The state, the crisis of state institutions and refugee migration in the Horn of Africa: the cases of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia
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9. POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT

Three decades of dictatorship, phoniness and misunderstood political ideologies have left a legacy of fear, poverty, refugees, outright thuggery and theft. ... The systems which have been in place for the last three decades in Africa have produced the likes of Amin, Bokassa,Nguema and the remaining political sphinx which strangle the continent and its people. ... Since assuming political power in their countries, these leaders have held their citizens hostage, have run national economies like private chicken-runs and created a national mentality of siege and a state of hopelessness. (George Sono, quoted in Ayittey, 1992: 1).

... industrial nations of North America and Europe were supposed to be the indubitable models for the societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the so-called Third World, and that these societies must catch up with the industrialized countries, perhaps even become like them. (Escobar, 1995: VII).

In the last three or more decades we have witnessed serious political crises in almost all African countries. Some of these crises resulted in the complete collapse of the state (Somalia and Liberia), the creation of an independent state (Ethiopia and Eritrea), and the continued civil war (Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Burundi, Rwanda, the Great Lake countries and many others). The economic and social crises have also been far more serious. These crises have been producing huge refugee migration. The difficult question to be raised here is: what are the factors that contributed to the socio-political crisis, economic collapse and the huge refugee migration? As indicated in chapters 6 and discussed in detail in chapters 7 and 8, both the pre-colonial and colonial developments of Africa are contributing factors to the failure-collapse of contemporary African states. However, this can not explain everything that went wrong in post-colonial Africa. The major explanation lies within the post-colonial socio-political and economic development (underdevelopment) of the continent, influenced by both domestic and external factors. What are these domestic and external factors? How have these factors interacted and produced the most disturbing results: political chaos, social crisis, economic collapse and massive refugee flows? This chapter will attempt to provide some answers to these questions.

Decolonization created an opportunity in which it would have been possible to (re)construct new post-colonial political communities, to create national identities, and establish a new order of political accountability, political legitimacy and political representation. It also created an opportunity to embark on the development of more indigenous political and economic structures. However, this opportunity was missed. This may be, perhaps, because the African leaders had a strong interest in maintaining the national-states they inherited from the Europeans because there was no guarantee, if they began to experiment with different types of political organization, that they would continue to be in power (Herbst, 1996: 121). It may also be because decolonization happened so quickly (in some cases) and African leaders were so intent on seizing power that there was neither the time nor the motivation to develop new concepts of national political organization (Ibid.: 122-123). More importantly, it may be because the imagination and the conception of the leaders of the anti-colonial struggle and later on that of the state elites were shaped by the dominant discourse of territorial sovereign state, ideologies of both West and East, and mainstream development theories. Thus, they failed to develop an indigenous alternative to the European styled state and economic development. One can strongly argue, therefore, that the crisis that Africa has been suffering from partially emanates from missing the opportunity of creating a political and socio-economic system which would have been relevant to Africa and to individual states.
Thus, the failure/collapse of the state in Africa may be better explained as the problem of the ideological commitment of the political leaders to both East and/or West, and the failure of state and development theories, which resulted in poor political, economic and social performance. In addition, external factors: intervention of both superpowers and others, globalization and regionalization, marginalization of the continent, which is the result of the restructuring of the world economy, have also played a significant role. I will try to briefly discuss some of these factors below with a special reference to the three Horn of Africa countries.

9.1 Ideology and Development Theories: General Overview

Somalia and Sudan inherited, from their colonial masters, a Western styled political system (some sort of multiparty system). In Somalia, this system existed for only few years until one party military dictatorship, in the name of socialism, replaced it. In Sudan, a Westminster-styled multiparty system existed longer than in Somalia. However, it was interrupted by repeated military and civilian dictatorial regimes in the name of socialism, multiparty system and lately in the name of religious (Islam) dominance. Ethiopia had been under a no-party absolute monarchical system up until a military dictatorship in the name of socialism replaced it in 1974. The non-socialist system in all these countries failed to meet the expectations of their respective citizens. As a result, socialism was taken as a better alternative. Thus, the three Horn of Africa countries adopted socialism (Marxism-Leninism or otherwise) at one time or another. However, the so-called socialist (mainly military) governments created more problems than they solved. These governments finally destroyed themselves and their countries.

Nationalism as an ideology by itself and together with liberalism and/or socialism also played a significant role. Nationalism was relatively successful in the struggle for independence. However, it failed to create the new system needed by the society. The failure of nationalism and the nation-building project to solve ethnic/tribal, regional and religious problems gave rise to politicized ethnicity. The emergence of politicized ethnicity contributed to the failure of the state.

After socialism, as an ideology and, as a socio-political and economic system, was discarded in all three countries they adopted liberalism of some sort and attempted to follow the principle of mixed economy where public and private enterprises would be allowed to play their role in the national economies. However, the ideological shift did not bring any meaningful result. Rather the situation went from bad to worse. Somalia completely collapsed as a state, Sudan fell under a strong religious (Islamic) regime, and Ethiopia was divided into two sovereign states, introduced ethnic federalism, ‘multiparty politics’ and a liberal economy. Currently, thus, Somalia went into deeper chaos without a central government and national economy. Sudan remains embroiled in an ever-worsening civil war, international isolation and finds itself in deep economic crisis. Ethiopia is moving into the unknown with no precedent.

These countries, as the rest of the Third World, have tried to follow different aspects of Western and Eastern ideologies, economic development models in their attempts to create a ‘modern’ society. The result has been disappointing, to say the least. The kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians, as Escobar (1995: 4) put it, produced its opposites, massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression. The question here should be how and why the different ideologies and development theories failed
to bring positive results in Africa? I will briefly discuss some of the general critical responses below.

9.1.1 Ideology

Ideology is an important component of any political process. Ideology, on the one hand, influences policy-making processes. It is a kind of lens through which policy makers perceive their various environments and react accordingly. Ideology can also play a major role in political action and it can be used as an agent of mobilization and social change (Mittelman, 1975: 20-21). Whether explicit or implicit, ideology both identifies and legitimates the principles and purposes around which policies are determined. It also sets the parameters of choice in terms of which salient constraints are recognized and dealt with (Rothchild and Foley, 1988: 281). On the other hand, ideology is a distorted or false consciousness, which disguised people’s real relationship to their world (Loomba, 1998: 25; Rejai, 1995: 4; Hawkes, 1996: 4). Thus, it can be used to legitimate domination and oppression. Ideology also plays a crucial role in creating consent, it is the medium through which certain ideas are transmitted and more importantly, held to be true (Loomba, 1998: 29). This means that ideology can perform multiple functions.  

Ideology, as indicated above, influences policy-making processes and decisions. However, it does not mean that ideology is always a sure guide to unravelling decision-making procedures and decisions already made. Rather it can give an important clue to what is going on and what is going to happen. It provides crucial clues to the motives, desires, and underlying principles of various regimes. With this in mind let us briefly consider the role ideology played in the Horn of Africa. It should be clear from the outset that different political leaders adopted different ideologies. Among these the most noticeable are nationalism, socialism including Marxism-Leninism, pragmatism (the pursuit of a market economy and a capitalist policy), and religious fundamentalism (Sudan is an example). The emphasis in the discussion below will mainly be on nationalism and ethnicity, socialism and religious fundamentalism.

9.1.1.1 Nationalism and Ethnicity

Nationalism can be an ideology in its own right or it can be a component of other ideologies (Rejai, 1995: 23, Markakis, 1999: 71). However, of all ideologies nationalism seems to have been one of the most successful, if the criteria of success are the capacity to mobilize people (Schwarzmantel, 1998: 131). Nationalism expressed as the anti-colonial movement in Africa is evidence for its success in mobilizing the African society towards independence. Earlier African nationalist thought was expressed within the framework of pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanists denounced the artificiality and illegitimacy of the territorial partition of the colonial domain. The major objective was to establish some sort of united independent Africa. However, later on the emphasis shifted from Pan-Africanism to the nationalism based on the territorial frame of the colonial partition (Young, 1994: 68). The goal of territorial nationalism was to create independent national states based on the territorial entities created by colo-

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1 For instance, Rejai (1995: 17-18) identified the following to be some of the major functions of ideology. First, an ideology provides a perspective on social and political reality and calls upon the believer to behave in a way that is consistent with that perspective. Second, it provides the individual with a sense of identity and belonging. Third, ideology serves to achieve social solidarity and cohesion. It binds a group together and gives it a sense of unity. It also rationalizes and justifies group goals, values, and objectives. Fourth, it provides hopes and promises. Fifth, ideology serves to support and maintain a political regime or to challenge and destroy it. Sixth, it serves as instrument for the manipulation and control of the people.
nial powers (Markakis, 1999: 66). In other words, African nationalists wanted to take over intact the colonial apparatus of power and order, and see it to work for the "nation-to-be" (Smith, 1983: 53). Here lies one of the root causes of African problems.

African territorial nationalism has two aspects. The first was the desire to seek independence from colonial rule, which was more or less realized with the creation of independent countries. Thus, anti-colonial nationalism was to a certain extent effective in mobilizing the population, at least part of the population, against foreign rule. It helped to create a wider movement for independence by bringing together different political, ethnic, and linguistic groups (Rejai, 1995: 48). The second aspect, the most demanding one, was the aim to reconstitute a new political community, national identity, political structure and viable economy, which many African countries failed to materialize. At least two basic problems can be identified. First, the objectives of African nationalism were limited. Far from dismantling the colonially created state, nationalists aimed to safeguard it. In other words, nationalists were not essentially the suppliants but the successors to the colonial regime (Markakis, 1999: 68). This explains, as Markakis (ibid.) asserts, 'the preservation of the economic edifice created by colonialism, as well as the endurance of the state structures that it founded. Adherence to the colonial blueprint meant that material and social disparities between regions, ethnic groups, and social classes, which had appeared during the colonial period, subsequently widened and became sources of political conflict that undermined all nationalist regimes in the Horn of Africa, caused the collapse of the state in Somalia, dismembered Ethiopia, and now threaten the existence of Sudan and Djibouti.'

The other basic problem of post-colonial nationalism in Africa, which has also been partially responsible for the first problem, has been its domination by the modernization discourse. It is believed that, as Schwarzmantel (1998: 137) points out: 'the creation of nation-states, internally unified in economic terms and culturally homogenous, was a necessary precondition of modernity and its continued development.' One of the implications here is that ethnicity - or tribalism as it used to be called - has been taken as a parochial remnant of a 'traditional' past that was fated to be transformed or overcome by modernization, nationalism, and nation-building (Atkinson, 1999: 18). Two fundamental points should be considered here. First, the categorization of society into traditional (African) and modern (Western), in which the traditional should be replaced with modern society through state/nation-building process, is basically flawed. It is flawed because it took societal development as a linear and evolutionary process, in which all traditional societies would follow the Western path towards establishing modern society. It is also flawed because it failed to take into account the unique socio-political and economic experience of the African society. Second, ethnicity (tribalism) is seen as an obstacle for the creation of modern society, therefore should be transcended through nationalism and the creation of nation-states. This was clearly reflected by Sekou Toure in 1959 when he said, 'in three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its

1 See Smith (1983: 49-51), on the territorial nature of African nationalism and the reasons behind it.
2 It should be noted that not all Africans joined the nationalist current. There were regions, ethnic groups, and social classes which were little involved or not at all. This is true of Southern Sudan, Northern Somalia, Northern Kenya, most of the lowlands in the Horn where pastoralists and agro-pastoralists live, all these regions have been subject to perennial conflict during the post-colonial era (Markakis, 1999: 67).
people" (Quoted in Young, 1994: 73). Samora Machel also bluntly put it, 'for the nation to live, the tribe must die' (Quoted in Berman, 1998: 306).

This dominant Western nationalist ideology may have worked in the West. This does not mean, however, it will work in Africa where the society had a very different historical experience. What happened during the last four decades, the (re)emergence of ethnicity and the intensification of ethnic conflicts, is clear evidence that the European (modernist) nationalist ideology did not work at all in Africa. Rather, the attempt to copy the European nationalist ideology changed the idea of nationalism from an 'icon of liberation to captive doctrine of an African national-state which has become a lifeless shell of bureaucratic or personal tyranny, corruption and defeat' (Young, 1994: 68). As Davidson (cited in Young, 1994: 68) correctly observes, 'this nationalism, alienated from its people's history in order to adopt another history, a European history, emerged as the opposite of its legitimating self.'

Taking into account the fact that many of the colonial territories, which later became independent states, are multietnic, multilingual and multicultural, it is difficult, if not impossible, to create an economically unified and culturally homogenous national-state. Furthermore, the rigid ethnic identities⁴ and ethnic hierarchies within each colonial territory that were created by the colonial rulers made the process of state-building extremely difficult. The creation of a national-state and the mobilization of people through nationalism involved an appeal to myths, the invocation of history and tradition. In this process, it was often the state (and the state elite) that created nationalism, created 'nations by design'. 'The state and its agents instilled a mood of nationalism, a sense of national identity, as a means of solidifying the legitimacy of state' (Schwarzmantel, 1998: 138). In order to do so nationalist movements have to emphasize the weight of the past, the glorious traditions of the society and its history. Nationalists have to invent such traditions when they cannot be found. The question here is which history and tradition. In a country where different ethnic, religious and regional groups have their own history, tradition and culture it is difficult to answer this question. The emphasis placed on the history, tradition and culture of a specific group's by the state elites creates suspicion and a feeling of alienation in the mind of other groups. It threatens their identity. They will feel that their culture, tradition and language are being suppressed. If they can not see themselves as being part of the imagined national political and cultural community, they will resist it. Moreover, if they feel that they are excluded from the national power structure and denied their fair share in the national distribution of resources, they will try to change it either by controlling the state or by destroying it (see, Markakis, 1999: 65, for similar argument). In other words, if the established state fails to accommodate the demands of these dissatisfied groups, it will lose its relevance and legitimacy in the eyes and minds of these groups. Then comes ethnic nationalism. That is what has been happening in most, if not all, African countries in which ethnic conflict has been a major problem.⁵

When does ethnicity, especially politicized ethnicity, (re)emerge? As Yeros (1999: 11) asserts 'symbolic, economic, and political investment in an imagined community occurs when this community offers in return something valuable, meaningful, and useful within the context of experience. In this light, the ethnification of societies occurs when the nation-state fails to re-

⁴ This was based on the belief by the colonial officials that 'every African belonged to a tribe, just as every European belonged to a nation' (Berman, 1998: 320). In the process of the creation of rigid ethnic/tribal identities 'through the application of such instruments of state as consensus and maps, and even the establishment of colonial museums, all communities, persons, lands and even physical artefacts were assigned a unique tribal identity and physical location' (Ibid.: 321).

⁵ See, the coming sub-topic 'Political development in the Horn of Africa', for what happened in Sudan and Ethiopia.
tain its relevance and legitimacy as an imagined community which delivers these goods and when people activate other sub-state communities to provide for themselves. In other words, the (re)emergence of sub-national identities, be they ethnic, religious, or regional, indicates that structures on a high level scale are weakening or breaking down (Eriksen, 1999: 57). Further more, as Berman (1998: 336-337) argues, economic decline, draconian reforms, the deterioration of already relatively weak states and the delay of distributable resources exacerbate reliance on patron/client relations and intensify the inter-ethnic political conflict or political tribalism. In circumstances of economic and political instability kinship and ethnicity provide networks of mutual support and trust. This means that people became loyal to ethnic or other sub-national imagined communities not only because they were born into them, but also because they assume or they were made to assume (or even believe) that such loyalty promises to offer something deemed meaningful, valuable, or useful, which the national-state failed to deliver. In short, when state institutions cease to deliver, kinship and, by extension, ethnicity is often the only alternative (Eriksen, 1999: 58). It is in this context that we must understand the emergence of, sometimes militant, African ethnicities as mass movements. Thus it can be argued that ethnic/tribal/religious identities are essentially products of specific situations, socially defined and historically determined (Atkinson, 1999: 34). In addition, ethnic identities are subject to change, and so are their functions (Markakis, 1999: 73). Such an understanding will direct our attention to the historical, social, and political processes through which images for identification are constructed and sustained, contested and negotiated (Norval, 1999: 86).

The construction of ethnic identity requires the existence of ‘other’ and the distinction thereby of insiders and outsiders. The construction of ethnic identity, as Berman (1998: 328) explains:

is a process of boundary setting, of making distinctions, involving a dialogue between insiders and outsiders, in which the characteristics of different groups are both ascribed and chosen, instrumentally manipulated and socially shaped. The boundaries between groups are contested and negotiated, always retaining a degree of ambiguity, varying situationally and changing over time as individuals and groups move back and forth across them. The differentiation between ethnic groups has no necessary connection with language, culture or political organization; cultural differences, in particular, may not be the decisive factor and groups may simultaneously become more similar in culture and more concerned with demarcating their distinctiveness.

Moreover, the demarcation of ethnic differences, in which differences are exaggerated and similarities are ignored, takes on political importance in legitimating claims to rights and resources, and in providing individuals with both meaning and organized channels for pursuing culturally-defined interests. Ethnic identities in such a context can be consciously manipulated and invested in economic and political competition. Thus, ethnicity, one can soundly argue, has the same relation with the state as nationalism. Its major objectives include obtaining and using state power in order to gain access to resources commanded by the state (Markakis, 1999: 72). Ethnicity, therefore, has proved to be an effective means of political mobilisation for those who seek access to state power in order to change the existing pattern of resource distribution. Exclusion from power and relative resources deprivation serves to heighten the cultural identity and solidarity of subordinate groups.

Another important point to be noted here is that ethnicity as ‘imagined community does not have an existence unless it is being imagined actively by its members’ (Eriksen, 1999: 48). In this process, the role of ethnic entrepreneurs who are keen to make political capital out of

See also Eriksen, 1999: 56-57, for similar argument.
ethnicity is significant. Ethnic movements, like nationalist ones, are organised, led, and ideologically inspired by intellectuals and petty bourgeois elements.7

9.1.1.2 Socialism8

Socialism, most of the time mixed with nationalism, had been an important ideology in many parts of post-colonial Africa. Different versions of socialist ideology had been adopted by post-colonial leaders.9 Military juntas led many of these socialist regimes with the assistance of the USSR and other socialist countries. This implies that African military Marxist states were not the logical outcome of the radicalization of urban elements that set the stage for political take-over by the military. This does not mean, however, that the dissatisfaction of the respective societies with the existing regimes and the demands for some type of change did not contribute to the political take over. They did. The regimes, which were replaced by military Marxists, failed to live up to the expectations of their respective societies. The population lost confidence in those regimes and demanded a change for the better. Thus, what is meant here is that in many cases the ultimate declaration in favour of socialism was made without the semblance of an existing cohesive revolutionary movement, and without the assistance of or pressure from a viable Marxist party. Moreover, where such nuclei did exist they were denied a significant role in the new order established under the military. Thus, the coup that overthrew the preceding civilian or military administration did not immediately usher in the African Marxist state, since the original inspiration and motivations were not Marxist or even socialist (Decalo, 1985: 124-125).10

African socialist regimes (Marxist-Leninists or otherwise), although encompassing divergent strands, had some things in common.11 First, the central themes commonly stressed by these regimes revolve around the issue of centralization of power, anti-colonialism and cultural nationalism.12 In general, considerably more attention had been paid to the centralization of power. Within the new centralized hierarchy supremacy was given to vanguard Leninist party militants, in which the military was but one corporate component, albeit the central one (Ibid.: 132; Keller, 1987: 12). In theory, the political parties are organizational weapons manned by a revolutionary vanguard of the ideological select, reflecting the will of the workers and the peasants and dominating the state decision-making structure (Young, 1982: 27; Keller, 1987:

7 For instance, a survey carried out by Markakis (1999: 75-76) in Ethiopia showed that the leading figures in all ethnic organisations were schoolteachers, civil servants, and traders.
8 The focus here is not the theoretical debate on whether socialism was possible in Africa or not. Rather it is only to show the effect of socialism as an ideology on the socio-political and economic development of the Horn of Africa countries. It is to show what was done in the name of socialism and with what results.
10 For instance, according to Decalo (1985: 125): the Marxist or radical path was immediately opted for after the overthrow of the civilian elites in Ethiopia, or Somalia, and member of the military juntas that supplanted them were not known to be particularly radical or ideologically-inclined. In Ethiopia the overthrow of the emperor was a revolutionary act, of course; but the radical land reforms and socialization of agriculture preceded by a full year the adoption of Marxism as the guiding light. Indeed, the Dergue originally had neither ideology nor any specific programmes in mind, and it was nearly three years before Marxism was discovered to be the appropriate path of development for Ethiopia. In each instance a consolidation phase followed, during which the precise direction of the revolution was hammered out in either a peaceful (Benin, Somalia) or turbulent (Ethiopia, Madagascar) tug-of-war with other social strata and factions.
11 Keller (1987: 11) also identified five common features of Afro-Marxist regimes: (1) Ideology was given priority; (2) the vanguard party was given a key role in providing political direction in society at large; (3) heavy emphasis on the construction of authoritative state apparatus; (4) state control of the economy; and (5) commitment to a centrally planned economy.
12 For instance, the major slogans of the Ethiopian revolution were anti-imperialism, anti-bureaucratic capitalism and anti-feudalism. 'Ethiopian Tikdem' which means 'Ethiopia first' was another important nationalist slogan of the revolution.
However, in reality, no military junta has been willing truly to give up its power and privileges and to share power with civilian formations, even those directly beholden to it, notwithstanding rhetoric to the contrary. The monopoly of power by the military had been the major source of the civil-military friction. This tug-of-war between the military and the civil society in countries such as Ethiopia, Madagascar and Burkina Faso can be good examples.

Second, though military leaders claimed to follow Marxism (very loosely or selectively interpreted) and established official populist regimes, in reality they established an authoritarian system of varying degrees of social oppression. To maintain their rule they forged uneasy and unstable links with like-minded urban social-class cohorts and elements of the intelligentsia, while discrediting and supplanting many of the political elite and formally eradicating traditional authority and hierarchy (Decalo, 1985: 123). They showed no intention of either vacating office, or liberalizing the political process by allowing for the introduction of competitive politics. This was exactly what happened in Ethiopia and Somalia, and more or less in Sudan. Socialist military leaders in these three countries controlled political power without sharing with any political group until they were kicked out of power.

Third, Marxism was fused with nationalism in an attempt to produce a political consensus in support of the state whose preservation is the principal goal of these regimes. To this end they used conventional means, such as the promotion of state nationalism, the expansion of the state apparatus, particularly the military and security branches, and the forced suppression of opposition (The Journal of Communist Studies Editorial, 1985: 3). Cultural nationalism, influenced by modernization discourse of cleansing the countryside of all social, economic and cultural fetters had also been employed. Somalia, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia and Madagascar are good examples (Decalo, 1985: 133).

Fourth, the state control of the 'commanding height' of the economy, and the creation of a 'socialist sector' designed to serve as a motor for state direction of the economy was another common feature (Young, 1982: 29; see also Decalo, 1985: 132-133). However, comprehensive central planning on the Soviet model was completely beyond the capacity of the Afro-Marxist states, even though there were good intentions. In Ethiopia, a central organ was established to carry out the country's central plan but its success was minimal. Moreover, with the exception of Ethiopia and Mozambique, Afro-Marxist states were reluctant to promote socialist agriculture.

In short, African socialists proclaimed a commitment to the creation of an egalitarian, just, and self-sufficient polity. The mechanism for the attainment of these goals was the state, which would furnish the pivot of critical identities and organize the economy. In the words, as Siad Barre of Somalia put it 'socialism for us is simply defined: it is a system in which the state takes primary responsibility for the political, social and economic development of the nation' (Cited in The Journal of Communist Studies Editorial, 1985: 4). This is the extreme end of the process of centralization which seems to be the aspect of socialism that soldier rulers find most attractive (Ibid.). The special attractiveness of the Soviet model is that it allows the ruling elite to define the normative order, and it approves the domination of the ruling oligarchy (Keller, 1987: 10). Thus, political centralization and mobilization were perceived as vehicles of real transformation (Chazan, et. al., 1988: 149). It was believed that political leaders and party activists were best positioned to interpret the general will and hence to define the interests of the collectives. The leaders provided the rationalization for the imposition of political uniformity under the guise of forwarding national unity. It can be argued that even
when this stance was adopted with the best intentions, it furnished a justification for authoritarian rule.

Another important point to be noted is that in many cases socialist military regimes came to power in a situation of acute structural crisis of the state. The invocation of socialism in this context served the primary need of saving the state. Socialism, it was believed, cut across ethnic and regional divisions in order to weld classes into a new political consensus underpinning the state. It was also assumed that turning the focus on class contradictions not only reduces the significance but ultimately denies the significance of ethnic and regional conflicts. Such conflicts are presumed to fade away naturally in a classless socialist society (The Journal of Communist studies Editorial Editorial, 1985: 4). This was what was believed in Ethiopia under the leadership of the military government and later the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Class contradictions were believed to be the basic contradiction, and ethnic, regional and religious conflicts were secondary. Accordingly, it was assumed that if building socialism solves the basic contradiction, secondary contradictions would also be solved. However, it was not the class contradiction that brought about the collapse of the government but ethnic and regional conflicts. The same applies in the case of Somalia and Sudan. It was the tribal conflicts that brought about the collapse of the state in Somalia. It is religious/ethnic/regional conflict that brought Sudan to the verge of collapse.

The same rationale was used to deny the legitimacy of the opposition political organizations (political parties) which undermined the civil society. In theory, a socialist system has no need for autonomous organizations that defend class and corporate interests. This assumption provides the justification for dismantling political parties, trade unions, professional and other mass organizations. This was exactly what happened in Ethiopia, and more or less in Sudan and Somalia. Members of opposition political and mass organizations were executed and imprisoned by the thousands. Those who could escape, especially university and secondary school teachers, and other intellectuals, fled the country to North America and Western Europe. As a result, these countries lost most of their intellectuals. This was the beginning of the production of Ethiopian refugees, in huge numbers that has continued until now.

The socialist military regime’s concern with the preservation and strengthening of the centralized state had prevented them from accommodating ethnic/tribal and regional demands for autonomy (Rothchild and Foley, 1987: 306 and 313). This was the case in the three Horn of Africa countries. In Ethiopia, for instance, the rejection of the demands of ethnic and regional groups and the attempt to solve the problem by force resulted in prolonged civil war (the civil war in northern Ethiopia is an excellent example). The use of force against every opposition movement alienated the government from the society. The more the government was alienated from the society the more the need to use force to stay in power. The anti-government forces, especially the Eritrean and Tigrayan guerrilla groups, capitalizing on the alienation of the government gained additional support for their struggle. The final result was the collapse of the government in 1991.

In general, socialism as an ideology has played an important role in consolidating Afro-Marxist regimes and legitimizing the power of a particular group. It was used to control the economy and establish one-party dictatorship. In addition, to gain support for their (the political leaders) claim to power they heightened expectations among the citizenry about the good life that would follow the establishment of socialism. However, with foreign exchange sources drying up, spare parts unavailable, skilled personnel emigrating, transportation in
short supply, production declining, political chaos worsening, etc., the Afro-Marxist leaders inevitably found it most difficult to deliver on their promises of redistribution and general upgrading of the quality of life. The cumulative consequence had been public disappointment and cynicism, a headlong retreat from the state and its formal economy, and a forced ideological shift and policy adjustment on the part of the state administrators. The final result, as witnessed in all three Horn of Africa countries, was more political chaos, more poverty, and the disintegration of the social fabric of the societies. This proved that the military socialist regimes were far worse than the regimes they replaced. For instance, the military socialist regimes produced far more refugees than their predecessors did. In addition, there is a wider implication that should be well noted. The collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and Africa and the shift towards liberalism had a very serious long-term impact in the minds of the people. It strengthened the domination of liberalism and may wrongly create an impression that there is no alternative to liberalism and Westernization.

The other ideology adopted by the three Horn of Africa countries and many others in the continent is liberalism/neo-liberalism. Political leaders, who adopted this ideology, set economic growth and prosperity squarely at the centre of the preferred order. Their focus was on the emulation of the Western model of development, and on the nurturing of private initiative in the capitalist mode. Accordingly, the state was endowed with the task of facilitating entrepreneurship, attracting foreign investments, and establishing a climate conducive to material advancement. This meant that even in the pragmatic approach statism was advanced, among other things, for the preservation of elite privilege. As Chazan (1988: 152) points out, centralization was as deeply ensconced in the political attitude of pragmatists as in those of self-proclaimed socialists.

As Young (1982: 185) identified there are a number of major characteristics of the African capitalist states. First, the market has not been left unregulated. State intervention has been strong. However, a significant place has been reserved for private markets, and a positive valuation of their developmental role persists. Second, capital is taken as the crucial factor of production, and important spheres are reserved for the private sector. In fact, the state sector is invariably quite large, but no intrinsic merit is believed to inhere in public enterprise. Third, it seems that an open economy has been accepted; however, it does not mean unrestricted movement of foreign capital, but it does postulate trade relationship as beneficial. An economic relationship with industrial countries is believed to be beneficial for development. Fourth, while nearly all African capitalist states are at least nominally non-aligned, in the economic sphere relationships with the West have been viewed as perfectly natural (liberalism/neo-liberalism will be discussed more critically below under development theory).

Religious, primarily Islamic, thought patterns were also introduced into the realm of official political discourse. Reference to the Koran as justification for policy have been cited repeatedly in Sudan, Senegal, Somalia, Mauritania, and Libya, even in Cameroon and Gabon (Chazan, et. al., 1988: 155). Nigeria is another recent case. The introduction of religious ideology into the politics of the Sudan will be discussed later.

From what we have seen in the last four or so decades, the ideological shift from liberalism to socialism and back to liberalism and the introduction of religion into politics did not solve any of the problems the countries encountered. In some case, as will be discussed in the section on individual countries below, the problems even worsened.
9.1.2 Development Theory

Development theories, as indicated above, contributed to the overall African crisis. In other words, the African crisis has partially been the crisis of development theories and the developmental state in Africa. For many years industrial countries of North America and Europe were supposed to be models for the societies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and, these societies had to catch up with, perhaps even become like them (Escobar, 1995a: VII; Hettne, 1995: 49-50). In reality, however, as Sardar (1999: 46) argued, even if Westernization (modernization) is accepted as the only way forward developing societies are caught in a time warp where they can never really 'catch up' with the West. The present of the developing societies is the past and their future is the present of the West. This entails that when the non-West reaches the point of arrival where it becomes 'developed', it has already become the past of the West. ‘The mechanics of development are thus the ideal instrument for the Eurocentric colonization of time. With a single definitional category, the West can, and indeed has, written off the past, present and future of the non-West’ (Ibid.).

How did the domination of the mainstream development paradigm all begin? Harry Truman, in his inaugural address as President of the United States on 20 January 1949, announced his concept of a ‘fair deal’. An essential component of his concept was his appeal to the US and the world to solve the problem of the underdeveloped areas of the globe. What this means is that to replicate the world over the features that characterized Western societies is the only way that the American dream of peace and abundance be extended to all the peoples of the planet. In other words, there was growing interest and determination to transform drastically two-thirds of the world into replica of the West. It was assumed that such transformation would bring about material prosperity and economic progress. This has been not only an integral part of but also dominant (hegemonic) in the socioeconomic, cultural and political discourse of the post-World War period.

This dream, as we have seen in the post-colonial record of the Third World and especially Africa, turned into a nightmare. The assumption that Western development theories would solve the problem of underdevelopment failed miserably. As Escobar (Ibid.) correctly argues, ‘... instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposites: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression.’ Thus, as Tucker (1999:1-2) argues,

... It would seem that the model of development now widely pursued is part of the problem rather than the solution. The sooner we demythologize this ideology the better. It distorts our imagination, limits our vision, blinding us to the alternatives that human ingenuity is capable of imagining and implementing. The myth of development is elevated to the status of natural law, objective reality and evolutionary necessity. In the process all other worldviews are devalued and dismissed as 'primitive', 'backward', 'irrational' or 'naïve'.

This has been true in Africa even more than in any other parts of the world. Therefore, it is crucial to critically reexamine the mainstream conception of development itself and develop-

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13 In his address, Truman asserted that ‘... For the first time in history humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. ... I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspiration for a better life. ... What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair deal. ... Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge. (Quote in Escobar, 1995: 3).
ment theories, and demythologize them in order to understand the crisis in contemporary Africa.

What does development represent? As Munck and O'Hearn (1999: XVI) put it “development, ..., represents an ideal instrument for the Eurocentric colonization of time. With one word the West has appropriated and controls the past, the present and the future of the non-West. This colonization of the future, once known as ‘Westernization’, now goes under the rubric of ‘globalization.’” The West has the power to colonize the future of the non-West. The real power of the West resides in its power to define, which is the result of its economic muscle and technological might. For instance, freedom, progress and civil behaviour; law, tradition and community; reason, mathematics and science, what is real and what it means to be human, are all defined by the West. Thus, the non-West civilizations have simply to accept these definitions or be defined out of existence. Moreover, its power is based on the strategy and tactics of promoting, licensing and justifying certain interventions and practices, delegitimizing and excluding others (Crush, 1995: 5). The result, as one can see all around the world, is that Westernization has become dominant in the non-Western societies just as it has in Europe and the USA: academics, writers, thinkers, novelists, politicians, decision-makers in non-West use the West, almost instinctively, as the standard for judgement and as the yardstick for measuring the social and political progress of their own societies (Sardar, 1999: 44). Development, as Tucker (1999: 1-2) correctly points out, is also: 

... the process whereby other peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped accordingly to an essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the world. The development discourse is part of an imperial process whereby other peoples are appropriated and turned into objects. It is an essential part of the process whereby the 'developed' countries manage, control and even create the third World economically, politically, sociologically and culturally. It is a process whereby the lives of some peoples, their plans, their hopes, their imaginations, are shaped by others who frequently share neither their lifestyle, nor their hopes nor their values. The real nature of this process is disguised by a discourse that portrays development as a necessary and desirable process, as human destiny itself. The economic, social and political transformations of the Third World are inseparable from the production and reproduction of meanings, symbols and knowledge, that is cultural reproduction.

Such critical understanding of what development is all about will help us to recognize that development is not a natural process. Development is also not transcultural in that it can claim universal validity. Therefore, despite the transfer of goods, gadgets, capital, technology, hospitals and roads, the economic policies and the socioeconomic accomplishments of the West cannot be replicated in the Third World. The proponents of the Western conception of development were aware of the importance of the cultural dimension of development. However, they approached this problem by regarding other cultures as traditional, backward and lacking inner dynamics. In addition, other cultural formations were viewed primarily as forms of resistance to modernization that had to be overcome (Crush, 1995: 9-10). Such (mis)concepton provided the Western societies with the motivation and the legitimization for transforming other societies according to their image.

The mainstream conception of development has not been static. Rather, it has gone through many transformations since the 1950s. However, the reshaping of development economics,
at each stage, reflected the agenda of the West. Thus, no matter how development is redefined its essential characteristics remain the same (Sadar, 1999: 53). It is therefore clear that if the prevailing conception of development is not fundamentally reconstituted to reflect the interests of the non-Western societies it can only lead to further subjugation and deeper poverty of the non-West.

One of the most important points that should be noted here is that once it became clear that 'the myth of development is a central myth of Western society', and 'once it becomes clear that the practices that we call development depend on shared beliefs rather than on nature or destiny, it becomes possible to challenge them in a way that was not previously possible' (Tucker, 1999: 3). Furthermore, in challenging the myth of development it then also becomes possible to ask if Third World societies must reproduce themselves according to the Western myth of development (Ibid.). In order to effectively challenge the Western development myth and reconstitute an alternative to mainstream development, however, we have to understand that 'the problem of development, is the problem of knowledge. It is a problem of discovering other ways of knowing, being and doing. It is a problem of how to be human in ways other than those of Europe. It is also a problem of how the West could liberate its true self from its colonial history and moorings' (Sardar, 1999: 60). We have also to understand how discourses of progress, development and modernization are constructed on the basis of the false polarity of 'traditional' and 'modern'. As Tucker (1999: 8) argues, 'traditional' society is an invention of the European mind. There are no traditional societies, only ways of looking at societies as traditional. However, the labelling of other societies as traditional plays an important role. For instance, on the one hand, labelling societies as simple and unchanging by contrast with the complexity and dynamism of Western societies became a convenient fiction which legitimized the right, and even the duty, of 'modern' societies to transform them in their image and likeness. On the other hand, the acceptance of the idea that the African society is 'traditional' and an obstacle for development by African intellectuals and political leaders has been one of the sources of the African crisis. By accepting that the 'traditional' society should be transformed into modern society African political leaders spent almost half a century in trying to copy the Western model. They rejected their own culture because it is traditional. Thus, they have been searching for solutions of their problems in the West rather than within their own society. They never found and will never find one.

How has the West been able to impose its own image and how has the other accepted it? To answer this important question we have to understand the unequal power relationship that prevails in the production of knowledge.

The production of knowledge about the Third World has taken place in the context of and as an integral part of the unequal relationship between the West and the Third World. In this context one group has the power to articulate and project itself and its worldview on others. The others thus become others - objects to be studied, described and developed. Overpowered by the hegemonic discourse of the West, Third World societies are stunted in their capacity to articulate their own identities and worldviews. They tend to internalize the perspective of the modernizers and developmentalists, a process that is facilitated by comprador intellectuals in the Third World. This is done not only through control of the media but also through ownership and control of the whole infrastructure of the production of knowledge (Tucker, 1999: 13).

This unequal relationship parallels and reinforces the unequal and dependent relationships in the domain of economy and politics. As a result, some cultures and societies are saturated with imposed meaning, ambitions and projects. In this way the Western societies imposed their development myth as if it is a universal truth and the Third World societies
could not successfully change this imposition. The result inevitably is the failure of development in the Third World societies.

Another crucial point that should be considered here would be: how relevant are economic development theories for Africa? Western economic development theories have been taken as ‘universal reference’, an example for others to follow. Especially, in the post-World War II period, both economic development and modernization theories have been utilized for westernizing the Third World (the underdeveloped world). As Hettné (1995: 49-50, and 52) puts it, modernization was very much the same as Westernization, i.e., underdeveloped countries should imitate those institutions that were characteristic of the rich.

The post-1945 period produced an incredible harvest of Western economic theories and paradigms to guide Third World countries on the fast track to promised prosperity, assisted by Western aid and technical assistance. In this venture, the United Nations took a leading role by declaring successive Development Decades and popularizing Western models and blueprints. The most crucial question that should be asked repeatedly after almost half a century of Western guided or dominated economic development is: what has been the end result? The end result has been disappointing, to say the least. As Crush (1995: 4) puts it, development rarely seems to work - or at least with the consequences intended or outcomes predicted. Why then, if it is so unworkable does it not only persist but also seem continuously to be expanding its reach and scope? One thing seems obvious, we lack clear and convincing theories and explanations. In recent years, however, productive attempts have been made in explaining why economic theories (models) failed and Third World countries are in persistent underdevelopment and mass poverty. One of the major explanations focuses on the faulty prescription derived from Western mainstream economic theorizing itself. Mainstream economics has produced flawed theories of economic development for the Third World. These flawed theories have distorted and biased Third World development. Western theories ignored these basic flaws in their theories, hiding these behind an idealized construction of perfect competition or rational (i.e. Western) behaviour. When these idealized theories failed in the Third World, the typical reaction of the mainstream economist was simply to rearrange the underlying assumptions of the theories, but always preserving its Western rationalist roots. In addition, mainstream development theory as a branch of Western economics suffers from a pair of culture-specific and pro-capital biases (Mehmet, 1999: 7).

What does this mean? It means, among other things, that under the rules of mainstream development economics, growth is capital-biased, which means capital-rich countries of the First World gain from it, capital-poor but labour-abundant countries of the Third World lose. It, therefore, seems clear that both the general assumptions of development and eco-

15 This part is mainly based on Mehmet’s excellent work ‘Westernizing the Third World’, 1999.
16 It is important to note that underdevelopment, contrary to the assumption that it is an original stage, is rather a created condition (Frank, cited in Hettné, 1995: 63). British deindustrialization of India, the destruction of the slave trade on African societies, and the destruction of the Indian civilization in Central and South America are good examples of the creation of underdevelopment in a particular society.
17 “... the market process rewards directly those who own and control capital in any form. Thus development economics, as a subfield of Western economics, has operated as a handmaiden of global capitalization” (Ibid.: 8).

18 Third World countries lose in two principal ways: first, the subjective (i.e. discretionary) elements of the market process externalize and under-price the Third World’s human and natural resources. They then transfer surplus value, directly or indirectly, to the First World to finance further capital accumulation and consumerism. Second, Western interests, typically enjoying monopoly and oligopoly powers, profit from trade in technology transfers, re-
nomic development theories have not been relevant in tackling the problems encountered by Third World countries in general and African countries in particular. The mainstream conceptions of development and economic development theories do not reflect the political, economic and cultural experience of these countries. Rather, they are all Eurocentric and meant to serve the interests of the North at the expense of the South. In addition, it has been wrongly assumed that there will be a 'level playing field' in which market forces objectively determine not only resource allocation, but distribution of rewards according to productivity. Mehmet (Ibid.: 148-149) describes it well: ‘... Western capitalism does not have an objective theory of distribution; it merely rewards the stronger. The inner logic of the system (what drives capitalism) is the extraction of supernormal profits by capitalists, captured as additional return on capital. Hence the capitalist has a single-purpose aim of continually expanding the capital base'.

Western domination is not only cultural and economic; it also exists in the modernist idea of nation-state. The nation-state has been seen as the only desirable and legitimate form of political organization. Thus, a people without a nation-state are taken to be a people without a home. This Eurocentric conception of the nation-state has played havoc with non-Western societies. This has been true in Africa for the last four or so decades. African political leaders and elites spend most of their time in following the Western model of building a nation-state. In other words, they have been trying to copy a model that has little, if at all, to do with their historical and cultural experience. The attempt did not work and it was not meant to work for Africa. With this general critical view on development and development theories in general let us focus on the economic development theories and their implication for the Third World in general and Africa in particular.

With the theoretical background briefly discussed above regarding ideology (nationalism/ethnicity, socialism and liberalism/neo-liberalism) and development theory (development theory in general and economic development theory) in mind, the remaining part of this chapter focuses on the post-colonial political and economic development of the three Horn of Africa countries. The first part will deal with the political development in the individual countries. The second part will focus on the different economic models and policies implemented and their results in the three countries concerned.

9.2 Political Development in the Horn of Africa Countries

In discussing the post-colonial political development of the Horn of Africa countries individual countries are treated separately. This will help us to comprehend the political development, the problems encountered and the solutions attempted and the outcomes realized through the years in each country by the various regimes. It also provides us with the opportunity to see the influence of the different ideologies and the mainstream development discourse.

9.2.1 Somalia

Somalia as an independent centralized state was created as the result of the unification of the former Italian and British Somaliland (refer back the previous chapter). As in many newly independent African countries between 1960-1969 Somalia maintained relatively open and competitive parliamentary politics (some sort of political liberalism). There were two post-
independence elections, two peaceful and constitutional changes in the premiership, and one for the presidency (Young, 1982: 61). On 21 October 1969, however, things changed after a military coup and the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and the coming to power of General Mohammed Siad Barre (Ibid.; Markakis, 1985: 21).19 The justification for the intervention was a familiar one. In his first speech Siad Barre claimed, 'it was no longer possible to ignore the evil things like corruption, bribery, nepotism, theft of public funds, injustice and disrespect for our religion and the laws of the country. The intervention by the army was inevitable' (quoted in Markakis, 1985: 21-22). Army officers were posted to ministries and state agencies to monitor the behaviour of the civil servants. As usual, the invocation of nationalism was coupled with strong emphasis on equality and social justice.

As in Sudan and Ethiopia (see below), the new rulers of Somalia had to produce a credible alternative to the regime they had overthrown. This alternative happened to be socialism.20 The appeal of socialism lay in the perception of it as the system most likely to promote rapid development in backward societies, a perception shared widely by the intelligentsia, military men included. In Somalia, socialism was regarded as 'first and foremost an ideology of development' (Ibid.). Thus, on the first anniversary of his coup, President Siad Barre proclaimed that 'in order to realize the interests of the Somali people; their achievement of a better life, the development of their potentialsities and the fulfillment of their aspirations, we solemnly declare Somalia to be a socialist state' (cited in Young, 1982: 62). It was also announced that the regime was committed to 'scientific socialism'.21 It was believed that socialism would be instrumental in uniting the nation and eradicating its ancient clan division. "'Tribalism', which was associated with nepotism and corruption, was officially banned and ritually buried (1971). Tribalistic behavior became a serious criminal offense. The collective payment of blood money was correspondingly outlawed and marriage officially emptied of its corporate lineage significance.... Lineage genealogies and their use to identify people were banned ..." (Lewis, 1991: 89). This was a typical influence of modernization discourse. The adoption of the Roman script for the national language was also another measure in the same direction. It is important to note that while these measures, directed at eliminating clan division and establishing national solidarity, were vigorously promoted at all levels, the president himself was covertly relying on older, time-honoured ties of loyalty, which helped him to construct his inner power circle with members of three related clans – each critically significant. His most trusted ministers were from his own patrilineal clan (the Marehan). The head of the National Security Service came from the clan of his son-in-law. The third clan in this triangle was that of the president's mother's brother, the Ogaden (Ibid.: 90). Although the re-

19 A twenty-five-man Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was established (Markakis, 1985: 21).
20 According to Young (1982: 62), the distant origins of Somali socialism go back to contacts which Somali elites established with the Italian Communist Party or Fabian and other socialist milieux in Britain during colonial days. However, the most important factor was the military relationships that developed with the Soviet Union from 1961 on. The genesis of these ties had no relationship to the philosophical merits of socialism, but rather originates in the consuming passion uniting all Somalis to realize the irredentist dream of gathering all of the Somali-speaking lands under soveriegnies. This imperative spawned the aspiration for a military force in scale and equipment beyond what the small dimensions and overwhelming poverty of the country might otherwise dictate. The United States was approached first and declined to provide equipment that might eventually be directed against Ethiopia and Kenya. The Soviet Union was approached next, and thus began a relationship that provided little Somalia with a powerful air force and armored strike force and a soviet military mission numbering 1,500 at the time of its expulsion in 1977. Some 2,400 Somali military personnel were sent to the Soviet Union for training (more than any other African state), as well as many hundreds of other students (695 in 1977). Markakis (1985: 23) included the relationship with Egypt as an additional factor.
21 The chairman of SRC was emphatic that Somalia was opting for scientific socialism, and specifically rejected alloys – such as Arab, African or Islamic socialism – that have been proclaimed elsewhere' (Markakis, 1985: 23).
gime at all times included representatives of other clans, the three clans represented the inner circle of power.

Institutionalization of Siad Barre’s Regime

In June 1976,22 the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)23 was established, to institutionalize the October Revolution.24 Though the Central Committee had a large civilian majority, all five members of the initial Political Bureau were generals (Young, 1982: 64).25 As Markakis (1985: 25-26) points out, this exercise proved as eye-opener for many young radicals who had embraced the October Revolution in the belief that it offered a genuine alternative to the debilitating corruption of the parliamentary regime. They discerned the regime’s design to use the socialist party as a political front for military rule and, behind it, the consolidation of Siad Barre’s personal rule. As a result, they were the first to break with this regime. The enactment of the constitution in 1979 was another step in the institutionalization process. The constitution gave supreme authority of political and socio-economic leadership to the party. Moreover, it legitimized the personal power of Siad Barre by designing a form of government in which the president had unlimited power, including the right to appoint one or more vice-presidents, as well as the prime minister, ‘if he shall deem it appropriate’ (Ibid.).

Though a socialist political movement was not launched and the SRSP was not established, significant nationalization was undertaken in 1970. The target for the expropriation was a segment of Italian colonial capital (Young, 1982: 64). Thus, the state sector took possession of the airline, electricity, banks, insurance, Fiat distribution, and a sugar factory (Ibid.: 65, see also Markakis, 1985: 23). However, a substantial foreign private sector was left untouched by these measures: the most prominent among these were the Italian banana plantations, and Italian soap, shoe, and meat packing enterprises (Young, 1982: 64). In addition, the nationalization was accompanied by an appeal for private investment, domestic and foreign. A moderately generous investment code was drafted for attracting foreign capital. In January 1972, more nationalization measures were announced affecting foreign trade, as the state took over the import of cereals, fuel, medicine and films, and (some time later) the export of banana, hides and skins. Foreign schools were taken over in the same year (Markakis, 1985: 25). With regard to agriculture what the state did was to promote sedentarization of the fraction of the pastoralists and the establishment of a handful of state farms, as a permanent response to the conjunctural crisis of drought (Young 1982: 65).

Another important measure, which was taken by many as a positive contribution to the Somali society, was the 1971 decision to resolve the dispute over an official script for the Somali language (Young, 1982: 65-66). On the third anniversary of the revolution, Barre informed the nation that the Latin script, with some modification, had been adopted (Markakis, 1985: 24). This decision helped to eliminate the gap between state and subject imposed by the

22 This will indicate that the so-called socialist revolution in Somalia had been without a party leadership for a number of years.
23 A committee appointed by Siad Barre prepared the constitution of SRSP and chose candidates for the various offices; these were subsequently approved by the Congress).
24 The founding members included about 3,000 Political Office representatives and members of the military and the security branches, who had been nominated by the regional governors. A number of prominent Political Office cadres, particularly those trained in Eastern Europe who had their own notions about the structure of the party and the role it ought to play, were excluded. For their presence was deemed undesirable, in view of the fact that these matters had been settled beforehand (Markakis, 1985: 25).
25 The political bureau was composed of the SRC chairman, its vice-chairmen and the chief of security. The central committee of 74 included 20 generals, 12 colonels and a solitary woman (Markakis, 1985: 25).
administration in a language few ordinary citizens could speak of read. With the Roman alphabet as a standard, an impressive year-long adult literacy campaign was mounted in 1974; secondary schools were closed for a year to permit students to serve as teachers. The switch from English to Somali as a principal instrument of education helped to eliminate the regional advantage that formerly accrued to formerly British administered northern Somalia. In addition, there has been limited progress in providing schooling opportunities for girls, and some of the more flagrant inequalities in customary divorce and bride-price custom have been reduced (Young, 1982: 66).

Politically, however, as was the case in Sudan and Ethiopia, the soldiers in power showed from the outset that they were not inclined to tolerate opposition of any kind. A law on the security of the state, known as ‘the twenty-six articles’, was proclaimed in September 1970, which decreed the death penalty for ‘everyone harming the unity, peace, and sovereignty of the state’ (Markakis, 1985: 25). To this effect, military courts were established and many Somalis were condemned for tribalism, corruption, and rumour mongering.

### Socialism Discarded

In 1977, scientific socialism was overshadowed by the failed campaign to profit from the disintegration of the old order in Ethiopia by taking the Ogaden. The political chaos created in Ethiopia in the 1974 revolution encouraged the Ogadeni Somalis to seize their opportunity to solve the long Ethio-Somalia boundary dispute by force of arms. The forces of the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), aided by troops from Somalia, began their attack on Ethiopia in the summer of 1977 to push the Ethiopians out of the Ogaden. The WSLF was initially successful in controlling the whole of the Ogaden. As a result, the Ogaden war had been immensely popular in Somalia and President Barre’s public standing had never been higher (Lewis, 1991: 92). However, the victory was short-lived. The Ethiopian government with the support of USSR, Cuba and other socialist countries repelled the invading forces.

The Ogaden war and the Somalia defeat had two interrelated impacts on the Somali political scene. First, the defeat and the resulting refugee invasion quickly led to widespread public demoralization and to the upsurge of ‘tribalism’ as different groups sought scapegoats to explain the debacle. In addition, an unsuccessful coup attempt was mounted against the regime in April 1978 (Ibid.). After the failure of the attempted coup, those who escaped arrest regrouped, forming a guerrilla opposition group called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which established its operational headquarters across the border in Ethiopia. After some initial success SSDF was subdued. Owing the continuation of the government’s policy of suppressing its opponents, Northern Somalia became under increasingly harsh military rule with savage reprisals against the assumedly pro-SNM (Somalia National Movement - SNM) local population who were subjected to severe economic as well as political harassment (Ibid.).

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26 Two members of SRC and a third officer were executed because of their alleged involvement in the May 1971 aborted coup. In January 1975, the military regime executed ten religious notable who publicly criticized Siar Barre’s interpretation of the Koran, when he introduced the Family Law that established sex equality and banned polygamy (Markakis, 1985: 24; see also Lewis, 1980: 213).

27 The coup was led by military officers of the Majerteen (Darod) clan who had played a dominant role in the old civilian governments (Lewis, 1991: 92).
Second, the Ogaden war and the Somalia defeat led to a rupture with the Soviet patron. As Young (1982: 67) points out, 'the sudden shift in Horn alignment in 1977' (the Soviets aligning with Ethiopia and USA with Somalia) 'and the thrashing applied to regular Somali army units in the Ogaden by Soviet- and Cuba-reinforced Ethiopians in spring 1978 sundered a far-reaching and multiplex relationship' (see also Markakis, 1985: 26). As a result, by mid-1977, Somalia started a military relationship with the West. By 1980, this had resulted in the establishment of American military facilities at the former Soviet base at Berbera. Agreements for limited military aid were signed in 1980, but the United State was wary of committing itself to a regime with little popular support and an uncertain future (Markakis, 1985: 27). After some hesitation, however, the United States and its Western allies agreed to support Somalia's development needs and to help with her security concerns. In turn, Barre's government agreed to discontinue the socialist programme and adopt a market-oriented strategy. Thus, the government started to move away from the state ownership strategies that it had adopted only a decade before and sought several IMF standby agreements (Mubarak, 1996: 16). Some institutional reforms were adopted, and improvements were made in resource mobilization and allocation. A number of parastatal organizations were dismantled. Similar steps were taken to strengthen public finance and to adjust the official exchange rate. However, these changes and the overall stabilization and adjustment efforts were not sustained (Ibid.).

The shift from socialism to a market economy did not bring any meaningful positive results. Rather, it created additional political problems. The political shift back to the West reinforced the opposition by alienating the last of the radical activists who had rallied to the call of socialism. Many fled abroad, while others ended in prison. There they were joined by numerous top officials who were purged at the beginning of the 1980s. By this time, many civilians who had served the regime during the revolution, as well as most of the military officers, were in prison or abroad. The Ethiopian government took this opportunity to turn the tables on its enemy by training and arming Somali dissident groups, which began to infiltrate and carry out raids within Somalia in 1980, forcing the regime to declare a state of emergency in October of that year. In addition, the Military Security Court became a dreaded inquisition chamber, against whose verdict there was no appeal (Markakis, 1985: 27). In short, Somalia turned into a garrison state where power lay exclusively with the army and security, and the dream of the October Revolution had become a nightmare.

The Road towards Complete Collapse

By the end of the 1970s, the consequence of the government's failure to achieve the unification of all Somali people under one sovereign state (Somalia), the intensification of clan politics and the deterioration of the economy left Somalia with grave political and economic crises (Mubarak, 1996: 12). Amid growing opposition and popular discontent, however, Barre was determined to retain his power at any price. Although some reforms were made in the economic sector, Barre's regime did not attempt to reform the one party system that gave him absolute power. Rather, the extensive security apparatus cruelly suppressed his political opponents. Though Barre was successful in creating rifts and hatred between major clans and sub-clans, he was unable to diffuse them totally (Ibid.: 15). Thus, the consequent political instability and civil war interrupted economic activity and caused further social, political economic crisis. The deterioration of the public finances seriously undermined Barre's ability to reward his followers, and it became more and more difficult for him to maintain and broaden his political base.
By the mid 1980s, the need for political change became clear. However, Barre and his shrinking numbers of supporters were no longer capable of introducing the reforms needed even if they wanted to. As Mubarak (Ibid.) correctly points out, ‘reprisal against the ruling elite could not have been prevented in the event of political change, whether peaceful or coup. It seemed that Barre lost the opportunity to solve the political crisis at an early stage, and hence violence was the only way that a succession of political power could occur.’

In the second half of 1980, especially in 1987/88, the growing clan dissent against the Barre regime became critical. The strengthening of the Isaaq clan’s militia (Somalia National Movement) operating from bases in Ethiopia forced Barre’s regime to make a preemptive diplomatic move by signing a peace agreement with Ethiopia in April 1988. According to Mubarak (1996: 15, see also Simons, 1998: 60), the agreement is believed to have contained promises by the Somalia government to refrain from using force to claim the disputed Ogaden region and to cease supporting Ogadeni liberation forces. The Ethiopian government was in turn expected to ban the bases and suspend the support it had provided to the Somali insurgents against Barre, the SSDF and SNM. When Somali guerrillas were pushed out of their bases, as the result of the implementation of the agreement in April 1988, they waged a desperate attack in the northern regions of Somalia, where their ethnic base was strongest, and took the government forces by surprise. The result was a bloody civil war in which major northern towns and all communication and trade routes were destroyed by heavy air bombardment of the government. The civil war also created a massive exodus of refugees (according to some estimates 300,000 Somali refugees from the north alone fled to Ethiopia), both internal and external (Ibid.: 15, see also Lewis, 1991: 93). The outbreak of this civil war marked the beginning of the end of the Barre regime and Somalia’s formal dissolution (Simons, 1998: 60). Although the fighting was largely confined to the north, it nonetheless involved Somalis from all over the country. As the war progressed, opposition groups throughout the country took the opportunity to seize land elsewhere for themselves (e.g., the predominantly Majeryten Somali Salvation Democratic Front in the northeast), while more recently created movements arose to protect other clan/or clan-family interests (e.g., the Somali Patriotic Movement to promote/protect the Ogaden in the south and the west, and the United Somali Congress (USC) to protect/promote Hawiye claims in the centre (Simons, 1998: 60-61). In short, as Mubarak (Ibid.: 15-16) put it: ‘By 1990, the armed opposition to Barre’s government had spread to the central and southern regions. Almost all Somali army units disintegrated, and members joined their respective clan militia. The government’s effective territorial control shrank to only the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu. Finally, in January 1991, the militia of the Hawiye clan-based United Somali Congress (USC) forced Barre and his supporters out of Mogadishu.”

While the downfall of Said Barre certainly represented a victory for the opposition, the opposition was hardly united. The opposition groups simply shared the same immediate goal: to remove Siad Barre from power (Simons, 1998: 61). Thus, the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorial regime did not bring relief to the Somali society. Rather, it was followed by ruthless

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24 This has been typical government policy in the Horn of Africa, in the relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Ethiopia and Somalia.

25 Two things can be said about Somalia’s divided opposition: ‘first, that this was a direct result of Siad Barre’s own shift in keeping opponents divided along genealogical lines; Second, that this inability of Somalis to cohere is exactly what allowed Siad Barre to remain in power for twenty-one years. Throughout the 1980s Siad Barre proved remarkably adept at stirring up sufficient suspicion between movements, clans, and clan-families to keep them divided. But, ..., this was not just the result of Siad Barre’s skillful manipulation; there also had to be something to be manipulated. ..., the strength of clan ties, ...’ (Simons, 1998: 61).
clan wars that brought the country more misery and hardship. The Somali state and its institutions completely collapsed, and the traditional social institutions were powerless to stop the manipulation of power-hungry warlords who exploited clan affiliation and friction. Thus, 'the Somali nation today', according to Lewis (1991: 95), 'is deeply divided along traditional lines of division. The pan-Somali ideal founded on cultural identity rather than political unity, which was so strong in the 1950s and 1960s, has taken a severe battering.'

9.2.2 Ethiopia

Ethiopia had been under Emperor Haile Selassie's absolute monarchical rule for almost five decades until the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution in 1974. It is, therefore, important to briefly consider this period as a background to the revolution and the adoption of socialism as an ideology.

Pre-1974 Ethiopia

After the restoration of the monarchy in 1941 Emperor Haile Selassie worked hard to strengthen his power and create a very centralized state (see the previous chapter). Accordingly, he introduced the first and second constitution of the country in 1931 and 1955. The second constitution was introduced mainly to give the government a more impressive façade of modernity as well as to rectify the anomaly created after the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia (Zewde, 1991: 206). It also served as a legal charter for the consolidation of absolutism more than its 1931 predecessor did (Ibid.: 207).

The ineffectiveness of the parliament that was established, as the result of the second constitution, had been one of the important issues raised by the young educated elite and leaders of the 1960 aborted coup in the pre-1974 struggle against the monarchical system. In addition, the absence of meaningful economic development and the growing gap between the rich and poor segments of the society became the focus of the decades of opposition against the feudal system. In the long anti-feudal struggle the 1960 attempted coup marked a watershed in the political opposition in pre-1974 Ethiopia. It sparked a more outspoken and radical opposition to the regime. Above all, the students became the true heirs of the rebels.

The opposition to Haile Selassie's regime was not confined to the elite. It had a broader dimension, which included the outbreak of peasant rebellions in different parts of the country. However, the most implacable opposition to the regime, especially from 1965 on, came from the radical students. Alarmed by the political implication of the radical student movement, the government launched its most determined offensive against the students. However, the

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30 This historical account is mainly adopted from Zewde, 1991.
31 The drafting committee included three American advisors, which clearly shows the foreign influence.
32 The coup was led by a higher military officer and his brother, an American educated intellectual, who was a civilian (see Zewde, 1991: 212-213).
33 Among the many pre-1974 peasant rebellions the following can be given as examples (see Zewde, 1991: 215-218 for the details): the Tigre province rebellion in the immediate aftermath of the liberation; the rebellion in the southeastern province of Bale which lasted from 1963 to 1970 (Islam - was the ideology which rallied the Somali and the Oromo rebels); the Gojam peasant rebellion of 1968; the Yeju uprising in Wollo, in the north-east, in 1948 and 1970; and the Gedeo (Darasa) uprising of 1960.
34 In February 1965, the first manifestation of radical opposition came under the revolutionary slogan of 'land to the tiller'. Another important year in the student movement was 1969-70 during which the university students raised perhaps one of the most sensitive issues, the question of nationalities. They supported the rights of nationalities to self-determination.
student movement both at home and abroad continued their struggle against the Haile Selassie regime up until 1974. The same student movement later became the offspring for the emergence of organized political movements inside and outside the country.

The other serious challenge to the regime was the armed struggle in Eritrea, which began in 1961. The federal arrangement that brought Eritrea back to Ethiopia, as the result of the decision of the United Nations, was not happily accepted by the Eritrean partisans of independence. The Ethiopian government was also reluctant to honour the federal arrangement. An autonomous Eritrea, enjoying a relatively higher degree of democratic and civic liberties, was a dangerous anomaly in the oppressive political climate prevalent elsewhere in Ethiopia. Thus, neither group was ready to give the federal scheme a chance. To make things worse, a series of steps were taken which eroded the autonomous status of Eritrea, with a long lasting effect. The most serious of all was the liquidation of the federation. This step was automatically rejected by the separatist elements in Eritrea. This marked the beginning of the bloody armed struggle to liberate Eritrea which continued up until 1991.

The Ogaden issue was another major problem. Though the problem started before Somalia achieved its independence (see the previous chapter), it was after independent Somalia was created that the problem surfaced. The Somalia Republic adopted a policy of uniting all Somali speaking people, including the Ogaden Somalis of Ethiopia, under one flag. To this end the Somalia government launched diplomatic and military actions to create a greater Somalia. In explaining how strong the public pressure was, Said S. Samatar (1991: 16) wrote:

The Somalis felt that their nation, whose dreamed-for unity was symbolized by the five-pointed star on the Somali flag, remained a dismembered nation. Only the two points of the star represented by the two former British and Italian Somalilands, were free to re-unify. The rest of the nation, it was felt, languished under alien rule. The public patriotic delirium pushed successive Somali governments to extreme measure of mobilization for an eventual showdown with Ethiopia, and to lead them to be generally preoccupied, unduly, with the fate of the missing territories.

This strong Somali nationalism was confronted with another strong Ethiopian nationalism. The Ethiopian government and the population at large were determined to maintain the status quo at all costs. The only solution for both sides was military means. The establishment of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in 1963 marked the beginning of open conflict between the newly independent Somali Republic and Ethiopia (Issa-Salwe, 1996: 58). The WSLF with the support of the Somalia government launched its armed struggle against the Ethiopian government and an open war between the two countries started in October 1963 and February 1964 (Ibid.). As was the case in the diplomatic field the military option also failed to bring any solution to the problem. Thus, the problem was left as it was for the next showdown.

In general, the failure of the Haile Selassie regime to improve the land tenure system, achieve meaningful economic development, to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor segment of the population, to develop a policy that could help to strengthen the national unity and create a strong national identity by accommodating the demands of the different nationalities,

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36 On November 1962, the Eritrea Assembly, the legislative body created by the Federal Act in 1952, voted itself out of existence, by terminating the federal arrangement and deciding to unite Eritrea with the rest of Ethiopia.
37 The five-pointed star on the Somali flag symbolized this Pan-Somali nationalism. The stars represent Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, Djibouti, the Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.
and to introduce the needed political reform strengthened the popular struggle for change. In addition, the failure to solve the problems in Eritrea and the Ogaden weakened the capacity of the government to take any meaningful measures to improve the living standard of the society. Thus, there was a clear need for change within the society, particularly among the educated elites. This was the situation in which the 1974 revolution broke out.

The Ethiopian Revolution and the Declaration of Socialism

Almost one and half decades after the 1960 aborted coup, in January and February 1974, military mutinies and civil strikes and demonstrations occurred in different parts of the country, because of material grievances.38 These material grievances then broadened into a more general attack upon the corruption of the system.39 By May 1974, a military coordinating committee (which later became the Provisional Military Administrative Council – PMAC better known as the Derg) came into being, whose members all had the rank of major or below.40 Its objective, according to a press release issued on 9 July 1974, was not even to change the absolute monarchical rule. The press release made it clear that the Co-ordinating Committee was, among other things, to be loyal to the Emperor and to uphold the Crown of His Imperial Majesty (for the details of the press release see Haile-Selassie, 1997: 120). However, the Derg pushed by the civilians, especially by students and teachers, started raising political questions and assumed a political role. By July the new Prime Minister had been forced out. On 12 September 1974, the Derg arrested the Emperor himself.41 In November, the Derg seized full power, executing General Aman Michael Andom (the first chairman of the Derg) and other leading figures of the old order. However, the monarchy was abolished only by Proclamation No. 27, 17 March 1975 (Ibid.: 128).

Many members of the Derg had no clear conception of what ought to replace the ruling clique. However, after taking full political power the Derg began to radicalize. Its first ideological proclamation, in December 1974, mentioned socialism for the first time, but only in rather general terms. The more central slogan, 'Ethiopia Tikdem', was essentially nationalist; it proclaimed the indivisibility and unity of Ethiopia (Young, 1982: 74; see also Markakis, 1985: 28). Accordingly, the major objectives of the Derg included: ensuring equality among Ethiopians; abolishing divisions along the lines of tribal or religious affiliations; removing traditional beliefs and administrative practices that hindered development and national unity; cleansing the society from immoral practices; promoting feelings of nationalism and patriotism; encouraging the expansion of indigenous industries and the promotion of local products; preserving the national heritage of the country; and issuing a broader national policy for development (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 129-130). These objectives have very little, if anything at all, to do with socialism. Rather they reflected the modernist nationalist ideology.

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38 The Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) called for a general strike from 7-11 March 1974. However, the strike was called off after the government and CELU signed an agreement (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 96).
39 On 27 February 1974, the Emperor ousted the Prime Minister (Aklilu Habte Wold) and on March 1, 1974 replaced him by another aristocrat (Endalkachew Mekonnen) (the first time that a Prime Minister had been driven from office by public pressure).
40 Endalkachew Mekonnen established the first Co-ordinating Committee of the Armed forces, Police and the Territorial Army, to consolidate his power and to win the army to his side (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 95).
41 According to Proclamation No. 1 1974, the justification for the dethroning the emperor was that: 'has abused the authority, dignity and honours of office for the personal benefit and interest of himself, his immediate family and retainers. As a consequence he has led the country into its present inextricable situation. Moreover, as he has progressed in age, being 82 years old, he cannot shoulder the high responsibility of his office' (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 127).
The Derg took measures to nationalized banks, insurance companies, industrial and commercial enterprises. As a result, the state had seized virtually the entire productive infrastructure of the country (Young, 1982: 74, See also Markakis, 1985: 31; and Haile-Selassie, 1997: 156). Moreover, pushed by popular demand, the Derg launched a radical land reform (The Proclamation for the Nationalization of Rural Land No. 31 1975) in March 1975. The Proclamation abolished private ownership of land. In July 1975 the regime nationalized urban land and rental housing. The objective of the Proclamation was to abolish private ownership of urban land and the evils supposedly associated with it (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 163). As part of this reform neighbourhood associations (Kebeles) were set up to provide local management of urban land and housing rents. However, they did not have the capacity and the resource to fulfill their responsibilities. It is important to note here that both the peasant and neighbourhood associations played an important political role by contributing a great deal in the government campaign to suppress and destroy its political opponents, rather than improve the living standard of the society. In 1979, agricultural collectivization (the Soviet model) was introduced as the most promising long-term solution to the problem of food production. The end results of the implementation of the reforms were not encouraging, to say the least.

Two other related measures - settlement and villagization - were also taken with very serious impact on the agricultural sector in particular and the overall economy in general (these programmes affected about 90% of the population), especially the rural villages. There were a number of fundamental problems in these programmes. First, neither programme was based on the necessary research. They did not take the culture and long tradition of the society into account. Second, before the people who were displaced by the drought were settled, the government started to unsettle the settled rural population. Third, in both programmes the population was forced to leave their traditional settlement without a meaningful attempt to persuade them. This logically created strong popular resistance, armed resistance in some areas. Finally, the huge task of moving millions of people to new settlement areas did not correspond to the realities of the country. It was unthinkable to deliver the proposed services to the new settlements due to the shortage of resources. It was also not possible to get external assistance because major western countries were against the programmes for various reasons. Thus, for these and other related reasons the programmes completely failed. This was one of the major factors that contributed to the downfall of the government and the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE).

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42 'Land for the tailor' was one of the most important slogans for the student movement. Although the precise form of it was not defined, land reform enjoyed wider support among the intelligentsia, the working class, and the lower ranks of the military.

43 The Soviet model collectivisation was adopted without serious consideration of the culture and experience of the Ethiopian peasant society.

44 An elaborate scheme was designed in which producer co-operatives would advance through four stages to reach full collectivization.

45 Even though the principle of forming consumer and producers' associations, including collective farms, was voluntary, in practice the cadres forced the peasant. There was no meaningful attempt to convince the peasant to form these co-operatives. Therefore the resistance of the peasant was to be expected.

46 The settlement programme was to resettle drought victims from the northern and central parts of the country in western and southern Ethiopia where the soil is still fertile and the climate is more favourable for agriculture. The villagization programme, on the other hand, was to change the very scattered rural villages into new villages where it would be possible to facilitate the delivery of services such as education, health, water, electricity, telephone, transport, markets, etc.
It is important to note that it was only after taking all those economic measures that the Derg began to define its doctrinal identity. Although 'Ethiopian socialism' had entered the regime's vocabulary in December 1974, it was not until 1976 that reference began to be made to Marxism-Leninism (Young, 1982: 78). Ethiopian socialism, it was declared, comprises the following major policies: (1) create a decentralized government structure with minimum interference from the centre to be introduced; (2) establish one political party that would have as its members all progressive elements; (3) control all major resources of the nation and means of production. The private sector would have a role in areas where it is beneficial for the development of the nation (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 155).

The adoption of Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of the government influenced the type of solution given to the country's major problems. The principal assertion was that the overthrow of the imperial regime and the establishment of the socialist state had liberated all the peoples of Ethiopia, so there was no justification for demanding secession (Markakis, 1985: 30). In other words, the various socio-political groups had no more justified (legitimate) causes to fight against the socialist state. If, however, they continued to do so, they would be crushed by military means as any enemy of socialism should be. Thus, for instance, in a nationwide address after the Somalia military was defeated in the Ogaden, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam called for national military mobilization against the Eritrean secessionist groups (see Haile-Selassie, 1997: 317). The policy of using force (militarization of politics) to solve these problems had devastating consequences:

To maintain an adequate supply of manpower the Dergue imposed universal military conscription in 1983. ... the cost of maintaining the largest military force in Africa far succeeded the country's resources, and Ethiopia was saddled with a mounting debt. The effect of militarization on such a scale was widely felt. It had a serious impact on overall resources allocation; it pre-empted a major share of imports and of foreign exchange; it removed people and resources from productive activity, and it retarded development in other fields: the regime's agriculture policy, for instance, was influenced by the heavy food requirement of the military (Ibid.: 34).

Another important problem, which is also related to the problem of Eritrea and the Ogaden, has been the question of nationalities (ethnicity). Ethiopia is a country of over 80 different ethnic groups. However, there had never been a genuine attempt made, even after socialism was proclaimed, to help the development of the languages and cultures of these ethnic communities. Nor was there any attempt to recognize the rights of these communities to self-rule or some sort of autonomy. The Derg showed superficial interest in finding a solution for this problem by issuing a proclamation providing for the establishment of the Institute for the Study of Nationalities, No. 236 of 1983. The institute made valuable studies on the social,

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47 'The Derg declared 'Ethiopian Socialism' as the political philosophy of the nation on 20 December 1974. In its declaration, the new political philosophy of the country was defined as Ethiopia Tikdem which means Hibretesebawinet and Hibretesebawinet means equality, self-reliance; the dignity of labour; the supremacy of the common good; and the inviolability of Ethiopian unity' (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 153).
48 This has never been implemented. Even though autonomous and special autonomous regions were created in the later years of the regime, power has never been decentralized.
49 This was the policy that the Derg strictly implemented until the ethnic guerrilla fighters overthrew it in 1991.
50 The detailed economic policy of the Derg was issued on 11 February 1975. The economic policy clearly delineated the activities reserved only for the state, activities where the private sector is allowed to operate; and activities open for joint venture between the state and the private sector (see Haile-Selassie, 1997: 157-158 for the details).
51 This was clear evidence of the militarization of politics and the society at large.
52 According to this proclamation the objectives of the institute were: (1) studying the political, social, economic and cultural conditions of Ethiopian nationalities; (2) conducting studies concerning constitution, state structure and administrative set-up on the bases of which a people's democratic republic could be established (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 252).
economic and cultural conditions and settlement pattern, geographical locations and distributions of over 80 ethnic communities. However, the findings of the studies were not taken seriously by the Derg leaders. Rather, similar militaristic policy was pursued all along. This was one of the lost golden opportunities that could have been used in solving the problem of ethnicity (nationalities).

Civilian Opposition, Institutionalization of One Party Dictatorship and the Resulting Chaos

There had never been any experience of party politics and party leadership in Ethiopian political history. Given the absence of political organization, therefore, the burden of formulating popular demands fell on existing organizations of the intelligentsia, the trade unions and student groups. These groups had to be won over or neutralized if the military was to gain acceptance. Conscious of the need to co-opt the civilian opposition, young radicals were appointed to high posts in the government. However, as was the case in both Somalia and Sudan, the military and the radical civilian groups could not move together for long. Foreseeing the establishment of military dictatorship of the type familiar in many African countries, the radical civilian groups demanded the setting up of a popular government and sought to rally the urban population against the military rule. They formed the National Advisory Committee (Known as the Shengo) in an attempt to accommodate this demand (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 131-132). However, the gap between the military and the civilian opposition widened and armed violence followed. As a result, thousands of young Ethiopians on both sides lost their lives.

The main opposition the Derg faced, in addition to the ethnic and regional guerrilla groups in the northern and southeastern part of the country that it inherited, came from the radical left, most of them former university students, who were in the process of forming the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). Lacking organized political support of its own, the Derg took this opposition very seriously. Thus, partly in order to relieve the pressure, it sponsored a rural development campaign and sent university and high school students and their teachers to the countryside from early 1975 to mid-1976 (Markakis, 1985: 32, see also Haile-Selassie, 1997: 134). The campaign strengthened the EPRP rather than weakening it. This challenge forced the Derg to create an alliance with the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, known by its Amharic acronym as MEISON. Unlike EPRP MEISON chose to collaborate with the military leaders and provided them with valuable ideological guidance in the initial phase of their rule (Markakis, 1985: 32). This helped the regime in drafting the National Democratic Revolution Programme of Ethiopia (NDRPE) issued in 1976. The NDRPE endorsed scientific socialism as the basis of its political ideology and consequently stipulated a new socioeconomic system identical to the one prevailing in the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist countries.

53 (See, Haite-Selassie, 1997: 133 for the details).
54 Remnants of the previous ruling elites, especially the Ethiopia Democratic Union (EDU), and other relatively weaker ethnic organizations in the southern party of the country had tried to challenge the military junta for some years.
55 The other political organizations that joined the Derg were Waz League, Ethiopian Marxist Leninist Revolutionary Organization (Amharic acronym MALRED), Ethiopian Oppressed People's struggle (Amharic acronym ECHAT) (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 172). They were joined by Abiyotawe Seded, an organization headed by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, in the latter part of 1976.
Moreover, MEISON and other collaborating factions initiated the process of institutionalization of the military regime by establishing the Provisional Office for Mass Organization Affairs (POMOA) in 1976. Its major tasks were to mobilize mass support, conduct political education, and lay the foundations for the workers’ party (see Haile-Selassie, 1997: 175, for the major functions of POMOA). 56 This was followed by violent suppression of the opposition movements57 and the twin task of consolidating state centralization and further institutionalization of the regime. In 1979, the regime proceeded by setting up a Commission for Organizing the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (COPWE). In June 1980, COPWE held its first congress and elected its leaders. In 17 September 1984, the founding congress of the WPE was convened. In addressing the congress, Mengistu Haile Mariam pointed out that ‘... the primary task of our party in the establishment of the new state will not be to bring about the dictatorship of the proletariat directly, but rather to establish a people’s democratic state which will lead us to the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Quoted in Haile-Selassie, 1997: 255).

Thus, the new state, that was to be established under the leadership of WPE, would be based on the Marxist-Leninist principles of democratic centralism, socialist legality, proletarian internationalism and conscious participation of citizens in the affairs of the state. The report clarified further:

The People’s Democratic Republic that we shall establish is a state where no citizen will be discriminated against on the basis of sex, religion, race or nationality, or in which a society of justice, of equality and progressive human relations shall come to exist. The principles of its organizational structure and functioning, as well as the basic rights of citizens, shall be guaranteed constitutionally and through appropriate legislation.

State power ranging from the lowest administrative units to the national level, will rest in the hands, and be expressed by, popularly elected bodies. With respect to structuring and functions of the republic, the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia will give special attention to ensuring that the working class gains supremacy, and the participation of the nationalities is guaranteed at all levels and in all the organs of the state power. (Quoted in Haile-Selassie, 1997: 255-256)

However, it was clear that this was simply rhetoric. There had never been any significant attempt to implement this policy. Rather, the regime violated every right of the Ethiopia people. There was no opposition political party, no freedom of expression, no freedom of press, no free and fair election, etc. It was simply dictatorship of a few individuals, especially Mengistu Haile Marian and his cronies.

With regard to the issue of nationalities and the role of the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia in solving the problem of nationalities, the report indicated, ‘... the aims of the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia concerning nationalities is that the democratic rights of each shall be recognized, and that they shall build their common prosperity together by co-ordinating their resources and abilities in the spirit of brotherhood and equality’ (Quoted in Haile-Selassie, 1997: 256). This was again rhetoric which had never been taken seriously. The regime even failed to take into account the recommendation of the Institute for the Study of Nationalities, which it created. The idea of decentralization of power had never been fully developed and put into effect.

56 To meet its objectives the POMOA created a massive apparatus parallel to the state administration and set out to recruit cadres for the regime. All the existing social and professional (including the trade union federation) associations were dissolved, and new ones were formed under the aegis of POMOA. It also took charge of the urban dwellers’ associations and turned them into vigilante bodies used in the bloody purge of the opposition that was to follow in early 1977 (Markakis, 1985: 33).

57 The red terror succeeded in destroying the urban base of EPRP. MEISON did not outlast its rival. In August 1977, MEISON was violently suppressed, many of its members falling victim to the red terror they helped to unleash (Markakis, 1985: 34).
The final step in the institutionalization of Mengistu's regime was the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The founding congress of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) was convened on 11 September 1987. At its first session the parliament endorsed the constitution, issued a proclamation that formally established the PDRE, and elected Mengistu Haile Mariam as the President of the Republic. In general, members of the Derg and WPE divided the power among themselves. This gave Mengistu's dictatorial regime a constitutional base to rule Ethiopia up until 1991.

Based on the new constitution the country was divided into 25 administrative, 4 autonomous and 1 special autonomous regions, replacing the former 14 administrative regions. The five regions accorded autonomous status had one thing in common. There was some form of armed resistance against the central government. The government hoped that the new political map of the state would appeal to insurgents, but none of the insurgent movements was tempted to accept the new arrangement. Rather they intensified their armed struggle. Not only the secessionist groups, but also groups who were fighting for a democratic system within the existing Ethiopia rejected the new system. First, the new system did not take into account the demands of the different ethnic groups for genuine autonomy. There was no real distinction between the administrative regions and autonomous regions, only a name. They were all meant to serve as instruments for implementing the decisions of the central government. Secondly, the different political, religious and ethnic groups had never been involved in the whole process. It was designed and implemented by the military junta in different names.

The Intensification of the Civil War and the Collapse of Socialism, and the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

The formation of the PDRE did not solve any of the political problems, especially the civil war in the northern part of the country. What the government did was to ask the insurgent groups to accept the unitary political system established by the ruling group. Even a federal system was not considered as an alternative which could accommodate the demands of the various socio-political groups. The logical reaction of the insurgent groups, especially the Eritrean and Tigrean guerrilla groups, was to intensify the civil war. As usual the government reacted with force but with minimum success. By 1989 the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) started penetrating deep into central Ethiopia. The victory of TPLF over the government forces changed both the domestic and international attitude. The TPLF gained international recognition as a force that could be used to overthrow one of the regimes most hated by the West.

In Eritrea EPLF's (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) strategy of opening another war front outside Eritrea by organizing (assisting) insurgent groups, like TPLF and OLF (Oromo Lib-

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58 Initially the Institute for the Study of Nationalities whose function was to draft a constitution was established. The institute drafted a constitution, which was tailored to meet the requirements of a unitary socialist state. Later on a constitution drafting commission was established by proclamation No. 291, 1986 with the power of drafting the constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 274). The Executive Committee of the commission was composed of the Politburo and Central Committee members of the WPE, Mengistu Haile Mariam as its chairman. The final draft of the constitution was adopted by the congress of the commission in July 1986 and approved by the WPE. Then the people accepted the final draft on the 1 February 1987 referendum orchestrated by the party officials. This was followed by the creation of the Electoral Commission by proclamation No. 314 of 1987. Finally, the election was held on 13 June 1987. Of all elected members of the parliament 93.6% were Party members (Ibid.: 279).

59 (See Haile-Selassie, 1997: 280 for the details).
eration Front), became fruitful. As the government forces were forced to operate on more than one war fronts, it became easier for the EPLF to win victory after victory in Eritrea. By 1989 and 1990, most of Eritrea came under the control of EPLF.

When the balance of power tilted towards the insurgents the government intensified its peace initiative. The Founding Congress of the PDRE appealed to the insurgents to settle their differences with the government by peaceful dialogue. The government further intensified its peace initiative by calling the First Extraordinary Congress of the National Shengo (parliament). The National Shengo (parliament) issued its peace plan. At first both EPLF and TPLF rejected the government initiative. However, as a result of international pressure they agreed to enter into dialogue with the government through Ex-President Carter in August 1989.

In the meantime, the government lost control of most of the northern part of the country north of Addis Ababa to EPLF and TPLF. Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Part (EPRP) also managed to control pockets of territories in different parts of the country. Therefore, when the final peace talk was to be held in London in 1991, the country’s destiny was decided on the war front.

Internally the collapse of the national economy and the intensification of the civil war and, externally the disintegration of the socialist system had their serious impact on the situation in Ethiopia. By the second half of the 1980s, the decline of both agricultural and industrial production, the failure of the national distribution system, the poor performance of the social sector, the disintegration of the country’s infrastructure, and the worsening of corruption brought the country’s economy to the verge of collapse. In short, the socialist experiment failed. In the political arena, the government controlled less and less territory month after month and year after year. Externally, President Reagan’s and Prime Minister Thatcher’s administrations exerted pressure on the socialist countries, especially on Russia, to stop their military assistance to Ethiopia. By 1990, the flow of military assistance from the socialist countries ceased, thereby creating a serious shortage within the military apparatus.

The insurgent groups used this opportunity to control as much territory as possible by defeating the demoralized government forces. The government, to check the mounting internal and international pressure and to improve its chance of remaining in power, declared a new economic policy and a change in the political system. Socialism was discarded and a mixed economy was declared in which the state, co-operative societies and the private sector would flourish in close co-operation in the development of the national economy. Accordingly, a...

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60 Peace talks had been tried on several occasions before the creation of PDRE. On the domestic level a committee composed of 38 Eritrean elders was established in 1974 to make contact with the insurgents and express to them the Derg’s readiness for a negotiated settlement, but the effort failed on account of the insurgents intransigence (Haile-Selassie, 1997: 288).

61 Earlier, in 1976, the military government made similar attempts before the creation of PDRE (see Haile-Selassie, 1997, 288-290, for the details). Other attempts were also made with the help of third parties. First, Cuba, Libya and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen attempted to mediate between EPLF and the government. Then, the German Democratic Republic made an attempt in 1978. However, after three rounds of unproductive discussion the effort was abandoned.

62 TPLF and the government held their talks in Rome in November 1989 and March 1990. With regard to the Eritrean insurgents, the government began talks at two venues simultaneously: in Khartoum with five factions of Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and in Atlanta, Georgia with EPLF in September 1989. The talk with EPLF continued in Nairobi in November 1989 and April 1991 but with no result. In 21 February 1991, the US government managed to bring together the government and EPLF for another discussion ended without any result (see Haile-Selassie, 1997: 293-295).
number of legislative measures, including liberal investment proclamation, were taken. The country's agricultural, foreign trade and housing policies were reversed. 63

The most superficial step was the proposed change in the country's political system. In the Eleventh Plenum of the party it was decided that, the WPE should be replaced with the Ethiopian People's Democratic Unity. The new party, it was declared, will embrace all nationals irrespective of their class, religion, etc. who are genuinely committed to Ethiopia's unity and progress (Haile-Selassie, 1997; 304). This political change did not go far enough to allow a multi-party system. It only proposed to change the name of the governing party and to bring the opposition groups under one political organization controlled by the regime.

Both the economic and political reforms that were proposed by the regime were measures taken in desperation. They were not meant to solve the country's problems, simply to keep the regime in power. Thus, the population received these so-called reforms with serious reservations. The different opposition groups rejected the reforms as superficial and meaningless. The public demand for a complete change of leadership was reflected, among other public demands, in an open letter issued by the Committee for Peace and Reconciliation in Ethiopia appointed by the participants of the Eleventh Conference on Ethiopian Studies, held in Addis Ababa between 1 and 6 April 1991. The Committee, among other things, proposed a peace plan and the establishment of a Council of Elders which would be authorized to appoint a trusteeship government under their control (Ibid.: 308-309). On 19 February 1991, Mengistu Haile Mariam personally rejected the proposal in his televised speech and made it clear that he would not resign. By that time the military situation had deteriorated and the insurgent groups were within 100 kilometers of the capital. Perhaps because of the frustration caused by the advancing insurgent forces, Mengistu Haile Mariam who was to visit the training centres for conscripts, instead landed in Nairobi, Kenya on May 1991 and then flew to Zimbabwe. His defection brought about the end of the regime and the beginning of a new era in the Ethiopian political scene.

The 1991 London peace conference, which was to be chaired by Mr. Herman Cohen, U.S. Assistant secretary of State for African Affairs, was the last and the most controversial attempt for a peaceful settlement of the political crisis. For one thing, the mediator rejected the demand of the government and many opposition groups that all organized opposition political groups should participate in the conference. For another, the talk was not formally held and the parties did not meet and discuss any issue. It was the mediator who decided what was to be done, and how and by whom the political transition in Ethiopia was to be accomplished (see, Haile-Selassie, 1997: 319-320).

However, the need for political transition and the establishment of provisional government was clear. To this end two draft proposals, one by the US government64 and another by the then Ethiopian government65, were formulated. Before the proposals were officially discussed, the US government used the unilateral cease-fire declared by the Acting President of

63 See, Haile-Selassie, 1997: 302, for the details.
65 See Haile-Selassie, 1997: 316-317 for all the details of the counter proposal of the delegation of the Ethiopian government.
Ethiopia as a pretext to invite the EPDRF to take power. The EPDRF took power alone and the golden opportunity for a genuine political transition was missed. EPDRF formed its own transitional government in Addis Ababa and EPLF formed its own transitional government in Asmara. Thus, the Ethiopian state as we knew it in pre-1991 collapsed, and the country effectively became divided into two independent states. The formation of a provisional government in Ethiopia and a provisional government in Eritrea, were undertaken by the US in accords separately entered into with EPDRF and EPLF. The two acts, orchestrated in large measure by the US government, set the stage for the post-Mengistu era. This was the beginning of a new type of dictatorship in both countries.

Institutionalization of Ethnic-based Federalism: Ethiopia to the Unknown

Ethiopia is an interesting example of a country that attempted instant socialist transformation in the 1970s and 1980s and now purportedly engaged in an attempt at liberal democratic transformation. However, Ottaway (1995: 69) observes, as was the case with the previous transformation attempt, the chances that the current transformation would succeed seem very remote for three reasons:

First, the events of the early 1990s - the period after the overthrow of the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam - suggested that the leadership was more interested in retaining its power than in bringing about democracy. ... Second, the conditions for a democratic transformation simply did not exist at that time in Ethiopia. ... Third, the emphasis on democratization as purely formal process that characterized those last few years may in fact decrease the longer term prospect for a democratic transition.

The other major problem for the transformation was the nature of the TPLF. It was an organized based on a single ethnic group to liberate Tigray which is only one province of Ethiopia. Thus, it was regarded with genuine suspicion by the rest of the population, fearful that it would impose the rule of a minority on the entire country. Conscious of the problem, TPLF created other ethnic organizations under its strict control and finally formed EPRDF to claim power in the country at large. Thus, nominally it was EPRDF that controlled the country and took power in 1991. But in fact the EPRDF was simply an instrument of the TPLF. In addition, TPLF had its roots in the student movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, in which Marxism was the fashionable ideology. It was only to secure the support of the West that TPLF made an ideological twist and embraced liberal democracy. Thus, it was clear from the beginning that a TPLF controlled government would not allow a multiparty system to take root in the country. Thus, after TPLF/EPRDF took power in May 1991 it encouraged (even created) the formation of ethnic based political parties (Mengisteab, 1997: 125-126), while preventing the major national parties from working legally in the country. To establish a transitional government a conference was held in Addis Ababa in July 1991, in which the major participants were TPLF/EPRDF, OLF and other newly organized ethnic based political organizations. The conference dominated by ethnic based organizations: (1) adopted a charter and set up the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) (87-member Council of Representatives of which EPRDF and OLF controlled 32 and 12 respectively); (2) agreed on the mo-

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66 Cohen (2000: 51) himself wrote "I earned the enmity of many anti-TPLF Ethiopians, who accused me of 'handing over the city of Addis Ababa to the TPLF's dictatorial rule'"

67 In the discussion below I consciously used direct quotations to minimize the influence of my personal emotions and feelings.

68 During the 1980s, furthermore, the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray, the hard core of TPLF, had proclaimed itself a pro-Albanian movement; that is, one rejecting political and economic liberalization and favoring the unreformed socialism that characterized Albania at that time (Ottaway, 1995; 69).
dalities of a transitional process to last two years, including election for local and regional government, the drafting of a constitution, general election for a constituent assembly to ratify the constitution and finally the election of the new assembly (Ottaway, 1995: 70). Later on, however, OLF and other members of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) left the government for various reasons, leaving EPRDF as the sole governing political organization. Thus, one-party ethnic dictatorship started to take root.

As it was expected, a constitutional commission was established, the constitution was drafted, a constituent assembly was elected in June 1994 under strict control of EPRDF. The draft constitution was ratified on 8 December 1994. Before and after 1994, elections were held at different levels. The major opposition political groups boycotted all those elections. Thus, EPRDF competed with itself and won all elections. This gave EPRDF a monopoly of power in the country at large.

It is obvious, that TPLF/EPRDF as a political organization based on ethnicity, will do everything possible to construct an ethnic based system that can give the party a free hand to implement its policy and keep its power. As Young (1996: 538) correctly points out, '... the best means for the TPLF to retain a leading position in Ethiopia, where Tigrayans constitute a small proportion of the country's population, is to maintain an ethnic-based coalition with elements of the numerically superior Oromo and the historically dominant Amhara. This is best achieved in a state where power is diffused to ethnic based administrations in the regions.' That was and still is what EPRDF did and is doing. What this implies is, first, if the country is divided into different ethnic groups and the political parties are based on ethnicity, there will be no strong national opposition, which can challenge EPRDF. When the ethnic parties engage themselves in their respective local politics, EPRDF as the so-called national organization will be free to implement its policies. Second, if the state is reconstructed as a federal state, TPLF will have a legal base to develop Tigray by transferring the country's resources. Third, EPRDF is well aware that it will not win in a free and fair election if the strong national parties and the major ethnic organizations such as the All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and The Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) are allowed to compete. Therefore, EPRDF prevented the national parties from participating in the country's politics. It also imprisoned, tortured, and harassed leaders and members of the larger ethnic organizations and closed their offices except in the capital city and forced them to boycott all the major elections. As a result, EPRDF successfully managed to have overall control of the country. From then on EPRDF became free to institutionalize its rule, implement its policies and restructure the country along ethnic lines.

The 1994 constitution endorsed EPRDF's policy of ethnic federalism and established the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The country is divided into seven ethnic and one multiethnic states, and three ethnically mixed city-states. However, there is great variation among the different states. This is mainly because in drawing their boundaries little attention was given to their respective geographical size, population density, resource bases, level of infrastructure, existing administrative capacity, or ability to generate tax revenue (Cohen, 1995: 164). The only major criterion used to draw the boundaries was ethnicity. The major

49 Under the constitution: (1) the federal government is headed by a Prime Minister and a nominal Head of State; (2) The legislative function is performed by two parliamentary chambers based on a division of labour rather than different bicameral powers, namely upper house, or Council of Federation (CF), appointed by ethnic groups, and a lower house, the Council of People's Representatives (CPR), comprised of representatives elected by a secret ballot every five years; and (3) the Prime Minister is elected by the dominant party in the lower house of the elected representatives.
factor in identifying the various ethnic groups was language. In addition, despite the constitution’s statements on the state and federal powers, it is not clear how much power will be devolved to and exercised by the states, and which regions will benefit the most. In the words of John Young (1996: 539):

> It remains to be seen whether devolution of power to the regions will present real decentralization of power, or simply deconcentration, with the national government still retaining dominant power, irrespective of constitutional provisions. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the EPRDF in its party guise has assumed control of assets and functions held by the state, notably in the economic sphere. While the EPRDF in the state is busily shedding enterprises acquired or created by the Derg, its agents and associates are in turn purchasing and managing these same assets.

Thus, Young (1996; 539) concludes, ‘... the success of regional administration, apart from Tigray, is uncertain.’ From what has been seen in the last eight years it is TPLF and Tigray which benefitted the most at the expense of the rest of Ethiopia. If the ethnic emphasis is combined with economic problem, as Abbink (1997: 174) suggests, it would ‘lead to ethnocentrism, regional economic disparity and a reproduction of inequality on the intermediate level of the new ethno-regional states, then one wonders what is new, and whether the Ethiopian people have won anything yet by the constitutional recognition of their being ethnically separate.’

A more serious problem in the constitution is the question of self-determination. According to Article 39.1 of the Constitution ‘every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’ (Young, 1996: 531). It should be noted that the acknowledgment of the ‘right of secession’ is an extreme interpretation of ‘national self-determination’. As Abbink (1997: 172-173) points out, ‘no other constitution of a democratic country has a clause stating this right,.... Ethiopia is special, but not so special that such a principle is needed.... the concept of secession has no validity as a feature of democratic governance.’ The danger attached is not only the extreme interpretation of the right of nations for self-determination but also the failure of implementation. The central government retains all real power at the central level. This ambivalent formula will in itself encourage a radicalization of demands for separatism of ethno-regions or ‘nationalities’, once they realize that the government is not serious about it (Ibid.).

Identifying which social groups are nations, nationalities or peoples is also another problem. As Abbink (1997: 166) comments:

> These three terms are seen as equivalent and defined as communities having the following characteristics: ‘people having a common culture reflecting considerable uniformity or similarity of customs, a common language, belief in a common bond and identity, and a common consciousness the majority of whom live within a common territory’.... This definition is questionable and contains contradictory elements. Not all groups identifying themselves as a community do so on the basis of all these criteria, only on a number of them, and some groups may primarily refer to territory, economic, religious or even a sub-ethnic clan identification (which allies them with people from other ethnic groups).

Moreover, it does not make sense for people who are born from mixed linguistic group families to identify with this or that group (there are millions of them in Ethiopia).

Furthermore, the constitution guaranteed the right of self-determination to nations, nationalities and peoples. However, there is no overlap between member states and nations, nationalities and peoples. Thus, there arises confusion as to what the real sovereign units are and how
many can claim their separate status. Already many groups have started claiming a separate status, which is complicating the administrative level of the country (Ibid: 167).

There are other risks attached to an ethnic based federation and the process of devolution. The most serious one may be internal violence and the disintegration of the country into many mini-states. As Cohen (1995: 168) argues:

... devolution to large regions reinforces the demands of some ethnic groups for regional secession and partition. This risk is compounded by the fact that the TGE's federal strategy can generate internal violence when ethnic majorities are intolerant towards minority groups in their jurisdictions, as has been the case in the Southern Peoples' Administration and Somali regions. A further risk is that the promotion of devolved ethnic government hampers central government efforts to build a democratic system, for the emerging regions based on ethnic parties have frequently disagreed with the governance system and electoral rules being formulated at the centre. Finally, regional-based ethnicity is a development risk because it limits the movement of capital and manpower required to take advantage of economic opportunities, creates entitlement that can block development, and leads to irrational use of energy and other resources. In this regard, it threatens to disenfranchise a number of Ethiopians who, over the past few decades, have moved into regions dominated by other ethnic groups, most notably northern farmers who were resettled in the south during the Mengistu era.

It is also to be questioned how a market economy, to which the EPRDF government is said to be committed will be reconciled with the creation of ethnic based mini-states. A market economy needs the free movement of capital and manpower. The creation of ethnic based states will restrict the movement of capital and manpower within the respective ethnic origins. The measure taken by many ethnic states to send thousands of teachers and other civil servant to their respective ethnic origin is a good example.

Ethnicity is not only used for the political restructuring of the country. It has also been used to restructure the country's educational system and the civil organizations. The objective in this regard is to minimize the power of these organizations in challenging the policies of the government by fragmenting them into smaller and weaker ethnic organizations.

All this has been done in the name of democracy and the right of self-determination of the people. In reality, however, Ethiopia is fragmented into many ethnic states and it may go on to further fragmentation. Thus, as Ottaway (1995: 79) perfectly argues:

The fragmentation of the Ethiopia polity should not be confused with decentralization. It is, of course, possible for a political system to be decentralized as well as democratic. Democracy can thrive in a federal system or one with strong local and regional governments. But these are systems where a common national arena exists in addition to the local and regional ones, and the same parties compete in all. Furthermore, in a decentralized, democratic system, there is agreement on the

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70 Already there were instances where some groups rejected their inclusion into regions which they believe they do not belong to (See, Cohen, 1995: 187).
71 Every ethnic state, according to the constitution, has been encouraged to choose not only the medium of instruction (language used in schools) in its school system but also the type of alphabet to be used. As a result, currently Ethiopia uses three different alphabets (the Ethiopian, the Latin and the Arabic). This politically motivated policy is aimed at exaggerating the differences between the different ethnic groups and at the same time undermining the use of the Ethiopian alphabet. The government also attempted to reorganize civil organizations on the basis of ethnicity. The two major examples are the Ethiopian trade union and the Ethiopian Teachers Association.
72 The Ethiopian trade union has been strongly challenging the policy of the government on structural adjustment programmes while the Ethiopia Teachers Association opposed the ethnically based educational policy which was not based on relevant research and did not involve any popular participation.
unity of the state and a determination to maintain it intact. In Ethiopia, major political players were uncertain whether to stay in one country or cause it to divide.

Ottaway (Ibid.: 81) further points out that there can be no democracy in Ethiopia as long as ethnic fragmentation continues. ... It seems likely that the level of ethnic conflict will increase in Ethiopia in the foreseeable future, making democracy a distant prospect.' In other words, 'separation of ethnic groups is unlikely to prevent conflicts as long as the factors that lead to conflict such as unequal access to resources, and uneven distribution of power, are not carefully addressed and mechanisms for economic, political and social integration of the different social entities are not developed' (Mengisteab, 1997: 117). In general, the reconstruction of the Ethiopian state exclusively on ethnic lines has been unprecedented. It is a very risky and expensive experiment. It is hardly possible to see which way the country is going. Even the Prime Minister, the main architect of ethnic federalism, openly admitted that 'he did not really know where Ethiopia was going' (Cited in Abbink, 1997: 172).

9.2.3 The Sudan

Sudan, since independence on 1 January 1956, oscillated between Westminster-style parliamentary democracy and military rule (in the name of socialism or otherwise). The political leaders adopted different ideologies: liberalism, socialism and Islamic 'fundamentalism'. Though different styles of government were established and different ideologies were adopted, Sudan failed to solve its problems. The political crisis that started immediately before independence has continued up until now without any durable solution. Sudan is a country where not only civilian governments were overthrown by military coups, but also where long years of military rule were ended by popular uprisings when an unarmed populace forced juntas out of office with virtually no violence or bloodshed on 21 October 1964 and 5 April 1985 (Bechtold, 1991: 2).

Sudan from Independence to the Adoption of Socialism

The first post-colonial government of Sudan was led by Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari of the National Unionist Party (NUP) until July 1956 and was followed by another government under his Umma Party rival, Abdallah Khalil (Bechtold, 1991: 3; Anderson, 1999: 11). During this period the political actors in the Sudanese politics began splitting into four groups. Commenting on this development, Woodward (1990: 100) writes:

Before independence the split had been the two co-dominis, the Sudan government, and the Sudanese. ...; but in the post-independence situation liberal democracy had once more produced a complex alignment. Two sectarian parties, with predominant support in the rural areas of northern Sudan, were competing with a self-proclaimed secular party, the NUP, while the fourth element, the south, was still largely estranged from the political process. The emergence of this situation had deep roots and had been clearly signposted.73 And while three of the four elements (the major parties) wrangled, the neglected southern problem was still ticking away like the time bomb it had already shown itself capable of becoming in August 1955.

This means that one of the major problems from the start was the issue of Southern Sudan. There had been a discussion in the parliament to consider a federal arrangement as solution for this problem. However, the committee74 that was in charge rejected federalism outright.

73 See the previous chapter on the historical roots of the situation.
74 Only three of the forty-six members were southerners, and they remained a minority in the subcommittee that examined the federal issue.
This rejection obviously was strongly resented by southern members of the parliament who felt it was a betrayal of the promises by northern political leaders at independence (Ibid.:101). Thus, the problem remained unresolved and was inherited by the military government. On 17 November 1958 Sudan's first experiment in liberal democracy ended when General Abboud, the army commander, took power (Anderson, 1999: 12). This was mainly the result of the failure of the parliament to form an effective coalition government and improve the poor economic performance of the country. Following the coup a new presidential government was formed with emergency powers vested in President Abboud, together with a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. As in many military coups a state of emergency was declared, political parties and trade unions dissolved, and the free and open press came under strict control.

As time passed the military government became more coercive and the national economy began declining. This gave rise to public protest from different segments of society followed by a call in November 1960 by party leaders for the restoration of parliamentary government. The Sudan Communist Party (SCP) played a major role in this protest and became the most clear-cut opposition to the military government (Ibid.). In the South dissatisfaction and resistance was indicated by the emergence of different political groups abroad and within Southern Sudan, especially by the emergence of the Anya Nya and the beginning of attacks on military targets. The development in the South provided the spark for a new outburst of public anger against the military regime, especially for university students and the trade unions under the leadership of the SCP. Faced with such widespread and coordinated opposition the military regime handed over power on 26 October 1964, in a deal with the National Front of Professionals (Woodward, 1990: 108). The October Revolution, as it was called, brought two important new forces onto the country's political scene: the Muslim Brotherhood, whose political organization then called itself the Islamic Charter Front, and the Communist Party of Sudan (Voll, 1991: 3).

After the military regime handed over power a broad transitional government was created. A new cabinet in which five parties were represented (two southerners were also included) was formed. However, in no time the various elements of the transitional government began to diverge on the issue of the coming election, the problem of the South and on the share of power in the new parliament (Woodward, 1990: 110). In spring 1965, six months after the transitional government was formed, general elections were held in areas unaffected by the civil war in the South, parliamentary rule returned (in May 1965) and Sadiq Al-Mahdi became the Prime Minister (Voll, 1991: 3, Anderson, 1999: 12). But the old rivalry between the political parties and their leaders for power and the usual political intrigue intensified. At the same time, the southern politicians started a campaign of aggressive regionalism. This was evident at the Round Table Conference on the South held in Khartoum from 16-25 March 1965. In the conference, federation or separation had been proposed. Finally, as the conference drifted towards deadlock, a more orthodox federal system was proposed, but it did little to rescue the main conference from collapse (Woodward, 1990: 113).

The political system constructed following the 1965 election had two major problems: it was chronically incapable of forming a stable government; and it was unable to produce adequate government policies, which combined resulted in damaging political effects on the different parts of the country, most notably the South. Generally, looking at the politics of Sudan during the first one and a half decades of independence, Woodward (Ibid.: 133-134) concludes:

Party politics from 1956 to 1969 (excluding the military period) had obvious weaknesses, especially in the way the Westminster model worked. It produced two dominant parties in the north, but no
comparable representation for the south; and when converted into government it worked out as unstable coalition cabinets with factionalism within the big parties and opportunism in the smaller ones. That led to neglect of policy or effective oversight of the administration, and the whole system encouraged disillusionment and a new interest in parties offering radical alternatives, whether of the left or the right.

In 1969, thus, the political, economic, and security conditions resembled those of 1958, before Aboud’s takeover, and public confidence in liberal democracy eroded (Voll, 1991: 3).

Institutionalization of the Numeiri Regime, Political Challenge and Socialism in Sudan

During much of the latter part of 1968 and early 1969 political parties were occupied with the formation of a coalition government. Unfortunately, however, on 25 May 1969 the military again intervened and took power. The coup d’etat (known as the beginning of the May Revolution) was carried out by middle-ranking officers, who dismantled the parliamentary regime and arrogated power to a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) headed by Colonel Jaafa Numeiri (Markakis, 1985: 15; Anderson, 1999: 12). This was the second military intervention in thirteen years of independence. The initial stance of the military government was not radical, and the justification offered for the coup was more or less nationalistic. It was on the first anniversary of the coup that socialism was declared. Even then, what precisely was envisaged in the name of socialism was not clear. Numeiri, in his speech on 16 July 1970, gave his version of ‘Sudanese socialism’, cautioning against dogmatism and copying foreign models, and declaring ‘we want to draw from all schools of socialism that which will benefit our Sudan’ (Ibid.16). In November of the same year, a National Charter was issued dedicating the regime to ‘scientific socialism’. As in the cases of both Ethiopia and Somalia, a series of nationalization decrees were announced on 25 May 1970. They affected mainly foreign enterprises, including banks, and several concerns owned by Sudanese living abroad (Ibid.). The SCP played a significant role in the formulation of the nationalization policies (Woodward, 1990: 138).

The first domestic opposition against the military regime came from the fundamentalist sectarian groups, the Ansar and the Muslim Brothers, who were disturbed by the soldiers’ radical posture and the political prominence attained by the communists and other radicals, as well as the strengthening of ties with Egypt, where the Muslim Brothers had been suppressed by Nasser. However, in March 1970 the challenge from the right was easily contained by force (Markakis, 1985: 17). Then came the challenge from the left. The problem started when the RRC demanded the dissolution of political parties and suggested that their members join a national movement of progressive elements to be organized by the regime. In addition, the SCP was not happy with Numeiri’s idea of uniting Sudan with Egypt and Libya (Woodward, 1990: 139). To destroy the opposition the RCC dismissed three of its members as sympathizers of SCP, in November 1970. Thirteen other officers with alleged links to the SCP were dismissed and a purge of communists in the government service was launched (Markakis, 1985: 18). The SCP’s affiliated organizations, including the trade union, were dismantled and new social and professional organizations were formed by the regime to replace them. The press was nationalized in August, and it was announced that a new political party patterned on the Arab Socialist Union of Egypt was to be created (Ibid.).

75 In 1968, another election was held in the North and in the South the election postponed from 1965 to 1967 was held in the same year (Woodward, 1990: 112).
The communist party participated in the 19 July 1971 aborted coup to overthrow the Numeiri regime. This was followed by several reprisals by the government. The coup leaders and many of their supporters were executed, including the SCP's secretary-general, the trade union leader and a prominent southerner (Woodward, 1990: 140). Numeiri urged the Sudanese to hunt 'every renegade communist who belong to the communist party' (Markakis, 1985: 18). Many were jailed, and many more lost their jobs. The result was a severe setback for the left.

Having subdued the opposition, the RCC started creating its own political structures with the proclamation of an interim constitution in August 1971. The constitution renamed the state the Sudan Democratic Republic and described it as a socialist state founded on the alliance of the 'people's active forces, that is, farmers, workers, soldiers, nationalist intelligentsia and national capitalists (Ibid.: 19). In October 1971, Gaafar Numeiri assumed the office of president and dissolved the RCC. Then the regime proceeded to reorganize a network of associations, including town and village development communities, professional organizations, youth and women's groups, which were to form the building blocks of the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU).

The SSU was founded in January 1972 and became the supreme political authority over all organs and activities of the state, and its structure was designed to parallel the state administration at all levels. Democratic centralism became its principle to govern its internal organization. However, the actual emphasis was on centralism, with the president of the SSU, who was also the president of the Republic, enjoying wider powers, including the right to name all top SSU officials and half the members of its central committee (Ibid.).

In 1973, the process of institutionalization continued with the promulgation of a permanent constitution. Sudan was proclaimed as a unitary, democratic, socialist republic. Contrary to what was proclaimed, however, the regime established a form of government in which an all-powerful president not only had absolute executive power but also held substantial legislative power (Ibid., see also Woodward, 1990: 148). It is also important to point out that the constitution preserved the key elements of northern Sudanese nationalism. Islamic law and customs were to be the main source of legislation, and Arabic remained the official language. However, Christianity was granted official recognition and customary law was sanctioned for non-Muslims, in order to facilitate the rapprochement with the southern rebels (Markakis, 1985: 20).

The other aspect of the institutionalization of the regime and Numein's government important achievement was the settlement of the conflict in the South on the basis of a political compromise that preserved the unity of the state while granting regional autonomy for southern Sudan. In the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement the South did not attain equal status with the North in a federal system, however, it attained a large measure of self-government within a unitary state (Markakis, 1985: 20; see also Anderson, 1999: 68-69).

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76 After the 1971 coup and execution of the communists the relations with the Soviet Union soured and Soviet ceased its aid. As a result, the Sudanese military forces were left without a supplier from abroad. It became difficult, therefore, for the government to continue its policy of solving the conflict by force. This was one contributing factor for the granting of regional autonomy to Southern Sudan.


This agreement was criticized by elements in both North and South. The northern elements of the old parties criticized the agreement, as it was a sellout to the rebels. ‘In the South the situation was more uncertain, especially given the understandable danger of fragmentation and criticism from secessionists’ (Woodward, 1990: 143). With all the criticisms the agreement was implemented and used as a major step in promoting Numeiri’s leadership.

In 1973, an election was held in the South as a result of which a new High Executive Council, a Regional Assembly and new regional administration were established. This was the first time that southern politicians had had their own institutions to run and their own political relations to manage. With regard to the South’s involvement in national politics, though Alier continued as vice-president and there was the usual quota of southern ministers in minor posts, the region remained essentially attached to, rather than incorporated in, the national political system (Ibid.: 146).

In 1980, the Regional Government Act was issued, which established five regions in the North. Administratively, according to this act, there was a significant degree of devolution in many areas with regions eventually taking responsibility for all except foreign affairs, defence, foreign trade, and mineral and natural resources (Ibid.: 154). However, the central government remained in a strong overall position because of its financial control.

**The introduction of Sharia, Numeiry’s continuous intervention in the South and their consequences**

Though socialism in Sudan was long dead, Numeiri’s complete ideological shift came in September 1983 when the Sharia was introduced. The Sharia law was implemented, despite opposition from both North and South, with severe consequences. In the same year, Numeiri’s intervention in the politics of Southern Sudan, disregarding the constitution, culminated in the re-division of the region into three. This gave rise to the feeling in the South that the Addis Ababa Agreement was no longer the basis of the relationship between the central government and the South, since Numeiri appeared to disregard it. This situation endangered the autonomy of the South and the relative peace created on the basis of the Addis Ababa Agreement.

Two other developments aggravated the situation. First, Sudan and Egypt announced that they would jointly build a canal at Jonglei. This was seen by the southerners as an example of Sudanese-Egyptian integration which might lead to further marginalization and discrimination against the South, the continuation of northern exploitation and danger to the environment (Woodward, 1990: 160). Second, the discovery of oil brought great uncertainties, especially regarding the intentions of the central government. Two issues were crucial here: the location of the oil field in relation to the borders of the southern region and the refinery. With regard to the location of the oil field a new region, Unity Region, between North and South including the main oil field was announced (Ibid.). Concerning the refinery the southerners were keen that the oil be refined at Bentiu (within the south), so that it would give a considerable boost to the regional economy as well as bargaining power for the region. However, the government announced that the location of the proposed refinery would not be at Bentiu but Kosti in the North. Worse than that it was consequently announced that instead of refining in Sudan, a pipeline could be built to the Red Sea coast for the export of crude oil. These announcements were taken by the southerners as a clear betrayal by the central government. The

79 Abel Alier was elected as the president of the High Executive Council in Southern Sudan in 1973 (Woodward, 1990: 144).
dissatisfaction and frustration of the population in the South by the actions of the central government (especially the introduction of the Sharia law, the division of the South into three regions, the construction of the canal and the location of the oil refinery) helped SPLA in achieving significant support and sympathy from the population. Thus, within a short time the SPLA attracted many people who were trained to use firearms, and it turned into a well-equipped and capable guerrilla army. Furthermore, SPLA established its political wing, the Sudan Popular Liberation Movement, which included northerners as well as southerners living outside Sudan. By the end of 1984 SPLA started its attack on government facilities, which forced the central government to stop its work on the canal and the oil field. The military struggle to contain the guerrillas put a heavy burden on the already impoverished economy. The return of widespread civil war and the collapse of the Addis Ababa agreement together with the collapse of the economy eroded Numeiry’s credibility and endangered his regime. But the worst was to come.

Different professional organizations began to challenge the regime with various economic demands. In 1983, judges and lawyers and in 1984 doctors went on strike. At the same time, the implementation of economic austerity policies triggered riots, after which the Professional Front decided to launch their campaign of demonstrations and strikes. As in October 1964 the protest snowballed rapidly. Numeiri returned as far as Egypt, but in April 1985 he was persuaded not to board a plane to return to Khartoum, and his sixteen years of rule were at an end (Anderson, 1999: 14). Woodward (1990: 164) correctly summarized Numeiri’s rule as follows:

Numeiri’s coup of 1969 had turned Sudan inside out and upside down in the sixteen years that he had remained in power, sometimes by the skin of his teeth. Ideologically the regime had moved from left to right across the political spectrum. In its attempt to build social bases it had sought to work with communists, the southerners, and the religious groups, but always ultimately on its own terms. Institutionally it had made peace in the south and established a regional government there (and later also introduced regionalism in the north) and established a permanent constitution as well. Presidentialism, however, was to be interpreted in ways that undermined the very institution created, even to the point of reopening civil war in the south. Above all, the man who had begun as a little known officer and primus inter pares in the Revolutionary Command Council had moved from the degree of support of neo-patrimonial ruler into a sultan seen by many as a devil incarnate and the sources of all Sudan’s woes.

In short, Numeiri’s attempt at state-building ended in failure. At the end of his rule Numeiri left Sudan with the many problems he inherited. The complicated party rivalry and political maneuvering in the North and the civil war in the South remained unsolved or even worsened. The North and the South remained further apart than ever. The national economy deteriorated to the verge of collapse. Religion was mixed up with politics.

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80 In 1983, there were waves of mutinies of which the most important mutiny was at Bor, where ex-Anyu Nya officer Lieutenant colonel John Garang de Mabior attempted to mediate (ibid.; 162). However, rather than mediating he was persuaded to defect to the mutineers and led them to the border to Ethiopia, where he was swiftly established as leader of what became the Sudan People’s Liberation army (SPLA).
81 SPLA got help not only from Ethiopia and Libya, but also from Cuba (Woodward, 1990: 162).
82 Numeiri was in the United States at the time.
Back to Civilian Rule Again

Initially the army was reluctant to move against the Numeiri regime. In fact, the army expressed its support for the regime as late as 1 April 1985 (Kok, 1996: 21). However, some leaders of the political parties and of the trade unions approached the army to seize power (Ibid.: 22): civilian political leaders used the army to overthrow a military regime. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) seized power on 6 April 1985 and a few days later announced the formation of a condominium rule over the Sudan: Transitional Military Council (TMC) and Council of Ministers (Anderson, 1999: 14; Kok, 1996: 23). The TMC, among other things, abrogated the Permanent Constitution of 1973, dismissed President Numeiri, declared a state of emergency, dissolved the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the Council of Ministers, and the notorious State Security Bureau (Kok, 1996: 25). It is important to note, however, that the demand for the cancellation of the 1983/84 Sharia law, which was one of the basic grievances in the popular struggle against the Numeiri regime, did not get any attention at all.

On 10 October 1985, a Transitional Constitution was adopted by the TMC. A number of points should be noted here. First, the constitution was prepared behind closed doors by lawyers with strong Islamic views and tendencies. Second, for the first time since independence there was no Southern Sudan representative in the drafting committee. Third, the constitution recognized Sharia and custom as the main sources of legislation.

The TMC organized the March 1986 election and transferred power to the elected government, Sadiq Al-Mahdi as the head (Anderson, 1999: 25). However, the election was a partial election. Because of the war in the South the election could not be carried out in 29 of the 68 territorial constituencies (Woodward, 1990: 207). The Constituent Assembly was therefore generally seen by most Southerners as a Northern Assembly with no legitimacy to legislate for all the country (Kok, 1996: 43). The coalition government collapsed on August 1987 (Woodward, 1990: 209; Anderson, 1999: 33-36). Then a 'Government of National Reconciliation' was formed in 1988, which was unable to tackle the country's fundamental problems, especially the problem of the South and the national economy (Anderson, 1999: 35). Describing the situation, Woodward (1990: 209) wrote, '... it was difficult to tell the difference between the periods with a government in power and those without, so little policy was being formulated and implemented. When government existed there was endless speculation about its internal problems and speculation about its collapse; and when there was no government there was equally endless speculation about who would be in the next cabinet.'

With regard to the problem of the South, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the Prime Minister, and John Garang, leader of the SPLA, met to discuss the possibility for peaceful settlement of the problem. This was a follow up of the Koka Dam Declaration. However, they could not agree on two fundamental issues: the immediate lifting of the State of Emergency (since it implied that

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83 In a letter to President Numeiri, who was then on a state visit to the USA, the Army commander, Lieutenant General Abd al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhabab, stressed that 'SAF will remain true to their oath of loyalty and would firmly move against renegades and traitors' (Kok, 1996: 21).
84 The TMC's major objectives for the transitional period included: (1) the containment of the vestiges of the past regime in the economic, political and cultural fields; (2) the preparation of a national programme for the restoration of human rights under the rule of law; (3) the resolution of the war in the South through dialogue and on the basis of equality of rights and duties; (4) the restoration of life to the south by opening up transport and communication routes; (5) rescuing the national economy; (6) the supervision of a transition to democracy; and (7) the strengthening of the SAF (Kok,1996: 23).
85 For detailed discussion of the Constitution see Kok, 1996: 26-34.
86 According to Kok (1996: 43), it was in 41 territorial constituencies that the election was not held.
the SPLA was not a legitimate body) and the abolishing of the Sharia law (Woodward, 1990: 210, Anderson, 1999: 74). Thus, the meeting was over without any result and the military conflict continued (Kok, 1996: 59-76). In December 1988 another attempt was made to break the deadlock by direct talks with the SPLA. But the different political parties, for different reasons, did not accept this initiative. Instead, the army finally broke the deadlock. In early 1989, with further setbacks in the military field, the army put forward a memorandum calling for a faster pursuit of the peace process. However, with the political scene thrown into greater confusion than ever, the possibility of another military coup seemed very close (Woodward, 1990: 213).

Sudan Back to Military Rule and the Islamization of Politics

As was expected, the continuing loss of confidence on both sides, the army and the government, finally sparked the coup of 30 June 1989, led by Brigadier General Umer Hassan Ahmed. After he took power, Al-Bashir established a fifteen-man Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). And became chairman of the RCC, Prime Minister, and Defence Minister. The RCC also appointed a largely civilian Council of Ministers, which operated under the instruction of the RCC (Lesch, 1998: 114). On its first day in power, as usual, the RCC annulled the constitution, abolished the elected assembly, banned political parties and unions, and closed down the newspapers.

The initial justifications for the military’s intervention were typical of most coup d’etats.\(^{88}\) There was a strong involvement from the National Islamic Front (NIF), which was committed to establishing an Islamic state in Sudan.\(^ {89}\) This was what Al-Bashir had to say in underlining the aim of creating an Islamic state and emphasizing the officer’s close relation with NIF: ‘when the revolution began (in July 1989) … the leadership of the NIF met and decided to … join the authorities. We needed a number of their cadres…. We are trying to apply (Islamic) text gradually and intend to establish an Islamic state in Sudan. … We have programs for comprehensive Islamic daw’a (call)’ (Lesch, 1998: 113). To implement this objective a shadowy Council of Forty, chaired by Turabi, set the regime’s strategy behind the official bodies. Thus, when the Islamic legal code was promulgated in 1991, the NIF leaflet claimed that ‘the zero hour is near and the Islamic Republic will be declared in Sudan’ (Ibid.: 117).

The Bashir’s regime, despite the talk of election, announced the establishment of a 330-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) in January 1992 to institutionalize its rule. However, since the appointment of the TNA lacked credibility and legitimacy, the regime was forced to organize elections. Thus, local elections were held in the fall of 1994 and regional elections the in spring of 1995. Political parties were banned from participating in both elections. The elections for the National Assembly and the presidency were held from 6 to 17 March 1996. In the South, however, the voting was cancelled for security reasons and the constitutional decree authorized the president to appoint MPs for those forty-six seats, pending election (Ibid.: 124). Bashir ran for president against forty-nine other candidates. The result was not surprising: he won 75.5 percent of the vote (Ibid.: 125).

\(^{88}\) See Lesch, 1998: 114, for the details.

\(^{89}\) Formed in the late 1940s, the NIF became a serious force after mid-1960 under Hasan Al-Turabi (Anderson, 1999: 31).
On 1 April Turabi was elected Speaker of the National Assembly. Thus, for the first time since 1989 Turabi assumed a central public role. The new cabinet composition was also dominated by NIF. In general, the Islamic elements managed to control political power.

The other attempt made to institutionalize the regime was the establishment of a federal system on 4 February 1991. By Decree, each of the nine provinces became states in which Islamic law would govern all aspects of public and private life, 'since the Muslim majority should have the right to practice the values and rules of their religion to their full range - in personal, familial, social or public affairs' (Ibid.: 126). The real power, however, remained in the hands of the central government, since the national law prevailed over regional law and the federal president appoints the governors and state administrators. The central government even altered regional borders to remove valuable resources from the South to the North.

The process of establishing an Islamist political system was further consolidated when the National Founding Conference for the Political System (April-May 1991) adopted a National Charter for Political Action which emphasized that 'our intellectual, spiritual and cultural values spring from our subservience to one God and our belief that He is the sole authority in this world and the world after' (Ibid.: 129). It was further indicated that adherence to those principles 'is the only guarantee for a righteous society' and jihad (holy war) against internal and external threats is a religious obligation (Ibid.). The government established in October 1993, thus, made commitment to Islam as the guiding religion obligatory for citizens. The religious scholars who met in Kordofan in 1992 issued Islamic legal opinion stating: 'he who is a Muslim among the rebels is an apostate, and non-Muslims a heathen ... both standing in the face of the Islamic call (dawa), and it is the duty of Islam to fight and kill both categories' (Ibid.). This means that the civil war in the South was elevated to a holy struggle to defend Islam against its enemies and to spread the Islamic faith.

The National Islamic Front (NIF) the major force behind the complete Islamization of Sudan restructured the army, the security structure and the civic and professional associations in line with its religious doctrine. The media was also reorganized so that they would reflect the Islamic values, mobilize the public behind the national goal of Islamization of the regime and protect the Sudan from the western mass invasion. Sudan, as a result, is defined as a purely Arab-Islamic state. This means that the African groups would have no place within the nation-state and territorial nationalism would be a hollow concept. This exclusivist definition of the nation led to renewed calls for secession by residents of the South (Lesch, 1998: 146-147). In short, the transformation of the Sudan into an Islamic state destroyed the possibility of solving the problem of the South and shattered the vision of constructing a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Sudan.

The North-South Conflict continued

As indicated above, there had been a number of attempts to solve the problem of the south under the various regimes (Anderson, 1999). As a continuation, the RCC started its attempt

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90 The three states in the South were exempted from a few Islamic punishments (Lesch, 1998: 126).

91 See, Lesch, 1998: 126, for the details.

92 See Lesch, 1998: 127, for some of the border changes.

93 For the details, see Anderson, 1999: 67-69, 73-74, 81-84, and 99-107.
by working out its official negotiation position at a National Dialogue Conference on Peace, held in Khartoum from 9 September to 21 October 1989. The conference recommended that Sharia should be applied through a federal system under which a region could exempt itself from certain Islamic punishment, but a non-Muslim living in the North would be fully subject to Sharia (Lesch, 1998: 168). The RCC and the cabinet endorsed the recommendation. The SPLM in its part made it clear that peace was possible only if the RCC restored democracy and held a constitutional conference.  

The two sides, though they had very different visions on the future of Sudan, agreed to negotiate. Neighbouring countries, regional and international organizations all initiated and participated in the peace talks between the two sides. Some of the major peace talks were:

2. The Nairobi peace talk held on 1 December 1989 arranged and chaired by Jimmy Carter.
3. The Abuja I (held from 26 May to 4 June 1992) and Abuja II (held from 26 April to 18 May 1993) peace talks initiated by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
4. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) initiative. The first meeting was held in Kenya in March 1994, the second meeting was held from 17-22 May 1994, the third round was held from 18-29 July 1994, and the fourth round was held from 5-7 September 1994.

In addition, a number of similar attempts were made after 1994 to bring a peaceful solution to the chronic problem of southern Sudan. However, all attempts failed to bring the two sides closer for a peaceful solution. Because the two sides had and still have serious differences on the following major issues: (1) the SPLM insisted on the separation of religion and the state while the government insisted that Sharia remain the supreme public law in a unified Sudan. (2) The SPLM proposed a confederation, with each state establishing its own legal system while the government rejected confederation and insisted on its current federal formula, the South’s division into several states. (3) The SPLM argued that the south confederal state would control the resources of the region, especially petroleum, while the government insisted that the central government would control the resources since they are common to all Sudanese. (4) The SPLM proposed to hold a referendum to choose between confederation and independence while the government rejected the idea of a referendum which might allow the south to secede (Ibid.: 177-178). This means that since neither side is willing to compromise its core belief, no peaceful solution would be possible. The result, as it has been since Sudan got her independence, will be protracted civil war and may be the disintegration of the country.

To sum up what has been discussed above, in the three Horn of Africa countries, the unsuccessful process of national-state building based on strong centralism, the resulting ongoing crises and the failure to peacefully solve them can be attributed to the following dynamics:

1. The unwillingness and the inability of the relevant social, economic and political forces (organized or otherwise) to forge some sort of national negotiated consensus on the fun-

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94 According to SPLM, this required four steps (Lesch, 1998: 168-169): (1) the establishment of an interim broad-based government of national unity; (2) the establishment of a national, nonsectarian, non-regional army from both the SPLA and the regular, army (3) the convening of the national constitutional conference by the interim government; and (4) ratification of the constitution by the constituent assembly, and the establishment of a democracy based government.

fundamentals of state and national-state building. This implies, among other things, constructing a strong new political community and creating a political structure in which a new order of political accountability and representation is clearly defined and constructing a strong national identity which can reflect all the different ethnic/tribal, regional and religious groups.

2. The striving, by the forces of hegemony, be they ethnic/tribal, religious, regional and/military clique, to impose their vision of state and nation-building.

3. The resistance of that vision by the marginal people of the countries and their general struggle for justice, freedom and cultural self-affirmation.

4. The conflict of interests over the control of the important resources of the countries. The hegemonic forces in each country try to maintain their absolute control of the resources while the marginalized groups demand the share they deserve.

By national-state building means putting in place institutions which respond to the legitimate needs of the citizens with efficiency and fairness and which have a built-in system of accountability and representation of the various groups. In multinational (multitribal in the case of Somalia) states like Sudan and Ethiopia, national-state building should ensure that such institutions effectively and fairly reflect the ethnic/tribal, regional, religious and cultural diversity of the countries. Such a process should not only involve the promotion of the well-being of the people through socio-economic and cultural development, but also create a sense of belonging, and pride in belonging to the national-state (Kok, 1996: 11). A viable process of national-state building should be procedurally democratic in a sense that it should be willingly and freely arrived at by the participation of all the relevant social forces and not be imposed from above. Furthermore, given the glaring socio-economic disparity between the various groups, national-state building mean an accelerated and compensatory socio-economic development of the neglected and disadvantages groups (Ibid.).

What do the fundamentals of national-state and nation-building mean? They mean the determination of the nature of the state: how state power is attained, exercised and checked; how wealth is produced and distributed; how justice is administered, how basic human rights are guaranteed; how national identity is nurtured and projected. They also mean, especially in the heterogeneous societies of the Horn of Africa countries, how the legitimate claims and aspirations of the various groups with regard to the aforementioned issues are treated. Furthermore, they are also concerned why and how the territorial unity of the countries should be maintained; and how dissent should be expressed and handled. The most important point concerning all these is, something which has been non-existent and/or ignored by the political leaders and elites, the participation of the citizens. This has been the most important problem behind the absence of a national consensus on all fundamentals of national-state building. The remarkable absence of some sort of national consensus, in turn, resulted in ungovernability, recurrent violent conflict, economic deterioration and social decay, and finally in the failure/collapse of the state.

9.3 Economic Development in the Horn of Africa

Africa's dismal economic performance over the past 30 or more years has given rise to several attempts to explain and understand what went wrong. As indicated in one of the previous chapters, Africa's economic deterioration (collapse in some cases) is partially the result of the political crisis. The discussion above, on the political development of the three Horn of Africa countries, can clearly show that this is very true. It should be well noted, however, that 'po-
Politically stable countries in the Third World have on the whole fared no better at development ... than politically unstable countries' (Mittelman, 1988: 13). This indicates that factors other than political stability and instability must be considered. For politics is not an autonomous sphere of activity and in politics the critical issues are heavily economic. This means that there is also an economic explanation for the African crisis, which is equally important. It is to this explanation I now turn. The focus will mainly be on the nature and relevance of the economic theories and economic models which dominated the African economic development process. I will then try to show the result of this domination.

As a growing number of institutions and scholars have expressed it, a major irony in African development is that economic theories and models employed have largely come from outside the continent. It is not only that, as the former World Bank Vice President noted, 'the extraordinary fact is that there are more expatriate advisers in Africa today than there were at the end of the colonial period' (Quoted in Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 35). In no part of the developing world such a density and diversity of technical assistance existed as in Africa. In some countries, ministries were literally partitioned among the different donors (Ibid.: 35-36). What this means for Africans is, as Professor Adedeji, then Executive Secretary of UNECA, lamented:

In many cases, our friends and development partners have been either unwilling or reluctant to grant us the elementary right to perceive for ourselves what is good for us and to assist us in realising our perceived goals and objectives. Often, they appear more interested in foisting on us their own perceptions and goals. When it comes to Africa, the outsiders have always behaved as if they know better than Africans what is good for Africa. and the result is that without the needed cooperation and support, Africa has particularly always been derailed from pursuing relentlessly and vigorously the agenda it has set for itself, whether it is the Monrovia Strategy, the Lagos Plan of Action or the Final Act of Lagos. (Quoted in Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 36).

Though Professor Adedeji was expressing his frustration regarding the treatment of the UN ECA's initiatives, his statements are very true for African at large.

One of the basic questions that should be raised here is: Why did the various economic theories and modes, which were and still are imposed on African countries, fail to produce the intended results? One of the fundamental reasons is that the various economic development theories and models have been generally incompatible with and irrelevant to the structural context of Africa's problems. What generally happened was:

The Third World, emerging out of colonialism, was suddenly discovered as lacking autonomous capacity for development. Mainstream economic development theorists, without inquiring into the history of this underdevelopment, rushed forward with new sets of US-Eurocentric prescriptions and paradigms to reconstruct the Third World. These were all dependent upon aid and technology flows from the First World caught in an ideological competition with the Second.

The new agenda of economic developmentalism for Third World development was thus set. It was an entire Northern agenda mapping the course of economic development in the Third World from outside, defining goals, and selecting policy instruments for state-sponsored capitalist development within, all ultimately justified with reference to rational behaviour. Domestic constraints and institutional capacity inside the Third World seemed not to matter at all. It was as if developing countries were all empty, ready for a brand new start. (Mehmet, 1999: 60).

It is estimated that about 100,000 expatriate technical-assistance staff work in Africa, involved in every aspect of policy analysis, advice, policy-making, and implementation and gulping up $4 billion USD per annum (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 37).

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This was mainly the reflection of the post-1945 order which was reinvented by US-Eurocentric social scientists with a new agenda centred on: the cold war bipolarity; modernization (Westernization) of former colonies, and modelling of economic development as a linear homogenized process (Mehmet, 1999: 58-59, Hettne, 1995: 52). Firstly, the post-1945 big power ideological confrontation between capitalist and communist worlds, and the North (rich) and South (poor) development affected what happened in the Third World. Secondly, the Western modernization agenda for the Third World which was based on the assumption that development was modernity, defined as the passing of 'traditional society' becoming 'modern' and embracing Western political institutions and norms as 'universal reference' (Mehmet, 1999: 60-61). Thirdly, the 1950-70 period can be labelled as the Golden Age of Eurocentric modelling to shape Third World economic development during which various microeconomic theories and models developed in the West were extended into the Third World.

It should be noted that the post-independence political elites of the Third World countries generally played a submissive or accommodating role in economic development, facilitating the diffusion of Western agendas and Eurocentric models. Most importantly, Western educated post-colonial leaders continued in the footsteps of colonial masters, among other things, by rejecting rural development and opting for urban-biased strategies.

It is crucial to briefly consider some of the theories and models to understand how relevant or otherwise they were to the problems of the Third World in general and Africa in particular. The models will be divided into two: before 1980s and after.

9.3.1 Economic Development Theories and Models from 1945-1970s

To begin with let us first consider the *vicious circles of the poverty and population trap model*. For proponents of this model, underdeveloped countries were generally poor because they were populated by 'traditional societies' which resisted change. Local histories and cultures were dismissed as 'barriers' to economic growth by leading economists and modernization theorists (Mehmet, 1999: 64). It is not surprising, therefore, that almost all African leaders placed so much emphasis on promoting industrialization, which was perceived as an integral part of the development agenda and expected to facilitate the transformation of predominantly agricultural economies into modern industrial economies (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999:12).

By population trap, it means that when population growth rate exceeds economic growth rate income per capita will be low. Low income means low saving, low investment and low economic growth. On the contrary, when economic growth rate exceeds population growth rate, per capita income will be higher. Higher per capital income in turn will induce higher saving and investment, generating further growth. In other words, the central message has been more people - less land - lower productivity - less food for everyone. The implication is that the ig-

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97 According to Mehmet (1995: 10), 'Eurocentricty is a European-centred worldview in which the interest and benefits of Europeans and their descendants is pursued at the expense of others while justifying this worldview by paradigms or ethical norms that proclaim universal benefits for all. While ethnocentricty or ethnocentrism prevails, more or less, in all cultures, what makes Eurocentricty particularly important is the dominant position which the West has occupied globally during the last 200 years as the underlying force of mercantilist empire-building, while suggesting, and indeed promising explicitly in the post-World War II period, the prospect of Westernization as the path to universal prosperity.'

98 The discussion below is mainly adopted from Mehmet, 1999.
norance of the poor is the source of their own suffering. Thus, to save themselves, they must adopt the contraceptive and agricultural technology on offer from the international aid agencies (Williams, 1995: 159).

Vicious circles of poverty model has two aspects. On the supply side, low income generates a low saving rate, capital shortage and low productivity; on the demand side, low income is responsible for limited purchasing power, low propensity to investment, a narrow capital stock and low productivity (Mehmet, 1999; 66). This means that persistent poverty is causally linked to capital accumulation. Thus, adherents of the vicious circles of poverty argument prescribed two solutions for escaping the trap. The first was a population policy, with the emphasis on birth control. The World Bank also adopted similar prescription by ignoring, in its generalized analysis of African demography, the complex and varied historical processes which have shaped the rise, fall, and age- and gender-distributions of population, and their patterns of settlement and migration (Crush, 1995: 17). The second was the 'Big Push' theory of industrialization, which aspired to dramatically convert a low-income country into a high-income country. The decrease in the population growth rate and the increase in industrialization, as the result of the Big Push, were expected to give rise to higher economic growth rate that would exceed the population growth rate. Thus, the vicious circles would be broken. However, the problem remained unsolved. The population growth rate remained high and the economic growth rate remained low, even declined in most cases. Mehmet (1999: 66-67) seems correct, thus, in concluding:

Despite its elegance, the vicious circles theory was no more than a distorted projection of non-European 'irrationality', the reverse side of the rational-behaviour assumption: in neo-classical orthodoxy, extra children are 'inferior' goods. Such orthodoxy was counter-factual because it was a non-institutional conception of Third World poverty. It ignored the colonial roots of this poverty, and exaggerated the capacity of central authorities to impose population and birth control policies ... in a top-down, authoritarian manner ... 'soft' and 'hard' state ... were equally assumed to be capable of implementing drastic population policies and to intervening and managing economic development on a grand scale.

In other words, this theory favours large-scale industrialization with strong pro-capital and urban bias. It legitimized a technocratic conceptualization of economic development as a more or less mechanical and engineering task of construction. It was also divorced from peoples and cultures.

The Big Push theory of industrialization, as indicated above, has been the other model of development prescribed as a solution for Third World underdevelopment. Its basic assumption is that 'industrialization is the way of achieving a more equal distribution of income between different areas of the world by raising income in depressed areas at a higher rate than in rich areas' (Mehmet, 1999: 67). The Marshall Plan and the European Miracle that it financed seemed to confirm the Big Push theory based on a massive infusion of American aid. It was in this optimistic climate that the European success story was set to be replicated in the newly emerging Third World countries under American leadership (Hettne, 1995: 36). The Premises of the Big Push Theory were "pro-capital and pro-big: Large-scale manufacturing and mega-projects were favoured over small-scale ones. In other words, small firms were taken as risky

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This will be discussed below.

100 Industrialization was defined as 'the increased use of capital per unit output, especially in the manufacturing sectors where all 'growth poles' were thought to exist' (Mehmet, 1995: 67).
and unprofitable because their unit cost would be relatively high since their production runs would be correspondingly limited. On the other hand, large firms, capable of mass production, could utilize the latest capital-intensive techniques of production and, by minimizing unit cast, maximize the rate of return. In addition, it was assumed that large industrial firms would be able to encourage the establishment of vertical and horizontal services or engineering firms. These in turn would provide specialized activities and promote further specialization and extension of market size (Mehmet, 1999: 68). It was also assumed that the development of a profitable industry would act as a leading sector, creating productive jobs and generating an income multiplier process. In turn, this would stimulate, through backward and forward linkages, the development of other related and complementary industries. Thus, it was believed, strategically selected Big Push manufacturing industries could promote general economic development.

However, the Big Push theory, which was successful in Europe after World War II, failed to be replicated in the non-European part of the world. One major problem here is that industrialization is linked to capital-intensive technology imports from the West in complete disregard of factor endowments in labour-abundant developing countries. In addition, its strong state interventionist assumption, its sole emphasis on investment and its over-optimism due to its rational assumptions contributed to the failure. It also totally ignored the questions of ownership of capital imports from the West and the distribution of value added generated in the growth process.

The Rostowian stages of growth theory, which was conceived as part of the American-led global strategy for the containment of communism\textsuperscript{101}, is the other model to be considered here. The stages of growth theory is, basically, linear, deterministic and guided by Western history perceived as the universal law of development. In addition, the European and American experiences were taken as confirmations of a long-term unidirectional transformation of society and its economy.\textsuperscript{102} It was also assumed that capitalist development, based on the Western historical experience, is historically inevitable. Thus, Rostow’s ‘distinct time segments’ along this inevitable path of unidirectional growth consists of five stages (Rostow, 1964: 275-279),\textsuperscript{103} in which Third World countries were in the first three stages, whereas countries of the First World were in the last two. According to Rostow the most important stage was the ‘take-off’, which was assumed to be as the launching pad of accelerated capitalist growth.\textsuperscript{104}

Two points should be emphasized here. First, the trigger of economic growth was taken as the change in investment activity concentrated in the manufacturing sector designated as ‘the modern sector’. By implication rural and agricultural sectors were relegated to traditional stagnant status, hence contributed to an urban biased system. Second, it was believed that by strategic decisions affecting resources allocation designed to stimulate investment in leading

\textsuperscript{101} The subtitle of Rostow’s book ‘A Non-Communist Manifesto’ is self-explanatory.

\textsuperscript{102} The unidirectional transformation can be subdivided into: (1) distinct time segments, characterized by different sources and patterns of economic changes, (2) a specific succession of these stages, so that b cannot occur before a, or c before b, and (3) a common matrix, in that the successive segments are stages in one broad process - usually one of development and growth rather than deviation and shrinking (Mehmet, 1999: 71).

\textsuperscript{103} The five stages are: (1) the traditional society, (2) the precondition for takeoff (3) the takeoff, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of mass consumption (Rostow, 1964: 275-279).

\textsuperscript{104} The take-off, according Rostow, requires all three of the following related conditions: (1) a rise in the rate of productive investment from 5 per cent or less to over 10 per cent of national income (Rostow, 1964: 278-279); (2) the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors, with high rate of growth; and (3) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social, and institutional framework that exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth the on-going character (Mehmet, 1999: 71).
sectors, a society (i.e. government) could engineer economic growth and accelerate the growth rate. Thus, Rostow legitimized state intervention in Third World development (Mehmet, 1999: 71-72).

Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI), Export Promotion and Infant Industry Argument. The central theme of the ISI argument was the so-called infant industry argument: developing countries should nurture new industries, subsidizing and protecting them with tariffs and other incentives. This protection was necessary until the new industries could achieve dynamic efficiency from ‘learning by doing’ and other external benefits to face competition from imports in the long run (Ibid.: 1999: 80). Significantly, this same strategy was utilized in the case of export-led strategies.

Thus, based on the ISI strategy, the creation of manufacturing sectors by active government intervention became synonymous with industrialization. The basic assumption was that industrialization (initially through import substitution) would bring about restructuring of the predominantly primary-export sector into a more diversified export sector in which exports of industrial products would increasingly play an important role. This entails that if industrial goods that were imported could be produced at home, this would dampen the effects of unfavourable terms of trade and in the long run actually improve them by steering the structure of export away from goods whose terms of trade tended to secularly decline (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999:12). To encourage ISI industries a wide range of incentives were utilized.105

However, the ISI strategy failed to work as expected by the rational, trickle-down theorists.106 Three interrelated factors that affected the result of the strategy can be identified here: (1) the desired production levels could only be maintained if an adequate level of imported inputs was maintained. This required adequate foreign exchange which African countries did not have; (2) the failure to acquire the necessary foreign exchange for the continued purchase of industrial inputs led to capacity underuse and economic decline; and (3) industrial investment and operations were not necessarily associated with strong linkage with the rest of the economy, especially with the predominant agricultural sector (Ibid.:12-13). The result was that within a short period of time most of the industrial sector became dominated by branch plants of Western multinational corporations (MNCs) producing brand new consumer products as well as more durable goods (e.g. assembled automobiles, kitchen appliances and electronics), all originally developed in the West. The Third World thus captured, as part of the global market in the global reach of the MNCs, Western tastes and marketing techniques superimposed on local culture (Mehmet, 1999: 81-82). In addition, the anti-rural bias of the ISI strategy discouraging food production while concentrating on modern/capitalist sectors in urban centres, caused an ever-increasing rural exodus.

The Trickle-down Theory. The major assumption of the trickle-down theory is that in due course of time and without any special intervention accelerated economic growth in the richer countries would spread, bringing the benefits of capitalist growth to poorer segments of developing societies. However, since the second half of the 1960s it has been increasingly demonstrated that it was not working as expected. Not only was the gap between the First and the Third Worlds widening, but the domestic inequality between the rich and poor within the de-

105 These include tax holidays, duty-free imports of producer goods, subsidized utility rates and infrastructural facilities, cheap labour and capital, and, of course, tariff protection against competing imports’ (Mehmet, 1999: 81).
106 This will be discussed below.
veloping countries was also getting worsen. In addition, the trickle-down theory resulted in:

1. rural exodus and the emergence of informal sectors, which mushroomed around over-crowded shanty-towns and slums;
2. worsening of the unemployment problem in the wake of capital-intensive ISI strategy;
3. increasing poverty and social injustice; and

When we look into the results of the attempts made by many Third World countries to implement some or all of the models and/or theories discussed above, it seems that they all failed to solve the major problems they meant to solve. In other words, almost all African countries, be it in the name of socialism or capitalism, tried to replicate these models with no meaningful positive results. According to the World Bank (Elbadawi, et. al., 1992: 7):

After an impressive start at independence, SSA is today the poorest and the least developed region in the world and it is getting poorer with time. About three fourths of the countries in the region are classified in the low-income category. Furthermore, of all the developing regions in the world, SSA is the most overburdened by foreign debt, the most dependent on foreign finance and technical assistance, the most dependent on food aid and imported food, and has the worst record on social indicators. In the mid-1950s, SSA was essentially self-sufficient in food and some countries were even exporting food. Since the 1960s, however, food production per capita in the region has been dropping at an alarming rate. Today, malnutrition, starvation and child mortality are widespread throughout the region.

The economic deterioration reached alarming proportion in the late 1970s and by the early 1980s many countries attempted to reverse their economic downfall through economic policy reforms assisted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (and other multilateral and bilateral agencies). The need for major change in the economic environment of these countries became clear in the early 1980s following the rapid deterioration in their social and overall economic performance and a significant decline in the standard of living of their citizens.

Africa, as indicated above, is the poorest continent in the world. But the situation in the three Horn of Africa countries is even worse when compared with other African and low income countries in general. To illustrate this point let us look into some selected indicators. As can bee seen in Table 9.1, between 1960 and 70 real GNP per capita growth rates was 0.5, 1.4 and 1.6 for SSA, South Asia, and all low income countries respectively. During the same period it was 2.0, -1.1 and -1.8 for Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. Between 1970-80 the situation improved (with the exception of Ethiopia). However, it started declining between 1980 and 1986 to -2.4, -2.3 and -1.8 for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. With regarding to GDP average annual growth rates a more or less similar trend can be observed (see Table 9.2).

If we look at the agricultural average annual growth rates between 1960-70 it was 2.2, -0.6 and 2.2 for Ethiopia, Somalia and all low income countries respectively (Table 9.3). Between 1980 and 85 the growth rates declined to -3.4 and -5.5 for Ethiopia and Sudan while they increased to 6.0 for all low income countries (the Somalia case was an exception). The daily calorie supply (per capita) for Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan remained low compared to that of low income countries and even of Africa in general (see Table 9.4). The infant mortality rate remained high and life expectancy at birth remained low compared to that of all low income countries lower (see Tables 9.5 and 9.6).

The three Horn of Africa countries, like the rest of Africa, significantly increased the number of students enrolled in both primary and secondary schools. However, they lagged behind
when compared with the rest of Africa (see, Table 9.7, for the details). Health-related indicators also show similar trends. As can be seen from Table 9.8 there was a significant improvement with the exception of Ethiopia (see the same table for the viability of nurses).

Finally, one thing that had consistently been increasing was the population. Between 1965 and 1980 the total population of Ethiopia and Somalia increased by 2.7 and 2.9 per cent (World Development Report, 1992). Thus, by 1980 the total population of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan reached 31.1, 3.9 and 18.7 millions (World Development Report, 1982). This was a significant increase from what it was in 1970 28.8 in Ethiopia and 13.9 in Sudan (Human Development Report, 1998).

As we will see below, the same forces, which contributed to the economic crisis of the continent, later on came up with their revised theories, economic development models and policy packages to reverse the crisis. But the essence of the dominant mainstream economic development paradigm remained the same and the crisis continued or worsened in some cases.

### 9.3.2 Economic Development Theories and Models since 1980s

The re-emerging mainstream economic development theorizing, in the last two decades, is mainly centred on: (1) new institutionalism; (2) structural adjustment; (3) sustainable development; (4) new growth theory based on human capital, and (5) globalization and tripolarity in world trade (regionalization) (Mehmet, 1999: 122). Of all these structural adjustment, and globalization and regionalization have been seriously affecting Africa. Let us briefly look into their major assumptions and their relevance.

#### 9.3.2.1 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)

In the 1980s and 1990s, structural adjustment and stabilization became a new paradigm with a strong intellectual leadership from economists associated with the IMF and the World Bank (WB). This new solidly neo-liberal orthodoxy, based on free market ideology and espousing the notion of comparative markets as a 'level playing field', has been imposed on Africa as a universal recipe for achieving faster economic growth, resolving social problems or dealing with many other contemporary development issues. In this regard, almost all African countries, irrespective of individual circumstances, are told to liberalize and integrate as quickly and as fully as possible in the world economy in order to achieve what foreign aid and other preferential policy arrangements have failed to achieve (Rugumamu, 1999: 7).

SAPs, as articulated by IMF and WB, mainly seek to control inflation; correct imbalances of the balance of payment via expenditure reducing policies; liberalize trade; deregulate domestic markets; reform the public sector; promote exports; and generally rely on the private sector as the engine of growth (Elbadawi, et. al., 1992: 17-18). This is based on the assumption that the market is efficient, whereas government intervention in resource allocation is distortionary and inefficient, and government failure is more costly than market failure. Minimal government intervention, especially in the provision of infrastructure and education, can be undertaken provided such intervention is functional, or 'market friendly. In short, 'rolling back the state' and 'unleashing the markets' have been the key phrases on the reform agenda (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 41). This has been a U-turn from the previously held funda-

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107 See Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 41, and Mengisteab, 1996: 30) for the historical events that made the SAPs the dominant model of economic management in most developing countries in the early 1980s.
mental assumption that development demands a strong and active state, and economic reform is a state activity, and serious economic reforms require a strong and capable state.\textsuperscript{108}

In the case of Africa, as Mkandawire and Soludo (1999: 41-42) point out, the Berg report\textsuperscript{109} provided the immediate intellectual precursor to the introduction of SAPs policies.\textsuperscript{110} Short-to medium-term macroeconomic stabilization measures, which fell within the province of the IMF; and SAPs proper, were designed to restore internal and external balances and unleash the markets so that competition could help improve the allocation of resources, getting price signals right and creating a climate that allows businesses to respond to these signals in ways that increase the return to investment (Ibid.).\textsuperscript{111} Almost all African countries have attempted to implement the policy packages.\textsuperscript{112} But with what results? In general, it became evident that such neo-classical recipes have not worked. Among other things, these Western remedies have paid inadequate attention to fundamental causes of external imbalances and budget deficits in the developing countries themselves, such as deteriorating terms of trade, supply shocks and rising protectionism in rich countries against exports of developing countries (Mehmet, 1999: 129). More importantly, as with the previous Western theories and policy packages, the latest one has its Eurocentric bias. It favours a large, capital-intensive formal sector, and opens the door to Western equity ownership and control of capital, while discriminating against indigenous informal and subsistence sectors (Ibid.: 127). Furthermore, the IMF-WB structural adjustment and stabilization programmes have serious problems in both theory and in practice. With regard to theory, the very logic of macroeconomics favoured by the IMF and the WB rests squarely on a standard policy package. However, because the situation in each country is different, specific measures are required rather than common 'medicine'. In practice, the implementation of the programmes requires strong state intervention contrary to the latest prescription of the WB to minimize the role of the state (Mengisteab, 1996: 34). The neo-liberal basic assumption that less-interventionist states in developing countries outperform interventionist ones is questionable and the empirical evidence that led to the conclusion that 'less-interventionist state outperform more-interventionist ones' has been elusive (Ibid.: 7 and see also (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 50). Moreover, the major human costs that inordinately burdened the low-income groups were not taken into account. The bank itself recognized these huge human costs and included poverty alleviation as part of its SAL strategy, though this has been too small a component in relation to the magnitude of social adjustment required (Mehmet, 1999: 130).

In a more ideological sense, structural adjustment programmes favour Western capital and technology, and tend to increase foreign control and ownership in developing countries. In addition, the terms of 'conditionality' of SAL and debt rescheduling completely ignore the social and domestic policy constraints in borrowing countries. While theories and policies are

\textsuperscript{108} At the time when most African countries attained independence, the international environment was decidedly in favour of state intervention in the development process. This was essentially as true for the centrally planned economies of the east bloc as it was for their capitalist rivals in the West. It was also as true for the developing countries as it was for the developed countries (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 29).

\textsuperscript{109} Named after Elliot Berg, the American expert employed by the World Bank.

\textsuperscript{110} According to the report, the declines of Africa's standard of living were not only due to vagaries of weather, political conflict, and external shocks but also arose from mistakes in economic policy-making. Hence, in order to correct the mistakes the report identified three major policy actions that are central to any growth-oriented programme: (a) more suitable trade and exchange-rate policies; (b) increased efficiency of resource use in the public sector; and (c) improvement in the agricultural policies.

\textsuperscript{111} For a brief description of the industrial, agricultural, financial, trade, labour market, and social-sector reforms see Mkandawire and Soludo (1999: 42-48).

\textsuperscript{112} See Table 10.9, for the period and the type of structural adjustment and stabilization programmes the Horn of Africa countries initially started implementing.
reformulated in the West mainly to ensure that foreign debts are repaid, the real social cost, in the form of falling real wages and rising food costs, are borne by the Third World (Ibid.: 132-133). Thus, it can be argued that Africa's current economic crisis is one of economic models and is therefore a crisis of the models themselves (M'Baya, 1995: 65). In other words, as the President of the Development Commission of the European Parliament so well expressed it, 'the development or structural adjustment criteria of Breton Woods institutions are perfect for Sweden but are completely outlandish for a country like Zambia and Mozambique. ... Let us stop the massacre. For there is no country where it has been successful, at least as far as the people are concerned. Why? Statistics indicate that over the past ten years there has been a permanent transfer of capital from the poorest countries of the world to the richest countries' (quoted in M'Baya, 1995: 72).

Another very important issue to be considered here is the political impact of SAPs on the continent's political development. As Mkandawire and Olukoshi (1995: 3) note:

... either because of the sheer unpopularity of the programme, its limited achievements and its adverse consequences for the living conditions of many social actors, or because the adjusting states have felt themselves accountable not to their citizens but to the IMF and the World Bank, whose performance criteria they must strive to meet against all odds, authoritarianism has been rampant in the implementation of market reforms. ... The authoritarianism which seems to inher in the implementation of structural adjustment is worsened by the fact that where states attempt to accommodate domestic pressure against the neo-liberal market reform programme, they are accused by the World Bank and the IMF of lacking in 'political will', the coded language for repressive capacity. It is remarkable that most of the countries described by the World Bank as being 'strong adjusters' have been quite authoritarian in the implementation of their programmes.

Thus, one of the results of the implementation SAPs was strong social resistance against the adjustment policies. Such resistance to authoritarianism arising from the implementation of SAP has been responsible for the pressures for democratization' (Mkandawire and Olukoshi, 1995: 3, see also, Dieng, 1995: 113).

Since the beginning of the 1990 there has been a sudden shift towards a position that links structural adjustment and political liberalization. This means that in addition to 'economic' conditionality that dominated Africa during much of the 1980s, we now have 'political conditionality'. The turnaround in the IFIs and other donors had been conditioned by experiences, not all of which emanate from Africa. First, the collapse of the socialist camp and the triumph of neo-liberalism, and the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe where economic and political liberalization have appeared simultaneously on the agenda. Second, the failure of authoritarian governments to implement structural adjustment programmes. Third, as Ake (1993: 76) asserts, '... misconception about the process of democratization in Africa has begun to emerge - the view that democratization entails 'destatization'. This theory has been finding fertile ground in the West, particularly among international financial institutions (IFIs), because it meshes with the liberal commitment to the primacy of market and the notion that democracy is associated with minimal government...'. Fourth, the growing demand by the African society for a political change. Fifth, donors have realized that the regimes they have thus far backed are on shaky ground. To curry favour with the new movement, therefore, some donors have had to make sharp turns in policies. In some cases, the turnabout has been mainly aimed at capturing the political initiative (Mkandawire, 1995b: 86).

Whatever the reasons have been, African countries are forced to implement the twin process of market-oriented economic reform and political liberalization. The result in many cases has
been that democratisation turns out to be in tension with economic liberalisation and when they do converge, the convergence is perverse: democracy ends up creating a new and narrow power elite and, as often, marketization ends up by privileging big, private capital. Hence, there is a recurring irony in democratisation: those who demand democratic change expect the further spread of power in society, whereas the managers of new democracies aim to stabilise the system, often by limiting the scope of democracy (Kohli, 1993: 678). Moreover, although political and economic liberalisation may occur simultaneously, they are not necessarily complementary processes, and the relationship between them may be accidental or even negative (Hamilton and Kim, 1993: 133). Similarly, Nelson and Eglinton (1993: 21) point out:

... a set of tension between certain market-oriented reforms on the one hand and consolidation of democracy on the other, is becoming increasingly evident. ... efforts to privatize (or rationalize) large state-owned industries, liberalize the labour market, and encourage private business provoke a bitter backlash from workers and their unions, from nationalist worries about growing foreign investment and control, and from any citizen disturbed by soaring inequality and shady dealings. ... Deregulation and privatization are almost certain to outpace appropriate new kind of regulation. The result in many countries already has been widespread scandals, undermining popular confidence in both market reforms and democracy.

In short, the implementation of liberal economic reforms and that of politics at the same time, in Africa, where both of them are not indigenous and do not take into account the specific conditions of the society brought about more problems than solutions. In addition, there is no clear evidence that liberal economic reform will facilitate political liberalization or vice versa.

Structural adjustment, as indicated above, intensifies authoritarianism because, while instituting measures that create widespread opposition, it fails to generate changes which would create or strengthen meaningful pro-adjustment constituencies. For example, while improving incentives for some groups of peasants, its main effect is to promote forms of economic activity which disarticulate urban and rural sectors, and creates strong opposition from other parts of the society. Hence, in confronting such opposition the state has little choice but increasing recourse to the banning of unions and professional associations, and the administrative silencing of critics (Gibbon, 1992: 34). Similarly, Beckman argues that authoritarianism is an essential property of adjustment itself, rather than of states which are adjusting. While the African states were already undergoing a crisis prior to adjustment, it is adjustment's insistence on the termination of its traditional popular and national basis which obliges it to resort to dictatorship. Thus, it is apparent that economic reforms of the types formulated in most African countries in the 1980's and 1990s will be difficult to implement in a liberal democratic framework (Gibbon, 1992: 33-34 and Beckman, 1992: 79). The reason lies in the strong opposition to the implementation of SAPs in many African countries. In this respect, nationalism is one strong ideological force confronting SAPs. It draws on the history of resistance to foreign political domination, cultural humiliation, and economic exploitation. From a nationalist perspective, SAPS are a means of foreign domination. The conditionalities linked to foreign finance that go with SAPs are a hallmark of rising neo-colonial domination. The liberalization of foreign trade and foreign exchange regimes deprive the state of the means of directing scarce resources to areas of priority of national development. It is seen as a capitulation to a world market that works in favour of the strong and at the expense of the weak.

While nationalism is the principal ideological force confronting SAPs, wage earners make up the most coherent social group in the opposition bloc. They are acutely affected by the restructuring of incentives enforced by SAPs, including cuts in public sector employment, the fall in domestic industrial production, the removal of price and rent controls and subsidies, and the rise of the
cost of imports. The deflation of the wage-earning economy reinforced by SAPs has also hit hard sectors of the economy directly and indirectly dependent on wage-earners' income, including a large petty commodity and petty service-producing sector. The informal urban sector is particularly badly hit because of its greater dependence on imports, both for consumption and trade. Thus, the hardship experienced by those affected is bound to have serious repercussions, threatening the implementation of SAPs and the democratization process.

Consider, for example, the following scenario. Democratisation will (presumably) lead to the responsiveness of policy makers to citizens' preferences. Politicians, then, may be forced to promise certain economic benefits in order to get elected. Once elected they will be faced with a cruel dilemma. If they deliver on their promises, the SAPs which are considered to be essential to rejuvenate African economies might be derailed, (for example, by an increase in public spending or the failure to remove price distortion). On the other hand, if politicians do not deliver these benefits due to the constraints imposed by structural adjustment reforms, or worse, inflict more pain on their population, the fragile process of democratisation might be undermined (Khagram, 1993: 67). This is the situation that many African countries find themselves in.

As was true with all Eurocentric economic development models and policy prescriptions, structural adjustment programmes failed to solve the economic problems of Africa. It became clear that the structural adjustment package of the IMF and WB is the cause rather than the solution to the economic problems experienced in African countries. The imposition of political liberalisation as a conditionality for further loans complicated the socio-political and economic crisis of the continent. A number of points should be noted here. First, political liberalization and the political change advocated by the IFIs can only change, if it can change at all, the officials charged with running the model (SAP) at the national level. However, it was very clear that one could not solve any problem by only changing the officials who are responsible for implementing a model that failed to solve anything. Second, the democratisation process advocated by IFIs and other donors has essentially been an adaptation or standardisation of the political system to the globalization of the economy (M'Baya, 1995: 79). It is simply the imposition of the neo-liberal ideology and political doctrine.

9.3.2.2 Globalization and Regionalization

Globalization and the emergence of three major trading blocs have been contributing factors for the deepening of the African crisis. Globalization and globalism were the product of specific historical conditions in the last three decades of the twentieth century: they emerged first in the advanced capitalist societies and were disseminated as objective truth among these societies' subordinate classes and to peoples in the rest of the world (Cox, 1996: 24).

Globalization should be understood as an all-encompassing concept that has political, economic, social and institutional dimensions (Edoho, 1997: 3). Globalization, in simple terms, is the intensification of economic, political, social, and cultural relations across borders. However, it is uneven in terms of cross-national intensity, geographical scope, and national and local depth (Holm and Sorensen, 1995: 1). Let us concentrate on the two dimensions: the political and economic. In politics, 'globalization is the transition to one world or the global village', in economics, 'it is the emergence of an integrated world economy' (Mehmet, 1999: 140). Though the political dimension is lagging, the economic dimension is already evolving as the result of the internationalization of production, consumption and trade patterns by creating global assembly lines, a global supermarket and by integrating the world economy into
larger and newer forms. Thus, globalization became a process by which events, decisions, and activities in one part of the world (more specifically in the West) can have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe (Edoho, 1997: 3).

Another related development is the emergence of tripolar world or triadic blocs, centred on the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the European Union (EU) and the Pacific (See, Amin, 1992: 49, for the details). In this formation Africa is left out. Global investment is heavily concentrated in the three regions. Since 1980s trading patterns revealed that transactions within regional blocs outpaced world trade. Intra-regional trade in goods now accounts for 61 percent, 41 percent, and 35 percent of the total trade in goods for EC, Asia, and North America, respectively (Edoho, 1997: 10-11).

What does globalization and the emergence of trading blocs mean for the African countries and African society? What are the major implications for Africa’s exceptionally fragile political and social structures as well as for vulnerable economies? These are among the many fundamental questions that should be asked. In order to answer these questions and grasp the effect of globalization and the related developments it is imperative to critically analyze some fundamental issues. First, ‘much of the impetus of globalization comes from the accumulation of capital; it is a by-product of the drive for competitive efficiency, an effort to create, control, and profit from the global mass market’ (Ake, 1995: 23). In this process of creating, controlling and profiting from the global mass market structural adjustment programmes have been important instruments, especially in the case of Africa, the main vehicle for accelerating the integration of Africa into the globalized (Western created and dominated) world economy (Edoho, 1997: 4). Globalization for most of Sub-Saharan Africa has not come about through the self-propelling power of rationality of the market but rather through the powers of coercion exercised by international creditors and multilateral financial institutions (Rugumamu, 1999: 4).

Second, the process of globalization is uneven both in intensity and geographical scope and depth. As Holm and Sorensen (1995: 6) put it, ‘globalization has meant increased integration for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, yet this process has also involved increasing marginalization of a number of Third World countries.’ Thus, uneven globalization is best conceived as a dialectical process, simultaneously integration as well as fragmentation, universalism as well as particularism, and cultural differentiation as well as homogenization (Ibid).113 Globalization has also been uneven in its implications for the different parts of the world. As Rugumamu (1999: 4) correctly explains:

... contemporary capitalist restructuring under globalization has led not only to creative processes of producing new technologies, more and better tradable goods and services, and expanding the range of opportunities; it has also engendered immiseration, social exclusion, gender inequalities, and the alienation of increasing number of people the world over. Rather than benefit all actors relatively equally, by its nature, globalization tends to produce gains for the few, marginalization of the many, and polarization between these two groups. In fact, developing countries have seen the gap between them and the developed ones widen and poverty within deepen ... At the same time, globalization is generating seemingly insoluble conflicts that cut across national boundaries ...

Some scholars also noted the correlation between race and poverty, which is the result of the unevenness of globalization. Arjun Makhijani, for instance, asserts ‘... the structure of the world economy is in its essential respects like that of apartheid South Africa - a kind of global

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113 See also Ake, 1995: 22, for similar conceptualization.
apartheid' (cited in Falk, 1999: 13). Thomas Schelling stressed the empirical underpinnings of such a radical assessment by pointing out that in the world in which we are living the rich are segregated into the rich countries and the poor into the poor countries. The rich are predominantly lighter skinned and the poor darker skinned and most of the poor live in ‘homelands’ that are physically remote, often separated by the ocean and great distances from the rich (Ibid.). One may add that the darker the skin (as in the case of black Africa) the poorer the society remains and the more tormented that region of the world becomes.

Third, globalization has an overriding trend, namely homogenization. It is this homogenizing trend that gives a dialectical unity to the singularities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the process (Ake, 1995: 22). Ake (Ibid.: 22-23) further argues that something even more important hides behind the homogenization:

What is globalized is not Yoruba but English, not Turkish pop culture but American, not Senegalese Technology, but Japanese and German. ... The popular notion of the world becoming one is more than anything else perhaps a description of hegemonization. Globalization is the hierarchization of the world - economically, politically, and culturally - and the crystallizing of domination. It is a domination constituted essentially by economic power. To the extent that globalization is so driven by economic forces, it represents the triumph of materialism and its ultimate triumph in mastering the world.

Fourth, there are a number of basic contradictions within globalization. One of the contradictions of globalization is that social polarization exists both among and within countries (Cox, 1996: 26). The social structure of the world shaped by globalization takes the form of a three-part hierarchy in which the bottom level consists of superfluous labour - those excluded from the global economy and who serve it only as a potentially destabilizing force. The whole continent of Africa belongs to the bottom level. However, tiny segments of the population of the continent are integrated into the world economy network, while rich countries are generating their own internal Third World. The other contradiction concerns the loss of autonomous regulatory power by states. 'States and intergovernmental organizations play a role in enforcing the rules of the global economy and in enhancing national competitiveness, but their powers of shielding domestic economies from negative effects of globalization have diminished' (Ibid.: 26-27). This has been very true in Africa, especially ever since the introduction of structural adjustment programmes. The third contradiction of globalization is a widespread but uneven tendency toward the decomposition of civil society. This has been reflected in both the fragmentation of social forces and in the growing gap between the base society and political leadership. Especially in poorest countries, there is evidence that people are turning their backs on the state and international organizations, which they see as their enemies rather than as possible supports (Ibid.: 27). 'This tendency toward decomposition', Cox (Ibid.) argues, 'is accompanied by the resurgent affirmation of identities (defined by, for example, religion, ethnicity, or gender) and an emphasis on locality rather than wider political authorities.'

114 According to Amin (1992: 7), the process of accumulation that governs its (capitalism) dynamics - shaped by a law of value that operates on a world scale limited to markets for commodities and capital to the exclusion of labor power - necessarily leads to polarization of the world into centre and periphery nations. Polarization is therefore immanent in capitalism.

115 In this hierarchy, the people who are integrated into the global economy, including everyone from the global economy managers down to the relatively privileged workers who serve global production and finance in reasonably stable jobs, are at the top. In the middle are those who serve the global economy in more precarious employment - an expanding category segmented by race, religion, and sex as a result of the 'restructuring' of production by post-Fordism (Cox, 1996: 26).
From what is briefly discussed above it is possible to understand that the significance and impact of globalization differs from one individual to another, from one group to the other, from one class to another and from one country to another country. The unequal access to dominant organizations, institutions, and dominant transactions in the emerging global order is what distinguishes the nature and magnitude of the impact of globalization on the respective actors. Power is at the heart of this uneven access. Power here is conceptualized as the capacity to transform material circumstances - whether social, political, or economic - to achieve goals based on the mobilization of resources, the creating of rule systems, and the control of infrastructure and institutions (Rugumamu, 1999: 5). Power should also be conceptualized as the capacity to define what is good or bad, what is appropriate or not, and to create and disseminate knowledge about oneself and others. In short, countries, groups, or societies with this power (in the North) have been benefiting from the globalization process whereas others (in the South) have been marginalized. What this means is that the gains of globalization will be concentrated in the developed world while the developing countries lose (especially in Africa) (Edoho, 1997: 2). As Ake (1995: 27) put it, the market is a theology, ‘it is the poor and the weak who bear the burden of this catholicity; generally it does not reflect their interests and they cannot change it, nor can they afford to indicate that they dislike it’ (Ibid.). This is mainly because the global economy is organized in such a way that only the capital owners and exporters of manufactured goods and technology (the North) will benefit.

Thus, it becomes clear that in the emerging international division of labour and regional economic and security realignment, Africa seems undoubtedly destined for even further marginalization. In short, ‘the spectre of marginalization is therefore quite real’ (Rugumamu, 1999: 12). This is reflected in a number of ways. First, the interest of the West is shifting from Africa to East European countries. The West dominated the UN preoccupation with the security problems of the former Yugoslavia and the relative inattention to the crisis in Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Rep. of Congo. Somalia and Sierra Leone is one concrete example. Second, in the emerging major economic blocs Africa appears to be left out. In a world where trade within the different trading blocs increased, Africa will remain further marginalized (Ibid.: 12-13). Third, on average Africa’s share of Foreign Direct Investment inflows have more than halved between 1986-90 and 91-96 of all developing countries. ‘Paradoxically, this low rate of foreign investment flows has coincided with various aggressive policy attempts at liberalizing investment policies, and signing bilateral investment promotion and protection treaties’ (Ibid.: 14). Africa’s share of Official Development Aid and world trade has also been declining for many decades.

From the brief discussion above, one can reasonably conclude that, like the pre-1980s economic development theories, models and policy packages, the post-1980s versions also significantly failed to solve the problems of Africa and improve the living standard of the society. Rather the gap between the rich North and the poor South widened. In other words, global inequality increased sharply.

To understand what happened in the specific cases of the Horn of Africa countries, let us look into, as we did with regard to the pre-1980s period, at the post-1980s economic performance of these countries with the help of some selected indicators. As can bee seen in Table 9.1, between 1980-1986 real GNP per capita growth rates for SSA, South Asia and all low income countries was -1.6, 2.7, and 4.1 respectively, where as it was -2.4, -2.3 and -1.8 for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Between 1986-1989 the growth rates remained negative for Somalia and Sudan. The figure for Ethiopia improved to 1.2, however, the growth rate in all three coun-
tries was well below that of South Asia (3.6) and all low income economies (4.1) (See Table 9.2 and 9.10 for the recent GDP average annual growth rates and GDP real). The Gross National Savings (see Table 9.11) in Ethiopia, Somalia and in Sudan have been well below the African average. If we also look at the Gross National Investment, as illustrated in Table 9.12, the figure for the three Horn of Africa countries is below the African average (with the exception of Ethiopia in 1998). The post-1980 terms of trade for the Horn of Africa and Africa in general were declining. Between 1980 and 1990 the annual average growth rates were -6.0, -1.8, 0.5 and 1.0 for Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Africa respectively. If we look at the most recent figures, 1997 and 1998, we can see further decline with the exception of Ethiopia (see Table 9.13).

Two things have been consistently increasing in the Horn of Africa and in Africa in general: external debt and population. For instance, between 1980 and 1990, the annual average growth was 14.3, 12.5 and 11.8 in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan respectively. This was much higher than the African average which was only 8.8 (See Table 9.14 also for the more recent figures). In addition, between 1980 and 1990 the annual average growth rates of the total debt service was 22.3, 22.6 and 30.0 for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (Table 9.15). This was also much higher than the African average which was 14.0. With regard to population increase, between 1965 and 1980 the total population of Ethiopia and Somalia increased by 2.7, 2.9 (World Development report, 1992). In 1995, the total population of Ethiopia increased to 56.4 and it is expected to reach at 103.6 by 2015 (Table 9.18). During the same year the population of Sudan increased to 26.7 and it is expected to reach at 40.4 by 2015. In 1995, the dependency ratio was 95.99 in Ethiopia and 78.94 in Sudan whereas it was 88.8 in least developed countries and 63.9 in all developing countries (See the same table for crude death and birth rates, and total fertility rates).

Between 1980-85 the agricultural average annual growth rates (Table 9.3) were -3.4 and -5.5 for Ethiopia and Sudan while it was 6.0 for all low income countries (the Somalia case was an exception). Between 1980-90 the figure for Ethiopia was still negative (-0.1) and declined for Somalia (3.3). If we look at the infant mortality rate (Table 9.5) it was only in Sudan that the figure was below the African average, 92 in 1980, 85 in 1990 and 68 in 1997 (see Table 9.16, for the comparison between 1960 and 1996). As illustrated in Table 9.6 life expectancy at birth has been below the level of other developing countries. For instance, by 1990 it reached 62 for all low income countries whereas it remained relatively low at 48, 48 and 50 for Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan (see Table 9.16, for the comparison between 1960 and 1995, and Table 9.19 for a male-female comparison).

The three Horn of Africa countries, like the rest of Africa, continued to increase the number of students enrolled in primary schools with the exception of Somalia. However, they lagged behind when compared with the rest of Africa (Table 9.7). With regard to secondary education there were mixed results. In the case of Somalia, however, it was consistently declining from 8 in 1980 to 6 in 1990 and to 5 in 1996 (see table 9.7 and Table 9.16, for adult literacy rate between 1970 and 1995, and gross enrolment rates for all levels between 1980 and 1996). Health-related indicators also show that the three Horn of African countries are lagging behind developing countries or even behind least developing countries (See Table 9.17 also for other health-related indicators).

The indicators used above are not the best indicators, there are different perceptions regarding their usefulness, however, they can give us some ideas of the economic performance of the
three Horn of Africa countries (See Tables 9.20-23 for military expenditure; resources imbalances; south-north gaps on life expectancy, adult literacy and mortality; and other basic indicators for more recent years). They can also provide us with a similar picture on the social aspects of the economic decline. In all the indicators used above the Horn of Africa countries are even worse when compared with the least developing countries and Africa in general.

What do these bitter results reflect? They reflect, among other things, that mainstream development paradigm and the various development theories and policy packages failed to deliver what they promised. The attempts made by IFIs and the West in general to shape the Third World in the image of the West miserably failed. The changes in and the transformation of the developing countries which were expected resulted in increased poverty, joblessness, environmental degradation and, recently waves of refugees trying to enter the privileged First World.

To sum up, Eurocentric (mainstream) economic development, as discussed above, did not work in developing countries as expected, for theoretical, ideological and practical reasons.

What should be done to rectify it? This is the basic question that the political leaders and elites in Third World countries should ask themselves and they must come up with their own alternative solutions (a few general recommendations will be forward in the conclusion). Then new alternatives should take the specific conditions of each society and should be elaborated and executed on the basis of the needs and priorities expressed by the people.

The discussion above, on the political development of the three Horn of Africa countries, also clearly shows that the economic crisis is partially the result of the ideological and political crisis. The state has not always been able to control a monopoly of force against ethnic/tribal and regional movements. Different forces have seriously challenged the state. The state elites resorted to violence to suppress the opposition. The various groups used (sometime were forced to use) violence to achieve their goals. The ideological shift from liberalism to socialism and back to liberalism did not change this situation for the better. The final outcome has been more violence and the destruction of the whole fabric of society and the state. The other point, which became clear in the discussion, is that political leaders spent most of their time in trying to destroy their opponents and maintain their power. They had no time to think and act to solve the economic problems. There have never been consistent policy measures taken to improve the living standard of the people.

The absence of a clear negotiated consensus on the basics of the political and socio-economic system to be constituted in each country has been another fundamental problem. Moreover, the another important issue which should have been taken seriously but unfortunately was ignored by the political leaders and elites, was the participation of the citizens. As a consequence the state has been at the mercy of tyrannical rules and dictators (both civilian and military) and, the whole system was paralyzed by corruption and personal enrichment (see Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999: 19 for similar arguments). On the other hand, there is a growing popular resistance against such regimes and serious demands for change. What this implies is that the struggle between forces that favour the status quo (which was mainly inherited from colonialism) and those who would like to change it resulted in political instability.

If there is no political stability, economic development is unthinkable. In short, political crisis contributed to economic collapse, and the economic collapse contributed to the political crisis which finally resulted in the crisis (failure/collapse) of the state, with refugee migration as one of its manifestations.
### Table 9.1

Growth of Real GNP Per Capita in the Horn of African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>-1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.S.Africa</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Low Income Economies</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Elbadawi, et. al., 1992: 35.  

### Table 9.2

GDP Average Annual growth Rates (%)

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</thead>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>*0.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure is for 1985-89, World Bank Data Base  
Table 9.3

Agricultural Average Annual growth Rates (%)

<table>
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</thead>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.S.Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Low Income Economies</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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</table>


Table 9.4

Daily Caloric Supply
(Per capita)

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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>1,681</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td>2,072</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>1,737</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,046</td>
<td>2,339</td>
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</table>

Table 9.5
Infant Mortality Rate
(Per 1000, Aged 0-1)

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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Income Economies</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>*72</td>
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</table>

* This figure for 1985


Table 9.6
Life Expectancy at Birth

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<tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Income Economies</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Table 9.7

### School Enrollment Ratio

| Country | Primary | | | | Secondary | | | |
|---------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Eritrea |       |       |       |     |       |       |     |     |
|         |       |       |       |     | 23   | 54   |     |     |
| Ethiopia| 7     | 36    | 33    | 43  | 2     | 9    | 14  | 12  |
| Somalia | 9     | 19    | 10    | 8   | 8     | 8    | 6   | 5   |
| Sudan   | 25    | 50    | 50    | 53  | 6     | 16   | 23  | 20  |
| Africa  | 79    | 76    | 80    |     | 22    | 29   | 28  |     |

**Source:** Africa Development Report, 1999: 218.  

## Table 9.8

### Health-related Indicators

(Population per...)

| Country | Physician | | | | Nursing person | | | |
|---------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------|-------|-------|
| Eritrea |       |       |       |     |       |       |     |     |
|         | 70,190 | 88,120 |     |     | 5,970 | 5,000 |     |     |
| Ethiopia| 33,900 | 17,500 |     |     | 3,630 | 2,550 |     |     |
| Somalia | 23,500 | 9,800  |     |     | 3,360 | 1,440 |     |     |
| Sudan   | 8,390  | 5,770  |     |     | 4,880 | 3,880 |     |     |

**Source:** World Development Report, 1987

254
Table 9.9

Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Programmes in Horn of African countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In Cooperation with the IMF</th>
<th>In Cooperation with the World Bank</th>
<th>Year of First Programme in 1980s</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>ESAF</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: SBA = Stand-by arrangement; SAF = Structural Adjustment Facilities; ESAF = Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities; EFF = Extended Fund Facilities; SAL = Structural Loans/Credits; ER = Economic Recovery/Rehabilitation; SECAL = Sector Adjustment Loans.

Source: Cornia, 1992: 12

Table 9.10

Gross Domestic Product, Real
(Million US Dollars, constant 1990 Prices)

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<td>714</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>847</td>
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<td>7,463</td>
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<td>8,760</td>
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<td>917</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>13,167</td>
<td>16,446</td>
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<td>18,639</td>
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<td>376,856</td>
<td>467,307</td>
<td>496,393</td>
<td>536,541</td>
<td>553,952</td>
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### Table 9.11

**Gross National Savings**

(Percentage of GDP)

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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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n.a. = not available


### Table 9.12

**Gross Domestic Investment**

(Percentage of GDP)

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**Source:** Africa Development Report, 1999: 203.
Table 9.13

Terms of Trade
(1990 = 100)

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MR. = Most recent year.


Table 9.14

Total External Debt
(Millions of US Dollars)

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### Table 9.15

**Total Debt Service**  
(Millions of US Dollars)

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### Table 9.16

**Trends in Human Development**

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (years)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate (%)</th>
<th>Gross enrolment ratio for all levels (% age 6-23)</th>
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### Health Profile

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<th>One-year Olds fully Immunized against tuberculosis (%) 1995-96</th>
<th>One-year-Olds fully Immunized Against measles (%) 1995-96</th>
<th>Doctors (per100,000 people) 1993b</th>
<th>Nurses (per100,000 people) 1993b</th>
<th>Public expenditure on health(as % of GNP) 1960</th>
<th>1990</th>
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### Table 9.18

**Population Trends**

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### Table 9.19

**Life Expectancy at Birth**

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260
### Table 9.20

**Military Expenditure and Resource Use Imbalances**

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Defence expenditure millions (1995 prices)</th>
<th>Defence expenditure (as % of GDP)</th>
<th>Defence expenditure per capita (US$; 1995 prices)</th>
<th>Military expenditure (as % of combined education and health expenditure)</th>
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**Source:** Human Development Report, 1998.

### Table 9.21

**Resource Use Imbalance**

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* the figure for 1960 is the percentage of GNP while that of 1995 is percentage of GDP.

**Source:** World Development Report.
Table 9.22
South-North Gaps

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (Index: North=100)</th>
<th>Adult literacy (Index: North=100)</th>
<th>Under-five mortality (Index: North=100)</th>
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Table 9.23
Basic Indicators

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Area ('000 Sq.Km)</th>
<th>Population (Million) 1998</th>
<th>GNP per Capita (US$) 1997</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at birth (years) 1997</th>
<th>Infant Mortality rate (per 1000) 1997</th>
<th>Adult Literacy rate (%) 1995</th>
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