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The politics of entry

Vorage, M.W.

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List of variables

a = strength of demand

α = polarisation

B = bribing (also as subscript)

β = political accountability

c = subscript denoting consumer(s)

C = bank control (state banking S or private banking P)

D = debt of a firm

Δn = entry wedge between ruling class and opposition

δ = investor protection

e = subscript for entrepreneur(s)

ε = shock

E = inefficiency cost of state banking

f = price of the final good

ϕ = legality

G = governance structure (bribing B or lobbying L)

H = home constituency or community (ruling class R or opposition O)

i = subscript denoting citizen(s) - consumer or entrepreneur

CHAPTER 6. LIST OF VARIABLES

I = initial investment required to start a firm

k = political contributions

K = contribution structure (of different contributions k by interest groups)

l = fixed cost of retrieving loans in case of bank failure

L = lobbying (also as subscript)

m = entry or share of entrepreneurs in total population if unconstrained

n = entry or share of entrepreneurs in total population

N = entry structure (different interest groups)

O = opposition (also as subscript)

p = subscript denoting the politician

P = private banking (also as subscript)

q = coalition of citizens

Q = coalition structure (of different coalitions q)

π = profits

R = ruling community (also as subscript)

ρ = size of ruling community as share of population

s = social welfare

S = state banking (also as subscript)

σ = entrepreneurial skill

θ = funneling as share of total lending

U = utility

ω = endowment for consumption per citizen

x_i = consumption of the numeraire good by citizen i

X_p = politician's utility in excess of utility from social optimum

y_i = consumption of the final good by citizen i