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Decline and Disengagement
An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalisation

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In the autumn of 2006, three researchers began work on this study: Frank Buijs as Project Manager, and Froukje Demant and Marieke Slootman as members of his team. Sadly, we were unable to complete the project in this original configuration as a team. On 2 September 2007, Frank died very unexpectedly during his holiday in the Swiss mountains. We miss his open curiosity, his critical outlook, his creativity and his warm personal interest. He made a significant contribution to the research on radicalism in the Netherlands and we are sorry that he is no longer able to continue with his research plans.

We were therefore faced with the task of continuing the study without Frank. Jean Tillie, who took over the role of supervising the project, supported us a great deal in this task. We would like to express our thanks to Jean in particular, as taking over Frank’s work was no easy task. We immensely value the pleasurable collaboration that we have had with him.

This study was commissioned by the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The supervisory committee consisted of M. Fennema (University of Amsterdam), B. de Graaff (Leiden University), E. Kleemans (Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)), M. de Koning (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World), R. Meertens (University of Amsterdam), C. Mellis (Municipality of Amsterdam) and S. Tempelman (Ministry of Justice). On behalf of the commissioning authority, T. Erkens acted as chairman and H. van Miert as secretary of the supervisory committee. We would like to thank the members of the committee for their critical yet constructive observations and remarks.

Finally, we would also like to thank all the respondents. We are unable to name them individually, as we promised all respondents that they would remain anonymous, but without them we would not have been able to conduct this study. We would like to thank them for their time and, most of all, for their openness.

Frank taught us to look ‘inside the minds’ of radicals and former adherents of radical movements. Whenever things didn’t seem to be going well he would quote Leo Vroman, who said: ‘Creation is a difficult - and painful!- process’. We have tried to complete this project properly, although achieving this was indeed sometimes a particularly difficult and painful process without Frank. We hope that he would have been pleased with the end result.

Amsterdam, 31 January 2008

Froukje Demant
Marieke Slootman
Summary

The aim of this study is to provide an answer to questions such as: What is it that makes radical movements break down? Why is it that a violent course of action is renounced at a certain point in time? Why do some people leave their radical group? Because of the fact that Islamic forms of radicalism are receiving a great deal of attention, and this phenomenon has, until recently, been relatively unknown in the Netherlands, we endeavour, in particular, to make assessments with regard to a possible decline in this phenomenon. We address the topic of possible deradicalisation of Islamic forms of radicalism in the future and discuss how this process of deradicalisation could be supported if required.

However, as there is no evidence yet of a decline in Islamic radicalism, we must look towards other cases of deradicalisation where we are able to analyse the decline. To this end, we undertake a detailed study of the radical Moluccans of the 1970s, the squatters’ movement in the 1980s and the extreme right-wing Centre parties of the 1980s-1990s and analyse the specific nature of religious radical movements in relation to non-religious radical movements. We examine the question of why radical movements cease to exist (the collective level of deradicalisation) and carry out research on an individual level into why individuals moderate their behaviour and beliefs and/or leave a radical group.

With the aid of an analytical framework, both at the collective level (developed in Chapter 2) and the individual level (Chapter 6), we analyse the deradicalisation of these three historical cases. We look at the role that various factors have played in the decline of the movements as derived from literature and interviews (Chapter 3), and in individual deradicalisation as derived from interviews (Chapter 7). Because these historical cases concern non-religious movements, we also study the extent to which religious radical movements differ in a unique manner from non-religious movements (Chapter 4). On the basis of what we know about Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands, we analyse the similarities and differences with the other cases. Using the results of this analysis, we formulate expectations with regard to the possible decline of Islamic radicalism and the factors that may play a role in this process (chapters 5 and 7). We also draw lessons from various deradicalisation programmes throughout the world (Chapter 8).

On the basis of the three historical cases, we are able to point out various factors that play an important role in their decline, and factors that might also be of influence in the possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the future.
Table i: The (historical/expected) role of collective factors in the event of decline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Moluccans 1970s</th>
<th>Squatters 1980s</th>
<th>Extreme right</th>
<th>Islamic radicalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failing ideology</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing strategy</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members’ needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members grow away from the movement as a cohort</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External factors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inter-) national or local conflict disappears/changes</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: repression</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: inclusion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: reform</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive competing interpreta-</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The factors linked to the movement appear to be very important in the decline of a movement. They played a significant role in all three historical cases. The movements declined because both the attractiveness of the ideology and the attractiveness of the strategy decreased - particularly when a violent course of action was chosen. Failing organisation also played a major role. In particular, the decline of the squatters’ movement and various extreme right organisations were linked with power games, internal conflicts and a harder, grimmer atmosphere within the group. The decline in the three cases was also linked to a lack of capable, charismatic leaders.

Furthermore, as in the case of the Moluccans and the squatters’ movement, the fact that new generations no longer feel attracted to the movement can also play a role in its decline. This lack of attraction can be a result of a change in the ‘image’ of the movement, or because the Zeitgeist in general has changed.

Various external factors also have an effect upon the strength of the movement. For example, a change in an (inter-) national conflict can have an effect in cases where the radical ideology is based upon this conflict. But it is mainly repressive government policy and public opinion that can play a major role in the case of decline. In the case of the Moluccans and the squatters’ movement, the state used violent means to repress radical actions that contravened the law. The resulting violent interaction divided the movements. It caused people to doubt their participation and to wonder what course of action was the best way to achieve their goals. It also turned out that the spiral of violence caused the violence to ‘turn in on itself’, causing the atmosphere in the movements to become
harder. At the same time, however, it was the police’s use of violence towards the squatters that, in the beginning, actually provoked the radicalisation of the squatters. In response to the violence by the police, they began to use violent means themselves. In the case of extreme rightist movements, repression played a different role. During the decline of the extreme right Centre parties, there was a restrictive social and political climate, in which no serious room was created for the wishes of the extreme right. The extreme right and its active members were stigmatised and excluded from society. It was more due to frustration and the impossibility of operating that people left this movement – or did not join it in the first place, even though they agreed with the ideology of the extreme rightist agenda. The role played by public opinion is connected to a decline in goodwill among the population (and among an individual’s own ethnic group), possibly also as a result of a changing Zeitgeist or because of violent actions. This created doubt among the members and a decrease in the acquisition of new members.

This study formulates the expected role that the factors from the model may play in a possible future decline in Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands, and discusses the four most significant (expected) factors that play a role in this process. Firstly, in the case of violent actions, a failing strategy can play a significant role. The effects of violent actions will probably act to further excite ideological discussions and may cause the support for violent strategies to decrease. On the other hand, the preference for a non-violent course does appear to be based upon strategic arguments, and this preference could change if violent actions lead to results. In addition, the decline in supporters among new generations may play a role. Islamic radicalism is currently successful in reaching potential recruits. This is partly due to the fact that many Muslims do not feel accepted as members of Dutch society and because, in public debates, radicalism and Islam are often regarded as one and the same thing. It is to be expected that the attractiveness of radicalism will decrease once Muslims feel more at home in the Netherlands, and this will have a significant effect on the radical movement. This factor is therefore linked to public opinion. A more inclusive atmosphere in which (orthodox) Muslims feel more at home in the Netherlands, feel that they are taken more seriously and are less often identified with radicalism, will probably reduce radicalisation. The negative image that restrained the squatters’ movement and extreme-rightist movement is having a largely opposite effect in the case of Islamic radicalism, as this causes many people in the Muslim communities to feel that they, as Muslims, are being held responsible. This causes a feeling of solidarity, causes people to close ranks, and feeds anger and frustration. If less pressure is placed on the Muslim communities, this will probably create more space for opposing views. And if members of the Muslim communities take a clearer stand against radical excesses, this will probably have an effect on the decline of radicalism. A positive impact can, therefore, also be obtained if people in general, including parents, have a clearer understanding of how they should deal with the radicalisation of young people, so that these young people will not isolate themselves so easily. Finally, attractive, competing interpretations can also play a role in the decline of radicalism. There is a large chance that deradicalisation can be furthered by the availability of a well-developed alternative ideology that also meets the various needs of Islamic young people (finding a meaningful purpose in life, social bonding, justice) in a convincing manner.

The religious nature of Islamic radicalism has two significant consequences, that make this form of radicalism different from the three other cases of radicalism. Firstly, from the viewpoint of Dutch secular society, radical Islamic ideology is regarded as illegitimate,
and as an irrational cause whose arguments should not be taken seriously. This makes it difficult to enter into a discussion from positions of equality. The religious nature of the movement also makes inclusion particularly difficult. The division between church and state means that the government is hardly able to be involved in an ideological discussion between radical and non-radical views, as this pertains to a religious ideology.

We then go on to consider the topic of individual deradicalisation. We distinguish between three different types of motives that play a role in deradicalisation: normative factors (when the ideology is no longer sufficiently appealing), affective factors (when the social and organisational aspects are no longer satisfactory) and continuance factors (when the practical circumstances are no longer satisfactory). With respect to former adherents of radical movements, the results of our research show that, in almost all cases, all three types of factors played a role in the process of deradicalisation. Various general conclusions are drawn. Firstly, the rejection of violent action plays a major role in deradicalisation, but there may be various motives behind this stance: motives of an ideological nature (violence is inherently bad, violence leads to undesirable hostility), of a strategic nature (violence will not lead to the future that is desired), or of an organisational nature (violence turns in on itself and leads to the corruption of the own movement). Secondly, deradicalisation can arise from the realisation that the desired future is not achievable. This realisation can have a major demotivating effect on members of a radical group, and cause them to doubt the benefit of radical actions. Such a realisation is often triggered by a failed radical action, whereby it has become clear that everything humanly possible has been done, that the utmost efforts have been made, but that those efforts have not brought the desired future any nearer. Another significant ideological factor is a change in the individual's viewpoint with regard to the existing order. Often this change in viewpoint involves the individual’s realisation that he/she is an integral part of society and that this tie is important. People no longer wish to view this society as an enemy. In addition to these normative factors, disappointment in the movement can also be a significant factor in deradicalisation. Disappointment in the group can cause doubts as to the feasibility of those ideals. People can also become disappointed in the group’s power if it has little political influence. The fifth point is that practical life circumstances play an important role. Many former adherents of radical movements name factors such as growing away from the movement, assuming responsibilities and wanting to build their own lives as factors that played a role in their deradicalisation.

In addition to motives that lead to deradicalisation, there are also barriers that hinder deradicalisation. For example, loyalty to their own community forms a barrier to deradicalisation for radicals from minority groups. A lack of social perspectives and social alternatives can also form a barrier to disengagement from a radical group. Furthermore, inner barriers can also play a role. This pertains mainly to the radicals’ reluctance to acknowledge the fact that the actual (radical) lifestyle is not right for them, or that their (radical) truth is not the only truth.

A significant trigger for deradicalisation comes from significant others. These are people whom the radical trusts and respects, and who enter into ideological discussion with the radical. When the radical is (slightly) open to the opinion of this person/these people, it is possible that he or she may be influenced by the other person(s) and that they trigger a process of doubt about the radical’s own ideology.

On the basis of the results, we put forward a number of policy suggestions at a collective level:
Summary

• Carefully consider what does and does not need to be dealt with. What social phenomena are (un)desirable? And what approach best suits an open, democratic society?

• Promote the democratic approach in order to discourage a violent strategy. It is important that people who want to achieve something in a democratic manner are taken seriously. Increasing the range of competing non-radical (democratic) ideologies also falls within the scope of a democratic approach.

• Make public debate and the atmosphere in the Netherlands more inclusive, as a result of which more room will be created within the Islamic communities, so that they themselves are able to express opposing views against radicalism. This will enable more Muslims to think in terms of ‘the Netherlands is my country’ and this will take the wind out of the radicals’ sails. This more open political climate will also decrease the possibility of adverse effects in response to repressive measures.

• Eliminate the breeding ground for new recruits by means of social reform, which will make radical thinking less attractive for new members.

• Do not dismiss radical demands in advance as illegitimate, so that the less radical movements (the apolitical and political salafists) will become more firmly connected to society and the wind will be taken out of the sails of the more radical movement (the jihadi salafists).

• Take extreme care when considering the application of repressive measures, because they may well be very effective, but they can also have adverse effects, such as a spiral of violence, a worsening of the struggle and further radicalisation of the ‘hard core’. But it appears that in the case of Islamic radicalism, the main risk is of an underdog effect, which would only serve to make the radical group more attractive.

We then offer a number of suggestions at an individual level:

• Enable an open ideological religious dialogue by providing persuasive discussion partners. When introducing specific discussion partners to deradicalisation programmes, in particular religious or even somewhat orthodox discussion partners, two dilemmas apply, namely what role has been set aside for the government in this matter, within a secular society, and how religious and orthodox does the line of thought offered as an alternative need to be?

• Establish openness to orthodox religious statements. It is easier for a person to change his mind and to moderate his or her attitude when room is given for experimentation with radical ideas and types of behaviour than when this behaviour is heavily condemned by others and has even become politically loaded.

• Limit isolation and stimulate the openness of society. It is important to prevent isolation of the radical individual and to ensure that society is as open as possible to taking someone in again after disengagement and to letting them feel a part of society once again.

• Set out the consequences of the radical course of action. Emphasising the negative consequences of radicalisation can promote deradicalisation.

• Offer support to an individual in taking hold of his or her own life. An improved perspective of the future can lower the barrier to disengagement.

• Suggestions regarding organisational aspects of individual deradicalisation programmes: (1) Address affective and normative as well as continuance factors. (2) Give the approach a voluntary basis and combine passive and active recruitment. (3) Ensure cooperation between various authorities.
1. Introduction

Islamic forms of radicalism have been a main focus of interest since the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States. The attacks in London and Madrid increased the feeling of urgency with respect to the need to prioritise this focus. The fact that Islamic radicalism is also a Dutch phenomenon became clear when Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered in 2004.

The political and academic interest in new phenomena is often extensive, certainly when these phenomena are considered threatening. By carrying out academic research, the hope is to gain further insight into - and therefore greater understanding of - the phenomenon, thus averting the danger. Over the past few years, a great deal of research has been carried out in the Netherlands into the rise and the development of various forms of Islamic radicalism. Examples of this research include the studies Strijders van eigen bodem ['Home-grown Warriors'] by Frank Buijs, Froukje Demant and Atef Hamdy (2006) and Processen van radicalisering ['Processes of radicalisation'] by Marieke Slootman and Jean Tillie (2006), both carried out at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) at the University of Amsterdam.

However, whenever the feeling of danger or unfamiliarity decreases, attention paid to this topic often decreases too. It is therefore no surprise that research is rarely carried out on the subject of deradicalisation. This is, however, quite unfortunate, as despite the fact that each phenomenon within a certain period has its own characteristic features, a great deal can be learnt from experiences with radicalism during (recent) history. If we can gain a greater understanding of deradicalisation processes in the past, we can draw lessons from this for the future. Although it is not currently possible to make definitive judgements about the numbers of new members and the number of those who are withdrawing from participation in the Islamic radical movement in the Netherlands, it appears as though this form of radicalism has not yet lost its strength. The question as to what factors and processes play a role in deradicalisation is therefore both topical and relevant. What makes radical movements break down, for example? Why is it that a violent course of action is renounced at a given moment? Why do some people leave their radical group?

The aim of this study is to endeavour to provide an answer to these questions. For this purpose, various examples of deradicalisation in the recent past in the Netherlands are compared. On the basis of this comparison, we attempt to draw conclusions about deradicalisation in general, and about the possible future deradicalisation of Islamic radicalism in particular. In this chapter, we briefly examine the research questions that we answer in this report as well as the general aim of the study (section 1.2). We also provide an overview of the structure of the report (1.3). First of all, however, we briefly examine the terms radicalisation and deradicalisation, which are central to this report (1.1).

1.1 Radicalisation and deradicalisation

The concept of radicalisation has been discussed in detail in the two aforementioned publications about radicalisation, and we now provide a summary of the concept, as follows: We regard radicalisation as a process of delegitimation, a process in which confidence in the system decreases and the individual retreats further and further into his or
her own group, because he or she no longer feels part of society. It is therefore (partly) a political process. The legitimacy of the system is increasingly called into question and the people who form a part of the system are increasingly dehumanised and regarded as the enemy. This attitude is connected with the wish and the intention to radically change the system. The most extreme form of radicalism is extremism, in which the intention is transformed into violent actions. Extremism is the opposite of democracy. Whilst democracy is based upon basic values such as popular sovereignty, the equality of all citizens, freedom of belief and freedom of speech, extremism rejects these democratic values and processes. Members of extremist groups therefore present their own ideology as the ideology that is universally applicable, which must be imposed upon the population, if necessary by the use of violence.

Deradicalisation is the opposite of radicalisation: it is the process of becoming less radical. This process of ‘becoming less radical’ applies both to behaviour and beliefs. With regard to behaviour, this primarily involves the cessation of violent actions. With regard to beliefs, this involves an increase in confidence in the system, a desire to once more be a part of society, and the rejection of non-democratic means. That is not to say that deradicalised groups or individuals no longer strive to bring about political changes, but rather that the aim is no longer to undermine the system, and the means that are planned to be introduced are in keeping with the democratic legal system.

In general, the deradicalisation of behaviour is linked with the deradicalisation of beliefs. For various reasons, movements or individuals may moderate or renounce their radical ideology and decide that as a result, radical actions are no longer in keeping with their world view. But changes in behaviour and in beliefs do not always go hand in hand. Radical behaviour can be stopped without this being accompanied by a moderation of radical beliefs. Radical movements may put a stop to their violent actions, for example, because the key figures from the organisation have been apprehended. Radical individuals may stop their violent activities because their partner puts pressure on them to stop. In both examples, the radical beliefs do not have to change, but deradicalisation has still taken place. Conversely, individuals who have radical beliefs but have not (yet) used any violence may moderate their beliefs. Although in a case such as this there is no clear change in behaviour, it can nevertheless be considered as deradicalisation.

Collective and individual

We distinguish between two levels at which deradicalisation can take place: the collective and the individual level. The collective level is the level of the radical movement, whilst the individual level is the level of the radical individual.

Deradicalisation on a collective level means that a radical movement ceases to exist. This can happen in various ways: a movement falls apart, peters out, is defused by means of government intervention, is absorbed into a non-radical movement, or transforms itself into a non-radical movement. In all of these cases, we refer to a decline of the radical movement. Decline automatically means that radical behaviour ceases on a collective level. A reformed movement or one that has fallen apart no longer carries out radical actions.

Deradicalisation on an individual level can take on various forms. First of all, we can refer to deradicalisation when a person ceases his or her violent activities. But as already mentioned, not all radicals are violent. For that reason we also take membership in
a radical movement to be an indication of radicalism. Although membership in a radical movement does not necessarily mean that a person shares all the convictions of that group or takes part in all its activities, we believe there is a high possibility that someone who is a member of a movement does subscribe to (some of) its main convictions. We also assume that membership in a movement increases the possibility that a person will also actively participate in (some of) the most significant activities. Continuing along the same line, we also regard disengagement from a radical movement as a form of deradicalisation. Disengagement from a radical movement may often be linked with the process of moderation of an individual’s radical beliefs but, as described, that does not always have to be the case. In cases in which an individual leaves a radical movement (and therefore also ceases his or her radical behaviour) but does not moderate his or her radical beliefs, we still call this deradicalisation.

Finally, it is possible that some individuals may well have radical beliefs but are not members of a radical movement, and do not carry out violent actions. In the case of such individuals, it is difficult to determine the extent to which they were radical, because no radical behaviour took place. Nevertheless, they may have undergone a process in which their radical beliefs have been moderated, so this also constitutes a process of deradicalisation.

1.2 A study into deradicalisation

Islamic radicalism is a fairly recent phenomenon and there is still no evidence of a decline. In order to be able to say something about possible deradicalisation in the future and about how this process of deradicalisation could be supported if required, we must take a look at other cases of deradicalisation. In addition to the case of Islamic radicalism, we take a look at the developments of three historical cases in the Netherlands, augmented by a comparison between religious and non-religious forms of radicalism. We therefore analyse:

- The radical Moluccans in the 1970s
- The squatters’ movement in the 1980s
- The extreme right-wing Centre parties of the 1980s-1990s
- The specific nature of religious radical movements when compared to non-religious radical movements.

On the basis of a comparison with the three historical cases and a comparison between religious and non-religious forms of radicalism, we provide some assessments with regard to deradicalisation in general, and we outline our expectations with regard to the possible deradicalisation of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands. We analyse the process of deradicalisation at both the collective and the individual level. In the study, we formulate answers to the following questions:

- What factors play a role in the decline of radical or extremist movements? In what way? (Collective level)
- What factors play a role in the disengagement of individuals from radical or extremist movements and in the individual’s process of moderating his or her radical or extremist beliefs and behaviour? In what way? (Individual level)

At a collective level, the analysis of the decline of radical or extremist movements is mainly based upon descriptions in the literature studied. At an individual level, the analy-
sis of deradicalisation is based upon information gathered from in-depth interviews with individuals who have at some time gone through a radical phase. For this purpose, we interviewed people from each of the four radical viewpoints (Moluccan, leftist, rightist and Islamic). On the one hand, the deradicalisation of these individuals concerns their disengagement from a radical movement. On the other hand, this concerns the moderation of ideas and behaviour, for example if someone formerly used - or endorsed - violence to achieve political targets, but later renounced violent means.

The analysis of individual deradicalisation is supplemented with an analysis of deradicalisation programmes in various countries. This analysis is based upon literature and interviews. We then proceed to formulate answers to the following two research questions:

- To what extent do the existing programmes address the factors that lead to individual deradicalisation?
- What lessons can be learnt from the existing programmes that can be applied to Islamic radicals in the Netherlands?

On the basis of the insights gained, we offer some suggestions with regard to the introduction of measures (if required) to deal with Islamic forms of radicalism, both at a collective and an individual level, as well as with regard to deradicalisation programmes.

1.3 Structure of the report

The report commences with an analysis of deradicalisation at the collective level of the movement (chapters 2 to 5). In order to be able to conduct research into deradicalisation, it is necessary to construct an analytical framework. The fact that the cases are all discussed in a completely different way in the literature means that they are difficult to compare. In order to be able to compare them, the cases must be described in the same terms. The first step, which is the development of a set of factors that may play a role in the decline and on the basis of which the cases can be compared, is described in Chapter 2. This analytical framework is based upon theories about radicalisation, social movements, sects and gangs.

We then use this analytical framework to describe the three cases in the Netherlands in Chapter 3. We describe the rise, the developments and the decline of the radical Moluccans in the 1970s, the squatters’ movement in the 1980s and the extreme right-wing Centre parties of the 1980s-1990s, and we use the analytical framework to compare the decline of the movements.

However, none of the three historical cases in the Netherlands constitute a religious movement. A frequently heard idea is that religious radical movements differ considerably from non-religious movements. The question is therefore raised as to whether we are not missing something with regard to Islamic radicalism if we only make use of experiences of non-religious radical movements. In Chapter 4, therefore, we research the extent to which religious radical movements differ in a unique way from non-religious movements.

We then apply these insights to the recent phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands. Chapter 5 begins with a description of Islamic radicalism, after which we proceed to analyse the similarities and differences with the other cases. On the basis of this comparison and the characteristics that are linked with the religious nature of the
movement, we then formulate expectations about the possible decline of Islamic radicalism and the factors that may play a role in this decline. This concludes the first part of the report.

The second part of the report focuses upon individual deradicalisation. We start with the development of an analytical framework for analysing individual deradicalisation (Chapter 6). Based on the information gained by the interviews, we then fill in this analytical framework (Chapter 7). We describe the motives for deradicalisation as explained by the individuals from the various radical movements, and examine the circumstances of their individual deradicalisation processes. Using this information, we analyse the similarities and differences and draw conclusions with regard to individual deradicalisation.

On the basis of these conclusions, in Chapter 8 we analyse the approach of various deradicalisation programmes in various countries. These are programmes that focus on the one hand upon individuals from the extreme right, and on the other hand, upon radical Islamic individuals. From these programmes we draw lessons that can be used in setting up deradicalisation programmes for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands.

In Chapter 9, we translate the results from the study into suggestions for an approach to deradicalisation. The findings cannot however easily be translated into concrete policy recommendations, as each separate suggestion requires a carefully balanced political consideration. In order to enable this report to serve as a starting point for policy makers, this final chapter summarises the results of the study in the form of various suggestions for a possible approach to Islamic radicalism and in a discussion of the associated dilemmas.
2. Collective deradicalisation: the theoretical framework

Radical groups are complex and multiform phenomena that cannot be easily pigeonholed. Black and white approaches and rigidly defined categories are inadequate when it comes to carrying out an analysis of these phenomena. It is therefore no surprise that radical groups are described in various different ways in the relevant literature: sometimes as a social movement (e.g. Wiktorowicz 2004), sometimes as a sect (e.g. Meertens et al. 2006) and sometimes as a gang (e.g. Bjørgo and Carlsson 2005). The approach that considers the radical group as a social movement places the emphasis upon the group’s political goal: the group wants to change something in society and therefore switches to (violent) action. The radical individuals within the group are regarded as people who rationally calculate that they can achieve their desired political goal by means of their actions. The approaches that consider the radical group as a sect or as a gang focus more attention on ‘irrational’ aspects of radical groups, such as the possible psychological dependency of the members on the leadership and the protection or status that radical groups are able to offer their members.

All three approaches are important when carrying out research into deradicalisation. By comparing radical groups with social movements, an insight can be gained into the functions that groups such as these perform for their members, as well as into the points on which radical groups can fail in to do so. Studies into the disengagement of individuals from participation in sects and gangs can shed light on the barriers that groups are able to raise in order to make it as difficult as possible for the members to leave these groups. We therefore make use of insights from both social movement literature and literature about sects and gangs. The approach that considers the radical group as a social movement is taken as the starting point because – given our definition of radicalisation – radicalisation has a political core: in the radicals’ vision, democratic society is increasingly losing its legitimacy and the radicals therefore want to bring about far-reaching changes in society. A radical movement may therefore be considered as a (specific form of) social movement. Wherever the literature on social movements fails to analyse processes of decline for radical groups, we make use of the literature on sects and gangs.

2.1 The radical group as a social movement

In order to understand why and how individuals leave radical groups and why such groups weaken or even disappear at a given moment, it is important to understand what function groups such as this perform for their members. After all, we have to analyse the motives for the disengagement of members from participation, and the decline of the group: is the group no longer meeting the needs of its members or is something else wrong? In the literature concerning the motives for radicalisation, we often see three fundamental motives that frequently recur: the response to perceived injustice (instrumental motive), the need for social bonding (motives of identity) and the need for meaning (ideological motive). In the second part of the theoretical framework (Chapter 6), these individual motives are elaborated upon further. If a radical group is unable to meet the needs of its members, the members tend to seek refuge elsewhere, but an exodus such as this does not have to mean the end of the movement. If the movement is to con-
The main matter of importance is that there is an influx of new members who can replace the old members. If the movement is unable to achieve this influx, it will become increasingly weaker and ultimately disappear.

What does this interaction between members and movement look like? Klandermans (1997) describes the evolution of social movements as an interaction between supply and demand. In a society, there may be a large number of dissatisfied people who strive for change, but this ‘demand’ for action can remain hidden if suitable opportunities for action are not ‘supplied’. Conversely, a supply of initiatives for change will not yield any results if there are not any dissatisfied people – although supply can also generate demand by making people aware of problems and possible solutions. The interaction between supply and demand does not take place in a vacuum; social movements take place in a context of ever changing opportunities and limitations that influence the dynamics of the movement. Movements can be both inhibited and strengthened by external factors that have an influence on the tactics, actions and choices of the movement. Many academics describe this context as the ‘political opportunity structure’. Within this structure, the focus lies in particular on the openness and closeness of the political space. How a movement responds to the opportunities and limitations depends upon how it interprets these factors. Furthermore, in practice, not just political, but also cultural, social and economic factors play a major role. Figure 1 is a diagram showing this approach.

The model forms a theoretical instrument for analysing the decline of movements, as it focuses the attention on the various parties that exert influence upon this process: not only on the decreasing supply (the movement no longer meets the members’ needs), but also the decreasing demand (the members’ needs have changed and potential members do not feel drawn to the movement) and on the possibly inhibiting environment (the environment influences the demand and/or the supply, giving rise to a situation in which these polarities are no longer optimally in balance).

We use the model of demand, supply and context in order to analyse the various factors that play a part in the decline of the movements, but we also supplement the model. Radical movements are not only attempting to guarantee their continued existence by complying with the needs of their members, but also by raising barriers to prevent members from leaving.

2.1.a Barriers against disengagement

By considering the functions and attraction of a movement, the manner in which a decline in this attraction can lead to the decline of a movement can be examined and ana-
lysed. The principle behind this is that individuals will only stay with a movement if the movement is of value to them; in other words if the supply is in keeping with the demand. This principle is true for most social movements, because they have an open structure and membership is voluntary in nature. Due to the fact that, for most social movements, numbers equal influence, almost everyone is welcome. The disadvantage of an open approach such as this is that the movement is not able to hold onto its members easily. Both free entry and free exit apply to a certain extent (compare Ferrero 2007). The movement can try to hold onto its members by performing its functions as well as possible, but it cannot force the members to stay. If members are dissatisfied about the way in which the movement is performing, they will move on, but the movement can overcome that by being as open as possible to new members. In this way, it will try to compensate for the outflow with a new inflow.

However, recruitment in the case of radical movements, much more so than for other movements, does not only concern quantity (attracting as many people as possible), but also - in particular - quality (attracting very involved people). After all, membership is not just a question of writing out a cheque or going to a demonstration, but also a matter of distancing yourself from society and possibly developing illegal and dangerous activities. The movement must put a great deal of time and energy into inaugurating the members into the ideology and testing their reliability. Recruiting a member incurs major expenses, so it cannot allow large groups of members to be drawn in, just to see them leave again afterwards. This is why many radical movements have built in mechanisms that make it more difficult for members to leave the group. A movement such as this raises so-called ‘barriers’ to disengagement from the group. These barriers can adopt various forms: from minimising the social alternatives to the group that members have, to simply threatening members who want to move on. In the case of radical movements, there are therefore many fewer examples of free entry and free exit than in the case of other social movements.

We are not able to revert to the knowledge about social movements in order to understand how exactly these barriers are erected, but we can make use of the literature about sects and gangs, as sects and gangs are two types of movements that try to actively prevent members from leaving the movement. By looking at these barriers within sects and gangs, we gain further insight into processes of this type. This enables us to carry out further research into what factors play a role in the failure of these processes, and therefore what factors may help eliminate the barriers to disengagement from the group - and also pave the way to the decline of radical movements.

We now describe the factors that emerge from existing literature as having an effect on the decline of radical movements, firstly on the basis of the three-way split of “demand, supply and context” (2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). Then, on the basis of insights gained from literature relating to sects and gangs, we describe what types of barriers these movements may raise in order to combat disengagement from the group (2.5). Using the information from these various sources, we construct a framework to define the various factors that may play a role in the collective decline of radical movements (2.6). In the subsequent chapters, we analyse the decline of various radical movements on the basis of that framework. We examine the motives for disengagement at the individual level in Chapter 6.
2.2 Supply: factors linked to the movement

Radical and extremist movements adopt various different forms: from fixed, centralised organisations with an authoritarian leadership to fluid networks. Nevertheless, each radical movement must comply with a number of conditions if it is to be successful. These include at least the following three aspects (compare Buijs 2002):

- The formulation of an appealing ideology (outlining a world view, providing goals)
- The development of organisational capacities (delegating tasks, having adequate resources at one’s disposal, reaching the target group)
- The selection of good leaders (who are able to play a role in the two aspects stated above)

In order to guarantee the movements’ continued existence, it is crucial that they comply with these conditions. In order to be able to explain the decline of radical movements, we therefore focus our attention upon these conditions.

2.2.a Formulating an ideology

The success of a radical group is partly determined by the ability to formulate an ideology in a way that satisfies the individual members and appeals to sympathetic sections of the population. What elements must an ideology contain, in order to fulfil the needs and wants of its adherents? For this study we are adopting Seliger’s viewpoint (in Heywood 2007: 45), which defines ideology as ‘a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power’. Seliger argues that ideologies therefore:

- offer a viewpoint with regard to the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view’
- provide a model of a desired future, a vision of the “good society”
- outline how political change can and should be brought about

**World view.** The ideology must provide a depiction of reality that one can relate to, and must contain an acceptable explanation for perceived injustice. Klandermans (1997) draws attention to the fact that this explanation should contain an element of a politically-defined shared identity. The combination of collectively defined grievances that produce a ‘we feeling’ on the one hand, and a clearly demonstrable ‘they’ who are responsible for the collective grievances on the other hand, ensures a mixture of shared moral outrage and oppositional consciousness that is crucial for collective action.

**Desired future.** A solution must be formulated, in terms of a prospect for a better future. In contrast with the wickedness and rottenness of the current world, a utopia of a good, harmonious world is described.

**Means for political change.** The members must have a sense of conviction that the movement is able to provide for this solution. They must therefore believe in the route that the movement decides to take in order to arrive at the desired society, and they must have confidence that politically, the movement has the power to achieve something.

The radical group must actively propagate its own ideology and also enter into combat with competing interpretations of social reality. These may be interpretations that are diametrically opposed to its own group’s interpretation of social reality and how to deal with it, such as democratic answers to the conflicts in society. But they can also be interpretations that for the outsider hardly differ from the radical group’s interpreta-
tion. For outsiders, this kind of inner struggle between radical fractions is often seen as a ‘secret language’, but in the eyes of the radicals it concerns fundamental deviations from the ideology of ‘the true warriors’. Tensions and ideological differences such as these will only increase as the group undergoes further radicalisation and its actions become more violent. After all, the group must include justifications for this behaviour in its ideology. Radical groups devote a great deal of attention to what Crenshaw (1992 in Della Porta 1995) refers to as ‘cognitive restructuring’: substantiating why objectionable behaviour is nevertheless honourable and necessary. The aim of this process of cognitive restructuring is to keep the radical group together, but it can put off many sympathisers due to its far-fetched argumentation. And whenever the radical movement loses its sympathisers, it also loses the most direct social basis from which new members can be recruited.

2.2.b Organisational capacity

As the group progresses along the path of increasing radicalism and extremism, higher demands are placed upon the organisational capacity of the group. On the one hand, the group must perform social and cultural functions for its members that they no longer want - or are able to receive - from established society. On the other hand, the development of militant actions places new demands on the organisation: money, communication systems, weapons, etc. In brief, the radical group must tap into new sources.

The path to radicalism and extremism is a process in which the group is continually subject to change. The group can only continue to exist if there is sufficient flexibility to capitalize upon the changes in its surroundings and within its own organization. The leadership must design a such transformation process in such a way that at least some of the members are retained and that the relationship with the population groups of potential adherents is maintained. The most flexible extremist movement is probably one that consists of many clusters of various sizes and complexity (a network of networks) that are held together by mutual confidence and a shared mission, instead of by a hierarchical structure. Individual clusters are able to attract their own funds and are able to recruit and arm their people individually (compare Stern 2004).

2.2.c Leadership

Leadership is an important aspect of radical movements, but leadership does not always assume the same form. In some groups there is a recognisable, formal leadership, while in other groups there is an informal and often implicit power base. But even in those cases, the leadership of a radical group must be able to perform the aforementioned tasks in the areas of ideology and organisation. Various forms of leadership have various advantages and disadvantages. In strictly hierarchically organised radical groups that have a strong leadership, the division of tasks and responsibilities is clear: the leader determines what is going to happen and the members carry it out. A charismatic leader can also be a binding factor. The disadvantage of this is that the group is highly dependent upon its leadership. If at a given moment the leader of the group disappears (for example because he or she has been arrested), the group will break apart unless a new leader emerges.

Fluid radical networks have no clear leadership. The advantage of this is that members and subgroups are able to operate completely independently, and that the organisation’s power is not affected if a member or part of the group disappears or drops out. The disadvantage is that ‘anything goes’. As there is no clear leader who determines
what is going to happen and who is responsible for communication to the outside, each participant is able to decide for him or herself what he or she is going to do. Actions of individual members or subgroups may be attributed to the entire group, even if the rest of the group does not agree with those actions.

2.2.4 Summary: Factors linked to the movement that may influence decline

Now that we have highlighted important conditions for the continued existence of radical groups, we are able to take an initial step in naming factors that can lead to the decline of such groups.

Internal factors that may influence decline:

1. Failing ideology: in the eyes of (potential) members, the ideology no longer provides the (potential) member with a world view that can give meaning to the currently existing order, does not describe an attractive desired future or does not formulate a clear means of achieving this future. The ideology loses its attraction to potential recruits as a result of cognitive restructuring.

2. Failing organisational capacity: the group is unable to perform the required social and cultural functions or is unable to tap into sufficient new sources.

3. Failing leadership: the (new) leadership provides insufficient direction, is not able to adapt flexibly to changes, or is unable to inspire the members sufficiently.

2.3 Demand: needs of the members

As we have already mentioned above, the demand at individual level is dealt with in subsequent chapters, beginning with Chapter 6. Those chapters examine individual motives for deradicalisation. In the present section we discuss the demand that is linked with collective aspects (i.e. group effects that influence the development of the movement). We examine the ‘cohort-effect’, which may occur when members leave the organisation, and the ‘generational gap’ phenomenon, which may occur when a group seeks to attract new recruits.

In general, it appears that it is primarily young people who are attracted to radical movements (see Silke 2003, for example). This has both its advantages and its disadvantages. A major advantage is that young people often have the time and freedom to devote themselves entirely to the movement. One problem however is retaining this devotion in the longer term from people who are in a transitional phase into more adult roles and identities. When members start to give a clearer structure to their personal relationships and to the direction their lives will take, the radical group may begin to occupy a position of lesser importance in their lives. Whenever a group predominantly consists of people of the same age who joined at approximately the same time (a cohort), there is a distinct possibility that at a given moment, these individuals will leave at approximately the same time in order to continue their lives in a different direction. At such a moment, the group can fall apart. If, however, there is a sufficient variation in age among the members of the movement, or the movement is able to attract sufficient new young members, continuity will be maintained, which will enable the group to continue to exist, even if members continue to leave the group from time to time.
Another aspect of the fact that it is mainly young people who feel attracted to radical movements is the generational dimension. By this we mean that a radical group may predominantly appeal to individuals from a particular generation, and that it may be far less attractive to individuals from subsequent generations. This is the case, for example, in situations where a widely-felt generational gap is experienced by the members. It appears that a socially-charged generational gap can have major consequences for the political socialisation of the young generation. One example is the Red Army Faction in Germany, which took a stand against the older generations due to their ‘flawed’ past (see for example Koenen 2005). Young people who reject the legacy of the older generation often also feel misunderstood themselves and not acknowledged for what they are. They experience very few ties, which makes it easier for them to distance themselves from established society.

This generational gap often corresponds to various stages within the process of social change, which also means that it is not a static factor. There is a distinct possibility that a gap that is experienced between two generations will decrease after a period of time, and that when life is normalised, new forms of associating with each other will be found. This means that the power of attraction of a radical group for individuals from a particular generation can be ‘extinguished’ in the course of a subsequent generation.

On the demand side, two factors can therefore be named at collective level that can lead to or contribute towards the decline of a radical movement.

 Demand factors that may influence decline:
1. Members outgrow the movement as a cohort.
2. The next generation does not feel attracted to the movement.

\[\text{\bf 2.4 Context: External factors}\]

We stated previously that (radical) social movements do not operate in a vacuum: they have a context that is characterised by ever changing opportunities and limitations that structure the dynamics of the movement. But ‘context’ is a rather broad concept. So what do we mean when we talk about the influence of the context on the movement? In order to discuss this influence in a structured manner, we have distinguished between various factors: the role of an existing social conflict, the role of the government, the role of public support and the role of competing movements.

\[\text{\bf 2.4.a Conflicts within society}\]

Existing conflicts within society can have a major effect upon (the decline of) radical groups. These conflicts often form a part of the ideology, of the vision of a radical group with respect to the existing world. If these conflicts change, they no longer fit within the world view that has been outlined. This may concern social conflict at an international, national or local level.

\textit{International.} When dealing with factors at an international level, we must consider centres of conflict throughout the world. These may concern broad global conflicts (e.g. the North-South conflict or the opposition between the West and the Islamic world) or
regional conflicts (e.g. the conflict in Kashmir). These may be strategic conflicts between
countries, or the struggle of oppressed groups of the population against domination.
Conflicts of this type can evoke solidarity at an international level: ‘their struggle is our
struggle’. International solidarity can give the struggle at national level a heroic nature. It
leads activists to the conclusion that they form a part of a grand, global movement and
that they are fighting for issues that really matter. A decline in the struggle at interna-
tional level may deprive activists of a stimulus and reference point at national level, as
well as causing their devotion and enthusiasm to decrease. Radical groups that refer to an
international struggle are therefore affected by changes in international conflicts.

National. In the case of social conflict at a national level, the existence of minority
groups who are discriminated against must be considered. It seems likely that whenever a
group of the population is oppressed or discriminated against, there is a good chance that
this will result in specific voting behaviour, choice of party and political action in general.
The condition for this is that this group of the population not only is discriminated
against, but also feels discriminated against. Without the awareness of discrimination or
poverty, the group will not begin to take action. Furthermore, the situation must be con-
sidered as changeable.

Local. At a local level too, conflicts between various groups of the population
must be considered. For example, there may be a polarisation between local groups of
young people who have different backgrounds. Both at national and local level, social
conflict can die out at a particular time. The population group that is discriminated
against may be given more opportunities, and may be able to acquire a better position by
means of ‘upward mobility’, or the elite from the various groups may be able to find a
constructive balance in consultation with each other (as is the case in a pillarized society).
Or local young people may get in contact with each other, which means that the percep-
tion of ‘the enemy’ between the various groups of young people has no chance of taking
hold. A conflict that, in this manner, is on the decline can result in a situation where the
radical group loses its power of attraction to members and/or new recruits, and therefore
becomes weaker or even disappears.

2.4.b Government policy

We address the issue of governmental influence on decline by focussing on three types of
approaches or policy lines: repression, inclusion and reform.

Here we define repression as the suppression, in the broad sense, of radical tenden-
cies. In this sense it involves counteracting both legal and illegal radical activities. In fact,
as far as radicalisation tendencies are concerned, a government always faces a choice be-
tween restraint and repression. An assessment must be made as to which approach is the
most reliable and effective way to take action. The choice of approach is partly linked to
the nature of the radical movement against which actions are being taken. A government
policy that displays restraint in response to an aggressive movement could be seen by
that movement as an encouragement with respect to their violent activities, because the
radicals are given the feeling that they can do anything, and that the government is not
putting the slightest obstacle in their way. But a conservative government policy, which
advocates restraint in relation to a radical movement that acts cautiously, could actually
lead to de-escalation. Repressive policy brings with it the danger of escalation and a spiral
of violence, but can also form the ‘rap on the knuckles’ that may prevent an escalation. The effects of repressive measures can therefore vary to quite a great extent.

Inclusion is the ‘polder model’ with regard to the measures to combat radicalism and extremism. As for example Duyvendak et al. (1992) have stated, this mostly concerns a two-sided policy: on the one hand pacification and inclusion of reformatory or ‘friendly-radical’ forces, and on the other hand isolation of the radical or extremist hard core. The inclusion and exclusion policy is closely linked with the functioning of the political system itself. This involves issues such as the accessibility of the political arena with respect to oppositional voices, and the extent to which government policy is accepted by the population at large.

Reform is a perpetual point of conflict in the response of a democratic society to the rise of radicalism and extremism. Radicalisation ties in with social unrest – how should we respond to this? Some people state that it is first and foremost necessary to suppress all activities that stretch the boundaries of the democratic arena or take place outside of these boundaries. Only once that has happened can we talk about possible reforms. And no sooner, as these people believe, as otherwise the effectiveness of undemocratic activities would be confirmed, which would undermine democracy. Others think it is important to examine whether the social unrest of the radicals contains elements of genuine issues to be addressed. If that is the case, these elements must be dealt with in order to remove the basis of the radical unrest, to demonstrate the flexibility of the political system and to keep those who are discontent within the democratic arena as much as possible.

2.4.c Public support

Public support is important for a social movement, and therefore for a radical movement as well. New recruits come from sympathetic groups of the population, but there are also other reasons why public support is important. Cronin (2007) describes various forms of active and passive public support. In addition to joining the movement, examples of active support include providing radicals with accommodation and collecting money to fund their activities. Passive support includes, for example, ignoring evident signals of radical or extremist activities, refusing to lend assistance in police investigations, sending money to organisations that act as fronts for the radicals, and pledging support for the radical group’s aims. It is therefore important that public opinion with regard to the movement is (moderately) positive, because it is difficult for radical groups to survive without the active or passive support of the surrounding population. Radical groups therefore tend to take into account the effect that their actions have on public opinion. This support can give way, however, if the movement makes errors of judgement, for example, or by the aforementioned ‘cognitive restructuring’ of the ideology.

A change in public opinion can also be caused by certain external events, which cause the group’s aims to become irrelevant and the sympathisers to lose their interest in the ideology or the objectives of the movement. However, sometimes changes in public opinion are not attributable to specific events. Coolsaet and Struyde de Swielande (2008) speak in this context of the ‘mood’ of the population and of the Zeitgeist. The Zeitgeist can be optimistic or pessimistic, or progressive or conservative. It is difficult to investigate what factors have an effect upon the population’s mood, and it is even more difficult to
make predictions in this regard. Nevertheless, a change in this mood can have an effect upon the decline of social movements.

2.4.d Competing movements

As described in the discussion of the significance of the ideology, radical movements must take up the struggle against competing interpretations of social reality. The decline of a radical group can be caused by an increase in the attractiveness of a competing interpretation, for example because other ideological accounts offer better explanations for the existing world order or because the persuasiveness of a more democratic course of action gains respect by achieving concrete successes. Whenever a competing movement becomes more convincing, the radical group loses its persuasiveness. This can also lead to the decline of the radical group.

2.4.e Summary: Context factors that may influence decline

To summarise, the context can have an effect upon the decline of radical groups in various ways:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context factors that may influence decline:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. An international, national or local conflict that is referred to by the radicals loses ground or disappears.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The government influences the movement in a negative sense through an approach based on repression, inclusion or reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Public opinion changes from (moderately) positive to negative, causing the movement to lose its broad recruitment basis, and its active and passive support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A competing movement becomes more attractive than the radical movement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5 Barriers to disengagement

We have now discussed the factors linked to the movement, the collective demand factors and the external factors that can play a role in the decline of radical movements. However, before we draw up an analytical framework of the factors that contribute to the decline of radical movements, we discuss yet another type of factor that maybe of influence. As we discussed previously, radical groups will try to stop their members from leaving the group. They will erect barriers to disengagement. In order to understand how they do that and what type of barriers these are, we take a look at the discussion of similar processes in the literature on sects and gangs.

2.5.a Sects

Radical groups are sometimes compared to sects. A sect is a very closely-knit group with distinct beliefs that is working towards a higher goal, is led by one or several very influential leaders who derive their position primarily from the fact that they lay claim to higher powers, and is often isolated from the outside world (Meertens et al. 2006). What sort of barriers do sects erect in order to prevent members from walking away? Barriers include
group processes that focus upon reinforcing group cohesion and minimising social alternatives. The emphasis that sects place on community, harmony and cohesion creates a very strong emotional bond. Sects use various mechanisms and processes in order to maintain the individual’s own social reality. One of these mechanisms is isolation.

Members of a sect often live with each other, isolated from the outside world. In most cases, all contact between members of a sect and their family and friends is broken off. Movements are able to reinforce this isolation by forbidding love relationships among their members, for example. Members thus enter into a type of ‘group marriage’, which serves to increase the loyalty to the group (Wright 1987). A significant barrier is therefore the social dependency of the individual on the group. Members of a sect run the risk of ending up in a social vacuum when they leave the group, because they have broken off all previous ties. This social dependency is therefore one of the main factors that discourages people from leaving the group.

A second barrier is formed by the psychological dependency of the individual on the group. In sects, members experience a systematic destruction of their individual identity. This is not a hidden, manipulative process, but rather something that the individuals were actually looking for as part of their religious quest (Rothbaum 1988). People usually belong to several social circles, and all of these circles have some effect upon the individual’s beliefs and behaviour. The different social circles have different value systems, and the competition between these values reduces the power of one circle over its members. But sect members have brought the interests of the sect to the fore and as a result, the influence of other social circles is reduced. Involvement in a demanding community such as this causes a decrease in the confidence that individuals have in their own ideas and in their ability to make judgements. This means that the influence of the sect and the sect leaders extends increasingly further, intruding into every area of personal and moral judgement. Disengagement from the group is often seen as failure, both by the individual him or herself, and by the group. Disengagement is then considered as a sign that you are not strong enough to live according to your ideals. Before they leave, most people undergo an intense inner struggle. The outside world has become a major unknown in which they are no longer able to move and they are afraid of ending up in a moral vacuum.

A third barrier is formed by investments that have been made previously (in the form of money, time, energy and/or socially). By demanding major investments from their members, movements are able to discourage ‘free entry’ and ‘free exit’. A person’s realisation of the costs that he or she, as an individual, has incurred for the movement may prevent that individual from leaving the movement. This mechanism is connected with processes of cognitive dissonance, which cause people to feel as if they have to justify effort and sacrifices. A consequence of this is that major sacrifices lead to greater determination (Meertens 2006). But in the event of a change of opinion, or in this case in the event of disengagement from the movement, the costs will, after all, have been ‘for nothing’.

In brief, making use of the literature on sects, three possible barriers come to the fore – see box. Breaking through these barriers at the collective level is an important factor for disengagement on an individual level, and in this way can encourage the decline of a radical movement (compare Wright 1987).
### Barriers to disengagement (from the literature on sects):

1. **Social dependency** (resulting in fear of ending up in a social vacuum).
2. **Psychological dependency** (resulting in a breakdown in self-confidence and fear of a moral vacuum).
3. **Previously made investments** (resulting in cognitive discord).

#### 2.5. b Gangs

Radical groups can also be compared with gangs (see for example Bjørgo and Carlsson 2005). A gang is a group of young people whose cohesion is enhanced by the acceptance of or even involvement in delinquent or criminal practices (Klein 1995). It is important that gangs profile themselves as a group in a particular way. In their own perception, they have set themselves apart from their neighbourhood and they are also considered as a separate group by many members of the local community (rival gangs and police institutions). Decker and Van Winkle (1996) explain that the origin and development of gangs can primarily be attributed to the role played by threat. In many areas, groups are formed to protect themselves against outside groups. But in addition to this protection, the motive of identity also seems to be a significant reason why individuals join a gang. By joining a group that poses a major threat itself, the members gain status and respect.

Gangs try to prevent members from withdrawing from the group, and just as in the case of sects, it is all about group cohesion. Contrary to the situation documented in the literature on sects, this group cohesion is not formed around a charismatic leader who gives a sense of purpose to the members, but around an informal delinquent network that offers status and protection. Gangs are not based upon a formal organisation or hierarchy, but on status, reputation and image. Gangs offer the members an identity, but both the group and the individual must live up to the expectations connected with this identity in order to maintain it. Betrayal by a member or a challenge by a competing gang is therefore dealt with extremely severely, and can lead to revenge and a spiral of violence. Literature about gangs shows that almost all individuals who are members of a gang think that there is no possibility of withdrawing, because you will be murdered if you do (Decker and Van Winkle 1996). The threats of rival gangs can also cause someone to stay with their gang for protection.

Group cohesion is enhanced by the isolation and marginalisation that membership in a gang entails. Because gangs are considered to be irrationally violent, individual gang members are perceived as threatening by society. Members of the community increasingly distance themselves from gang members, and as a result, gangs become more and more alienated from society and from friends and adults. This process causes the individual gang members to become even more isolated from social institutions such as school and the labour market. This isolation then results in a situation where gang members are no longer involved in activities and relationships that can re-integrate them into society, causing them to become increasingly marginalised.

From the literature on gangs, the following barriers therefore come to the fore:
2.6 Summary

The analytical framework that we use to analyse the decline of radical movements consists of the factors that have been presented in this chapter. These factors result from a supply and demand model. A movement declines when whatever the movement has to offer (the supply) is not sufficiently in keeping with a collective dissatisfaction (the demand). Various developments may play a role in this process.

Firstly, there are factors linked to the movement that result in a situation whereby the movement is not sufficiently able to meet the demand. It may be that the ideology fails, whether this is because the viewpoint with regard to the existing order is no longer sufficiently appealing, or because the vision of the desired future no longer appeals to the (prospective) members. Or the ideology may fail because people are no longer convinced that the movement's chosen path or strategy is the correct one. It may also be the case that the organisation fails in organisational terms and no longer has sufficient sources at its disposal, or is no longer able to comply with the social and cultural functions desired from it. This latter factor may be linked to failing leadership, which is not able to provide sufficient direction, is not able to adapt flexibly to changes or is not inspiring. The leadership plays a more central role in some movements than in other movements. It is, in particular, in those cases where the leadership forms the core of the movement that a departure of the leaders can have major consequences for the movement.

In addition to the factors linked to the movement, there are also factors at collective level that are linked to the demand (the individual reasons for disengagement are discussed later on in the report). Whenever the movement consists predominantly of members of the same age group who joined at approximately the same time, this can have major consequences when the entire cohort outgrows the movement simultaneously. Another effect of the demand at collective level involves the new recruits. Sometimes a movement that is attractive to a certain generation is no longer attractive to the generation that follows. If the movement is not able to sufficiently anticipate the needs of this new generation, it will (after a period of time) decline.

In addition to the factors that are directly linked with the movement and the demand, we also distinguish environmental factors that can have an effect upon the movement and the demand. A social conflict can thus fulfil an important role, because the ideology is partly founded upon issues involved in that conflict, for example. A change in the conflict, whether at international, national or local level, can result in a situation where the ideology no longer appears convincing. Government policy is another factor that can play a major role. A repressive approach can hinder the functioning of the radical movement or deter the members and new recruits. An policy of inclusion in the socio-political arena by the government can ensure that the wind is taken out of the sails of the radical movement, and that the demand decreases. Government reforms which address some of the needs of the radical movement also aim to slow down the momen-
tum of the movement to an even greater extent. If the social unrest decreases, there is a major chance that the movement’s followers will also decrease in number. A third contextual factor is public support. A lack of support from (part of) the population makes it more difficult for a radical movement to function, and reduces the number of new potential recruits. The loss of sympathy can be caused by the direction that the movement is perceived to be taking, or by other specific events, or by a change in the Zeitgeist. Finally, competing movements, whether they be radical or democratic, can have an effect upon the continued existence of the radical movement. Whenever competing movements present a more attractive ideology or are able to achieve greater success, there is a chance that both the members and the new recruits will associate themselves with these groups, and that the radical movement will die down.

One condition for the decline of a movement is that any barriers to disengagement from the movement must be breached, so that members are actually able to leave the group. Possible barriers include social and/or psychological dependency on the group and the extent of the costs invested in the movement. Other possible barriers include fear of the loss of reputation and protection, or fear of reprisals. Marginalisation can also form a major barrier to disengagement from a movement. Disengagement from the group is severely hindered when there are no opportunities for members of radical groups to participate in society once they have left their group.

Through the use of a representation of these factors in the form of a table, we create a framework that we are able to use in the analysis of the decline of movements. We use this framework in the following chapters in order to analyse the various cases.
Table 2.1: Analytical framework (collective factors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Moluccans 1970s</th>
<th>Squatters 1980s</th>
<th>Extreme right</th>
<th>Islamic radicalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors linked to the movement</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
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<td>Failing strategy (the outlined route)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Needs of the members</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Members outgrowing the movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>External factors</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(Inter)national or local conflict disappears/changes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government: repression</td>
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<td>Government: inclusion</td>
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<td>Government: reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public opinion/ media/ <em>Zeitgeist</em> changes (image worsens)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attractive competing interpretation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Breakdown of barriers</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social dependency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychological dependency</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Amount of costs incurred</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group reprisals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of loss of reputation and protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of marginalisation</td>
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3. Decline of radical movements: cases in the Netherlands

We have now mapped out the factors that exert an influence on the decline of a radical movement. In this chapter, we describe to what extent and in what ways we encounter these factors in practice in three historical cases in the Netherlands: the radical Moluccans in the 1970s (section 3.1), the squatters' movement in Amsterdam in the 1980s (3.2) and the extreme right-wing Centre parties in the 1980s and 1990s (3.3). In order to get a thorough understanding of these descriptions, and to be able to compare the developments properly with each other and with Islamic forms of radicalism, we also describe the origin and the nature of the movements. These descriptions are mainly based on literature study. Quotations have been included from interviews with 'ex-radicals' (which are discussed further in Chapter 7) wherever these relate to collective developments. The perspectives from which the three movements are approached in the available literature vary considerably. Literature about the squatters' movement and the Moluccan RMS movement provides a description of the movements from the inside out. It has been written by people who appear to be sympathetic towards the movement that they describe, or who have even been members of it. The available literature about extreme rightist movements (and this also applies to Islamic radicalism) is mainly written by people who have not been members of the radical movement and who analyse the movement from the outside. They write from a neutral position, or expressly consider an extreme rightist movement as an undesirable phenomenon that has to be combated in some way. In order to make the information as comparable as possible, when describing each case we will provide an overview of the factors that played a role in the decline of the movement, on the basis of the analytical framework. At the end of the chapter a comparative overview of the three cases is provided (3.4). In Chapter 5, we will use these case descriptions and the mutual comparison in order to formulate expectations with regard to a possible decline of Islamic radicalism.

3.1 Radical Moluccans in the 1970s

During the 1970s, the Netherlands was startled by a sudden flare-up of extremist activities. Young Moluccan migrants pursued a violent campaign in their struggle for an independent republic on the Southern Moluccas and in order to raise international attention for their goal. We will examine the backgrounds to this struggle and the radicalisation of the Moluccan young people. We will also describe the decline of the radicalisation in this population group. The chapter will be concluded with an overview of the factors that have played a role in the decline of this movement.

3.1.a The RMS: backgrounds and political mobilisation.

The majority of the Moluccans who came to the Netherlands with their families at the beginning of the 1950s had fought in the Dutch army against Indonesia. In the struggle for the decolonisation of Indonesia, many Moluccans took the side of the Netherlands. Under Dutch rule, they had held a privileged position and, because they had been a part

1 The description of this case is largely based on Steijlen (1996).
of the KNIL (Royal Dutch East-Indian Army), they could also expect reprisals from the Indonesians. In the decolonisation process, Indonesia made agreements with the Netherlands with regard to a federal structure, but did not abide by these agreements, and annexed the member states, including the Moluccas, in January 1950. In the Moluccas, this resulted in a call for secession, and on 24 April 1950, under pressure from the Moluccan KNIL military, from other sections of the population and from the leading figures of Manusama and Soumokil, the independent Republic of the Southern Moluccas was declared, the RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan). Although some of the Moluccans were against the RMS proclamation, there was, in general, widespread support for the RMS among the Moluccan population. Indonesia subsequently won back the majority of the Moluccas by means of a military invasion. And partly due to the fact that the Dutch government did not dare to take a firm stand against Indonesia, the Netherlands was averse to the RMS proclamation.

This made the KNIL superfluous, and it was abolished in July 1950. Just under four thousand Moluccans then had to be demobilised, but the Moluccans demanded that they would not be demobilised on Indonesian territory, but rather on or near to RMS territory. This caused the demobilisation to reach a deadlock, and an emergency solution was chosen. In addition to the possibility of redundancy or transfer to the Indonesian army, a third option was added: temporary secondment away from Indonesia, through expatriation to the Netherlands. Those who refused to make a decision were to be transported to the Netherlands. Finally, at the beginning of 1951, approximately 12,500 people went to the Netherlands. When they arrived there, the ex-KNIL soldiers were discharged from military service immediately, which the Moluccans were not expecting and which affected them deeply. Steijlen describes them as feeling betrayed, ‘rejected and set aside as a “disposable item”’ (1996: 57). They were not given any redundancy pay or pension, just items for subsistence and three guilders and fifty cents per person per week. Further friction occurred. Contrary to what the Dutch government stated, the Moluccan ex-KNIL soldiers believed that they had been sent to the Netherlands under (military) order, and not by free choice. There was also disagreement about the temporary nature of the Moluccans’ stay. The Netherlands expected that once a ‘cooling-off period’ had taken place, the Moluccans would return to the Moluccas of their own accord, whilst in the eyes of the Moluccans, it was the Dutch government’s responsibility to return them to the Moluccas in order to be able to complete the incomplete demobilisation. And the establishment of the RMS was a requirement for the accomplishment of this goal.

Activism up to the mid-1960s

Most Moluccans backed the RMS ideal. During the first fifteen years in the Netherlands, the RMS struggle was led by the political organisations formed by the first generation Moluccans, which at a given moment, however, grew weak.

Steijlen explains that the RMS ideal played an important role for the Moluccans because it provided them with a concrete interpretation for the ‘temporary stay’ in the Netherlands, and guaranteed the claims to the right to demobilise. That meant for example that various policy measures were considered in light of the RMS ideal and ex-KNIL rights, which gave them a political undertone. The RMS ideal also played an important role in the internal cohesion and the solidarity amongst the Moluccans, and it gave the Moluccans’ stay in the Netherlands an international perspective. Their stay was linked to
the right to self-determination, and that right was based upon international agreements. One of the respondents explains this:

Respondent 3: ‘What we were told, from the very beginning, was: we are Moluccans, we are victims, we need each other and we must do everything we can to maintain our identity. And everything and everyone else is the enemy. And the ideal of the RMS is the best point of departure on which to base this identity. Yes, it had already been used by our parents, but not from the very beginning. The ideal that they made a stand for was the rights of the KNIL. Things would have gone differently if the Netherlands had given them army status in 1951 and had deployed them again. The main issue was pride; of being deployed and then returning. And there was major disappointment among the first generation. They did not receive any recognition of their rights. And then the RMS gave them a justification for what had been done to them. It was an ideal, a point of departure from which they could focus their frustrations. It was a change: it politicised the lack of political recognition.’

Differences in opinion and ethnic differences meant that various political interest groups existed. The vast majority of Moluccans were members of organisations who backed the RMS. Some joined more neutral parties or organisations that focused upon a rapid return to the Moluccas. In 1953, leader Manusama came to the Netherlands, which gave the RMS movement a major boost. The Dutch government allowed him to go ahead and build up a position of power, probably because of his moderating influence on the Moluccan community.

Living conditions played an important role in the mobilisation and the organisation of the activism. Most Moluccans were accommodated in camps, including Westerbork, the former Nazi transit camp. They lived in these camps for many years, segregated from the rest of society. Because the government had management problems in the camps and a power vacuum had arisen due to the fact that everyone had been discharged from military service, thereby causing the ranks and positions to disappear, the government appointed political interest organisations as discussion partners. This gave these organisations a strong position of power, which was reinforced as the government began to redistribute the Moluccans amongst the camps on the basis of their affiliation with these organisations. This caused the social control - and therefore the social (and political) pressure - to increase.

The RMS movement changed in the 1960s. It weakened, for instance as a result of the loss of unity in the movement. The theme of return, for example, played a role in this loss of unity. The fact that return organisations began to adopt a more pro-Indonesian attitude (from a pragmatic point of view) created disagreement and even disturbances. The movement then became weaker as the RMS guerrilla movement on the Moluccas was broken and the RMS president Soumokil was arrested and given a death sentence. This caused the movement in the Netherlands to lose its tie with the Moluccas, which cast doubt on its credibility. This had implications for the legitimacy of the leadership. Now that the RMS government was located in the Netherlands and was no longer led by the legendary Soumokil, but by Manusama, it was exposed to criticism and competition. A counter-government was even formed under the leadership of Tamaela. The rivalry was accompanied by acts of violence, and the political climate within the Moluccan community hardened.
3.1.b Radicalisation due to the rise of the second generation

Midway through the 1960s, a new generation entered the political domain, which led to a radicalisation of the RMS movement. Young people became increasingly politically involved and became members of political youth organisations. On the one hand, young people were dissatisfied about the lack of results under the established Moluccan leaders, and at the same time they withdrew from the control of the first generation (Smeets and Steijlen 2006: 221). Whilst the older Moluccans had focussed their struggle against the Dutch government, the young people considered the entire Dutch nation as being responsible for the Moluccans’ situation. In July 1966, a militant group of young people from Moordrecht, inspired by the arrival of Soumokil’s widow in the Netherlands, tried to commit arson in the Indonesian embassy. They were considered heroes within the Moluccan community.

The young people began to organise themselves in two different ways. They took part in the established organisations, but as a generation they also had connections which bridged the differences between the leaders. Across the entire country, Moluccan young people sought contact with each other and they came together everywhere in order to discuss the role of young people in the RMS struggle. This was possible because most Moluccans had since been moved to residential areas, which meant that they could move more freely. The young people called upon other young people to take control themselves. Steijlen describes how this ‘revolutionary rhetoric’ and the increasing impatience among the young people ensured a willingness to progress to more far-reaching actions (Steijlen 1996: 118). Since the decline of the RMS movement on the Moluccas, there was also more scope for militant actions, as they now no longer needed to worry about any negative consequences for the movement there. In August 1970, a group of 33 activists occupied the official residence of the Indonesian ambassador. Out of protest against the arrival of Suharto, they took a number of people hostage, and a police officer lost his life. The Netherlands was shaken by this action and the older Moluccans were called to account. It was supposedly their ‘crazy ideas and illusions’ that had spurred the young people on to do this. Although they did not all agree with the methods used, the Moluccans did however back the activists’ demands. Six months later, there was a hunger strike among young Moluccans in the Binnenhof (the building complex that houses the Dutch Parliament) in The Hague, and demonstrations for the rights of Moluccans took place afterwards. The young people were not only distancing themselves from the Netherlands, but also from their own leaders. They wanted to “wake up” the Moluccan community and call on them to be less submissive.

Steijlen describes how the young people became more militant than their parents. The young people became increasingly engrossed in their parents’ history. They formulated their own ideals based on those of the RMS, and focussed their struggle on issues which they placed within the context of colonialism and imperialism. In their new vision, the Netherlands was also considered the enemy as it was the coloniser, and they regarded their parents as victims, which fuelled their anger.

Respondent 3: ‘And I only became angrier. And you entered into discussions with your parents, and that made you even angrier. These discussions allowed you to visualise what had happened and what you had suffered. The feeling of uprooting, of being removed… (…) About how we have been treated! The reception in emergency housing in former
concentration camps. Fobbed off with 2 guilders and 50 cents pocket money and adults were given 3 guilders and 50 cents per week. And you weren’t allowed to work. And suddenly working was compulsory! The feeling of injustice. That makes you radical in your thinking. Also in relation to the Netherlands. (…) The thing that we inherited was actually: frustration, disappointment and distress. We bear the scars of our parents. We have seen them cry. Then, after three weeks, for example, we received a letter, which my mother opened. And then she began to cry, but you didn’t know why. It is only now that you hear what they had to go through - the types of hardships they had to endure – the fact of being uprooted.’

This anger was easier for the young people because, in contrast with their parents, they had not fought for the Dutch in the Dutch East Indies. This ideological shift was linked with the Zeitgeist in which processes of decolonisation were getting underway. The young people also began to refer increasingly to movements outside of the Moluccan community that focussed upon changes, such as the Provo movement and the student movement, but the revolutionary atmosphere in particular gave ‘the identity of the Moluccan youth a push in the direction of subcultural movements such as the Black is Beautiful Movement in the United States. Individuals such as Bobby Seale (one of the Black Panther leaders who was in prison at that time) and Che Guevara became personifications of these revolutionary ideals’ (Smeets and Steijlen 2006: 224). Under the influence of these counter-movements, the young people, who had been brought up with the idea that the stay in the Netherlands was temporary and had learned to feel a certain amount of distrust towards the Netherlands, increasingly turned away from Dutch society and began to express themselves more clearly as Moluccans. Room had been created for the young people because of the power vacuum that had developed (due to the decline of the RMS government). The execution of Soumokil in 1966 could be a more direct reason for the general mobilisation of the young people in 1966, although Steijlen does not make this connection. One of the respondents does however refer to this as an important moment in his political development.

Respondent 5: ‘I still remember it well: As a child, I entered the room and saw my father cry. He was sitting in front of our family altar. I asked him what the matter was, and he answered crying: “We can’t go back anymore, child.” That was when Soumokil was arrested. Later we received the news that he had been executed.’

Increasing radicalism at the beginning of the 1970s

During the first half of the 1970s, radicalisation among the young people increased. A variety of organisations and movements were formed, partly (but unintentionally) thanks to the new government policy, under which new organisations also became eligible for subsidy. The intention of this policy was to break through the existing balance of power within the Moluccan community and to reduce the distance between the Dutch and the Moluccans, whereas in reality this distance increased. The young people travelled throughout the Netherlands to meet each other which was, in part, made possible by the Tienertoerkaarten [young person’s railcard] that could be used to obtain cheap train tickets.
Respondent 3: ‘Initially, the anger was not political, but against Dutch society. The trains had to suffer the consequences of this anger, as well as the Dutch Railways. This was also a consequence of the Tienertoer, whereby large groups, numbering dozens of Moluccans, made use of the train. Sometimes there were 500 young people at the station in Utrecht. There were also a large number of fake cards in circulation. And news always spread quickly through the grapevine. As soon as you heard that Moluccans had been refused entry to a particular bar or discotheque, that location would soon be visited by a group of Moluccans. During this period, many discotheques were smashed up and turned into rubble.’

Two political factions emerged that actually worked together and sometimes overlapped. The first was formed by the young people who fought for the old RMS ideal. This faction did not have such an ideological orientation, but was more focussed upon action. In addition, another school of thought emerged, one that Steijlen refers to as a more ideological ‘revolutionary youth culture’, in which the old RMS ideal was brought up for discussion. This movement was in keeping with a wider social radicalisation at this time and took its inspiration from liberation movements and anti-imperialism theories. It had contacts with the Cineclub Vrijheidsfilms (freedom films association), the communist KEN-ml and Rode Hulp (Red Aid). Part of this movement was in favour of the RMS. Another part, however, rejected the RMS ideal, and sought solutions for the Moluccas in collaboration with other population groups who were being suppressed by Indonesia. But at the same time, anti-RMS viewpoints were rarely formulated openly, as there was no room for this.

Respondent 4: ‘Later we began to place the RMS in a more international context, in Indonesia’s conflict. At that time I regarded the RMS as a colonial project. I certainly wasn’t thanked for that statement! I was almost the first person to say that. And I also had to pay the consequences for saying it. ‘He is not an RMS adherent... (…) In the 1970s, fires were started and our windows were smashed in. You also had an ambivalent attitude: you were brought up being told that you were not a good Moluccan if you were not in favour of the RMS, and you felt that too, deep inside.’

The distance between the younger generation and the older Moluccans increased, partly because of the older generation’s lack of success in achieving results. The older Moluccans also strongly criticised the young people, and the young people did not feel appreciated by them. But also the few moderate groups of young people had little influence on the rest.

Steijlen concludes from this that the actions that followed did not just originate ‘out of nowhere’. A situation had arisen that he compares with a volcano that was about to erupt. The regular confrontations between Dutch and Moluccan young people had contributed towards this, as had the attitude of the Dutch government, which labelled the RMS as unfeasible and referred to the RMS ideals as dreams and illusions that should not be given any more attention. Many Moluccans had gotten the idea that they were only given two choices, i.e. either to adapt or to return to Indonesia, and that the RMS had disappeared from view. Young people were becoming increasingly inclined towards confrontation. They were increasingly prepared to take violent action, and the leaders had less and less of a grip on them.
Respondent 1: ‘In 1975, further attention was again paid to the RMS; it once again came to the fore to a greater extent. During the preceding years, Dutch politicians often declared: ‘The RMS is dead.’ ‘That is a dream’. We wanted to step up the struggle once again, in order to demand attention from both the Netherlands and the rest of the world for our independence. The political context hadn’t changed, but we were being overlooked. They said: ‘Just let the Moluccans dream’. They made a real error by calling it a dream, and the radicalisation increased during this period. It would definitely have made a difference if they had listened. We had already been working on petitions, etc. for a number of years, and the older generation still did that. But the young people mainly had the feeling of ‘This is the limit!’ If only they had listened to us or had taken us seriously, that would have taken away a great deal of the fuss and unrest. But instead, these feelings were actually fuelled by statements such as ‘What they want is irrational, a dream’. We always responded to statements by politicians, either Dutch or Indonesian. And up to 1969, we continually renounced violence.’

In 1975, a group of seven young people from the town of Bovensmilde decided to take action. The 25-year ‘anniversary’ of the RMS proclamation and the information that activists on the Moluccas were being arrested and tortured probably formed direct reasons for this. They hijacked a train at the nearby town of Wijster and killed three people in the process. Parallel to this, out of solidarity several activists occupied the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam, where one person was killed. They demanded a free retreat and a discussion between the Moluccan leaders and the Indonesian government. After 12 days, the hijackers in the train surrendered, and five days later the other activists followed, once Manusama had promised that he would go and speak with the Dutch government. The action caused the relationship between the Dutch and the Moluccans to deteriorate. The Moluccans’ attitude was twofold. Although most people did not approve of the method, they felt solidarity with ‘their own people’ and backed the hijackers’ demands (Steijlen 1996: 157). This solidarity with the activists and the dilemmas that came with it resounded in the interviews.

Respondent 2: ‘You didn’t approve of it, but at the same time you did support them. You recognise their drive: injustice; taking action in order to obtain justice. Only it was somewhat of a bad choice. But we know why they did it. They were your ‘brothers in arms’, but you didn’t approve of the method.’

Respondent 3: ‘Yes, Wassenaar was good. It was magnificent. I believed that it was justified. But when the hijack took place in 1975, the most difficult thing was to take a stance. You still form a part of this naïve solidarity. On the outside, you don’t reject it, but you do on the inside. This is more or less a law. Or even stronger than a law…It is a code of conduct that you do not break. You do not say that out loud. You do not take a public stance and say that you distance yourself from the movement. Ultimately, you just say nothing.’

As a result of the action, a discussion took place between Manusama and the Dutch government and a committee of inquiry was established. An advisory council in the field of welfare had just been established, consisting of Moluccans (Het Inspraakorgaan Welzijn Molukkers, IWM [The Moluccan Advisory Council]). But the young people who dedi-
cated themselves to the RMS were not able to appreciate these advances in relation to social policy.

Among the younger generation of Moluccans, too, discussions arose about the RMS ideal and possible alternatives. And over time, tensions increased once more. The Moluccans felt increasingly forced into an even more far-reaching integration, and the government’s promised contribution to the RMS ideal failed to appear. And all this was happening even though Queen Juliana had just made specific statements concerning the right of nations to apply self-determination, on the occasion of granting Surinam its independence in 1975.

After the actions of December 1975, the idea arose within the Moluccan community that these actions had not produced a great deal of success. People arrived at the opinion that the Moluccans were being appeased with a committee and an advisory council but that – when push came to shove – they were treated with violence, such as the violent evacuation of the Vaassen camp at the end of 1976. But at the same time, there were also major doubts as to the effectiveness of violent actions in the Netherlands and as to the question of whether the struggle shouldn’t be relocated to the Moluccas.

Within the Moluccan community, fierce discussions arose concerning all of these issues. These discussions owed their special character to the community’s closeness. The political differences of opinion were significant, and were fairly often settled using violence. Anyone who formulated a line that was unacceptable to the majority could sometimes be beaten up, or in the worst case, could expect bullets to come through the windows. But the most complicated thing was that politics only formed a limited part of the Moluccan network. Loyalties were also determined by which island one originated from, by relationships between the villages, by a shared history in camps and barracks, and by family and friendship ties. And the generational gap was, in a certain sense, only relative: the reconciled attitude adopted by some older people in relation to the Dutch establishment was indeed rejected by many young people, but at the same time it was also respected.

As a result of the close social ties, the radicalisation within the Moluccan community took on a unique form. Usually, a gradual separation occurs in the development of extremism – a situation in which the radicalising activists become less and less in tune with the beliefs of ‘the crowd’ and this same ‘crowd’ becomes increasingly less able to reach the radicals. This was different in the case of the radicalisation of the Moluccan young people. One reason was that they remained connected to the population group that they formed a part of. The more widespread doubts seeped through to the radicalising young people as early as the first half of the 1970s. A second reason was that the realisation of the RMS ideal remained the direct aim for everyone involved, regardless of whether they were more radical or less radical. Compared to the abstract utopias of many more strongly radicalised extremists (classless society, a caliphate on earth, etc.), this was a concrete aim, against which the effectiveness of all actions could be measured. In practice, a situation unfolded within the Moluccan community whereby various political beliefs were able to exist alongside each other. Sometimes fierce conflicts arose in this context, but ultimately the differences of opinion were accepted.

In 1977, further hijackings took place. A train at De Punt was hijacked, and hostages were taken at a primary school in Bovensmilde. The hostage takers demanded that the Dutch government release the Moluccan captives and discontinue the support given to the Suharto regime. The activists in the train did not surrender this time, and after
twenty days the hijacking was brought to an end by the army in an extremely violent manner. Almost all the activists and two hostages lost their lives. The Moluccans were resolutely and almost universally condemned by the Dutch population. The Moluccans were shocked at the violence and out of a feeling of solidarity came en masse to the funeral of the hijackers. Although there was major condemnation of the actions, particularly because children were involved, the hijackers were considered as heroes and martyrs because they had not surrendered, and had given their lives. According to Steijlen, this forms the pivotal point of the radicalisation: ‘Despite the anger conjured up by the death of the hijackers within the Moluccan circles, the violent end to the actions in 1977 clears the way for reflection on the future. In contrast with the “dishonourable” surrender in 1975, the militant Moluccan young people proved that they were actually prepared to die for the RMS ideal.’ (Steijlen 1996: 164).

In 1978, an additional and unexpected event took place, which involved three young people storming the provincial government building in Assen. But these young people were labelled as desperate and the action was not really taken seriously. The Moluccan community condemned it, and there was no longer any real interest in such action.

3.1.c Moderation of the RMS struggle

The period following the hijackings was a time of deradicalisation and, according to Steijlen, this was caused by various changes in the Moluccan community. Firstly, the sociopolitical climate within the Moluccan community started to change, which created room for various opinions. Initially, only one small left-wing group spoke out against the RMS ideal. They considered the RMS struggle paternalistic. Since the supporters of this group did not live in the Moluccan districts, they were able to make controversial statements relatively easily. Although they were unable to develop an acceptable alternative to the RMS ideology, gradually more and more discussion took place about the RMS ideal, and the response to divergent opinions became less and less harsh. The political climate became more liberal and the number of supporters of the political organisations decreased significantly. The leaders, as well, began to distance themselves even further from the aim of achieving the RMS in the short term. The political organisations began to focus more upon international lobbying, for which no mass of active supporters was necessary.

This liberalisation was accompanied by a changing attitude in relation to the Moluccas. Travelling to the Moluccas had been taboo for a long time (people who went there were even regarded as traitors – after all, it was still Indonesian territory), but the urge was now so great that many Moluccans travelled there regardless. This served to alter the image that the Moluccas were an occupied territory, and that there was a militant vanguard in the Netherlands that had a large number of adherents on the Moluccas. Personal relationships were also formed with families and villages, and many people – including young people – devoted themselves to development projects in order to help to create a better life for their relatives on the Moluccas. But the visits also led to disappointments. On the Moluccas, the RMS ideal turned out to exist in a much weaker form than had been expected, and many people underwent a culture shock, which caused them to realise how westernized they had become.
That brings us to the third change, namely the attitude in relation to the Netherlands. There was an increasing amount of willingness to integrate in the Netherlands. Moluccan young people left the Moluccan districts in increasing numbers in order to go and live on their own, and they increasingly broke away from their original communities. As a result, they not only came into closer contact with the Dutch population, but also with Moluccans who had a different background; for example with people who had not lived in camps or whose family had not served in the KNIL. This led to discussions about what it meant to be Moluccan; these discussions focussed more on origin and knowledge of the Malay language, and less on the RMS. During this period, the Moluccan community struggled with major social problems relating to unemployment and the use of hard drugs. The Moluccans began to do more and more to solve these problems, because they realised that these problems formed a threat to the internal cohesion, but also – and primarily – because they realised that they would be staying in the Netherlands for the time being. Many young people who used to be politically active were also active in the new welfare institutions, which – in contrast to former institutions – only had social aims. The RMS ideal began to play an ever less prominent role. The government policy, which initially had a radicalising effect, now started to have a positive effect, and the categorical drug assistance and employment projects strengthened the orientation towards the Netherlands. The effectiveness of the dialogue between the Moluccan Advisory Council and the Moluccan community increased, because this dialogue was no longer only led by key political figures, with the result that discussions were no longer linked to the ideals of the RMS. In 1986, the Dutch government and the Moluccans reached an historical agreement that could be formulated separately from the RMS, which brought an end to the arguments concerning the ex-KNIL rights. Social interests and political interests no longer coincided with one another.

The increasingly liberal political climate within the Moluccan community and the stronger orientation towards the Netherlands created room for thought, which meant that most people were able to place the significance of the RMS in a different perspective. The group of Moluccans who still backed the old RMS ideal became smaller and smaller. And those people increasingly pursued the path of international lobbying, as more attention was being paid to native peoples on an international scale. But despite this decline, more and more people considered themselves to be pro-RMS, even those who had formerly taken an anti-RMS position. The RMS had acquired more of a symbolic significance. On the one hand, it referred to the background of the Moluccans in the Netherlands (the KNIL past, the camps and the relationship with Dutch society) and to a person’s identity as a Moluccan in the Netherlands. On the other hand, it expressed the solidarity that was felt with the Moluccans on the Moluccas and that had now partly taken shape in small-scale development projects.

According to Steijlen, however, this is not to say that the RMS flame can never be rekindled again. Although he considers the random actions and by third generation Moluccans in the 1990s primarily as ways of determining their position and forming their identity, he points out that these actions do indeed involve a manifestation of political consciousness. According to Steijlen, the question of whether possible developments on the Moluccas would lead to a resumed struggle in the Netherlands depends, among other things on the way in which prevailing feelings are responded to, for example on the degree to which they are taken seriously by the Dutch government.
3.1.4 Radical Moluccans and the collective framework

The fact that the radical Moluccan second generation became more moderate at a given moment has various causes. We summarise these causes on the basis of the analytical framework.

Table 3.1: The role of collective factors that influenced the decline in the case of the Moluccans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Decline in the case of the Moluccans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>The altered relationship with the Moluccas and the shift in Moluccan identity made people realise that the RMS is not the highest priority. The altered relationship with the Netherlands also provided a different view of the ideology. Because people focussed upon building up a life in the Netherlands, the Netherlands was regarded less and less as the enemy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing strategy (the route which was outlined)</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>The radical, violent strategy did not lead to the desired results. It only led to sacrifices and to the breakdown of Dutch support. Furthermore, many people were revolted by it, especially when children were taken hostage. A point had been made by the sacrifices made by the kidnappers in the last hostage situation, namely that the Moluccans were serious in their RMS ideal. This reduced the pressure to prove this, and provided scope to moderate the approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Decline is not caused by a decrease in organisational capacities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>There were no effective inspiring leaders. Furthermore, they were considered too weak to be able to lead a state on the Moluccas. And some people found them too weak because they allowed themselves to be bribed with social concessions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs of the members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members outgrow the movement as a cohort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Inter)national or local conflict disappears/changes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Factors and Role in the Decline of the Moluccans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government: repression</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Initially, the repression did not help. It strengthened pride and self-consciousness, which encouraged the rise of a radical political course of action. The repression did however play a role in the later decline: despite the fact that the violent response to the hostage-taking in 1977 created ill-feeling, people were still shocked by the effects, and aversion to the violence increased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: inclusion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>The Moluccan Advisory Council that had been set up caused the KNIL negotiations to become separate from RMS politics. Scope was created for a democratic course. (But an earlier attempt at inclusion, and a serious consideration of the Moluccans’ concerns and ideals, would probably have counteracted radicalisation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: reform</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>As the government did not meet the demands of the extremist Moluccans regarding the RMS, the lack of results led to deradicalisation. Deradicalisation was mainly caused by a lack of 'reform', but the original radicalisation was actually also a consequence of this. (The social reforms did not play a part, as these actually only took place after the first phase of deradicalisation. They probably did play a part in the further deradicalisation, however.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion/media/Zeitgeist</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Dutch population: the violence of the Moluccan actions caused the support to break down. Moluccan community: The support broke down through the use of violence and because people did not wish to place the relationship with the Netherlands under further pressure. Because the climate became more liberal, further scope was created for more moderate opinions. This doubt filtered through to the radical ranks, because of the close links that existed between the radical young people and the Moluccan community in general.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive competing interpretation</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Other (non-RMS) solutions for the Moluccans gradually came to the fore and formed an attractive alternative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Breakdown of Barriers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social dependency</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>As no social vacuum followed after deradicalisation, there was no social barrier when withdrawing from a group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological dependency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>The uniformity within the Moluccan community decreased, as a result of which more scope was created for various opinions. This was caused by events such as the deaths in the action of 1977.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of costs incurred</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>There was no barrier to disengagement associated with the high costs of radicalisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factors | Role | Decline in the case of the Moluccans
--- | --- | ---
Group reprisals | + | The increased scope for different opinions caused the reprisals to decrease.
Fear of loss of reputation and protection | + | The Moluccan victims who died in the army’s efforts to release the hostages in 1977 confirmed the seriousness of the Moluccans. This enabled them to take a more moderate course whilst holding their heads high.
Marginalisation | + | Although it was not so much the marginalisation that caused people to remain radical, the decline was linked with the increased prospects for life in the Netherlands.

3.2 The squatters’ movement in Amsterdam

The squatters’ movement is an example of a left-wing radical movement that gave rise to much heated interest and discussion at the end of the 1970s and during the 1980s, as a result of protests and the occupation of vacant buildings. In this case description, we concentrate upon the development of the squatters’ movement in Amsterdam.²

3.2.a The rise of the squatters’ movement

Squatting is a social phenomenon that initially had little if anything to do with politics or with social conflict. During the 1960s, it was still referred to in the Netherlands by a term which equates to ‘creeping in’ and mostly took place on an individual basis. At the end of the 1960s, squatting gained a collective aspect and a political dimension. Various groups that were politically active then began to engage in this phenomenon. In the years that followed, squatting remained a limited phenomenon, but the historical foundations of a new movement had been laid. These foundations actually consisted of two elements. On the one hand, there was a failure in government policy with regard to housing: many years after the war had ended, there was still a housing shortage and there was an unanticipated need for accommodation for young people; a need which was not met. At the same time, buildings stood unoccupied, partly as a result of speculation and partly because they had been set aside for demolition. On the other hand, a youth movement came into being that called the government’s authority and policy into question and that started to act on its own authority. Initially, the government failed to act creatively and effectively in this new situation.

Until 1976, squatters mainly operated individually or in small groups, sometimes forming ties with a particular area. From 1976 onwards, they began to develop forms of collaboration. The phenomenon grew in size and the practice of acting ‘on one’s own authority’ encouraged self-organisation, in the form of squatters’ consultation hours, meeting places and district newspapers. The impending introduction of the Antisquatting Act led to forms of collaboration at city-wide level and - from November 1976 onwards - to a city-wide newspaper for squatters: *de Kraakkrant* [the Squatters’ Newspaper].

² This case description is based in part on Buijs (1995).
Initially, the squatters’ movement and its predecessors operated according to informal rules, which later became known as ‘the squatters’ code’. This code limited the choice of property in which to squat and the methods to be used. For example, there were rules that particular categories of empty property were in principle exempt from squatting, such as renovated homes, ‘distribution’ homes (valued below a certain threshold and intended for disadvantaged groups), homes that were considered ‘too nice’ with a high rent, homes that were for sale and in general homes that had been empty for less than three months. The squatters’ code also stipulated that the means used had to be non-violent and that resistance to eviction, for example, may only take a passive form. The peak and at the same time the end to this non-violent attitude came in November 1978 with the violent eviction of the building on the corner of Nicolaas Beetsstraat and Jacob van Lennepstraat in the Kinkerbuurt area of Amsterdam.

Respondent 9: ‘And then, when people were evicted from the Kinkerbuurt, they held a sit-in on the streets. These people were really being molested! The group was badly beaten up, and then we just decided: we won’t take this any longer!’

Respondent 11: ‘We all stood arm-in-arm and the anti-riot squad approached and began to hit us straight away. Those were very harsh blows. At the time I was wearing glasses, which broke into a thousand pieces, and I never even thought to take them off! I also had bruises everywhere. It was a real fight. And afterwards we were sprayed with a water cannon. We were completely taken aback. It makes you think of dictators! From countries such as Chile! People were arrested and detained. You end up in an us versus them situation.’

It is often suggested that the transition towards the use of violence within the squatters’ movement was a response to the violent actions on the part of the police. Dijst however explains that this is too easy an explanation: the behaviour of the police formed just one factor in the radicalisation of the squatters’ movement. One of the other factors related to the fact that the squatters’ movement started to squat in new types of property and therefore came into conflict with owners (including speculators), gangs of thugs, the municipality, the police and the judiciary. As these conflicts developed, more militant forms of self-organisation and conflict then came into being.

But squatting was more than just a form of promoting one’s interests and more than a form of campaigning; for many of those involved, it was also a lifestyle. This attitude to life was expressed in a specific subculture shaped by the local and social conditions. Dijst names the following as central values of the movement: solidarity, self-activation and independence (in Buijs 1995). These ‘subcultural’ or ‘counter-cultural’ aspects have figured right from the beginning of the squatters’ movement in a particular way, but at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s a clearer distinction was visible between this subcultural trend and a ‘harder’ political stance. Duivenvoorden (2000) explains that with the subcultural trend, the emphasis lay on self-activation. Scope was created within the subculture for improvements in one’s own environment. There was a form of self-organisation that orientated itself against representation and spokespeople. Squatters organised themselves on the basis of these principles, and not principally on the basis of the fact that they had squatted. This development can be seen in the way in which the social scope that was acquired by the squatters was used, amongst other
things. This includes forms of collective living such as communes, the integration of living and working, and squatters’ own cafés, bookshops and newspapers.

Respondent 9: ‘It was very cozy. One of the districts was also home to the People’s opera. It was a very cultural movement. We had our own coffee shops, squatters’ restaurants where you cooked your own food, etc. (…) It was really ‘our town’. If you cycled around during this period… I really knew the entire town.’

Respondent 10: ‘It was a world within a world. (…) It was the development of a culture. We even had sport clubs. For example, there were very long, large premises in the town, where we had tango lessons.’

The second stance was of an entirely different nature. It was more focussed upon politics, in the sense that the dominant political order was much more of an immediate reference point for actions. This stance was much more focussed on getting rigid political relationships to develop more flexibility, to “get things moving”. The methods that were used here varied from moderate attempts to influence the decision-making process to direct confrontation. Whichever method was chosen, it was crucial that squatters organised themselves as squatters. The political stance was much less free of obligations than that of self-activation and self-organisation. The political stance also offered more opportunities to radicalise the squatters’ conflict.

The squatters’ movement has always had this double nature. In an ideological respect, the pretensions were far-reaching in nature: the notion of ‘breaking with the imposed standards and laws’ was fairly widely adhered to. This was expressed in slogans such as: ‘Your legal order is not our legal order’. As long as the objectives were limited and the political relationships simple, there was general agreement on the nature of the (squatters’) actions and it was possible to keep to the values of internal solidarity, independence and self-activation without problems. But during this same period, in addition to private dwellings, an increasing number of business premises were also occupied by squatters, whereby it was demanded that the municipality purchase the premises for the purpose of young people’s accommodation. A complex guerrilla conflict began in which owners, the police, judges and squatters experimented with various tactics and means of conflict within an administrative-legal vacuum. In late 1979 and early 1980, squatters were evicted from many of the premises in which they lived. The Ministry of Justice tried to pursue a more decisive policy in order to enable eviction to take place sooner. The municipality developed new policy. It not only set more and more limits [to squatters’ activities], but there was also an increasing desire on the part of the municipality to strongly enforce the boundaries of behaviour that it had established. The municipality gained the initiative step by step and the squatters became defensive, but struck back. The following years showed an intensifying and hardening of the conflict.

3.2.b Hardening of the conflict

The increase in the number of evictions and the threat of even more led to discussions among the squatters on the use of violence. At the end of 1979, these discussions gained momentum due to the impending evacuation of the Groote Keyser, a squatters’ complex
that consisted of six office blocks on the Keizersgracht canal in Amsterdam. This factor united squatters throughout the city.

Respondent 11: ‘We had little knowledge of other areas. There was little contact. Everyone had his or her own things to be getting on with. But this intensification was achieved... The first major focal point was the Groote Keyser. Everyone got together because of a situation that they recognised from their own area, but on a larger scale.’

Respondent 10: ‘The Groote Keyser formed a focal point of the second half of 1979. It was the symbol of the housing shortage and of the squatters’ movement. The city meetings took place there. Sometimes 200-300 people met together in the cellar for the city meetings.’

Respondent 9: ‘And when the Groote Keyser came under threat afterwards, the movement became a citywide movement. And that was initiated by the Staatsliedenbuurt area. (…) There was a city action plan, disturbance groups, a first aid team, an occupation plan and plans to occupy all bridges quickly.’

Squatters talked about violence, resistance and devoting their own lives to the cause. Politicians and media were surprised by the vehemence of the squatters’ remarks. The threat of violence surrounding the Groote Keyser appeared to work: out of a fear of serious disturbance of public order, mayor Polak did not provide the bailiff with police backup. The symbol of the squatters’ movement was maintained for the time being, and the basis was laid for what was later referred to as the ‘myth of the Groote Keyser’. For some squatters, the idea took root that violence, or the threat of violence, leads to a stronger negotiating position. The ‘course of action entailing the maximum threat’ arose on the basis of this idea. The idea behind this course of action was simple. The threat of violent resistance was initially intended to prevent the confrontation itself. If that succeeded, the squatters had won the first fight. If the threat did not work, violent actions would take place either during or after the evictions. Repeated resistance would mean that eviction carried ‘a high cost’ for the government, which would tempt it towards a policy of caution. In that case, the squatters would have still won in the second instance. Although the squatters were under no illusion that it was possible to resist the police in a military fashion, they increasingly began to take recourse to intentional violence. Step by step, violence or the threat of violence gained a more important position, both on the streets and in the heads of the squatters; it started to become an institutionalised factor in the movement.

In 1980, a series of violent incidents surrounding evictions occurred. After a number of evictions, on 29 February a confrontation took place between squatters and the police in the Vondelstraat. This event turned out to be of major importance for the development of opinions within the squatters’ movement. The importance of ‘the Vondelstraat’ is also emphasised in the interviews with our respondents:

Respondent 9: ‘The Vondelstraat was the major turnaround. (...) The police were clearly in the wrong there. There was uproar across the city and we proceeded to re-squat the Vondelstraat. Barricades went up in the street, and that can only happen when people become that angry... We were in the right. It became a real fortress. A great deal of negoti-
ating then took place. If we would be allowed to retain the Vondelstraat, we would clear away the barricades... but Polak was probably trying to make a point, and at a certain point the tanks just drove through the street. It was an escalation; for us as well.'

Respondent 11: ‘The Vondelstraat played a major part in uniting us. You got to know many more people. The meetings increased and we had won! We had retained the premises and had caused all of the Netherlands to shake to its foundations. We had won, because they had used violence against us!! That was important for the future. It became a type of formula; a model.’

It appears that among that generation of activists, the opinions on street violence had finally changed, whilst the government, for its part, did not quite know how to find the optimum combination between de-escalating policy and firm resolve.

Matters came to a head during the ‘Kroningsrellen’ [Coronation riots] on 30 April 1980. The events on this day were important for the further development of the movement. An open divide within the squatters’ movement manifested itself for the first time around the Kroningsrellen between those who turned away from the violence and the confrontation, and those who wished to pursue the chosen route until the very end. The rest of the year was particularly turbulent. The government had recourse to the eviction of squatters from squatted premises more quickly. The squatters responded to this by re-squatting vacated premises and all of these events were accompanied by many forms of street violence. The fact that premises often remained occupied, despite evictions, was attributed by some people to the concept of ‘threat using maximum violence’. After all, the cost of an eviction was high for the municipality. The squatters, on the other hand, knew that they were able to develop formidable power on the streets, but in a confrontation with the police they would ultimately be defeated. This is why, within the concept of confrontation, the squatters sought a guerrilla-type form of action that focussed upon avoiding defeats.

3.2.c Decline of the squatters’ movement

The feeling of not having any control on what was happening and of being caught up in a spiral of violence and counter-violence had an increasingly negative effect on the squatters the longer this situation went on. The proven strategy gradually lost its power of attraction: the ‘confrontation for the sake of confrontation’ was not a perspective that the majority of the squatters were in favour of. Most members of the squatters’ movement acted in a controlled manner regarding the use of violence in a number of cases, but were given less and less control over what happened on the streets. This led to discussions as to whether this was the right path to pursue.

Respondent 7: ‘An increasing amount of violence was seen during squatting and evictions. More and more discussions got under way: ‘Do we actually want this?’.’

Respondent 11: ‘And I thought myself that after 30 April the range of ideas had become a bit more radical and a bit more uniform. Even with regard to clothing, etc. Many people withdrew from the movement. There was also a great deal of discussion. ‘Is it good?’ But
o.k., you didn’t completely understand all this, of course. You simply didn’t agree with people who didn’t agree with it.’

The confrontation had been sought, and had not been without effect. Right from the beginning, violence - or at least the threat of it - was an implicit part of this tough political strategy. In the context of the problems raised by the squatters, it is true that large sections of the population did not consider that this violence was justified, but they did understand it. The squatters’ movement speeded up the developments surrounding accommodation for young people, which would not have come about without the use of violence. But it also led to increasing repression by the government on the one hand and internal discord on the other. In general, the eviction of squatters from the Lucky Luyk on 11 October 1982, followed by ‘very violent disturbances’, is regarded as the end of the line for the development of the squatters’ movement. The use of violence surrounding the Lucky Luyk permanently turned the tide against the squatters. According to most researchers, from this time onwards the power of the movement and its members’ readiness to take action decreased.

Only Dijst (in Buijs 1995) places the decline of the squatters’ movement in an earlier phase. He believes that it began in 1980, when violent events began to dictate the perception of the squatters’ movement, the squatting itself became more difficult and internal developments led in part to disintegration. Our respondents confirm Dijst’s analysis; they place the movement’s turnaround at an earlier point in time. Although the respondents state that the reversal in the movement’s development took place on different occasions, they all mention events which took place in 1980.

Respondent 9: ‘When the Groote Keyser was re-squatted, there were already major divisions. One group was dissatisfied with the Staatsliedenbuurt’s militant behaviour. There was also a group that wanted power for itself. (…) ‘Then came Koninginnedag (the Queen’s birthday). That was a turning point, for the goodwill on the streets as well. Before this, people had been sympathetic towards us. At the butcher’s and the baker’s. All of a sudden, you were the enemy, as a result of the disturbance on Koninginnedag. There was no goodwill any more. (…)’

Respondent 11: ‘But what happened: one group pulled out (after ‘the Vondelstraat’, ed.). But we didn’t completely grasp that. I registered that on the side. (…) ‘It was not that they said ‘we are pulling out’, but they no longer came to city events – only those in their own neighbourhood.’

The movement became characterised by violence and unreasonableness. A major section of the public regarded the squatters’ movement as the cause of the escalation of violence. The sympathy previously expressed by a section of the population for the backgrounds and reasons behind the movement was displaced by the negative attention that was paid to its violent actions. The violence also led to an increase in internal differences of opinion within the squatters’ movement. Some people used confrontational means for achieving their own purposes, and some of the activists caught sight of the negative consequences of this. But just as important were the differences of opinion about the objectives. These differences of opinion had remained out of view for a long time, as a result of the motto of ‘solidarity – present a united front to the “outside” world’, but nonethe-
less they played a part in and contributed towards the decline of the squatters’ movement.

Respondent 7: ‘Another factor that plays a role: you have a personal need to be thought of as a nice person, but you also want to be thought of as a nice movement. And for the squatters, public opinion in Amsterdam was very important. (...) Important points of reference for the squatters were the neighbourhood and the neighbours. Is what we are doing and what we want still meeting with approval? That changed in 1980-81.’

Respondent 9: ‘The militant group said: This is squatting, so this is how it has to be. I thought: Why??! That’s not me! (...) There was also an ideological discussion. The movement was on its last legs. There were too many people with too many opinions. (...) It is not possible for everyone to share the same opinion in a large group. For example, the idea that violence doesn’t make sense any more, and on the other hand, the idea to continue. Everyone has different experiences and also takes different steps.’

Furthermore, in the 1980s the municipality altered its policy relating to the renovation of city centres and to traffic circulation: large-scale projects that required the demolition of large numbers of old homes were called off at the last minute. The renovation of existing homes and the construction of new buildings was carried out on a smaller scale. The municipality acquired an increasing number of old homes, and vacant homes due to be demolished were temporarily rented out. ‘Distribution’ homes fell under the control of house-building corporations in increasing numbers and became difficult to squat in, just like renovated or new homes. Owners’ eviction procedures became more effective in relation to larger properties, which were often business premises. All of these elements reduced the number of spaces that were eligible for squatting, and limited the movement’s breeding grounds. At the same time, the municipality also developed a more decisive policy in relation to squatted premises. It moved to evict squatters more and more quickly, and in fact began to remove – step by step - the administrative/legal vacuum that had made squatting an attractive pursuit for many years. In addition, the municipality increased the opportunities to purchase squatted premises and to legalise occupation by squatters. When implementing this option, strict requirements were set which forced the squatters involved to enter into negotiations with the municipality and to refrain from radical action.

Respondent 6: ‘The older generation in particular personally benefited from these successes. They often lived in the houses that were purchased. Suddenly they were able to reside legally in the beautiful premises that they had squatted in for such a long time.’

Respondent 8: ‘Firstly, legalisation and eviction was carried out, which meant our whole infrastructure in the city was down the drain. Before, there were places for us all over the city. There were workplaces, theatres, our own greengrocers….’

Respondent 10: ‘We no longer had the opportunity to make a political point to the residents. The initiative shifted to the town hall.’
3.2.d Fragmentation, spreading out, running out of steam

Within the movement, a group manifested itself that strongly opposed the willingness of a section of the squatters’ movement to negotiate with the municipality, and that vehemently rejected the inclination of sections of the movement to engage in matters other than just squatting. This group, known as ‘the restorers’ or ‘the political wing of the squatters’ movement’ consisted of around fifteen people, some of whom had been active from the start of the squatters’ movement and who had played a more or less leading role. They sought a ‘restoration of the squatters’ movement’. In their opinion, the decline was due to insufficient radical qualities, i.e. the lack of an uncompromising attitude in relation to the government and insufficient severity of the actions.

From the repeated conflicts with the police, another section of the movement drew the conclusion that it was important to overcome this concentration only on the housing shortage and the squatting by means of spreading out and cooperating with other activist groups. This enabled them to tie in with a trend that had already existed for much longer. From around 1980, demonstrations had been held on themes such as nuclear energy and ‘fascism’. There were always connections between squatters and activists in fields such as militarism, anti-imperialism, women’s liberation, nuclear energy, racism, the environment, transport policy, city planning, the role of multinationals, biotechnology and support to West-German radicals. For some, it was the violent confrontations with the police that encouraged them to spread out, forcing the activists to determine their position in relation to the government and democracy. But the squatters’ movement not only came into frequent conflict with the government and the police; it was also confronted with estate agents, gangs of thugs, banks, project developers and political parties. This had the effect of placing the conflict in the wider context of the ‘struggle against a shift to the right and fascism’. What was first a squatters’ movement with an alternative social atmosphere slowly became a ‘counter-movement’: against authorities, oppression, exploitation, compulsion, discrimination, environmental pollution - in brief, against everything that prevents people from determining their own destiny.

After 1983, the lines along which the squatters’ movement had developed finally grew apart from each other. The majority of the squatters withdrew into the premises. For many, it was the start of the major drop out that gradually led to them returning to civilian society once again. Although for some this step was mentally challenging, it was possible to achieve in practice. Because of their background and often also because of their social network, it was relatively easy for squatters to participate in society again.

Respondent 9: ‘I was one of the many. It was nothing. I’d had enough. Many people withdrew from the movement at the same time.’

Respondent 11: ‘Well, the majority made the same step. Or people became even more ‘adapted’ and left politics altogether. (…) With us it was like this: you put different clothes on and you were able to join in once again.’

Respondent 7: ‘We were of course well-read and well-educated. We were not a marginalised group. We were able to hold our own in the ideological discussion, which meant that we could actually position ourselves in part of the mainstream. We were privileged, and many of our parents came from the middle classes, which meant that many young people
The movement became increasingly fragmented. This resulted in internal solidarity being placed under increasing pressure. As time went on, activists tolerated each other less and less, and some even began to accuse others openly of treason. Over time, the *restorers* began to regard everyone who did not agree (exactly) with their political stance as opponents. Everyone who had different political ideas was blamed for the decline of the squatters’ movement. The campaign for a ‘destructive cleansing of the squatters’ movement’ would continue until approximately 1987 as a permanent accompaniment on the sidelines while the movement slowly ran out of steam.

At the end of the 1980s, the movement had, to all intents and purposes, run its course. The number of activists and their readiness to take action had decreased, there was a lack of perspective and there was no theoretical basis for developing new perspectives. The left-wing spectrum found itself in a crisis. Activists no longer had the feeling that they formed part of a counter-movement and they felt isolated. The number of new recruits had also decreased significantly, and the subculture had changed considerably.

Respondent 11: ‘The people are gone. They are having children. The violence has turned in on itself. There was nihilism. It was over. After the Shell action, it was simply over.’

Respondent 6: ‘A few years after the disturbances, the atmosphere in the Netherlands had also changed completely. It was much tougher. You could also see that in the political climate, for example. At the end of the 1970s, there was still a kind of political balance; a polarisation between left and right. In the 1980s, the left were no longer able to keep pace, and the scale tipped to the right. This was accompanied by a change in the image of the squatters’ movement: from an ‘idealistic group of young people who occasionally do something they shouldn’t’ to a violent group. And an image such as this determined the perception of the group in the provinces. In the past, many people had come from the provinces to Amsterdam. Although there were squatters in other places, too, everyone wanted to go to Amsterdam anyway. This therefore decreased significantly.’

3.2.e The RARA

Within this confusion, the group Radical Anti-Racist Action (RARA) began to manifest itself in a more explicit manner. This group formed the most radical offshoot of the left-wing movement. Within the RARA, the analysis of the international imperialist system took a central position and, of all the groups, this one considered itself most as a vanguard. In September 1985, RARA committed arson in a branch of Makro in Duiven-drecht, which belonged to Steenkolen Handelsvereniging [SHV, Coal Trading Association]. In an accompanying declaration, RARA announced that ‘all economic, political and military supporters of the system will be dealt with’. These people were not only seen to be responsible for the continuation of the apartheid regime in South Africa, but also ‘for the development and implementation of domination, destruction and oppression throughout the world’. In December 1986, RARA committed arson in two branches of Makro simultaneously. Two reasons were given to justify the arson attacks. The first reason was that...
they constituted an ‘attack on the economic cornerstones of apartheid’: the links that the Dutch business community had with South Africa had to be terminated. The second reason was new. In South Africa, ‘heavy, bitter repression’ was rife, but ‘the world fell silent without taking action’. ‘In order to break through this deafening silence, we carried out actions in two branches of Makro’. The actions were successful and SHV felt forced to sell its interests in South Africa.

In the summer of 1987, RARA committed a further two attacks. In June 1987, when a surge of different actions against Shell took place, the group committed an attack on a Shell petrol station in Nieuwegein. One week later, on 26 June, arson was committed in the garages belonging to Shell wholesaler Boot Olie in Alphen aan den Rijn. The RARA actions again signified an escalation in relation to the ongoing, non-violent actions. Within the wider movement, a debate got under way relating to the means and objectives employed by RARA. Activists from the movement labelled the RARA approach as arrogant and totalitarian and did not wish to participate in a sect that propagated blind violence. The anti-imperialists from the RARA had become far removed from the legacy of the anarchistically-tinted ‘movement’, which had long had an aversion to bosses, a correct stance and vanguard pretensions.

Respondent 8: ‘It was a divisive element: the RARA. They were far removed from the reality and the ideology of the rest of the movement. The RARA’s pretension to being a vanguard… So compelling. You really had to choose: for or against us. There was no middle course, and limited scope. It was a divisive element.’

The period between January 1988 and March 1990 formed a phase of confusion and decline. Eight members of RARA were arrested in April 1988. Seven of the eight detainees were released due to a lack of evidence. The eighth detainee was sentenced to five years in prison, but was released on appeal after nine months. During the period that followed, the RARA took action on various fronts and against various opponents. In February 1989, the struggle related to solidarity with the imprisoned members of the Red Army Fraction who had gone on hunger strike, and in April 1989, a major non-violent action by the ‘Shell out of South Africa’ committee was thwarted by an arson attack in the Thermo Shell Centre in Hilversum.

The multitude of standpoints on the struggle and of arguments can be understood against the background of the developments in South Africa, which was RARA’s traditional reference point. The situation in South Africa underwent radical changes during the second half of 1989; the ANC and other anti-apartheid organisations were legalised and on 2 February 1990 Nelson Mandela was released. The RARA lost its traditional point of reference and looked for new ways to shape the extensive struggle against ‘Imperialism and Capital. This was not very successful, and only a few members continued on the path of violent action. In 1991 and 1993, two further ‘follow-up actions’ were held. In November 1991, bomb attacks were carried out on the residence of State Secretary Kosto and on the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The letter of demands was particularly chaotic in nature. In the authors’ opinion, the establishment had completely run away with itself and was paranoid. The authors believed that their policy did not encompass any political rationale and therefore could not be combated with any arguments, either. It was their belief that politicians were spreading xenophobia in order to gain acceptance for their crisis policy. In July 1993, RARA claimed responsibility for a
bomb attack at the Dienst Inspectie Arbeidsverhoudingen [Labour Relations Inspectorate] at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. That was the last attack that the RARA committed. It seems as though the confusion surrounding its own ideological principles caused the end of the RARA, but this cannot be said with complete certainty.

3.2. The squatters’ movement and the collective framework

Various factors played a role in the decline of the squatters’ movement. These factors ensured that members left the movement, that there were very few new recruits and that the movement decreased in power and scale.

Table 3.2: The role of collective factors in the decline in the case of the squatters’ movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Decline in the squatters’ movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factors linked to the movement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>There was disagreement in relation to the squatting, and what properties could be squatted. Some people also thought that wider solidarity was necessary than that which was purely related to the squatters’ movement. The decline of the RARA was partly due to the fact that their ideology was based upon an international situation that changed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing strategy (the route which was outlined)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>There was disagreement in relation to the course to be followed. Were negotiations with the government necessary? The disagreement mainly related to the use of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>The atmosphere worsened to a considerable extent. There was increasing inflexibility with respect to policy, emphasis on uniformity and power, and mutual accusations. ‘Violence turns inward’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Attempts were made at rigid leadership in the originally anarchistic squatters’ movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Needs of the members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members outgrow the movement as a cohort.</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>The subculture changed among the new cohorts, which at a certain point no longer appealed to the older members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>New generations were not attracted, mainly due to the worsening of the movement’s image and the shift to the right in the Dutch climate. In addition, the number of opportunities to squat decreased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inter)national or local conflict disappears/changes</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Did not play a direct role in the squatters’ movement. The decline of the later movement and the RARA was however indeed linked with disappointing international developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: repression</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>The violent response of the government and the police meant that violence was used and that the violence hardened. But</td>
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</table>
this also caused people to doubt the choice of strategy of the movement. In addition, the legal loopholes were closed, and the choice to take recourse to evictions was implemented more quickly, which decreased the scope for squatting. The (alleged) infiltration by the Dutch National Security Service (BVD) also caused paranoia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Decline in the squatters’ movement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government: inclusion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Contact was regularly made between squatters and the municipality. The movement was reasonably embedded in the city, which meant that part of it was relatively easy to contain. This created internal tensions in the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: reform</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>The municipality ensured a reduction in the number of unoccupied buildings, which removed the purpose of the movement. And this caused a reduction in the number of opportunities to squat. At the same time, there were more opportunities to purchase and legalise squats, which meant that there was less and less of a need for squatting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion/media/Zeitgeist changes (image becomes worse)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>The violence used and the shift of the Zeitgeist to the right caused the goodwill among the population, which certainly existed before, to decrease dramatically, and the squatters’ movement become socially isolated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive competing interpretation</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Other alternatives did not play a role in the decline of the squatters’ movement (but the more democratic left-wing alternatives did play a role in the decline of the RARA).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Elimination of barriers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social dependency</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological dependency</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of costs incurred</td>
<td>O</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group reprisals</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of loss of reputation and protection</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 The extreme right and the extreme right-wing Centre parties

The third case relates to radicalism from a politically right-wing perspective, which falls under the heading of the ‘extreme right’. However, a large number of divergent stances fall under the heading of ‘extreme right’. There is no unambiguous definition of what constitutes extreme right-wing ideology. Here we take the pragmatic approach of labelling the organisations and parties that are called extreme right-wing in practice as being extreme right-wing, whether this is theoretically correct or not. The first theme is ethnic nationalism; an idea of national unity that is formulated in terms of culture and ethnicity. This is linked with concepts such as racism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism. A distinguishing feature of this theme is therefore a contempt of foreigners and disdain for current immigration policy. Social problems are often seen in terms of immigration and immigrants. The second theme is the populist nature of the movement. Extreme right-wing parties are protest parties and it is usually clearer what they are against than what they are in favour of. They fiercely criticise the established order and left-wing politics in particular, which is considered by them to be cowardly and self-seeking. Extreme right-wing parties are orientated towards ordinary people and emphasise the wisdom and value of the common man. Extreme right-wing views therefore often focus not just on ‘foreigners’, but also on political enemies or on what are regarded as social wrongs. The third theme is therefore the theme of the powerful state and powerful leadership. There is a call for clarity and relentlessness in politics, and for measures to summarily deal with people who pose a threat to society.

Extreme rightist ideology can be referred to as radical. Although a section of the extreme right-wing field participates in politics, the current system is not regarded as legitimate, or as representing the ‘common man’, and radical changes are pursued. Extreme rightist groups are also often associated with convictions as a result of unacceptable remarks and with criminal actions and acts of violence.

3.3.a The extreme right movement

There is no single extreme right movement in the Netherlands. The extreme right field consists of various types of players. There are political parties, such as the Centre Party 1986 (CP’86), the Centre Democrats and the New Right. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, the political branch of the extreme right-wing movement is disintegrating more and more, due to a decline in confidence in its political success for example, Fennema (2005) classifies the family of parties that fall under the heading ‘extreme right-wing’ in practice, but which he calls ‘anti-immigration parties’ or ‘radical right parties’. He distinguishes between protest parties (the most moderate parties, characterised by populism), racist parties (in addition to populist, also racist) and a third group of parties for which he reserves the term ‘extreme right-wing’ (this group is oriented towards fascism). He believes that the term extreme right-wing does not apply to the first two groups of parties.
Decline of radical movements: cases in the Netherlands (2007a). However, this is accompanied by a growth within the non-political branches. On the one hand, militant non-political organisations fall under this, such as the Racial Volunteer Force, Blood & Honour, Jeugd Storm Nederland [Netherlands Youth Storm] and various local action groups, such as the radical neo-Nazi splinter group Aktiefront Zuid Holland Zuid [South Holland South Action Front]. The number of supporters in these groups varies between approximately 20 and 200 (Wagenaar and Van Donselaar 2006). They are extreme, but despite their fascination with weapons and violence, both the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the General Intelligence and Security Service estimate that there is no terrorist threat from the extreme right wing (National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism 2005, General Intelligence and Security Service 2007a). Groups such as these and the extreme right-wing youth culture can however contribute towards further polarisation in society.

There are also individual extremists: young people who are members of the ‘gabber’ scene and ‘Lonsdale youth’, for example, who have a subculture that some people associate with the extreme right. And these people in particular have been the centre of attention recently. It is unclear to what extent these groups are extreme rightist in their views (see for example Van Donselaar 2005, Politieacademie (Police academy) 2007, Vogel-van der Duin 2006, the General Intelligence and Security Service 2005). Some of them adopt extreme right-wing forms of expression because they agree with them in part, but others simply do this to provoke (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2005). The fact that no unambiguous definitions of extreme rightist ideology are in use also creates uncertainty. Radicalisation is definitely taking place among a small number of those on the gabber scene (a few hundred). This ensures a growth in Neo-Nazi groups such as Jeugd Storm Nederland [Netherlands Youth Storm], Aktiefront Zuid Holland Zuid [South Holland South Action Front] and a part of Blood & Honour Nederland. Compared to the Lonsdale youth, these groups are more tightly-knit in their organisation, and they adhere to a definite extreme right-wing (National Socialist) set of ideas.

Extreme right-wing political parties have already existed for a long time, but in the Netherlands they have only been granted a marginal role. They have never received more than a few thousand votes (Klandermans and Mayer 2006: 46). Schikhof writes: ‘The extreme rightist movement in the Netherlands is small-scale, fragmented and powerless’ (1998: 143). International comparisons also reveal that the extreme right in the Netherlands lags behind other countries (see for example De Witte 1998, Husbands 1998, Rydgren and Holsteyn 2005: 41).

Wagenaar and Van Donselaar identify three very radical extreme right parties in the current political scene: the Nationale Volks Unie (NVU) [Netherlands People’s Union], the Nationale Alliantie (NA) [National Alliance] and Nieuw Rechts [New Right] (2006). The radical and neo-Nazi NVU has existed since 1971, and in 2006 it had around 100 members. There are regular conflicts between the NVU and other extreme right-wing groups, such as the very radical (and violent) National Alliance. The NA was formed in 2003 as an offshoot of the radical wing of the New National Party, and very recently it was discontinued, when the management board resigned and no new members came forward. At the time, the party only had twenty members. The NA probably died out particularly as a result of its rapid radicalisation, the constant internal arguments and the lack of electoral success during the most recent council elections. Various members were convicted

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4 Source: http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nationale_Alliantie
Decline and Disengagement

for acts of violence. The party ‘New Right’ was established by Michiel Smit after he was expelled from Leefbaar Rotterdam [Liveable Rotterdam] due to his extreme right-wing orientation. With its few hundred members (October 2006), it is larger than the other extreme right-wing political parties, but the council elections in 2006 proved disappointing, with only a single seat being won in Ridderkerk. Furthermore, the party then found itself in major financial difficulties. Following these disappointments, the party underwent a partial collapse. The only member of the board (Smit was unable to be a board member because he did not live in the correct municipality) left the party at the start of 2007 in order to set up his own party, prompted by the radicalisation of New Right and the anti-Semitic remarks of some members 5. A fourth extreme right-wing party, the Nationalistische Volks Beweging [Nationalist People’s Movement] is mentioned on the website of the anti-fascist research group Kafka; this party broke away from the NA in March 2006 because the NA did not wish to place any anti-Islamic cartoons on the Internet in response to the cartoon affair in Denmark 6. Four of the five founders were former members of the Centre Party 1986.

The fact that the extreme rightist movement remains relatively small is not due to the fact that there are insufficient people in the Netherlands who might feel attracted by the extreme right-wing message. Klandermans and Mayer argue that a reasonable movement could have come into being if people had been presented with a more appealing ideology and strategy (2006: 48-50). It therefore seems as though there is a greater number of potential voters in the Netherlands than that which is mobilised by the extreme right. This makes it not just interesting to look at the decline of extreme right-wing parties, but also at the causes which have meant that the extreme right has never become a significant movement in the Netherlands.

This is partly explained by the lack of embedding of the extreme right movement within the Dutch society. In Flanders, for example, there is a more widespread nationalist movement, which enables the extreme right-wing movement to build upon an existing network of individuals and organisations, in addition to an existing ideological framework (De Witte 1998). In contrast with Flanders, this ideological tradition does not exist in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the Netherlands differs from other countries due to its traditionally pillarized social structure, which has also caused a lack of political traditions that the extreme right wing can appeal to (Husbands 1998). Klandermans and Mayer refer to a similar concept when they state that there is little in Dutch history that the extreme right wing can identify with in a positive manner (2006).

The literature on this subject indicates that the failure of the extreme right in the Netherlands can mainly be attributed to the restrictive climate. Political barriers are not considered to be major factor with respect to this failure. Although the Netherlands has one of the most accessible voting systems in Europe, the extreme right-wing movement is not managing to make good use of this (Klandermans and Mayer 2006, Husbands 1998). Extreme right-wing concepts form a major taboo, and the extreme rightist movement was and is being opposed on many fronts. Various studies have been conducted that investigate the effects of the restrictive climate (see for example Van Donselaar 1995 and 1997, De Witte 1997 and 1998, Husbands 1998 and Schikhof 1998). These works focus predominantly on the case of the extreme right-wing Centre parties.

Although the militant extremist organisations are actually the most interesting for our study, we focus upon the political extreme right-wing Centre parties in the 1980s and 1990s. The reason for this is that there is greater insight into this section of the extreme right-wing field, as extensive research has been carried out into the decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties and into the influence that the context factors had on this decline. This is of course of interest in light of the question regarding the causes of decline that forms part of the study at hand. Furthermore, we believe that the factors that played a role in this political movement also influenced the developments of the more radical and even extremist extreme right-wing groups. This political Centre movement is also interesting because it was relatively successful when compared with other extreme right-wing political parties, and yet, after a period of activity, it declined. Despite the fact that other extreme right-wing parties in the decades preceding the rise of the extreme right-wing Centre parties were only able to exist on the edge of the party system, outside of parliament, the Centre Party (CP) and the Centre Democrats (CD) were able to make it into the Lower House of Parliament. Once there, however, they continued to play only a marginal role. In this report we describe the developments and the decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties and the factors that played a role in this decline7, and we discuss the applicability of these findings to the current extreme right-wing landscape.

3.3.b The case of the extreme right-wing Centre parties

The CP broke away from the Netherlands People’s Union (NVU) in 1979-80, due to the NVU’s fascist and racist nature. The members who had broken away did not agree with the radicalisation of the party that took place under the leadership of Glimmerveen. Violence against illegal migrants was encouraged within the NVU. The party was even banned by the courts, which according to Lucardie was ‘because its activities were said to conflict with “public order or public morals”’ (1998: 18). Initially, those who had broken away established the National Centre Party, but this was dissolved when illegal Moroccan immigrants were assaulted by party members in a church in Amsterdam, following a party meeting. The Centre Party was established the following day. Hans Janmaat soon became the chairman of the Centre Party when one of the founders, Brookman, disappeared into the background because his involvement in the CP endangered his position at the Vrije Universiteit [Free University of Amsterdam]. The CP experienced electoral growth until the beginning of its decline in 1984. A power struggle was taking place at the top of the party between Janmaat and the somewhat more militant Nico Konst. The conflict quickly became more of a matter of personal disagreements than ideological differences, and fierce accusations were expressed regarding financial mismanagement and undemocratic action. The opinion spread that Janmaat was gaining too much power, and he was forced to transfer the chairmanship to Konst at a party conference in Boekel. (The meeting was disrupted by radical anti-fascist activists with smoke bombs, which caused a great deal of panic.) When Janmaat tried to organise an opposition, he was expelled for acting on his own authority. After his expulsion, he set up the more moderate

7 The description of this case is largely based on Lucardie (1998), the Racism and Extremism Monitor (http://www.monitorracisme.nl/content.asp?PID=181&LID=1, viewed on 1 November 2007), and Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 23).
CD. In the meantime, he had been dismissed from the two schools where he worked as a teacher, for which he received a compensation of twenty-five thousand guilders.

The CP began to experience financial difficulties, partly as a result of the loss of subsidies that were linked with Janmaat’s seat in parliament. Added to this, the party was ordered to pay damages because it had collected signatures under false pretences during the elections of 1986, which was a huge financial blow. Ultimately, many active members withdrew from the party due to frustration, disappointment or for other reasons. Konst resigned from his position as chairman so as not to lose his job as a teacher.

Things were not going well with Janmaat’s Centre Democrats either and they did not win a single seat during the parliamentary elections of 1986. Discussions were still under way with the CP about a reconciliation, but consultation about this in a hotel in Kedichem was violently disrupted by anti-fascists. Smoke bombs caused a fire in the hotel, and the secretary of the CD lost a leg as a result of the fire. Only two police officers were responsible for protecting the meeting and of the 72 anti-fascist activists, only a few were issued with (light) punishments.

In 1989, Janmaat succeeded in returning to parliament, and during the years that followed, the CD gained in success. At the height of its success, in 1994, the CD achieved 78 seats at the local elections and 3 seats in parliament. The party’s key objectives were to put a stop to the multi-cultural ‘Anti-Netherlands Policy’, to bring about the abolition of Article 1 of the constitution and to realise the introduction of the death penalty, but the ideas were rarely converted into concrete proposals. Lucardie writes that parties such as the CD and the CP attracted many people with aggressive and sometimes criminal tendencies. But due to the issue of electoral success and therefore the strong need for active members, the party was unable to be selective, and many members who began to play an active role ended up failing, or came into conflict with the courts. The image of the party was damaged by articles written by undercover journalists who disclosed ideas that were expressed internally (‘back stage’), which were less refined than the party wanted to let outsiders believe (‘front stage’). These publications caused a great deal of unrest in the party and some of those elected left the party in order to join another party, the ‘Nederlands Blok’.

Not long after the dissolution of the CP, the party was re-formed in 1986 as the Centre Party 1986 (CP’86). Initially there was little political activity, but some years later a revival took place. The party became more radical and attracted predominantly radical members, such as those who were active in the NVU’s youth organisations. (Illegal) demonstrations took place that attracted new people, particularly young skinheads, but they also put off many potential voters. Moderate members left the party. In 1995, the party was found guilty of criminal activities such as the propagation of discrimination and incitement to hatred. Agreement was reached with Janmaat over an amalgamation of the CP’86 and the CD, possibly out of fear of a party ban. During that year the parties worked together a great deal during demonstrations, with the CP’86 providing ‘strong-arm boys’ to help keep order. But the amalgamation was rejected by the CP’86 party conference. The tension between the radicals and the remaining moderates within the CP’86 increased and led to a split, which involved the radicals appropriating the party and the moderate party leadership being expelled. The party then openly developed into a Nazi organisation and an announcement was made by the authorities that proceedings to ban

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8 Source: http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g6hmvc3u3
the party would be initiated, which caused members to desert the party. In 1998, the party was banned and disbanded.

The radicalisation of CP’86 caused many members to transfer to the CD, but a large number of them were then put off by Janmaat’s headstrong, self-willed attitude. Internal conflicts arose again in the CD, partly with regard to the leader’s personality. Janmaat had insufficient charisma to unite the party and make it a single entity, and the fact that he led the party as if it were a family business also led to conflicts. He was responsible for ensuring that members who expressed criticism were expelled from the party. Janmaat and his wife Wil Schuurman (also a member of parliament) were convicted of discrimination on a number of occasions. Janmaat held a seat in the Lower House of Parliament during three periods (1982-1986, 1989-1994 and 1994-1998). And although he was present most of the times that the parliament was in session and contributed to the debates, he was never paid any serious attention (Holsteyn 1998). He only received media attention in relation to individual incidents, and in degrading and stigmatising terms. Members of parliament walked away when it was his turn to speak, and with respect to invitations he was ignored. No one spoke to him during breaks, and in contrast to other members of parliament, who were served by parliament staff, Janmaat had to fetch his own coffee (Schikhof 1998: 145). The elections in 1998 were a flop (Janmaat blamed it on election fraud) and Janmaat and his party disappeared from the Lower House of Parliament.

Marginal position and decline

The above description of the developments within the extreme right-wing Centre parties provides a picture of the factors that played a role in their decline. An image is portrayed of organisational difficulties and of internal discord that led to expulsions, disengagement and situations where members split off from the main group. This was partly the result of the repressive manner in which the parties and their members were treated by the society. This picture is confirmed in the interviews we held with former members of these groups.

The developments took place in a very restrictive climate, where attempts were made to suppress extreme right-wing organisations as much as possible. There were bans on demonstrations and there were party bans. People were also convicted for discriminatory remarks and employment contracts were terminated by the court because, according to statements by employers, an unworkable situation had arisen due to someone’s membership of an extreme right-wing party. In addition to judicial measures, other strategies were also employed in order to hinder the functioning of the extreme rightist movement. Extreme right-wing parties were isolated and stigmatised. Cordons sanitaires ensured that other parties did not collaborate with extreme right-wing parties, and extreme right-wing politicians were not taken seriously.

Respondent 12: [Why isn’t your right-wing movement much larger?] ‘We are being put under pressure until we break. (…) But there is a never-ending smear campaign. The very term ‘extreme right’ is a rather unfortunate one. But these are very sensitive, normal people.’

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9 Source: http://www.parlement.com/9291000/modulesf/g6hmvcu3
Journalists played an important role in these developments and portrayed the extreme right-wing politicians, partly unjustly, as performing badly (see Van Riel and Van Holsteyn 1998). Furthermore, the image that is portrayed of the extreme right-wing members of parliament is, in fact, mainly one in which “the scandalous and dilettante characteristics of this category of council members in particular [are] magnified” (Van Donselaar 1995 cited in Van Riel and Van Holsteyn 1998: 62). ‘If and in so far as Janmaat or his party receive media attention, this is usually in relation to individual incidents. (…) Only in exceptional cases is any attention paid to [his contributions to debates and decision-making in the Lower House of Parliament, ed.], often in general terms and inadequately substantiated’ (Van Holsteyn 1998: 50-51). In addition, journalists infiltrated the parties in order to reveal the internal remonstrations and to ‘unmask’ the true face of the parties.

Individual members of the extreme right-wing parties experienced exclusion from society, resulting in dismissal and expulsion from clubs and societies. Only a few people still wanted to be associated with them.

Respondent 12: ‘You also get into rows with everyone, with family and friends. You feel like you are being destroyed.’

The opposition to the extreme right-wing political movement by radical anti-fascists was fierce. Anti-fascists tried, often successfully, to disrupt meetings of extreme right-wing parties, and often did so in a violent manner. The limited action on the part of the police in situations such as these, and the limited punishments that were imposed on these activists created the impression amongst the extreme right-wing that the police were biased and that the anti-fascists were receiving support from the established order (Alert 2005).

Respondent 12: ‘But that [the use of ‘strong-arm boys’ who keep order, ed.] is necessary, because the police is corrupt and also multicultural.’

From an organisational perspective the parties performed badly, partly as a result of the pressure that was exerted on them and their members. There was a major lack of organisational capacity. People who had a lot to lose thought twice before they became active within the extreme right-wing Centre parties. Others moved further into the background, such as Brookman and Konst. According to Schikhof, the fact that the more moderate individuals left the movement contributed towards further radicalisation (1998). This was enhanced by the fact that those members who were left behind radicalised further, because of the feeling that the entire world was against them, and in response to the anti-fascist violence. The parties however did attract people who had less to lose, particularly non-conformist and ultra-right-wing individuals, but these people generally had poor organisational skills. They were admitted because there were few other people available, but also because ‘rougher’ types were able to offer protection against violent anti-fascist actions. It is therefore no surprise that this did not give rise to any well-performing party organisations.

Respondent 12: ‘Many people lose their jobs. These are personal dramas, but they strengthen you too. If you are seriously active and you join the board, you continue to be a member. But if they don’t gain a position like this, they break away from the party, as then the disadvantages outnumber the advantages. A guy like this burns out.’
Respondent 13: ‘And in Amsterdam the situation was pitiful! (...) I thought: this is our mutual demise! And Janmaat put people off too. But even more important was the fact that you could lose your job, or that your windows were smashed in. You got people who showed an interest in the party, but who didn’t want any trouble. (...) If there hadn’t been such a negative attitude, we would have been able to build something. But you can’t build on a group of idiots. The movement only attracted losers. Better educated people with jobs are more cautious. They show an interest, but don’t want to risk everything.’

Parties struggled with criminal convictions, financial and personal problems, poor leadership and in particular with internal arguments. Some of these arguments concerned personal conflicts, including disagreements about Janmaat’s leadership and the lack of democratic procedures – which was partly due to the anti-fascist actions which made it difficult to hold meetings. The conflicts were sometimes caused by internal differences of opinion between more moderate and more radical members regarding the correct course of action to take, in response to anti-fascist violence or in response to the stigmatisation.

As Van Donselaar explains, the more pressure that is placed on an organisation, the more the organisation has to moderate its ideas to the outside in order to be accepted at all, both politically and socially (1997 and 1995). Van Donselaar refers to this as the ‘assimilation dilemma’, as moderation brings with it the risk that ideological principles are denied and the contrast with established politics becomes blurred. This causes the party to lose its attraction to its radical supporters, which has a negative effect upon the party’s internal coherence and power. The solution is often for the party to show a different face to the outside (‘front stage’) than to the inside (‘back stage’), but this renders the organisation sensitive to exposure, which can again lead to paranoia.

All of this discord regularly led to situations where members split off from the group, or were expelled. The uncertainty and the disagreement were again reinforced by disappointing electoral results. Our respondents regretted the lack of effective leadership that would be able to establish a proper organisation:

Respondent 12: ‘There was a lack of management, which resulted in a disproportionate focus on personal faults. You should refer to all of these people as unique… Most of them are mentally retarded.’

Respondent 13: ‘At a moment such as this, you begin to appreciate the achievements of people who are able to start off a movement from scratch, such as Lenin. The fact is, a new movement such as this attracts a large number of losers! That applies to all parties, but even more so to the more extreme movements. You almost have to be a super-human leader in order to keep something like this together and to build up something decent.’

The descriptions therefore show that the pressure on the extreme right-wing Centre parties had a destabilising effect, as Van Donselaar also concludes (1995). There are too few people with organisational capabilities. The anti-fascist actions mean that no assemblies and information meetings are possible and the pressure on the party leads to internal conflicts.
But although these repressive strategies turn out to be successful, they also bring about major inherent disadvantages. Various comments are made about this in literature. For example, Elbers and Fennema describe an underdog effect in relation to the extreme right (1993). Because of the fact that the extreme right-wing is under fire from the established order, the feeling is endorsed that established politicians are not interested in the common man. This idea that the extreme right-wing movement is the underdog makes it attractive to those citizens who feel excluded by the political system. Other authors warn that repression is in part just an example of “treating-the-symptoms” (see for example Choenni 1993 in Schikhof 1998). Radicalisation is linked with the delegitimisation of established society, and it is doubtful whether legitimisation can be enforced by means of repression. Repression can combat the manifestation of this delegitimisation, and break down radical structures. But Choenni adds that it will most likely not cause radical ideas and social unrest to disappear. It can only cause them to go underground and to develop in an uncontrolled manner. Nonetheless, Van Donselaar (1995) adds that this does not apply in the case of the extreme right-wing. Finally, a number of authors raise the question as to what extent repressive approaches are desirable within a democratic system. To what extent can non-democratic means, such as restricting the freedom of speech, be used in order to protect society against undemocratic ideas? Van Donselaar refers to this in his discussion of the extreme right-wing, and calls it the ‘repression dilemma’ (1995). Fennema adopts a critical attitude towards restricting the freedom of the extreme right and adds that democratic procedures are more important than democratic moral standards. He takes a stand against the cordon sanitaire and against the assumption that radical parties have concealed, ‘backstage’ ideas, because this smothers any political debates (1997).

Another factor that influences the development of the extreme right-wing in a negative manner is the hardening of viewpoints within the established political parties. This is not clearly indicated in the description of the extreme right-wing Centre parties, but is however referred to as an influencing factor in other literature about the extreme right-wing (see for example Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005 and Husbands 1998). During the past few years, since the ‘Fortuyn revolt’, the established politicians have adopted a harsher attitude in relation to immigration policy. This shift of established political parties to the right causes a blurring of the boundaries between the extreme right-wing and established parties. It would appear obvious that, in response to this “shift”, the extreme right-wing parties then become more radical in order to recreate a clear identity for themselves, in other words a more radical public profile. Within politics, this course of action entails risks, however, with regard to judicial measures and public perception. According to Wagenaar and Van Donselaar, this ‘problem of profiling’ is one of the reasons why the extreme rightist movement in the Netherlands is still insignificant (2006).

3.3.c The extreme right-wing Centre parties and the collective framework

The following factors played a role in the decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties.
Table 3.3: The role of collective factors in the decline in the case of the extreme right-wing Centre parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Decline in the case of the extreme right-wing Centre parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>No attractive, unambiguous philosophy has been presented. There is friction between the need to moderate ideas in order to play a role in politics and the need to contrast with established politics in order to appeal to the radical supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing strategy (the route which was outlined)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>The fact that no electoral successes were achieved led to disappointment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>The organisational situation was often characterised by financial problems and a lack of capable people. Internally, there were arguments and plotting. Sometimes paranoia developed due to infiltration by journalists. The functioning of the organisation was also restricted by external factors, for example isolation in politics and bans on demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Leadership was often poor. The leaders were not charismatic or capable, but self-willed and had an undemocratic approach. They were responsible for nepotism and financial disorder, internal arguments and plotting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs of the members</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>The cohort-effect did not play a role in the decline.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members outgrow the movement as a cohort</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>The decline was not caused by new generations feeling less attracted by the message of the extreme rightist movement than older generations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External factors</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>Decline/failure to get established was not linked to any (changing) social conflict in the Netherlands.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Inter)national or local conflict disappears/changes</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>The repression mainly took the form of a restrictive climate. Individuals received convictions after making discriminatory remarks, and employment contracts were terminated by courts. No (serious) measures were taken against anti-fascist actions. Furthermore, there was evidence of a cordon sanitaire and demonstration bans. Violent anti-fascist actions were not denounced and discrimination against extreme right-wing individuals was permitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government: repression</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>The repression mainly took the form of a restrictive climate. Individuals received convictions after making discriminatory remarks, and employment contracts were terminated by courts. No (serious) measures were taken against anti-fascist actions. Furthermore, there was evidence of a cordon sanitaire and demonstration bans. Violent anti-fascist actions were not denounced and discrimination against extreme right-wing individuals was permitted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Government: inclusion | + | The lack of political traditions in the Netherlands that the extreme right-wing could latch onto played a part in ensuring that the Centre parties were not able to obtain a solid position in the established system (a lack of inclusion). A hardening of established politics could have negative consequences for the extreme right wing (with regard to the inclusion of right-wing
Factors Role Decline in the case of the extreme right-wing Centre parties

Government: reform O Decline was not caused as a result of the demands of the extreme right-wing Centre parties being met.

Public opinion/media/Zeitgeist changes (image deteriorates) +++ The extreme right wing had acquired a very bad name and was subject to strong stigmatisation. This had major social consequences such as social isolation, expulsions and dismissals. The chances of a extreme right-wing member pursuing a career in society were slim. The media played a role by reinforcing the stigmatisation and criminalisation of the movement, and also by ‘unmasking’ it. Infiltrations by journalists caused paranoia. There was also a powerful anti-fascist counter-movement that regularly used violence against extreme right.

Attractive competing interpretation O This does not come to the fore as an important factor in the decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties.

Breakdown of barriers to disengagement

Social dependency O There was a barrier in the form of a social vacuum that awaited people who withdrew from the movement, but the extreme right-wing Centre parties did not experience a decline due to this barrier being broken down.

Psychological dependency O Psychological dependency did not form a barrier to disengagement from the movement.

Level of costs incurred O The costs of participating in an extreme right-wing group were high, which could form a major barrier to people disengaging from the movement. But the extreme right-wing Centre parties did not experience a decline due to this barrier being broken down.

Group reprisals O The extreme right-wing Centre parties did not experience a decline due to a reduction in reprisals.

Fear of loss of reputation and protection O The extreme right-wing Centre parties did not experience a decline due to members becoming less fearful of losing their reputation or protection if they were to disengage from the movement.

Marginalisation O Marginalisation after disengagement could form a major barrier to disengaging from the movement. But the extreme right-wing Centre parties did not experience a decline due to this barrier being broken down.

To what extent does the account of the extreme right-wing Centre parties now apply to the current extreme right-wing field, which largely exists outside of the political system? From the description of the extreme right-wing movement in the beginning, it is clear
that no single united extreme right-wing movement exists in the Netherlands, nor is there one single rise or decline. What there is, in fact, is an extreme right-wing landscape with a continuous basis that cannot free itself of its marginal position. It is more the case that there is a field with a hard core of activists than a field with a fixed basis of parties and organisations. The landscape is characterised by internal arguments and divisions (for instance with regard to the radical course of action), electoral disappointments and organisational weakness. These general dynamics appear to have much in common with the specific dynamics found within the extreme right-wing Centre parties.

The restrictive attitude within the political sphere affected the extreme right-wing Centre parties, but there was also evidence of social exclusion and stigmatisation outside of politics. Although non-political parties obviously do not experience any difficulties when it comes to exclusion from politics, it is likely that other comparable mechanisms exist and that the social exclusion and stigmatisation also plays a role with respect to these parties.

3.4 The three cases in the Netherlands: A summary

In this section we provide a brief summary of the decline in the three cases and compare the movements on the basis of the analytical framework. On the basis of this, we endeavour to make general assessments relating to the factors that play a role in the decline of radical movements. In Chapter 5, the cases are compared with Islamic radicalism, and this subsequently serves as a basis for the formulation of expectations with regard to the decline of Islamic radicalism.

Various factors played a role in the deradicalisation of the radical Moluccans. The decline of the Moluccan radical movement was mainly caused by an altered view with respect to their ideology. With regard to its political aim, the RMS was called into question more and more. International developments played a role in this, as did contact with other protest movements. This resulted in a change in ideas about the Moluccas, and ideas about the desired future were gradually adjusted. The prevailing world view changed too, as the Netherlands was no longer regarded as an enemy. The fact that a violent course of action no longer came to be regarded as the best strategy was mainly due to the government’s repressive response, which meant that the lack of results of the violent course of action was not worth the sacrifices that were made. At the same time, the ‘martyrs’ who fell when the army intervened at the hijacking at De Punt confirmed the seriousness of the Moluccan dream. This enabled people to follow a more moderate course of action without ‘damaging their reputation’. For a long time there was little opportunity for those Moluccans who wanted to adopt a less radical viewpoint in relation to the RMS. The interweaving of the RMS and the Moluccan identity meant that there was little room for different opinions. For a long time, people who called the RMS into question were portrayed as traitors by other Moluccans, and it was not uncommon for violent reprisals to follow. At a certain point, more room was created for varying opinions, and different voices were heard. The fact that the young people in particular began to focus on their societal careers and had new opportunities, also played a role in the deradicalisation.

In contrast to the Moluccans’ situation, ideology only played a subordinate role in the deradicalisation of the squatters’ movement in Amsterdam. It was the increasingly
grim atmosphere within the movement in particular, that caused a major section of the squatters’ movement to disengage. The increasingly violent nature of the conflict between the squatters’ movement and the government played a major role in this development. The government reforms also played a role, as the distressing housing shortage was dealt with and the squatters were given the opportunity to purchase squatted premises. The squatters’ movement was a relatively open movement, with many contacts outside of the movement. It was also easy for the squatters to resume life in society after disengaging from the movement. Therefore there were not actually any collective barriers that prevented disengagement.

A variety of factors played a role in the decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties and in the explanation of why the establishment of extreme right-wing organisations failed. But all of these factors can largely be traced back to society’s repressive approach, as shown in the description of the developments within the extreme right-wing Centre parties. Extreme right-wing ideas and affiliations are not tolerated in society and result in stigmatisation and isolation. This means that few people join the extreme right-wing organisations, and in particular even fewer competent people do. It also makes it difficult for extreme right-wing political parties in particular to present an appealing ideology, because they are forced to compromise between a moderate formulation of the ideology that is (more) politically accepted and a radical formulation that appeals to the hard core of the extreme right-wing supporters. The isolation of the extreme right-wing in politics also impedes the achievement of political successes. The fact that there is little space in society for people who are associated with the extreme right forms a barrier to joining the movement, but also to disengaging from it – but this did not change during the decline of the right-wing Centre parties. The decline is not therefore linked with a lowering of this barrier.

The table below provides an overview of the roles that the factors from the analytical framework play in the decline of the various cases.
On the basis of these three cases, we attempt to formulate some carefully worded general conclusions relating to the decline of radical movements.

Factors linked to the movement:
- **Ideology** (the current world view and the desired future) appears to play a relatively powerful role in the decline of radical movements, but has not however been granted one specific role. Among the Moluccans, an ideological interpretation that differed from the previous one gradually gained the upper hand. Within the squatters' movement, there was too little consensus about its aims and ideals. In the case of the extreme right-wing Centre parties, it was difficult for them to present an appealing ideology because the version that was politically acceptable (front stage) was not radical enough for many of the supporters (backstage).
Decline and Disengagement

- **Strategy** also appears to play a major role. Violent actions had a major influence on the decline of both the movement among the Moluccans and the squatters’ movement.

- Failing **organisation** also appears to play a major role in the decline. Power play, internal conflicts and an increasingly grim atmosphere within the group are responsible for the decline of both the squatters’ movement and of various extreme right-wing organisations. Organisational factors did not play a role in the decline among the Moluccans. Even during the process of radicalisation there was no evidence of coherent organisation among the Moluccans.

- A lack of capable, charismatic **leaders** appears to play a significant role in decline. None of the three movements that were studied had capable, charismatic leaders that could keep the movements afloat. The presence of capable, charismatic leaders might perhaps have caused these movements to develop in a completely different manner, although the squatters’ movement flourished the most when it was without leaders.

Needs of the members:

- The factor of members outgrowing the movement as a **cohort** does not appear to play a major role.

- The factor concerning the phenomenon of **new generations** no longer feeling attracted to the movement does however play a role. In the case of the Moluccan movement and the squatters’ movement, the **Zeitgeist** and the altered image of these movements caused their attractiveness – in the eyes of new generations – to decrease.

External factors:

- **Change in an (inter)national conflict** plays a variable role. In the case of the extreme right-wing movement, this had no influence on the development of the parties. The later squatters’ movement was affected when the success of the international liberation movements, upon which the international solidarity was based, had run its course. The struggle to achieve the RMS ideal was strongly influenced by the situation on the Moluccas. When the relationship with the Moluccas changed and the settlers in the Netherlands came to understand that the liberation of the Moluccas was not the greatest wish of the islands’ inhabitants, this had major consequences for the radical agenda.

- **Repressive government policy** can play a significant role in the decline – by means of various mechanisms. Among the Moluccans and within the squatters’ movement, actions which violated the law were violently repressed. The violent interaction that resulted from this divided the movements. It caused people to doubt their own participation in the movement, and to question what was the best way of achieving their goals. It also turned out that the spiral of violence caused the violence to ‘turn in on itself’, which in turn caused the atmosphere in the movements to become more grim. At the same time, however, it was initially the police force’s use of violence towards the squatters that actually caused the squatters to radicalise. In response to the police violence, they began to use violent means themselves. Repression played a different role in the case of the extreme right-wing movement. During the decline of the extreme right Centre parties, there was a restrictive social and political climate in which hardly any space was created for the wishes of the extreme right wing. The extreme right wing and its active members were stigmatised and excluded from society. It was primarily due to reasons of frustration and the impossibility of operating that people left...
this movement – or did not even join it in the first place, even if they agreed with the extreme right agenda.

- It is difficult to evaluate the effects of inclusion and reform, because this only took place to a limited extent in the three cases. The only example is the reforms on the housing market which had influenced the decline in the case of the squatters’ movement.

- Public opinion appears to play a major role in decline of these movements. A lack of goodwill among the population (and among one's own ethnic group), whether or not due to a change in the Zeitgeist or because of violent actions, effected all three of the radical movements. It created doubt among the members and resulted in a decline in new recruits.

- It is difficult to make general judgements about the role played by competing ideologies in the decline of a movement. We are only able to establish that they played practically no role in the cases studied (only among the Moluccans). It is difficult to say whether this was due to the fact that there were no alternatives or because alternatives only play a limited role in the decline.

**Barriers:**

- It is also difficult to make overall judgements about the effect of eliminating the barriers to disengagement from a movement. Only among the Moluccans did the breakdown of the barriers play a role in the decline of the movement.

**General:**

- All the factors that were included in the analytical framework turn out to play a role in decline in the cases studied to a lesser or greater extent. The only exceptions are the breaking down of the social dependency barrier and the barrier formed by the level of costs incurred. The decline was not linked to an elimination of these barriers in any of the three cases.

- Overall, we can say that the factors linked to the movement play a very important role in the decline of the three movements studied. Public opinion and repressive government action also have a major effect on the movement’s attractiveness, for members as well as for the new recruits.
4. Decline of religious forms of radicalism

Religious forms of radicalism are attributed with unique characteristics. The inherent motivating power of religion and the allure of a paradise that encourages suicide are often referred to. Furthermore, in secular societies such as ours, religious arguments are often seen as ‘irrational’ as well as illegitimate, which means that religious radicals are seen as people with whom it is impossible to talk with. Religious manifestations therefore seem to occupy a unique position. In this chapter, we examine in detail the question to what extent religious forms of radicalism differ fundamentally from non-religious forms of radicalism.

The question as to the way in which religion gives a radical movement and a radical conflict a specific character is of interest to our study. After all, we want to draw conclusions relating to deradicalisation in the case of Islamic radicalism, and we do this partly by considering other cases of deradicalisation: left-wing squatters, right-wing extremists and activist Moluccans. These are non-religious forms of radicalism, meaning no lessons can be drawn from these cases with regard to the role of religion.

Religious radicalism is two-sided. Radicalisation is a process of delegitimisation of society and therefore, in addition to the religious side, religious radicalism has, by definition, a political side as well. Although the roles played by religion and politics can differ considerably between movements, we have opted to refer to each radical movement that describes its struggle and the legitimisation of this struggle in religious terms, as being ‘religious radical’.

In order to gain a picture of the role played by religion in radical movements, we examine studies in which religious radical movements have been investigated in detail. A very extensive study was carried out under the leadership of Marty and Appleby. Together with other researchers they studied the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, which resulted in five enormous reference works and the book *Strong religion* (Almond, Appleby and Sivan, 2003). In particular they study religious movements that reject society in a militant manner (and that we refer to as radical movements), and they use the term ‘fundamentalist movements’ for these radical movements. Juergensmeyer has also carried out extensive research into religious radicalism and extremism, and in his book *Terror in the mind of God*, he provides a glimpse into the way of thinking of religious extremists with various backgrounds (2001). Our analysis is largely based on these two studies. In these studies, however, the religious radical movements that are examined are not compared with non-religious movements, which means that there is insufficient substantiation of the authors’ claims with regard to the unique nature of religious fundamentalist movements. This is why we also use the insights gained through our examination of the (non-religious) cases from this current study when making comparisons between religious and non-religious radical movements. We also rely on the work of Pape, who has compared religious and non-religious movements in his research into a specific type of extremism, namely suicide terrorism (2005).

In this chapter, we endeavour to formulate answers to the question of whether religious forms of radicalism differ substantially from non-religious forms and if so, in which way they do differ from each other. Firstly, we examine the role of ideology and discuss religion’s power of motivation (section 4.1) and the mobilising power of religious radical movements (4.2). We then examine the characteristics of the organisation (4.3)
and the relationship with the context (4.4). In these sections we begin with an analysis of the claims made by researchers of religious (radical) movements in relation to the characteristics of these movements, and then go on to evaluate the extent to which we can say that religious radical movements have a unique nature. Conclusions are given in section 4.5.

4.1 The religious world view as additional motivation

Many religious radicals have a fundamentalist world view. Appleby and Juergensmeyer provide descriptions of fundamentalist world views. In their opinion, these world views share a number of common elements, irrespective of what religion they are based upon. We can also find these elements in the description of Islamic radicalism by Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006) and Slootman and Tillie (2006): the world is divided into chosen people and evil enemies that have to be fought. The world is a bad place because religion is being marginalized and is therefore under threat. A cosmic war is underway which is bringing salvation closer and in which violence is legitimised. Taking action to achieve this salvation is very desirable and even modern technology is used. This world view provides individuals with meaning and purpose in relation to their situation and actions. Because such a world view relates to a ‘higher aim’, the achievement of its goals is seen as a long-term process: the aims do not need to be achieved within one generation. Modern secular society is the ultimate enemy because it is man-made and professes to be all-encompassing - and therefore competes with God. The secular government and the authorities are the epitomisation of the enemy, but believers who collaborate with this enemy are just as bad, and their behaviour must also be challenged. Therefore there is often major tension between established religion (and established religious leaders) and fundamentalists. According to fundamentalists, the solution lies in the past, during the period when, according to them, the religion still flourished, and in a world such as the one that is described in the holy texts. The holy texts must therefore be interpreted in a very strict and literal manner and implemented once again, as it were (but this time properly). Boundaries between friend and enemy must be clearly defined, with strict codes for both behaviour and doctrine. There is therefore little room for internal variation and contradiction, and homogeneity is important. Fundamentalist movements are facilitated by an outside world that adopts a hostile position, as this confirms the fundamentalists’ dualist world view and strengthens the boundaries between friend and foe.

The basic characteristic of fundamentalism is that it is a response to the idea that religion is being marginalised. Fundamentalism revolves around defending the religion which is (perceived to be) under threat. This enables religious fundamentalism to feed radicalisation. We also see that a such a fundamentalist world view has various characteristics that can pave the way to radicalisation, such as moral Manichaeism, absolutism, selectiveness, Millennialism and Messianism, a ‘chosen’ charismatic leadership, well-defined boundaries, authoritarian relationships with little room for diversity and objections, strict codes of conduct and a mandatory devotion. A fundamentalist religious ideology provides radical movements with an explanatory world view, motivation and legitimisation. But does this then mean that because of these factors, religious radicalism can be deemed unique in nature? And is it true that in contrast with non-religious ideolo-
gies, the discourse of these religious radicals encourage people to sacrifice themselves, as is often assumed?

**Evaluation: additional motivation due to the relationship with the factor 'identity'**

On the basis of their research into the fundamentalist world view, Appleby et al. and Juergensmeyer conclude that religious radical movements are fundamentally different to non-religious radical movements. According to these authors, the movements differ due to their absolutist nature. The concept of a ‘cosmic war’ is a strong incitement to violence and self-sacrifice. As we already mentioned, unfortunately no non-religious movements are included as comparison in the extensive studies into religious fundamentalism undertaken by Appleby and Juergensmeyer, and therefore their claims about the unique nature of religious fundamentalist movements are not sufficiently substantiated.

Pape does however use a comparative analysis in order to examine the role played by religion. He examined conflicts that revolve around the occupation of a country, and concludes that conflicts in which the occupying power and the occupied nation have different religions are more intense, and that this situation is more likely to lead to suicide terrorism than if both parties have the same religion. But he concludes that this is not intrinsic to the religious nature of the ideology, but it is a consequence of the fact that the difference in religion deepens the gap between the occupier and the occupied nation. According to Pape, this gap influences a conflict’s intensity to a considerable extent. He argues that the greater the difference between the identities of the foreign occupiers and the local community (i.e. the less they have in common), the greater the chance that the local community will regard the foreign occupiers as inherently different, and the greater the fear will be that the occupation will lead to radical changes in one’s own culture and customs, and the more the community will try to put an end to the occupation – at almost any cost (2005: 86).

Pape regards religion as one of the most important factors that can mark the difference between two groups. This is partly because of the exclusivity of religion. Whilst it is relatively easy to cross a language barrier by learning to speak another language, conversion to another religion is, in the context of a conflict situation, regarded as downright treason. Differences in religious views can increase the fear of the influence that the other party may exert, which stems from the expectation that people of other religions will have less respect for your own religious and cultural customs. Furthermore, people of different religions are often seen as being inferior, which makes it even easier to demonise the other party. In addition, Pape argues that a situation in which the two conflicting parties have different religions leads to a quicker legitimisation of martyrdom. Although martyrdom is not by definition religious, it is, however, a concept that is religious in origin, whereby someone is only regarded as a martyr for his or her belief if he or she is killed by an enemy of his of her religion. If the conflicting groups have different religions, this makes it easier for a radical group to legitimise suicide missions (which are actually strictly forbidden in most religions) by using the concept of martyrdom.

But Pape also names a number of examples of suicide attacks which are not inspired by religion. And we also see in our interviews that martyrdom and willingness to sacrifice oneself are not purely religious. Among some former Moluccan fighters, we encounter a comparable deep motivation and willingness (sometimes even a secret wish) to become a victim in the struggle, which does not have religious motivations. In addi-
tion, the six Moluccan hijackers who died in the action in 1977 have also been honoured as martyrs. These examples of the motivation of non-religious fighters, some of whom are even willing to give their lives, point in the same direction as Pape's explanation, namely that a particularly deep motivation arises in the case of major differences in identity – thus when movements strongly appeal to a person's identity (i.e. to the factor that forms the central element to who someone is, and which sets a person, as a member of a group, apart from others). In many cases religion plays an important role in this, but also in the case of the Moluccans, for example, the struggle for the establishment of an independent Moluccan state was at that time interconnected with being Moluccan, which gave their 'cause' additional motivation. Moluccans who did not back this struggle were regarded as traitors and violence was even used against them. Being a Moluccan was something that inspired the Moluccans in the Netherlands to the core, almost without exception. Some former activists with whom we spoke tried to explain this to us in an emotional manner. Others did not even hazard an attempt at providing such an explanation, because according to them this close bond could not be understood by an outsider. Such a strong identification means that everything that is seen as an attack on the group feels like an attack on yourself as individual. The absolute division between friend and foe and the idea that as a group you are attacked by an outsider, makes the act of taking that last step towards violent conflict and suicide terrorism less daunting, as is also stated by Pape. This division into an 'us versus them' situation, which makes it easier to demonise the other party, can occur in any situation in which the other group is regarded as essentially different to one's own group.

This explanation provides a reason why many religious conflicts are more intense than many other conflicts. Religion can reinforce the perceived difference between two parties, but does not provide an inherently different mechanism for radicalisation. Other parts of an individual's identity, such as ethnicity or nationality, can also be perceived to be inherently different to those of another person. This could be a reason why conflicts with migrant groups are also more intense than conflicts between other population groups within society. In some cases, people from a migrant group are regarded as the essential 'Other', and migrants themselves also may tend to see themselves as being different. Migrants also often try to retain and guard (some of their) individuality, and many identify themselves with people in their home country – especially when those in the home country find themselves in a conflict situation. The Moluccans form an example of this.

4.2 What do religious radical movements have to offer?

Religious fundamentalist or radical movements can arise whenever they become attractive to people. As religious radicalism always contains a political component as well, it involves more than simply a religious perception. Juergensmeyer says that religious radical movements do not arise of their own accord, but they are 'religious responses to social situations' (2001: 225). What makes people feel attracted by movements such as these?

In the various descriptions of the attractiveness of religious radical movements, such as the one by Juergensmeyer, we can recognise three types of motives that we mentioned previously (identity motives, ideological motives and instrumental motives).
Firstly, religious radical movements provide an identity and a purpose for living (identity and ideological motives). The clear distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the associated demonisation of ‘them’ and the superiority of ‘us’ can impart a feeling of pride and self-worth. This forms a clear division of the world into good and evil, which is pleasant for some people, and can give meaning to the current world situation. According to various researchers, including Appleby and Juergensmeyer (but also Heitmeyer et al. 1997, Spohn 2007, Slootman and Tillie 2006 and Stern 2003), there is an ever greater need for a clear, unambiguous description of reality. Recent processes of modernisation, secularisation and globalisation create an increase in uncertainty, (perceived) inequality and uprootedness. This means that people are looking for extra stability, would like to belong to a group and are looking for new forms of authority and control. And it is no wonder that this takes a religious form. Religion provides a structure for many people’s everyday lives throughout the entire world. In many cases, it provides clear codes and an identity which people can be proud of. It is familiar and provides stability. And fundamentalist forms of religion, which often form the basis of radical religious movements, provide even further clarity and stability, and even more of a feeling of superiority, than regular forms of religion (see Buijs, Demant and Hamdy 2006 and Slootman and Tillie 2006). At the same time, radical movements in particular are also able to make good use of the achievements of the modern age. In many cases they emphasise individual moral autonomy and gratefully make use of technological facilities, such as those in the field of communication.

But religious radical movements also draw on the instrumental motive. They are fighting a situation that many people consider to be unjust. People who feel neglected and humiliated can feel particularly attracted to such a movement. Involvement in a religious radical movement can give people a feeling of empowerment; the feeling that they don’t need to resign themselves to a particular situation, but that they can actually change it. Many religious radical movements appeal to people because these movements stand up for the political interests of the individuals concerned. Such movements are often involved in a struggle against a form of occupation or oppression that is perceived as unjust by the entire community. Furthermore, many religious movements provide social facilities such as education, healthcare and financial support; facilities which, in many countries, the government is failing to provide and which, when provided, produce a great deal of goodwill and solidarity. People are not only attracted to such a movement because of their own situation. They can also be moved by the situation of people with whom they identify. Religion’s transnational nature can also make people feel involved in the situations of religious ‘brothers and sisters’ in other countries.

**Evaluation: An additional motivating factor?**

The combination of identity, rules and religious content that provides a recipe for improving the situation means that radical religious manifestations can dovetail well with some people’s feelings of uncertainty and uprootedness; in some cases even better than non-religious manifestations. And in view of the fact that religious forms of radicalism can fit in so well with the wishes and opportunities that occur from processes of modernisation, secularisation and globalisation, expectations are that religious radicalism will not decrease, at least not for the time being.

Religious radical movements can fill the gap left behind by a government’s laxity or incapability, by providing the population with basic facilities, or can make a stand
against an occupying force in a nation. This can lead to widespread support and understanding from the population, but of course this does not have to be exclusively the role of religious organisations. Religion can also enable people to identify with the inferior situation of people in other countries, but this is not exclusive to religious movements either. Ethnic minority groups in particular can also often provide this mobilising factor, for example.

We believe there is yet another difference between religious and non-religious movements that is related to ideology; and this is the way in which the discourse of this religion is rooted in the community. Religious radical movements tie in with religious discourses that are deeply rooted in a religious community. This has two possible (conflicting) effects on mobilisation. On the one hand, it is possible that this will enable the religious philosophy to appeal to people more easily, as the terminology that the religious radicals use is known to many people; they have been brought up with it and they use the same religious language. And the reference to religious sources that are considered to be The Truth can also provide radical movements with a certain credibility and allow them to rise above any doubt.

However, it is also possible that the radical philosophy will appeal less easily to people who have grown up within the same religious tradition, precisely because they are well acquainted with the moderate interpretations. The fact that a religious discourse is deeply rooted in a community often means that it is the more moderate interpretations that have become strongly embedded in that community. In all religions, radical fundamentalists are only a minority group. People are often brought up with a pragmatic and more moderate interpretation of their religion, and the religious established order is also often somewhat more moderate. This can mean that people are more resilient and will not easily be convinced by a new (or renewed) interpretation of their faith.

### 4.3 Characteristics of the organisation

According to Appleby et al., the leadership of a fundamentalist movement has emerged as the factor which has the most influence on its success. The leadership must excel in its timing and with regard to finding (financial) sources. It must formulate its ideas in an attractive manner in terms of the religious tradition, propagate them in optimal doses and forge coalitions, etc. In addition to the leadership and the target group, Juergensmeyer also mentions the importance of social support, a support network. As described above, religious radical movements often make manifest the needs of a much wider community. And in some cases these movements even take care of the community in a practical way. Although in these cases people from the community often do not directly support the chosen strategy (especially not if it is a violent one), because of the care that they have received, they often at least show some sympathy for the radicals’ actions.

Appleby et al. also look specifically at the phase of decline, but unfortunately there is little information about this, as most movements that they have studied have not declined. They distinguish between three situations when describing the decline of religious radical movements. In non-democratic societies, (repressive) government policy is the main reason for the decline of religious radical movements. The oppression and associated demoralisation of movements in many of these societies has led to the decline of radical movements. Internal discord, regarding leadership for example, also contribute
towards the decline of a movement, as does economic improvement. Furthermore, public support often decreases when an organisation engages in terrorist activities. In democratically-structured societies, there is often an internal cause of decline: the growth of the movement. This is often linked with a strengthening of the hierarchy, which causes the distance between leaders and the other members to increase. There is also the risk that the boundaries separating the movement from the rest of society will become less clear, for example because the outside world adopts a less negative attitude in relation to the movement. This ‘institutionalisation’ can cause the movement’s attractiveness to decrease. In situations in which there is an ethnic conflict, economic improvements and political solutions seem to have a great deal of influence upon the decline of radical movements. On the basis of their analyses, Appelby et al. conclude that the factors of ‘government policy’ and ‘leadership of the movement’ have the most influence on processes of decline of religious radical movements.

Evaluation: Difference in organisation?

Religious radical movements have not been found to differ from other radical movements as far as their organisation is concerned. They must satisfy comparable organisational conditions if they are to survive. We recognise the argument of Appleby et al., that the organisation faces a risk whenever there is an increase in hierarchy. The attractiveness of the squatters’ movement decreased when people tried to appoint themselves as leaders and began to set rules (but this is partly related to the characteristically loose nature of the squatters’ movement). The important role that leaders have been granted within religious movements is not unique either. If we look at the case descriptions in the previous chapter, religious movements do not differ from other movements in this regard. Despite the fact that the leadership of religious groups is often able to derive its authority from religious arguments, it is evident that this does not mean that the leadership automatically also has authority. Charisma and organisational skills remain vital, even in religious movements.

4.4 Relationship with society and politics

Every movement has its own relationship with society. This is a product of the movement’s aims and strategies and the (political) opportunities available. Appleby et al. use examples from the movements they studied to describe the various relationships that these movements have with the outside world. The movements differ from each other in terms of how closed they are. Some movements are open and others cut themselves off completely from the rest of society and form a parallel society, an enclave. Radical movements also differ from each other in terms of their chosen strategy and means. Whilst one movement will try to negotiate, another movement will want to destroy the enemy and take over society using violence. The movements also differ in terms of their political goals. One will focus upon optimising its own separate enclave, whilst another will focus upon changing society as a whole. Ferrero explains that there is a difference between the pursuit of religious and non-religious goals (2007). He argues that religious radical movements grow more as a result of setbacks than of success, in contrast to non-religious movements. According to him, this is because fundamentalist movements are based upon the past, upon traditions, which contrasts with secular movements. As a re-
sult, they revert to the familiar, to aspects that provide certainty in uncertain times – in other words, in times of setbacks. Secular radical movements, on the other hand, enter new, unknown territory, which means they need success to confirm the correctness of their chosen path.

There are also major differences between the political systems in which the movements operate. These systems determine the movement’s political opportunities to a large extent, and it is therefore fairly significant whether the movement is operating in a democratic or a non-democratic system, or in a system with an ethnic-religious conflict. In the context of the political system, Appleby et al. also observe that the role played by religion within politics is greatly underestimated. Whilst religion forms a daily guide for the actions of millions of people throughout the world and for their personal and political decisions, secularists reject all arguments that are based upon religious convictions and holy books. According to the authors, the importance of religion is being denied and ‘reasoned away’ within elite circles, as it is not in keeping with the enlightenment school of thought, which postulates a continuous progress in the direction of scientific rationality and secularism.

**Evaluation: Relationship with secular politics**

The possible relationships that a religious radical movement can have with society, in terms of the extent of its segregation and the strategy it chooses, do not differ substantially from those of non-religious movements. However, religious radical movements differ fundamentally from non-religious movements in relation to their political goals and the formulation of these goals, and therefore also in the ways these goals are pursued. This is associated with the denial within secular politics of the role played by religion. An obvious difference with non-religious movements, which Appleby et al. mention but whose implications they fail to discuss in sufficient detail, is the fact that religious radical movements use religious discourse in order to formulate their political goals. This means that they have an inherently different relationship with politics in secular societies than non-religious radical movements. Because of the fact that religious arguments are regarded as irrational within secular politics and societal debates, they are not legitimate. As a result, the desirability of goals and moral views cannot be substantiated in religious terms in many secular societies, such as in the Netherlands. This division between politics and religion is a notion that typically connects with secular discourses. Juergensmeyer calls this strict division between religion and politics the ‘enlightenment scenario’.

However, a discussion in terms of a strict separation between politics and religion clashes by definition with the worldview held by religious fundamentalists, and therefore also with that of most religious radicals. They will not agree with a non-religious definition of their wishes. Their political goals, agendas and strategies cannot be viewed separately from the religious terms in which they are formulated. Furthermore, the enforced division of religion and politics is actually contested by many religious radicals; in their eyes this division is central to the ‘cosmic war’. This fundamentally different relationship with (secular) politics could mean that religious movements sometimes have to make different choices with regard to the strategies to be employed than non-religious movements; because, even though religious movements have the opportunity to formulate their requirements in non-religious terms, an equal and open discussion about the basic ideas of a movement and the associated arguments is often not an option.
According to Zemni (2007), the denial of religion within politics means that religious radical violence cannot be understood; for it is not possible to understand the violence in itself, as political violence is always legitimized in the discourse of those who pursue the violent means. Violence and political demands cannot be viewed separately from the philosophy of the radical movement, and can therefore only be understood if the philosophy is understood. The fact that within many secular societies there is little room for this consideration, is therefore a problem when combating religious radicalism.

Juergensmeyer, as well, argues that the enlightenment scenario provides insufficient opportunities to deal with religious radicalism. In his opinion, a possible solution is to deflect the radical message within its own religious discourse, using a more moderate, established form; but that can only happen under a number of conditions. Firstly the moderate version of the religious philosophy must be convincing and secondly the political opponents of the religious radicals must accept this (moderate) religious philosophy and not regard it as a threat. Secular governments are unable to control the first factor, but with respect to the second, they are largely in control. It is important not to act as the enemy of religious believers, but to be open to the role played by religion in a more moderate form. According to Juergensmeyer, support for more moderate leaders and for a more moderate interpretation of beliefs will cause the support for radicals to decrease. He therefore sees a policy based on these ideas as the most successful approach. According to him, the government takes out the wind of the radicals' sails most when it shows that it is ethical and upholds important moral values. This makes it difficult for the radicals to portray the government as the evil enemy. If on the other hand the government sets aside its own moral values in response to terrorism, it automatically confirms the religious radicals' greatest claim: that there is a lack of moral values in secular society.

We referred to all forms of radicalism that are defined in religious terms as 'religious radicalism'. This makes sense, as the discourse is religious in all of these cases. A distinction can be made however between the religious radical movements that focus their attacks on modern secularism (to make matters easier, in this report we refer to these as anti-secularist movements), and movements that have concrete political goals that are in keeping with modern secular society. This is in line with the distinction that Appleby et al. make between movements that enter politics on account of their religious goals ('pure fundamentalism') and movements that seek religious justification for ethnocentric nationalist political goals ('syncretic fundamentalism') (2003: 104-105).

The goal of anti-secularist movements differs fundamentally from that of radical movements that have concrete political goals. The anti-secularist goal is more abstract and can be regarded as less feasible, certainly in secular countries. This makes it likely that adherents of such movements will expect to wait longer before seeing these goals achieved and will have a longer time line, as well as being less willing to make concessions. It will be these movements in particular that will be driven by failure instead of success, like Ferrero suggested. It is more difficult for secular governments to enter into discussion with these movements and to possibly comply with their wishes. In these cases, it is therefore particularly important to deal with the breeding ground of such movements, and to prevent the causes and circumstances that can lead to radicalisation.

Anti-secularist radicalism is therefore fundamentally different to other forms of radicalism as the anti-secularist political goals are abstract and by definition are not in keeping with modern secular society, and therefore probably require a different approach. However, it is important to note here that we doubt whether the distinction be-
tween anti-secularist movements and movements with concrete goals is absolute. The
distinction is rather theoretical, and in practice it is difficult to divide movements into
‘essentially religiously inspired’ and ‘essentially ethnically/nationalistically/politically in-
spired’. This could be because the cases in which modern secularism is regarded as a
point of conflict can nevertheless contain underlying factors and goals that could be dealt
with within modern secular society, as in cases where religious radicalism is a way of em-
powerment, is a response to frustration and humiliation or perhaps is a protest against neo-
colonialism. It is our opinion that in many cases the distinction is not absolute and anti-
secularist goals are combined with other political goals that could be subject to discus-
sion within a secular setting.

The separation of church and state also has other consequences for government
policies. For example, a repressive approach can easily lead to the impression that the
entire religion is being opposed, and not just the radical group. This means that a situa-
tion of repression of a radical religious group may differ from that of most radical non-
religious groups, because of the possibility that more people identify with the opposed
group – i.e. non-radical believers as well. However, a government policy of inclusion is
also complicated if it relates to groups that principally identify themselves as being reli-
gious. The separation of church and state means that the opportunities for implementing
policies of inclusion for religious groups are limited. Furthermore, the fear of religious
domination that is evident among some people within society can make attempts at in-
clusion even more complex. In addition, if religious radicals focus their criticism upon
the secular state and their aim is to establish a religious state in the long term, it is diffi-
cult to comply with the demands they make, and then a course of reform does not seem
an realistic option. It is also more difficult for the government to meet less radical de-
mands when these demands are formulated in religious terms.

4.5 Conclusions

To summarise, we can draw the following conclusions from the analysis:
• Religion can make conflicts more intense. This is not because religion automatically
incites conflicts, but because religious differences can increase the schism between
two parties. In this regard, the effect of religion is comparable with other aspects of
identity, such as differences in ethnic or national identity. However, the fear of reli-
gious domination by the other party can also cause the gap to increase further.
• Religious radical movements seem to align more easily with the wishes of some peo-
ple in modern society than non-religious radical movements.
• The fact that religious radical movements connect with religious discourses that are
deeply rooted in a culture can have two opposite effects:
  o It may make it easier for the movement to appeal to people as they are
    familiar with the discourse.
  o It may make it more difficult for the movement to appeal to people as
    they have been brought up with a moderate interpretation of beliefs and
    also because there is a moderate established religious order.
• The organisational aspects and the role of the leadership of religious radical move-
ments are comparable with non-religious radical movements.
• In secular societies, the religious substantiation of political desires is generally not regarded as legitimate, and is not understood. Adherence to a rigid separation of politics and religion can fuel religious radical ideas. A possible solution is to deflect the radical message within its own religious discourse, using a more moderate, established form. To this end it is necessary that:
  o the moderate ideology is convincing,
  o this moderate religious ideology is not viewed as a threat within the established order,
  o there is therefore more room created for religion,
  o the established order comes across as having a high level of integrity, and upholds its own moral values.

• Abstract, anti-secularist goals cannot be achieved within the existing secular political systems. This does not change the fact that, in addition to abstract, anti-secularist goals, these movements may have supplementary objectives which could indeed be addressed within the established order.

Repression, inclusion and reform of a religious radical group involves risks that are different to those that arise when dealing with a non-religious radical group.

The aspects in which religious radical movements are unique can be described in terms of the theoretical framework (see table below). In this chapter we have not examined possible barriers. For further information on this subject, we refer to the discussion of literature on religious sects in Chapter 2.

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**Table 4.1: Extent to which the religious nature of religious radical movements makes them unique**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Extent of difference</th>
<th>Unique to religious movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>In the case of a conflict along religious dividing lines, the religious difference between friend and foe can intensify the conflict. However, this practice of seeing ‘us’ and ‘them’ as an absolute division is not unique to religious movements, although the fear of cultural and religious domination is greater when there are religious differences. Religious discourses seem to better meet people’s desire for stability and meaning than non-religious discourses. An ideology that has been formulated in religious terms is not considered to be legitimate within the secular political and public domain, and on the other hand many religious radicals are not susceptible to secular arguments. This is a substantial difference with respect to ideas formulated in non-religious terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy (the route which is outlined)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Because of the fact that, within secular societies, the ideologies formulated in religious terms are considered illegitimate, the strategic possibilities also differ from ideologies formulated in non-religious terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>The role of organisation in religious radical movements,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>Extent of difference</td>
<td>Unique to religious movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>The role of leaders in religious radical movements, does not differ fundamentally from that observed in other movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs of the members</td>
<td>Cohort effect</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power of attraction to new generations</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External factors</td>
<td>(Inter)national or local conflict</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government: repression</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government: inclusion</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government: reform</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public opinion/media/Zeitgeist</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competing interpretation</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands

Islamic forms of radicalism are a relatively new phenomenon in the Netherlands, and the fact that Islamic radicalism is not just a phenomenon occurring in the Netherlands but is also a Dutch phenomenon is emphasised by the existence of the radical Islamic Hofstad Network [Hofstadgroep] and the murder of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed B. in 2004. In the same way that we described the other cases in the Netherlands in previous chapters, we describe the case of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands, which we do in section 5.1.

As this form of radicalism is still on the rise in the Netherlands, it is difficult to comment on decline on the basis of this case description. We can only observe some cautious decline of the extremist faction of this movement. In order to make assessments about factors that might possibly play a role in the decline of Islamic radicalism, we compare the Islamic case with the three other cases. We discuss the differences and the parallels between the cases (section 5.2) and draw conclusions from this relating to Islamic forms of radicalism (section 5.3).

5.1 Description of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands

5.1.a The radical ideology/ideologies

The ideas held by Islamic radicals in the Netherlands are mainly based upon Salafism, a ‘pure form of Islam’ which takes the life of the first generations after the prophet as an example (Buijs, Demant and Hamdy 2006). Within Salafism, the customs of the prophet and his followers form the guiding principle for a good life, as recorded in the Koran and the hadith (Islamic traditions). Salafism incorporates various different streams. Apolitical Salafists have a firm religious orientation and keep themselves detached from politics. They adhere to the Wahhabist established order in Saudi Arabia and are strongly opposed to everything relating to human politics. The political Salafists’ movement is reasonably widespread in the Netherlands, for example in mosques such as El-Tawheed in Amsterdam and As-Soennah in The Hague. Political Salafists differ from the apolitical Salafists by means of their engagement in politics and society, and they are also more critical with regard to religious leaders. They seek to form an Islamic state, because a state that has been organised according to human laws and not according to God’s laws is a form of idolatry and forms a threat to the faith. Their critical attitude in relation to the established order places them under pressure in many Islamic countries and sometimes they are even imprisoned or tortured. In addition to dawa (proclamation), they try to use the opportunities and possibilities within the political and social system in order to change society. They reject violence, but it is difficult to assess the extent to which strategic motives play a part in this. The Jihadi Salafists’ movement differs from the previous movements. Their ideology is most strongly based upon the ideologies of the thinkers Qutb and Mawdudi. In their eyes, an Islamic state is the only way of saving the Islamic world and all means are permitted in order to achieve this. It is not just ‘non-believers’ who are the enemy, but also many regimes in Islamic countries must be opposed because they do not govern according to the laws of Allah (sharia) and do not stand up for the interests of Muslims as best they can. They regard it as every Muslim’s job to dedicate him or herself to these tasks.
Islamic radical ideas are characterised by the following views (Buijs et al. 2006 and Slootman and Tillie 2006: 19). (1) Islam is under fire and under threat. (2) Civil leaders have contributed to this marginalisation and must not therefore be trusted; resistance to them is justified. (3) Religious leaders resign to this situation and therefore betray the faith. (4) The foundations of the faith must be repaired by returning to the true religious standards and values and by interpreting the Koran literally. (5) Their own religion is superior and should form the basis for society and must be the guiding principle for politics. (6) The true believer must play an active role in bringing about this society, something that is regarded as an urgent matter. The following convictions are characteristic of Islamic extremism: (7) Achieving the ideal, divine society is the highest goal (utopianism). (8) The pursuit of this is an obligation for every believer, which justifies all means, including violence. (9) Dualities are made absolute and the enemy is demonised, because the activists regard themselves as fighters of good who combat evil.

It is clear that these Salafist ideologies not only have religious components, but have political components as well. Because they propagate distance from established society, which in their eyes is (highly) illegitimate, these movements can be labelled as radical. Obviously, violent extremist actions form the greatest threat to society, but non-violent strategies as well can be seen as a threat. The legitimacy of the system is a requirement for democracy to function properly. Although not all citizens have to actively propagate all democratic standards (such as diversity, tolerance and the willingness to compromise), a large proportion of the population must at least passively support a large part of these values (Slootman and Tillie 2006: 17). This support becomes less and less the case when a growing group of people radicalise even further.

It can be concluded from the description of democracy and of Islamic radicalism that certain forms of radicalism can be regarded as a threat to democracy. The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) are indeed worried about the intolerant and ‘anti-integrative’ nature of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, Islamic radicals employ various tactics on a small scale in the Netherlands, which run counter to society’s open and democratic nature and contribute towards polarisation and hostility. These tactics try to make people (particularly Muslims who have a less strict interpretation of their faith) conform to strict radical standards of behaviour and to force them to distance themselves from Dutch society in general and Dutch politics in particular, by means of pressure and intimidation.

These actions do not conflict with the letter of democracy, which raises the question of whether the government may take action against these developments. The cabinet (supported by a large majority in the Lower House of Parliament) takes the view that this is indeed the government’s obligation; they argue that these developments form a danger to Dutch society, as they do conflict with the spirit of democracy.

5.1.b Rise and development of Islamic radical movements

Internationally, various factors have played a role in encouraging the rise of a supranational Islamic radical movement (Buijs, Demant and Hamdy 2006). A few decades ago, Islamic radicalism made headway in many Arabic and Islamic countries because it was supported by the ruling regimes. They saw Islamic radicalism as a buffer against the communists. During the 1980s, the influence of communism declined and Islamic radi-
Islamic consciousness gained a major boost throughout the world when the radical Islamic militants in Afghanistan triumphed over the Russian occupiers, which was partly thanks to the substantial financial support from Saudi Arabia and the United States.

At the time, this radicalism hardly penetrated through to the Netherlands however. Dutch Islamic migrants were mainly oriented towards their countries of origin in terms of organisation and politics. They were mainly concerned with the issue of how they should behave as Muslims in a non-Islamic country and how they should organise themselves. However the Islamic organisations did not succeed in achieving full political participation, for reasons such as inadequate organisational capacity. The General Intelligence and Security Service places the ‘first phase’ of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands in this period (2007b). This radicalism did not focus on Dutch society and was characterised by an orientation towards the home countries of the migrants, foreign clerics and foreign conflicts, and mainly found resonance among a number of migrants from the first generation. It was supported by the influence and financing of Saudi organisations, which were also involved in the establishment of some Salafist mosques such as El-Tawheed in Amsterdam and the Al-Fourkaan mosque in Eindhoven, the As-Soennnah in The Hague and the Islamic Foundation for Education and Transfer of Knowledge in Tilburg.

At the start of the nineties, Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands was beginning to gain in significance. Differences between immigrants and native Dutch citizens (‘allochtonen’ and ‘autochtonen’) were being defined more and more in religious terms, instead of ethnic terms. An ever increasing number of people responded to the religious movement from Saudi Arabia as a result of this trend of ‘de-ethnicising’. This was partly due to the fact that this movement is a form of Islam that presents itself as ‘pure’, without ethnic influences. But also the cultural repertoire of this movement offered opportunities to articulate the problems in the West and to give them a place. And furthermore, the conservative perspective connected with the preference for isolation of some Muslims. Often, the combatants who had finished fighting in Afghanistan, as well as the fighters from Chechnia and Bosnia, could not return to their country of birth because of their radical orientation, and they came to the Netherlands as asylum seekers or illegal immigrants, giving rise to transnational networks. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, the first recruitment activities took place in the Salafist mosques, around the year 2000. Some youngsters were attracted by the heroic past of the fighters who had arrived, particularly if they also had religious knowledge. The emphasis on a supranational community of faith, the rejection of the national cultures of the countries of origin, and the refusal to integrate in the country of origin appealed particularly to young people who felt alienated by both the culture of their parents’ country and by Dutch society.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States had a great influence on Islamic radicalism, and the General Intelligence and Security Service sees this moment as the beginning of the second phase, in which Islamic radicalism appealed to more and more second generation young migrants. The attacks had a major influence, but did not achieve the aspired objectives. In contrast to the hopes of Bin Laden, the Americans did not withdraw from the Arabian peninsula and not all Muslims throughout the world suddenly became supporters of Islamic radicalism. Most Muslims condemned the terrorist attacks and, according to Buijs, Demant and Hamdy, this caused the conflict to shift
to the ideological arena and reinforced the position of the non-violent, non-Jihadi radicals. They describe a crystallisation of the various different factions within the Islamic activist movement. The radical factions of the Jihadists and the political Salafists in particular (the General Intelligence and Security Service refer to the latter as the ‘radical dawa’) distinguished themselves from each other more and more. The General Intelligence and Security Service notices that a trend towards self-governing is taking place. The foreign support is being combated and is falling away, and what is left behind is a fragmented, disorganised landscape of various autonomous groups, and networks that consist of young people, and a few Salafist mosques with strong ‘attractiveness’ quotients. These radicals focus more on the Netherlands, where in their eyes Islam is being threatened. They resist integration and advocate what the General Intelligence and Security Service refers to as ‘intolerant isolationism’. Islamic radicalism has therefore developed from an outside threat to a home-grown phenomenon (Buijs et al. 2006, Slootman and Tillie 2006, General Intelligence and Security Service 2007a).

5.1.c The current landscape

Radicalisation in the Netherlands mainly occurs among young people. Those in the 16-25 age group in particular form part of the local networks in the Netherlands (General Intelligence and Security Service 2006: 39). Buijs et al. (2006) and Slootman and Tillie (2006) provide insight into radicalisation processes. The process of radicalisation among young Muslims always begins with an individual quest, but in most cases it seems to further develop in interaction with other people, whether this be via regular contacts or via the Internet. Radical ideologies meet a need for clarity and a meaningful purpose in life, a need for social ties and acceptance and a need for justice. Young people – more so than older people – focus on Dutch society and are looking for a ‘pure’ form of Islam, causing them to reject the Islam of their parents, which is rooted in the culture of their countries of origin (see also the study by De Koning (2008) into the formation of identity among young Moroccans). There is a strong feeling that two different yardsticks are in use in Dutch society, and many young Muslims do not feel accepted as they are. They have the feeling that they are continuously being called to account as Muslims and are never fully accepted (by the way, this is by no means just the case for radical young Muslims). The radical groups that exist have very explicit ideas but do not form sects in the sense that there is no interaction with people with different views. The groups typically have fierce discussions, and these often take place on-line between young people from various Salafist factions.

In their report, Slootman and Tillie describe a group of Jihadi-Salafi youngsters in Amsterdam among whom fieldwork has been carried out. There is a clear distinction between the leading figures, who have a solid ideological basis and come across convincingly, and the followers, who seem to be highly impressionable and who do not seem to be as deeply affected by the ideological thinking. These young people meet each other almost exclusively in the mosques, and not at each other’s homes. The only friends they have are those who share their ideological beliefs. They do not have friendly ties with people who have different views. Originally, their parents appreciated their increasing religiosity, but now their parents find that it goes too far and do not support it. The youngsters look down on their parents’ religious interpretation. Books and the Internet play a major role in shaping the views of these youngsters. There are not many lectures
for them to attend, because their movement is so radical. It is not likely that the young-
sters are in contact with foreign recruiters. In the mosques they are viewed with suspi-
cion, and at a number of mosques they have already been thrown out and are not al-
lowed to return.

More and more of a ‘jihadi subculture’ is arising among young people. This is a
protest culture among youngsters who aim to provoke others and want to shape their
social identity within Dutch society by means of outward appearances and extreme tenets
(General Intelligence and Security Service 2007b). For most of these youngsters, this is
not linked to an orthodox lifestyle, nor are they in contact with extremists. The General
Intelligence and Security Service therefore emphasises the importance of distinguishing
between the subcultural aspects and those who indeed adhere to and preach the violent
Jihad. The Jihadi subculture, however, does connect with a wider development within
Islam in the Netherlands, in which the emphasis is increasingly being placed on a conser-
vative and fundamentalist interpretation. This is partly due to the fact that young people
are gaining more influence in Moroccan mosques and because they, more so than their
parents, advocate an orthodox interpretation of Islam.

Nature of the movement

Although in this report we talk about ‘the radical Islamic movement’, in practice there is
no cohesive movement. Islamic radicalism, particularly Jihadism, has a predominantly
diffuse, interactive and spontaneous nature, and this does not just apply to the Dutch
landscape. In their discussions of the international Al-Qaida network, Cronin (2006) and
De Graaff (2007) describe how intangible such a diffuse network is. Cronin states that
Al-Qaida differs from traditional (terrorist) organisations with regard to four aspects.
Firstly, she mentions Al-Qaida’s fluid nature. There is no cohesive international organisa-
tion, but an increasingly diffuse network of separate (ad hoc) cells and groups that all
adhere to the world view that Al-Qaida stands for. De Graaff refers to this as a ‘scale-
free network’, or a relatively informal social network with a limited hierarchy and a high
level of decentralisation. There is strong mutual interaction between the cells, but their
mutual knowledge is limited. Secondly, not all people are actively recruited and are mem-
bers of an organisation, but it is more as though they are affiliated with a social move-
ment. Additionally, this diffuse form brings with it a specific financing structure. Large
sums to keep an international organisation afloat are not required, but the local autono-
mous cells are all responsible for their own incomes and use the ‘Al-Qaida brand’ in a
kind of franchise manner. Finally, methods of communication are different. The Internet
plays a crucial role in shaping and maintaining Al-Qaida’s image and reputation. The con-
tinued existence of the movement strongly depends upon the Internet, which plays an
important role in attracting and educating new people and circulating internal and exter-
nal messages. It has already been stated in Chapter 2 that a diffuse network nature such
as this makes an organisation difficult to combat.

The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the General Intelligence and
Security Service describe the network in the Netherlands as having a similar nature.
There is a loose structure of groups, which is partly virtual, and takes the form of net-
works more than that of hierarchical relationships. It is true that ‘there are also somewhat
more structured organisations (parties) which propagate these ideas, but it is not true that
those who adopt (some of) those ideas also belong to these organisations. The influence
of these organisations however, can be significant: they ensure the continuous presence of material on the Internet, in the media, etc.’ (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2005). According to the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, these organisational characteristics of the radical Islamic ‘movement’ are similar to the current forms of the extreme rightist movement and animal rights activism. The description of (jihadist) networks by the General Intelligence and Security Service shows a similar picture (2006: 13): these networks are characterised by a lack of formal (hierarchical) structure and by informal and flexible membership and fluctuating leadership. The structure consists of individuals linked by communication in the context of achieving a common goal.

There is therefore no cohesive movement within the radical Islamic landscape in the Netherlands, but it mainly consists of diffuse local networks with a predominantly autonomous nature. We use the term ‘movement’ to make matters easier, and by this we refer to the entire landscape: all Salafists structures of the political Salafists and the Jihadists movements, including mainly autonomous groups and networks, but also some individuals. Because Islamic radicalism – in the worldwide context as well – is characterized by an increasingly diffuse, interactive and spontaneous nature, the fight against Islamic terrorism is uncertain and unpredictable at all levels.

Influence of the international arena

Despite the fact that the radical networks in the Netherlands are not controlled from outside the Netherlands, the international arena plays an important role, namely as an ideological source of inspiration. Conflicts such as those in Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Afghanistan provide a framework in which the relationship between the Muslims and the West can be phrased in an appealing way, i.e. as one in which Muslims are victims of the Western enemy. Incidents such as the ‘Cartoon affair’ in Denmark, Israel’s attack on Lebanon and the Pope’s negative remarks about Islam evoke outrage, and for many Muslims this acts as confirmation that the West is targeting Islam. The greatest role that the General Intelligence and Security Service therefore attributes to Al-Qaida is that of a symbol and source of inspiration (2006). A major part of the Al-Qaida network has been severely weakened by the War on Terror. Local autonomous networks join the network in name only, purely for propagandist or opportunist motives. ‘This has enabled Al-Qaida to become the operating name and ideology of this international movement, which is constantly growing. It consists of countless groups, networks, cells and individuals that often founded themselves at local and national level, and that attempt to shape the violent Jihad in their own way, mostly without direction or support from the outside’ (2006: 21). The General Intelligence and Security Service has determined that the threat of violence in Europe has decreased due to the pressure that the authorities exert on the networks. On the other hand, incidents in the international arena such as the war in Iraq keep forming new sources of inspiration. Every now and then foreign recruiters recruit young people in the Netherlands for the struggle abroad, but this type of activity has declined, partially due to a stricter control by the Dutch government and the fact that

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10 In addition, in Europe there seems to be an increasing number of transnational networks that operate in various (European) countries and prepare attacks in one or more countries. This sometimes involves instruction from a country outside of Europe (Threat of Terrorism in the Netherlands progress reports, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism).
recruitment for the Jihad has been made legally punishable, and by the closing of training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Recent trend towards professionalisation

In recent years, the Salafist sphere of influence in the Netherlands has increased considerably (General Intelligence and Security Service 2007b). According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, in response to the disorganised nature of the Salafist landscape the political Salafists’ mission is increasingly being shaped in a professional, active and organised manner. The General Intelligence and Security Service sees this phase, which began in 2005, as the third phase of Islamic radicalism. This implies that since 2005, a trend towards professionalisation has been taking place in the Netherlands: more powerful control is being exerted by Salafist preachers and mosques. An increasing number of mosques and Islamic institutes are coming under the influence of the well-known Salafist centres. The ideology is highly politicised and is mainly focussed upon the situation in the Netherlands. This group of political Salafists, is however separate from the violent Jihad. The General Intelligence and Security Service writes that violence is renounced by the political Salafists, mainly for strategic motives. In addition, the ‘forms’ of the first and second phase (in which Islamic radicalism has an internationally orientated or diffuse character, respectively) have not disappeared completely, and the various types of radicalism exist alongside each other.

The political Salafists use this trend of professionalisation in order to bring about a widespread movement and a firm group of supporters. This is important if they are to stay ahead of the counter-movements. An increasing number of separate groups are arising within the Islamic communities that are able to provide an alternative. For example, there are non-radical Islamic activists, secular movements, organisations consisting of lapsed Muslims and non-activist orthodox groups. The leaders of the political Salafists are increasingly appointing themselves as spokespersons of the Islamic communities and claim, wrongly, that they represent the majority.

According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, this strategy adopted by the political Salafists is showing success. The preachers are becoming more and more successful in connecting with the experiences of young people in the Netherlands. There are an increasing number of preachers and lectures being given at an increasing number of locations in the country. From the four leading Salafist mosques lectures are being organised in around thirty other (Moroccan) mosques in the Netherlands – this is twice the number compared to 2005. The audience at these lectures often consists of around a hundred young people. When the General Intelligence and Security Service report was published in October 2005, there were around fifteen experienced preachers and ten preachers ‘in training’. There is also an active recruitment system. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, active recruitment is taking place among young people, especially among the more highly educated, for whom a more leading role is said to have been granted. The preachers appeal strongly to feelings of subordination and a search for identity. They are clearly able to capitalise on the motives for radicalisation as defined by Buijs, Demant and Hamdy (2006), and by Slootman and Tillie (2006): a need for clarity and a sense of an ideological purpose in life, a need for justice and a need for social ties and recognition.
Distrust of this Salafist movement is expressed in the General Intelligence and Security Service reports (2007a and 2007b). The General Intelligence and Security Service observes a major difference between ‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ ideologies. It writes that the well-known Salafist centres often avoid radical statements because they are aware that the political system and the media follow them closely, but that this is often just a front. Ideologically they have not distanced themselves from the radical teachings, and in closed circles these teachings are still being preached. The General Intelligence and Security Service also writes that various tactics are being considered by these Salafists, but it remains unclear by whom and on what scale this is the case. These tactics are thought to include influencing of social organisations by means of a ‘secret entry policy’, disrupting the harmony of society by spreading false rumours and conspiracy theories, introducing an own legal system, and influencing and intimidating political office holders.

5.1.d Slight decline of Islamic extremism and current approach

Despite the growth of the organised political Salafists, the General Intelligence and Security Service states that the power of the Jihadis is decreasing, which is causing the immediate threat in the Netherlands to decrease. According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, this is partly due to the government’s approach to terrorism suspects and partly due to internal developments within the movement (2007a).

Since 2004, national and local government policy has on the one hand focussed upon prevention (by increasing the resilience to radicalisation), and on the other hand upon non-judicial, governmental repression via governmental measures, such as in the fiscal field or in relation to immigration law, or in relation to subsidy provisions (General Intelligence and Security Service 2007b). There are various interventions that focus upon combating radicalisation, such as developing an attractive supply of alternative ideologies in collaboration with moderate forces, promoting knowledge about democracy, and hindering the spread of radical ideologies, all of which aim to increase resilience (Willemse 2007: 32). In recent years, various initiatives have been developed throughout the Netherlands in order to combat radicalisation. For example, at the end of 2006 the municipality of Amsterdam presented a detailed action plan against radicalisation. This partly focuses upon eliminating the breeding ground for radical thought by increasing social cohesion and resilience to radicalisation among Muslims, and partly upon increasing the visibility of Islam’s internal diversity. The municipality is working closely with Muslim communities, including imams and mosques.

Strategies have also been developed that focus upon contact with radical groups (Meines, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2007). It is important here that individuals and groups who are undergoing radicalisation are quickly identified. Specific policy has also been developed in relation to ‘centres of radicalisation’. The Dutch authorities keep a close eye on imams and other key figures and their social responsibility is emphasised. People advocating intolerance and sowing hatred are prosecuted or deported.

According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, important steps were taken in the Netherlands in 2006 in the fight against Jihadi terrorism, which ‘have had a significant disruptive effect upon the known networks and cells’ (2007a: 33). Criminal prosecutions and deportation of suspects from the Netherlands were two of these steps. One of the judgements in the trial against the Hofstad Network was that this group was
regarded as a terrorist organisation. (However, in January 2008 the court of appeal ruled otherwise.) Various suspects have been convicted, some for murder or possession of weapons, but also for the fact that they were preparing for a terrorist attack. Others have been charged with the crimes of ‘recruiting for armed conflict, membership of a terrorist organisation, forging travel documents and incitement or spreading incitement’ (General Intelligence and Security Service 2007a: 28).

‘Criminal prosecution has led to the imprisonment of central figures from a number of networks, some of them for a long period of time. Others have, upon their release, been declared undesirable foreigners and were deported to their country of origin. This does not just apply to suspects from the Hofstad trial; some important figures from other networks have also been removed from the Netherlands over the past year. Furthermore, these deportations seem to have an effect upon the other members of the networks.’ (General Intelligence and Security Service 2007a: 33)

It is striking that the General Intelligence and Security Service does not mention controversial operations such as intrusive interventions and obtrusive surveillance in its reports. The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism does mention these however:

‘In the case of personalized hindrance, this relates to the monitoring of an individual – based upon what is legally permitted – who poses a ready threat of participating in such activities, in such a way as to make it clear to his or her environment that he or she is a subject of government action. This will make that the individual can no longer actually play a role in terrorism-related issues. And it will prevent this individual from getting involved in terrorist activities. (…) The following actions may be included: home visit (by local police officer); asking individuals to come to the police station; contact with family; contact with work/school; getting in touch with contacts from the subject’s environment; visiting the individual’s meeting places (call shops, cafés, etc.); distributing ‘Report Crime Anonymously’ cards in the subject’s neighbourhood; an extensive standard check or (non-systematic) surveillance.’ (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2006: 59)

Professor Brouwer, expert in General Law, expresses sharp criticism of interventions that are focussed upon personalized obtrusive monitoring. According to him, they lack a legal foundation and can lead to arbitrariness and adverse effects. The fieldwork that was carried out for Slootman and Tillie’s study among a group of young Jihadis in Amsterdam also revealed that there are adverse effects to the close monitoring of radicals. Although one of the respondents indeed distanced himself from the group due to this pressure, the increasing isolation and pressure from the intelligence services made the other youngsters pull closer together.

In addition to government interventions, there are also internal factors, because of which currently no powerful Jihadi organisation in the Netherlands exists that would be able to put its ideas into action. The General Intelligence and Security Service notices a lack of cohesion and power due to a shortage of leaders and internal discord (2007a).
5.1.e The Islamic case and the collective framework

We now provide a summary with regard to the case of Islamic radicalism, based on the factors from the analytical framework (see table below). This does not relate specifically to decline, but to the role that the factors have played in the developments of Islamic radicalism so far.

Table 5.1: The role of collective factors in the developments of Islamic radicalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Role in the developments of Islamic radicalism in NL so far</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
<td>The orthodox Salafist ideology is powerful because it ties in with the feeling of not being a part of the culture of one’s parents, nor of Dutch society. This makes it appealing to young people in particular. It provides a world view that translates the current situation in an appealing manner, by clearly dividing the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the strategy (the route which is outlined)</td>
<td>The growing movement of political Salafists renounce violence, but this could be a strategic decision. The fact that the Jihadis have not gained in attractiveness seems to be partly caused by the fact that terrorist actions have not lead to the expected success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the organisation and leadership</td>
<td>There are no powerful leaders; there is more of an informal, unorganised, diffuse landscape. The movement is flexible, which means that it is difficult to combat, but at the same time it has little power. Currently, the influence of political Salafist mosques and preachers in the Netherlands, who wish to counterbalance upcoming alternative ideologies and who wish to create a widespread movement and a widespread group of supporters, is increasing. The fact that there were no substantial Islamic/Moroccan organisations appears to have created room for an orthodox youth movement. The organisational influence from abroad has decreased considerably in recent years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs of the members</td>
<td>On average, the active members in the Netherlands are very young (teenagers and those in their early twenties), but because the phenomenon is still relatively recent, it is difficult to say whether/how/when people are outgrowing the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power of attraction on new generations</td>
<td>Up to now, Islamic radicalism has been undergoing a phase of growth and has been able to attract new recruits. In view of the fact that political Salafist preachers are able to capitalise on young people’s experiences more and more effectively, it is likely that this trend will continue for the time being.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

External factors

| Role of (inter)national or local conflicts/developments | The international arena played a major role in the rise of Islamic radicalism. The Salafist movement was introduced from Arabic countries. Radical Islamic self-confidence increased due to military |
Factors | Role in the developments of Islamic radicalism in NL so far
---|---
successes in Afghanistan (with financial support from the United States and Saudi Arabia). In the Netherlands, former fighters who had taken refuge there served as an example. International conflicts form an ideological source of inspiration (incl. Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel).

Role of government: repression | According to the General Intelligence and Security Service, the government’s repressive role, i.e. legal actions and deportations, has been successful and caused the direct threat to decrease. At the same time, the way in which this is carried out can lead to adverse effects.

Role of government: inclusion | A lack of inclusion, acceptance and institutionalisation paved the way to radicalisation. Currently, the government is cautiously approaching people who are members of groups with a Salafist nature, with a view to combating radicalism.

Role of government: reform | Little can be mentioned here, apart from the fact that the cautious approach to Salafists can be seen as a type of reform.

Role of public opinion/the media/Zeitgeist (image) | There is a widely shared perception among Muslims that Dutch society does not accept them as fully-fledged Dutch citizens and that two different yardsticks are in use. This creates the need for an identity that does provide respect and a feeling of belonging, such as the radical Muslim identity (therefore also the Jihadi subculture).

Muslims: Many Muslims do not back radicalism and prefer to have a good relationship with Dutch society. But a religious, orthodox lifestyle yields a great deal of respect and credibility. There is a large gap between many parents and their children, which means that parents have little influence on them. Because young people no longer feel attracted by their parents’ country and culture, they are seeking a supranational identity, such as the one offered by radical Islam.

Role of competing interpretations | An increasing number of competing ideologies are developing which could form a threat to Salafism. That gave political Salafism the incentive to organise itself better. It remains difficult for alternative ideologies to manifest themselves, as the radical ideas are attractive and are being highly sponsored/strongly encouraged.

5.2 Comparison with other cases

Now that we have described Islamic radicalism, we can look at the parallels with the other three cases and what we can learn from these. On the basis of this, we make assessments in the following section as to what we can expect with regard to the decline of Islamic forms of radicalism. Because the case of the Moluccans shows the greatest similarities, we deal with this comparison as the last point in this section.
Comparison with the squatters’ movement in Amsterdam

The radical Muslims do not have a great deal in common with the radical squatters. The movements have a completely different nature and both movements also differ widely as far as their social background and the type of social protest are concerned. Whereas the squatters’ movement made a stand for solutions to concrete problems such as unoccupied buildings and the housing shortage, the abstract aim of radical Muslims is to establish a pure Islamic state and to reject non-Islamic standards and values. This means that there are fewer direct opportunities for influencing radicalism by adopting a (reform-based) approach to the problems raised than there were in the case of the squatters’ movement.

The decline of the squatters’ movement was the result of a change in atmosphere within the movement, more than a result of reforms on the housing market. The movement grew and that led to power games and attempts at institutionalisation. This, along with the increasingly grim atmosphere within the movement, caused the squatters’ movement to become less and less attractive. This is hardly the case in radical Islam. The radical Islamic movement is mainly diffuse and unorganised, even though the General Intelligence and Security Service has observed trends towards professionalisation and institutionalisation in recent times. We expect institutionalisation to have a different effect within Islam than among the squatters, because the squatters’ movement originally had an anarchist nature which meant that people were fairly opposed to power structures. It is likely that there is less resistance to forms of institutionalisation and more room for (charismatic) leaders among Islamic radicals than there was within the squatters’ movement.

The role played by violence in the two movements shows similarities. Because the squatters’ movement became more and more violent, this caused the goodwill of some of the supporters and the general population, which had previously been sympathetic towards the squatters’ movement, to disappear. We believe that radical Islamic violence also causes general support for a radical approach to decrease. Although many Muslims could sympathise with the attacks in New York in 2001, the attacks did not cause them to support a violent course of action and the attacks formed the initiative for an internal ideological discussion which caused the support for non-violent radicals to grow. The murder carried out by Mohammed B. on Dutch soil deterred many people in the Netherlands even more. This action in 2004 was condemned by Dutch Islamic communities more heavily than the attack of 2001, with a clearer stand being taken against a violent strategy and (far-reaching) radicalisation being rejected more explicitly.

The shift in atmosphere in the Netherlands and the disappearance of goodwill in relation to the squatters’ movement poisoned their image and meant that new recruits felt less attracted to the movement. Islamic radicalism has never had a positive image in society at large, and the social opposition to this does not have the effect that it did with the squatters’ movement. This is linked to the fact that Muslims form a minority group. Because the resistance to radicalism is projected onto all Muslims, they sometimes do not feel accepted by society and feel that they have been heaped together with radical Mus-
lims. As a result, it appears that social opposition encourages rather than discourages radicalism, in contrast to the case of the squatters’ movement.\footnote{We discuss how Islamic communities view Islamic radicalism themselves and the effects that this may have, when we deal with the case of the Moluccans.}

Although repression by the government plays a role in both cases, these are not comparable. In the case of the squatters’ movement, the repression mainly involves the fact that at a given moment, illegal actions of the squatters’ movement were dealt with in a violent manner. This resulted in a spiral of violence, with specific consequences. The repressive strategies that are mainly being employed with regard to radical Muslims are completely different. They are more comparable with the situation of the extreme rightist movement and come up for discussion later.

The squatters’ movement hardly contained any barriers to disengagement as squatters came into contact with other views, were able to leave the movement easily and were able to build up a life for themselves outside of the movement relatively easily. No social vacuum was awaiting them. Many squatters found it difficult to distance themselves from their ideals, which were interwoven with their lifestyle, when disengaging from the movement (a form of psychological dependency). The radical Muslim groups seem to be more closed, and as a result a social vacuum could prevent people from disengaging from the groups. The lifestyle of radical Muslims is also interwoven with their ideals, but in contrast to the squatters it is possible for them to reshape this within a non-radical (yet orthodox) orientation. Due to the isolation and the major sacrifices that thus were made when radicalising, the barrier to cognitive dissonance could well be significant (as in the case of the extreme right). In addition to the organisational role of leaders, we do not know much about their social influence. The Islamic radicals are relatively young – on average much younger than the squatters. Because of this, it could be that leading figures or recruiters have a great deal of power. We do not know a great deal about possible specific reprisals either, but in view of the fierce struggle between radical streams, which indicates little tolerance for other opinions, disengagement from a group is unlikely to be tolerated. But we doubt whether this takes the form of physical reprisals.

Marginalisation when disengaging from a radical group could also form a barrier. Compared to the squatters, many of the radicalised young Muslims find themselves in a relatively inferior position and have fewer opportunities to participate fully in society. (This makes them comparable with the young Moluccans at the time.) This is certainly the case whenever they hold on to orthodox beliefs as far as their outward appearance is concerned. All in all, it seems as though there are more barriers to disengagement in the case of Islamic radicalism than in the case of the squatters’ movement.

**Comparison with the extreme right**

It is difficult to compare the ideology and the organisation of Islamic radicalism with that of the extreme right, because in the case of the extreme right we focussed on political parties, and in the case of radical Islamic groups there is no focus on political parties. The social context does however show major similarities. In the case of the extreme right, society adopted a restrictive (repressive) attitude. This attitude was the main cause of the organisational and ideological weakness of the movement, which inhibited the rise of the extreme right and caused parties to decline again. In the case of the decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties, we can clearly see how this happened. The extreme right
held an isolated position and its ideas and claims were not taken seriously. Everything possible was done to make the extreme right come across as untrustworthy; for example, the parties were accused of being two-faced. This resembles the treatment that Islamic radicalism is currently being subjected to. The details of the members’ wishes are not being examined (this is perhaps also difficult due to the far-reaching and abstract nature of their objectives) and neither are their points of criticism, such as a moral decline in Western society and the use of double standards - despite the fact that non-radicals may also be able to identify with this criticism. Islamic radicals are often presented in the media as irrational dangerous idiots, and the radical Muslims who appear or preach in public, for example, are accused of being wolves in sheep’s clothing and, just like the members of the extreme right, of being two-faced.

It was made difficult for the extreme right-wing Centre parties to function. The statements of the extreme right were closely monitored and people from the extreme right were criminalised. This also has parallels with the treatment of Islamic radicals. Abrupt arrests and personalized monitoring have the same aim: to make it impossible for Islamic radicals to function, for example by means of criminalisation.

The lives of active members of extreme right-wing Centre parties were made difficult. They experienced social isolation and were dismissed from their jobs, expelled from organisations and besieged by the anti-fascist counter-movement. It is our impression that somewhat comparable isolation is awaiting radical Muslims, although it is difficult to assess whether this is caused by their views or by their orthodox appearance and behaviour (which are often considered as inappropriate in education or the work environment). We hear from various sides that Muslims are afraid of being associated with radicalism because they fear that this will have consequences for their career. As already mentioned, this indicates that there might be a barrier of cognitive dissonance for radical Muslims that is comparable to that found among the extreme right. There is however a clear difference between radical Muslims and the extreme right: in the case of the extreme right, we see that skilled and able people avoid associations with the movement because they have a great deal to lose. In the case of Islamic radicalism, we see however that more highly educated young people feel attracted to the movement. This could be because they feel that they have little to lose because they would not be able to become fully-fledged members of Dutch society anyhow.

A significant difference between Islamic radicalism and the extreme right is the role played by ideology. Whilst Islamic radicalism is formed around an ideology that is the subject of frequent reflection and discussion, an in-depth ideology plays a less central role among most members of the extreme right. We see that among members of the extreme right, disagreement about the objectives and the radical nature of the movement continuously leads to friction and divisions. And because this relates to political parties that wish to play a role in the political system, a front stage-back stage strategy is often employed, which undermines the power of the party. There is also disagreement among radical Muslims, and discussions take place between and within the various factions. Until now, this does not appear have such a destabilising and disuniting effect as among the extreme right. This may be due to the fact that we are not dealing with defined political parties, but with diffuse networks.

It is our impression that, as in the case of the extreme right, with regard to Islamic radicalism an underdog effect is involved. The repression of the extreme right partly leads to the fact that the extreme right sees its viewpoints being affirmed, i.e. that the
movement and its followers, consisting of the ‘common man’, are not being taken seriously by the established order. This provides the extreme right with a persuasive power. The same may happen in the case of Islamic radicalism. The radical viewpoint that the West has taken up a position as the enemy of Muslims and is without morals is perceived by radicals to be confirmed by the repressive, stigmatising atmosphere under which (orthodox) Muslims live and by the tough approach adopted towards terrorism suspects.

Comparison with the radical Moluccans from the 1970s

There are both differences and clear parallels between the radical Moluccan youth from the 1970s and the current Islamic radical youth. The greatest difference lies in the nature of the objective. In contrast to the Islamic radicals, the objective of the Moluccans, that of the RMS, was just like the initial aim of the squatters a concrete political aim that could have been achievable in the short term. This was interwoven with the problems that the soldiers of the KNIL had and with the transfer of the Moluccans to the Netherlands. This ideal was already present among the first generation of Moluccans, in contrast to the situation among Muslims, who did have a religious upbringing but this upbringing was not combined from the very beginning with political ideals. The young Moluccans were spoon-fed with the RMS ideal. The RMS ideal did however adopt a different form among the younger generation than it had among the older generation, as the young people, influenced by the *Zeitgeist*, had given it an ideological slant. A parallel between the two groups however is the interweaving of the ideal and the identity. Both among the Moluccans and among the young radical Muslims, the RMS ideal and the Salafist ideology are closely linked to their ethnic-religious identity, and with the core of the identity that positions these groups in the Netherlands.

The arrival situation of the two groups was comparable with regard to the temporary nature of the stay. In the cases of the Muslims and the Moluccans, both the migrants themselves and Dutch society assumed that the stay in the Netherlands would be temporary, and this characterised the relationship that they had with the Netherlands. The migrants continued to focus upon their country of origin and the Netherlands also discouraged the integration of these groups. This meant that the migrants came to have a subordinate position and the feeling arose that they were not being taken seriously. The young Moluccans had the feeling that the Dutch government was treating their parents very badly.

The young second-generation Moluccans radicalised in their struggle for the RMS. This was because the older Moluccans did not achieve many results using democratic means, but this was also mainly due to the fact that there was a lack of recognition of their goal. The fact that their RMS ideals were dismissed as dreams and illusions within the Netherlands in combination with the increasing understanding of how their parents were treated, only served to fan the flame. This renewed ideology branded the Netherlands as the enemy. This attitude was probably influenced by the fact that the young people in the Netherlands had little to lose. They had already been dealt a bad hand and there were regular confrontations between Dutch and Moluccan young people. This forms a clear parallel with the young Muslims in the Netherlands. They also feel as though they have been driven into a corner and are not being taken seriously. In their eyes, the Netherlands is using a double standard, and the Dutch Muslims are the victim
of this practice. By acting in this manner, the Netherlands is actually turning itself into the enemy.

Due to a lack of strong adult leaders who were able to appeal to the youth, there was room for the young Moluccans to form their own movement. Despite the closeness of the community and the strong bonds within the group as a whole, the older generation had no hold on the younger generation, which took advantage of its freedom and sought its own way. A strong parallel can be drawn between the two cases here too. The young Muslims do not have many older leaders or role models in the Netherlands either, and parents often have too little insight into Dutch society in order to be able to understand and guide the young people. Young people create their own identities, but also their own ideologies.

The social cohesion of the community plays a complex role in all this. Despite the fact that the older Moluccans had no control over the youth, there was a certain closeness within the community. Initially, everyone also backed the actions — or at least, solidarity with ‘the people’ came first and foremost and group cohesion was important. Although not everyone thought the same about the actions, the activists were not let down in public. It was only later on that the doubt increased, and the close networks caused the doubt to quickly work its way through to the young radicals. In the case of the radical Muslims, we see that they are not only turning away from Dutch society, but also from their own community, including their families. This means that it is less easy to appeal to and influence these young people than it was for their Moluccan counterparts. In the Islamic communities, just as among the Moluccans, there is ever decreasing support for radical concepts and people do not want the relationship with the Netherlands to deteriorate. The attitude within the Islamic communities towards radicalisation is however somewhat ambiguous, just as was the case among the Moluccans in the later stages. The fact that young people are becoming more religious in the radicalisation process leads to approval and respect, but whenever this goes too far the young people’s environment becomes opposed to this. At that time it is however difficult for the environment to counterbalance these developments. Often the young people can only be convinced by religious arguments, and their parents are often inferior at this method of discourse.

The deradicalisation among the Moluccans was associated with a shift in ideology (in addition to the government’s repressive response to the hostage-takings in 1977 and a reorientation towards the Netherlands), which was the result of a change in relationship with the Moluccas. New ways were found for the Moluccans in the Netherlands to be of service to their counterparts on the Moluccas. In theory, it is conceivable that a different viewpoint towards the conflicts in the Middle East would cause Islamic forms of radicalism to decrease, for example if the radicals were to become convinced that the Muslims there do not back the same objectives and violent strategies. In practice, we do not expect this change to be likely. It is possible that, if the Netherlands were to adopt a different attitude, this might mean that they would no longer be seen as the enemy. This has both a national component (subordination of Muslims) and an international component (such as military participation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and siding with Israel in the conflict over Palestine); but these are political choices that come about after considering many factors.

Due to the fact that in both cases the radicalisation arose in part from a lack of acceptance, from people not being taken seriously and from a lack of social perspectives,
a government social policy could influence the decline of Islamic radicalism, as it did in the case of the Moluccans. Although in the case of the Moluccans the deradicalisation took place earlier than most social reforms, it seems probable that these reforms played a role in further deradicalisation and in preventing re-radicalisation. Both groups cannot simply opt for a neutral position within society (like the squatters), but continue to form a part of a recognisable ethnic minority group that generally still occupies a subordinate position. With regard to the Islamic communities there are more opportunities for social reforms than was originally the case among the Moluccans, among whom the social problems were highly politicised. Only once the social problems were considered as an issue that was separate from the political structure, could reforms be implemented on a social level and could the KNIL problem be solved and room was created for deradicalisation.

There are differences and similarities between the two cases in relation to the barriers to disengagement. There seems to be considerable homogeneity within the radical Islamic groups, but they are not so closed to the extent that there is no discussion with people who have different views. A great deal of discussion takes place between the (somewhat) radical factions in particular. It is not the case that the entire community backs the same objectives as the radicals, as in the case of the Moluccans, and that there is no room for different opinions in the entire community. Reprisals for deradicalisation can perhaps be expected in radical Islamic groups due to the internal homogeneity, but these are more likely to stem from one’s own radical group than from the wider community, such as in the case of the Moluccans. We have already discussed marginalisation as a barrier to disengagement from the movement under the comparison with the extreme right.

At the time, the Moluccans had long expected to return again to the Moluccas, and the understanding that they would stay in the Netherlands helped pave the way to deradicalisation. This is different however among the radical Muslims. Among this group, the understanding that they live in the Netherlands is the factor that incites radicalisation (because they do not feel accepted there). It may be that radicalisation will decrease, and the barrier to disengagement will be reduced, if and when the (perceived) future prospects of the group improve.

Islamic radicalism as religious radicalism

In the previous chapter, it was discussed in detail in what respects religious forms of radicalism differ from non-religious forms. We described the fact that religious differences can significantly increase the gap between two groups. We can indeed see that in the case of Islamic radicalism, differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are magnified by the differences in religion. The fear that Islam will exert too great an influence on Dutch society and will gain the upper hand is a dominant fear among some non-Muslims. Radical Muslims oppose the ‘perversion’ of non-Muslims, who are said to be completely deprived of any morals. However, radical Muslims find other Muslims corrupt as well. This is remarkable, because the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not therefore purely made across the dividing line between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In the case of Islamic radicalism, we see that the radical discourse is a counterpart of non-radical interpretations of the same religion. As a result, young people in the first stages of radicalisation are applauded by others, because increasing religiosity is seen as a
positive thing. Some young people are also particularly susceptible to the ideas because they are familiar with some of the terminology as used by radical thinkers, but at the same time this makes others extra resilient, because they are convinced that this radical version does not correspond with true Islam.

The illegitimacy of religious discourse, from the viewpoint of secular politics, forms a significant difference between religious and non-religious forms of radicalism. We can clearly see this in the case of Islamic radicalism. Islamic radicals (and sometimes even Muslims in general) are often regarded as irrational and crazy, and their wishes and the criticism that they have of society and of (inter)national policy, are rarely taken seriously. In the case of the Islamic radicals, it is indeed difficult to meet their demands if these involve establishing a global Islamic state. This makes ‘reform’ difficult, but that is not to say that all their points of criticism are automatically irrational and unfounded. There are points of criticism that can be discussed and which even non-(radical) Muslims can agree with.

It is difficult to say whether the religious nature of Islamic radicalism means that a repressive approach is assessed differently. It is however true that house searches and arrests cause acquaintances of the prosecuted radicals to radicalise. However, the outcry seems not to be caused purely by the feeling that the government is ‘going after the Muslims’. A major proportion of the outcry about the treatment exists because those involved do not consider this treatment to be in keeping with the Dutch constitutional state. The confidence that they previously had in the justice of the Dutch legal system is taking a terrible knock and this is causing some people to disassociate themselves from the system.

As a result of the separation between church and state, the opportunities for pursuing a policy of inclusion with respect to religious organisations, are more limited than those for non-religious organisations. In fact, within society there are discussions about the extent to which the government is allowed to encourage certain religious interpretations above other ones, and about government initiatives for supporting (non-radical) religious ideologies in order to counteract Islamic radical concepts. It would be easier for the government to enter into discussion about the issues at hand and to express a preference for non-radical versions of the ideas in the case of non-religious ideals, such as those of the Moluccans, the squatters and the extreme right.

### 5.3 Expectations in relation to the decline of Islamic radicalism

In the comparisons above, we discussed the parallels and differences between Islamic radicalism and the cases that we discussed previously. From these comparisons we are able to express expectations relating to a possible decline in Islamic radicalism. For each case, we now discuss what we are able to learn that could apply to Islamic radicalism, and in conclusion we utilise the analytical framework in order to interpret the way in which the various factors might be able to play a role in a future decline of Islamic radicalism. In Chapter 9, we formulate points where we can apply policy on the basis of these assessments.
Expectations in relation to the decline of Islamic radicalism based on the comparison with the squatters’ movement:

- There are relatively few opportunities to meet the ideological objectives that have been set.
- The growth of the movement and the associated institutionalisation and power structures are not expected to lead to decline.
- It is highly plausible that violent radical actions will lead to a reduction in support given by sympathisers, and therefore have a negative effect on the (violent) radical movement (such as in the case of the squatters’ movement and the Moluccans).
- The decrease of social goodwill in relation to the squatters’ movement did not benefit the radical squatters’ movement. The social opposition to Islamic radicalism does not have a constraining effect on the radicalisation, however, as radicalism is too often identified with Islam in social debate.
- This means that many Muslims feel that they have been lumped together with the radicals, which increases their identification.
- It is expected that barriers to deradicalisation will play a greater role in the case of Islamic radicalism than in the case of the squatters’ movement:
  - There is more isolation than is the case within the squatters’ movement, which will cause the social dependency of the members to increase, as will the barrier associated with the major sacrifices that have been made for the radicalisation.
  - Just as in the case of the squatters’ movement, the radical Islamic ideals are linked to a radical lifestyle. However, the Islamic radicals also have the opportunity to shape these ideals within a non-radical (orthodox) lifestyle; thus this does not necessarily form a psychological barrier to deradicalisation.
  - Charismatic individuals may be able to exert more influence locally on the relatively young Muslims who are receptive to radicalisation.
  - There may be a greater possibility of reprisals.
  - There are fewer social opportunities when disengaging from the movement and a greater possibility of marginalisation. (There is less to win by disengaging from the movement).

Expectations in relation to the decline of Islamic radicalism based on the comparison with the extreme right:

- The analysis of the extreme right-wing movement has revealed that a repressive, restrictive approach can play an important role in decline. In the case of Islamic radicalism, we can see partly the same approach, but the question is whether this approach has the same effect in this case. The General Intelligence and Security Service states that the repressive approach has achieved results so far, which has caused the threat from the Jihadis to decrease. On the other hand, we can also see opposite, radicalising effects in response to the approach adopted by the police and judicial authorities.
- If people have more to lose, they will be less inclined to become active. Because of the repressive social atmosphere, extreme right-wing political parties only obtained a very limited number of (capable) new recruits, as people with a good position within society in particular had a great deal to lose if they wanted to become members. Because many young Muslims believe that their future prospects are limited anyway, the fear of losing a great deal does not form a barrier to membership; even for many
highly educated individuals. With regard to the Islamic case, the marginalisation of radicals does not automatically lead to a weak movement with no capable people, as it did among the extreme right. It can be expected, however, that if people believe that there are social opportunities open to them, this will contribute towards a decline in Islamic radicalism.

- Within extreme right-wing organisations, internal discussions concerning the party’s ideas led to friction and divisions within the movement. We can also see such friction among Islamic radicals. Ideological disagreement could contribute towards a weakening of the movement, although the diffuse nature of the movement means it can also be strong with a lesser degree of unanimity.

Expectations in relation to the decline of Islamic radicalism based on the comparison with the radical Moluccans:

- See point on the squatters’ movement relating to the concrete nature of the objective.
- The young Moluccans were brought up with the RMS ideology. Although the young Dutch Muslims had an Islamic upbringing, they were not brought up with radical ideas. Within the Islamic community, not everyone backs the same radical objectives. There is definitely an ambiguous attitude. This diversity gives this form of radicalism a weaker basis than in the case of the Moluccans.
- The fact that the process of integration was not initiated at the time of migration, both by the migrant group and by Dutch society, led to the formation of a breeding ground for radicalisation in various ways, both among the Moluccans and among many Islamic migrants in the Netherlands:
  - It gave rise to anger about the resulting subordinate position of the migrants.
  - People felt badly treated and felt that they were not being taken seriously.
  - There is a great rift between parents and children because parents do not understand their children and are unable to guide them adequately.
  - Without understanding these backgrounds, it is difficult to be able to respond well to the reasons behind radicalisation and to the sensitivities of radicalising young people.
- The radical ideology is strongly linked to the ethnic-religious identity. We can see this both among the Moluccans and among the radical Muslims. This identity is linked with pride and self-respect and with a sensitivity to discrimination by others. The poor relationship with the Dutch people encourages the young people to increasingly opt for a confrontational course of action. Among the Moluccans, we can see how a lack of appreciation and the failure to treat the issues seriously can pave the way to radicalism. We can also see among the Moluccans that the recognition that they feel they received at a given moment (‘we have used the actions in 1977 to make a serious point and we are to be taken seriously’) played an important role in deradicalisation. It is clear that an atmosphere in which people and ideals are taken seriously can contribute towards deradicalisation.
- A lack of appealing adult leaders and role models creates a space that young people fill in their own way – and which can therefore be filled in a radical manner too. This was the case in the rise of both the radical Moluccan movement and the rise of young Islamic radicals. This leads us to suspect that a better institutionalisation of al-
ternative ideologies focussed on young people will contribute towards a decline in radicalism.

- We can see with the Moluccans, just as within the Islamic communities, that people do not like to condemn the attitudes and actions of people from their own community in public, on account of internal solidarity. It puts people in a migrant group in a difficult position whenever they are asked to speak out against actions that are committed by someone who is counted as a member of the group. The more pressure that is exerted on a (migrant) group, the more significant a role this group solidarity plays, and the more difficult it becomes for someone from the group to take up an independent and critical position. This muffles the opposing views within the migrant group itself. It is likely that less negative pressure on the Islamic communities will contribute towards expression of more opposing views.

- The links that the radical core has with other people encourage the decline of radical movements. Doubt and other opinions can filter through to radical cores. It is worrying that the links that radical young Muslims have with the community are not as strong as in the case of the Moluccans.

- A less hostile view with respect to the Netherlands could contribute towards deradicalisation.

- Social reforms could play a role in deradicalisation. The fact that Islamic radicalism is not interwoven with the social problems and the social problems are not politicised, as in the case of the Moluccans, makes it easier to explore the possibilities for social reforms.

Islamic radicalism appears to have a specific position in secular Dutch society because of its religious nature. The religious nature of the movement makes dealing with Islamic radicalism especially complex.

- Within secular society in the Netherlands, radical Islamic ideology is regarded as illegitimate; it is seen as an irrational cause whose arguments should not be taken seriously. That makes it difficult to enter into a discussion on an equal level.

- In regard to reform, there are no possibilities for giving in to the main objectives set by the movement, that of establishing an Islamic state. That is not to say that all points of criticism on society cannot be discussed.

- It is difficult to say whether repressive actions are assessed differently because they focus upon radical religious individuals. We are under the impression that this is not the case.

- Inclusion is difficult. Because of the division between church and state it is complicated for the government to participate in ideological discussions between radical and non-radical views, as these relate to religious ideologies. Furthermore, there is fear among some non-Islamic Dutch citizens that religion (and Islam in particular) is gaining too much influence in Dutch society.

- The radical version of Islam forms a counterpart to a widely embedded non-radical version. There exist, therefore, in any case, non-radical versions of the same religion. These could play a role in increasing the resistance to Islamic radicalisation.
Table 5.2: The possible role of collective factors in the decline of Islamic radicalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Expected role</th>
<th>Expected role in the possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failing ideology (view of current world and desired future)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>It seems unlikely that a failing ideology will play a role in decline. The radical view of the current world and the desired future is very powerful and ties in with the holy scriptures. It is possible that internal friction could occur due to ideological differences of opinion or in the case of preachers who remain in conformance with social standards and do not express themselves radically enough.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing strategy (the route which is outlined)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>The effects of violent actions will probably act to further encourage ideological discussions and may cause the support for violent strategies to decrease. The preference for a non-violent course of action does however appear to be based mainly upon strategic arguments, and this preference could change if results are achieved with violent actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>It is difficult to make judgements about the role of the organisation. On the one hand, we do not expect this to play a major role in decline. It seems as though the diffuse, informal, flexible nature of the movement makes it powerful and resilient, and makes it difficult to gain a hold on the structure and the active members (this is particularly true among the Jihadists). However, it may be the case that disrupted communication with potential supporters will have an effect after all. It is difficult to assess the consequences of the current ‘wave of professionalisation’ in the Netherlands, which political Salafists are using to pursue the establishment of a wider movement and larger group of supporters. We do not expect this ‘institutionalisation’ to weaken the movement, as was the case with the squatters’ movement. In contrast to the extreme right-wing movement, in the case of Islamic radicalism more capable people seem to be involved, which ensures better organisational skills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>The flexible organisation means that the movement is not just run by one or a few inspirational leaders. (Someone like Bin Laden is only seen as an example at a more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs of the members</th>
<th>Expected role</th>
<th>Expected role in the possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members outgrow the movement as a cohort</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>As it is still a relatively recent phenomenon, it is difficult to say whether, how or when people outgrow the movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Islamic radicalism is successful in reaching potential supporters. There is an extensive supply of information and it is conveyed in an appealing manner. As long as radicalism and Islam are identified with each other in public debate and many Muslims continue to feel unaccepted (as long as people have the idea that two different standards are being applied to Muslims and non-Muslims), the power of attraction will probably not decrease. This also means that a decrease in social goodwill will increase the attractiveness. The opposite was true with the squatters’ movement, where less goodwill led to a decrease in attraction. In contrast to the extreme right-wing movement, highly educated individuals join the radical Islamic movement too. It can be expected that the attractiveness will decrease when Muslims feel more at home in the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External factors</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Inter)national or local conflict disappears/changes</td>
<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Radicals often refer to international conflicts such as those in Israel, Iraq and Afghanistan in order to illustrate that Muslims are besieged by the West (including the Netherlands) and that the West applies different standards to Muslims and non-Muslims. They conclude from the attention that the media pays to various victims, that in the West a non-Muslim victim is more important than a Muslim victim. It is likely that an (inter)national approach, that is not perceived as ‘applying two different standards’, could have a moderating effect on radicalism.
### Government: repression

Expected role: +

A restrictive, stigmatising approach towards the extreme right made it impossible for the movement to make any headway at all. Among both the squatters and the Moluccans, violent repressive responses to violations of the law turned out ultimately to play a role in the decline of the movements. This therefore appears to be an effective strategy. However, the position held by Islamic radicalism differs on essential points, as a result of which the possible effects of a policy of repression are unclear for the time being.

### Government: inclusion

Expected role: +

The feeling that ideals are taken seriously plays an important role in deradicalisation. It is however difficult for the secular government to find ways of entering into discussions that are conducted in religious terms and to support non-radical ideas when these relate to religious movements.

A policy of inclusion, also with regard to orthodox Muslims, could have a major effect upon deradicalisation. Political inclusion of Islamic organisations (perhaps even of somewhat radical organisations) could have a comparable effect if it could serve to increase the confidence of these groups in a democratic approach. But it is then important that these groups are taken seriously, otherwise the confidence will in fact be damaged. There is fear among some non-Islamic Dutch citizens that religion (and Islam in particular) is gaining too much influence in Dutch society. (By the way, this fear also exists among moderate Muslims with regard to radical Islam.)

### Government: reform

Expected role: +

On account of the abstract objectives that require the established order to be completely overthrown, reforms with regard to the radical political objectives do not seem to be an option.

Social reforms that improve the social opportunities for young Muslims in the Netherlands could have an effect upon deradicalisation, just as they did among the Moluccans.

If the Netherlands were to adopt a different attitude (both nationally and internationally), this could mean that the Netherlands is no longer seen as the enemy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>Expected role</th>
<th>Expected role in the possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion/media/Zeitgeist changes (image becomes worse)</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Society: A more inclusive atmosphere in which (orthodox) Muslims feel more at home in the Netherlands, feel that they are being taken more seriously, and are being identified with radicalism to a lesser extent, will probably cause radicalism to decrease. The negative image that worked against the squatters’ movement and the extreme right-wing movement is having a largely opposite effect in the case of Islamic radicalism, as it causes many people, as Muslims, to be made to feel responsible. This causes a feeling of solidarity, it causes people to close ranks and fuels anger and frustration. If less pressure is placed on the Islamic communities, this will probably create more room for opposing views.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive competing interpretation</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Muslims: A variety of views exist within the Islamic communities. If a clearer stand is taken against radical excesses in these communities, this will probably influence the decline of radicalism, although it will filter through into the radical groups less quickly than in the case of the Moluccans. There will also be an impact if people, including parents, know better how to deal with the radicalisation of young people, so that these young people will isolate themselves less. There is a major rift between parents and children which causes many children to disregard any advice from their parents. At present, a young person’s increasing religiosity is often initially applauded. But young radicals are maligned and become isolated, and people often have few responses to their arguments to hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attractive competing interpretation</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>There is a significant chance that a well-developed alternative ideology, which also convincingly meets the various needs (a meaningful purpose in life, social ties, justice) will have a deradicalising effect. In a way, we have already seen this happen, and the decline of Jihadism is the consequence of the stronger position held by the political Salafists. The analysis carried out by the General Intelligence and Security Service also reveals that political Salafists feel that other (non-radical) interpretations of Islam are gaining ground on them. Nonetheless, whenever political successes are achieved</td>
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<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>Expected role</td>
<td>Expected role in the possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>through violent means, this could lead to an increase in extremist thinking.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breakdown of barriers to dis-</td>
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<tr>
<td>engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social dependency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>The young radicals are relatively isolated. Although they hold discussions with</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>people with different opinions, they rarely associate with these people other-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wise. Other Muslims often avoid them and they are expelled from mosques. Al-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>though the isolation of radical groups may discourage some individuals from</td>
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<td></td>
<td>joining the group, we believe that this isolation mainly acts as a barrier to</td>
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<td></td>
<td>disengagement. A social vacuum awaits those people who do so. We expect that a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>less isolated position at collective level will help pave the way towards deradicalisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological dependency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>For those individuals who wish to disengage from the group but who wish to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>continue to live according to their religious ideals, the psychological</td>
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<td></td>
<td>barrier to disengagement will be eliminated if enough room is created in</td>
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<td>society for orthodox views. Although the movement does not rely on a powerful</td>
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<td></td>
<td>leader, it could be the case that at local level young people are inspired by</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>charismatic individuals. It is conceivable that an inspiring individual would</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hinder disengagement from the group and that this barrier would be</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>eliminated if this individual’s power of persuasion were to decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of the costs involved</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>As a result of the high level of isolation and the stigmatisation of radicals,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>both by the Islamic community and by society, the costs of radicalisation are</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>high. This can form a barrier to deradicalisation. If these costs are lowered,</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>i.e. by reducing the level of isolation, this will make disengagement from the</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>group easier and could contribute towards a collective decline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group reprisals</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Although there are no indications that physical reprisals take place following</td>
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<td></td>
<td>an individual’s disengagement from the group, we have the impression that be-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cause of the uniformity of the ideas within the group and the intolerance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shown to different opinions, deradicalisation goes hand in hand with expul-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sion from the (radical) social group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>Expected role</td>
<td>Expected role in the possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of loss of reputation and protection</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>We do not believe that fear of loss of reputation and protection prevents people from deradicalising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Most young radicals have the impression that they have few social opportunities, which does not encourage disengagement from the group. It may well be that improved social opportunities (including for those people with an orthodox religious appearance) will make it easier for individuals to disengage from the group and therefore help pave the way towards a collective decline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Individual deradicalisation: theoretical framework

Why and how do individuals deradicalise? What makes people moderate their views and behaviour? What exactly does the process of disengaging from a radical group involve? Very little is known about this individual process: we were hardly able to find any academic sources which describe this process. On this point we are therefore reverting back to the literature concerning disengagement from sects and gangs, and we are making use of some sources concerning disengagement from extreme right-wing groups.

Skonovd (in Wright 1988) described the process of disengaging from sects on the basis of the following phases: (1) crisis, (2) overview and reflection, (3) release, (4) disengagement, (5) cognitive transition and (6) cognitive reorganisation. In the crisis phase, there are both internal and external causes of conflict which lead to doubt. Internal factors relate to the radical group; for example social disruption or interpersonal conflict. External factors include incentives in the field of career or study, relational incentives and legal removal from the group. The crisis phase is often followed by a re-evaluation of one’s own (religious) identity, lifestyle and world view. The individual is able to solve his or her doubt by reasoning away the causes of the doubt from his or her sectarian world view, or by distancing him or herself more from that world view. In this case, the individual breaks away more from the group in the following phase. Ideological conflicts are systematically developed into a rationale for breaking away. This breaks the individual’s psychological dependency. The transition to the disengagement phase is characterised by the final decision to leave. Once the individual has departed from the group, he or she enters the phase of cognitive transition. The individual is standing between social worlds, is dismantling his or her sectarian identity and is trying to find a new identity and new meaning. The last phase is the cognitive reorganisation phase, when the individual reintegrates into ‘normal’ society, with varying degrees of success.

In order to examine disengagement from radical groups, we utilise this model as the starting point. The first four phases are of particular interest to this study. After all, in order to understand the disengagement process, it is important to know why individuals doubt whether they are still in the right place in the radical group. What are the factors that contribute towards individuals finding themselves in the first phase of crisis? And what are the barriers that then have to be overcome in order to actually break away? We regard the model as a practical conceptual description that cannot however be translated in its exact form into the social reality. In reality, the disengagement process often takes a more confused course in which the separate phases are not so clearly defined. We do not therefore name these phases explicitly in our discussion of the deradicalisation process in this chapter and in the following chapter. We do however discuss the factors that can play a role in the various phases and describe various forms of crisis (first phase).

In this chapter we develop an alternative theoretical framework. We begin with a discussion of the possible motives for undergoing deradicalisation (6.1). We then discuss what types of crises can occur (6.2), the barriers that can make disengagement from a group more difficult (6.3) and the direct causes of a crisis and the factors that contribute towards preventing individuals from radicalising further (6.4). Finally, we present a summary in the form of a analytical framework (6.5).
6.1 Motives for radicalising and deradicalising

Why do individuals deradicalise? We have provided evidence that individuals who undergo radicalisation have particular needs which radical movements meet (see Chapter 2). The radical movement forms an appropriate ‘supply’ to individuals’ demands. If that supply no longer ties in well with individuals’ demands, the movement’s power of attraction will decrease and these individuals will disengage from the movement.

In order to understand why a movement’s power of attraction decreases for an individual, we first have to know what this power of attraction amounts to. What are the motives of individuals to radicalise, or in other words: what functions do radical movements fulfil for individuals? In the literature about motives behind radicalisation, we see three fundamental motives for radicalisation recurring time and time again: the response to perceived injustice, the need for social ties and the need for meaning (see for example Buijs et al. 2006 and Slootman and Tillie 2006).

The response to perceived injustice is linked to a perception of injustice that can hurt people deeply. The injustice can be experienced on various levels, such as on an economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious and/or social level. An individual may feel unjustly treated either personally or as a group. Some individuals feel the need to take an active response to the perceived injustice and may become increasingly radical in this. Buijs et al. refer to this as the political-activist dimension of radicalisation.

The need for social ties implies that individuals not only wish to achieve something, but they also wish to belong to a group that is valuable to them. The members feel that they have ties with the movement, with the people in the movement or with the group leaders. Furthermore, the group offers a subculture in which the individual feels at home, and from which he or she derives a positive social identity. The subculture forms an alternative to today’s society and is the manifestation of the views of the group members about the ideal life, whether this is adventurous and free, or very structured and orthodox. Buijs et al. refer to this as the socio-cultural dimension of radicalisation.

The need for meaning is linked to the search for personal significance. Some people are looking for a clearer explanation of the world in which they live and of the role that they (have to) perform in this. Radical movements offer an ideology that provides the clear answers that these people require. Buijs et al. refer to this as the religious dimension of radicalisation.

In their study into motives behind participating in social movements, Klandermans and Mayer (2006) identify similar motives to those mentioned above: identity motives, ideological motives and instrumental motives. The identity motives correspond to the need for social ties and the ideological motives correspond to the need for meaning. The instrumental motives are more far-reaching, however, than a response to injustice: they involve people being active in a social movement because they believe that they can change their social and political environment (2006: 8). People participate because they believe that participation will be of benefit to them, whether this is via ‘collective incentives’ or via ‘selective incentives’. Collective incentives are benefits that are linked to the movement’s objectives, and are related to the need for political justice. The advantages that the individual participant experiences, such as a career within the movement, a job or benefiting from the network, etc., fall into the category of selective incentives. These selective incentives, which are linked to the practical aspects of how someone organises his or her life, form an important addition to the classification of the more ‘substantive’
themes for radicalisation, which are a response to injustice, a need for ties and a need for meaning.

Individuals will deradicalise when their needs and motives no longer tie in with those things which the radical movement has to offer them. The movement’s ideology plays a crucial role in this. As we described earlier, the ideology offers (a) a view of the existing order, mostly in the form of a ‘world view’, (b) a picture of the desired future in the form of a view of the Good Society, and (c) a description of how political change can and should be achieved. So the ideology gives significance to the situation (and therefore meets the need for meaning), encourages people to do something in their current situation (and therefore meets the need to respond to injustice), and indicates how this should be done (thus providing a collective incentive). Doubt, a ‘crisis’, can arise whenever the ideology fails on one of these points.

In addition to a failing ideology, other aspects can also cause someone to doubt whether he or she wishes to belong to the radical organisation. For example, if the movement is no longer able to comply with the need for social ties, or whenever there are no longer enough selective incentives to stay with the movement (which means that the movement no longer offers any personal advantages and may even offer personal disadvantages). On the basis of the stated classifications of factors that play a role in radicalisation and entry into social movements according to Buijs et al. and Klandermans and Mayer, we classify the factors for disengagement from movements as follows12 (see table below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of radicalisation /joining social movements from literature</th>
<th>Factors of deradicalisation in our analytical framework</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need for meaning (ideology)</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for justice (instrumental – collective)</td>
<td>Organisation/subculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for social ties (identity)</td>
<td>Needs on a personal level (instrumental – selective)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disengagement from a radical movement is just one form of deradicalisation at the individual level. Individual deradicalisation can also consist of a moderation of radical views and radical (violent) behaviour. Whenever someone is not a member of a radical group, deradicalisation is therefore unrelated to the group aspects. The organisation does not play a role in the deradicalisation process and an aspect such as subculture may not play a role or may only play a minimal one. In cases such as these, deradicalisation will mainly

12 On the basis of research on extreme right-wing individuals, Bjørgo (2002) also classifies factors that play a role in disengagement from movements. He distinguishes between push, pull and restraining factors. Push factors are the negative social powers and circumstances that make it unappealing to stay in the group. Pull factors are the positive factors that make an environment other than the right-wing extremist environment attractive. Restraining factors are the factors that make it difficult to leave the group. Because we find that a distinction based on the content of factors provides better clarification than a classification based on the direction of factors, we are not using Bjørgo’s classification within this study.
be the result of a failing ideology. We examine the factors from our analytical framework in greater detail below.

**Failing ideology**

The ideology can fail on various different points. It may be the case that the analysis of today’s world that is provided by the ideology no longer appears convincing to the individual, or that the view of the Good Society does not inspire the individual anymore; or perhaps the proposed route from today’s world to the ideal world is no longer desirable or effective. In the latter case, this often concerns the use of violence. People who find themselves in a radical group often have a ‘romantic’ image of violence: that of the tough rebel or the militant comrade. This image becomes more realistic when they are confronted with actual violence, and as a result their view of violence sometimes changes. Rommelspacher (2006), who carried out research into the disengagement of German right-wing extremists, describes the way in which being confronted with violence caused some right-wing extremists to realise that they did not wish to participate in this because it went too far. Decker and Van Winkle (1996), who studied individual disengagement from gangs in America, conclude that most people withdrew because they had been personally confronted with violence.

Doubt about the ideology of the movement can also be the result of a perceived lack of success in achieving the desired change. A situation in which success is not forthcoming can lead to doubts about the route that has been followed, but also to doubts about the objective to be achieved (the Good Society) or about the analysis of today’s world.

**Failing organisation/subculture**

Some members of radical groups become disillusioned about the group dynamics and the movement’s activities. Limited loyalty shown by members to each other can weaken the ties with the group. Sometimes a certain paranoia and fear of infiltrators can dominate in a radical group. This can lead to even long-standing members running the risk of losing the trust of the group, their status and their position. Rommelspacher describes processes such as these among the extreme right-wing where she makes a distinction between disappointment shown by members in their extreme right-wing comrades and that shown in the leaders (2006). The comrades are often a long way short of satisfying the idealised image of ‘the hero’ which the young people took as their basis when joining the groups. Sometimes there is no sign whatsoever of the security that they expected. There is mutual competition and contempt, and mutual distrust. Others become disillusioned in the leaders. The leaders often played a major role in a member joining the group, but often they do not remain on their pedestals for long. Nowhere near all of them live in accordance with what they propagate, and that turns the messages that they preach into empty slogans. They have an instrumental attitude with regard to comrades: they see the other comrades as less, as ‘human material’, as ‘instruments’. Group factors such as these can undermine the notion that people live according to the shared ideals within the group. The subcultural aspects can also make the group less attractive to the individual. Bjørgo (2002) describes for example that extreme right-wing young people can become fed up with ‘pointless drinking and fighting’ at a certain point.
Practical life circumstances

At a certain point, active members often get the feeling that they have become too old for what they are doing and many people long for the freedom of a ‘normal’ life. There comes a time when individuals who joined the movement as adolescents or in their early twenties in particular will develop the desire to start a family, which carries with it the responsibility for their partner and children. They no longer have a great need for excitement, but simply want to lead a calmer life. Bjørgo and Carlsson (2005) write that ‘front-line’ members of the extreme rightist movement often become worn-out and can no longer take the pressure.

Another important aspect that often plays a role is formed by negative social sanctions from the individual’s environment, such as stigmatisation. Although in some cases this leads to increased solidarity and unity within the group, as Linden and Klandermans describe for the extreme rightist movement (2006), this also creates the idea among members that they are throwing away their career prospects and personal future. The threat of prosecution or a long prison sentence can also form a reason for disengaging from the movement.

6.2 The nature of the crisis

In order to describe the disengagement from sects, Wright (1991) makes use of the concept of commitment. Sects (just like radical groups) demand major commitment from their members, and as a result, the decision to join a sect or, conversely, to disengage from a sect forms a major step with significant consequences. The level of commitment required resembles the level required in an intimate relationship and Wright adds that disengagement from a sect is comparable with a divorce. Klandermans (1997) also uses the concept of commitment to the movement in order to describe why someone remains active in a social movement or disengages again at a certain point. This concept is useful to us in order to gain better insight into the nature of the personal crisis (phase 1 in the disengagement process) when someone begins to doubt his or her participation in a radical movement.

Klandermans distinguishes between three forms of commitment: the moral obligation to remain in the organisation (normative commitment), emotional attachment to an organisation (affective commitment), and the awareness of the costs that are associated with leaving the organisation (continuance commitment).

Normative commitment is the result of a long process of socialisation that gives rise to values and views that correspond to those of the organisation. The more the ideological views of the individual and the movement correspond, the stronger the attachment of an individual to the movement. As discussed earlier, an ideology provides meaning to the world and a view on perceived injustice. Whenever an individual begins to doubt the movement because the movement’s ideology no longer ties in well with his or her needs in these areas, we can speak of a crisis in his or her normative commitment.

Affective commitment leads to increased participation, and participation leads to increased affective commitment, but the opposite is also true: disappointing experiences when participating weaken the affective commitment, and lower affective commitment leads to a decrease in participation. This can create a downward spiral. If the individual
becomes disillusioned with the movement in the extent to which it meets his or her need for ties and identity, he or she can experience a crisis in his or her affective commitment. The level of continuance commitment is determined by the magnitude of the investments that an individual has made in the movement and the quality of the alternatives that he or she sees. Good alternatives mostly do not form the only reason for disengagement from a sect, but whenever an individual’s commitment is waning, a good alternative can form the deciding factor for disengaging from the sect. Continuance commitment is therefore linked to the practical circumstances (costs, benefits and opportunities for the individual) of group membership. Whenever an individual begins to doubt the movement because these practical circumstances are no longer of benefit or are even unfavourable, this forms a crisis in his or her continuance commitment.

Table 6.2: Relationship between the factors of deradicalisation and the nature of the crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of deradicalisation</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Organisation/subculture</th>
<th>Practical circumstances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature of the crisis</td>
<td>Decline in normative commitment</td>
<td>Decline in affective commitment</td>
<td>Decline in continuance commitment</td>
</tr>
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</table>

6.3 Barriers to disengagement

In addition to factors that encourage a decline in commitment – and therefore help pave the way to deradicalisation – there are also factors that hinder deradicalisation. These are the barriers that movements raise in order to prevent individuals from disengaging from the movement (see Chapter 2). We referred to the following as barriers: 1) social dependency, 2) psychological dependency, 3) the extent of the costs involved, 4) reprisals, 5) fear of loss of reputation and protection and 6) a marginal position following disengagement. When we place these barriers alongside the factors of deradicalisation that we have referred to, we can see that they are closely connected. Essentially, the barriers form an opposite incentive to the motives behind deradicalisation: they ensure a dominance of the ideology in the individual’s perception of the environment (normative barriers), social dependency of the individual on the group (affective barriers), or practical circumstances such as fear of reprisals or loss of protection, which all but force the individual to remain in the group (continuance barriers).

Barriers can be overcome in various different ways. The doubt about disengagement from the movement can be overcome for example because someone sees a clear discrepancy between what leaders teach and what they do in practice. Breaking through the isolation is also an important way of achieving this breakdown; an involvement in new activities can form the first step in the disengagement process, for example. Doubt about disengagement can also be overcome because an (unofficial or unregulated) relationship is maintained with someone outside of the group who offers a new reference framework. Such factors can have an effect upon various barriers at the same time. Breaking through the isolation can reduce both the psychological and the social dependency of the individual on the group, for example. And a new relationship can lead to
both the psychological and continuous barriers being broken through: the individual who is disengaging from the group realises that the previously made sacrifices and costs may be high, but that if he or she disengages from the group, he or she may also regain a great deal. Additional factors that can lower barriers are: family ties, return to school or discovering alternative (religious) perspectives. Such factors in themselves are not seen as valid reasons for disengaging, but they can have a powerful legitimising effect in an initial phase of doubt and therefore help to overcome barriers (Wright 1988).

Table 6.3: Relationship between the factors of deradicalisation and various types of barriers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of deradicalisation</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Organisation/subculture</th>
<th>Practical circumstances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of barriers</td>
<td>Normative barriers</td>
<td>Affective barriers</td>
<td>Continuance barriers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4 Immediate causes of deradicalisation and factors causing an individual to not radicalise further

Alongside the factors that can play a role in the origins of a crisis, we can also distinguish immediate causes and circumstances that set the process of doubt, and with it the crisis, in motion. These triggering events and circumstances form a different type of factor to the motives mentioned above: while the motives involve substantive considerations, the immediate causes and circumstances are the events or the individuals who set these considerations in motion. For example, the death of a close fellow radical can lead to an individual doubting his or her continuance commitment, or an argument within the radical group can result in the need for ties no longer being met properly and lead to a crisis in the affective commitment.

Rommelspacher (2006) describes that for some right-wing extremists a meeting with an individual who turned the extreme right-wing world view upside down was important. Such a meeting formed an immediate cause for the disengagement process to get underway. In many cases, meetings with other people prompted individuals to think about their own assumptions. This came about due to critical questions or due to a meeting with one of the ‘others’, who did not turn out to comply with the extreme right-wing stereotypes. People who accept you just as you are, a sympathetic foreigner who treats you without prejudice, or an understanding judge can all turn the radical world view upside down. Stereotypes and social codes of distrust and conflict do not appear to apply everywhere.

Finally, it is important not just to look at the factors that contribute towards deradicalisation, but also at the factors that contribute towards individuals not radicalising further. This question is most important to individuals who have already taken a number of steps in the radicalisation process, who approve violence in principle, but who do not take the final step of using violent means themselves. What discourages these individuals from going even further in this process? We do not have any theoretical presuppositions for these two last types of factors – immediate causes and factors behind not
radicalising further. We therefore do not include them in our analytical framework, but discuss them in an explorative manner in the following chapter.

6.5 Summary

If we link the types of crises in commitment and barriers mentioned with the factors of radicalisation and deradicalisation, we create a framework which we can use to analyse individual deradicalisation, and individual disengagement from radical movements in particular. In the following chapter we use this framework to analyse the deradicalisation of individuals from the Moluccan movement in the nineteen-seventies, the left-wing movement in the nineteen-eighties and the extreme right-wing movement, as well as that of Islamic radicals. We also discuss the factors that formed immediate causes or circumstances for their deradicalisation, and the factors that contributed towards stopping the progress of their radicalisation.

Table 6.4: Overview of relationships between factors, crises in commitment and barriers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors of deradicalisation</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Organisation/Subculture</th>
<th>Practical circumstances</th>
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<td>Nature of the crisis</td>
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<td>Decline in continuance commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barriers</td>
<td>Normative barriers</td>
<td>Affective barriers</td>
<td>Continuance barriers</td>
</tr>
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</table>
7. Deradicalisation of individuals: cases in the Netherlands

In this chapter we look at the factors that play a role in the disengagement of individuals from radical or extremist movements. Our research is based on in-depth interviews, which we have held among people who have undergone a process of deradicalisation. They were all once a member of an organisation that was labelled as radical and are now no longer members, and/or they adhered to an ideology that can be labelled as radical and are now more moderate in their views. In the interviews, we mainly focussed upon the process of deradicalisation. What is it that makes you distance yourself from a radical group or from radical ideas? What precisely goes through your head? What are the factors that encourage this process of distancing yourself and what are the factors that hinder it? In order to be able to categorise these life stories properly, we have also examined the respondents' backgrounds and the original radicalisation process. Their lives during the radical period were also discussed: objectives, activities, social contacts, etc.

Data collection

For each case, we have tried to speak to five people who have become deradicalised. These people either came to our attention indirectly, or because they had been mentioned in literature or in the media in connection with their (de)radicalisation. We have wherever desirable supplemented these ‘primary’ interviews with background discussions with experts (‘secondary’ discussion) from the field of research, municipalities and the police. During all the discussions held, we guaranteed the respondents strict anonymity.

The former left-wing activists were the easiest for us to identify (from literature, documentaries and indirectly), and were most prepared to give interviews. All of these respondents had been active in the Amsterdam squatters’ movement.

The Moluccan activists seemed to be a problem. We were warned by several people that Moluccans are ‘very tight-lipped’ and do not like to talk, and some of those we approached for an interview were indeed not willing to talk. Ultimately we were able to speak with five ex-activists, and they were very open.

Young people who distanced themselves from extreme right-wing groups were difficult for us to find and difficult for us to approach. In the case of certain individuals whom we approached, we encountered a wall of (rude) reluctance and distrust. They were too busy, as they put it, building up their lives again and had no need whatsoever for a conversation with us. We were able to hold one telephone interview, and were also able to speak to two former politicians who had devoted themselves to extreme right-wing parties in the past, and to a former hooligan. Although hooliganism and the extreme rightist movement actually constitute two different phenomena, these two milieus do, however, have aspects in common with one another. We therefore expect that certain factors that play a role in the disengagement of hooligans can also play a role in the case of extreme right-wing young people. Furthermore, the ex-hooligan who was interviewed by us has some insight into the extreme right scene from his profession as a youth worker. In addition, we have supplemented the knowledge gained as a result of the interviews with an interview with a former member of CP’86 that was published in Alert! magazine (Alert 2005). Because this interview refers specifically to his process of withdrawing from the party, it provides a valuable addition to our interviews.
It was not easy to approach people who have had a radical Islamic orientation either, as they too have a great distrust of researchers (and the media in particular). In the end, we were nevertheless able to hold five interviews with Muslims who had undergone a radical phase at some point. None of these respondents have been members of a radical group, however. Wherever these interviews failed to provide sufficient information about factors that play a role with regard to disengagement from radical groups, we reverted back to an autobiography of an Islamic radical who is a former group member: Ed Husain (2007). To summarise, we have used the following sources of information.

Case of the Moluccans:
- 5 interviews with individuals who were radical to a greater or lesser extent during the nineteen-seventies, for example by participating in radical student groups or by becoming involved in the (very) violent actions (1 woman and 4 men).

Case of the left-wing movement:
- 6 interviews with individuals who were active in the left-wing movement in Amsterdam, who were involved to a greater or lesser extent in the actions in which violence was used by the government and the squatters’ movement from the late of the nineteen-seventies to the end of the nineteen-eighties (2 women and 4 men).

Case of the extreme rightist movement:
- 2 interviews with people who have been active in extreme right-wing political parties for many years, but who have no longer been active for some time (2 men).
- 1 former hooligan (male).
- 1 telephone interview with a recently deradicalised person with extreme right-wing views (male)
- 1 interview with a deradicalised person with extreme right-wing views (male), from Alert! Magazine (magazine of the Anti-Fascist Action 2005).
- 1 background discussion with an expert.

Case of Islamic radicalism:
- 5 interviews with individuals who were formerly radical, either very recently or some time ago (1 woman and 4 men).
- 2 background discussions with experts.

The interviews were semi-structured in nature. We allowed the respondents to give their own account and we were interested in their previous history, the radicalisation process, the deradicalisation process and their current position and view. We also tried to allow the respondents to reflect on certain themes on the basis of questions that had been formulated in advance. We were aware that many people believe that their own ‘spontaneous’ insights have played a major role in (changes in) their own development (Horgan (2005) discusses this phenomenon among radicals). The aim of our questions was therefore to gain greater insight into the influence of external factors such as developments within the movement or social contacts. The interviews took two hours on average, with some lasting longer (three hours) and some lasting not as long (half an hour).
No judgements can be made about quantitative representativeness on the basis of the twenty primary interviews. The number of interviews is too few for this purpose, and there is too great a chance of some results being skewed as a result of possible self-selection. For example, it is possible that only individuals who look back on their past with a certain amount of satisfaction will have agreed to an interview. Furthermore, the respondents were mainly recruited indirectly, which may have resulted in certain clusters of individuals being over-represented within a movement. The results are not therefore representative on a quantitative level, but the in-depth interviews did however provide us with extensive insights into the motives that individuals may have for deradicalising, into the circumstances under which deradicalisation takes place, and into the processes of deradicalisation.

Structure of the chapter

For each group, we describe the deradicalisation factors as these arise in the four cases. For each case, we describe the motives behind deradicalisation and disengagement from the group that are linked to the ideology (7.1), to the organisation (7.2) and to practical life circumstances, illustrating this by means of quotations from the interviews. The interviews also give rise to a discussion of the factors that form a barrier to withdrawing from a group. These factors, which make deradicalisation more difficult, are discussed in 7.4. In addition to the three groups of motives that form a reason for withdrawing from a group and the barriers that prevent disengagement, we are also able to identify immediate causes and circumstances that play a role in deradicalisation. We discuss these separately in 7.5. In 7.6, we examine factors that caused the respondents to not radicalise further. The chapter ends with conclusions based on the comparison between the various cases (7.7).

7.1 Factors related to the ideology

Individuals may deradicalise when they develop a different view towards the objectives that they are pursuing, the means that they wish to use in order to achieve these or come to view their current society differently, or in other words, if their normative commitment decreases. If they initially supported a violent strategy, but subsequently reject violence, this represents an important step in their deradicalisation process.

Ideology: Moluccan respondents

Desired future. Among a number of the Moluccans interviewed, we can see a clear ideological change that played a role in their deradicalisation. Initially, the aim of the activist young Moluccans was to establish the RMS, the independent South-Moluccan state. Over the course of time, however, a number of young people began to adopt a more left-wing course of action, and identified with liberation movements in the third world. They had contacts with anti-colonialist movements and identified with groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In interaction with these other movements, they started to regard the RMS as a colonial project that they no longer wished to pursue as a matter of course. Democratisation became more important than having a state of their own, all the more because they could not
imagine that the leaders were sufficiently capable of building up a healthy, democratic Moluccan state if the independence were to become reality one day.

Respondent 4: ‘Later we began to place the RMS in a more international context, in Indonesia’s conflict. At that time I regarded the RMS as a colonial project. I wasn’t thanked for that. (…) And I was also judged because of it. “He is no real adherent of the RMS”. But I found that there were other ways! We must strive for democracy, for a democratic society.’

Respondent 5: ‘During this period I withdrew from the RMS. I found that the leaders, with all their good intentions, should have put in place a different type of politics. And as one of the few I thought: we should not do that from the inside out. We began to set up a movement. [Not just focussing on the Netherlands, but on the Moluccas?] Yes, but not just on the Moluccas either. We began to work together with other political groups, which meant that the Moluccas was one of the many issues. It was just a small part. If you consider the affliction of the Indonesians, including the Moluccans… but the fact that in terms of quality other areas were even worse off, that was even more important.’

Respondent 5: [I do not want to know what you did, but why you ultimately chose not to take this [military, ed.] course of action.] This direction was too physical. The ideological side of the liberation was missing. What people were seeking was self-determination, but there are various parts to liberation, not just physical, but the takeover has to encompass government too. And that just didn’t add up. What did we know about the country? About the structures? About our own people? We didn’t yet know the half of what was going on there! [And did you begin to realise that?] Yes, slowly.’

Some people also shifted their objective, as the original goal turned out to be unachievable. The actions in the Netherlands did not lead to a different attitude by the Netherlands with regard to its efforts to achieve a South-Moluccan state, and some people concluded that the struggle should be shifted from the Dutch arena to Moluccan territory. For them, the Netherlands was no longer the site of political actions. Some people began to prepare physically for the military invasion that they expected would take place at some time on the Moluccas. Others decided to contribute to the Moluccan people in a different way and became active in developing aid or in the care and treatment of drug addicts.

Respondent 5: ‘We were so far after ’75. At the time we knew: you cannot build upon the RMS leadership. You concentrated on breathing new life into the armed conflict. To give a good example. But that was not something you could prepare for in the Netherlands. It simply would have been too noticeable. So we went to practice in Palestinian camps instead.’

Respondent 3: ‘We asked ourselves: “what are we doing?” We felt that the RMS was simply a colonial project. We sought links with a democratic movement, which would enable us to join if Suharto were to leave. But we felt it was important to connect with people. Therefore we opted for community work, in order to find links with the community. And in Assen, every family contains at least one drug addict. In Assen and Bovensmilde there
were 230 drug addicts, therefore the care and treatment of drug addicts was a good way of obtaining acceptance.

Respondent 2: ‘It became diluted. [But how?] I came to realise that a separate republic was not feasible. And then we began to do development work. (…) Then we began to adopt the approach that was the least negative: attempting to develop the islands. We began to help the population. So, it was not a Republic, but the effort did create houses, water pipes and education. A great deal of financial support was given by the Moluccans here. So we shifted our focus from a political ideal to building up Moluccan society in Indonesia. (…) I saw that it was not feasible! But I wanted justice. I focussed upon that, and then I began to do development work. There was a shift in my ideal.’

Path to change. In the struggle for the RMS, various violent actions were carried out in the Netherlands. There were hostage-takings and train hijackings, during which a number of people also lost their lives. There are people among the respondents who approved of the violence, and even people who took part in an action such as this, but also people who had actually never supported violence. All respondents now reject the use of violence, but the reasons vary. One or two people state that they reject violence because it is bad - it is bad because ‘anyone who is of sound mind would regard it as such’, or it cannot be approved because in the case of the RMS struggle in the Netherlands it is not related to the objectives. But most respondents have a strategic reason: violence doesn’t help. Violence doesn’t help – even stronger, it inflicts damage upon your own population group.

Respondent 1: ‘You think that you can get anything you want with a gun. Well, you definitely can’t. And then you might get really angry… but if that doesn't get you anywhere… Then we stopped. (…) Then everyone in the train suddenly understood: if we gun everyone down… that doesn’t work. So we stopped. We changed our strategy.’

Respondent 3: ‘No, I never really changed my views. Or rather: I underwent the same development as the Palestinians: violence is a means, and if means don't work, you must bring other (democratic) means into action. (…) This particular change did not just occur at one particular time. It was between approximately ’74 and ’78. And this was predominantly also an internal conflict with yourself, in particular. It had to be in line with your own conscience. You compare all kinds of radical means in different situations: the PVP, the PLO, the RAF… Ultimately, you feel the most for the liberation movement in Africa, where violence is actually legitimate, because the population is being exploited. And in the beginning we found: “Europe is the centre of the power, and each action against the power contributes towards support of the oppressed and the fight for liberation”. But you start to think more and more that that is very far-fetched.’

Respondent 5: ‘I then thought: no more of that. We must not have any more of that. We must not be massacred like this. We are a small group, and if we want more than to be martyrs, we must join a larger group. The step to a better world will never happen if you give up your own life, will it?’
View of current society. A respondent stated that he began to condemn violence because he realised that he felt part of the Netherlands. This argument is essentially a change in his world view: while as a Moluccan he first felt like an enemy of the Netherlands, he realised later that he was starting to love the Netherlands. Another respondent expressed this feeling too.

Respondent 4: ‘Only years later did I renounce violence as a means. That is because you have taken over part of Dutch society. You have become a part of it. (…) If you are a part of society, only then can you renounce violence. Nevertheless, you wish to contribute towards society. You have a place in society, you have chosen this society, and then you have to find other ways of realising your love for your country. (…) Not only did I realise that violence doesn’t pay, but I also realised that violence means that a fundamentally hostile attitude exists between the Moluccans and the Dutch. And that this stands in the way of you being accepted. And you begin to love this country anyway.’

Respondent 5: ‘We had learnt that there is always an enemy, but we never learned that we can also be friends. (…) [What caused this reversal in attitude: from looking at some people as the enemy to looking at them as friends?] I don’t know. A bit of education, I think. In our movement we were one of the few with self-criticism. And we learned reconciliation and forgiveness.’

We did not hear this from the other respondents. Although they see their future in the Netherlands, with their children, in the first instance they feel Moluccan and their words express little warmth towards the Netherlands.

Ideology: left-wing respondents

Desired future. Within the left-wing movement, ideology and subculture merged together: the left-wing radicals tried to create the ideal world by adopting a particular lifestyle. There were global ideas about an ideal world with far-reaching individual freedom and expression and there was an aversion to regulations. But – certainly in the initial phase of the movement – there was a clear political goal on the agenda that was mainly being pursued for very practical reasons: easing the acute housing shortage by addressing the unoccupied homes in the town centres. In these sections, we consider the role of the political goal and the role played by violence in pursuing this. We discuss the disappointment about the changes relating to the subculture further on, under affective factors that relate to the movement (in 7.2).

Unlike in the case of the Moluccans, for the left-wing respondents there is no evidence that deradicalisation stemmed from a change in political goals, and therefore from a changed view of the desired future. We see in the case of the squatters’ movement that this ‘desired future’ came somewhat closer in practice, as political goals were, in part, achieved. The municipality called off large-scale projects that required the demolition of large numbers of old homes. Many squatted premises were legalised and this enabled a number of squatters to obtain a legal home. It is remarkable that the respondents do not bring this to the fore as a motive for distancing themselves from the squatters’ movement. A changed view of the desired future comes to the fore with one re-
spondent, when he describes his disappointment that resulted from the understanding that the future he had imagined did not prove to be achievable.

Respondent 10: ‘I am disappointed, actually due to the realisation that reality is winning... I have been working on a good goal for a long time now: a widespread social movement. An everyday reality in which you feel fine, and in which people have more time for one another. (...) I found it a truly fantastic day, on the Queen’s birthday that year. There are many people who even doubt that. Within a few months it was chaos. The unity was gone. That meant disappointment. The end of an idyll.’

Another respondent, who was also active in a later stage of the movement – when the movement had expanded to cover several issues (which often refer to the international context), said that achieving goals at international level led to a change in participation.

Respondent 11: ‘But then Mandela was released and the anti-apartheid struggle lost its edge. We didn’t want to continue with them any longer, with the actions.’

Path to change. For many squatters, violence did not prove to be the right way to achieve change. As the Moluccan respondents also often argued, a number of left-wing respondents condemned violence on account of strategic reasons: because it gives rise to an alienation from society, and as a result, would not be effective.

Respondent 11: ‘I was concerned about our isolation. We carry out actions that are no longer as productive. The fact is, you don’t want the actions themselves to be the subject of discussion. A survey was then also conducted that revealed that two percent of the Dutch supported us. I considered that too few. I would have considered twenty as alright, as we were not going for a majority. To the contrary: we wanted to have something to explain and to convince people with. But I felt that two was too few.’

Respondent 10: ‘It simply isn’t possible! If you find yourself up against a whole load of police officers, etc., militarization is necessary. But I do not consider that to be a good course of action, as that is too much like a civil war. Then you have lost the social basis.’

Respondent 9: ‘Lucky Luuk was already no longer on city level. At the time, I didn’t back it anymore either. Issuing threats to riot (‘otherwise we will destroy the town’) didn’t work anymore. Therefore I didn’t agree with this approach anymore. Guys, we are deadlocked!’

This alienation from society is therefore strategically undesirable, but one or two also stated that they found this alienation unpleasant on the personal level.

Respondent 9: ‘But I didn’t want to be excluded from society. I didn’t like standing in the baker’s shop and feeling antipathy. The fact is, I didn’t want any negative things at all.’

In addition to these ideas about the use of violent strategies, in the following section we see that violence also plays a role in a change in atmosphere within the movement.
View of current society. One of the respondents, who was also active in a later stage, told us that the world view changed, which meant that the political ideals came to be viewed in a different light.

Respondent 8: ‘Well, and during this period the world was also different. South Africa was already different. There was major disappointment among many people who were active in this. Then the ANC came to power… And later Mugabe did too. He came from the left-wing movement that seized control, but now he is one of the most terrible dictators. That is not without its effects and causes you to doubt some of your choices. There was disappointment. Human impotence.. Particularly if you think that you are on the right side.’

Ideology: right-wing respondents

The role of ideology differs within extreme right-wing groups. Some have an extensive vision of the world, which substantiates their extreme right-wing positions, while the standpoints of others are based only on a general xenophobia and a well-thought-out ideology does not play a role at all. In the interviews, an altered ideology does not emerge as a motive for deradicalisation. The two former politicians do not seem to have changed their viewpoints since the time that they were active in extreme right-wing parties. Therefore, our interviews unfortunately offer too few insights to say anything further about the role of ideology in radicalisation and deradicalisation. One of the respondents does state that he acquired a different view after his disengagement and says that his view of foreigners softened somewhat about the time of his disengagement, though he does not give the impression that this was a motive for disengagement.

Respondent 14: ‘I went to work after completing my education. And then you also get non-Dutch friends. (...) My own ideas have changed greatly since that time. I still perhaps think ten percent of how I did then. Ninety percent of my ideas are different.’

The ex-hooligan is of the opinion that ideology hardly plays a role for extreme right-wing youth anyway, either in their engagement, or in their disengagement.

Respondent 15: ‘You only see the ideology among the diehards. The largest group are those who just go along. They don’t even know what a swastika means. A group had chalked a swastika on the walls of a home for the elderly. I asked, “Do you guys know what that means?” They thought it meant “foreigners out”. I said, “No man, it means something completely different.” Then I tell them about the fascists and the war, and that by doing this you’re hurting the older people who experienced that.

Ideology: Islamic respondents

In those cases of Islamic deradicalisation we see the opposite of the extreme right, i.e. that deradicalisation does arise mainly from an altered view of – religious – ideology. Though the people did remain Muslim in all cases, they began subscribing to a less radical school of thought. Deradicalisation was therefore accompanied by a clearly different
ideological interpretation of Islam. This was not explicitly a matter of an altered vision of the desired future, but mainly an altered view of the path to change and an altered vision of today’s world. The changes in ideology predominantly arose through the respondents coming in contact with other ideas (Islamic and non-Islamic), which derive their persuasiveness primarily from their manner of argumentation.

Respondent 18: “Then I visited a new website: selefiepublications.com. (…) They said: not only are violent actions not permitted, but you go to hell for them! Great scholars, al-Albani for example, shared this opinion. Nobody doubts Albani’s research, though they do doubt his methodology. He said that now we must not occupy ourselves with politics because there’s no point in it. There is a jihad, but that isn’t good yet. First things first. Start by first looking at yourself. And we’re not talking about five years, but about generations. (…) He says: “Even in the case that we were already a strong nation, then September 11th would not have been permitted.” I (still) share his opinion because he is able to substantiate it so well. Everything fits! Islam is not at all that violent, Islam is one of the most peaceful religions. Islam did not grow through violence, but through good conduct. (…) For me Islam is more important than politics. If Islam says that the war is not good, then I don’t think it’s good either.”

Path to change. One of the experts from our background discussions tells us that fragmentation occurs within some small radical groups due to differences in opinion on the question of whether jihad in the Netherlands is permitted. Some members (mainly women) are frightened off by this. They cannot/don’t want to take that ultimate step; that’s going too far for them. One of our respondents also discusses the doubts about jihad.

Respondent 17: ‘And there was always the discussion: is participation in jihad an individual or societal obligation?’ There are so many statements on this. Some say that Iraq has the obligation for jihad, but they indicate precisely where the final boundaries lie with respect to the circle of countries around Iraq that have that obligation. In contrast, others say that jihad is an obligation all over the world. You go looking for the extremes. (…) For me, jihad was always an undecided issue. I was never at the point of going, even though I found (and find!) it very unjust there. I didn’t want to choose that path because it is a more complex matter. I wanted to find the truth first.’

Another respondent had a strategic reason for following a more moderate path:

Respondent 19: ‘[So you chose more of a constructive strategy than a confrontational one?] Yes, I already distanced myself from that five years ago. I came to realise that if I am not prepared to distance myself from that then I won’t get the masses to go along with me.’

Vision of current society. Among most respondents, the radical ideology is supported by orthodox religious ideas, in which a central question is when somebody can be considered a good Muslim. This pertains both to attitude and behaviour. Because of this interweaving of ideals and lifestyle, we categorise these positions under the ‘world view’. In that sense we are broadening the world view to include here a vision of one’s own lifestyle and identity. In the case of two respondents, their deradicalisation was partly due to the realisation that in practicing such orthodoxy they were not on the right path.
Respondent 17: ‘He [the new Moroccan imam in the neighbourhood mosque, -ed.] often addressed me regarding my attitude and my clothing. Then he said, ”You don’t really think that that’s what Islam is, that Pakistani or Afghan clothing? That can’t be?! Islam is for everyone.” [But if you’re radical, then don’t you just think, “he’s not a real Muslim!”?] Yes, at the time I often thought, “Is he doing good things? Is he not a fake Muslim?” But I believed him due to the foundations of his argument.’

We hear a comparable story from another respondent. She also became less and less convinced that she was on the right path when she had to deny parts of herself.

Respondent 16: ‘At the time I was very strict, religiously speaking: I wore a headscarf and a long dress, and I wasn’t allowed to listen to any music. But then I went with girlfriends to shops where music was playing. And I found that very nice. I noticed that I actually started to swing along with it. But that wasn’t allowed, and because of that I started thinking, “Why isn’t it allowed anyway?” I started discovering more parts of my identity. I said to myself, “You can be very strict, but you love music! You love dancing!”’. There were parts of myself I didn’t want to deny (...) In the summer before I went to higher secondary school, I was sixteen at the time, we were in my parents’ village. There was Berber music, about love. (...) My brother said, “Do you get it now that Berbers can’t radicalise?” Men and women sang together. I didn’t approve of it, but actually, I did think that it ‘had something’ after all… - that there was something to it. I thought, “Why is this not supposed to be good?” That was the switch, the confrontation with my roots. “Look, I come from here, these are moderate Muslims.” That created the first slight doubt. It made me think twice.’

A third respondent says that, after a period in the Middle East, he began to realise that the Netherlands was his country, and that it would be better for him to focus on ways to constructively contribute to the position of Muslims in the Netherlands – something we had also heard from the Moluccans.

Respondent 19: ‘That constructiveness you talked about, I’ve only had that for two years now. I went to live in Dubai at the time (I just went there to work, I wanted to get out of the Netherlands), but I quickly tired of that world. I came back after two months. I turned brain dead there, realised that that was not my society. I find it frustrating to not be understood. (...) Now I can best engage in the Netherlands. This is my country. When Moroccan youths say, “I am Moroccan”, then I think, you were born and raised here in the Netherlands. Morocco is your mother country.’

And a fourth respondent became more and more aware that there isn’t just one truth.

Respondent 20: ‘But the “start with yourself” approach ... gradually you learned that Islam is different. That it’s more complicated. But this is a process that takes years. You’re confronted with how little you know. (...) In this manner a process of awareness started for me. You start discovering that “truth” does not exist, that instead there are very many different standpoints. Then you put previous standpoints in perspective, the glorification of certain actions, hijacking and things like that.’
7.1.a Conclusions re. Factors which are related to ideology

This description of factors that are related to ideology and thus associated with a decline in normative involvement is summarised in the following table.

Table 7.1: Role of ideological factors for different types disengagers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disengagers</th>
<th>Decline in normative involvement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moluccan</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>Ideology constitutes the most important reason for deradicalisation of Moluccans. The ideology failed in various aspects. For three respondents this had to do with the desired future not seeming achievable. Various persons reject violence (the path). This position mainly has a strategic background. And one respondent rejects violence because he reached the conclusion that it is not legitimate (within the context of this conflict in the Netherlands – this is not a rejection of violence per se). In the case of the last respondent, this arises mainly from a change in his vision of the current situation: he realised that he is a part of the Netherlands and does not want any fundamental animosity between the Dutch and Moluccans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>For a number of respondents, their disengagement has to do with a crisis in their normative involvement. For most of them this is a result of a crisis in their affective involvement, because the ideology of a better world without power was significantly interwoven with the movement’s subculture. A number became disappointed in what could be achieved. Almost all respondents emphasise that violence is not a good means of bringing the desired future closer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Ideology does not seem to play a role for former members of the extreme right-wing movement. They do not seem to have really changed their opinions, or this seems to have been more a result than a cause of their disengagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>Ideology is the most important reason for deradicalisation among Islamic respondents. We can see various processes in this regard. One respondent became less radical because he realised that he belongs in the Netherlands. Two others were very orthodox but became more moderate when they came to the conclusion that that orthodoxy did not suit them well and was therefore not the proper path. For one of them, it was mainly the confrontation with personal taste and needs that played a major role in this; for the other, it was other people’s substantiations. A fourth respondent did remain orthodox, but the Salafist school of thought which he finds convincing now has a non-violent strategy. And the last respondent realised that there is not one single truth, but multiple ones.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An important similarity between almost all the individuals from the Moluccan, left-wing, and Islamic perspectives is that at a certain moment the instrument of violence (the path to change) was rejected. This rejection of violence is obviously of very great importance for the deradicalisation process, but almost never comes on its own – it is usually associated with an altered vision of the desired future, or with an altered vision of the movement. It was mainly an altered vision of the desired future that played a role for the Moluccans. They had a concrete political goal that they wanted to achieve but when they came to the conclusion, after several violent actions, that the goal was not achievable, the motivation for radical action ceased to exist. For the left-wing respondents, the rejection of violence had more to do with organisational reasons: violence resulted from alienation from society, power struggles and fragmentation within the movement (see also 7.2). For the Islamic respondents as well, the underlying reasons for rejecting violence are all of an ideological nature. A significant reason is the insight that their religion is not a violent one. A change in the world view is another reason. On the one hand, this pertains to a change in one’s vision of his or her own lifestyle and identity – the respondents realised that an orthodox lifestyle did not suit them, and that the own truth was not the only truth. On the other hand, they realised that they belonged in the Netherlands: ‘the Netherlands is my country’. We have seen that this realisation also played a role for some Moluccan respondents in the rejection of violence.

None of the respondents from a right-wing perspective cite an altered view of violence – or, more generally, an altered view of the path to change – as a factor in their disengagement. This might have to do with the fact that the majority of respondents were active in a non-violent niche of the extreme right-wing movement.

7.2 Factors linked to the movement

Another category of factors that causes people to disengage from a radical group is associated with the movement itself (affective factors). People are members because the group provides them with something they need. Once the group is no longer able to fulfil their desires (whether because the group changes, or because the desires change) then they may consider disengaging from that group. We can see that movement-related factors play a different role in the four cases.

Factors linked to the movement: Moluccan respondents

The respondents themselves do not speak of a Moluccan ‘movement’. Originally, the entire Moluccan community had the same endeavour; though not everyone opted for the violent and confrontational course, the activists remained a part of it nonetheless. There were two Moluccan leaders with differing political orientations, but youths did not organise themselves along these two lines, instead trying to bridge the disunity between the two political groups. Youths from various cities had contact with each other and regularly visited each other. But the actions were organised by individual cells distributed over all of the Netherlands. Though these individual cells did have mutual contact, there was no real structure to this contact. There were also various left-wing (student) groups separate from these. This loose structure meant that activism was not dependent on individual leaders. The organisation therefore did not play a central role in the deradicalisation
of these respondents, but rather a subsidiary role. Indeed, in most of the conversations frustration is expressed regarding the approach of the leaders.

Respondent 5: ‘I saw more and more what the leadership was like. There is a difference between having contact with resistance groups, as the leadership did, and contact with ordinary people who wonder, “What do I want with my existence?” And there was absolutely no idea of this! What do you know about that if you’re only living to lead your own life? (...) But there were opportunities – which were destroyed by military sabre-rattling and by political leaders.

Respondent 1: ‘Our leaders were bad, weak. While we were busy with our actions, they deserted us and started negotiating. They let themselves be bought out. And they ultimately used our actions for social purposes. They labelled our struggle a social one. That’s not what it was! We were really sick to death of that!! It’s not about luxury, and they shouldn’t have profited from us. They should have made this separate from us.’

Factors linked to the movement: left-wing respondents

In many of the conversations with left-wing respondents an altered atmosphere within the squatters’ movement was cited as one of the main motivations for leaving the movement. The movement became more rigid instead of an organic, spontaneous movement without formal leadership or regulations. Power started playing a role; self-declared leaders came into being, who started speaking on behalf of the movement, and violence turned inward– which had a major effect on the atmosphere. This change in organisation and subculture contrasted greatly with that which most of the people in the squatters’ movement were seeking (and thus with their ideals and ‘ideology’) and disappointed many respondents.

Respondent 7: ‘The atmosphere in the movement changed: violence, egotism, drugs. That didn’t fit in my ideal world view. (...) And from a political perspective, things were becoming more and more annoying within the movement. The social network was nice, with a lot of parties and such. We had a shared world view and carried out actions. But this changed with the discussion on violence. Violence is not good for your head. Because it works. You get what you want that way – in the short term, in any case. (...) At a certain point violence is used within the movement as well. In discussions about ownership, for instance. To be the boss. Originally you only use violence externally, with rational considerations. When a crew brings along firearms, for example. But as violence becomes more functional and more rational, it also starts playing a role in relationships. It turned out to be an effective instrument. But that’s destructive. More and more people who don’t agree with it take off, and then it gets harder and harder. That became increasingly clear in ’84 – you can see that in the RARA attacks of the time as well. And that’s a path that I as an individual, but also for the movement, did not see working. I was still planning on having a career... (...) It’s also a generational thing. Sooner or later power issues start playing a role: somebody needs money, somebody doesn’t feel like doing something, somebody steals, people let themselves be bought out and are seen as traitors...’
Respondent 9: ‘Like the Staatslieden district increasingly pointing the finger. That created an oppressing atmosphere. Then we also got those torture practices. [When the Groote Keyser squat was recaptured?] Yes, all that led to the squatters’ movement falling apart. (...) The Staatslieden district sounded a city alarm at a certain point. A young man was evicted who was subletting and hadn’t paid his rent. And the Staatslieden district tried to prevent the eviction... They were all standing there with their helmets and clubs... They were totally out of it! Pure fascism! I didn’t want to belong to that anymore.’

Respondent 8: ‘That normative stuff, that can’t be. That’s when I left.’

But the composition of the movement also changed to such an extent that people no longer recognised themselves in it.

Respondent 6: ‘When Hans Kok died in ’85 I was already past my highpoint. It was a totally different squatters scene. I was no punk. I had already been in the squatters’ movement for five years by then, and room had since been made for other generations.’

Respondent 7: ‘The movement became increasingly marginal and exerted less and less influence. More and more addicts were coming in as well. Around 1980 there was a kind of cheerful activism. There were thousands of activists. All of my age. We wanted influence. And we succeeded too. But these people left the movement. Criminals came in. Heroin dealers.’

And at a certain point the movement had changed so much that it was unable to pursue its goals in a good way. Two respondents tell us they were disappointed with what the movement was able to achieve.

Respondent 10: ‘Back during the Groote Keyser I was one of the only people who were enormously disappointed about Polak’s decision. (...) I was disappointed. The movement was done in by its own success. I quit it. I was still involved in the scene, but then I (...) went to university. (...) I’m disappointed that a movement turns out to be as strong as its weakest link. A non-hierarchical movement can’t be directed. There is diversity, therefore no authority. That makes a movement as weak as its weakest link. It just can’t be done!’

Respondent 7: ‘The movement became increasingly marginal, got less and less influence. (...) And the game was up at a certain point. The movement was marginalised. I wanted to mean more and be part of something larger.’

For one of the respondents, the feeling that his activities were being misused for things he didn’t support also played a part.

Respondent 7: ‘I was also misused in my role. I supplied things to groups, which were used for (terrorist) activities that I didn’t agree with. Abroad. Definitely people from the Middle East. More and more hardcore boys came in between ’86 and ’89. I made my decision. My things were misused for actions such as murder and killing. I’m against that. That goes against my conscience.’
Factors linked to the movement: right-wing respondents

Disappointment in the organisation also plays a significant role for respondents from the extreme right-wing movement. This has to do with a lack of loyalty within the organisation, disappointment in the leadership and the awareness that the movement is gaining little ground in the Netherlands.

Respondent 14: ‘I worked for the party for half a year. I even put my own money into the party! At a certain point they still owed me [hundreds of euros, -ed.]. But I didn’t get that back – because of their poor financial situation. And then I stated: I don’t want anything more to do with you guys. I didn’t write off the money they owed me until they removed me from all their files. That was a year later. (...) I was very active in the party. A party on the rise. That didn’t materialise, due to the actions of certain people (...) Perhaps... if the party did have a future, if I’d become a member of the PvdA or the CDA, then I would have stayed in it, or I would have kept it up a bit longer.’

Respondent 13: ‘[He, -ed.] and I did cry on each other’s shoulder. I wanted so much to have a true leadership figure, with or without moustache! I always saw myself as a right-hand man. But maybe everybody sees that – everybody waits for a true leader. Maybe Fortuyn also waited a really long time for the main man before he just went ahead and did it himself.’

The lack of support and loyalty from the movement also played a role in the disengagement of the young man interviewed in Alert!.

From published interview: ‘And I noticed that there was little support to be had from the group I went around with. Engaging myself, and then they let you down, that didn’t help either. Oh yeah, and you also had to pay the fines yourself. For example, the first time I went canvassing, I thought, well yeah, it’s a legal party, seat on the city council, so that’s okay. But then you’re picked up and fined because of that and the top party official that you talk to about it acts completely nonchalant about it. No sympathy. Then you don’t believe in it anymore either. If a party stands for what they preach and then acts that way about it...’

For one of the former politicians, his activity in politics actually ended when he lost his seat in the city council. The other left politics when his party went under, due to internal quarrels (and dismissal was hanging over his head – see following section).

Respondent 13: ‘I didn’t care in the least what people called me. But it was the combination: the party’s fallen apart (with all those quarrels we got into the media, we lost in the polls) and the school said: you have to choose.’

Both respondents are ambiguous towards renewed political activities. They emphasise the weakness of the movement and of the current leaders but both turn out to have ventured another attempt at finding a connection once again. This was not successful.
Decline and Disengagement

Respondent 12: ‘When it comes to politics I no longer have a role. I would like to work off my energy; my ideas are still the same. But Wilders is arrogant. If you call him you get his voicemail. And if you leave a message, he never calls back, then you’re out of the game. (...) They [other leaders of extreme right-wing groups, -ed.] weren’t okay with me either, because I was too much a part of accomplished, established politics. But they never achieved anything, never worked, never performed. I’m getting furious at that. (...) I was recently asked by a little club (...) But you need staff, a top staff, because I can’t make do on my own. I did have three people altogether participating. But when they saw that it was going to be a real task, you didn’t see them again. It was just hot air.’

Respondent 13: ‘[What do you think about Wilders?] ’I did email him once, but he never emailed me back.’

Factors linked to the movement: Islamic respondents

In the case of respondents with a radical Islamic background, our selection unfortunately does not suffice to be able to say anything about the role of a movement. The respondents were not a part of any organised or strongly cohesive group or movement. And no motives for disengagement were cited in the conversations that pertain to the movement, group or organisation.

An expert from one of our background discussions does tell some things about the role which the radical group can play in disengagement. She states that disengagement is often due to trivial reasons such as an internal quarrel or a separation: someone is denounced and expelled from the group. Ideological discussions take place internally, whereby there are also differences of opinion. The search for evidence supporting the various positions is a kind of sport, on which members spend a lot of time. But a group can be so extreme at a certain point that a member may be denounced for a triviality, such as wearing the wrong brand of shoes. Deradicalisation can also result from disappointment with the subculture of a certain group. Youths often find that a radical group looks very exciting from the outside. Belonging to it lends a certain status, but in practice it is sometimes disappointing.

Another source, which reveals that factors linked to the movement can play a role in the disengagement of Islamic radicals, is the biography by Ed Husain, *The Islamist* (2007). Disappointment with the support and focus of the leadership of the Hizb ut-Tahrir organisation in the UK played a major role in his disengagement from the movement. This comes into play when a fellow activist stabs another Muslim to death, and though Husain is greatly affected by this, he believes that the leadership has to stand behind the perpetrator. Instead of doing so, the leader, Omar Bakri, distances himself from the event, claiming that Hizb is a non-violent party. Husain finds this hypocritical and talks about Omar Bakri’s deceit (p. 155). He cites this as being a direct inducement to his disengagement from the movement. This disappointment had already come into play before when Husain, very moved and indignant, informed a leader of the fact that he and his Hizb fellow activists had been violently removed from the mosque by members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The reaction of the leader was what inspired Husain’s first doubts:
Ed Husain: ‘Farid’s response on hearing what had happened stunned me: “you must change public opinion in the area. That is the only way to control the mosque.” There were no words of comfort (…) Farid's impersonal, indifferent response shook me. How could he? When Farid had been expelled from university campus, we had stood by him. (...) And yet, when we were down, he did not care.’ (p.128)

7.2.a Conclusions re factors linked to the movement

This description of individual factors which are linked to the group, organisation or movement, and are thus associated with a decline in affective involvement, is summarised in the following table.

Table 7.2: Role of factors linked to the movement for different types of disengagers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disengagers</th>
<th>Decline in affective involvement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moluccans</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Disappointment in the movement played a subsidiary role in the deradicalisation of radical Moluccans. Reference is made to the weak leaders, who used actions for their own ends and even used the struggle for personal gain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>For the squatters, the factors linked to the movement played the largest role in their disengagement. ‘Rottenness’ crept into the movement. The respondents give two explanations for this: (1) the violence. This was originally a reaction to government intervention but increasingly became an external strategy, and the violence ultimately turned inwards. (2) An increasingly explicit power struggle, partly as a result of the violence. Because the subculture was interwoven with the ideology, for some people the disappointment in the dynamics within the movement also led to doubts about their own ideals and to a crisis in their normative involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>Disappointment in the organisation also plays a significant role for disengagement among the extreme right. This has to do with a lack of loyalty within the organisation, disappointment in the leadership and the realisation that the movement is gaining little ground in the Netherlands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>It is difficult to say anything about factors linked to the organisation with respect to deradicalisation of our Islamic respondents, as those we spoke with were not members of any group or organisation. Other sources reveal that denouncement within the movement or disappointments about the practices within a group can play a role in disengagement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the respondents from the left-wing activist movements and those from the extreme right-wing groups indicate that factors linked to the movement played a significant role in their disengagement. For the left-wing respondents this had to do with the increasingly
The ideal had always been a free place where everyone has equal power, but there slowly arose more and more differences in opinion about the strategy to be carried out and the desired future, and different smaller groups tried to take the power for themselves. The left-wing respondents describe a strong, inspirational movement of great appeal, which slowly disintegrated into a ‘mess’ in which violence and drugs assumed an ever more significant role. For the right-wing respondents it has more to do with disappointment in the movement’s power and possibilities. They view the extreme right as a movement with great potential which never came to fruition. On one hand this has to do with the low capability of the people drawn to the movement, and on the other hand with the pressure and exclusion exerted by the outside world.

Affective factors play a much smaller role for respondents from the Moluccan activist movement. This might have to do with the fact that the Moluccan ‘movement’ coincided with Moluccan community overall. Because the activists were connected with this community in many ways – and not just through their radicalism – affective considerations did not lead as easily to disengagement; a rejection of the movement meant in this case after all a rejection of the community. The fact that the only criticism to clearly emerge in this area was aimed at the leaders and not the group confirms this idea: leaders are certainly replaceable, while the community is not.

The respondents from the Islamic activist movement do not cite any of the factors linked to the movement as a reason for deradicalisation. This has to do with the fact that none of them perceived themselves to be part of a group. This does not mean that no movement is evident among radical Muslims, but that we do not have much empirical insight into this. Our secondary discussions with experts and Ed Husain’s biography reveal that factors linked to the movement can indeed play a role in disengagement. This could have to do with disappointment in the leaders, with disappointment in what it actually means to belong to such a group, or with internal quarrels and disunity.

### 7.3 Factors related to practical life circumstances

In all four cases we see that practical, personal life circumstances (continuance factors) constitute a motive for disengagement and a decline in activism.

#### Practical life circumstances: Moluccan respondents

One of the Moluccan respondents put a stop to all radical activities when, during his time at university, he got married and had a daughter for whom he felt responsible. He also emphasises how important the social possibilities and opportunities were for him in this regard.

Respondent 4: ‘But the social perspective was important for me. I was viewed as a successful Moluccan in this society. (...) It’s about taking advantage of your opportunities. So you need to have new opportunities in your personal development as well. And be fortunate, such as a job like that (…)’

The following quote from another respondent reveals that the activist life was very intensive and could not be kept up indefinitely:
Respondent 2: ‘When I began I had an incredible drive. You put everything into it, you have no private life. And it even came up in my work. I paid house calls to Moluccans, and the same topics played a role there. [Why did you stop?] I didn’t do anything else at the time. You put so much into it! At night we had discussions, and at the weekends we had meetings. And I was working too. (...) And maybe we were tired politically as well. We were too tired to do anything more for the RMS.’

Time is also a factor in itself. One of the respondents was able to spend years thinking things over while in prison, and another claims to have gotten older and wiser over time.

**Practical life circumstances: left-wing respondents**

A number of the left-wing respondents cite motives which reveal that they distanced themselves from the activist life because they wanted to return to their own lives. They were sick of the intensive life. They wanted to earn money and start a career, either because they were responsible for a child or otherwise.

Respondent 9: ‘At a certain point I had enough of ‘the common good’. I wanted to go further. I wanted a house to live in. I had given enough. In ’81 the large urban movement was over. I had given so much. I wanted to have a boyfriend again. (...) And so then I came [into another house, -ed.]. That was a transition... You have no life. Your ideals are far away. Then you start thinking. I wanted to earn my own money.’

Respondent 8: ‘Things changed when my daughter went to (...) school (...) Things changed then. I even had a real job for a time. Then I also figured out that that’s not for me! That was to put the finances in order.’

In the case of another respondent, his life was gradually occupied by other interests. ‘Other things slowly started to prevail.’ He sought intellectual challenges and became more and more immersed in his studies. Yet another saw that the squatters’ movement no longer offered him any possibilities for putting his life to good use or having an effect.

Respondent 7: ‘My decision for a career was also reached by looking at other people. How do they, former squatters, arrange their lives? What do they achieve? Most of them remained very marginal. I wanted to have an impact myself. I wanted to continue engaging myself for the constitutional state, for honesty and openness. It was a rational choice. I didn’t want any violence, but did want to be effective. This is what I wanted to achieve, having influence. (...) Well, if you saw those people, they were just kind of mooching about, tinkering with their dole. Not very inspirational.’

**Practical life circumstances: right-wing respondents**

Factors having to do with the desire to lead a quiet life are also evident among the former extreme right-wing respondents. The picture they sketch of their life at the time of their extreme right-wing activities reveal that involvement in the extreme right has major
consequences. Life is made almost impossible because of the exclusion and stigmatising mechanisms which the rest of society employs. The respondents talk about vandalism, threats and the risk of losing their jobs. Prejudice and pending legal cases also played a role. All this applied even to those who were active in a democratic political party. In part they took (and take) this for granted and accept the situation.

Respondent 12: 'Then once again an enormous group of those people were standing in front of my door and everything was written all over. They’d chalked my name and address on the street. There was a lot of tension, it was always the familiar mohawks, left-wing activists. (...) Our type of clubs were picked on and stigmatised. It was really a pity, I was even excluded from the city councils. (...) And you get into quarrels with everyone, family, friends. You get broken down. I was kicked out of my house as well. (...) You said that you quarrelled with your family. What’s that like now? When the hate campaign has gone on for so long (twenty years), at a certain point you think: damn them all! I hardly see anyone in my family anymore.'

Respondent 13: ‘At home I didn’t get much trouble from antifascist actions (...) But then they stood in front of the school [where I worked, -ed.,] during open house, for example, sometimes with signs; you can also see that the number of pupils went down during that time. (...) There are a number of teachers who are clearly against me, but that doesn’t affect me. Well, that’s my nature. It might sound hard, but the opinions of those teachers mean nothing at all to me. But I was never isolated either, never sat alone. Because there were other right-wing teachers.’

However, for some people these factors do also constitute a clear reason for stopping extreme right-wing activities.

Respondent 13: 'Things got totally out of hand at school. The walls were often vandalised. From other teachers I heard, “They want to make sure you leave your job.” I knew that I wouldn’t get a chance anywhere else. I didn’t care in the least what people called me. But it was the combination: the party’s fallen apart (with all those quarrels we got into the media, we lost in the polls) and the school said: you have to choose. They did let me remain a member but I had to give up all my positions, otherwise I would be fired within a week. (...) It was the combination. “If I continue like this, I will be fired too.” I (...) loved my subject and my teaching position. And I didn’t want to become a social outcast through no fault of my own. (...) When I stopped, I lay in bed, crying. That was the first time since my early youth. (...) I had had legal cases for years. (...) That did play a part. I hate legal cases so much. I also felt kind of like: “Why am I standing here?” If I was sentenced, they would fire me. And that just kept hanging over my head all those years.’

Respondent 14: ‘I was fired when my employer found out about my extreme right-wing activities. That was through the Internet. Everything is visible for so long via the Internet, even photos. That’s a pity. I had to go to a lot of trouble to get everything off the Internet.’
And the young man from the published interview got sick of the repeated visits by the police at a certain point.

From published interview: ‘At first it only brought misery; the police kept coming to the door to serve summonses; I was sentenced and things at home weren’t all that pleasant anymore. (...) When the police came to the door more and more often, almost every week, she [his mother, -ed.] started getting sick of it.’

The ex-hooligan also cites predominantly practical reasons for his decision to quit the scene. These mainly have to do with his ever-increasing drug use.

Respondent 15: ‘I was picked up when my girlfriend was seven months pregnant. We were pulled out of bed and our whole house was ransacked. (...) And then there were the drugs; I used cocaine and was acting crazier and crazier. Because of the hooliganism I ended up in the criminal circuit. At a certain point there was no longer a positive spiral of activities, but a negative one – leading downwards. And my daughter and my family ... I had to constantly prove, prove, prove myself. And I needed more and more drugs for that. Yes, because when I was sober I became uncertain. And I lost the relationship with my daughter, started raising my hand to my girlfriend at home, and things were going wrong with my work. There’s no school and no work. Then you don’t see any positive things anymore. At a certain point I thought, “it can’t go on like this.”’

Practical life circumstances: Islamic respondents

Among the Muslims we spoke with, the topic of practical life circumstances was raised here and there. Responsibilities towards a spouse and having a child constitute reasons to deradicalise or to not radicalise any further. We also see that the desire to make something of your life plays a role. It constitutes a motivation for deradicalising and also for not radicalising any further. In one case the respondent became inspired by the example of others.

Respondent 17: ‘But then I also came in contact with other boys. They were also actively involved in the religion, but they were also highly educated. I looked up to them, me with my incomplete lower secondary education. I did sometimes help the elderly and other people, and then they said, “Hey, go do something with that!”’

Respondent 16: ‘I thought, “Fuck the world, I’m going there! I’m going to join the struggle!” But I wouldn’t have done it, you know, I love life too much for that. And my environment also reacted very soberly to it. My mother said, “Just go get a nice diploma first.”’

One of the experts confirms that stigmatisation can be a reason for deradicalisation, because people who radicalise and join a radical group get labelled negatively by the outside world; ‘...and that's not a good outcome’. Finally, a respondent describes how a lot changed at the time he started working.
Respondent 20: ‘You start working and then whole other worlds open up to you. You live in a different reality. I was still super religious, but not so occupied with big ideas. Your attention shifts – you just want to earn your bread. It’s about time and knowledge.’

7.3.a Conclusions re. factors related to practical life circumstances

This description of factors which are related to practical aspects of a person’s life and are associated with a decline in continuance involvement is summarised in the following table.

Table 7.3: Role of practical life circumstances for different types of disengagers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disengagers</th>
<th>Decline in continuance involvement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moluccans</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Practical circumstances play a significant role among the Moluccans. A number of respondents state that they wanted to begin leading a quieter life, they became responsible for a child, they became older and wiser over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Practical circumstances play a significant supporting role in the disengagement of squatters. Three respondents state that they had enough of life within the movement at a certain point, and had the need to pursue their own life. The other three respondents also withdrew at a certain point or went looking for a job, but they describe this personal development more as a result of the movement falling apart: ‘the movement was over’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>Practical circumstances play a significant role in the disengagement of extreme right-wing activists. For all respondents in this case, this had to do with stigmatisation by the outside world and radical anti-fascist actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>Practical circumstances also play a role among Islamic activists. Responsibilities for wife and child play a role in deradicalisation, likewise the desire to make something of life. Participating in the labour process can also contribute to deradicalisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An important similarity between almost all the individuals from the various movements is that at a certain point practical life circumstances begin constituting a reason for deradicalisation. There are two variants:

- A ‘positive’ variant: persons grow out of the movement and want to go on with their lives. They get tired of the activist life, become, or want to become, responsible for a family, or want to establish a career. This plays a role among the left-wing activists, the Moluccans and the Islamic activists.
- A ‘negative’ variant: persons do not want to throw their future away (any longer). They are stigmatised because of their radicalism, because of which their social life is
eliminated and their career opportunities are minimized. This plays a role among the extreme right in particular. Although practical life circumstances constituted a factor for disengagement among almost all respondents, this is most evident among respondents from the right. This is due to the fact that these respondents have to deal with the negative variant: extreme stigmatisation and exclusion. The negative variant carries such weight that this itself can be regarded as an independent factor which directly contributes to the disengagement process. In contrast, the positive variant, though indeed often significant, mostly plays a supporting role.

7.4 Barriers

We previously described how radical movements not only attempt to satisfy the needs of their members, but also erect barriers to impede the disengagement of members. These barriers can take three forms: normative barriers, affective barriers and continuance barriers.

**Barriers to disengagement: Moluccan respondents**

The way in which the majority of Moluccans viewed the RMS and the extent to which the RMS was interwoven with Moluccan identity formed a barrier against deradicalisation. Although none of the respondents say they let this factor hold them back, the picture they sketch demonstrates that the shifting of goals was not an easy path. This evidently did prevent others from quitting the struggle for the RMS.

Respondent 2: ‘Look, everyone agreed that violence was not the way. Especially that case at that school. Yes... this is a slippery slope... You disapprove of it, but you’re behind it.’

Respondent 4: ‘Other people were less able to express themselves. I did hear from some people at the time that they were happy that I said it in that way. Because I dared to say that, other people also gained the room to express their feelings.’

Those people who quit the struggle for the RMS or disapproved of it were viewed as traitors. This was a touchy situation within that tight-knit community. In addition, this was also accompanied by internal violence. This was a difficult period for the respondents, and often accompanied by their own ambivalences.

Respondent 3: ‘I also received threats, by the way. In ’78 my house was shot to pieces.’

Respondent 4: ‘And then people believed “[He, -ed.] is a traitor,” and that was not totally a wrongful perception. (...) And previously, that led to threats. In the ’70s fires were started and our windows were broken. You also had an ambivalent position: you had been taught that you weren’t a good Moluccan if you weren’t for the RMS. And you felt that too, inside.’

Respondent 5: ‘Although then we were almost opponents. We were viewed as traitors to the RMS, and we were even shot at! It’s pure chance that I’m still alive.’
The Moluccan respondents therefore experienced both affective barriers (the sense of being a traitor to one's own society) and continuance barriers (physical threats).

**Barriers to disengagement: left-wing respondents**

In contrast to the Moluccans, the former squatters all indicate that they did not feel any pressure from the movement to remain in it. They did not feel any explicit social pressure that might constitute a barrier to disengagement.

Respondent 7: ‘Yes, my disengagement was accepted. There was that freedom. I was appreciated too. And from the beginning I also had contact with the outside world, I wrote, had contact with other writers and politicians.’

Respondent 9: ‘[What was the reaction?] I was one of many. It was nothing. I thought it was enough. A lot of people left at the same time.’

One individual indicates that disengagement from the movement was difficult because she had few contacts and activities outside the movement. But in most cases the opposite is emphasised, that disengagement was made easier by the contacts and activities that one had outside the movement.

Respondent 7: ‘One of the things that helped me take responsibility is that the Netherlands gives you the room to do so. I chose to leave the margins. That felt good. A good choice.’

Respondent 8: ‘The people from the left-wing movements, they also had a lot of contact with normal life. People were still part of a choir, or part of a football club. We also had a lot of contacts in the ordinary world. (...) Actually, I still sometimes get it, that feeling of: ‘I’m just a squatter in different clothes’. Sometimes I can be a real lady, you know. But it is a part of my identity. I also know a whole lot of people who turned their background in those movements into jobs – in development cooperation or international diplomacy, or as researchers at universities, in journalism or the music world...’

Respondent 11: ‘There was a feeling of not having any prospects within the struggle. There was no more growth. And that was combined with a society that is very open to accept people. An open society is very crucial. Because when the doors are shut – then you don’t have anything else. Now you can go back, you can still get opportunities. With us it was like: you put different clothes on and you could participate again. It’s completely different with the Moroccans...’

The squatters therefore did not experience any affective or continuance barriers. Among the former activists we do see that distancing themselves from the squatters’ life was accompanied by disappointment and despondency, and we have the idea that their own love of the squatters’ life (living out their social ideal) is what made disengagement difficult for some and that this constituted the most significant barrier. This is primarily a normative barrier: it required effort to admit that the ideal could not easily be lived out.
Respondent 9: ‘So my disengagement came after that sombre winter. The whole winter I thought about: what should I do? Everybody had that, by the way. (...) [What was it like, disengaging?] I found it really awful. Really difficult. There was an incredibly deep hole. Ideologically, but also about what to do with my life from then on.’

**Barriers to disengagement: right-wing respondents**

We do not get the impression that the amount of pressure exerted from the right-wing organisations was of such magnitude that continuance factors constituted a major barrier to disengagement.

Respondent 14: ‘It went quite easily. If they know that you’re leaving because you have certain ideas, then they do let you go. And so a number of guys that I hung around with also left.’

From published interview: ‘In general I didn’t have any trouble about it. I just unplugged the telephone and let the doorbell ring to its heart’s content. What struck me was that the leader acted as if I hadn’t said that I wanted out and kept stubbornly calling to ask if I would go to some meeting or other that Saturday. They did try to hold onto me because I was so active and it wasn’t easy to find that type of people.’

The conversations do not reveal any normative barriers either. What did constitute a barrier that had to be overcome was one’s own social attachment to the party. We can conclude that, for some people, all their social contacts are related to the party, and one of the respondents also explicitly states that it’s difficult to distance oneself from this. This is therefore an affective barrier to disengagement. So having friends outside the movement also helps.

Respondent 13: ‘[And when you were active in the party, did all your social contacts come from the party, or did you also spend time with other people?] Yes, I actually did. I only spent time with people from the party, but I also did little else at the time.’

Respondent 14: ‘It did take some time. They’re your friends after all, in the party. It’s not easy.’

The respondent from the previously published interview says that his contacts outside the party helped him overcome this barrier.

From published interview: ‘The few ordinary friends and colleagues I had helped me enormously. They helped me register with the housing association so that I could get my own apartment. They encouraged me to get my driving licence. How proud I was when I passed my driving test. I no longer needed the CP’86 or the actions against ethnic minorities.’
The ex-hooligan says that he himself did not experience any barriers in his disengagement (although he does let slip that he would have been punished if he had ‘ratted’ on someone), but that nowadays it is much more difficult to turn your back on the scene. In addition, he emphasises that the lack of follow-up support after a prison sentence often leads to ex-convicts looking up their extreme right-wing friends again.

Respondent 15: ‘It’s more difficult to get out nowadays, because then you’re given the cold shoulder. (...) One of those boys from [-name of city, -ed.] who got out, he’s totally ostracized now. (...) There is a boy who does want out. He’s having a hard time. I don’t know if he’s going to succeed. He’s coming from the slammer and doesn’t have anything. There is no follow-up support in the Netherlands. Suddenly you’re standing in the street with ten euros... and yeah, then those boys look for support from family. But if they don’t have any, then from their friends...and those are their old friends.’

Barriers to disengagement: Islamic respondents

The Islamic respondents deviate from the respondents from the other movements in the sense that they were not active in a radical movement, and so did not disengage from such a movement. This means that they did not encounter any affective or continuance barriers. Their process of deradicalisation involved more of an inner process, in which they discarded radical ideas. Two respondents experienced a normative barrier in this regard: they slowly let go of the orthodox interpretation of Islam, and this was a path fraught with doubts and uncertainties.

Respondent 16: ‘And listening to music in shops...doubt came very subtly. And my mother, who had tapes of Berber music. That music... that touched a nerve in me. Then I yelled, “Turn that music off” and my parents said, “Hey, pipe down, kid. This is our house and we listen to what we want.” And I love that music. You can deny that, but then that’s not really you.’

Respondent 17: ‘[But if you’re radical, then you just think, “he’s not a real Muslim!”?] Yes, at the time I often thought, “Is he doing good things? Is he not a fake Muslim?” But I believed him due to the foundations of his argument. And because of my contact with certain intellectuals.’

A third respondent deradicalised not by letting go of his orthodox interpretation of Islam, but by opting for another school of thought within orthodox Islam. He states that he did not experience any barriers in this process because in an earlier phase he had already immersed himself in another religious interpretation and therefore was open to other ideas.

Respondent 18: ‘I had already (...) learned that totally different ideas existed. I completely opened myself up.’
7.4.a Conclusions with respect to barriers

The description of the barriers to disengagement among respondents from the various radical movements is summarised in the following table.

Table 7.4: Role of barriers for different types of disengagers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disengagers</th>
<th>Normative barriers</th>
<th>Affective barriers</th>
<th>Continuance barriers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moluccans</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similarity exists between respondents from the left-wing and right-wing movements with respect to the lack of barriers they experienced in disengaging from their respective movements. Most respondents from the left state that the movement was quite open and that additionally they always maintained contacts with people outside the movement. The only barrier which some people experienced was of a normative nature: it required effort to recognise that the ideals could no longer be easily lived out. The respondents from the right also tell us that the group or party which they left placed few barriers in their way. In this case, however, we have strong doubts as to whether this outcome is not associated with the particular respondents we selected. We did not speak with any ex-members of skinhead or neo-Nazi groups, and it’s precisely in that area that barriers to disengagement may be evident. This suspicion is confirmed by statements made by the ex-hooligan, who says that members who disengage themselves from extreme right-wing youth groups are given the cold shoulder by their old friends, and end up in the extreme right-wing scene again because of the lack of care provided after a prison sentence.

While the left- and right-wing respondents had little trouble with barriers during their disengagement, the Moluccans did experience clear barriers. These barriers took various forms. First of all, the aforestated fact that the movement and the community were interwoven led to a situation where a rejection of activist goals was viewed as a rejection of the community. Loyalty to the community and the fear of being viewed as a traitor thus constituted an affective barrier. Secondly, ‘traitors’ often had to deal with physical threats and reprisals. This constituted a continuance barrier to disengagement.

Because the deradicalisation process did not, in the case of the Islamic respondents, involve any disengagement from a movement, there were not any barriers raised by a movement which had to be overcome. Deradicalisation was more of an inner process, and the barriers which these respondents experienced thus arose from their own ideology. It was difficult to relativise orthodoxy’s truth. In this regard the Muslims somewhat resemble the respondents from the left, for whom the largest barrier was constituted by the difficulty of accepting that their ideal could no longer be easily lived out.
7.5 Immediate causes and circumstances

Besides the motives and barriers which can play a role in the deradicalisation of individuals, we also distinguish another type of factor that is significant here, namely that of ‘immediate causes and circumstances’. What event or moment formed the impetus for the first phase of deradicalisation for the respondent, the impetus for the crisis in involvement?

Immediate causes and circumstances: Moluccan respondents

Four of the five Moluccan respondents state that they began doubting the usefulness of radical actions after such an action had taken place and not yielded any results. Although this process of doubt often went on for some time, the violent action at De Punt in 1977 is cited with striking frequency as the moment of seriously renouncing violence. A respondent who was personally involved in such an action also states that his crisis was set in motion when, during the action itself, he realised that the action would not yield any results.

Respondent 4: ‘And taking Van Agt hostage, so that was earlier. During that time I realised: violent actions in the Netherlands do not work. (...) De Punt was the turning point for me. At that time I didn’t just see that violence doesn’t pay, I also saw that violence means there is a structurally hostile relationship between the Moluccans and Dutch.’

Respondent 5: ‘[But when did you get out of the game?] Never. It’s latent knowledge... When...? In ’77. It was then I thought to myself: no more of that. We can’t have that anymore. We can’t be butchered like that anymore.’

Respondent 3: ‘[So you started choosing other means – when was that exactly?] That was in ’75. After the Wijster action. That’s when it clearly started. For a long time I still thought, if they had chosen a different target, then I still could have found a way to justify it. And then came ’77; that’s when I thought, “No. This is worthless.”’

Respondent 1: ‘We were so convinced that justice would triumph. Only after three days in the train, when we realised that we wouldn’t get what we wanted, even if we shot the whole train to death, did it get through to us. (...) Well, and in prison I had plenty of time to think about, “What have we done to end up here?”’

One of the respondents states that other people also influenced his deradicalisation process.

Respondent 1: ‘People from outside, you talked with them too. Friends and family, they did influence you as well. They had sympathy, but they did not say that they found the means we used, or the way we did these things, was justified.’
Immediate causes and circumstances: left-wing respondents

A clear cause for disengagement is less evident among the left-wing respondents. Many of them state that the process of disengagement occurred quite gradually. Two people state that they became more interested in their studies or career at a certain point; a third tells us that the movement was simply 'over' at a certain point and that he also got offered a serious job at that time. One respondent also states that she never actually consciously left the movement, but did become more home-loving when her child went to school. Only two respondents indicate a clear immediate cause for their disengagement. One respondent says that her conversion was triggered because she felt unhappy in the new environment in which she was living.

Respondent 9: ‘I was no longer with the house-share group, but was in a big impersonal building with a bunch of 'bourgeoisie' and druggies. There was no substance. I didn't feel at home there at all. I was also in an unhappy relationship. (...) That was a transition ... You have no life. Your ideals are far away. Then you start thinking.’

Another respondent says that he was so disappointed that the Groote Keyser was not evacuated that he decided right then and there that he would start withdrawing from the movement.

Respondent 10: ‘Back during the Groote Keyser I was one of the only people who were enormously disappointed about Polak's decision. (...) I quit it. I was still involved in the scene, but then I (...) went to university. (...) Yes, that was really a switch! It was one of the biggest steps of my life.’

Immediate causes and circumstances: right-wing respondents

The disengagement of respondents from the right predominantly had to do with disappointing experiences with the party. One of the former politicians had a quarrel in his party and was told at that time that he was facing dismissal. For him, that was the immediate cause to put an end to his activities. For another respondent, the party's lack of reliability played a role (whereby it is not clear whether this entailed the direct cause, or the final straw that triggered his disengagement).

Respondent 13: ‘It was the combination. “If I continue like this, I will be fired too.” (...) When I stopped I lay in bed, crying. That was the first time since my early youth.’

Respondent 14: ‘At a certain point they still owed me [hundreds of euros, -ed.]. But I didn’t get that back – because of their poor financial situation. And then I let them know: I don’t want anything more to do with you guys.’

The other former politician does not seem to have deliberately chosen to end his activities, but stopped for all practical purposes when his party lost its last seat. Afterwards he was unable to find a place in other parties or groups of the extreme right. The ex-hooligan does not state any clear triggering event for his disengagement. Through various
circumstances (including the unease of his grandmother, who had raised him) he became more aware that his hooliganism and drug use had begun taking severe forms.

**Immediate causes and circumstances: Islamic respondents**

As with the left-wing respondents, the deradicalisation process seems to have been a gradual process for most of the Islamic respondents as well. In most cases, a new contact in particular seems to have been the immediate cause for them to reconsider their ideas. Four of the five respondents explicitly reveal that other persons played a crucial role in changing their ideas. A new imam played a decisive role for one of them; another was introduced to a mosque at which he felt very at home; and a third respondent had a warm family who gave her a sensible word of warning.

Respondent 17: 'But the imams did ultimately clarify it for me and helped in my return. (...) especially the imam from the neighbourhood mosque. (...) That was a new imam from Morocco. He knew about everything that was going on in Morocco, and he was very liberal and was well informed of everything. He kept an open view, had a lot of knowledge about Islam and was able to convey that well. I was able to master Arabic really fast. (...) It was my own attitude: I was searching. And I was able to speak Moroccan Arabic with him, my own dialect. He didn’t come across like a holy man. You could really talk to him.'

Respondent 18: 'That change happened really fast. I went to a mosque in [place-name, -ed.] and met a number of converts (...) It was a revelation: the mosque was directed by youths, everyone was very active, and the women attended classes. I always felt good there, I always felt at home. They were highly educated. [Did you feel good mainly because of the atmosphere or because of the ideas?] It had more to do with their behaviour and attitude than their ideas. I started attending classes: Arabic, but also about Islam. I had to start from the beginning. I didn’t have to pay anything. Unfortunately the mosque closed and I have no contact anymore. That was two years ago; I was only there a short time. (...) During that time I also met a little group of Surinamese converts (...). They had the same ideas.'

Respondent 16: ‘And my environment also reacted very soberly to it. My mother said, “just go and get some qualifications first.” And my brothers said, “(...) just chill out...” (...) It actually came from my own family. I always maintained good contact with my family. My brothers loved cigarettes and a beer now and again. And I didn’t want to judge people so harshly, especially not my brothers. (...) The process of deradicalisation happened gradually. It helps if you have a lot of older aunts and cousins who say, “just act normal.”'

One respondent states that a shocking violent event put him on the path to deradicalisation. The confrontation with violence can form an immediate cause to start reconsidering goals and violent means.

Respondent 17: ‘Yes, in retrospect I think that it was the death of Van Gogh. That was the last straw. I knew: something like that cannot happen. A lot of Moroccan scholars
were very disapproving of the murder then as well. For me it was the time to start thinking about a whole lot of things.'

7.5.a Conclusions with regard to immediate causes and circumstances

It is difficult, based on our data, to draw conclusions about the immediate causes which put the process of doubt and disengagement in motion. Many respondents do not cite any clear triggering event, perhaps because the disengagement process happened so gradually that no immediate cause was evident. The causes which were cited are diverse. One cause is striking because it was cited by a relatively large number of respondents: a (violent) political action. This can have two effects: first, the violent character can cause the radicals to realise that they find violence undesirable, or the failure of such an action can also sow doubts about the usefulness of such actions.

In the case of the Moluccans, in particular the course taken by, and the failure of, the train hijacking at De Punt formed a significant part of their deradicalisation process. It seems, however, that their process of doubt about radical action and violence had already been put in motion during previous actions. A respondent from the left-wing activist movements says that the moment it became clear that the De Groote Keyser squat was not going to be evacuated constituted a turning point for him. He perceived the time of the Groote Keyser to be a great build-up of tension. For him, the realisation that it was not going to be evacuated was an enormous letdown: the tension was not going to break. For both the Moluccans and the left-wing activists the course of political action led to the realisation that the goal which was aspired to was not achievable in this manner. This was the core of the crisis which would lead to their disengagement. For one of the Islamic respondents the murder of Van Gogh was an immediate cause to denounce violent actions. He realised that Van Gogh’s murder was going too far, that that kind of violence was not the intention.

In the case of the Islamic respondents, contact with significant others is also mentioned as a significant circumstance in deradicalisation. This involved people – whether a new imam, co-religionists or family members – who were respected by the respondent and discussed the respondent’s ideology with him or her. Because the respondent saw this person as a legitimate conversation partner, it was possible for this person to introduce the respondent to a new train of thought. For most of the Islamic respondents this was the cause of a crisis in their normative involvement. The importance of contact with others is more evident in the case of the Islamic respondents than in any other. This might be associated with the fact that the respondents from the other cases had gone through the deradicalisation process longer ago than the Islamic respondents, because of which they no longer knew for certain the exact circumstances and influence of others. But we do not regard that as very likely; many of the other respondents were still able to describe quite precisely and in detail the moment or period which started their deradicalisation. In addition, for two of the Islamic respondents deradicalisation was already far in the past. We suspect that the influence of others was so great among the Islamic respondents because their radicalisation was of such an ideological nature and was closely connected with their religion and their identity as members of a minority. They were uncertain in their search for their own place in society and in their
search to find a truth of their own, and therefore were quite open to the views of others (so long as they regarded that person as credible).

7.6 Why do individuals not radicalise even further?

An important question besides that of why people deradicalise is the question of why people in radical movements do not become more radical. This question is of particular significance for persons who have already taken a number of steps within the radicalisation process, who approve of violence in principle but do not take the final step to start using violence themselves. What prevents these people from going any further into this process?

*Why individuals did not radicalise further: Moluccan respondents*

In the case of the Moluccan respondents, it is not always equally clear why one opted for violent actions and the other did not. One person cites a ‘healthy mind’, but sometimes it also seems to pertain purely to certain coincidental circumstances.

Respondent 2: ‘That is so humiliating! I could have radicalised further – just like that! - and picked up the weapons. [Why didn’t you do that?] Well yeah, my common sense told me not to.’

Respondent 4: ‘If I had continued living in Assen, and not gone to university, then maybe I would have been in the train. All Moluccans were ready for terrorist actions! We wanted to take Van Agt hostage then. I was already at uni then! And we had made plans, but I wasn’t allowed to take part because I was a student. They said, maybe we still need you.’

A respondent states that his mother – though also involved in the Moluccan cause – played a role in preventing him from becoming more radicalised.

Respondent 5: ‘[And your parents?] They were also involved in it. They saw a lot of things going on, especially my mother. (…) It’s nice, because although she did not completely understand everything, she still played a role in the fact that we’re still here on the earth – that is, that we’re not dead and didn’t go any further. [How so?] My mother was really a cohesive factor. It’s because of her that we did not become any more hardcore than we were. [How did that work? What did she do?] My mother always had a spiritual influence. For example, if she dreamed about us, and she told everyone that, then I would always give that an extra thought.

*Why individuals did not radicalise further: left-wing respondents*

A rejection of violence played a minor role in deradicalisation among left-wing respondents, though in contrast it did play a major role in the fact of not radicalising any further. Many people rejected violence against others because it in itself was bad. Additionally, the use of firearms did not fit in the subculture of the squatters’ movement because
it was associated with the political right and criminals. One individual also admits not rejecting violence per se, but simply not having anything to do with it personally.

Respondent 10: ['Did you consider radicalising further?'] That means violence, and I saw weapons as conservative. That then leads you in the direction of civil war. Then you can’t be yourself anymore. You can’t develop. That’s not creative.’

Respondent 11: ‘There was something about violence. Culturally I did not feel completely at ease with it. One of those refrigerators on your roof. I didn’t see the need for that... I found it a little too heavy. Yes, I was there. I had also been involved in the organisation. But with violence – that’s just not me. Yes, I just think it’s frightening. I’m also not so strong physically.’

For a long time the squatters’ movement was able to count on widespread solidarity from society, but after violent actions, such as the riots during the coronation of Queen Beatrix, the goodwill quickly declined. A number of respondents stated that they did not want to take the final steps towards violence because that would place them truly outside society. For them, that was one step too far; despite their radicalism, they still somehow felt they were a part of Dutch society. For one of the respondents, his parents also constituted a significant frame of reference for what was permitted and what was not.

Respondent 11: I did do some radical things, but there were a few final steps I didn’t take. [What was the reason for that?] It came from within me. Because I always felt I was a part of Dutch society. In the “us vs. them”, the “us” can’t get to be too small. It is not good when everybody is your enemy.’

Respondent 9: ‘Yes, but violence places you outside society. I didn’t want that. I didn’t want to always have to be afraid of being arrested. And maybe running the risk of not being able to see my family anymore.’

Respondent 11: That matters: my parents were always a point of reference. They thought everything I did, all those actions, were fine. And I myself sometimes thought, what would they think about it? They taught me my standards and values. I did sometimes wonder, can I explain that to them? I think they wouldn’t have approved of more radical actions, such as violence against others.’

The accounts of some of the squatters also reveal how everyday practices played a role in not radicalising any further. For example, the environment in which a person lived played a role, or a person’s responsibilities.

Respondent 9: [Why didn’t you radicalise any further, like others did, towards the RARA?] The group I was living with fell apart. We had totally exhausted the experiment of living with each other. It’s a turning point when you start to choose for each other again. Then you could have chosen together to go underground. That’s also how the RARA was formed, from a big shared house.’
Decline and Disengagement

Respondent 8: ‘[If you had been in a different situation and hadn’t had a child, would that have been different?] Oh, I think so. I surely would have dived deeper into it then.’

Why individuals did not radicalise further: right-wing respondents

The interviews with respondents from the extreme right do not make it clear why these individuals did not radicalise any further. The former politicians do however give a clear reason for why they did not become politically active again: stigmatisation and exclusion.

Respondent 12: ‘Physically, I’m no longer capable of doing the job. And you get into quarrels with everyone, family, friends. You get broken down. (...) Me become active? Yes, I would like to. But the trouble you get then... and my clients... (...) They [certain extreme right-wing groups, -ed.] would just love to have me, because that would legitimize the whole thing. But instead of me pulling them out of the mud, they pull me into the mud. Then I’m hit with a tsunami of agitation. I (...) am better at considering the risks than when I was twenty or thirty.

Respondent 13: ‘Fortuyn was able to pull it off because he was alone. He had no partner, no children. Then he was shot to death. Shot to pieces! [respondent gets tears in his eyes, -ed.] I still get emotional about that. Because I recognise that: then you’re alone, with all those losers you have to pull along. I saw all sorts of parallels with us in the past. That could have happened to me too. (...I But I have children. If you’re unattached it doesn’t matter, but with a wife and children... Then you are very vulnerable. So no public role for me anymore.’

Why individuals did not radicalise further: Islamic respondents

The Islamic respondents cite various reasons why they did not radicalise any further. One of the respondents cites his responsibilities for his family as an important reason. He additionally states that he always took on an attitude of searching and because of that was not so easily convinced to choose a violent path himself.

Respondent 17: ‘I was married, had a child. And I am not easily convinced. And I did believe that it had to happen, but I was not capable of it. I had social obligations, I was responsible for my family. My wife was also Muslim, but she was not so extreme, she didn’t always agree with me either. She wasn’t so occupied with my thoughts, she had other thoughts. [So she didn’t stimulate you in your radical views?] No, she did not stimulate me. (...) [But maybe if you had been more adventurous?] Yes...or not married. If I had not been married and there’d been an attack against Afghanistan or Iraq and I was desperate... maybe then I would have gone.’

As with respondents from the left-wing groups, one respondent also cites that social opportunities played a role for her. This kept her from radicalising further.
Respondent 16: ‘And I had opportunities for my development. The future wasn’t sombre, so I didn’t need religion to help against sombreness. But I had a certain world view; it was about honesty.’

In reflection, she also describes how the fact that she was given room – and the understanding – to follow her own path of discovery and her adolescent attitude of protest kept her from radicalising further. She thinks that an atmosphere of negative attention and a lack of understanding result in a situation where youths will rebel to an even greater extent.

Respondent 16: ‘But at school they weren’t startled by my head scarf at the time either; they thought, just let her discover her identity. That wouldn’t be possible now. Nowadays I really would have been radicalised. The debate is carried on much differently. Much more overbearing. (...) We were given room, and because of that we stayed involved. For example, back then we would ask if we could go to the mosque the last hour on Friday if we made up for it on Tuesday, and that was allowed. That was really good; because of this we stayed involved at school. (...) We were very pious, but were never really very radical. Nowadays I would have been radicalised; it’s often counter-conduct. I did not radicalise because there was the room and the understanding to go through that evolution. That room isn’t there now; all that fuss about head scarves. A lot of girls are starting to wear a head scarf now as a way of rebelling. I would have done that too.’

The Moluccans stated that coincidental circumstances seemed to determine why a person did or did not radicalise further. Along the same line, we learn from an Islamic respondent that the fact that he did not have the proper contacts played a role in his failure to further radicalise.

Respondent 18: ‘I did want to do something myself then, but I had no network. No contacts. I was in [place-name, -ed.] and didn’t have any money to get anywhere else. Yes, without a doubt things would have gone differently if I had been in Amsterdam or Eindhoven.’

7.6.a Conclusions regarding the issue of why individuals do not radicalise further

The reasons which are cited for why people do not radicalise are diverse. It is not easy for many Moluccan respondents to say why they themselves were not ultimately involved in a radical action; they cite their ‘common sense’ or a ‘coincidence’. Overall, the respondents from the right-wing movements do not give any reason for this. The respondents from the left-wing squatters group are reasonably uniform in this: they cite their aversion to extreme violence and their connection to society. This last factor in particular is an interesting one: it indicates that for many people the radicalisation process is a process of detachment from society. Many people have doubts in taking the final steps; this entails a life underground which is cut off from old social ties and frameworks. There are various reasons why the Islamic respondents did not radicalise further. These can be summarised as: family responsibilities, room and opportunities, and a lack of contacts. Two respondents told us that they had the room to develop their identity and to seek their own path.
They stated that they surely would have radicalised further if they had grown up at the present time, because there is now far too much fear and distrust to be able to figure out who you are at your own pace, or to be able to experiment with different religious interpretations.

7.7 General conclusions

The role the various factors play in individual deradicalisation are summarised in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of crisis among disengagers</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Organisation/Subculture</th>
<th>Practical life circumstances</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Right-wing</td>
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<td>Islamic</td>
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What can we conclude from comparing the data on disengagement of persons from the Moluccan, left-wing, right-wing and Islamic activist movements? First of all, it’s important to mention that respondents who come from the same movement often cite the same factors as having played a role in their disengagement: for the Moluccan and Islamic respondents this mostly pertained to ideological considerations, while for the majority of left-wing respondents developments within the movement played a decisive role, and for the right-wing respondents the factors of disappointment in the movement and outside pressure are often intertwined. Although we only spoke with four to six people per case, these results indicate that the similarities between respondents within the same movement occur more than incidentally. When we compare the data of respondents from different cases we see that they are comparable in various areas but that there are also major differences. Based on the preceding discussion, we can draw a number of conclusions:

1. Part of the deradicalisation process is the rejection of violent actions. That rejection can have various underlying reasons: reasons of an ideological nature (violence is inherently bad, violence leads to undesired animosity), of a strategic nature (the desired
future is not reached through violence), or an organisational nature (violence turns inward and leads to the fragmentation of the movement itself). The rejection of violence can be triggered by a (failed) violent action.

2. A significant ideological factor in deradicalisation is the realisation that the desired future is not achievable. This realisation can have a greatly demotivating effect, and result in radicals starting to doubt the usefulness of radical actions. This realisation is often related to the failure of a radical action; it is the realisation that everything has been wagered, that a person has gone to the utmost extreme, yet this has not brought the desired future any closer. It seems that this factor can play a role particularly when the radical strives to achieve concrete political goals (an independent RMS, more housing). Goals are more difficult to refute if they are vaguer and more abstract; in this case the concrete failure of an action does not say anything about the achievability of the ideal.

3. Another significant ideological factor is a change in the view of the current society. This often has to do with the realisation that a person is a part of society and perceives this connection to be important. One does no longer wish to view this society as an enemy. This can play a role both in deradicalisation and in not radicalising any further. Radicalisation is a process in which the connections to society are increasingly severed. When it gets through to people that further radicalisation entails these connections being permanently severed, this can frighten them off. It can lead to a situation whereby a person does not take that step (does not radicalise any further) or that he or she even starts to take some steps backward (deradicalising). A somewhat different process seems to occur for radicals from minorities. Many people from minorities do not feel the connection to society as strongly as people from the majority. For them, the feeling of ‘not belonging’ in society is often precisely that which plays a significant role in the radicalisation process. For persons from the majority, the realisation of being a part of society constitutes a barrier to the last step in the radicalisation process. For many radicals from minorities, this realisation in itself is a first step in the deradicalisation process. They realise that they ‘belong’ and that they want to belong, as well.

4. Disappointment in the movement can be a significant factor in deradicalisation. This can occur in two ways. 1) If the group’s lifestyle is viewed as the manifestation of one’s own ideals, then disappointment in the group can lead to doubts about the achievability of those ideals. 2) If the group has little political influence structurally, a person can become disappointed in the group’s capability. Radicals may then disengage and deradicalise, though they may also go searching in another, perhaps yet more radical, area.

5. The role of practical life circumstances is a constant in the process of disengagement. Factors such as growing out of the movement, assuming responsibilities, and wishing to establish one’s own life play a role among all types of radicals. These factors are significant in the deradicalisation process, though they seem mainly to play a supporting role. They constitute an extra motivation in addition to affective and normative factors. Only in the case of the ‘negative’ variant does this factor play a more direct
role: stigmatisation, outside pressure and isolation constitute immediate reasons for disengagement. We see this in the case of the extreme right, in particular.

6. For radicals from minorities, loyalty to one's own community appears to be a major barrier to disengagement. A lack of social prospects and social alternatives can also constitute a barrier to disengagement (this also plays a role among the extreme right). Inner barriers can also play a role. This mainly pertains to the individual’s realisation that the own lifestyle does not suit him or her well, or that the own truth in question is not the only truth.

7. A person’s significant others can play a role in deradicalisation. These are people whom the radical trusts and respects, who initiate an ideological discussion with the radical. Because the radical is (somewhat) open to the opinion of this person or these persons, there is the possibility that he or she will be influenced by this person or these persons, and a process of doubt about one's own ideology will be put in motion.
8. Experiences with deradicalisation programmes

We now have some insight into the factors and motives which play a role in the deradicalisation of individuals. In this chapter we will build upon this knowledge and examine whether, and in which manner, the process of deradicalisation of individuals can be stimulated and/or supported. Although the Netherlands has dealt with various forms of radicalism and continues to do so, little experience has yet been gathered here regarding initiatives for stimulating or supporting the deradicalisation of individual radicals. For that reason we will look across the border to examine various deradicalisation programmes. In doing so, we wish to find answers to the following two questions:

1. To what extent do the existing programmes take into account the factors which lead to individual deradicalisation?
2. What lessons can be learned from the existing programmes that may be useful for application in cases involving Islamic radicals in the Netherlands?

Most of the experience in this regard has been gathered through programmes for right-wing extremists and Islamic radicals. In the first part of this chapter we will focus on deradicalisation programmes for the extreme right (8.1). We discuss experiences in Norway, Sweden and Germany, and cite a pilot programme in the Netherlands. In the second part of the chapter we will focus on deradicalisation programmes for Islamic radicals (8.2). This includes programmes in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Great Britain, among others. We will conclude the chapter by answering the two key questions (8.3).

8.1 Deradicalisation programmes for right-wing extremists

Deradicalisation programmes have been developed in various Western European countries; these programmes are intended to stimulate individual members of radical movements to disengage and change their ideology. The Norwegian researcher Bjørgo is one of the founders of a programme to help right-wing extremists disengage. Called the Exit Programme, it was developed and applied in Norway in the mid-1990s, after which – in a somewhat modified version – it was applied in Sweden and Germany. We now proceed to discuss the programmes in the various countries. This discussion is based on various sources. Our study of the Exit Programme in Norway is a case study consisting of literary research and interviews carried out on site with the people who created and implemented this programme. Our study of the Exit Programme in Sweden and of Exit and supplementary deradicalisation programmes in Germany consists of a literary study. We also mention a pilot project underway in the Netherlands.

8.1.a Norway\textsuperscript{13}

There are only about 100 to 200 active right-wing extremists in total in Norway, distributed over five to ten locations. The movement reached its peak in 1995-1996, with roughly 300 members. There was a second, smaller peak in 1999-2000, after which the

\textsuperscript{13} This Norwegian case study is based on interviews with key figures from Oslo and Kristiansand, and on Bjørgo (2002), Bjørgo (2005) and Carlsson (2006).
movement stabilised. The members are young and have a relatively short career within the movement. Only a small number remain active after the age of twenty. Most of the members have only achieved basic vocational training and are experiencing social and societal problems. This makes the organisation weak, and vulnerable in the case that its leaders get arrested. However, although the movement is weak, there are a number of small local groups that are powerful enough to intimidate others and to dominate the streets in their community. Violent conflicts have occurred between neo-Nazis and groups of young immigrants in Oslo and Kristiansand. Various acts of violence against immigrants have taken place, the most serious incident occurring in January 2001 when a dark-complexioned fifteen-year-old boy was stabbed to death by two members of the neo-Nazi movement in Oslo.

The Norwegian neo-Nazi movement has begun to organise itself more effectively in recent years, deriving inspiration and help from the Swedish Resistance Movement. The Norwegian Resistance Movement predominantly organises boys and young men who have previously participated in Boot Boys, a violent skinhead group. The movement emphasises the importance of physical training, and over time has become increasingly visible and ideologically oriented. Another organisation, Vigrid, is led by the 62-year-old Tore Tvedt and is inspired by the National Alliance, the largest and most active neo-Nazi organisation in the United States. Vigrid worships old Norse gods, exalts Adolf Hitler and denies the Holocaust. The organisation does not stimulate violence directly, though it promotes a racist and violent ideology and revolts against the ‘Zionist occupying regime’ in Norway. With Tvedt as a father figure, the organisation actively tries to recruit youth in all of Norway. ‘Blood and Honour’ has also tried to establish a foothold in Norway in recent years, with little success up to the present time.

In 1996 the Norwegian government brought together a group of experts in the field of right-wing extremism, the Interdisciplinary Advisory Service for Local Action against Racism and Xenophobia. This advisory group consists of a dozen researchers and professionals, including police agents, social workers, pedagogues and conflict mediators. Because the problem of right-wing extremism is rather limited in Norway, the group is not permanently engaged. It is called in when local problems arise, and usually a team of two advisors will then help the local municipal authorities analyse the problems and develop effective responses. Bringing various experts together has led to the systematisation of knowledge, methods and practical experiences. Among other things, this has resulted in the Exit Project. The Exit Project was developed between 1995 and 1997 and has three goals:

• Giving help and support to youths wishing to withdraw from extreme right-wing or other violent groups,
• Giving support to parents whose children are in extreme right-wing or other violent groups by establishing local parental networks,
• Developing and disseminating knowledge and methods among professionals who work with youth from violent groups.

It was decided that, instead of establishing a separate institute, the Exit Programme had to be carried out by the authorities directly involved. The Exit Project has trained over 700 professionals such as teachers, local youth workers, police agents, etc. in the prevention of and intervention in right-wing extremism and other violent groups. We spoke with three different authorities active in the prevention of and intervention in right-wing
Adults for Children is a Norwegian NGO active in children’s mental health; it directed the Norwegian Exit Programme from 1997 to 2000. Adults for Children was called on to help because the Norwegian police did not have the means and contacts which were necessary for the Exit Programme. This organisation has a lot of knowledge, a good network and good contacts with parents. Exit was subsidised by three different ministries (the Norwegian Immigration directorate, the ministry of Justice and Police and the Ministry for Children and Family Matters). There is no longer any financing because the government regards the problem as solved.

According to Adults for Children, the youths who get caught up in the right-wing extremist environment do so initially because of the group, while the ideology doesn’t become part of the picture until later. Many of the youths have psychological problems. The Exit Programme opts for ‘old-fashioned’ social work and cooperates with the police. Parental networks are established for the parents of youths involved in an extreme right-wing group. These parents are often in need of knowledge and information. By sharing their experiences, they are better able to gain insight into the environment in which their child has become involved. They can discuss their dilemmas with people who do not stigmatise them simply because their child is active in extreme right-wing circles. And together they can bring about solutions and develop initiatives for getting their child out of such a group. There are considerable differences between the different parental groups. Some parents are very successful; they are able to bring their children back within a few months. Other parents do not have the means or the motivation for that. Some parents share their children’s views, and especially in these groups professional support is necessary. Not every parent is equally motivated to participate in a group; some, for example, are happy that their child has finally found friends. Others are afraid of being stigmatised, are apathetic or indifferent, or don’t want to talk to strangers about their problems. Parental networks therefore do not work for everyone, though the approach is viewed as successful.

Good employees are indispensable for running a successful Exit programme. Social workers are often the ones who think along with the youths and are able to understand why they end up in a right-wing extremist environment, yet at the same time have a solid enough foundation to be able to talk with the youths and give them support. Personal qualities are therefore more important than any specific training. Exit employees are like a spider in a web: they have to ensure that all the institutions that are involved are functioning properly, and they have to get access to the parents.

The voluntary character of Exit is an important aspect of the programme. It offers a supportive contact to the person who wishes to disengage, as well as to parents and professionals. People who wish to withdraw from the movement can call the special Exit telephone number. People in prison can also get in contact with Exit. You often see that people are especially motivated to disengage at the beginning and the end of a prison

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14 This text is based on an interview with Randi Talseth and Jan Steneby, both of whom work for Adults for Children (Voksne for Barn, VfB), held on 12 December, 2006.
sentence. A successful method which Adults for Children applied is bringing youths in contact with people who previously withdrew from the right-wing extremist environment. The idea of employing former members of extremist groups was launched by Tore Bjørgo in 1997. The idea was picked up in Sweden in 1998 when an Exit programme was established there with former radicals as employees. Because there were too few people in Norway able to fill this role, Adults for Children brought youths in contact with the former right-wing radicals from Sweden. In roughly two years, Exit helped more than seventy youths get out of the extremist environment.

The Police Security Service

The Norwegian secret service is active in identifying (potential) right-wing extremists and, in cooperation with the local police, attempts to prevent individuals from becoming part of the right-wing extremist environment. According to the Police Security Service (PST), most of the youths are approximately fourteen years old, have few or no friends and often hang about in the street. These are ‘social dropouts’: poorly educated youths with few opportunities who lack a social safety net. Sometimes they have a violent confrontation with a group of young immigrants and then seek protection from a right-wing extremist group. Often their parents share the same racist views. These youths lack an ideology; they’ve ended up in a right-wing extremist group by coincidence, and that’s where they find the friends they were looking for. There are, however, a number of leaders who are more highly educated and often fill the role of a father figure for the youths.

The PST has two tasks: ensuring that youths do not get caught up any deeper in the right-wing extremist environment, and taking the more hardened members out of the group. For the first task, which is a preventive one, the PST works with the local community, youth clubs, the children’s shelter and the local police. The ‘preventive talk’ is an important instrument in prevention, also referred to as ‘empowerment conversation’. This entails the local police establishing contact with the youth in question, and the youth and his parents being asked to appear at the police station. Youths under eighteen years of age and their parents are obligated to comply with that request if the police suspect that the youth is involved in illegal activities or is on the path to joining a young criminal group. A conversation is held pertaining to the concrete cause of the matter (theft, drug use, participation in an extreme right-wing group). In particular, the problems which the youth stands to face are addressed, as well as the fact that he is throwing away his future. The goal of the conversation is not to punish the youth, but to create a basis for reorientation and a change of behaviour. The police ask the parents’ permission to involve other significant institutions, such as the school, in the subsequent reorientation steps. The conversation is based on a structured procedure, the purpose of which is to make the child aware of the consequences of his behaviour and to seek possible (legal) alternatives. This method is suitable especially as a preventive measure for youths at risk of going off the rails. A good example of the effect of this preventive conversation is the action taken against the Norwegian neo-Nazi group Vigrid in 2003. 109 discussions were held with 95 members of this group over the course of forty days. The parents were present in 39

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15 This text is based on an interview of 12 December, 2006 with Tommy Larsen and a colleague, both of whom work for the Police Security Service, and on Bjørgo (2002).
16 The Norwegian abbreviation for the Police Security Service is PST.
cases. 60 people left the group after this, though these were mostly the younger members.

For older, more hardened members, other tactics are used. This mostly involves ‘disruptive’ activities, whereby the police apprehend the person and take him to the station for the slightest violation. At the same time, a short conversation is held every time someone is apprehended, in which the consequences of the person’s actions are emphasised again and again. In this manner, a number of hardened members have also been able to be ‘pried loose’ from the right-wing extremist environment. Isolating the central leaders of the group can also help. In this way the leader is pulled out of the centre of the group, and the groups then fall apart. The PST is concerned with preventing violence, but they are no ‘mind police’. If they can keep youths away from violence, then their mission is accomplished. The extent to which the youths let go of their right-wing extremist sympathies is not clear.

The fact that Norway has predominantly local communities where the police operate on a community level is an advantage. This means that the local police usually know the youths personally and try to have a discussion with all of them. The PST cooperates a lot with the local police. Now and again they lend somebody to the Exit programme, but this does not happen very often. While the Exit programme works on a voluntary basis, it’s the PST’s job to prevent youth violence, whereby they can compel some youths to take part in the discussions. And while the Exit programme is based on voluntary participation, whereby youths are not actively recruited, the PST approaches the youths itself.

Coordination group for crime prevention in Kristiansand

Kristiansand is a city on Norway’s south coast. The city itself has approximately 75,000 inhabitants, though the greater metropolitan area (including some neighbouring communities) has a population of approximately 100,000 – a typical mid-size Scandinavian city. Kristiansand is a well-to-do city, with no distinctively ‘poor’ or ‘bad’ areas, and it has a well-developed network of welfare centres. About ten years ago a coordination group for crime prevention was established consisting of all the authorities which are involved with youth, including the police, the youth council, the social work centre, the children's shelter, the cultural centre, the church and a representative of Adults for Children (the organisation which established the Exit programme). The coordination group meets once a month to discuss developments and problems pertaining to the youth in Kristiansand.

In the mid-1990s a group of boys between the ages of fourteen and twenty began marching through the streets and took over the youth centre. The boys were angry at society, had racist views and were afraid of the immigrant population. The dominant majority of this group of 'neo-Nazis’ – as they were called by the local population – came from the lower class: low-income single-parent families suffering from alcohol or drug problems, psychological problems or abuse. Many of the youths had failed in school, and many of them were victims of bullying or violence. In addition, the majority had had personal negative experiences with individuals from an immigrant background (such as abuse by their mother’s partner or by their own boyfriend) which they generalised across

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17 This text is based on a conversation of 13 December, 2006 with Nanna Thune (inter-agency crime prevention group), Else Berge Loland (Exit, Mentor project), "Kikkan" (the Church Youth Project) and Ole Hortemo (Police Station Chief), among others, as well as on Bjørgo (2005) and Carlsson (2006).
the entire immigrant population. A relatively large number of them stated that the need for protection from enemies was the most significant motive for them to become a member of the neo-Nazi group. The level of ideological awareness varied greatly; though some youths had a relatively coherent totality of National Socialist ideological views, the majority had only a superficial and fragmentary picture of this racist ideology, yet expressed themselves in a racist and hateful manner. For them, the group mostly provided a strong group identity, and loyalty to the group was many times more important to them than the ideological identification.

Fights broke out between right-wing extremists and a violent anti-racist group of young immigrants, the so-called Valla gang. Both groups hated the police, both felt they were being neglected by society, and both were in need of respect. While the neo-Nazis had racist motives, the immigrant group had other motives, varying from criminality to nothing more than the excitement of a fight. The coordination group was founded at that time, and the various authorities developed methods of intervention under consultation with one another. The representative of Adults for Children, for instance, launched a local variant of the ‘Nightravens project’. The Nightravens project has existed in Norway since the early 1990s and entails teams of parents walking through the city on evenings that youths would go out and initiating chats with these youths. In this manner an attempt is made to prevent alcohol and drug abuse and violence among young people. The Nightravens team always monitors from 10.00 PM to 4.00 AM and works closely with the police. There are eight parents on the street at a time in Kristiansand (teams of two or four people). There are Nightravens in approximately 450 municipalities in Norway.

Exit also established a parental network in Kristiansand, and practical help is given to youths wishing to disengage from a violent group. Many of these youths seem to lack parental support, because their parents suffered from psychological problems or drug addiction, or were deceased. For this reason they were unable to use their parents as a ‘stepping stone’ back to society. An alternative ‘stepping stone’ can come in the form of a significant other who establishes a bond with the youth by listening to him or her, and helps the youth disengage from the extreme right-wing group. The Church Youth Project (CUP) played this role in Kristiansand. This is a small, flexible organisation composed of three social workers and a group of volunteers who work with problem youths in the city. The three social workers were able to establish contact with, and gain the trust of, a number of neo-Nazi youths. They helped the youths find a job, housing or education. This approach was emphatically of a social, rather than ideological, nature; talking about ideology was avoided. Above all, an attempt was made to meet the practical and social needs of these youths by offering an alternative social environment. Over the course of three years they helped 24 neo-Nazi youths, only two of whom still remain in the right-wing extremist environment.

All members of the coordination group agree that the cooperation between the many authorities is very important. The advantage of this broad cooperative structure is that there is always someone who has a link to the individual in question. Although it regularly happens that there is internal disagreement about the approach taken, the members do respect each other’s profession, as a result of which the cooperation continues to work well. A good structure has been put in place, with dedicated people; but, in addition to good will, there is also the need for a shared base and a shared policy on higher levels. It is good that the cooperation continues during quieter times as well. On
that basis, new things can be developed and only a small step has to be taken to come into contact with each other when one of the authorities is in need of another.

8.1.b Sweden

The extreme right-wing environment in Sweden consists of approximately 3,000 people and can rightfully be called a social movement. There are several thousand sympathisers, and the extreme right-wing movement has developed an organisational, economic and media infrastructure. In addition, it is not purely a matter of a youth scene any more: many of the activists are in their twenties or thirties and have already been involved in the movement for ten years or more. The movement is able to offer protection from outside enemies. Because of its size, the movement is not vulnerable: when leaders are sent to prison, new leaders rise up.

Exit Stockholm

Shortly after the founding of the Norwegian Exit project in 1997, contact was established with Kent Lindhal, a former Swedish neo-Nazi. He disengaged from the neo-Nazi movement in the early 1990s and gave lectures at schools warning against the extreme right-wing environment. Lindhal established the Swedish Exit programme in Stockholm in 1998. The Swedish programme had the same objectives as the Norwegian programme, but had a somewhat different set-up. For example, a large portion of the staff themselves had a background in the extreme right-wing environment and such personal experiences ensure that these staff members have great credibility among youths who wish to disengage. In addition, it’s easier for them to establish contact with youths who are considering disengaging from the movement. The Swedish project also developed a five-stage plan, which persons generally go through when they leave the extremist group and in which the person is supported in various ways.

1. **Motivation phase.** The person is still in the group, but has doubts, and contacts the Exit team. The team provides information and offers a contact person who has also gone through this process and understands its significance.

2. **Disengagement phase.** The person has made the decision to disengage from the group. This is a chaotic period, during which the Exit team helps the individual talk with them. Sometimes a person has to move, or needs help financially. The contact person is always available by telephone and is the intermediary to the institutions involved in the programme. He or she also provides personal support.

3. **Settling phase.** The break is now complete. The person has a place to live, financial resources, and sometimes a job or studies. But he or she is often isolated socially, feeling empty and lonely. The contact person tries to establish new ties to ‘normal’ life. Group discussions are often useful in this phase.

4. **Reflection phase.** The person begins to let go of things from the past, such as violence, crime, extremist ideology and hatred. Some people experience problems such as fear, depression, insomnia or alcohol abuse. They are often referred to a therapist. This is the phase in which they let go of their extremist and racist ideas.

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18 This text is based on Englund (2002), the National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) (2001), Bjørgo and Carlsson (2005) and Rheims (2002).
5. Stabilisation phase. The person now has a 'normal' life again, with work, studies, and sometimes a family of his or her own. He or she is still afraid that the past will ruin his/her future, and often experiences feelings of guilt and shame. The Exit programme is no longer active now, though many people remain in touch with their contact person.

In general, it takes between six and twelve months for an individual to complete the Exit programme. The discussions that are held are not aimed at changing a person’s mind ideologically, but mainly build upon the personal desire to distance oneself from the extreme right-wing environment and establish a normal life. The negative personal consequences of staying in the extreme right-wing movement are addressed, as well as the possibilities and alternatives associated with disengagement.

Between 1998 and 2001, a total of 133 people contacted the programme for help. The majority (over ninety percent) consisted of young men. They were between the ages of 18 and 25 and had been in the movement for periods of between two and five years. Half of them had been excessive users of alcohol, and sometimes drugs, during their time in the movement. In addition, half of them had been convicted of crimes, and yet another quarter stated they had committed crimes but had never been convicted for them. According to a 2001 evaluation by the Swedish Council for Crime Prevention, 125 of these 133 people disengaged from the movement after contacting Exit. Doubts later arose about the accuracy of this high success rate. Although the evaluation was generally very positive about the programme and its results, it did reveal the existence of organisational problems and a high turnover rate among the staff.

Exit Motala

In 1999 a second Swedish deradicalisation programme was established in Motala, called Exit Motala. From that time on Lindhal's programme was called Exit Stockholm. The Exit Motala programme differs from Exit Stockholm in several regards. Help is offered not only to youths from the extreme right-wing environment, but also to marginalised young immigrants from violent groups, and to asylum seekers. The objectives are also broader; the aim is not only disengagement from extreme right-wing circles, but also the combating of racism and marginalisation and the promotion of democratic principles. The project has three components: Exit, Amir and Dellen. Exit, like Exit Stockholm, is oriented towards extreme right-wing youths. The Amir component is oriented towards young immigrants from criminal gangs, and was expanded in 2002 to offer help and activities for asylum seekers. Dellen is a programme specifically oriented towards girls from the extreme right-wing environment. Although the three components offer specific help to their target group, the general objective is to integrate the different groups as much as possible. For example, an activity evening is held every week in the local youth centre in which the members of the various components participate and get to know each other. In this way an attempt is made to eliminate prejudices and racist views. By involving all members in decision-making and letting them make suggestions for future activities, an example is provided with regard to how democracy works on a small scale, and the influ-

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19 See Englund (2002).
Experiences with deradicalisation programmes

ence that each person can have on this process. Various methods are applied in the project:

- **The five-step plan for disengagement** (which is also used in Exit Stockholm).
- **The ‘Choice of Path’ programme.** This programme is oriented toward youths with a criminal lifestyle. It makes use of a brochure with various ethical and moral questions and various exercises involving value judgments. The brochure can be used both in individual discussions and in-group discussions. The idea is that people can arrive at new thoughts and insights by discussing matters of this sort.
- **The ‘Aggressive Replacement Training’ (ART).** The basis of this training is that aggressive behaviour is viewed as a behavioural and cognitive as well as an emotional phenomenon, and it is assumed that all aggressive behaviour is acquired. Social skills training, anger management training and moral reasoning training are all provided.
- **Individual therapy.**
- **The Diversity and Dialogue programme.** In this programme, activities are organised as stage plays and other role-playing exercises to address problems such as social marginalisation.

Over time, disagreements arose between Exit Stockholm and Exit Motala. They have not worked together since late 2001, and Exit Motala has been a totally independent project, subsidised by the government, since early 2002.

8.1.c Germany

Germany has been struggling with young extreme right-wing groups for a long time. Many youths from eastern Germany in particular join skinhead groups and neo-Nazi Kameradschaften. Germany currently has about 39,000 right-wing extremists, of whom over ten thousand people (predominantly from skinhead groups) are regarded as being ready to commit violence. Germany accordingly has a range of programmes for combating and preventing right-wing extremism. Various deradicalisation programmes were launched around the year 2000. At present there are some fifteen to twenty projects aimed at deradicalising right-wing extremists. These programmes differ greatly in terms of their target group (key persons, experienced activists, hangers-on or sympathisers), methodologies and organisational framework. Projects have been established on both state and national levels. Grunenberg and Van Donselaar (2006) researched four of these projects: the national NGO-based ‘Exit Deutschland’ programme, the national Bundesverfassungsschutz government programme and two government programmes on the state level (North-Rhine Westphalia and Hessen). The ‘Exit Deutschland’ programme was also researched by Rommelspacher (2006).

Exit Deutschland

This project was the first deradicalisation programme in Germany. The ‘average’ disengager is a man between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five who was a member of a skinhead group or neo-Nazi Kameradschaft for two to six years. The dominant majority have a criminal past. They usually disengage because they realise that their extreme right-
wing activities lead to a vicious circle with negative consequences for the future. The disengager must take the initiative on his or her own to contact the project. A general profile of the disengager is then outlined and potential problems determined. Safety and ensured means of existence are important topics in this approach. In addition, the construction of a social network is very important, and the disengager is given support for possible psychological problems. The duration of such a procedure varies considerably. The disengagers are usually counselled for six months to three years. The project is not a part of any network of government authorities, and suffers from financial problems. Nonetheless, Exit Deutschland has gotten approximately 230 disengagers out of the extreme right-wing environment over the past few years.

According to Rommelspacher (2006), the core component of Exit Deutschland is a content-based processing of an individual’s personal history. Intensive discussions are carried out to determine what the motives for entry were, which argumentations were used, and where gaps exist to refute these argumentations. The purpose of this is not to impress a different world view upon the disengager, but to get him to take a critical look at himself and his own views. But this personal reflection can only take place if the disengager’s safety is guaranteed. That’s why safety is in the foreground, as well as resocialisation to promote new social contacts and career perspectives.

Aussteigerprogramm für Rechtsextremisten vom Bundesverfassungsschutz

This programme has two different target groups. The first target group consists of leaders from extreme right-wing organisations who have become aware that their political objectives are not achievable and who need help leaving their group. The Bundesverfassungsschutz (BfV) actively approaches these people and informs them about the possibilities of disengaging from the movement. The second target group consists of people who do not belong to the top level of the groups. The BfV only gives information about the second group. The typical member of that target group is between twenty and twenty-five years of age, and ninety percent are male. The disengagers often have to deal with alcoholism, psychological problems and drug addiction. In addition, the majority have a history of violence. The amount of time a person spends in the extreme right-wing environment largely depends on the age of the disengager. The reasons for disengagement are diverse: the expectations of one’s partner and the threat of criminal prosecution can play a role, or people become aware of the negative consequences of their participation in the extreme right-wing movement. The programme only accepts people who are actually prepared to come clean. A profile is made of the disengager and detailed contracts are drawn up, establishing when the disengager must meet specific goals. If the disengager is in a stable, committed relationship, then the partner is involved in the programme as well. Disengagers are given help in establishing a new means of income, and often need to go through rehabilitation. The disengagement is successfully completed when the individual has achieved the goals set and then remains stable for two years. It usually takes approximately two years to achieve these goals; it therefore takes about four years total before a person has gone through the entire process. The BfV cooperates with the state security services. With the help of this programme, a hundred people have disengaged from extreme right organisations or are still receiving counselling.
The North-Rhine Westphalian programme for disengagement from radicalism

The disengagers in this programme are mainly men about twenty-five years old who are coming from the *Kameradschaften* and skinhead groups. They are often addicted to alcohol and drugs, and almost all of them have a criminal record, which includes violent crimes. They want to disengage because they are in a dead-end situation. The parents or partner often demand they leave the extreme right-wing movement, and the threat of criminal prosecution also plays a role here. Contracts are drawn up, though they are less detailed than those of the BfV. The process begins with a clean-up of the individual’s residence, in which all extreme right-wing paraphernalia are confiscated. The disengager is required to leave the environment and no longer commit any punishable offences. He must also unambiguously distance himself from all extremist values. Disengagers are given help in starting a new life, and they often need to go through rehabilitation. Disengagement is regarded as successful if the individual in question no longer has any contact with the extreme right-wing movement, does not commit any new punishable offences and is reasonably stable. Ideally, the disengager also changes his world view, but this is not always feasible by any means. The disengagers are counselled for an average of three years. The counselling is intensive in the beginning, but is later toned down.

The Hessian programme for disengagement from radicalism

The programme was launched in Hessen in 2003. It is oriented mainly towards youths who are in the extreme right-wing circuit for a relatively short time. These are mainly youths from 13 to 16 years of age, on whom a discussion of the negative consequences of their extreme right-wing orientation can have a great effect in itself. But the programme is also oriented towards youths who have been in an extreme right-wing group for a longer period as well. These are youths between 18 and 20 years of age, who are often addicted to alcohol, have committed acts of violence and are struggling with psychological problems. Here as well the reasons for disengagement often have to do with pressure from one’s partner and the threat of criminal prosecution. Ideological reasons hardly play a role. A personality profile of the disengager is prepared at the start of the process. Extreme right-wing paraphernalia are removed from the individual’s residence and a rather detailed contract is drawn up. This project as well is concerned with the disengager’s safety, establishing a means of income, and personal support. The counselling period usually lasts from three to six months. Most of the disengagers are reasonably stable by that time. However, the counselling period can extend to two years, particularly for disengagers who have been given probationary sentences. One is warned not to have overly high expectations: though the disengagers do not commit any new crimes and have no more contact with the extreme right-wing movement, their ideological views often remain unaltered. The programme has taken approximately fifty people out of the extreme right-wing environment.

In summary, two profiles are striking in the German programmes. The first profile is that of skinheads or neo-Nazis, 18 to 25 years old, addicted to alcohol, with no regular means of income, a record of violence, often criminal prosecutions, sometimes psychological disorders. The second profile is that of a less derailed, younger group of new recruits and hangers-on. A significant outcome is the relatively low significance which ideological considerations appear to have. The majority of the programmes are
mainly aimed at resocialisation of the disengager, and not at reflecting upon the extreme right-wing ideology. Only the Exit programme still seems to pay attention to this, but the extent to which this is engaged with in practice (in addition to ensuring a safe environment and new social contacts) is not clear. It is also not clear whether success is achieved in this area or not. A disengagement is often regarded as successful if the disengager just gets up on time, goes to work and does not immediately raise his fist when there’s a difference of opinion. In such cases there is no talk of a change to the individual’s extreme right-wing world view.

8.1.d The Netherlands

In September 2007 a pilot was launched in the Netherlands for a deradicalisation programme for extreme right-wing youths. The programme was developed on the initiative of the FORUM institute, the Racism & Extremism Monitor and the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES). The programme is carried out in the municipalities of Winschoten and Eindhoven and the approach is oriented towards the individual. At the time of writing, the pilot is fully underway and it is still too early to evaluate the programme.

8.1.e Evaluation of programmes for right-wing extremists

A striking fact of the Exit approach is its 'depoliticised' character: radicalisation is regarded as a psychosocial problem arising from a weak social and societal background. Aspects of political activism and a radical ideology play a minimal role. This vision of the radical as a ‘social dropout’ is dominant in Norway in particular. Here Exit mainly aims at getting youths who come in contact with the extreme right-wing environment back on the right path as quickly as possible. The underlying thought is that initially the youths have hardly been shaped at all ideologically but turn to the extreme right-wing group out of a need for cohesion and identity. Once they have become active in the group, this will gradually shape them ideologically and they will be groomed to commit violent crimes – and this must be prevented at all times. According to the Norwegian view, it is essentially quite easy to prevent this: the youths who feel attracted to right-wing extremism must be helped with basic matters such as education, a place to live and social contacts and activities. These are youths who state that they are mostly lacking a circle of friends, and benefit greatly from the development of an alternative social network. For that reason Exit is oriented towards social help, combined with cooperation from the police. The Norwegian Exit programme therefore responds to the role played by continuance factors and the elimination of continuance barriers (offering help with practical life circumstances). Some attention is also given to affective factors (ensuring a different social environment), but no consideration is given to the ‘ideology’ factor. This approach has been shown to work well in Norway. The Exit programme has succeeded in changing the minds of a large number of youths who tended towards the extreme right-wing environment, and has directed successful parental networks. Such good results were obtained that in many cases the government withdrew the subsidy because they regarded the problem of the extreme right as solved.

In Sweden and Germany as well, the focus is on practical life circumstances and social factors, though the ideological factor also seems to be given a role, in the Exit programme in Germany in any case. Rommelspacher (2006) states that content-based reflec-
tion forms a core element of the programme. She even explicitly contrasts this approach with that of the other German deradicalisation programmes which supposedly view ideology as a problem which is secondary to the more important problem of the disengagers’ aggression and violence (2006: 214). However, the role of ideology in Exit Deutschland is not addressed at all in the report by Grunenberg and Van Donselaar (2006). They emphasise the practical help offered by the programme. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that Rommelspacher oriented her study mainly towards the programme’s objectives, while Grunenberg and Van Donselaar looked mainly at the concrete effects. In the latter publication the disengagers’ low ideological engagement is itself emphasised (it appears that they mainly wish to disengage because this offers them a practical personal advantage, and not so much because they reject the extreme right-wing ideology) and their definition of success, which is hardly based on ideology (a reasonably successful resocialisation without any clear change in ideological views). In other words, it is quite possible that the German Exit programme has a number of ideological objectives, but in practice does not get much beyond offering the disengager a new and safe social structure.

The Exit programme is successful mainly among youths who are not yet deep into the extreme right-wing environment, and among older persons who, because of the threat of criminal prosecution, pressure from outside and/or drug and alcohol addiction, see themselves at a dead end. The conclusion that presents itself is that only those persons who are not yet deep into the environment, or those persons who experience outside pressure, are able to deradicalise, and that people of another profile are already too deep into the ideology to be ‘saved’. Indeed, only those persons with the above-stated profiles approach the programme, and these are the only groups to be successfully helped. This conclusion is not justified, however, because this would overlook the fact that the Exit approach itself emphasises (the elimination of) the practical disadvantages of membership of an extreme right-wing group. It is therefore quite possible that right-wing extremists of another profile are not appealed to by the programme.

In Norway the majority of right-wing extremists consists of youths with a weak social position who have not yet gotten deeply caught up in the extreme right-wing environment. The ideological ‘hard core’ consists merely of a very small group. The Exit programme thus appeals to the majority of the extreme right-wing group, and for this reason is comparatively very successful. The situation in Sweden and Germany, however, is different. In Sweden many right-wing extremists have a background in political activism, in contrast to the ‘social dropouts’ in Norway. In Germany as well the extreme right is not merely a problem of marginalised youth but constitutes a serious movement. It seems that in these countries the programme (and related programmes in Germany) does not appeal to right-wing extremists of a different profile. Thus the programme is indeed successful, but only within the group to which the programme appeals.

We can conclude that the programmes might benefit from giving attention to the ‘ideology’ factor as well. Our study of individual deradicalisation (see chapter 7) reveals that ideological factors play a major role for disengagers in putting the deradicalisation process in motion. Doubts about the feasibility of the desired future and changes in the world view can effect a crisis in ideological involvement. By incorporating this factor into a deradicalisation programme, people who are currently outside its scope can also be reached.
Practical application

Although this study of deradicalisation programmes for the extreme right did not focus on the practical application of the programmes, we can briefly draw some conclusions of a practical nature:

- The Kristiansand case study reveals how crucial cooperation among different authorities is for the programme’s success. The approach must be embedded in a supporting structure of police, school, social work, youth care and community work. An integrated approach can be created by combining the insights of the different authorities.
- In order to ensure that different regions are not negatively impacting upon one another and the wheel does not constantly have to be reinvented, it is sensible to put together a mobile team which combines expertise on the extreme right and can be deployed in various places.
- In Norway the programme is very much oriented towards municipalities. The underlying idea here is that you have to have detailed knowledge of the local scene and the local youths’ motives to be able to establish a successful programme. The knowledge of local authorities is then combined with the mobile team’s expertise. The disadvantage of this is that there is little overview of groups or movements that extend beyond local level. Neither is the role of the Internet taken into consideration.
- Good employees are indispensable for the success of a deradicalisation programme. This involves a mixture of personal involvement and professional distance. In addition, the employee must have a certain authority over the disengager. This therefore partly involves personal qualities that cannot be easily acquired. The use of people who have themselves previously disengaged seems to be an advantage.

8.2 Deradicalisation programmes for Islamic radicals

Now that we have described a number of deradicalisation programmes aimed at disengagement from extreme right-wing groups, we will now focus on a series of deradicalisation programmes specifically oriented towards Islamic forms of radicalisation. We will first examine a number of prominent programmes from the Middle East and Asia, after which we will discuss the approach taken in Birmingham and Amsterdam.

8.2.a Saudi Arabia

After the bombings in Riyadh in 2003, ‘soft’ strategies were also implemented in addition to direct safety measures. The goal of these measures is to make the extremist ideology less attractive. A ‘sophisticated hearts and minds campaign’ was launched (Boucek 2007), consisting of a combination of educational, PR and media programmes in which all state-affiliated religious sources are engaged. Three years ago this ‘war of ideas’ resulted in a ‘re-education programme’. In his article, Boucek describes how this programme looks and how it is assessed. An article by Amnesty International also gives an idea of the programme (Zuijdgeest 2007).
Experiences with deradicalisation programmes

The goal of the programme is to get prisoners who subscribe to the extremist *takfir* ideology\(^\text{22}\) to arrive at a different view of Islam in exchange for a reduced sentence. This occurs by means of intensive religious discussions and psychological support. The programme is oriented towards people in prison, but it is not clear to which extent a change of ideas is really connected with the prisoners’ release. As someone from Human Rights Watch critically commented in the article by Amnesty International, ‘It is mandatory for prisoners to participate in the programme, but they are not necessarily released in exchange.’

The programme is carried out by an Advisory Commission headquartered in Riyadh, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This advisory commission consists of four subcommittees. First of all, there is a religious committee that consists of about a hundred clergymen, scholars and professors. This is the group which actually engages the participants in discussion. The psychological and social committee consists of about thirty psychologists, social scientists and researchers. They assess the participant’s status, his cooperation and progress, and determine the support which the prisoner and his family have to receive. Additionally, there is the security committee (which decides on the release of every prisoner and has the job of counselling the participants after their release) and the media committee (which provides all educational and informational material).

In the first conversation with him, the prisoner is mainly just listened to. Over the course of the contacts, he is increasingly engaged in discussion. An attempt is made to show the prisoner that his ideas and motivations are not actually Islamic and are founded on an incorrect interpretation of Islam. The basis for this is that the prisoner will begin to realise that he has been misguided into a false interpretation and that the version to which the state subscribes is the best. A component of the programme consists of a series of individual conversations. Another component consists of a course of group lessons lasting six weeks, in which subjects such as *takfir*, *jihad* and terrorism are addressed and psychological courses are given to promote self-esteem. An exam is held at the end; if this is not passed then the course has to be repeated.

Since its launch in 2004, over two thousand prisoners have participated in the programme. 700 have renounced their ideas and been released. 1,400 prisoners have refused to participate in the programme. The Saudis claim a success rate of over eighty percent. Boucek correctly states that the programme’s success is difficult to determine, partly because it has not been running very long. According to the Saudi authorities, of the people who went through the programme and were released, only nine have been arrested for security-related violations.

**Success factors**

Boucek indicates various success factors. According to him, the programme works partly because it is carried out in a benevolent manner, and not from the perspective of vengeance or retribution. The assumption is that the suspects have been misled and misused and that the state is guiding them onto the right path. The vast majority of participants did not receive any religious training during their youth and were radicalised through

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\(^{22}\) In the *takfir* ideology, other Muslims and members of other faiths are declared infidels. In reality, this ideology comes down to informal death sentences being declared on anyone who does not adhere to the strict laws of a radical version of Islam.
extremist books, tapes and the Internet. Another significant factor appears to be the fact that, during the discussions, the professionals emphasise that they are honest and independent scientists, and that they are not in the service of the Ministry or affiliated with the intelligence services. Additionally, the programme gains legitimacy through the fact that a number of former militant combatants participate in it, and these people have a lot of credibility among the participants. In the article by Amnesty International the Saudi government advisor also emphasises that there is no torture. According to him, the past has taught that this only leads to further radicalisation. Because the terror suspects are warned during their ‘terrorist training’ that they will be tortured if taken prisoner, a benevolent approach in which they are treated ‘in accordance with Islam’ comes as a surprise.

Boucek also indicates that the attention given to the social needs of the prisoner and his family is also crucial for the programme’s success. The Psychological and Social subcommittee looks at how these needs are best met. Some methods, for example, are paying compensation to the family if the prisoner was the breadwinner, and providing education and health care. This support is continued after release from prison if the re-education process has been completed in a satisfactory manner, and the prisoner has renounced his old ideas. He is stimulated to remain in contact with his discussion partner and study group. He is also stimulated to settle down because of the expectation that someone who is responsible for a family will not get into trouble as easily. Sufficient financial resources are ensured, as well as a job, and sometimes even a dowry of about 10,000 euros so that it will be possible to get married.

According to Boucek, the programme also makes use of many traditional Saudi methods of dealing with conflicts. It was formerly not unusual for families to request that scholars talked with an incarcerated family member about his behaviour. The Saudi social networks and family obligations are also put to use. Upon release, the family is made aware that they also are responsible for their family member’s behaviour.

**Challenges, bottlenecks and points of criticism**

Some prisoners actively oppose the programme. These are prisoners who know that they will not be released and have the idea that they will be most useful by sabotaging these efforts.

There is a lot of criticism about the programme, even in Saudi Arabia, where some find that this approach is much too soft and does not act enough as a deterrent, as Boucek writes. The programme is also criticised in the media because it is said to not have any good results and because it was established in secret. Also, according to critics, you cannot assume that the participants are honest. Naturally, they will say anything to be released. This is also what a Saudi human rights activist is concerned about (Zuijdgeest 2007). He claims that the people who are released are still very dangerous because a person’s views are not so easy to change.

Another human rights activist casts doubts about other aspects of the programme in the same article. For example, he finds it unjust that people are obligated to participate in the programme but are not necessarily released in exchange. He also notes that the causes of radicalisation are not addressed in this manner. And, he states, people who actually have blood on their hands should not be accepted into the programme but should simply be prosecuted.
8.2.b Indonesia

The police in Indonesia have a well-functioning deradicalisation initiative, as demonstrated in a report by the International Crisis Group (2007). The basis of the police programme is that jihadis do not listen to moderate people from outside their own group, instead the debate about whether violent strategies are right or wrong must be carried on within the movement itself. They are aimed at members of the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) who have been apprehended; this is the largest radical organisation in Indonesia. The police select people from the JI who are in prison. They choose people who are looked up to within the movement, are well acquainted with the movement, and wish to cooperate with the police. Central to this approach is substantial knowledge of the individual prisoner. Personal needs are met, usually related to his family’s economic situation, communication and attention. These people then try, in informal discussions, to make other radical prisoners aware of what's good and bad about their approach to jihad. The police have been able to involve two important JI figures in the programme, among others. Because there remains a major risk that jihadis who have changed their ideas while in prison will once again become part of the old radical networks (which function as intensive social networks) immediately upon release, an attempt is also made to neutralise these networks. For that reason a meeting of non-incarcerated jihadis was organised in July 2007 under the direction of one of the cooperating heads of the JI. This was mainly a way of sounding out the possibilities, though it was agreed that there had to be a follow-up. The range, however, was limited. The movement’s strictest ideologues were not invited. And the top leaders of JI did not attend the meeting. Neither was this meeting oriented towards any other jihadi groups beside the JI. The task at hand now is to further configure similar comprehensive programmes and to consider the success indicators.

The prisoners’ approach is regarded as a success. Over twenty members of the JI as well as a number of people from other organisations have already given their cooperation to the police in the programme. One of the factors that contribute to its success is the friendly treatment by the police. Through their benevolent attitude the police refute the jihadis’ assumption that they are un-Islamic. And they hope that in doing so they can also cause the jihadis to doubt other convictions they hold. The success is largely driven by economic support, especially after release from prison, which the authors of the report find to be more important than religious arguments in changing a prisoner’s position. Unfortunately, this is a peripheral comment in the report and is not substantiated further.

The programme is only carried out within the police organisation because the situation in the prisons is not suited for carrying out such a programme. There is a shortage of staff, the staff are underpaid, and there is practically no knowledge about the individual situation of the separate prisoners. Corruption is rampant. And there is too little coordination between the prison authorities and the police force active in counterterrorism. To prevent terror suspects from ending up in prison, some are detained in police cells for as long as possible. The prison organisations will have to be improved in order to implement deradicalisation programmes in prisons.

The authors of the report comment that there must be a balance between the treatment of various types of prisoners, as well as between deradicalisation of perpetrators and the justice that is due their victims.
8.2.c Other re-education programmes

Comparable initiatives pop up here and there, such as in Singapore and Malaysia (Montlake 2007) and Egypt (Goerzig and Al-Hashimi 2007). Like the programme in Saudi Arabia, these initiatives are based on a re-education programme that is reported to have first been applied in Yemen, though according to Montlake this was stopped in 2005 due to the high rate of recidivism. No mention is made of the programme being stopped, however, in the documentary of 12 March, 2007 by the Muslim broadcasting network entitled *The Judge and the Fanatic*. The documentary does explain that the ‘Dialogue’ programme was originally difficult to get off the ground because members of the clergy did not wish to participate out of fear that this would turn their followers against them. This improved, and the programme is finally working well now, partly thanks to the fact that it’s anchored in Yemen’s age-old tribal system, whereby in cases of conflict people engage in discussion with each other under the guidance of a neutral intermediary. The basis of the dialogue programme is that members of the clergy initiate an open and equal discussion with prisoners, in which both sides attempt to convince the other that they are right, based on a source whose truth both acknowledge: the Koran. The goal was, among other things, to ensure that terrorists no longer viewed the commanders of their Al-Qaida terror cell as the earthly leader, but the president instead. This had to be confirmed in an oath by which they promised obedience to the president. They could afterwards receive their freedom so long as violence against non-Muslims was clearly renounced.

Singapore has had a similar programme since 2001. Seventy people were taken prisoner at this time under the International Security Act, after a plot by the regional counterpart to Al-Qaida, the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), was uncovered. More than one third of these people have since been released, after cooperating with the programme. In 2003 the Religious Rehabilitation Group was established, in which twenty members of the clergy voluntarily participated, leading weekly one-on-one discussions with the prisoners to rectify their vision of Islam. This also includes some former militant combatants. The United States is examining this programme with great interest and, according to Montlake, is considering implementing it among incarcerated jihadi fighters in Iraq.

A similar programme is underway in Malaysia as well, though the implementation of this reveals that the programme does not work well under coercion. In contrast to Indonesia, where there is also hope for people who do not participate in the programme and those who do participate can truly choose to do so on their own, in Malaysia the prisoners are coerced (Montlake 2007). In Malaysia, as in Singapore, it is apparently not possible to be released without participating in the programme. It therefore seems logical that people will be more prone to lying in that situation if their ideas have not been sufficiently altered.

Goerzig and Al-Hashimi describe how a dialogue approach to the Jamaah Islamiyah group in Egypt proved fruitful, and in 1997 in this manner the group renounced violence and even made attempts to establish a political party in order to take part in the multi-party democratic system. The Egyptian government’s approach is comparable to the programmes described above and arose from the insight that the severe, repressive course, which had always been taken, had only adverse effects. Islamic scholars who registered with the government engaged in debates with prisoners from the JI to change

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21 The International Security Act (ISA) makes it possible to imprison terror suspects without a trial.
their ideas on violence. The government encourages the prisoners to engage in mutual discussion in the presence of Islamic scholars. They were given full room to carry out their discussions and full possibilities for further immersion in Islam, and the government permitted the leaders of the group to go through other prisons to talk with their followers about their new views. Over time, this introduction to other ideas and other insights changed their views, even without them standing to gain very much from doing so. They were not offered any prospect of release from prison, received no recognition, were not allowed to talk with people from outside, and still, as the two authors state, their views did change. The most important thing was that they began realising that violence does not fit within the intention of Islam. The leaders officially renounced violence and since that time have made various statements about their new standpoints and the cease-fire that they have called. They have elucidated their standpoints in various television and radio broadcasts and various books about their renewed ideology have appeared. The authors of the article do advocate some wariness in evaluating the success. The JI is ‘still in an inner search stage’.

8.2.d Birmingham

A programme was launched in Birmingham in January 2007. The initiative to establish the programme was taken in response to the arrests of people in Birmingham under the ‘Prevention of Terrorism’ legislation. A terrorist threat is said to be evident in Great Britain, specifically from the Muslim communities in Birmingham. A programme to combat extremism was subsequently developed in various meetings with the Muslim communities in Birmingham. And an official has been appointed who is specifically active in preventing terrorism.

The programme is based on the idea that the Islamic value system offers good foundations for being a good citizen, and for this reason the Islamic faith can be used to combat radicalisation. The programme consists of various components. The programme is partly oriented towards defensibility against radical ideas and other forms of prevention. It also partly focuses on people who are radical and is aimed at deradicalisation. The Study Circles, the Success Clubs, the Journey of the Soul and a women’s project all fall under the latter type of programme. In the first two programmes, experience has already been gained in working with people who were members of a gang. The projects are aimed at the development of responsible behaviour, both as an individual and as a member of society, and in doing so refer to Islamic values.

The Study Circles offer knowledge of Islam to young people at non-religious locations such as youth centres. Non-Muslims also sometimes participate in these, though the Study Circles are mainly oriented towards Muslim youths. The goal is to ensure that these youths (re-) gain a place in established Islamic institutions and learn to define their identity and position in a western society in a responsible manner. The programme is based on an older, non-Islamic programme called Cultural Studies. According to Meah, however, it is important that this is specifically adapted to Muslims, as it is of great importance that the Islamic aspects of the identity of Muslim youths are recognised. Lessons are not given by imams but by specially trained teachers. There are ten Study Circles in Birmingham, nine for men and one for women. The groups have between fif-

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24 This text is based on an interview with Yousiff Meah held on 13 December, 2007 in Amsterdam. Meah leads the Preventing Extremism Project Team in Birmingham.
teen and twenty participants. Good libraries are available, and there is a generous budget, because this is crucial for being able to provide a counterweight to the well-financed jihadi movement. Although, according to Meah, this can also be viewed as a deradicalisation programme, it seems to be aimed more at youths who are not (yet) radicalised.

The Success Clubs are community service programmes in which youths, including radicalised youths, engage themselves for community-centred goals which they themselves set. It is not intended exclusively for Muslims. The core of the programme is that youths acquire knowledge and skills which heighten their chance of personal success. Youths between the ages of 13 and 30 are approached by youth workers or key figures who know them. The proposal is that these people serve as mentors to the youths while they begin working on something they would like to see improved. The groups vary in size. The smallest club consists of a single person, while the largest has 27 people. There are eight clubs in Birmingham. Three of these are oriented specifically towards problem youths. The mentor has completed training courses in setting goals, Islamic ethics and values, and Islamic bases for success. A Success Club can be about a small project lasting a few months, or a larger project of several years. It is important in this regard that the youths are counselled by the mentor during the entire project. The goal is for them to learn to work together and acquire moral awareness. They develop their own skills and learn to bring something to realisation. Family members are involved in ‘success moments’ as much as possible. The following two examples illustrate the intention. A young, 21-year-old Muslim woman wished to establish her own organisation to train women so that they could make their voices better heard. A mentor helped her define her ideas, and she has since received two prizes for her plans and is about to launch her own organisation and website. Another example is a group of Islamic street kids who greatly bemoaned the lack of possibilities for them in the neighbourhood. A youth worker approached the boys. For half a year now they have been working together to make a plan for improvements in the neighbourhood. They attended a course on researching the situation in the district and organised a dinner with local politicians to discuss their ideas.

In the Journey of the Soul programme, youths from radical groups are approached and, in consultation with their parents, taken on trips. The idea is that they become more open by being out of their old environment. This makes it possible to gain their trust. They are spoken with about their religious experience, are educated in a different religious interpretation and supported in their search for identity. According to Meah, this intervening approach coincides with the traditional teaching methods in most Muslim communities. The first trip took place just over a year prior to the writing of this report. Fifteen youths who had been sentenced to prison went on a trip to the religious sites of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia. According to Meah, since that time they have no longer resorted to negative behaviour; he believes this is partly because they began realising that God would hold them responsible for their own behaviour.

Additionally, a women’s project was established, called the Women’s Development Project. Considering the fact that there is actually nothing known in Birmingham about radicalisation processes among women, this programme is not oriented towards radicalisation among women. Women are viewed as significant key figures who, as mothers, sisters and spouses, are able to detect radicalisation processes in time and are then able to intervene. The project is aimed at training women to be able to recognise signs of radicalisation in time and be able to help vulnerable family members defend themselves.
against radical and extremist influences. An attempt is made to bring Islamic women’s
organisations together. This project, however, is hindered by the role of the police and
justice department. People are actually obligated to report persons who are radicalising.
This makes it difficult for parents to ask for help when they see that their children are
radicalising. This creates friction between the police, who want insight into the cases of
radicalisation which arise, and the project. There is much distrust between the two par-
ties. A parenting course for Islamic families is a new component of the programme. A
prevalent taboo must be broken for this purpose, namely that of parents in Muslim
communities not openly expressing the fact that they have difficulties with their child.
The programmes have not been running long enough to be able to say anything about
their effects. According to Meah, the following factors play a role in the organisation of
similar programmes. First of all, the Extremism Prevention Team consists exclusively of
Muslims, and all branches and orientations are represented. An open attitude is impor-
tant for the credibility perceived by the youths, and the fact that some members of the
team were once quite radical themselves contributes to this credibility. In addition, the
base of support from the Muslim community is important, and it is important that not all
initiatives are implemented under the banner of government, but also by people from the
Muslim community itself. They have good contacts, for example, with a very respectable
Muslim network, the Association of Muslim Schools. A significant challenge still remains –
that of approaching girls. Up to now only boys have been reached by the team.

8.2.e Amsterdam

In Amsterdam the emphasis of the approach taken to radical Islamic youths is on a cus-
tomised basis. A system has been set up to detect behaviour that is possibly indicative of
radicalisation as early as possible. The system is based on formal and informal networks.
As many contacts as possible are established with and between people from neighbour-
hood organisations and reporting centres, but also with youth workers, educators, aid
workers and key figures within the Muslim communities. Mutual trust is crucial. Anyone
who has concerns about a person’s behaviour can report this to the reporting and advi-
sory station of the Radicalisation Information Management (Informatiehuishouding Radicaliser-
ing). This mainly receives reports from within the formal network (youth workers, aid
workers, teachers, officials) and from key figures. Over seventy reports were made be-
tween March 2005 and autumn of 2007, and these were of varying gravity (Amsterdam
municipal government 2007). The case is then discussed in the Case Council, which
analyses the situation based on its knowledge and background information and on this
basis advises the individual making the report. This informant is further supported in his
or her contact with the (alleged) radicalising person or group. It is the intention that the
informant engages the person in discussion and counsels him or her. If this does not
work, only then is the Information Management’s network searched to see if there are
people who can support the informant, or who are better able to take on the supportive
task because they have better access to the individual in question due to their position or
their background knowledge. The goal is to make the radical individual more resilient
radical ideas, and to bring him or her back to full participation in society.

25 The information about the intervening approach to radicalisation in Amsterdam is based on an article by
Colin Mellis, the Amsterdam municipal government’s policy advisor in the field of radicalisation (2007),
and on an interview with him on 21 January, 2008.
A two-track policy is employed to achieve this. One the one hand, it is necessary
to materially and socially bind people to society as much as possible. Information Man-
agement has contacts with authorities able to help with finding work, schooling and ap-
prenticeships, or other ways of grounding the individual more soundly in society. On the
other hand, an ideological counterweight must be offered. According to Mellis, the fur-
ther a person has radicalised, the more emphasis comes to bear on the ideological aspect.
In this sense, the Information Management’s programme covers the entire radicalisation
process (except for the actual use of violence, which falls outside the scope of the pro-
gramme). Within the informal network key figures are sought who can be linked with the
individual cases and can possibly influence the radical individual’s ideas. This has both
political and religious components, though Mellis notes that religious legitimation is more
important in later stages of radicalisation. These key figures must therefore have substanc-
tial knowledge of Islamic theology and democratic societies. They also must emphatically
be practising Muslims themselves to come across as credible. It helps if these are reli-
gious scholars who enjoy a certain esteem, but radicals from a certain school of thought
will accept nothing which comes from people who emphatically are proponents of a rival
religious interpretation.

8.2.f Assessment of programmes for Islamic radicals

It is striking that the emphasis of the deradicalisation programmes discussed in recent
literature is placed on ideology and re-education. We do not know whether this is be-
cause these actually are the most central key points of Islamic radicals’ approach in the
different countries, but it is clear that there is widespread attention for such initiatives.
This reflects the apparently widely shared belief that repressive measures (by themselves)
are not sufficient for effecting deradicalisation. And the great interest in the ideological
approach indicates that people have the impression that an altered view of the ideology
can be a significant factor in deradicalisation. This carries the risk that insufficient atten-
tion is given to other factors. It has been previously demonstrated in this report – but
also in the description of the programme in Indonesia – that these play a significant role
as well. It is commented there that economic measures have a greater impact than ideo-
logical measures. This is an interesting finding that deserves closer examination. Also,
almost all projects follow two tracks, whereby an ideological angle is combined with an
approach oriented towards practical life circumstances. The underlying assumption is
that a person in a dire situation will easily let themselves be enticed back into the radical
circuit. The importance of working on a customised basis is emphasised in this regard. In
order to optimally help and motivate people, it is important that the specific needs of the
individual in question are addressed.

It is commented in some project descriptions that the programme correlates with
traditional customs which are deeply rooted in the society in question. For example, the
rules of the Dialogue in Yemen correlate with the conflict mediation in the old tribal
system, while people in Saudi Arabia are accustomed to scholars trying to change the
ideas of imprisoned family members, and the programme in Birmingham uses parenting
methods which are conventional in many Muslim communities. The assumption is that
this increases the base of support, and thus the success of the programme.

The programmes in Asia and the Middle-East focus primarily on prisoners. Ac-
cording to the report by the International Crisis Group, this is the starting point of
deradicalisation initiatives in many countries because this target group offers various advantages (2007). First of all, it is a group which can be clearly identified and delineated, and is easy to approach with such initiatives. And, after their release from prison, they also possibly influence their radical environment with their altered ideas. An additional reason for the focus on prisoners is that prospective rewards can easily be set for this group. Indonesia is the only case in Asia and the Middle-East in which it is evidenced that re-education is also aimed at radicals outside the prison.

In all the programmes, much attention is given to the credibility and legitimacy of the persons who initiate the dialogue with the radicals. It is important that these persons are both independent and knowledgeable in matters. Respectable scholars are engaged in some programmes. People who had been radicals themselves seem to have the greatest legitimacy. For this reason some programmes try to engage former militant combatants and get them to cooperate with the government. The dialogue has to take place in an atmosphere of openness and equality and be based on sources which are beyond dispute for both sides. Credibility is worked on in another manner as well. Efforts are made to ensure that jihadis are approached in a friendly way as much as possible. This ‘Islamic treatment’ must refute their expectation that the police and government are going to be un-Islamic and thus the enemy of true Muslims. And this should also then compel a person to re-evaluate other radical views. We would like to note in this regard that this religious dialogue, which is initiated on the part of the government, is more complicated in secular countries than in countries with a form of state religion, due to the question of which religious interpretation needs to be offered.

Despite the attempts to come across as convincing as possible, a point of criticism about these re-education programmes remains the fact that it is never completely certain that a person is revealing his actual beliefs. People can easily lie about their beliefs. This also causes these programmes to fail under coercion. And it is also likely that overly large rewards, such as release from prison, encourage lying. In any case, there is little that can be said about the programmes’ success at the present time. Too little is yet known about the effectiveness of those Islamic re-education programmes that have been described to be able to say that these are actually successful. This is partly because they have been running only a few years. In addition, there is the question of the extent to which reports about their success are reliable, especially when dealing with situations in non-democratic countries.

Justice is another sensitive issue. Under what circumstances is preferential treatment of jihadis who have changed their ideas still just and fair with respect to other prisoners and to the victims of acts of terror? Finally, it is striking that the programmes deal almost exclusively with radicalisation among men. It is apparently assumed that women pose little threat of terrorism.

8.3 Conclusions and discussion with respect to deradicalisation programmes

At the beginning of this chapter we posed two main questions, which we will now attempt to answer.

Question 1: To what extent are the existing programmes connected with the factors which lead to individual deradicalisation?
When we compare the existing deradicalisation programmes for right-wing extremists and those for Islamic radicals on the basis of the previously distinguished factors, this yields the following table:

Table 8.1: Role of individual factors within deradicalisation programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disengagers</th>
<th>Normative factors</th>
<th>Affective factors</th>
<th>Continuance factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis of programmes for extreme right</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis of programmes for Islamic radicals</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Programmes aimed at the extreme right place the emphasis on eliminating the disadvantages connected with membership in the extreme right. These disadvantages are primarily in the area of practical life circumstances (career, drug addiction, threat of criminal prosecution) and in the social field (dependence on the extreme right-wing group). The programmes are therefore oriented primarily towards continuance and affective involvement in the radical group and attempt to eliminate barriers in these areas by offering social and societal alternatives. They are not oriented towards normative involvement in the group. Programmes which are oriented towards Islamic radicals do, however, place the emphasis on ideology. They attempt, by means of discussion and dialogue, to deflect the individual’s convictions away from the radical ideology and to demonstrate to the radical that violence is not the proper path. In addition, they also pay attention to the radical’s practical life circumstances, particularly in the social-economic sense. These programmes are thus primarily oriented towards normative and continuance involvement in the radical group, but are not occupied with the radical’s affective involvement in the group.

The two types of programmes supplement each other well, as both lack a significant factor for disengagement. The programmes for the extreme right stand to gain a lot by introducing the ‘ideology’ factor. This is a matter of engaging the right-wing radical in discussion about his or her world view in a constructive manner. In this regard, these programmes could learn from the discursive techniques applied in the programmes for Islamic radicals. The more politically motivated radicals could also be appealed to through an addition such as this. The question is whether the system of self-registration works in this case. We will return to this in the answer to the second main question.

The programmes for Islamic radicals also stand to gain by making an addition of their own: the affective factor. At present the adhesion to, and dependence on, the radical group is hardly addressed, even though this can constitute a very significant barrier to disengagement. By counselling individuals in finding social alternatives (in the case of incarceration, after completion of the sentence), the adhesion to the group can be severed. Birmingham’s Journey of the Soul programme tries to achieve this by temporarily removing youths from their radical environment. Another way is to help the disengager find a new place to live. This does happen with disengagers from the extreme right whose safety in their old place of residence cannot be guaranteed – but this is quite a bit more difficult when dealing with youths still living at home. The Indonesian police programme is also somewhat oriented towards affective involvement by encouraging the
radical group to hold internal discussions about its own ideology, though this method is more on a collective, rather than individual, level.

**Question 2. What lessons can be learned from the existing programmes for application to Islamic radicals in the Netherlands?**

The first lesson that can be applied to Islamic radicals in the Netherlands can already be formulated based on the answer to the first main question above.

*Lesson 1: A deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands must be oriented towards affective and normative factors as well as continuance factors.*

In comparing the two types of programmes, the difference between target groups is striking; while the programme for right-wing extremists is predominately a matter of voluntary participation on a self-registration basis, most of the programmes for Islamic radicals are oriented towards prisoners who participate voluntarily, but are sometimes also obliged to participate. Different choices are therefore being made in the area of voluntary participation versus mandatory participation, and in regard to passive or active recruitment for the programme. Regarding the first area, the question is whether mandatory participation is ethically responsible, and whether mandatory participation will actually yield the desired result. Participation on a voluntary basis has a much greater chance of success because the participants stand to gain nothing by lying. In the second area, a combination of passive and active recruitment appears to be the most appropriate path. As the results from the programmes for the extreme right reveal, passive recruitment has the result that only those individuals register who themselves wish to disengage, specifically because they are encountering the practical disadvantages of their membership. The more ideologically motivated individuals are not reached. These individuals will perhaps feel attracted to such programmes if a passive recruitment method is combined with an active recruitment method. As elaborated in the following paragraphs, this active recruitment also has to take the proper form. In order to ensure that the programme will appeal to radicals, they must be approached in the proper manner.

*Lesson 2: It is advisable to base a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands on voluntary participation, and to combine passive and active recruitment.*

The ideological dimension of a deradicalisation programme which consists of confrontation of, and discussion about, the radical’s ideology demands a careful and well-considered approach. First of all, it is important that the radical individual is approached in the proper way. It has been demonstrated to be counterproductive if the person engaging the radical in discussion has the attitude of wishing to convince the radical that he or she is wrong (Rommelspacher 2006). This attitude just leads to greater conviction and encourages the radical to bring up additional evidence for why he or she is right. Rommelspacher distinguishes this ‘ideological struggle’ as differentiated from an ‘activation of doubt’. The ideological struggle must be avoided and the discussion must lead to an activation of doubt. The radical must be encouraged by the other person’s input to question his or her own reasoning. This demands a discussion partner who is regarded as credible and is well acquainted with the contents of the various ideologies. For that reason some of the programmes make use of people who were once adherents of the same movement or ideology. Above all, however, this demands an open approach by the discussion part-
ner – who must also be willing to examine his or her own ideological views. Thus most of the descriptions of Islamic deradicalisation programmes emphasise the programme’s open, equal and benevolent character.

Along these lines, the question is which ideology to address as an alternative in the discussion. What ideological message does the deradicalisation programme promote? This question is especially difficult to answer when dealing with a radical religious ideology. Should a religious alternative be posed in opposition to this? And if so, which religious interpretation should be used? This is certainly a difficult choice in secular countries in particular. Suffice it to say here that the concrete answer to this question is beyond the scope of the present report, but that it is of primary importance that, in developing a programme, a person is aware of his or her own ideological principles.

Lesson 3: In developing a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands, one must be aware of the religious-ideological alternative that is/must be promoted by such a programme. Subsequently, an open ideological discussion must be carried out by someone with substantial content-based knowledge.

A following point of discussion involves the extent to which social-economic aid must be offered to those disengaging from a radical movement. If disengaging radicals are helped with finding a place to live, a job, and – in the case of the Saudi programme – even a considerable dowry, then the question may quickly arise as to whether radicals are not being too greatly ‘rewarded’ for their radicalism. We can comment in this regard that it is of great importance that the disengager is helped to independently rebuild his or her own life. Self-reliance must therefore be given the highest priority. Financial contributions do not appear to be the best way to achieve this. Providing support in finding paid employment and advice regarding any necessary debt repayment are better methods. In addition, aid given to disengagers must be in proportion to the aid given to victims of radical violence.

Lesson 4: A deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands must be oriented towards developing the disengager’s self-reliance.

Finally, there are lessons to be drawn for practical application of a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands.

Lesson 5: Cooperation between various authorities is crucial for the success of a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands. A customised approach based on a combination of local knowledge and general expertise is indispensable in this regard.
9. Suggestions and dilemmas

This concluding chapter brings us to a discussion of the research results and the formulation of policy suggestions. In this study four Dutch cases were examined and compared, with the goal of drawing conclusions regarding deradicalisation both on a collective level (the decline of radical movements) and an individual level (the question of why and when do individuals become less radical and/or disengage from a radical group). Based on the three historical cases of the radical Moluccans of the 1970s, the squatters’ movement of the 1980s and the extreme right-wing Centre movement, we wanted to outline expectations about a possible decline of current Islamic forms of radicalisation. In the following section, therefore, we concentrate mainly on policy recommendations with regard to Islamic radicalism, though many of the suggestions may also be valuable for other cases of radicalisation.

One of the conclusions of this study is that processes of deradicalisation are extremely complex. The report makes clear that a comparison of radical movements does not automatically lead to recommendations of a generally applicable nature. Each case is too specific for this. Nor is it possible to state that specific factors have specific effects under all circumstances. Processes of deradicalisation depend for example on the specific characteristics of the movement, on specific individual motivations and on the specific measures and their objectives. It would be too complex a task to elaborate an all-encompassing deradicalisation scenario in detail. We have, however, developed an analytical framework in this report which can serve as a starting point for analysing the factors which play a role in a movement’s possible decline. And, based on the detailed comparisons, we are able to draw lessons from history in order to interpret current phenomena, and to express expectations about possible future developments as well as possible government policy effects. On this basis, suggestions for an approach to deradicalisation interventions can be formulated which will be applicable to both radical movements and radical individuals.

In this chapter we describe basic guidelines for policy which arise from our analyses. Some suggestions require additional commentary and some are part of a political or policy dilemma. An approach to radicalism requires a nuanced view, well-considered political decisions and a balanced policy. We briefly discuss a number of these dilemmas in the following section (9.1). We then continue with suggestions for a possible approach, both on a collective level (9.2) and an individual level (9.3).

9.1 Approach to radicalism: dilemmas

Which social phenomenon must be addressed, and which not? This deserves careful consideration. What is undesirable? Which phenomena and which lines of approach fit within our open, democratic and secular society? To what extent are terrorist plans unlawful? To what extent must hostile thoughts be rooted out? Which ideas must be designated as hostile? To what extent is separation from society undesirable? These are questions to which political answers must be formulated. This entails two dilemmas which have to do with the relationship between the religious character of Islamic radicalisation and the secular state.
**Government intervention and the separation of church and state**

The first dilemma has to do with the separation of church and state. A difficult question is the extent to which the government is able to make statements with respect to the religious content of an ideology, and the extent to which the government is able to express a preference for a certain ideological religious interpretation, and oppose other ideological religious interpretations. Other social players have more room for rejecting and promoting religious-ideological creeds, though the question which arises here is to what extent the government may offer support to such parties.

**The level of religiosity and orthodoxy in alternative ideologies**

There is an additional dilemma related to the level of orthodoxy and radicality of possible alternative ideologies. We have seen in various places throughout this report that radicals sometimes open up to people whom they view as credible discussion partners. On the one hand, this credibility is associated with the fact that these discussion partners are viewed as belonging to ‘us’ and not to the hostile ‘them’. On the other hand, this also has to do with content-based authority and legitimacy, because the conversation partners are equipped with substantial ideological knowledge and utilise a manner of argumentation which appeals to the radical. The current deradicalisation programmes in for example Saudi Arabia and Indonesia are based on this notion. This notion can be of value for deradicalisation initiatives in the Netherlands as well. The question immediately arises, however, as to what persons could be engaged as credible discussion partners. Can this role be filled by non-orthodox, perhaps even non-religious, persons? Or do radicals mainly believe those persons whose beliefs largely coincide with their own ideas; thus persons who are relatively radical and orthodox themselves? It is quite possible that the latter is the case for some radicals. That makes the selection of the alternative (religious) ideology to be promoted a complex task. Indeed, the goal is for the alternative ideology to have the most deradicalising effect. But to what extent must relatively orthodox ideas be promoted? And who has to do this? These questions are even more complex if the role of the government is taken into consideration.

The following policy suggestions must be read in the specific context of the above-stated dilemmas.

**9.2 Suggestions for the approach on a collective level**

The approach to radical movements on a collective level deals with interventions from the outside which cause a decline in the radical movements’ attractiveness, both for members and for potential recruits. We offer suggestions to influence radical Islamic movements on the collective level, based on the analyses of the three historical cases in chapter 3 and the comparison of these cases with the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in chapter 5. For each suggestion we reiterate the research results on which the suggestion is based. We divide the suggestions on a collective level into three different approaches: inclusion, reform and repression.
Suggestions regarding inclusion

Research results:
- A certain effect of inclusion and acceptance can be observed both among the Moluccans and the squatters’ movement (chapter 3).
- Social inclusion of (orthodox) Muslims could have a major effect on deradicalisation (chapter 5).

**Suggestion: Stimulate the democratic approach.** The counterpart to the discouragement of a violent strategy is the stimulation of a democratic course of action. The radicalisation of the Moluccans, for example, resulted partly from too little success being achieved by democratic means. And, vice-versa, an opening of democratic paths played a role in their deradicalisation. Central to this is that people who wish to achieve something by democratic means are taken seriously. In order to stimulate a democratic course of action, however, it is important that non-democratic means are given as little room as possible. To combat violence it is important for the standpoint to be conveyed that violence is bad and does not lead to success.

Increasing the range of competing non-radical (democratic) ideologies can form a component of the democratic approach. In order to offer a counterweight to radical versions of the school of thought through non-radical ideologies, it is important that the latter are well formulated, put forth clearly and that they find a willing ear among searching youths. It is important that more people, such as imams and parents, are better equipped to deal with radicalisation. Obviously, the question in this regard is what role the government can play in this.

**Suggestion: Make public debate and the atmosphere in the Netherlands more inclusive.** Many non-radical Muslims currently feel they are being held responsible for the radicalisation of other Muslims, and that they are pressured to condemn it. Based on the experiences with the Moluccans, it is to be expected that when this perceived pressure is reduced, more room will be made within the Muslim communities for them to express counterarguments against radicalism. We also saw that the awareness that ‘the Netherlands is my country’ played a role among some Moluccans as well as some Muslims. These individuals become aware of their ties to the Netherlands, and therefore no longer view violence as desirable or legitimate in the Netherlands. The rejection (actual or perceived) of certain people from society causes these people to feel less and less a part of that society, and make it hard for them to think in terms of ‘the Netherlands is my country’. A different atmosphere in society, whereby Muslims feel accepted in the Netherlands, constitutes a precondition for the success of inclusive measures. Otherwise, the chance of adverse effects is great. A more inclusive atmosphere will also cause a reduction in new recruits for the radical movement, and take the wind out of the radicals’ sails. An ‘inclusive’ socio-political climate does not mean that every type of behaviour and every attitude simply has to be embraced without criticism. A balance must be struck whereby a position is clearly taken against undesirable behaviour on the one hand, while on the other hand no large groups of people feel excluded by society.
Suggestions regarding reform

Research results:
- In the case of the squatters’ movement, reforms in the housing market influenced the decline, and in the case of the Moluccans, social reforms had a certain influence on the process of deradicalisation (chapter 3).
- Social reforms which improve the social opportunities for Muslim youth in the Netherlands could have an effect on deradicalisation (chapter 5).

Suggestion: Eliminate the breeding ground for new recruits (social reform). New recruits feel attracted to the radical Islamic movement through a feeling of injustice, among other things, which is partly caused by a subordinate position (or the perception thereof). This is one of the reasons why the black-and-white world view of the radicals, in which Muslims are oppressed by the western enemy, appeals to some people. Social reforms could eliminate feelings of dissatisfaction and injustice, as a result of which people will possibly find less appeal in the radical world view.

Suggestion: Do not reject radical demands out of hand as illegitimate. Islamic radicals are anti-secular, which means that their demands are often formulated in abstract terms and, by definition, do not all fit within modern secular society. It is difficult, if not impossible, to address certain demands which cannot be realised within the current political system. That does not mean, however, that such wishes cannot be listened to. Also, this does not automatically mean that all the demands are abstract and impossible. It is worth recommending that wishes expressed in a democratic manner should be seriously listened to and examined to see whether these do indeed contain legitimate social criticism which could actually improve society. On the one hand, this could reduce the radicals’ potential following if the wishes of the radicals are shared by other citizens who are not (yet) radical. On the other hand, it may take the wind out of the sails of the radicals who claim that the secular government is the enemy of every believer, and that the secular government is immoral.

It is important in this regard, for example, to differentiate between the views and demands of the various schools of thought (apolitical, political and jihadist). The wishes and demands of the apolitical and political Salafists are expressed in a largely democratic manner and possibly contain reasonable social criticism. By looking at these demands in a serious and critical manner, these schools of thought can be connected more with society, and the wind can be taken out of the sails of the more radical jihadists.

Suggestions regarding repression

Research results:
- In the case of the squatters as well as the Moluccans, the repression in reaction to their illegal actions initially only fanned the flames. Ultimately, however, the resulting violence played a major role in the movements’ decline because the atmosphere hardened and the support eroded (chapter 3).
- In regard to Islamic radicalism, legal prosecution seems to have had some effect on
Suggestions and dilemmas

In the case of the extreme right, a restrictive, stigmatising approach resulted in a situation in which they were never able to establish a well functioning organisation (chapter 3).

Islamic radicalism differs from the extreme right in essential points, because of which a stigmatising approach towards (orthodox) Muslims probably does not discourage many Muslims from joining, and which increases the risk that such an approach will actually encourage radicalism (chapter 5).

**Suggestion:** Consider the advantages and disadvantages of the application of repressive measures very carefully. The cases show that repressive measures, such as violently suppressing illegal activities on the one hand and creating a stigmatising and restrictive climate on the other hand, can be very effective. However, repression can also have adverse effects (see section 3.3.b), such as the underdog effect, which actually makes the group more appealing to new recruits. In the case of Islamic radicalism, it appears that the chance of an underdog effect is significantly greater than for the extreme right. In addition, there is also the question when repression is acceptable in an open, democratic society, which makes this consideration a difficult political decision. This issue makes the application of repression a complicated consideration, whereby it is important to carefully consider which form of repression to apply, against whom, against what and at what time. Our overview of possible positive and negative effects can offer guidelines for this.

### 9.3 Suggestions for the approach on an individual level

In addition to a deradicalisation approach on the collective level, which is aimed at the radical group or movement, an approach to deal with deradicalisation is also possible with interventions on the individual level. In chapter 7 we described the individual motivations for disengagement from the radical group or for moderating one’s radical convictions, and on this basis we offer suggestions for an approach which is aimed at the radical individual. Considering the fact that the deradicalisation programmes which we examined in chapter 8 are also focused on individuals, we repeat here the suggestions of that chapter regarding the set up of deradicalisation programmes for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands.

**Suggestions regarding normative factors and barriers**

**Research results:**

- Ideology is the most significant reason for deradicalisation among both the Moluccan and the Islamic respondents. The Moluccan respondents were mainly disappointed in the feasibility of their ideals. The Islamic respondents deradicalised specifically because they became convinced that the radical, orthodox path could not be ‘the right path’ (section 7.1). Many deradicalisation programmes for Islamic radicalism (aimed at re-education) are oriented towards a change in ideology (section 8.2).

- For a number of Islamic respondents significant others, such as an imam or family member, effected a change in their ideological view (section 7.5).
• At the same time, ideology also constitutes the greatest barrier to deradicalisation for Islamic radicals. The firm conviction that the orthodox, radical path is the right one causes a difficult inner struggle (section 7.4).
• Among some Islamic respondents, radicalisation remained limited due to the room that was given for experimenting with ideology and identity (section 7.6).

**Suggestion:** Ensure open ideological religious dialogue through a persuasive discussion partner. The most significant reason for deradicalisation among the Muslim respondents is an altered view with respect to their ideological principles. Certain aspects of the radical ideology are no longer viewed as the truth. A personal dialogue with a discussion partner who was regarded as credible and persuasive by the individual in question, often plays a role in this process. This credibility is associated in many cases with substantial theological and political knowledge as well as an understanding of the radical ideas and of the manner of argumentation. When specific discussion partners are selected for involvement in deradicalisation programmes, the two dilemmas relating to the religious character of the ideology, discussed in section 9.1, come into play; particularly when these discussion partners are religious or even somewhat orthodox (these are the dilemma of government intervention and separation of church and state, and the dilemma of the level of religiosity and orthodoxy of an alternative ideology). A significant role seems to be reserved here for societal parties outside the government, considering that significant others, i.e. people from the radical’s social environment, can have a major influence. They constituted a corrective or tempering factor, or were viewed as a role model.

**Suggestion:** Establish openness to orthodox religious statements. We have seen that various individuals deradicalised because they realised that some orthodox religious customs did not suit them or their faith. When room is given for experimenting with orthodox ideas and types of behaviour, it is easier for a person to make this discovery and to moderate his or her attitude, than when this behaviour is heavily condemned by others and even has become politically loaded. When something becomes politically charged in this way, this can cause people to become more convinced of their decisions and be less prone to reverse their choices. However, certain orthodox expressions can lead to aversion among non-orthodox citizens. The question of which types of behaviour are permissible and which are not, in an open, democratic society, is a political consideration.

**Suggestions regarding affective factors and barriers**

**Research results:**
• Denouncement within the movement or disappointments about the practices within a group can play a role in disengagement from a radical group (section 7.2 and 7.5).
• Contacts outside the radical group can play a role in disengagement, while it’s precisely the bonds with the radical group which impedes disengagement (section 7.4 and 7.5).

It is difficult to influence the experiences within the radical group and the views and opinions on the group expressed by those outside the radical group, partly because of
the risk that an approach that vilifies a radical group will lead to an underdog effect, making the group tighter-knit and all the more attractive.

*Suggestion: Limit isolation and stimulate the openness of society.* Disengagement from a radical group is difficult in some cases when one’s social contacts are limited to this group. It is important to prevent isolation of the radical individual and to ensure that society is as open as possible to take someone in again after disengagement. It is important that people in the radicals’ direct environment, such as imams or parents, are supported in dealing with these youths, because it is not always easy to prevent isolation. Radicals themselves sometimes have a tendency to shut themselves off from others and not trust people with a different opinion. Additionally, they are often no pleasant company, because of their often didactic attitude, condemning everything that deviates from their own standards.

**Suggestions regarding continuance factors and barriers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research results:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Practical circumstances, such as the desire to begin leading a quieter life, play a role in deradicalisation among all types of radical activists (section 7.3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Suggestion: Set out the consequences of the radical course of action.* The prospect that radical activities would possibly reduce the chances of a social career, played a role in the deradicalisation of some Muslim respondents. Emphasising the negative consequences of radicalisation can promote deradicalisation.

*Suggestion: Offer support to individuals in taking hold of their own lives.* Although practical life circumstances did not constitute a principal motivation for deradicalisation among those respondents interviewed, these did play a significant side role among almost all respondents. The good examples and encouragement of others caused them to start opting for work and studies and to stop turning away from society. When respondents acquired more responsibility for a partner or children, this also stimulated deradicalisation for some. An improved perspective of the future can lower the barrier to disengagement. And for this reason it is also important that deradicalisation programmes are oriented towards self-reliance in the process of disengagement.

**Suggestions regarding the practical framework of deradicalisation programmes**

*Suggestion: Address affective and normative as well as continuance factors.* Most of the existing deradicalisation programmes for Islamic radicals focus on the ideology (normative factors) and practical life circumstances (continuance factors). This should be supplemented with the expertise gained by various countries through their experience with extreme right-wing deradicalisation programmes which, in addition to the continuance factors, are also aimed at breaking through social networks (affective involvement). This approach
needs to be carried out on a customised basis, in which knowledge about the individual is thoughtfully combined with general expertise.

_Suggestion:_ Base the approach on voluntary participation and combine passive and active recruitment. Programmes that are based on voluntary participation are the most effective, though of course it is unfortunate that radicals who are not open to these cannot be reached in this manner. Additionally, a combination of passive and active recruitment seems to be the most effective. Passive recruitment will only attract people who wish to leave the radical group because they encounter drawbacks related to their membership in this group. In contrast, active recruitment will possibly influence people who did not directly have the intention of leaving the group of their own volition.

_Suggestion:_ Ensure cooperation between various authorities. This is crucial for the success of any intervention directed towards Islamic radicals in the Netherlands.
Appendix: Detailed summary

Islamic forms of radicalism are currently given a great deal of attention. Although it is not possible at this time to offer conclusive statements about the number of individuals who are joining or leaving the radical Islamic movement in the Netherlands, it appears that, for the time being, this form of radicalism has not yet suffered any loss of power. The question as to which factors and processes play a role in deradicalisation is therefore both current and relevant. For example, what causes (Islamic) radical movements to break up? How does it come about that a violent course of action is renounced at a certain point in time? Why do some people decide to leave their radical group? This study endeavours to provide answers to these questions.

Deradicalisation is the opposite of radicalisation: it is the process of becoming less radical. This ‘becoming less radical’ refers both to behaviour and views. With regard to behaviour, this primarily has to do with the cessation of violent actions. With regard to views, this has to do with increased trust in the system, with people wishing to (once again) become part of society, and with the rejection of non-democratic means. That does not mean that former members of radical movements are no longer interested in striving for political changes, but undermining the democratic system is no longer the goal. And the means that people wish to use are ones which fit within the democratic legal order.

Islamic radicalism is quite a recent phenomenon, in which no decline is evident. In order to be able to say anything about possible future deradicalisation and how this process of deradicalisation could be supported if so chosen, we have to look at other cases of deradicalisation. Besides the case of Islamic radicalism, we also examine developments in three historical cases in the Netherlands, supplemented with a comparison of religious and non-religious forms of radicalism. We analyse:

- the radical Moluccans in the 1970s,
- the squatters’ movement in the 1980s,
- the extreme right-wing Centre movement in the 1980s - 1990s, and
- the specific character of religious radical movements in relation to non-religious radical movements.

Based on a comparison of the three historical cases and the comparison of religious and non-religious forms of radicalism, we offer conclusions about deradicalisation in general and outline expectations regarding possible deradicalisation of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands.

We distinguish two levels on which deradicalisation can take place: the collective level and the individual level. The collective level is that of the radical movement. The individual level is that of the radical individual. Deradicalisation on a collective level means that a radical movement ceases to exist. This can occur in various ways: a movement falls apart, peters out, is defused by government intervention, is absorbed by a non-radical movement, or reforms itself into a non-radical movement. In all these cases we refer to the radical movement’s decline.

Deradicalisation on an individual level can take various forms. First of all, we can refer to deradicalisation when a person ceases his or her violent activities. But not all radicals are violent. For that reason we also take membership in a radical movement to be an indication of radicalism. Though membership in a radical movement does not nec-
essarily mean that a person shares all the convictions of that group or takes part in all its activities, we do believe there is a high possibility that someone who is a member of a movement does subscribe to (some of) the most significant convictions. We also assume that membership in a movement increases the possibility that a person will actually participate in (some of) the most significant activities. Continuing along the same lines, we regard disengagement from a radical movement as a form of deradicalisation as well.

The report consists of two parts. Chapters 2 to 5 deal with the collective level, while Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the individual level. In chapter 8 different existing deradicalisation programmes in various countries are discussed. In chapter 9 we make some policy suggestions for promoting deradicalisation processes on the collective and individual levels. We also outline a number of dilemmas which arise in this regard. We will summarise the most significant findings for each chapter.

**Collective deradicalisation: theoretical framework**

Our analytical framework is based on a model of supply and demand. A movement declines when what the movement has to offer (the supply) does not sufficiently meet a collective dissatisfaction (the demand). There are various developments which can play a role in this process.

First of all, there are factors linked to the movement that make that the movement cannot continue to adequately meet the demand. It might be that the ideology fails, whether this is because the vision of the existing order is no longer sufficiently appealing, or because the vision of the desired future no longer appeals to people. Or the ideology fails because people are no longer convinced that the movement’s chosen path or strategy is the right one. It can also happen that the organisation fails on organisational grounds and no longer has sufficient resources at its disposal, or can no longer satisfy the desired social and cultural functions. This latter point may be associated with a failing leadership, one that is unable to offer sufficient direction, unable to flexibly act upon changes, or is not inspirational. The leadership of a movement plays a more central role for some movements than for others. A departure of the leaders can have major consequences for a movement, particularly when the leadership constitutes the core of the movement.

In addition to the factors linked to the movement, there are also factors on the collective level which have to do with the demand. For example, if the movement consists predominately of members of the same age who entered at approximately the same time, it can have major consequences when this entire cohort grows out of the movement simultaneously. Another effect on the collective level that is related to demand has to do with new recruits. It is sometimes the case that a movement which is attractive to a certain generation is no longer attractive to the following generation. If the movement cannot sufficiently satisfy the desires of this new generation, then it will (gradually) decline.

In addition to the factors which are directly related to the movement and to demand, we also distinguish external factors which can influence the movement and the demand. For example, a particular societal conflict can play a significant role when the radical ideology strongly refers to it. A change in the conflict, whether on an international, national or local level, can have the result that the ideology is no longer convinc-
ing. Government policy is another factor which can play a major role. A repressive approach can hinder the functioning of the radical movement or deter its members and discourage new recruits. A government policy of inclusion can cause the wind to be taken out of the sails of the radical movement, thereby decreasing the demand. Reforms by the government in which the wishes of the radical movement are (at least partly) met, also have the goal of taking the wind out of the movement’s sails. If social dissatisfaction wanes, then there is a good chance that the movement’s following will also decline. Public support is a third contextual factor. A lack of support by (part of) the population hinders the functioning of a radical movement and reduces the number of potential new recruits. A decline in sympathy can be the result of the movement’s course of action or other specific events, or the result of a change in the Zeitgeist. Finally, competing movements, whether radical or democratic, can influence the movement’s continued existence. If they present a more attractive message or are capable of achieving greater success, then there is a chance that the members as well as the (potential) new recruits will join these competitors, and the radical movement will decline.

A precondition for the decline of a movement is that any barriers to disengagement are eliminated, so that members are actually able to disengage themselves from the group. Possible barriers include social and/or psychological dependence on the group, and the amount of the costs incurred (the sacrifices made during membership). Other possible barriers are fear of losing reputation and protection, or fear of possible reprisals. Marginalisation can also constitute a major barrier to disengagement. Disengagement is greatly hindered if there are no possibilities for members of radical groups to take part in society after disengagement.

Collective deradicalisation: Dutch cases

We describe the decline of the three Dutch cases on the collective level: the Moluccans in the 1970s, the squatters’ movement in Amsterdam and the extreme right-wing Centre movement. The following table indicates which factors played a greater or lesser role in the decline of the three historical cases, as well as the role these factors can be expected to play in any future decline of Islamic radicalism.

Table 9.1: The (historical/anticipated) role of collective factors in decline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors linked to the movement</th>
<th>Radical Moluccans</th>
<th>Squatters’ movement</th>
<th>Extreme Islamic right</th>
<th>Radical Moluccans</th>
<th>Squatters’ movement</th>
<th>Extreme Islamic right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failing ideology</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing strategy</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing organisation</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members’ needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members grow out of movement as cohort</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New generations not attracted</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>++</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factors linked to the movement:

- **Ideology** (the current world view and the desired future) seems to play a relatively large role in the decline of radical movements. However, it is not one specific role that ideology fulfils. In the case of the Moluccans, a different ideological interpretation gradually gained the upper hand. Within the squatters’ movement there was too little consensus about the ideals and goals. For the extreme right-wing Centre parties it was difficult to present an appealing ideology because the version which was politically acceptable (front stage) was not radical enough for many adherents (back stage).

- The role that **strategy** plays appears to be equally large. Among the Moluccans as well as the squatters’ movement, violent actions had a major influence on the movement’s decline.

- A failing **organisation** seems to play a major role in decline as well. Power games, internal conflicts and a grim atmosphere within the movement are to blame for the downfall of both the squatters’ movement and various extreme right-wing organisations. In the case of the Moluccans, organisational factors did not play any role in decline. Among this group there never was any evidence of a cohesive organisation, even during radicalisation.

- A lack of capable and charismatic **leaders** seems to play a significant role in decline. None of the three movements studied had capable, charismatic leaders who were able to keep the movement on its feet. The development of these movements could perhaps have taken a completely different turn had such persons been present, though the squatters’ movement flourished the most without leaders.

Members’ needs:

- The fact that members grow out of the movement as a **cohort** does not appear to play any major role.
• What does play a role is that the movement no longer appeals to new generations. In the case of the Moluccan and squatters’ movements, the Zeitgeist and the movements’ altered images reduced the attractiveness of these movements for new generations.

External factors:
• Change in an (inter-)national conflict plays a variable role in the decline of a movement. In the case of the extreme right, this factor did not have any influence on the parties’ development. The later squatters’ movement did encounter its effect when the success of the international liberation movements, which formed the basis for international solidarity, proved a disappointment. The RMS struggle was greatly influenced by the situation in the Moluccas. When relations with the Moluccans changed and people in the Netherlands became aware that Moluccan liberation was not the greatest desire of the Moluccans’ inhabitants, this had a great effect on the radical agenda.
• Repressive government policy can play a major role in decline — through various mechanisms. In the case of the Moluccans and the squatters’ movement, this had to do with the violent repression of actions in which the law was violated. The resultant violence divided the movements. It caused people to have doubts about their participation and about the best way of achieving the goals. It also turned out that, through the spiral of violence, this violence ‘turned in on itself’, which caused the atmosphere within the movements to harden. In the case of the squatters’ movement, however, the use of violence by the police is precisely what in the beginning led to the squatters’ radicalisation. It was in reaction to police violence that they resorted to violent means. Repression played a somewhat different role among the extreme right. The decline of the extreme right-wing Centre parties had to do with a restrictive social and political climate, in which no serious room was made for the wishes of the extreme right. The extreme right and its active members were stigmatised and excluded from society. People left this movement more out of frustration and the impossibility of functioning — or did not join it in the first place, even if they agreed with the extreme right-wing agenda.
• It is difficult to evaluate the effects of inclusion and reform because these factors occurred only to a limited extent in the three cases. Only for the squatters’ movement did reforms (in the housing market) influence its decline.
• Public opinion seems to play a major role in decline. A lack of goodwill among the populace (and among one’s own ethnic group), whether or not because of a change in the Zeitgeist or because of violent actions, had an effect on all three radical movements. This created doubt among the members and reduced the number of new recruits.
• It is difficult for us to offer any general conclusions about the role of competing ideologies. We can only conclude that they played almost no role in any of the cases (with the exception of the Moluccans). It is difficult to say whether this is because there were no alternatives or because alternatives play but a limited role in decline.

Barriers:
• It is also difficult to offer any general conclusions on the effect that the elimination of the barriers has on the process of disengagement. Only in the case of the Moluccans did the elimination of existing barriers play a role in the movement’s decline.
General:

- In the cases studied, all the factors which are included in the analytical framework evidently played a role to some extent in the movement’s decline. There are only two factors to which this does not apply: the social dependence barrier and the amount of costs incurred barrier. In all three cases, the decline was not clearly associated with an elimination of these barriers.
- In general, we can say that factors linked to the movement play a very significant role in the decline of all three movements studied. Public opinion and repressive government intervention have a major influence on the movement’s attractiveness, for members as well as for new recruits.

Decline of religious forms of radicalism

We discuss religious forms of radicalism in greater depth, considering that these forms of radicalism are often ascribed unique characteristics. In summary, we can draw the following conclusions from this analysis:
- Religion can intensify conflicts. This is not because religion automatically incites conflicts, but because religious differences can increase the schism between two parties. The effect of religion is comparable in this regard to other aspects of identity, such as differences in ethnic or national identity. In the religious domain, however, fear of domination by 'the other' can further widen the divide.
- It seems that religious radical movements better address the wishes of some people in modern society than do non-religious movements.
- The fact that religious radical movements address religious convictions which are deeply rooted in the culture can have two contrary effects:
  - This possibly makes it easier for these movements to appeal to people because the people are familiar with the discourse.
  - This possibly makes it more difficult for these movements to appeal to people because the people have been raised with a moderate religious interpretation and also because there is a moderate religious order established.
- The organisational aspects and the role of religious radical movements’ leadership are comparable to those of non-religious radical movements.
- In secular societies the use of religion to substantiate political desires is generally not regarded as legitimate and is not understood. Maintaining a rigid separation of politics and religion can encourage religious radical ideas. A possible solution is to deflect the radical message within the same religious discourse, using a more moderate, established form. To do so requires that:
  - the more moderate message is convincing,
  - this moderate religious message is not viewed as a threat within the established order,
  - more room is thus made for religion,
  - the established order comes across as having integrity and upholding its own moral values.
- Abstract anti-secular goals cannot be achieved within the existing secular political systems. This does not change the fact that, in addition to the abstract anti-secular
goals, there may be subsidiary objectives which can indeed be addressed within the established order.

- Repression, inclusion and reform towards a religious radical group entail other risks than an intervening approach towards a non-religious radical group does.

*Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands*

We formulate the role that the factors in our analytical model can be expected to play in a possible decline of Islamic radicalism in the Netherlands. The four most significant (anticipated) factors are:

- **A failing strategy.** The effects of violent actions will probably further excite ideological discussions and possibly reduce the support for violent strategies. However, the preference for a non-violent course of action appears to be based on strategic arguments, and this preference could reverse if violent actions lead to results.

- **New generations to whom the radical Islamic creed does not appeal.** Islamic radicalism is quite adept at reaching potential adherents. There is an extensive range of information and it is presented in an appealing manner. As long as radicalism and Islam are equated with each other in public debate and many Muslims do not feel accepted (as long as people have the idea that Muslims and non-Muslims are subject to a double standard), then the attractiveness will probably not decline. This also causes a situation where less social goodwill leads to greater attractiveness. This is contrary to the squatters’ movement, in which less goodwill made the movement less attractive for (potential) members. In contrast to the case of the extreme right, in the case of Islamic radicalism less social goodwill does not stop more educated individuals from joining. The attractiveness of Islamic radicalism can be expected to decrease if Muslims feel more at home in the Netherlands.

- **Public opinion.** A more inclusive atmosphere in which (orthodox) Muslims feel more at home in the Netherlands, feel that they are being taken more seriously and are being less identified with radicalism, will probably reduce radicalisation. The negative image, which was detrimental to the squatters’ movement and the extreme right, has a largely contrary effect in the case of Islamic radicalism because many people feel addressed by this as Muslims. This creates a feeling of solidarity, causes people to close ranks and fosters anger and frustration. It is likely that there will be more space for counter-arguments within Muslim communities if there is less pressure on these communities. A diversity of views is present in the Muslim communities. If in these communities a clearer position is taken against radical excesses, this will probably influence the decline of radicalism. However, these opinions will probably not seep through to radical groups as quickly as it did with the Moluccans. It will therefore also have an effect if people, including parents, are more aware of how they should deal with the radicalisation of youths, so that the tendency of these youth to isolate themselves will decrease. There is a great divide between parents and children, and many children accept little guidance from their parents. In many cases, increasing religiosity is now initially encouraged. But radical youths are castigated, and isolated. And people often do not have many convincing counter-arguments at hand.

- **An attractive competing interpretation.** There is a good chance that a well-developed alternative creed, which also meets Muslim youths’ various needs (finding a meaning in
The religious nature of Islamic radicalism has two significant consequences whereby this form of radicalism differs from the three cases studied. First of all, the radical Islamic ideology is regarded as illegitimate in Dutch secular society, and seen as an irrational cause whose arguments should not be taken seriously. This makes it difficult to engage in a discussion from positions of equality. The religious nature of the movement also makes inclusion by the government difficult. Due to the separation of church and state, the government can hardly intervene in the ideological discussion between radical and non-radical views, because this pertains to a religious ideology.

**Deradicalisation of individuals: theoretical framework**

The concept of involvement is important in explaining why someone remains active in a radical movement or happens to withdraw from it at a certain point in time. Three types of involvement can be distinguished: the moral obligation to remain with the organisation (normative involvement), emotional attachment to an organisation (affective involvement), and awareness of the costs incurred which are connected with leaving the organisation (continuance involvement). In line with this, we distinguish three different types of factors which play a role in the deradicalisation of individuals: a failing ideology, a failing organisation or subculture, and dissatisfactory practical life circumstances. These types of involvement and the factors which play a role in deradicalisation are associated as follows:

- The more the individual’s ideology coincides with that of the movement, the stronger a person’s bond will be to that movement. Ideology gives meaning to the world and a vision of perceived injustice, among other things. When an individual begins doubting the movement because its ideology no longer properly addresses his or her needs in these areas, we refer to this as a crisis in normative involvement.
- Disappointing experiences in participation in the movement weaken affective involvement. If an individual is disappointed by the way the movement satisfies his or her need for bonding and identity, then that individual will experience a crisis in his or her affective involvement.
- Continuance involvement is associated with the practical circumstances (costs, benefits and possibilities for the individual) of membership in a group. When an individual begins doubting the movement because these practical circumstances are no longer rewarding or are even detrimental, we refer to this as a crisis in continuance involvement.

In addition to these factors which enhance a decline of involvement – and thereby encourage deradicalisation – there are factors that hinder deradicalisation. These are the
aforementioned barriers which movements erect to prevent disengagement: 1) social
dependence, 2) psychological dependence, 3) the amount of the costs incurred, 4) repri-
sals, 5) fear of losing reputation and protection, and 6) a marginal position after disen-
gagement.

In order to explain the deradicalisation of individuals, we therefore have to look
at the various forms of involvement in a radical movement, the factors that can influence
this involvement, and the barriers which must be overcome for an individual to be able
to disengage.

**Deradicalisation of individuals: Dutch cases**

We examine individual deradicalisation processes based on interviews with deradicalised
individuals from our four cases. We draw the following general conclusions:

- Rejection of violent action is a component of the deradicalisation process. This rejec-
tion can have various underlying reasons: reasons of an ideological nature (violence is
inherently bad, violence leads to undesired animosity), of a strategic nature (the de-
sired future will not be achieved with violence), or of an organisational nature (vio-
lence turns inward and leads to fragmentation of the movement itself). The rejection
of violence can be triggered by a (failed) violent action.

- A significant ideological factor in deradicalisation is the realisation that the desired
future is not feasible. This realisation can have a greatly demotivating effect and
cause radicals to begin doubting the usefulness of radical actions. This realisation is
often associated with the failure of a radical action; it is the realisation that everything
has been wagered, that a person has gone to the utmost extreme, but this has not
brought the desired future any closer. However, it seems that this factor plays a role
particularly in the case that concrete political goals are pursued (like an independent
RMS, more housing). Goals are more difficult to refute if they are vaguer and more
abstract; in that case the concrete failure of an action forms no indication of the abil-
ity of the movement to achieve its ultimate ideals.

- Another significant ideological factor is a change in the vision of today’s world. This
often has to do with an individual’s realisation that he/she is a part of society and
perceives this connection to be important. The individual no longer wishes to view
this society as an enemy. This can play a role both in deradicalisation and in not rad-
icalising any further. Radicalisation is a process in which the connections to society
are increasingly severed. When people become aware of the fact that further radicali-
sation entails the definitive severing of all these connections, this can frighten them
off. It can lead to a situation where a person does not take that important step (not
radicalising any further) or where he/she even starts to take steps back (deradicalisa-
tion). A somewhat different process seems to occur for radicals from minorities.
Many people from ethnic minority groups do not feel the connection to society as
strongly as people from the native Dutch majority. For these members of minorities,
the feeling of ‘not belonging’ in society is often precisely that which plays a signifi-
cant role in the radicalisation process. For persons from the majority, the realisation
of being a part of society constitutes a barrier to the last step in the radicalisation
process. For many radicals from minorities, feeling a part of society is in itself, a first
step in the deradicalisation process. These people realise that they ‘belong’ and that they want to belong.

- Disappointment in the movement can be a significant factor in deradicalisation. This can occur in two ways. 1) When the group’s lifestyle is viewed as the manifestation of one’s own ideals, then disappointment in the group can lead to doubts about the achievability of those ideals. 2) If the group has little structural political influence, a person can become disappointed in the group’s capabilities. A person may then disengage and deradicalise, though he may also go searching for another, perhaps yet more radical, alternative.

- The role of practical life circumstances forms a constant in disengagement. Factors such as growing out of the movement, assuming responsibilities, and wishing to establish one’s own life, play a role among all types of radicals. These factors are significant in the deradicalisation process, though they seem mainly to play a supplementary role. They constitute an additional motivation in addition to affective and normative factors. Only in the case of the ‘negative’ variant this takes a different form: stigmatization, outside pressure and isolation constitute an primary reason for disengagement. We see this among the extreme right in particular.

- For radicals from minorities, loyalty to one’s own community appears to be a major barrier to disengagement. A lack of social perspectives and social alternatives can also constitute a barrier to disengagement (this also plays a role among the extreme right). Inner barriers can also play a role. This mainly pertains to reluctance to acknowledge that the actual (radical) lifestyle does not suit him or her well, or that the truth in question is not the only truth.

- A person’s significant others can play a role in deradicalisation. These are people whom the radical trusts and respects, who initiate an ideological discussion with the radical. When the radical is (somewhat) open to the opinion of this person or these persons, there is the possibility that he or she is influenced by them, and that they trigger a process of doubt about one’s ideology.

**Experiences with deradicalisation programmes**

Lessons can be learned from existing (international) deradicalisation programmes for application to Islamic radicals in the Netherlands. We distinguish 5 lessons.

- A deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands must be oriented towards both affective and normative factors as well as continuance factors.

- It is advisable to base a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands on voluntary participation, and to combine passive and active recruitment.

- In developing a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands, one must be aware of the religious-ideological alternative that is/should be promoted by such a programme. Subsequently, an open ideological discussion must be carried out by someone with substantial content-based knowledge.

- A deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands must be oriented towards developing the self-reliance of those in the process of disengagement.

- Cooperation between various authorities is crucial for the success of a deradicalisation programme for Islamic radicals in the Netherlands. A customised approach
Suggestions

We offer a number of policy suggestions and outline the dilemmas which arise in this regard.

Dilemma: Government intervention and the separation of church and state
The initial dilemma has to do with the separation of church and state. A difficult question is the extent to which the government is allowed to make judgements about the religious content of an ideology and the extent to which the government is allowed to express a preference for a certain ideological religious interpretation and to oppose other ideological religious interpretations. Other social players have more room for rejecting and promoting religious-ideological creeds, though the question which arises here is to what extent the government may offer support to such parties.

Dilemma: The ideological persuasiveness of alternative creeds
There is an additional dilemma related to the level of orthodoxy and radicalism of possible alternative ideologies. We have seen in various places throughout this report that radicals sometimes open up to people whom they view as a credible discussion partner. The current deradicalisation programmes in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and elsewhere are based on this insight. This insight can be of value for deradicalisation initiatives in the Netherlands as well. It immediately begs the question, however, of who could be engaged as a credible discussion partner. Can this role be filled by non-orthodox, perhaps even non-religious, persons? Or do radicals mainly regard those persons as credible whose beliefs largely coincide with their own ideas, thus persons who are relatively radical and orthodox themselves? It is quite possible that the latter is the case for some radicals. That makes the selection of an alternative (religious) creed to be promoted a complex one. Indeed, the goal is for the alternative creed which is promoted to have as deradicalising an effect as possible. But to what extent must relatively orthodox ideas be promoted? And who has to do this? The question is whether it is desirable for views of a somewhat radical or orthodox nature to be promoted with the government’s support.

The following policy suggestions must be read in the specific context of the dilemmas outlined above. First the suggestions on the collective level:

Suggestion: Stimulate the democratic approach. The counterpart to the discouragement of a violent strategy is the stimulation of a democratic course of action. Central to this is that people who wish to achieve something by democratic means are taken seriously and that non-democratic means are given as little room as possible. Increasing the range of competing non-radical (democratic) creeds can also form a component of the democratic approach.

Suggestion: Make public debate and atmosphere in the Netherlands more inclusive. It can be expected that, if the pressure on Muslims is reduced somewhat, then this will lead to more room within the Muslim communities to express counter-arguments against radicalism,
also that this will take out the wind of the radicals’ sails and that more Muslims will think in terms of ‘the Netherlands is my country.’ This is a precondition for repressive measures to be successful. Otherwise, the chance of adverse effects is great.

**Suggestion: Eliminate the breeding ground for new recruits (social reform).** New recruits feel attracted to the radical Islamic movement through a feeling of injustice, among other things, which is partly caused by a subordinate position (or the perception thereof).

**Suggestion: Seriously listen to radical demands, making a distinction between the various schools of thought,** so that the less radical schools of thought (the apolitical and political Salafists) become more connected to society and the wind is taken out of the sails of the more radical schools of thought (the jihadi Salafists).

**Suggestion: Consider the application of repressive measures very carefully.** Repressive measures can be very effective, but repression can also have adverse effects. It can lead to a spiral of violence, a hardening of the struggle, and further radicalisation of the ‘hard core’. In the case of Islamic radicalism, however, it seems that there is mainly a risk of creating an underdog effect, which only makes the radical group more attractive. There is also the question when repression is acceptable in an open, democratic society.

Then suggestions on the individual level:

**Suggestion: Ensure open ideological religious dialogue through a persuasive discussion partner.** In many cases deradicalisation is associated with an altered view of one’s religious foundations. A personal dialogue with a discussion partner viewed as credible and persuasive by the individual in question often plays a role in this. In engaging specific discussion partners in deradicalisation programmes, specifically religious or even somewhat orthodox discussion partners, the two above-stated dilemmas come into play.

**Suggestion: Establish openness to orthodox religious statements.** When room is given for experimentation with radical ideas and types of behaviour, it is easier for a person to change his mind and to moderate his or her attitude, than when this behaviour is heavily condemned by others and has even become politically loaded.

**Suggestion: Limit isolation and stimulate the openness of society.** It is important to prevent isolation of the radical individual and to ensure that society is as open as possible to taking someone in again after disengagement and to letting them feel a part of society once again.

**Suggestion: Set out the consequences of the radical course of action.** Emphasising the negative consequences of radicalisation can promote deradicalisation.

**Suggestion: Offer support to an individual in taking hold of his or her own life.** An improved perspective of the future can lower the barrier to disengagement. And for this reason it is also important that deradicalisation programmes are oriented towards the self-reliance of the individual in the process of disengagement.
Suggestions regarding organisational aspects of individual deradicalisation programmes:
- Address affective and normative as well as continuance factors.
- Give the approach a voluntary basis and combine passive and active recruitment.
- Ensure cooperation between various authorities.
Bibliography


