of the castrated. (Muzuri, 1995: 21-22)

Though, as is indicated above, the recent development which takes the crisis of the state as the
major cause for the exodus of refugee migration is a plausible explanation, it has its own basic
shortcomings. Firstly, as in many realist and neo-realist arguments it takes the state and the
states-system as given-for-granted. Thus, it is generally assumed that refugee events occur in
the world of states presumed to be already fully constructed. On the contrary, refugee events
have been part and parcel of the social (re)construction of the state which is never complete.
The refugee events that occurred during the creation of Pakistan, the (re)division of the Balkan
states, the creation of Somalia (colonial and post colonial) and more recently the creation of
Eritrea out of Ethiopia, the creation of many new states as the result of the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and Soviet Union are all evidence of this fact.

Furthermore, failure of the state has been taken as a phenomenon which occurred to states that
are complete. Rather, the crisis of the real existing states should be understood as an integral
part of the ongoing (re)construction of the state. It is, therefore, imperative to go further and
understand how states fail or collapse and what the contributing factors are. What this means
is that displacements, whether under the name of the refugee or the exile, have been 'a
manifestation of statecraft, that is, something that happened in the course of statecraft or was a
result of statecraft, yet something that was also useful to the task of statecraft, something that
escaped the control of statecraft but was also harnessed to the task of statecraft' (Soguk, 1999:
66). The state occupying a circumscribed space is authorized to patrol it not only with a view
to securing its external borders against enemies but also with the desire to shape its content -
its population - to serve the preference of the state. The construction of the state by public
adherence to the official ideology, religion, etc.; creating loyalty and ensuring a more
homogenous population; and national consolidation and/or integration have all been part of
the process. This desire has been the characteristic of and essential to any territorial sovereign
state. The attempt to meet this desire creates refugee events.
The fundamental point here is, as Soguk (Ibid.: 244) cleverly put it that, 'the histories of statecraft and refugeeing have been intimately bound up with each other and that the figure of the refugee has been integral to statecraft, the art of imagining and socially producing the state's territorial universal order.' Thus, in order to understand better the refugee crisis it is imperative to examine, how, historically refugeeing may have figured in the process of statecraft. To do so, one has, first, to pose the question of the state in terms of the problem of modern statecraft, a problem that goes to the heart of its practice in local and global politics. Second, it is important to acknowledge the inherent difficulty in distinguishing and categorizing complex life experience into those of the refugee and those of the citizen based on a prior presence of the context of state sovereignty as an already fixed and stable context, a finished project (Ibid.: 14-15). Rather, the state should be seen as it has been in never-ending process of social construction and reconstruction and refugee migration as one of its results.

Most of the explanation discussed above failed to answer the following fundamental questions, which are crucial for understanding refugee migration in post-colonial Africa: how was the pre-colonial political system constituted and how was it reconstituted during colonialism? How did the post-colonial state come into being, how was it constituted and/or reconstituted? How were the boundaries of the colonial and post-colonial states constituted? How were the different and competing identities constituted and reconstituted during colonialism and after? How did the post-colonial states attain their sovereignty, or to use Jackson's term their 'negative sovereignty', and at what expense? What has been the impact of negative sovereignty in the production of refugees in Africa? Thus, in order to make the argument that the social (re)construction of the territorial sovereign state and the crisis of the real existing states are the major factors behind refugee migration more plausible, these questions should be answered (this will be the focus of the remaining chapters).

Therefore, the fundamental thesis of this research is: Refugeeism (refugee migration) is the result of, on the one hand, the social (re)construction of the state as a territorial sovereign entity, which involves the creation of bounded communities with rigid boundaries, the construction and reconstruction of competing identities, the conflict of interests within these bounded communities and states, and the violence involved in achieving all of these. On the other hand, refugeeism is also the result of the construction and reconstruction of the international states-system with all its injustice, inequalities, exploitation and uneven development. The restructuring of the world economy and its globalization, in which Africa is further marginalized, has also significantly contributed to the crisis in the continent and the resulting refugee migration. These internal and international factors are dialectically related in intensifying Africa's crisis and producing refugees.

This formulation will help to answer the questions raised above and then strengthen the argument that in the Horn of Africa the refugee problem is a constant one because the countries in the region epitomize the classic failure of the (re)construction of the territorial state in Africa. It is the failure and in extreme cases the collapse of the real existing states that has been providing the raw material for making this regional tragedy. It is the territorial state that establishes a solid substructure for the problem. It is the action of the state or the failure to take necessary action that forced citizens to respond militarily and this creates all sorts of conflicts, which have been and will be responsible for the exodus of refugee migration. Some of the factors, which contributed to the failure of the state, are deeply rooted in history both pre- and post-colonial,

---

9 For Jackson's distinction of between positive and negative sovereignty refer back to chapter one.
while some are more recent. Other factors are internal to individual countries. Still other factors are interstate (regional) and global in nature. In the light of these general assumptions, as can be seen in the model, it is crucial to identify the major factors involved in the social (re)construction of the territorial sovereign state, which at the same time contribute to the failure/collapse of the real existing states and the production of refugee migration. First, the pre-colonial political and socio-economic underdevelopment of the countries. The focus here is the major discourses and practices that shaped the pre-colonial development of the continent and the resulting socio-political and economic structures. It is also assumed that even though colonialism interrupted and distorted the gradual development of the countries, there is a continuation between the pre- and post-colonial development.

Second, the dominant colonial discourses and practices which were behind colonial expansion in Africa and hence the political and socio-economic impacts of colonialism. Mainly, the (re)constitution of the existing pre-colonial political structures and the introduction of rigid artificial boundaries, the hierarchical and centralized nature of the colonial state and its continuation in the post-colonial period, the creation of rigid ethnic identities and hierarchies, the unbalanced and uneven development in each colonial state, the integration of the continent into the international capitalist economic system, and the distortion of the social fabric of the society.

Third, the dominant ideologies and mainstream development theories that shaped (dominated) the socio-economic and political development of Africa, especially in the post-1945 era. The crucial point here is that the imposition of the European ideologies (both Eastern and Western), mainstream development theories and the European modelled territorial state, which are not relevant, on Africa has been the major factor behind the failure (re)constituting a strong and viable national-state, national identity and national economy. In other words, the imposition from outside prevented the development of an alternative which could have helped to solve the problems and meet the demands of the African society. In addition, there are other related factors which played a significant role in the ever worsening African crisis: (a) the failure of the developmental state; (b) the monopoly of political and economic power by a particular group/s and the exclusion of others which resulted in massive discontent and subsequent rebellion by the disadvantaged groups. In other words, the continuation of ethnic, religious and regional hierarchies; (c) the struggle for wider autonomy by the various groups and the resulting failure of the centralized state to accommodate the various interests; (d) the intervention of the military and the establishment brutal military administration; (e) economic underdevelopment and poverty, resulting partly from and exacerbated by the political crisis and partly
FAILURE\COLLAPSE OF THE STATE AND REFUGEE MIGRATION MODEL

PRE-COLONIAL HUMAN MOVEMENT

Pre-colonial Development and State Formation

Colonial State Formation and its Legacy
- Constitution of colonial state pattern of decolonization
- Colonial legacy

Post-Colonial State Formation and its Development
- (re)constitution of post-colonial state
- Political performance
- Economic performance
- Social performance
- The role of the military

External Intervention
- Relation between neighboring states
- Superpower Intervention
- Globalization

Domestic Socio-Political and Economic Development (Underdevelopment)

Socio-Political and Economic Underdevelopment and Political Instability

Failure/Collapse of the state

The (re) Constitution of the State and its Crisis

Human Displacement
- Internal Displacement
- External Displacement

Refugees
resulting from the unbalanced international trade and marginalization of the individual states and the Africa continent at large; (f) conflicts resulting from pre-colonial development, colonial interruption, post colonial political and economic crises; (g) interstate conflicts which resulted from colonial artificial boundaries and the post colonial process of 'competitive state formation' to use Zolberg's (1986: 158) term. Last but not least, external intervention, mainly superpower rivalry, in support of one or the other party in both domestic and interstate conflicts which increased the level, intensity and probably the duration of the conflicts. It should be noted that all these factors have to be considered as cause and effect of the ongoing social (re)construction of the territorial sovereign state.

Fourth, in addition to the impact of the slave trade and colonialism, globalization and the restructuring of the world economy worsened the situation in Africa. The domination of the world economy by transnational corporations (TNCs) and the creation of regional trading blocs in which Africa is excluded and marginalized more than ever before. This is mainly because of the unevenness of the process of globalization and regionalization. The unevenness of globalization entails, integration in OECD countries and increasing marginalization in many Third and Fourth World countries. This process of globalization created the hierarchization of the world economically, politically and culturally, and the crystallization of domination by the developed world. As a result the states in Africa are weaker than never before. Moreover, the implementation of structural adjustment programs resulted in creating more poverty and political instability. The combined effect of all this has been the further weakening of the African states both politically and economically. The final outcome is the failure/collapse of the real existing state and more outflows of refugees. Some of these complex and interrelated factors will be the focus of the coming chapters.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\) Only the factors which I believe are crucial will be considered for lack of time and space.