Authority and utility: John Millar, James Mill and the politics of history c.1770-1836
Westerman, I.

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From May 1796 to August of the same year, Millar expressed his anxieties about the state of Britain in the light of the war with France in thirteen letters to the editor of the *Scots Chronicle*. The *Scots Chronicle* was an Edinburgh-based periodical that faced the harsh measures government took to dissuade the British populace from following the example set by the French. To escape persecution for libel, the proprietor and the editor veiled their involvement with the *Scots Chronicle* but it is certain that it was established under the patronage of James Maitland (1759-1839), the eighth Earl of Lauderdale. Lauderdale was Millar’s ‘favourite pupil’, according to Craig. ‘With none of his pupils did Mr Millar continue on a footing of so much intimacy and friendship’. Together with Charles Grey, the future prime minister who would see parliamentary reform through, Lauderdale founded the Association of the Friends of the People in April 1792. As its name suggests, the initiative of a few aristocratic Whigs was meant to paternalise the various societies devoted to reform. Millar was a ‘zealous member’. He subscribed to the charter of the London Friends of the People. And he was actively involved in the formation of the Glaswegian branch of the society, which had a more popular membership than its metropolitan counterpart.

The declared objectives of the Scottish Associations of the Friends of the People were deliberately nondescript: an ‘equal representation of the people’ and a ‘more limited duration of parliamentary delegation’ were to be ‘constitutionally’ pursued. To the surprise of those Whigs who attempted to take custody of the movement for parliamentary reform, they were opposed by members of their own party. The issue for which they stood would soon split the Whig party. The reformist Whigs were not befriended by the people either. Widespread loyalism (militantly expressed in acts of violence mostly against Dissenters) and the enfranchised’s enthusiasm for the royal proclamation against seditious writings of May 1792 (which was thought to target the Friends of the People as well as truly radical statements) showed that little support could be mustered. On top of it all, the rank and file of the Scottish Friends of the People could not long be controlled. They hijacked the third national convention (of November 1793) and made it into a radical platform, copying French revolutionary titles and terminology and demanding universal manhood suffrage and annual parliaments. Aristocratic custodianship of reformism and popular sentiments proved to be incompatible.
Millar’s activities did not provide shelter in ‘hurricane season’ (a phrase of another of his former students, William Windham). The government reacted severely to radical activism and reformist alternatives, helped by a judiciary that passed repressive sentences, especially in Scotland. Colonel Norman Macleod, a man who later helped to fund the *Scots Chronicle*, was expelled from service for leading the Glasgow Friends of the People. For decades Millar had been accused of lecturing on ‘democratical principles’, and of ‘inculcating republican doctrines’. But that had never stopped him from performing his professorial duties, be it with a little more than the usual circumspection. First in the 1790s, Millar or his publisher felt so ill at ease that he decided that the third volume of *An Historical View of the English Government*, which had just been completed, should be withheld from the public for a while lest repercussions would follow.  

The politics of the final decade of the eighteenth century made John Millar suffer personally as well as professionally. Millar’s oldest son and namesake, a lawyer ‘carrying his conviction of the necessity of reform in some degree farther than his father’, emigrated to America in 1795 to escape the contentious atmosphere of his country. He died from a sunstroke shortly after. This and other tragic events which concerned Millar privately (like the trial of the political activist Thomas Muir discussed below) help to explain why his tone hardened while his vocabulary remained largely unchanged. ‘On the subject of politics’, Millar’s biographer wrote,

> he argued always with zeal, and towards the end of his life with a considerable degree of keenness. ... On a subject ... which he had studied with the utmost care he naturally might be rather impatient of ignorant and presumptuous contradiction. Nor could his mind brook the imputations which, at a season of political intolerance, were so liberally passed on all the opposers of ministerial power.

Millar practiced the combination of outspokenness and secrecy in writing the aforesaid letters under the pseudonym of Crito. The *Letters of Crito* (containing two letters that had not appeared in the *Scots Chronicle*) were published as a single pamphlet in September 1796. The pamphlet was printed simultaneously in Edinburgh and London, and a second edition was distributed throughout Scotland. Even to his acquaintances Millar did not acknowledge the authorship of the *Letters*. Crito’s arguments are clearly recognizable as Millar’s, however.

A second set of letters, written under the pen name of Sidney, were printed in the *Scots Chronicle* from August to September 1796. The nine letters supplemented with nine more appeared as the *Letters of Sidney* in January 1797. Millar’s connection to Sidney is
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subject of debate. Some, among whom the recent editor of both sets of *Letters*, assert that Millar was Sidney. Others suggest that Millar’s nephew, pupil and biographer John Craig was the author. The evidence for the second suggestion is quite convincing. The greatest difficulty with attributing the pamphlet to Millar is the absence of ideas known to be specifically Millar’s, apart from some general comments on (the inheritance of) property from his lectures on jurisprudence.

The *Letters of Sidney on Inequality of Property* argued against ‘great inequality of property’, ‘one of the most striking features of the present state of society’. First the deleterious effects of excessive wealth and abject poverty were discussed. The writer calling himself Sidney next assured the reader that he did not advocate ‘levelling’. He showed that an ‘equal division of property has never been attempted in any age or country’. ‘Levelling’ was never considered a serious option in any of the ‘popular revolutions and governments’ in the history of mankind. About the English Levellers of the mid-seventeenth century, Sidney stated that their number was wrongly added to a handful of religiously misled and politically ignorant individuals who preached community of goods, and that their denomination was falsely interpreted to stand for economic rather than political equalising. The same held true for the French Revolution. The opinion of a few fanatics was mistaken for the ‘principle of the revolution’ which was not a propertied but a political equality that presupposed the sanctity of private property. After stressing that radical redistribution of property would have much more ruinous consequences for commerce than excessive inequality, Sidney presented a scheme for moderate rearrangement that would save ‘commercial prosperity’ which was presently threatened by the inequality of property. He proposed to abolish primogeniture, to re-establish the ‘natural rules of succession according to consanguinity’, and to introduce progressive taxation in Britain. These plans corresponded to none of Millar’s ideas, but they were notoriously present in the work of Thomas Paine. Sidney’s set of proposals neatly mirrored Paine’s plan of a progressive tax explained in the *Rights of Man, Part the Second* (1792). In reverse order, Sidney followed Paine’s single solution against ‘prohibitable luxury’, in favour of ‘restoring justice among families’, and against the ‘unnatural law of primogeniture’.

Some scholars who have studied the *Letters of Sidney* try hard to make sense of a social programme for redistribution of property that proclaimed the inviolability of individual property rights. Inspired by later theories on the development of capitalism, Sidney’s *Letters* are read as a plea to halt economic progress at a stage in which the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ could successfully assert its entrepreneurial interests. The alleged tensions of a vindication of private property that is combined with a vilification of inequality are resolved in the contradictions of capitalism in which the spokesman for the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ is caught. A less retrospective interpretation of Sidney’s arguments resolves the tensions more smoothly.
Gregory Claeys writes that ‘levelling’ was what Painites were accused of in numerous anti-jacobin loyalist tracts. The crucial theme of the political writings of the 1790s, according to Claeys, was the relationship between inequality and opulence. Very many writers for the loyalist cause emphasised that economic equality, which Thomas Paine and his followers were said to promote, was hostile to commercial activity and to Britain’s prosperity. The *Letters of Sidney* were a piece of economic anti-alarmism. Vindicating progressive taxation by insisting on its economic benefits, Sidney turned around the loyalist case. Thus he could hope to legitimise that part of Paine’s programme which was most open to attack.\(^{10}\)

The present chapter discusses and contextualises the ideas concerning the revolution in France and reform in Britain that are either known to be Millar’s or, in the case of the *Letters of Crito*, indistinguishable from his known opinions. In his lectures, letters and essays of the 1790s, Millar argued for parliamentary reform. He wanted the ‘better part’ of the people to be included in the political nation. For all the ambiguity of his objective, that was not an easy undertaking. On the level of party politics there was the problem of fundamental differences of opinion and ideological realignments that split the Whig party. From Millar’s perspective the divisions over the combined issue of British reform and the French Revolution were disastrous. Since the Commons was pocketed in 1784 the opposition party was liberty’s last stand, as far as Millar was concerned. While parliamentary reform should have restored the balance as he saw it, it actually became an issue that diminished the number in opposition and fed the executive power. When several Whigs under Portland’s lead coalesced with Pitt’s administration in July 1794 a relatively small group of Foxite MPs were condemned to what must have seemed, O’Gorman writes, an ‘unpropitious and hopeless term in the barren wilderness of opposition’.\(^{11}\)

John Millar was intellectually challenged by the predicament of the Whig opposition, and pleasantly surprised by the early revolutionary occurrences in France. Those two political circumstances were easily merged into the Foxite mould. With the withering away of opposition, the House of Commons (from Millar’s perspective) ceased to be what it should be (according to his own definition), namely an independent representative body that was strong enough to withstand the executive power. A reform of parliament was necessary to restore its independence, representative nature and its strength. To that purpose opposition Whigs needed to mobilise something with which they had freely identified themselves for a long time: the nation. The political exertions of the French populace were a source of inspiration for Millar and other Foxites, for whom identification with the people and their interests had always been more of an incantation than an act of empathy. Millar tried to explain the unexpected revolutionary developments in France with the help of the principle of utility. The emancipation of the people, at least its ‘better part’, was caused by the ‘general diffusion of knowledge’ which led to a critical reappraisal of the reasons for political
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allegiance. As it stands, that was not an implausible explanation for the psyche of the patriote and the sans-culotte. But also on this occasion Millar paraded the people mainly to bring down the royal banner. The French nation, he thought, had won victory in the typically Foxite feat of fighting the influence of the crown. Looking at the 1790s, it seems as if the king turned into Millar’s only certainty. A king, at least, could always be trusted to increase his might and to manipulate the weak. The people, on the other hand, throughout the decade, proved too radical or too docile to live up to Foxite expectations. In other words, the opposition Whigs could not count on much popular support. Finally, in his reactions to the French Revolution, Millar showed uncertainty about the aristocracy’s role in a modern policy. In the light of the nobiliaire character of his history of authority, doubt of the last sort came close to bewilderment.

‘A GOOD STOUT BLOW AGAINST THE INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN’

Millar’s first known response to the French Revolution was a lecture he fitted into the regular course on government on January 28, 1790. He spoke of an ‘extraordinary event’. Perhaps most extraordinary about what Millar constantly referred to as the ‘late Revolution in France’ was that it occurred unprovoked. Consulting the frame of modern revolutionary reference, Millar could find no parallels. The revolutions that mattered most in the previous century and a half were supported by a people inflamed by direct oppression, inspired by religious enthusiasm, or both. The English Civil War was waged against ‘open tyranny’ and fought with religious fervour. The Glorious Revolution was ‘owing altogether to the terror of popery’. And the American Revolution was caused by oppressive taxation, according to Millar. In France, on the other hand, the people had no ‘object of complaint’. Their taxes weighed heavily, but that was common to all the large European nations. True, the French monarchy was a despotism. But such it had been for nearly 200 years. And it was, Millar explained with a reference to Montesquieu, the ‘mildest and best regulated despotism of which there is any example’. The ‘real cause’ for the French Revolution was the ‘advancement of philosophy, and emancipation from ancient prejudices upon political subjects’. Millar’s explanation was the application of the distinction between the principles of authority and utility. The principle of authority underlay the notion that a monarch had an ‘independent right to govern, bestowed upon him by the supreme being or in the natural course of things’. The principle of utility, Millar lectured, implied that a monarch was a ‘public officer invested with high powers for the good of the community’. Ultimately, a notion of the latter had superseded that of the former in France. This change was effected by the ‘diffusion of knowledge and of liberal opinions’ over ‘all men of a liberal education’
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and through them 'in some measure [over] persons of inferior rank'. French involvement with American independence helped political reflection and liberality to spread; the social make-up of the army and the poverty of the lower clergy made them support the revolutionary cause.¹⁴

The very strict limits that were suddenly set to the powers of the French monarch were caused by a wholly new set of circumstances, but the role to which Louis XVI was reduced formed part of a familiar setting. Speculating on the turn that events might take, Millar saw signs that a balance of political powers like in Britain was aimed at. 'The leading people seem at present to point at the great outlines of the British constitution'. As well as France followed the example of America and perhaps Britain, France itself was to set the example hereafter. Millar was hopeful that, 'if a free government is established in France, it will give a peculiar tone to the rest of Europe'. 'France will lead the fashion in point of government. Civil and religious liberty will consequently be extended to the rest of Europe'. Millar confided similar sentiments to Samuel Rose (1767-1804), a former student of his and a reputable lawyer, in a letter dated 16 February 1790.

The system established in France will have the effect of reflecting upon this country some of those rays which have been received from her through the medium of America. Our scruples concerning the repeal of the test-act will have a singular appearance after the liberal sentiments on that subject displayed by a Roman Catholic nation, the great leader of fashions and opinions upon the continent. Is our High-church more strait-laced than that of Rome? Is the English in greater danger from latitude of opinions than the Gallican establishment? Entre nous, I do believe it is in greater danger, from the greater stupidity, ignorance and narrow prejudices of the people by whom it is principally supported. As to the reform of parliament, I am not surprised that the measure should for a while longer continue to be unsuccessful. There is a great pecuniary interest that must lead many powerful individuals to oppose it, and it must require some length of time before the voice of the community at large is able to silence the opposition arising from private views. But I should think it impossible that the people of England will be contented with a national assembly so ill constituted, while they have the example of one so much superior in France.¹⁵

Before the example of French freedom could be applied to Britain, the French situation had to be captured in British constitutional terms. That is, before the reform or removal of the rigid upper register of the Anglican church and the 'great pecuniary interest' that corrupted the English government could be suggested as following from French practices, Millar needed to establish a fair measure of common ground between the political constitutions of the two countries. It is well-known that all sorts of British response to whatever phase of the French Revolution were dominated by themes from English constitutional history. Most commonly, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was held out as
either a mirror or a shield. Before Richard Price hailed the French Revolution at a meeting organised to commemorate the Glorious Revolution, and long after Burke explored old Revolution principles to castigate French prospects, British commentators compared 1789 with 1688. It is noteworthy that John Millar was more concerned with 1784 (the year of the ‘fatal blow to the British constitution’) than any other date in British politics, 1688 included. That was the beginning of a new era to which the French example could be applied. Millar followed Charles James Fox who welcomed the French Revolution in opposition idiom: Fox spoke of a ‘good stout blow against the influence of the crown’. Millar as well as Fox tried to see French revolutionaries as honest Whigs. But when the monarchy of France was abolished in September 1792 and the king’s person received a death-blow in January 1793, it became ever harder to maintain the Whig mould. French internal politics became less and less useful as an example. Millar turned to the European diplomacy of war to account for the obvious excesses in France and to criticise the constitutional wrongs of his own country. Like Fox, he blamed the French outrages on foreign, partly British, intervention. The criticisms of the British war efforts, as we will see later on, gave occasion to revive the demands for parliamentary reform.

In a lecture that (extrapolating from what we know of the academic schedule and from details of the lecture) must have been delivered as part of the lectures on government in the fall or winter of 1790-1791, Millar repeated that the ‘French Revolution was produced without the aid of any religious enthusiasm and without any public grievance’. In the afore-mentioned lecture of January 1790 Millar paid most attention to what he thought to be the cause of the French Revolution, and subsidiary circumstances. At that time he could only guess at the kind of constitution that was going to be established and at the consequences it would have. In this second lecture he cursorily repeated his previous thoughts on the cause of the Revolution. The bulk of the lecture was taken up with a description of the nature of the government established by the ‘late Revolution in France’, and a vindication of this government in the face of the most important objections that had been raised against it.

‘By the late Revolution’, Millar lectured,

> a total change has been produced in the government, and in place of the former despotism a very democratical constitution, this under the name of a monarchy, has been introduced. The chief branches of power [are] distributed between the legislative assembly, the king and the courts of justice.

The new French constitution as Millar saw it seemed to conform to the British balance of powers in the freest of manners, and to assume the form of a nominal monarchy. Power was shared by the many, the one, and (since judicial reform was put into effect in November
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1790) the many once more. Two of the three branches were popularly elected (even though the electorate was less broad-based than Millar suggested) while Louis XVI was stripped of many prerogatives. The competences of the legislature included making war and peace and both determining the amount of the public revenue and managing its disposal, like fixing the civil list. Besides, the nobility was abolished. This was a 'very popular government' indeed. The elements of British constitutional experience were put together (or left out) in a way that left the whole utterly unbalanced when compared with the original. Millar defended the novel separation of powers by pointing out the exceptional circumstances of France. Meeting the objection that the French were dangerously innovative, Millar stressed that in the old government the king wielded legislative, judicial and executive power. Anything short of a radical redistribution of power would have left despotism intact. The nobility, possessed of 'high and oppressive privileges', simply needed to make way for the new order of things. To have preserved them 'would have been absurd'.

In answer to the objection that an extensive country like France was unfit for democratical government, Millar vindicated the concentration of most of the powers in the hands of the people. Millar inverted the received notion that democracies (this was the term he employed here) were practicable in small states only by arguing that it was the extent of French territory and the number of its inhabitants that made democracy their only remedy for despotism. With the public revenue at his disposal 'in a state of 5 or 6 millions of people' (a conservative estimate of the population of Britain, some ten years before the first census) the king 'would enjoy considerable influence, but not such as to endanger the liberty of the nation'. The king 'in a state composed of 24 or 25 millions', ceteris paribus, would control the whole of government. Millar magnified the argument against the influence of the crown by force of numbers. By doing so he drew attention to a qualitative difference between the French and the British situation. 'From the different circumstances of France and of Britain it appears that a democracy is necessary in the former country and not in the latter'. France required a democratical government to be free while Britain did not because a limited monarchy was not just practicable but practice there.

The comparison raises questions about Millar's ideas on the state of freedom in Britain. Portraying the new French constitution as the radical solution to excessive royal influence seemed to put corruption at home in the shade. It looked as if the application of the opposition idiom to France reduced its expressiveness in Britain. Millar was reserved on what the opposition should do, and on the lessons that must be learnt from the French situation.

It would be the height of folly to give up the old constitution, which is in the main so favourable to liberty, and to which the bulk of the people have, from long usage, acquired a strong attachment, for the sake of a new constitution of which they have no experience and for which
they have no prepossession. The example of France has no doubt a tendency to promote political reasonings and to extend the principle of utility as the foundation of government. But when we have so much at stake it is [likely] we shall be cautious of admitting innovations and that we shall endeavour to profit by the experience of our neighbours.\[20\]

The principle of utility would receive impetus, Millar taught, but he was unclear about where that would lead to. For the moment he said nothing about parliamentary reform. The boundaries of political participation of the people, however, can be gathered from Millar’s comments on the procedure of popular representation in France.

In the latter of the two lectures considered above Millar explained how the members of the National Assembly were chosen indirectly to ‘prevent bribery’ and to ‘render a fuller representation practicable’. He asserted that the primary assemblies were formed by the ‘whole inhabitants with a few exceptions of menial servants, insolvent debtors, etcetera’. Allowing for a due degree of misinformation, Millar’s idea of what sort of men made up the ‘whole inhabitants with a few exceptions’ seems to have corresponded to the relatively restrictive Revolutionary category of active citizens. Male citizens older than 25 who paid taxes worth three days of unskilled labour were considered active. Double election may have been meant to prevent corruption as Millar think it did, but it certainly excluded the largest proportion of the electorate from the passive right of eligibility for the position of departmental elector. A little over one in hundred ‘active citizens’, namely those who were taxed the equivalent of ten days’ labour, were given the right to choose the national representatives directly. These requirements were more restrictive than those concerning the right to vote for the States General.\[21\]

Millar expressed another view on the political emancipation of the public in an essay called ‘The Progress of Science relative to Law and Government’. The essay, certainly not completed before August 1791, appeared in the fourth volume of An Historical View of the English Government and it contained nearly all of the very few particulars on the French Revolution that were published under Millar’s name (and that only after his death). The essay told of the natural progress of political speculation from being based on the principle of authority to the investigation of that of utility. An important addition was that Millar stated for the first time that the principle of authority, defined as the ‘immediate effect of the peculiar qualities or circumstances by which any one member of society may be exalted above another’, had a role to play even now. In his earliest responses to the French Revolution Millar was content to stress the spread of the principle of utility (or ‘consideration of the advantages to be derived from any political establishment’). But although he unflinchingly accepted the abolition of the French nobility, he observed the usefulness of a ‘gradation and subordination of ranks’. Clearly, the notion of utility must not spread too
Upon the whole, it is evident that the diffussion of knowledge tends more and more to encourage and bring forward the principle of utility in all political discussions, but we must not thence conclude that the influence of mere authority, operating without reflection, is entirely useless. From the dispositions of mankind to pay respect and submission to superior personal qualities, and still more to a superiority of rank and station ... the great body of the people, who have commonly neither leisure nor capacity to weigh the advantages of public regulations, are prevented from indulging their unruly passions and retained in subjection to the magistrate. The same dispositions contribute in some degree to restrain those rash and visionary projects, which proceed from the ambition of statesmen or the wanton desire of innovation, and by which nations are exposed to the most dreadful calamities.

Exploring the lower limit of utility as a political guide-line, Millar once again expressed his doubts as concerned the enlightenment of the crowd. Although nothing new in itself Millar's sound of warning was a far cry from the firm call for reform he had supported since 1783 and which he was to support anew. There was much more to it than fear of involving the respectable movement for reform in Britain with French atrocities: Millar took up the cause for constitutional reform again explicitly linking it to France after much more blood was shed than had yet been the case. To understand Millar's erstwhile hesitation we should look at the predicament of the Whig party in the first three years of the French Revolution. At least since 1783 the party was divided over the issue of parliamentary reform. The issue was brought to a head by the responses to events in France from Whigs on different sides of the question. Edmund Burke's hostile reaction to the French Revolution and the hostilities directed towards him by members of his own party were the first in a series of unfriendly exchanges that betrayed how divisive the issue had become. When the schism finally led to the breakup of the old Whig party, the wish for unity could no longer hinder the cause of reform. Having temporary reservations about parliamentary reform, Millar followed in Charles James Fox's footsteps. In his attempts to keep the Whig party together Fox vested the early phases of the French Revolution in well-tried oppositional garb without insisting overtly on the issue of reform.

Leaving Glasgow at the beginning of May 1792 for his second visit ever to the capital, John Millar 'arrived in London in sufficient time to be present at several very important debates in both houses of parliament, and he enjoyed the satisfaction of becoming acquainted with Mr Fox and the other leaders of opposition ... whose steady patriotism, unshaken by obloquy and superior to popular censure or applause, was the object of his highest veneration'.
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One of the ‘very important debates’ of which Millar’s biographer made mention was probably that of the 25th of May on the royal proclamation against seditious meetings and writings. By issuing the proclamation Pitt hoped to widen the rift that had opened up the Whig party for all to see on April 30, 1792. On that day Grey had moved for parliamentary reform. The motion was strongly opposed by Windham, Burke and other members of the opposition. That Pitt failed to cash in on this conflict was largely due to Fox’s attempts to conciliate both camps on the eve of the debate on the proclamation. In December of the same year, however, Fox gave up the hope of party unity and sided unambiguously with the reformers. It was in the intervening months that, from a British perspective at least, French affairs entered a new phase with the abolition of the monarchy. The scenes of violence which inaugurated the new phase were described in the eyewitness account of Millar’s old friend John Moore (1729-1802).

On his second visit to London Millar spent most time with Lauderdale, his ‘favourite pupil’, and with Moore. John Moore, physician and a writer of novels and travel journals, was one of the few persons with whom Millar corresponded on a regular basis. Their wives were already close friends before their marriages, and the Moores had trusted the supervision of the education of their sons at Glasgow University to Millar. In London the Millars stayed with Moore’s family. On the fourth of August 1792, John Moore and one of his sons accompanied Lauderdale to France. Lauderdale (whose father had befriended Moore) undertook a trip of several months for reasons of health, but the fact that of all countries with a wholesome climate he chose France leads one to suspect that he also took an interest in the political climate of that country. That John Moore took this interest is clear from the journal he kept during the trip, and which appeared in print the next year. The Journal during a Residence in France centred on the overthrow of the French monarchy at the tenth of August and on the September Massacres which Lauderdale and Moore witnessed in Paris. It ended with an account of the trial of Louis XVI, and his sentence and execution that took place after the travellers had left for England on December 14.

John Moore expressed his sorrow for the cause of the revolution that took place in the summer of 1789. Being a Foxite, he had welcomed the early phase of the French Revolution which he interpreted as redress of constitutional wrongs. But then, Moore thought, the recently obtained freedom had suffered greatly when ‘order, tranquillity and submission to law did not return. One revolution has been grafted on another. New alterations have been imagined and executed by men more violent, and means more bloody, than the former’. Shortly after the Convention proclaimed the Republic on 22 September 1792, Moore stressed the dual role of the Jacobins. By throwing out groundless accusations and spreading the vilest rumours the Jacobins destroyed the constitution which was erected with the ‘spirit of liberty’ they diffused. Instead of a balance between executive power and
the popular element, the multiple revolutions led to a shoot-out which ended in the death of
monarchy.

The great evil of the ancient government of France was that the executive power was too strong,
and all the other powers of the state too weak: so that however unjustly the former was exercised,
the people had no means of redress or of resistance but by open insurrection ... The framers of
the late constitution of France fell into the opposite extreme. They left the executive power too
much exposed to attacks, and too unable to defend those rights and prerogatives with which the
constitution endowed it.27

Despotism resulted in the French revolutions which resulted in anarchy. The remedy for this
disastrous succession, an aristocracy that might have guided political innovation, had fled the
country en masse.

Moore, travelling in the company of Whig grandee Lauderdale, lamented that a large
number of French nobles had emigrated at the outset of the revolutionary events. Instead of
blessing the French constitution with the balance, continuity and moderacy which only they
could provide, their flight discredited and finally endangered the remaining noblemen. Freedom
would have been secured, Moore insisted, had the whole body of the French
aristocracy faced the revolutionary challenge.

Had all the noblesse remained, it cannot be imagined but that a body of men of the most extensive
property must, in spite of the torrent of the times, have retained great influence and prevented
many of the disorders which have distracted this unhappy country. Numbers of the noblesse would
have been elected into the Assemblies ... By accommodating themselves in some degree to the
prevailing opinions they would have gradually rendered them more mild and conciliatory, and
prevented that degree of acrimonious prejudice which at present prevails against the whole body
of nobility.28

Millar read Moore's Journal and he referred to it in the third volume of his Historical
View of the English Government.29 But he did not share Moore's view of an activistic and
innovating aristocracy. It was exactly because of a disagreement on the involvement of
different ranks in the political process that the Whig party split, and that a fight broke out
over the Whig heritage.
In the essay on the ‘Progress of Science relative to Law and Government' Millar applied the idea that the principle of utility made headway at the cost of the principle of authority to the history of the Whig party. Millar agreed with Smith that utility was the principal tenet of the Whig creed. In 1688 it was not yet a popular creed: it was only to the ‘terror of popery' that the principle of authority then gave way. In the eighteenth century the continuing ‘progress of arts and commerce' stimulated a further ‘progress of opinions'. The notion of utility was spread, and consequently the authority of the Whig party increased. At the same time, and pushed by the same developments, members of the Whig party proceeded in a more popular direction.

The Whigs themselves have not been exempted from the progressive operation of the same circumstances which have gradually exalted their speculative principles, and occasioned a proportional change in their practical system. It cannot be overlooked that the disposition to pry into the abuses of government is likely to suggest limitations in the power of rulers; and when a people at large employ themselves in discussing the advantages arising from different political arrangements, they must feel a bias in favour of that system which tends to the equalization of ranks, and the diffusion of popular privileges—Hence the distinction between the old and the new whigs, by which a famous political character endeavoured lately to cover the desertion of his former tenets.  

Millar was referring to Edmund Burke's *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, of course. In the *Appeal*, published on 3 August 1791, Burke defended himself in the third person against the accusation that he betrayed his old Whig credentials by standing up to French principles. In turn, Burke accused the Foxites to betray theirs in making him step down. Millar seemed to accept the predicate New Whig, but on his own terms. Burke assembled commentaries from radical pamphlets written in response to his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (like Mary Wollstonecraft's *Vindication of the Rights of Men* and Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man*) and proclaimed them New Whig. And those he contrasted unfavourably with the principles laid down by the Whigs of Anne’s reign. Millar, on the other hand, rationalised his own position as conforming to a new ‘practical system' but nonetheless faithful to ‘former tenets'. By looking more closely at his reaction to Burke we shall learn what connection Millar saw between a change in practice and a steadiness of principle.

In the letter of 16 February 1790 addressed to Samuel Rose, Millar wrote that he was a good deal alarmed by this late altercation which has fallen out between our two opposition friends. By some accounts from London, I see people are disposed there to decide in favour of the invective against the French assembly. But this does not seem to be the opinion of any person...
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I have conversed with here. The truth is, it grieves me to differ from so excellent a man as Burke, but I do not see in this instance how he can be vindicated. He is an enemy to the reform of parliamentary representation and to the repeal of the test-act—and seeing that the revolution in France is likely to forward both of those measures, he chooses to take the first word in declaiming against that revolution. ... A propos, how do you like the behaviour of Fox in this late dispute. That man never loses his presence of mind. It was impossible to say any thing more consolatory to poor Burke, and at the same kind to sail more clear of those opinions which he has imbibed.\textsuperscript{32}

Millar alluded to a scene that took place in the Commons the week before. On 9 February Burke gave a long speech on the dangers of the French Revolution after he had heard Fox speak approvingly, and Pitt speak appeasingly on the same matter. Fox's tactful intervention made Burke, who had threatened to 'abandon his best friends, and join with his worst enemies' to save the British constitution, look back on that day as ending 'with unbroken friendship'. The friendship between Burke and Fox came forever to an end on 6 May 1791. Provoked by Fox's panegyric on the French Revolution of 15 April, and not prevented by a few attempts on the part of Fox and others to let matters rest, Burke spoke on the dangers of French politics and its British imitators. Further incited by nagging interruptions by Foxites intent on silencing him, and by Fox's insisting on his former sympathies, Burke made good his previous threat and declared to the House 'their friendship was at an end'. The fact that Fox's tearful contestation to the contrary was immediately followed by a condemnation of Burke's inconsistency with regard to reform demonstrated that Burke's action shocked Fox's personal feelings but not his constitutional convictions.\textsuperscript{33}

Always opposed to a reduction in the privileges of the Anglican church in England, Burke's alleged inconsistency came down to his position on the reform of representation and the opposition's apprehension of executive power. From his first reactions to the French Revolution Burke presented himself, in Millar's and many others' eyes, as an 'enemy to reform'. He who uttered that 'the nearer to monarchy any government approached, the more perfect it was' directly before declaring his friendship with Fox dead, was the same man who nine years before had carried a bill for economical reform to protect the independence of the Commons from the influence of the crown. In the \textit{Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs} Burke cleared himself from the charge of not being consistent (the virtue he said he valued the most) by arguing that to take measures to secure one branch of the constitution against another at one time did not imply supporting the abolishment of the latter for good.\textsuperscript{34} This line of defence was unfair: to support the abolition of the monarchy was what no member of opposition expected from Burke. It is not easy to decide his consistency here. Burke had long, 'since at latest 1782', aired his aversion to fundamental parliamentary reform. At the time that the Rockingham ministry of which he was part enacted economical reform, he seems to have believed (as he was later to claim in the \textit{Appeal}) that that was all that was
needed to keep the legislature independent. In 1784 he made known his ‘unwillingness to continue the struggle against the influence of the crown’. But one can see why many Whigs interpreted Burke distancing himself from their cherished creed as a volte face as soon as he associated himself with Pitt. In their eyes Pitt betrayed the cause of reform, disavowing measures in the spring of 1792 that he had promoted on previous occasions. More importantly, Pitt was seen as the personification of an extremely overbearing executive power since he took office in 1783 (riding on the wave of an unreformed electorate as far as the opposition was concerned). Worse still, Burke outpitted Pitt in militating against the French Revolution, and in his attempts to detach Whigs from the opposition. When Pitt got him a royal annuity in 1795 Burke’s turn-around seemed complete. Lauderdale, Millar and many others took Burke most severely to task for accepting the pension.

Mutual hostilities and personal tragedies like the death of Burke’s son Richard, who had seconded his father in his crusade, chilled the political atmosphere. Foxite Whigs thought of themselves as liberty’s last resort. They saw liberty threatened by a combination of the autocratic executive and the parliamentarians and judiciary under its influence. The supporters of the cabinet saw those who appointed themselves spokesmen of the rights of the people as elements dangerous to the state. Both sides reproached each other with promoting unconstitutional politics. A case in point was the trial of Thomas Muir. Muir (1765-1799) was a Scotsman bent on parliamentary reform, who performed a leading part in the Edinburgh Convention of the Friends of the People in December 1792 (the month in which Fox lost hope to unite the Whig party, Moore and Lauderdale returned to Britain disillusioned, and Burke showed a dagger to the Commons to warn for imminent danger). Muir divided the delegates by reading an address from the United Irishmen to the Convention. This was one of the deeds (and the only of which he was undoubtedly guilty) for which Muir was tried in August 1793 and sentenced to fourteen years transportation. He managed to escape from Botany Bay, a penal colony in Australia, and travelled the world over. On the run for spies he died in France, untimely and miserably.

Foxite Whigs sprang to action over Muir’s trial. Lauderdale and William Adam, yet another student of Millar, were among those who decried the legality of the sentence. Lauderdale visited Muir and promised to bring the case that made Fox’s ‘blood run cold’ to parliament. This was done to little effect by William Adam in March 1794. Adam (1751-1839) was very close with Fox and with Millar. Since 1789 he was largely responsible for managing the Whig party and organising opposition. After the suspension of a broad-based ‘systematic opposition’ in 1793 he remained with Fox. On his visit to London in 1792 John Millar sought the company of Lauderdale, Moore and Adam. Millar was not just personally involved with the parliamentary champions of Muir’s case but also with Muir himself. Muir attended the commemoration dinner of 14 July 1791 presided over by Millar.
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Both were active in founding the Glasgow Friends of the People of which Muir became vice-president. Millar’s oldest son was a Convener just like Muir and they were good friends. Muir had been Millar’s student in the early 1780s. When Muir was expelled from Glasgow University in 1785, earning early notoriety as a student leader, Millar saved his legal career by commending him to his colleague at Edinburgh University, John Wilde. Muir took more to his first teacher’s political principles than to Wilde’s. The latter defended Burke when, upon the publication of the Reflections, he was charged with a ‘total dereliction’ of his former principles. Burke thought he was ‘ably defended’, and rejoiced in Wilde’s signature, ‘A Rockingham Whig’. John Wilde took up the defence of Burke’s consistency again in two pamphlets in which he critically addressed the Friends of the People.38

John Pocock has established that Burke first employed the argument for prescription in May 1782, shortly after the enactment of economical reform in which he had a hand. It is important that we know when Burke first used the argument that the ancient constitution should not be amended on principles that could be independently known because it went against arguments he had formerly used. John Brewer has followed up on Pocock’s findings. Brewer explains that Burke’s changed political prospects induced him to change his argumentation. His Thoughts on the Present Discontents was a bid for power. Once in office, Burke wanted to recall moderate reformers ‘to their political senses’. He meant to show that all the reform that could reasonably be proposed had just been accomplished. No longer having to ride the wave of popular protest, he kept his distance from the people from his newly obtained oligarchical position.39

Leaving behind the contemporary question of Burke’s consistency for the moment, we will now turn to considerations of Burke in the role of prophet. Still today Burke’s immense power of expression is attributed to his gift of foresight as well as to that of eloquence. He foresaw much of the dread French revolutionaries would create. In the eyes of a Foxite like Millar however, Burke’s prophecy was wholly self-fulfilling. Foxites reasoned that Burke, wanting to go to war to stop reform at home and to restore French despotism, should have foreseen that he was responsible for the excesses that followed. The person whose predictions came true, it was thought, through no fault of his own was Charles James Fox. In fact, Fox applied his rhetorical skills to style old anti-oligarchical cant to the new situation. That situation looked far from bright. By 1793 the rift in the Whig party was beyond repair, and at the end of that year the Friends of the People proved to be totally out of the control of Foxites who had tried hard to manage popular discontent.40 The revolution in France had taken many unsavoury turns, and Britain was at war. Abandoned by his peers, the experiment in paternalism at an end, the French Revolution no longer exemplary, and facing accusations of being unpatriotic, Charles James Fox became an apostle of peace. His offensive was as bold as its logic was old. Fox interpreted the early phases of the French
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Revolution as a ‘good stout blow against the influence of the crown’. When the events in France, such as described by John Moore, entirely upset that interpretation, Fox inculpated the British political establishment. Much of the misery that followed upon the wholesome punch, he said, was really caused by international aggression against the French. The British government, aided by the influence of the crown, took the cynical course of exploding French freedom to obstruct reform in Britain, according to Fox. By thus turning French disaster to his advantage, and combining arguments for peace (that went further than non-intervention) and reform, he could hope to oppose a war without being called unpatriotic, and to insist on reform without being called a jacobin.

LETTERS OF CRITO (1796)

On 1 February 1793 the French Convention voted unanimously for a declaration of war against Britain. A few days earlier, induced by the news of regicide, an augmentation of British forces had been declared necessary in the name of George III. On the first day of February prime minister Pitt persuaded parliament to comply. A month and a half before, at the opening of the parliamentary session, Charles James Fox had spoken out against the reasons given for the augmentation of the navy and the army in the King’s Speech. Those reasons were an insurrection kindled by French interference, and indications that France intended to invade the rights or even the territory of neutral nations. Fox preferred to speak of his majesty’s ‘assertions’, or rather ‘insinuations conveyed in the shape of assertions’. And all of them were false.

An insurrection! Where is it? Where has it reared its head? Good God! an insurrection in Great Britain! ... But where is it? Two gentlemen have delivered sentiments in commendation and illustration of the speech. And yet, though this insurrection has existed for fourteen days, they have given us no light whatever, no clue, no information where to find it. The right honourable magistrate [the Lord Mayor of London] tells us that, in his high municipal situation, he has received certain information which he does not think proper to communicate to us. ... The honourable gentleman who seconded the motion tells us that the ‘insurrections are too notorious to be described’. ... I will take upon me to say, Sir, that it is not the notoriety of the insurrections which prevents those gentlemen from communicating to us the particulars, but their non-existence.

Fox continued that France was provoked by the aggression of that ‘horrid league formed against human liberty’ headed by the duke of Brunswick. Instead of negotiating with the French and mediating between the belligerent parties, Britain was doing its utmost to insult the French and to foreclose entente. Fox tried to convince the House that that was the best
way to create discontents in the kingdom an to head for war.  

In the same debate of December 1792 Fox made a final appeal to the Whigs who had left the opposition. He reminded them of the administration’s unconstitutional beginnings and mischievous continuation. He stressed the need for a strong and unified opposition party. He said he knew that the task at hand was not always thankful and never easy. But now, if ever, the time had come to urge parliamentary reform. Reform was needed to check the executive power and so to prevent impending war.

I am not so ignorant of the present state of men’s minds, and of the ferment artfully created, as not to know that I am now advancing an opinion likely to be unpopular. It is not the first time that I have incurred the same hazard. But I am as ready to meet the current of popular opinion now running in favour of those high lay doctrines as in the year 1783 I was to meet the opposite torrent, when it was said that I wished to sacrifice the people to the crown. I will do now as I did then.

On the eve of the debate Fox swore that ‘there was no address at this moment Pitt could frame, he would not propose an amendment to, and divide the House upon’. And so he did. He proposed motions three days in a row. On 13 December Fox moved an amendment to an address to the crown, in which he expressed the ‘deepest anxiety’ about the extraordinary powers assumed by the executive ‘which the law authorises only in cases of insurrection within this realm’. He wished to have investigated whether the reports of revolt were well-founded. The next day Fox moved an amendment to the same address, in which he prompted his majesty to ‘employ every means of negotiation, consistent with the honour and safety of this country, to avert the calamities of war’. 15 December Fox put forward a motion to entreat the king to return the minister to Paris that had earlier been recalled. He hoped that move would help to start negotiations. All of Fox’s motions were negatived, and his party was seen to be shrunk to less than 50 MPs.

On that fateful February the first Fox spoke again. He pleaded against going to war. No matter what the ministry professed, the real object of war was to destroy the internal government of France so as to combat the French principles which filled the ministry with fear; fear of losing their hold on the British people. On 12 February 1793 Fox proposed the Commons to ask the king to steer for pacification. Six days later, and to little more avail, Fox moved five resolutions against the war. Looking back from October 1795 Fox prided himself on having ‘sometime in every session since [December 1792] renewed, in one way or another, the same motion’. Following Lauderdale’s initiative, Fox also organised petitions to end the war. In July 1793 John Millar was reported to have drawn up such a petition which, signed by over 40,000 Glaswegians, was presented to the king by Lauderdale in September.
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Fox moved for peace again on 10 May 1796. In a speech that lasted nearly four hours Fox stressed again that Britain had failed the opportunities to mediate and negotiate. Pitt’s ministry roused by Burke had made war instead. He refuted the argument that the successive governments of France were untrustworthy negotiators. Whatever government had happened to prevail, and however badly it treated its own people, not one was proven unreliable in its foreign affairs. The internal government of France was simply none of British business. Fox’s motion fared even worse than his previous ones and Grey’s motions for peace with France in January 1795 and in February 1796. It got only 42 votes. Seventeen days after this last (but not final) effort of Fox to end the war, Crito’s first contribution to the Scots Chronicle appeared. The whole series of letters appeared as a pamphlet shortly before the meeting of a new parliament. Those were the landmarks of the oncoming weariness and the tempered hope that determined Millar’s mood while he wrote the Letters of Crito.

The Letters of Crito on the Causes, Objects and Consequences of the Present War were dedicated to Charles James Fox. In an editorial, attention was drawn to the fact that the Letters contained a ‘compleat fulfilment of the memorable prediction uttered by Mr Fox, in the House of Commons, near four years ago’. In the dedication, Fox was honoured for his forwardlooking and patriotic conduct, and the king was humbly asked ‘to dismiss from his presence and council those ministers whose pernicious measures have produced our present calamities’.

Crito began by recalling the joy that was felt when despotism, even though in France it ‘had acquired the most plausible appearance of which, perhaps, that species of government is susceptible’, fell and a ‘regular system of limited monarchy’ was erected in its place. Naturally, the sudden changes were accompanied by many lamentable losses. The most lamentable loss was occasioned by the unnecessary removal of all distinctions of rank. ‘Though the old privileges, immunities and peculiar jurisdiction of the clergy and of the nobility were with great propriety abolished, the entire abolition of the titles and rank of the latter appeared a needless and insolent stretch of innovation’, Crito thought. But on the whole the Revolution was a happy occurrence for France and for mankind.

The ‘ultimate cause’ of the French Revolution was the ‘general diffusion of knowledge, and the progress of science and philosophy’. Familiarity with literature and science was spread more widely in that fashionable country than elsewhere. Stimulated by those developments the principle of utility replaced the principle of authority.

The knowledge, which has diffused itself over all that part of the society exempted from bodily labour, could hardly fail to shed its rays upon the subject of government, and ... to enlighten the great body of the people. It has enabled them to examine and to despise the quackery of
Millar (there is no doubt that he was Crito) stressed that with the Revolution of 1789 the limits of monarchy were reached but not overstepped. Partial reform was out of the question since the monarch had unlimited executive, legislative and judicial powers. The nobility had ‘very arbitrary powers’. And the higher clergy ‘were a sort of nobility ... with similar powers’. In their stead a national assembly, elected indirectly by ‘all the male inhabitants ... with very few exceptions’, was erected. The king retained a share of executive power, a negative upon the legislative power, and an extensive patronage. Hesitant to pass judgement on a form of government so short-lived, Millar ventured it had the ‘appearance of a liberal system, greatly superior to most of those which have ever been established in a great nation. As to the double election of the national representatives, it seems peculiarly calculated for securing an equal representation’.

The absolute monarchs of Europe trembled. They knew well, Millar thought, that their authority was ‘founded upon opinion’. They saw what the spread of the notion of utility could do to alter popular opinion, and they feared what that would do to their authority. Although no absolute monarchs, persons ‘at the helm’ of England shared those perceptions and fears. The persons in power understood that the people could no longer fail to observe the ‘necessity of a reform [of representation] to check the rapid advances of prerogative and to retain the constitution upon its ancient basis’. Those views went against the interests of the MPs who bought their seats, and of all the people who were making money in the process. But none had such a stake in corruption as the present ministry. Millar’s detestation of Pitt knew no bounds.

To give a history of the conduct and sentiments of our prime minister, from his first appearance on the political theatre, would be to probe an empoisoned sore which, I am persuaded, no ordinary medicine can cure ... His procuring that unconstitutional interference of the crown in the deliberations of a great assembly, by which he forced himself into office; and the long train of dissimulation and deception ... for the purpose of concealing the measure of a dissolution of parliament that, in order to obtain a majority in the House of Commons, he had all along determined to execute; these are events which ... will not soon be forgotten.

Indeed, Millar remembered them all too well after nearly thirteen years. As he saw it, it was the beginning of a period in which elections were ‘easily overruled’ and all the efforts of the opposition were ‘effectually defeated’.

The Austrian emperor and the king of Prussia drew up the declaration of Pilnitz to
make known their intention to uphold absolute authority. Near a year later, the initiative was followed up by the duke of Brunswick, whose manifesto Millar (just like Fox) considered an act of downright aggression to the people of France. These movements which were meant to restore the ancient French despotism could not but increase suspicions about the role of Louis XVI. Thus the ‘combined powers of Europe’ forced the French to reconsider their aims and means which, up to that time, had been limited and surprisingly bloodless. This was the time, according to Millar, that Britain should have intervened to stop matters from growing worse. Instead, the ministers poured oil on the flames by treating the new French government as the foes of mankind. They were spurred on by Burke who ‘repeatedly declared, without the least contradiction or mark of disapprobation from his ministerial friends, that the two states might already be considered as actually engaged in war’. In spite of rapprochements by the French and repeated warnings by the opposition, Britain sided with the parties upon whom the ‘principal blame’ for French excesses and the miseries of the present war must fall. The government ‘could not miss to foresee the consequences, and yet persisted in that line of conduct which infallibly produced them’. The French nation was just a little impolitic when it formally declared war on Britain. 

The conduct of the ministry and Burke (whom Millar sarcastically alluded to as an ‘old Truepenny’ who was ‘glad to retire upon a most extravagant pension, and had the effrontery to laugh at his former professions, by stating the price of his apostacy as the reward of his services’) was informed by the need they felt to prevent parliamentary reform in Britain. The ‘introduction of a more adequate representation in the House of Commons began to stare them in the face as the necessary effect of the successful exertions in France’. It was decided that, in order to discipline the British people, the French should be brought to their knees and their old government restored. Millar was convinced that the prevention of parliamentary reform was the ‘real and ultimate object of the war’. Because of the structural nature of corruption he thought that it was not sufficient that his majesty dismissed Pitt’s ‘miserable junto’. The war was attributable as much to personal decisions as to the system which the persons in question represented. That is why the termination of the war required ‘not only a change of ministry but a total change of measures’. 

To end the war its ultimate object must be placed out of reach.

In his last letter Crito shortly explained that parliamentary reform was necessary to preserve the liberties of the people. After all, the French war was only one of the evils caused by corruption.

From [1688] forward a new order of things was introduced. The House of Commons, no longer jealous of the crown, became hearty and liberal in granting supplies. ... It is unnecessary to observe that [the] augmentation of the public revenue, by creating a correspondent increase of
patronage, has produced an extension of influence, pervading all the different branches of administration, and advancing without end. ... It was this view of our political state which ... extorted the memorable declaration from the House of Commons, 'that the influence of the crown had increased, was increasing and ought to be diminished'.

For a long time it was thought that, when called for by extraordinary circumstances, the interposition of the Commons would produce a change of ministry.

But the transactions in the year 1784 ... demonstrated that if ever the crown, from a singular concurrence of accidents, should lose a majority in that House, its ministers might safely venture upon a dissolution of parliament as an infallible expedient for supporting their interest. A great majority of the Commons being, in the present state of the representation, returned by the interest of a small number of individuals, a dissolution of [that House] was not, in reality, an appeal to the nation at large but, in a great measure, an appeal to such of the nobility and gentry as had acquired the direction of rotten boroughs or of certain political districts.

The representative system needed to be revised because, as 1784 had shown, the Commons no longer performed even the essential role of controlling the executive. Without revision, the rights of the people were unprotected. In other words, parliamentary reform was meant not to empower the people, but to clip and contain the king and his ministers.

Millar’s plea for a ‘total change of measures’ had a ring of powerlessness about it. A change of ministry had to be asked from the king who helped Pitt to office. He addressed a new parliament that was the product of the unreformed electoral system. Millar combatted undue influence which he thought was stronger and more repressively active than it had been for over a century. And to back him up there was an opposition party that rapidly ran out of members. About the defectors he bitterly remarked that they ‘felt no reluctance at quitting the cold and thankless climate of opposition for the genial sunshine of court favour’. Finally, the people at large had proven far from enthusiastic in supporting the claims that Millar was forwarding on their behalf. The only thing that spoke for Millar were his arguments. But even his arguments seemed to have a will of their own. The old patriot language of the public debt, ministerial influence, and the duration of parliaments had lost its authority as oppositional language. Millar’s medicine for the ‘secret malady affecting the vitals of the constitution’ stood entirely on its own without a party to prescribe it. The patient somehow had to cure himself. The well-tried arguments for parliamentary vigilance presupposed an independent Commons. And a public under tutelage. The arguments were not addressed to the people; they did not speak to them directly. By continuing to speak the language of patriotism Millar retained its paternalism.
In the Socratic dialogue Plato named after him, Crito is confronted with the dictates of the people. Trying to convince Socrates, Crito argued that if he would not run from his sentence with the help of his friends their reputation would suffer. Popular opinion would say that Socrates’ friends failed to warn and save him. Socrates replied: ‘But why should we, my good Crito, care so much about popular opinion?’ Valuable opinion was not a matter of ‘counting heads, but of consulting the most reasonable heads’. The dialogue was not just about reputation but also about the public good. Socrates, convicted by ‘public clamour’, explained that to disobey the laws of Athens in this instance was to endanger the whole community which on these laws depended. He rather gave his life than to betray his city.55

It is tempting to look at the Letters of Crito in the light of the patriotism of Socrates. Millar’s Crito stressed that he, disregarding popular opinion, acted out of love of country. This was a necessary move to free himself from the allegations of unpatriotic behaviour (like deserting a war that went badly, settling for a regicide peace). The fact that he had to disregard popular opinion brought out some of the tension implicit in Plato’s dialogue. What exactly was the relation between the public good and public opinion? Could a polity or a constitution that was claimed to guarantee the good of a people be defended contrary to the opinions of the same? Socrates thought it could. Millar’s Crito did too. Both preferred the views of an enlightened few.

Millar’s attitude towards the people was never free from ambiguity. He wrote about emancipation and devoted himself to a more equal representation. But he did so, first, side by side with Burke who thought that the ‘present discontents’ were a sign that the Rockingham Whigs should take office. Later, as a Friend of the People, he would demand reform by way of paternalising more ‘popular’ initiatives. Millar, who wrote that opinion could make or break governments saw fit as a political writer to hazard popular disapproval. Of course, he was careful to speak on behalf of the people, like he did at the end of the last of Crito’s letters.

Notwithstanding the mortifying suspicions which have been cast upon [the populace], notwithstanding the neglect which their humble petitions in behalf of their favourite object have constantly met with, notwithstanding the invidious distinctions which have unnecessarily and injudiciously been held up between them and the superior ranks ... they have waited with patience the issue of a war which they could not approve of, and against which they had in vain remonstrated.50

What this passage also reveals, however, is the docility of the people. Fox was much nearer to the mark in predicting the turn the relations between Britain and France would take, than
in warning for widespread discontent. We have seen that Fox was aware of the impopularity of his proposals to prevent war and to reform parliament. Millar’s duality was that of Fox. Millar faced the fact that remonstrations against the war were less conspicuous than demonstrations of popular loyalism. This was hardly consonant with his argument against the war, which rested on the supposition that a notion of the good of the governed had taken the place of unthinking deference.

The attitude of a large part of the population towards their self-styled Friends gave John Millar little comfort. In 1784, the king and Pitt had had the help of the people in defeating Fox (although Millar and others held that the ‘man of the people’ was defeated by the unreformed system). Millar had the doubtful honour of being the first speaker to be hissed at by a Glaswegian public when he ‘urged delay’ in complimenting the crown on the fall of the Fox-North coalition. That same year, Burke claimed ‘unwillingness to continue the struggle against the influence of the crown because the people had so decisively rejected the Whig party at the general election’. Here we see the Whig party already splitting, and the differences in popular appeal of Foxites and Burkeans foreshadowed. Burke could discontinue the Whig indictment against the executive power with an appeal to popular opinion, whereas a crowd attempted to silence Millar when he tried to speak out for the people. If anything, Burke was more straightforward than Millar in his attitude towards the people. In his *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs* Burke said nothing new when he fulminated against the people in their political capacity, understood as a ‘majority of men, told by the head’. The New Whigs were told that a truly political nation was much more than a ‘mere reckoned majority’. Most important was the quality of a ‘natural aristocracy’.

A true natural aristocracy is not a separate interest in the state, or separable from it. It is an essential integrant part of any large people rightly constituted. ... To be habituated to the censorial inspection of the public eye; To look early to public opinion; To stand upon such elevated ground as to be enabled to take a large view of the widespread and infinitely diversified combinations of men and affairs in a large society ... These are the circumstances of men that form what I should call a natural aristocracy, without which there is no nation.

Burke honoured the point of view that the only people that deserved the appellation had a natural aristocracy for its ‘leading, guiding and governing part’.

By posing that the ruling class was naturally fitted to inhale and filter public opinion and to let the public good prevail, Edmund Burke pronounced the nobiliaire presentiments that had for so long characterised oppositional discourse. Rid of rhetoric concerning the ‘influence of the crown’, that discourse was adapted by Burke to suit establishment purposes. While Burke made the most of the aristocratical interest, Millar (as ideologue of the Whigs in opposition) clung to the complaint of corruption. To Millar’s misfortune, more people seemed to conform to Burke’s ideas.
Millar’s uneasiness with the complacency of the crowd permeated his last political statements that have appeared in print. The last year of his life Millar corresponded with Christopher Wyvill, who had by then forgiven Fox for having once deserted the cause of reform. Pitt was now their common enemy. The first letter (dated 27 July 1800) was written by Wyvill, who responded to some comments made by Millar in a letter to a third person. Wyvill wrote that he was pleased to know that both Millar and he ‘entirely agreed’ on the propriety of inaction, at present, both on the part of Mr Fox and his friends in parliament, and also on the part of those advocates of the people who wish to see popular meetings held, when with effect they can be held, in opposition to the system of Mr Pitt. No efforts against the baseness and tyranny of this system, till calamity has roused the public from that state of stupid submission in which it has long been sunk, are likely to have any good effect in parliament, or at meetings of the counties. Even from rational publications in favour of popular rights, little immediate effect is to be hoped. The evils of our situation may indeed be demonstrated; but calamity alone can overcome the fears or apathy of the people, and stimulate them to vindicate their constitutional freedom.  

The calamity Wyvill spoke of might have been famine. Food riots took place in February 1800 and after. In the words of Roger Wells, Wyvill was ‘confident that a fundamental “crisis of public opinion” was on the immediate horizon’. That was why he decided not to petition for peace around this time. All the same, Wyvill did not foresake ‘rational publications in favour of popular rights’. Shortly before he had written a pamphlet to vindicate the secession of the Foxites from parliament.

In May 1797 Fox withdrew from parliament to return only in February 1800. The occasion of his return was the government’s turning down of Napoleon’s proposal to treat for peace. In his pamphlet Wyvill gave the reasons why Fox and the Foxites withdrew in the first place. He asked Millar to help him get the pamphlet printed and distributed in Scotland. Millar was happy to oblige. In a letter of 4 August 1800 addressed to Wyvill, it took Millar one sentence to state the predicament of his final years as a political writer.

It is surely of great importance that the people should be impressed with the extent of that corrupt influence which pervades our great counsels, and that they should see in a proper light the secession of Mr Fox and his friends, which in reality has reduced an assembly, formerly the object of universal respect and curiosity, to the insignificance of a town council in a rotten borough.

When what little remained of the opposition party seceded from parliament the last pillar of the patriot creed as oppositional language fell down to the ground. The Commons was no longer the authoritative House that opposition language presupposed it to be. Yet Millar persisted in spreading the message of ‘corrupt influence’ and of triennial parliaments by
helping to circulate Wyvill’s pamphlets. Both Wyvill and Millar still thought to reach a public even if a national disaster was needed to, as Millar expressed it, rouse the people ‘from that lethargy which has so long prevailed over the nation’.

With the suspension of opposition within doors, and nothing more than bitter hopes without, Millar could still sound local protest. In 1798 Millar opposed a resolution of his university to contribute £300 to war efforts. He thought it an improper way of using college money. And of course Millar still had his private views. He repeated Crito’s opinion that the war would not end ‘until [the ministers] are driven from the helm with disgrace’. In the last letter he wrote to Christopher Wyvill, a few months before his death, Millar was amazed that Pitt took the honourable way out. But he held fast to his former idea that a change of ministry was not sufficient. In his letter of 20 February 1801, shortly after Pitt resigned from office, Millar gave vent to his apprehension in a way that stressed the dual role the people played in his thought.

There is one piece of management on the part of ministers of which I have long been apprehensive. Those who brought us into this war certainly wish to get out of the scrape, and if the nation can be induced to express a strong desire of peace, they will make a merit of complying with the voice of the public and, throwing the blame of the terms upon the people, will continue in their offices and keep up the military establishment, at least such a part of it as will be sufficient to suppress the general inclinations of the country.

Millar feared that a new ministry would abuse popular opinion by turning it against the people. However, that required such a measure of public assertion as Millar never managed to procure. Perhaps, it was easier to rouse the people against their interests than for their own good. For the last time Millar positioned himself between the executive power and an unresponsive people that needed protection.

Millar’s history of authority had always been better suited to argue against oligarchy than to argue in favour of a self-assertive people. In his final years Millar not only faced a wayward people but also the prospect of losing his favoured language to the establishment. Edmund Burke, whose Reflections on the Revolution in France coloured establishment ideology in the 1790s and after, took most of the oppositional discourse with him, as it were, when he joined Pitt. He backed up his sympathy with the aristocracy and his consideration for monarchy with lachrymose accounts of the cruelties committed against French nobles and royalty and the miseries caused by a populistic government swayed by the issues of the day. Against the background of the French Revolution, the history of authority became a genre that was but little suited to state the case of opposition but all the more to support the government.
In 1791 a series on the history of the British constitution was published in the Edinburgh periodical called the Bee. It was written by the journal’s editor, James Anderson. Anderson (1739-1808) has of late been called a 'humorless and scatterbrained crackpot', but it was his respectability that made the authorities treat him leniently after his periodical published a piece of political criticism that was usually good for persecution in those times. The series delivered what its full title promised. Moreover, the 'Historical Disquisitions respecting the Origin of Government and the principal Changes that have taken place in the Constitution of the Government and Parliament of Great Britain from their first Establishment to the present Time' were pure Millar. Having discussed Millar's final considerations in print in the previous section, we will bring part two of this study to a close by looking at what Anderson and some others did with Millar's favoured history. That will shed some more light on the presuppositions underlying the history of authority, the limitations those presuppositions imposed on an oppositional use of history, and the possibilities they offered for supporting a 'conservative' position.

James Anderson stressed that one could not reasonably want to set back the clock with regard to the British constitution. Instead of wanting to restore the constitution to a former state we must, Anderson insisted, study the 'natural progression of government' to see what changes have taken place and what further changes were suitable to the present state of society. Anderson may have had Major Cartwright in mind. Cartwright presented his proposals for universal male suffrage and annual parliaments as a return to lost Anglo-Saxon liberties. At the outbreak of the French Revolution, Cartwright sent the Constituent Assembly congratulations and a collection of tracts on English constitutional history. He hoped that the delegates of the French people would take the English constitution for their model, but not in its present corrupted state. The tracts, Cartwright explained, 'distinctly point out essential provisions which in the English Revolution were neglected to the extreme injury of the people'. The collection shipped by Cartwright may have included work by himself, Catharine Macaulay, and David Williams. Anderson preferred not to see 1688 as a defective restoration but as a glorious end to a gradual process of constitutional change.

Anderson wrote the history of the British constitution as a part of a natural history of 'subordination'. First he shortly described the 'natural progress of patriarchal regimen'. The first governors were fathers of family; the first national assemblies were formed by elders. The first kings, chosen for superior valour and wisdom, derived their authority from such assemblies. Bit by bit, royal authority became permanent and was extended to the king’s family. So, with time and without thinking, a ‘distinction of ranks [is formed], which gradually gives rise to hereditary authority and despotism’. As a consequence the idea of
equality was ‘imperceptibly’ lost. Having sketched the ‘rise of personal rank and hereditary authority’ Anderson next traced the ‘modifications of that authority in different stages in the progress of civil society’. The part of the progress of civil society that mattered most was the change in conceptions of property. Among hunters, the notion of country and property were strongly connected.

In this state of society the idea of country strongly prevails.—In cases of danger they find it necessary to associate for mutual defence.—Extent of territory is, to men in these circumstances, extremely necessary.—An idea of property in territorial possession therefore takes its origin here, but this idea of territory is only connected with the nation or the tribe.

Herdsmen went from there. Only the slightest idea of personal property was developed. Agriculturalists gradually grew an attachment to the soil they cultivated, and the community confirmed the justness of exclusive claims to such lots as were worked.

The universal history of property formed the groundwork for a study into the ‘origin of the feudal system’ in Europe. James Anderson’s account of how the feudal system originated was nearly identical to Millar’s. Referring to Caesar and Tacitus he showed that the development of the feudal system followed from the ‘military subordination’ of the Germanic peoples who conquered Europe, their combinations with the conquered, and the differences in their respective notions of property. Just like Gilbert Stuart, Anderson emphasised the originally communal nature of feudal subordination. Anderson thought that the feudal system was ‘radically the same over all Europe’, yet ‘considerably diversified in regard to lesser particulars in different countries’. His attention was fixed on Britain, the best government under the sun.

A fundamental quality of all Germanic constitutions when they were founded was that the ‘deliberative voice remained with the people, while the executive power was entrusted to a particular officer appointed for that purpose’. The authority of the latter had grown as a matter of course while its purpose was lost out of sight. In this part of the narrative Anderson inserted a favourite oppositional theme. ‘By the emoluments [the monarch] has to dispose of, by the favours he can confer, his influence is gradually extending’. This move enabled Anderson to introduce and italicise the following maxim.

*That it is by carefully watching the progress of the ruling powers at present, and by guarding against the effects of modern encroachments that the circumstances of the times may not render very unpopular, and by this alone, that the essentials of freedom can ever be preserved.*

James Anderson shared John Millar’s fear for secret influence, which he warned against. ‘It is by corruption, often clothed in the most patriotic pretexts ... that designing men have
established their power, and not by openly attacking the privileges of the people'.

Whereas around this time (Anderson’s warning appeared in the Bee for October 1791) Millar racked his brains on how to support parliamentary reform without suspending ‘systematic opposition’, Anderson’s series took what can best be described as an antiquarian turn. The remaining articles (the final one appeared the last day of the year) were wholly dedicated to the, mostly medieval, history of parliament. Anderson discussed philological niceties and introduced antiquarian asides. The defects of parliament of which he made mention were situated either in the early or the late middle ages. Anderson was concerned with the introduction of the knights of shire, not with contemporary demands for county representation. In an aside on the duration of parliaments his timescale did not even extend to 1716. The French Revolution was only hinted at in a nondescript footnote. Anderson did not want a return to Cartwright’s political egalitarianism of old, and he did not face present-day issues; the ‘Historical Disquisitions’ were neither primitivist nor up-to-date.

The difference between the histories of James Anderson and John Millar came down to the assessment of the prominence of parliament as it was. Both feared that the influence of the crown might upset the ancient constitution, but of the two only Anderson seemed to think that the unreformed Commons, which he referred to as that ‘respectable assembly’, could do the job. What the example of Anderson’s disquisitions neatly shows is that the language of patriotism presupposed a vigorous House of Commons, or at least a vigorous opposition party in the House. Millar realised that it could not be left to the present opposition to stem the tide. He thought the electorate needed to be extended before the people’s rights were secure, but he could not use the arguments he had formerly used to make his case. By demanding extra-parliamentary measures he stepped outside the bounds of the parliament-centred language of patriotism.

The view of parliament as the weightiest element in the constitutional balance rested, besides on a real-life, strong opposition part, on the conception that society was divided in at least two, usually three ranks, the largest of which the Commons represented. Writing the history of privilege and prerogative one could hope to show how the liberties of the people fared, but not those of a un(der)represented people. The people had their representatives and their proper place. Again, Anderson provides a clear example.

We can form no idea of the existence of man in society without subordination. ... Mankind, as they come from the hands of the creator, we shall admit, are all equal in respect of rank—but nothing can be more diversified than they are in regard to natural talents, personal endowments and instinctive propensities: so that in every possible case where men associate together, a distinction of rank will instantly take place. By distinction of rank I mean a difference in regard to the respectability with which one man is beheld by the general body of the people when compared with another.
Expanding on the distinction of ranks in the 1790s could lead to antiquarianism, as with Anderson, or to disillusionment, as in the case of Millar. More often it led straight to authoritarianism. In the 1790s the Scots Magazine featured several short pieces that can be classed history of authority. In that period the editors of that Edinburgh-based periodical perceived the political nation like Burke did, as the following articles attest. They also battled the Foxite condemnation of the war against the French, as a review of Colonel Macleod’s Considerations on False and Real Alarms (1794) makes clear. Macleod, who dedicated the moderate pamphlet to Lauderdale, was the same who helped to start the Scots Chronicle. In Burke’s idiom, the Scots Magazine was Old Whig, the Scots Chronicle New Whig.

The Scots Magazine for May 1794 opened with an article called ‘On the Necessity of Distinction of Ranks in Society’. The nameless author stated that ‘there can be no authority without a distinction of ranks, such as may at all times influence the public opinion’. Hesitantly he admitted that the governors were not just opiniating but also the creatures of opinion.

It is asserted that government is founded only on opinion, and that this opinion is of two kinds: opinion of interest and opinion of right. When a people are persuaded that it is their interest to support the government under which they live, that government must [remain] stable. But among the worthless and unthinking part of the community this persuasion has seldom place. All men, however, have a notion of rights: of a right to property and a right to power. And when a nation considers a certain order of men as having a right to that eminence in which they are placed, this opinion, call it prejudice or what you will, contributes much to the peace and happiness of civil society.

The political eminence of the nobility was a pressing matter due to the ‘oppressive anarchy and shameful violences’ presently perpetrated in France. It was common knowledge that the ‘order of nobility’ was the natural mediate between the monarch and the people. The end of the article, which spilt over into the June issue of the Scots, illustrated the naturalness of the leading position of the nobility by relating mankind’s earliest recollections of subordination. Under the ‘patriarchal scheme’ the valorous and virtuous formed councils and furnished commanders. In Europe the nobility took its rise from the territorial claims of the conquering Germanic tribes.

The Scots Magazine for July 1794 opened with the epistle ‘On the Love of Our Country’. Patriotism, it said, was knowing one’s place and performing one’s part in one’s own country. Without it, civil society would cease to exist. ‘The welfare, nay, the nature of civil society requires that there should be a subordination of orders, or diversity of ranks and conditions in it’. The received wisdom, rehearsed by the unnamed writer, that each order would principally care for its own interests did seemingly not hold true for the upper layers.
The lower ranks should trust their superiors to govern in their interest, which was a duty that need not be performed to authorise those that governed. ‘The superiority of the higher orders... intitle them, especially if they employ their authority well, to the obedience and submission of the lower’.77

At the end of 1794 the Scots Magazine published a piece by Sir Brooke Boothby under the title ‘Origin and Progress of Civil Society’. In 1791, Brooke Boothby (1743-1824) had in a public letter blamed Burke to be blinded by the splendour of the French court, and blind to the misery of the commoners. Yet the article demonstrated that the latter must be the submissive part of a well-ordered society. Brooke Boothby gave his very own version of the four stages theory. Monarchy originated in societies of hunters; aristocracy came up among pasturing people. Agriculturalists were the first to have exclusive property, ‘that inexhaustible source of civil relations’. Lasting distinctions of rank were a characteristic of all ages, the stage of commerce included. ‘The first law of civil society’, Brooke Boothby wrote, ‘is subordination’.

To oblige men to do their duty in their different stations of life, to render them content with what is unavoidable, and to make this necessary inequality the most productive of good and the least possibly burthensome and oppressive, has hitherto been the object of morals, and religion and the laws.

The greatest danger to civil society was the spread of the notion of equality, as effected by the Encyclopédistes.78

The last article we will consider appeared four years later, in the Scots Magazine for December 1798. Its title was ‘On Distinctions of Rank’ and it dealt with the history of property. The ‘natural consequence’ of the establishment of property, according to the author named Brydson, was the gradual development of ‘hereditary distinctions connected with hereditary influence’. To a ‘nobility of the blood or hereditary distinctions of rank’ were attached the great qualities of humanity, respectability and chivalry. These aristocratic virtues originated with the ‘feudal system’ and developed further in the ‘commercial system’.79

We have come a long way from the strict condition set to the distinction of ranks by Gilbert Stuart in 1768. Thirty years later, Stuart’s Germanistic panorama in which a nobility owed its existence to all the love of country it was capable of giving was painted over with an anti-French scene in which the nation owed its being to a ‘natural aristocracy’. In the history of authority as written by Gilbert Stuart and John Millar, the public good or the general interest served as the basis for a variety of social positions and as the legitimating principle for the exercise of power thus distributed. In Burkean histories of authority, on the other hand, like
those published in the *Scots Magazine*, 'subordination' was declared to be the 'first law of civil society', and serving the common good was held to be a secondary matter instead of a prerequisite of lawful authority. Patriot Whigs wrote about the feudal system, chivalry and related subjects to prove the parliament's solidarity or even identity with the nation (and its independence of the crown); Burke and the Old Whigs after him did the same to demand deference to the ruling class.

In a highly interesting attempt to assess the relation between the Whiggism of Adam Smith and Edmund Burke's reaction to the French Revolution, Donald Winch has suggested that the conservative quality of Burke's response lay in the fusion of the concepts of authority and utility. This fusion is confirmed, and perhaps partly explained, by our earlier observation that party politics and popular opinion enabled Burke to found his aristocraticism on an appeal to the people at large. Winch draws attention to the fact that Millar, who stressed the importance of both authority and utility, kept the two notions separate as Smith had done before him.80 Having come at the end of the part of this study that deals with John Millar, we can see that Burke's political history (at least to Millar) must have looked more like cutting the Gordian knot than tying the principles of authority and utility. The complex connection between both principles in the work of John Millar, with all the ambiguities and tensions to which that complexity gave rise, was not solved by Burke, or sublimated, but evaded. He thought that the common good was inherent in the natural order of society, and that the people need not worry and preferably kept silent when the aristocracy was in control. Millar and Burke followed basically the same logic and spoke mostly the same language as concerned the obedience the people owed to their betters. But the 'anti-democratic' and pro-aristocratic elements that Millar left implicit and perhaps sometimes repressed were freely voiced and stressed by Burke. Edmund Burke's 'conservatism' consisted in making the principle of utility openly, unmistakably and unconditionally subsidiary to the principle of authority.
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NOTES


5. Millar’s nephew and biographer saw Millar shortly after he had heard about his son’s death. ‘Seldom have I witnessed more deep distress. He had opposed his son’s quitting his profession and his country, in the full confidence that the political animosities could not be of long duration. Already symptoms of the decline of party rancour were beginning to appear’. Millar’s wife died earlier in 1795. Craig, *Life*, xcvi-ix, cxxiv-vii.


8. A very large part of Sidney’s text was faithfully followed in a chapter called ‘Of the Distribution of Wealth among the several Classes of the Inhabitants’ of John Craig’s *Elements of Political Science* (Edinburgh, 1814), 2:188-280. On the title page of one copy of *Sidney*, moreover, an unidentified contemporary ascribed it to Craig. Haakonsen, ‘John Millar’, 155-56 n. The only alternative to ascribing the *Letters* to Craig is to accuse him of plagiarising. This indeed is what Medick proposes. There is little evidence that it was Millar who was plagiarised, notwithstanding the two references to ‘professor Millar’s lectures’. In fact, those references cast additional doubt on Millar’s authorship. Ignatieff, ‘Millar and Individualism’, 323. Iain Hampsher-Monk suggests that Sidney may have been Lauderdale. See his ‘Radicalism or Radicalisms? Radical’s Ideas of Property in Eighteenth-Century Britain’, in *Der Eigentumsbegriff im englischen politischen Denken*, ed. Günther Lottes (Bochum, 1991). In private correspondence Hampsher-Monk has backed up this suggestion by arguing that Sidney’s ideas on taxation were more radical than anything published by Millar, but that those ideas were echoed in Lauderdale’s work on political economy. Sidney’s *Letters* were dedicated to Lauderdale, however. That would seem to make the latter’s authorship unlikely.
10. Which are exactly those subjects taken from exactly those lectures to which Sidney refers while invoking Millar's authority. Sidney, 201 n., 209 n. Haakonssen, 'Millar', 170. Ignatieff says (and Haakonssen disagrees) that several arguments put forward by Sidney were 'more Jacobin than any text which can be definitely attributed to Millar'. Ignatieff, 'Millar and Individualism', 323.


12. 'Opposition was now more fruitless and less hopeful than ever before'. Frank O'Gorman, *The Whig Party and the French Revolution* (London, 1967), 212.

13. GUL MS Gen 180. The lecture is inserted between 2:256-257.


15. GUL MS Gen 180. GUL MS Gen 520/43. Rose matriculated in 1784. He died untimely from the effects of a cold caught while successfully defending William Blake from a charge of high treason. *Dictionary of National Biography* 49 (London, 1897), 243-44. On the education Rose received from Millar and other professors at Glasgow University, see GUL MS Gen 520/13.


17. GUL MS Gen 290, 34.

18. GUL MS Gen 290, 34.

19. GUL MS Gen 290, 36, 38, 40.

20. GUL MS Gen 290, 40, 42, 44.


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32. GUL MS Gen 520/43.


34. Burke, from the New to the Old Whigs, 100-2, 110-12.


43. Fox, Speeches, 67, 69-70, 83-84, 92-93, 296.


46. Crito, iii, v.

47. Crito, 1, 2, 3, 5.

48. Crito, 6, 8, 9.

49. Crito, 9, 11, 13, 16-17.


51. Crito, 69, 32, 31, 60, 97, 100.
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52. Crito, 101, 103.
53. Crito, 104.
54. Crito, 32.
58. Burke, from the New to the Old Whigs, 167, 177, 168, 169.
61. Wyvill, Political Papers, 6:98.
62. Hampsher-Monk, 'Friends of the People'
63. Lehmann, Millar, 51.
64. Wyvill, Political Papers, 6:99-100, 106.
67. Bee 4 (1791), 95, 96, 97.
68. Bee 4 (1791), 97, 98, 100.
72. Bee 6 (1791), 162.
74. Scots Magazine 56 (1794), 409-10.
75. Scots Magazine 56 (1794), 241.
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79. *Scots Magazine* 60 (1798), 817, 818-19, 820.


**PART THREE**

**PALLIACIES OF AUTHORITY 1802-1836**