Staying Connected: Explaining parties' enduring connections to civil society

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Online Appendices

Appendix A – connective density

The Comparative Candidates Survey

Connective density is measured on the basis of Waves I and II of the Comparative Candidates Survey. Wave I of the CCS covered elections between 2005 and 2013 and Wave II covered elections between 2013 and 2018. Of the 29 elections covered in our revised paper, 21 took place during Wave I and 8 took place during Wave II. Our dataset does not include all elections that took place in the countries under study for the period, for example in the Netherlands in 2010 and 2012, nor do we have observations for connective density for France and Spain. The CSS has not yet produced data for either country. We also exclude four elections in Iceland, which are covered by the CSS. We make this decision because of Icelandic exceptionalism as explained in the literature (e.g. Demker et al. 2019) and because a lack of data availability for key variables for several elections.

The CCS takes a number of steps to ensure a high response rate deploying a mixed mode survey using postal and online surveys of all candidates and starting fieldwork as soon as possible after each election (Comparative Candidate Survey 2014).

The total number of candidates covered by each country survey varies reflecting factors such as electorate size, the numbers of representatives elected to each Parliament, and the number of parties contesting the election. The survey does succeed in getting good response rates from candidates who comprise each party's representative elite.

We consider that candidates' membership of civic associations is a good indicator of their connection to civil society for three main reasons.

First, we consider that election candidates are a core component of the party elite. It is through the nomination and selection of election candidates that parties perform one of their core functions in representative democracies, namely the recruitment of political elites (Rahat 2007). These candidates form the pool from which members of parliament and government ministers are drawn. In total our data set has information on the connections with CSOs of 2,215 candidates elected at 21 elections in 12 Western European countries between 2005 and 2017[1]. The proportion of elected legislators covered by election candidates in our data set ranges from 13.0% in the case of Finland in 2015 to 72.5% in the case of Switzerland in 2007, with a mean (unweighted) coverage of 34.1%.

Second, CSOs play key roles at different points in the electoral cycle that make links to these party candidates important. In an election period, for example, CSOs engage in 'proactive

electoral mobilization' (Blings 2020; McAdam and Tarrow 2010) using information briefings and protests to elicit policy commitments from parties and their candidates. A number of scholars find that these types of contact are particularly important for parties with close or historic ties to CSOs, and to parties with links to CSOs representing large numbers of citizens in areas of policy that are salient to parties campaigns. For example in the context of coalition negotiations Romeijn (2021), finds that politicians rely on interest group advocates with whom they have ties to provide signals on the popularity of potential policy compromises with party supporters and voters.

The benefits to parties and their candidates of their membership of civic associations flow from these dimensions of connectivity – reduced uncertainty about the opinions of key constituencies of voters, the opportunity to retain ownership of salient issues, and the potential to secure alignment with, and allies amongst, CSOs with direct access to large numbers of supporters and voters (Blings 2020; Romeijn 2021).

Third, party elites are aware of the benefits of aligning their parties with CSOs, for example the retention of core electorates and reduction of policy dissonance, that are important to their electoral strategies. Some parties (see for example della Porta et al. 2017) actively encourage their candidates' memberships of civic associations and some such as *Syriza* in Greece and the *Partie Socialiste* in Belgium have directly provided social movement activists with places on party election lists. These memberships help ensure that party elites remain in close contact with CSOs and acquire information about their policy demands (Blings 2020). As a result there is an overlap of party elites and activists in CSOs, the cooperation between them meaning that they 'will move in similar networks'. (Romeijn 2021: 879)

Categories of organization in Connective Density

In each wave of the survey candidates of each party were asked whether they were members of a number of organization types. Table A.1 summarises which categories of membership organization were selected to operationalize connective density. The selection was made on the basis of an assessment of whether a type of membership was pertinent from the perspective of electoral mobilization. Based on this criterion, for example, membership of sports or cultural associations was not included unlike membership of religious associations.

The Table shows that there was some inconsistency between the two waves in the categories of association surveyed. While candidates in both waves were asked about their membership of Trade Unions and Religious Organisations there were slightly different survey categories in other important respects.

The principal source of potential inconsistency was the higher number of relevant categories of membership in wave II opening the potential for a candidate to report higher connections simply as a product of a greater number of possible membership categories, thereby destabilizing recorded values across waves of the CCS. To correct for this, memberships of two categories of organization in wave II – Human and Civil Rights groups and

environmental organisations - were treated as equivalent to interest group memberships in wave I and a new variable was computed that could only take on a maximum value of 1 in cases of candidates' membership of both categories of organization in wave II of the survey. The resulting values for mean country connective density are stable across waves for the seven countries with elections in both waves – falling, or remaining essentially flat across waves in three countries each, and rising significantly in just one country.

Table A.1 - Connective Density

Wave (no. elections)	Categories selected	Treatment
I (21)	Trade Unions Professional Associations Interest Groups Religious Groups	Not adjusted
II (8)	Trade Unions Business Associations Human and Civil rights organisations Environmental organisations	Not adjusted Business treated as equivalent to Professional Associations in Wave I Human and civil rights and environmental organisations treated as equivalent to the single category of interest groups (in wave 1) and coded so that a maximum value of 1 was possible in cases of membership of both groups.
	Religious Groups	Not adjusted

Observations of connective density by country and election year

Our dataset has 242 party observations for our dependent variable connective density. However, for six of the 14 countries included in our data set we have observations for parties at just one election. Table A.2 summarizes how our observations of connective density were distributed across countries and elections.

Table A.2 – Distribution of observations of connective density by country and elections

Country	No. elections	Total observations	Observations by election year (no. of observations)
Austria	1	9	2008 (9)
Belgium	3	36	2007 (11), 2010 (12), 2014 (13)
Denmark	1	9	2011 (9)
Finland	3	24	2007 2011 2015
Germany	4	28	2005 (7), 2009 (6), 2013 (8), 2017 (7)
Greece	4	15	2007 (2), 2009 (2), January 2012 (6) May 2015 (5)
Ireland	1	7	2007 (7)
Italy	1	11	2013 (11)
Netherlands	1	9	2006 (9)
Norway	2	16	2009 (7), 2013 (9)
Portugal	3	14	2009 (5), 2011 (5), 2015 (4)
Switzerland	2	33	2007 (17), 2011 (16)
Sweden	2	18	2010 (9), 2014 (9)

United Kingdom	1	13	2010 (13)
All countries	29	242	

Possible limitations of the measure

At the candidate level the minimum and maximum possible values on the DV are respectively 0 and 4. Observed values for connective density ranged from 0.00 to 2.09 with a mean value of 1.09 and a standard deviation of 0.41. Across the elections covered by the dataset, 28.5% of candidates had no connections, 36.3% had one category of connection, 25.9% had two categories of connection, 8.0% had three categories of connections, and 1.2% had four categories of connection. Given the range of possible values (0-4) on the dependent variable these values for the mean and upper values are not unexpected. It is consistent also with other measures of connections such as the *Party Link Score* (Allern et al. 2021b) which has a mean of 2.11 on a possible range of 0-9.

It is possible that candidates could be members of several organizations within a category, and that in practice this could make the density of connections for these candidates higher. It is not possible to measure this with the CCS data but we believe there are good theoretical grounds for considering that the category level association is a meaningful way to measure the effect of memberships, for example in respect of groups policy influence and relevance for electoral mobilization. For example, Rasmussen and Reher (2019) argue that measuring citizen engagement by association type is the best way to measure the strength of information flows from groups to policy-makers and the congruence of policy outcomes and public opinion that results. It is also possible that our measure may not include participation, short of membership, by candidates in informal networks.

We conclude that our measure of connective density provides a good indicator of candidates membership connections to CSOs.

Connective density with elected candidates only

It is possible that parties attempt to secure parliamentary status for members of the party elite by, for example, ensuring they have a high place on party lists or, in the case of FPTP electoral systems, nomination for safe seats. This might mean that those candidates who were elected at each respective election might be more representative of party elites than the full sample of candidates

We have no theoretical reasons for believing that the connections of unelected candidates are any less indicative of the connective density of a party than those of those who were elected. Rather we believe that there are sound theoretical and methodological grounds for measuring the DV on the basis of the full sample of election candidates rather than the smaller number of those that secured election.

There are two main theoretical reasons for believing that the full sample of candidates is as representative of party elites as elected candidates alone.

First, the process by which parties select candidates in Western Europe is predominantly one in which party members have a decisive say and in consequence the influence of central party institutions on candidate selection is generally constrained (Krouwel 2012). Appendix B details our coding of parties' candidate selection procedures. In only 1 in 7 cases (14.4%) were party leaders or the party executive in sole control of the candidate selection process. This was substantially smaller than the proportion of parties – 82% - in which members decided on selection by means of delegate conferences, ballots at a local level, or ballots of the full party membership and party primaries. The proportion of parties using the latter most open and inclusive candidate selection process – 21% - was alone more prominent than the two most exclusive and centralized forms of candidate selection. The mean coded value for candidate selection processes, on a scale ranging from 1 (the most closed and exclusive) to 6 (the most open and inclusive) was 4.46 which is towards the more open and inclusive end of the selection process continuum.

Second, elections in the period covered by our data set were characterized by increasing levels of electoral volatility, rising from a mean for elections held in 2007 of 9.8 to a mean for elections held in 2012 of 26.7 and a mean for elections held in 2017 of 25.3.[2] Individual parties have correspondingly experienced increasingly large swings in their share of the vote. In circumstances of large vote loss by a party, substantial numbers of senior candidates elected at previous elections become unelected candidates at the election in question. Similarly in circumstances of large vote gain by a party, candidates from lower down party lists are pulled, sometimes against expectation, into elected status by the party's vote surge. There are many illustrations of this effect. At the Greek election of May 2012, for example, *PASOK* lost 119 seats in Parliament, 74% of its total parliamentary representation, while the *Independent Greeks* (*ANEL*) entered parliament for the first time with 33 new MP's. In the UK election of 2010 the *Labour Party* had a net loss of 91 parliamentary representatives including members of cabinet in the outgoing Labour government. For this reason we believe it is problematic to specify elected candidates at any specific election as any more representative of party elites than unelected candidates at the same election.

There are also methodological reasons for operationalizing connective density with the full sample of candidates rather than elected candidates only.

First, the number of elected candidates at any given election is constrained by the size of the legislature. Six of the 12 countries for which we have information on whether candidates were elected or not have legislatures of 200 members or less. In highly fragmented party systems such as Belgium and the Netherlands, which both have 150 members of parliament, the size of the potential pool of elected candidates at the party level is reduced further. In the Netherlands in 2006, for example, ten parties secured parliamentary election. And the largest party at the Belgian election of 2014, the NV-A, elected just 33 candidates to office.

As a result the number of elected candidates for many of the parties in our data set is not large enough to test for the effects of a number of key interesting variables. Our data set has 156 observations on parties' connective density for elected candidates only. Of these more than a third (56) were based on samples of candidates of less than five, and 22 of these observations were based on a sample of just one candidate. The correlation between the sample size of elected candidates for each party and the absolute sum of the difference between the connective density of elected candidates and that of all candidates is -0.32, indicating that differences between the measures are inversely related to sample size.

Second, the exclusion of unelected candidates leads to a substantial loss of data and a loss of statistical power. Data on whether candidates were elected or not is not available within the CCS for 2 of the 14 countries and 8 of the 29 elections included in our data set. The total number of elected candidates covered by the CCS, 2,215, in the remaining 21 elections represents just 12.3% of the total number of candidates surveyed at those elections. The number of party observations possible is 156, a fall of 86 or 35.5% compared to the number possible with all candidates. And the number of parties for which there are one or more observations on the dependent variable falls from 149 with the full sample of candidates to 96 with the sample of elected candidates only. The parties that drop out of the sample tend to be smaller and from radical right or left party families with no government experience, making tests of the impact of government experience on our DV less reliable.

We have estimated the dependent variable on the basis of elected candidates only and run a numbers of robustness checks.

Our first finding is that there is no systematic relationship between candidate status after the election and connective density at the party level.

At the party level the measure of connective density for elected candidates was higher than that for all candidates in 74 cases, lower in 75 cases, and the same in 7 cases. Table A.3 summarizes descriptive statistics for different operationalizations of the DV. It shows that the mean value of parties' connective density for elected candidates was identical to the mean value of parties' connective density for all candidates in the full sample, **and** to the mean value of parties' connective density for all candidates in the 21 elections for which direct comparison was possible. The only difference between the measures is in the amount of variation in the connective density of parties including elected candidates only – the standard deviation for this measure is 0.2 points higher than in the full sample of candidates.

Table A.3 Comparison of values for the mean and standard deviation
Of different operationalizations of connective density

Type of candidate	Elections	Countries	No. party observations on the DV – CD	Max value - CD	Mean value of CD	Standard deviation
All candidates – full sample	29	14	242	2.09	1.09	0.41
All candidates in elections with	21	12	156	2.09	1.09	0.41

data on elected candidates						
Elected candidates only	21	12	156	3.00[3]	1.09	0.61

We ran fixed effects regressions for all of our models with the elected candidates only operationalization of connective density. The results of this robustness check are reported in Table A.4. With just two exceptions – office seeking in model 2 and centralization of party decision-making in model 4 – the direction of the effects of our independent variables are stable. However, the substantial loss of cases (between 29-33%) for all models results in some inflated standard errors and the models explain substantially less of the within country variation in the DV than for the DV based on all candidates (.185 compared to .327 for the full sample of candidates).

In the manuscript we showed that left-wing ideology and government experience were the principal significant drivers of variation in connective density. In the analysis based on the elected density of elected candidates only, the effect of party ideology remained significant in the expected direction for all categories of party family. However, while the effect size of government experience was stable (a coefficient of .187 compared to .207 in the full model), an inflated standard error meant that the coefficient for government experience did not attain significance (p=.219). The predictive margins for government experience with the full sample of candidates was .21 (significant at the .05 level) but narrowed slightly to .18 for the sample of elected candidates only[4]. We interpret this apparent loss of significance of government experience as the result of a substantial loss of data on parties with no government experience when the sample is restricted to candidates only - the loss of data on parties with no government experience is 47% compared to 26% in the case of parties with government experience.

Table A.4
DV based on elected candidates only

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intra-party democracy - Centralization - Candidate selection	087 (.119) .038 (.058)	- -	- -	.054 (.120) -.041 (.061)
Party Trajectories - Party Age - Social movement origin - Office seeking - Policy seeking - Government experience	- - - - -	.054 (.068) .078 (.110) .196 (.171) .208 (.157) .145 (.140)	- - - - -	.068 (.066) -.182 (.142) -.055 (.176) -.064 (.180) .187 (.151)
Ideology (ref. centre-				

right)				
- Radical-right	-		-.442*** (.131)	-.124 (.198)
- Centre-left	-		.298*** (.104)	.484*** (.136)
- Radical-left	-		.248* (.137)	.453*** (.186)
Constant	.986	.799	1.04	1.07
Within country R^2	.015	.067	.182	.185
N	134	152	156	133

* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p <.01, two sided

As a further robustness check of our principal findings we ran our models only for all parties that elected at least one candidate at elections in our data set but with our original operationalization of the DV, i.e. including both the elected and unelected candidates of those parties. The results are shown in Table A.5. The pattern and conclusions are substantively similar. Government experience was positively and significantly related to the level of connective density. In model 2 (party trajectories) government experience was significant at the .05 level (p=.029), and in model 4 (full model) government experience was significant at the .10 level (p=.054). Our conclusion is that our substantive findings with respect to government experience and ideology are robust to the alternative operationalization of our dependent variable.

Table A.5

Connective density – all candidates; parties with at least one elected candidate

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Intra-party democracy				
- Centralization	-.134** (.167)	-	-	-.002 (.060)
- Candidate selection	.053 (.032)	-	-	-.011 (.030)
Party Trajectories				
- Party Age	-	.038 (.037)	-	.044 (.036)
- Social movement origin	-	.138** (.061)	-	-.017 (.069)
- Office seeking	-	.001 (.093)	-	-.080 (.086)
- Policy seeking	-	.123 (.087)	-	-.008 (.089)
- Government experience	-	.168** (.076)	-	.147* (.076)
Ideology (ref. centre-right)				
- Radical-right	-	-	-.345*** (.066)	-.216** (.099)
- Centre-left	-	-	.228*** (.051)	.283*** (.069)
- Radical-left	-	-	.248*** (.070)	.337*** (.094)
Constant	.931	.907	1.05	1.02
Within country R^2	.096	.130	.357	.394
N	135	152	156	134

* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p <.01, two sided

Choice of regression modelling

We selected multilevel modelling to reflect the hierarchical structure of our data which is nested within parties and countries. While our DV is a count variable with a limit on the range of possible values, the data is not overdispersed – the standard deviation of observations is less than half the mean and the distribution of residual values is approximately normal (kernel bandwith = 0.0988). There is a substantial amount of interesting variation in values of the DV and the range between the lowest and highest observed values (0 and 2.09 respectively) is not surprising given the nature of the categories of CSOs we have used to estimate the DV. For these reasons we concluded that it was most appropriate to use multilevel OLS models with fixed effects rather than a multilevel binomial regression.

Comparison with other measures of party ties to civil society

We aim to build on recent work in the field with a novel measure focusing on the affiliations of party elites with CSOs, with similarities to at least one other study.

We considered five recent studies in particular, all of which seek to measure forms of non-institutional connection and all of which are based on survey data (Allern et al. 2021a; Allern et al. 2021b; Allern et al. 2021; Berkhout et al. 2021; and Otjes and Rasmussen 2017).

Of these studies, three (Berkhout et al. 2021; Allern et al. 2021: Otjes and Rasmussen 2017) are surveys of interest groups and (Allern et al. 2021) is based on responses collected in the PAIRDEM data set. The DV in each of these studies is:

- Formal tools used by interest groups to contact political parties in two countries in 2007-08, operationalized as an ordinal variable taking three values for the level of collaboration – none, low, and regular (Otjes and Rasmussen 2017)
- Frequency of contacts made with political parties by interest groups in a 12 month period in five countries, operationalized as a dummy variable – contact or no contact (Berkhout et al. 2021).
- Whether or not interest groups have a 'lobby routine' with parties in related policy areas in seven countries (six in Western Europe), operationalized as a dummy variable measuring the existence or not of group-party-policy triads (Allern et al. 2021).

The other two studies are surveys of national party organizations – legislative party groups (LPG's) and central party organizations (CPO's) in Allern et al. (2021b) and either leaders, members of party executives or LPG's in Allern et al. (2021a). The DV in each of these studies is:

- Organized links for contact with trade unions in the five years prior to 2013-14, operationalized in a *Party Link Score,* an additive index of nine different types of organized contact (Allern et al. 2021b)

- Regular contacts with interest groups in a 12 month period, operationalized with a dummy variable measuring the existence or not of regular contacts (Allern et al. 2021a)

Several differences between our measure of connective density and the measures employed in the above studies stand out. Most importantly, our study focuses on CSO membership reported by candidates, whereas most of the existing studies focus on contacts reported by interest groups. Additionally, our study measures CSO membership of candidates specifically at the time of elections, whereas existing the studies measure contacts between CSOs and parties between election periods. Furthermore, our measure covers a period of 13 years (2005-2017), while the existing measures cover a narrower timeframe. And lastly, our measure of connective density is continuous, while - with the exception of Allern et al. (2021b) - the existing measures are dichotomous or ordinal.

In summary we believe that our measure of the DV, connective density, while related to others is novel in its focus on the membership affiliations of a particular group of party elites at critical moments for communication with, and mobilization of, members of CSOs in the wider electorate. The measure is based on a large number of different parties within a relatively large number of party systems and, we believe, makes possible a test for alternative explanations for variation in the connectivity of party elites, something that as far as we are aware has not been attempted to date. In addition our measure and data set make it possible to compare connectivity between party families and aims to fill a gap in the literature identified for example by Berkhout et al. (2021).

Partial cross validation of connective density and the party link score

Of the measures in other studies the Party Link Score (PLS) is perhaps closest to our measure of connective density (CD):

- It is based on an additive score of individual level measures (party-trade union dyads) that are aggregated into a mean value for each party (the number of dyads per party range from 2 to 8) and a continuous dependent variable
- Its time window (2008-2014) allows us to compare measurements (for PLS and CD) at elections that fall closest to the point at which the survey was administered.
- Apart from Allern et al. (2021a) it has the most extensive country overlap in terms of coverage with the countries in our data set, i.e. 8 of 14.

The study has measurements of the PLS for both LPG's and CPO's but despite having 53 union-party dyads for its measurement in both cases, the data set on which it is based (the LPTU[5]) only includes 13 parties that are covered by our own data set. This makes possible just 13 direct comparisons of CD and PLS.

Notwithstanding these limitations we tested partial cross-validation of the measures by correlating two different measures of the PLS with the nearest equivalent measures of connective density:

- The PLS for the LPG's of 13 parties with the estimate of the connective density of elected candidates – both groups form the elected group of parliamentarians. The correlation (two-tailed) of this measure with our DV was 0.891 (p=.002).

- The PLS of CPO's for 13 parties with the estimate of the connective density of all candidates – both represent a group of central party figures including but not limited to elected candidates. The correlation of this measure with our DV was 0.490 (p=.004).

The results of the partial cross-validation are promising but because of the limited number of comparative data points we are unable to draw any firm conclusions from the results.

Robustness checks for candidates personal backgrounds and incumbent status

Candidates' personal backgrounds

To check for the impact of candidates' personal backgrounds on values of our DV we looked at two potential background influences – candidate age, and education.

First, we evaluated whether the observed relationship between party candidates and connective density might be due to an age effect. It is conceivable, based on longevity of occupational history and developed social relationships, that older candidates have more connections and that parties with older candidate profiles in consequence have more dense connections. We have data on candidates age by four age groups – up to 35 years old; 36-45 years old; 46-55 years old; and 56 years old and over – for parties at 26 of the 29 elections in our data set. We correlated estimates for the percentage of party candidates for a) the two most senior groups of candidate (46 and older), and b) the single most senior group of candidates (56 and over) with the connective density of each party. The correlation between the proportion of party candidates of 46 years and above with parties connective density was 0.089, and the correlation between the proportion of candidates of 56 years and above with parties connective density was 0.045. Both correlation coefficients were very small and insignificant and we conclude that parties' connective density is not a function of candidates age.

Second, data is available on the education status of candidates at 23 of the 29 elections in our dataset. To check for the impact of candidates' education on the connective density of parties we estimated the correlation between the percentage of each parties candidates that had completed a university degree with the connective density of those parties. The correlation was low at 0.199 but significant at the .05 level.

We conclude that our measure of the DV is robust to important aspects of candidates personal backgrounds.

Candidates' incumbency status

It is conceivable that the rules and norms governing connections between elected MP's and interest groups might mean that incumbents had lower connective density than candidates who were not members of the outgoing legislature. Data on the incumbent status of candidates is available for 23 of the 29 elections covered by our dataset. We correlated the percentage of each parties candidates at each election who were incumbent members of parliament with the connective density of those parties at each election. The correlation was very low at 0.044 and was not significant. We conclude that there is no significant relationship at the party level between the incumbent status of candidates and the connective density of their parties.

We also consulted additional sources on the extent and development of rules and codes for governing conflicts of interest for parliamentarians and interest groups. A summary of key findings is given here:

- In most of the countries covered by our data set there are no formal rules or provisions governing relationships between parliamentarians and interest groups - Lobbying and Intergroups: EP Study PANA W-5/rev. - RULES ON LOBBYING AND INTERGROUPS IN THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES (europa.eu)
- There has been a trend since 2007 towards increased regulation of conflicts of interest of government ministers in EU member states - https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/651697/IPOL_STU(2020)651697_EN.pdf
- Codes requiring transparency from parliamentarians in respect of their financial and non-financial interests are most comprehensive in Denmark, Germany and Ireland - Codes of Conduct in National Parliaments: Transparency (parlament.cat)

Robustness checks for party resources and staffing

It is also conceivable that parties may be limited in their ability to build links to civil society by a lack of resources and staff that could retain long-term contacts with CSOs. We did not include a control variable for parties' resources or staff because of problems of missing data. For example the Political Parties Database (PPD) has just 17 coterminous observations on parties' headquarters staff for the parties in our data set, and Webb and Keith (2017) were compelled to remove party staff from their additive *Party Strength Index (PSI)* because of insufficient valid data. However, the PSI does include measures of parties financial and membership resources, and there are 73 observations on the PSI for the parties in our data set. This number of observations is insufficient for inclusion in the regression models but we did estimate the correlation between connective density and the PSI for the 73 data points we have. The correlation is a positive one – stronger parties on the PSI have higher connective density – but is very low at 0.155 ($p > .10$).

Trends in membership levels of CSOs at the country level

Our data on connective density is consistent with evidence on trends in the level of membership of CSOs in Western Europe.

With respect to country differences, Anheier (2013; 2019) suggests that patterns of engagement in civic associations are closely linked to welfare traditions, regulatory environments and economic structure. Civic engagement is most pronounced in Scandinavian countries and least pronounced in Southern Europe, with 'corporatist countries' such as Germany somewhere in between. This pattern is borne out by country level data on connective density. The average connective density for connective density in Scandinavia (4 countries, 8 elections) countries is 1.20. The average connective density for countries in northern Europe (7 countries, 13 elections) and for countries in southern Europe (3 countries, 8 elections) is nearly identical at respectively 1.11 and 1.12. The average figure for northern Europe is reduced by low levels of connective density in Belgium and Ireland, while the average figure for southern Europe is increased by high levels of connective density in Greece at two elections (2007 and 2009) prior to the electoral fallout of the financial crisis. Post-2010 the average connective density of southern European countries (3 countries, 5 elections) fell to 0.90.

In terms of trends over time, a recent study by Cameron (2021) of civic engagement in times of economic crisis, and including three of the 14 countries in our data set, finds that membership of civic associations is relatively stable compared to voting patterns for example. However, the economic fallout of the global financial crisis from 2008 led to a depression rather than mobilization of levels of participation in civic associations, a trend that was not dependent on type of association (Cameron 2021:15). This finding is consistent with our data at both a country and party level. For example, those countries, particularly in southern Europe that experienced the biggest economic shock during the financial crisis saw large falls in connective density at both the country and party level. In Greece the mean value for connective density at the country level fell from 1.59 in 2007 to 1.28 in May 2012 with connective density for both the major parties falling by between 20-24%. This fall continued at the January 2015 election – connective density at the country level more than halved and *Syriza*, the most densely connected party in 2012, had a connective density of 0.81 compared to 1.46 three years earlier. In contrast Germany, which experienced positive GDP growth in the years prior to all elections covered by our data set, had much more stable levels of connective density. Over four elections between 2005 and 2017, connective density at the country level in Germany ranged between 1.18 and 1.27.

Appendix B – details of independent and control variables

Descriptive statistics

Table B.1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Models

Variable name	Variable type	Description	N	Missing values	Min. value	Max. value	Mean	Standard deviation
Connective density (DV)	Scale	Measure of connections of parties to organizations in civil society	242	10	0.0	2.09	1.09	0.41
Centralization (IV)	Nominal	Value 1 where major internal decisions are centralized. Value 0 where internal decisions are decentralized	213	39	0	1	.404	0.49
Candidate selection (IV)	Scale	Openness and inclusiveness of procedures for selecting party candidates for general elections	194	58	1	6	4.46	1.33
Party age (IV)	Scale	Age of party at each general election	238	14	1	176	47.47	40.49
Social movement origin (IV)	Nominal	Value 1 where party originated in a social movement. Value 0 in all other cases.	231	21	0	1	.338	0.47
Party goals (IV)	Nominal	Three dummy variables measuring parties primary goal maximising strategy at each election – office, policy or votes	238	14	0	1	Policy - .512 Office - .336 Votes - .151	0.47 0.50 0.36
Government experience (IV)	Nominal	Value 1 where party had previous government experience at the date of each election. Value 0 in all other cases.	252	0	0	1	.536	0.50
Ideology (IV)	Nominal	Four values then recoded into separate dummy	252	0	1	4	2.40	0.93

			N	Missing	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev
		variables for party families – radical right, centre right, centre left and radical left.						
GAL/TAN (IV)	Nominal	Four values then recoded into four groups from most alternative/libertarian authoritarian to most nationalist/authoritarian	198	54	1	4	2.37	1.03
Party polarization (CV)	Scale	Extent of party polarization at each election.	252	0	13.3	106.2	57.9	26.14
Absolute disproportionality index (CV)	Scale	The disproportionality of electoral systems. It computes the absolute difference between votes cast and seats obtained.	252	0	0.25	1.86	0.86	0.47
Regulation of political activity of CSO (CV)	Nominal	Three dummy variables for types of regulation of CSO's political activity – no regulation, partial regulation or full regulation	252	0	0	1	N/A	
Party system	Scale	The number of parties obtaining at least 2% of the vote at each election	252	0	4	11	7.55	1.90
Party size	Scale	The percentage vote of each party at the preceding election	236	16	0	48.66	11.47	11.82
System of government	Nominal	Two dummy variables from Lijphart – Patterns of Democracy (Lijphart, 2012)						
		Executive vs. legislature	252	0	0	1	0.167	0.37
		Unitary vs. Federal	252	0	0	1	0.504	0.50
Cultural diversity	Scale	An additive	252	0	0.338	1.134	0.714	0.24

		measure comprising the ethnic fractionalization index and the religious diversity index						
Incumbency	Scale	Percentage of election candidates of each party that were incumbent members of parliament at the election	173	79	0	100	20.92	25.50
Age groups 3-4	Scale	Percentage of election candidates of each party that aged 46 or over	199	53	0	100	57.13	16.72
Age group 4	Scale	Percentage of election candidates of each party that aged 46 or over	199	53	0	100	28.46	17.83

Sources and coding

Details are given below of sources used to determine coding of most of our independent variables. Two variables did not require coding decisions. First, *party age* at each election was calculated by the number of years between a party's official formation and the date of the relevant election. Second, *party size* is operationalised simply as the percentage of the vote obtained by each party at the election preceding each election included in our data set. The source for data on party vote share is https//politicaldatayearbook.com.

Centralization

Our principal data source for the categorisation of parties as Centralized or Decentralized was the Party Political Database (PPD) (Poguntke et al. 2017) and literature based on the Database (e.g. Bolin et al. 2017). In some cases, including for those countries such as Greece that are not covered by the PPD, we consulted country experts to confirm coding decisions. We also cross-referenced our coding with those made in an unpublished doctoral thesis (Schumacher 2011). Our data set has 213 measurements of party centralization. Of these 86 parties (40% of the total) were coded as centralized and 127 parties (60%) were coded as decentralized.

Candidate selection

Our coding scheme for parties' candidate selection procedures is based on a modification of the six-point scale developed by Krouwel (2012). Krouwel operationalises candidate selection on the extent of openness and inclusiveness of candidate selection procedures, a score of 1 on his scale indicating completely centralized and closed procedures and a score of

6 indicating open and completely decentralized procedures. Krouwel's data covers the period 1945-2010 and includes all 14 countries in our data set. We modified his codes to clarify the distinction between different levels of centralization and inclusiveness and to reflect the trends in selection procedures in the last decade. For example, code 2 in Krouwel's scheme captures selection procedures controlled by national party elites or executives. We clarified this code by specifying that party leaders have an input to procedures determined by national party elites. Our codes and the results of our coding are summarised in Table B.2.

Table B.2 Coding: Candidate Selection Procedures

Code	Description	No. cases (% of total)
1	Unilateral nomination by the party leader	5 (2.6)
2	National party elite or executive controls and decides; party leader has some input	23 (11.9)
3	There is significant member involvement in proposing candidates and electing delegates who either select or recommend candidate lists to national institutions for decision; the parliamentary party may play a role and there may be some member ratification of lists	7 (3.6)
4	Party members select candidates at a party congress; the national executive can preselect candidates and has a veto	43 (22.2)
5	Local or regional units of the party control selection at local meetings; national executive can only veto; while there may be primaries or ballots the list of candidates presented is highly influenced by national party institutions	75 (38.7)
6	All members (and some non-members) have the right to participate in open primaries of full membership ballots; there is no leadership or national executive veto	41 (21.1)

Our main source of data for candidate selection procedures was the Political Party Dataset (PPD – https://www.politicalpartydb.org/). The PPD has four variables covering procedural aspects of candidate selection, and covers over 80 parties in 12 of the elections, and 9 of the 14 countries in our study. We supplemented the PPD with information from a wide range of scholarly studies covering candidate selection procedures in specific time periods (e.g. Coller, et al. 2020) and within individual countries (e.g. Vandeleene 2017). It is also worth noting that some countries, e.g. Finland and Germany, have statutory provision for party primaries or membership ballots to determine candidate selection. This reduces in-country variation in selection procedures in those countries. In Finland, for example, we coded all parties as 6, and in Germany as either 5 or 6.

Social movement origin

We coded parties as having a social movement origin if they are a party formed directly by, or out of, a social movement such as a trade union, environmental movement, or confederation of agrarian interests. Our coding is based on the origins of a party at its date of foundation rather than the origins of parties from which they emerged. So, for illustration, we did not code parties as movement parties if they were the outcome of a split or expulsion from a party that did originate in a social movement. Likewise we did not code a party as

having social movement origins if it developed strong ties to social movements subsequent to its foundation.

To code specific parties we consulted online sources of information about the circumstances in which all parties in our data set were founded. For example, our data set includes nine parties who contested the Danish general election of 2011. The example of the Danish *Socialist People's Party (SPP)* illustrates our coding approach. The SPP was founded in 1959 by Aksel Larson after he was expelled from the *Communist Party of Denmark* (DPK) for criticizing the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet Union in 1956. The DPK was itself the result of a breakaway forty years earlier from the *Social Democratic Party* (SDP) which did have origins in the *International Labour Association*. For these reasons we did code the SDP as a movement party but not the SPP. We coded two other Danish parties as movement parties; the *Kristen Demokraterne* founded in 1970 by the movement opposed to leglization of abortion and liberalisation of laws on pornography; and *Venstre* founded by an agrarian movement opposed to the interests of the landed aristocracy in Denmark.

Including the Danish *Red-Green Alliance* and the Dutch *Gröen Links* there are 13 Green parties in our data set. We coded all of these parties as originating in a social movement with the exception of the *Red-Green Alliance* which was a merger of three left-wing parties, *Gröen Links* which was a merger of four parties with varying traditions, and the *Green Liberal Party* in Switzerland which was formed by the breakaway of four cantonal branches of the Swiss *Green Party*. A number of parties from other party families also originated from social movements. For example, the Centre parties in Finland and Norway, the Liberal parties in Denmark and Norway, the Christian Democrats in Denmark, *ANEL* in Greece, and *Sinn Fein* in Ireland amongst others.

Of our 231 data points for parties' social movement origin, 78 (34%) are coded as originating in a social movement and 153 (66%) are coded as not originating in a social movement. Overall the parties we coded as movement parties had a mean value on the dependent variable of 1.22 compared to a mean value of 1.02 for parties coded as not having social movement origins.

Party goals

In order to code the goal maximising strategies of parties at each election covered by our data set we assessed the *primary* goal of each party using two main sources. First, the *Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project* (DALP) maintained by Duke University – https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/. Specifically, we used expert assessments contained in answers to three questions:

- e5 – the extent to which parties sought to mobilise electoral support by emphasizing general competence to govern (office seeking)
- e2 – the extent to which parties sought to mobilise electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of their position on policy issues (policy seeking)
- e4 – the extent to which parties drew on partisan identity invoking achievements, symbols and ritual (vote seeking)

For example, the DALP data set assessed the goals of seven parties at the Norwegian election of 2009. We took the expert scores assigned against each of the above questions and made an initial coding of each party to one of the three goal maximising strategies on the basis of the highest score for a party on the three questions. For example, experts score the Norwegian Labour Party at 4.0 (out of a possible 5) on question e5 (office seeking), 3.9 on question e2 (policy seeking) and 3.3 on question e4 (vote seeking). We, therefore, coded the Labour Party initial as office seeking at the 2009 election in Norway.

We checked our initial coding by means of our secondary source – expert accounts in academic journals and blogposts of each general election covered by our data set. For the Norwegian general election of 2009, for example, we referenced the article by Allern (2010) to evaluate the strategies of each party at the time of the election and to confirm or amend our initial coding. We were also able to code the two parties in our dataset that were not covered by the DALP data set.

We coded 15% of parties as having primarily vote seeking goals at the 29 elections in our data set. Populist and radical right parties such as the *PVV* in the Netherlands (2006 election) and the *True Finns* in Finland (2007 and 2011) were coded as vote seeking, but parties from several other party families were also coded as vote-seeking at particular elections. This could be because they were new entrants to the party system, such as the *Five Star Movement* in Italy in 2013, because their election campaigns were preoccupied with mobilising sufficient votes to cross the threshold for parliamentary representation, such as the Greens and the *FDP* at the German election of 2017, or because their primary electoral goals were mobilising the votes of a small religious constituency such as the Christian Democrats in Denmark in 2011.

There is a negative correlation (-0.34) between vote-seeking and government experience but parties with government experience may be compelled by specific circumstances to pursue a vote maximization strategy. This was true for the German *Free Democratic Party* (FDP), a party with 38 years of government experience, at the general election of 2017. In 2013 the FDP fell below the 5% threshold in the party list vote required for election to Parliament for the first time in its history. This result 'traumatised' the party (Faas and Klingelhofer 2019) leading to a change of leadership and a redefinition of the party's traditional civil rights based identity.

A party with government experience may also adopt a vote seeking strategy in the event of a strong disagreement with previous coalition partners. The *Finnish Green League*, for example, participated in coalition governments between 1995 and 2002 but left the government when it approved the construction of a new nuclear power plant. In the subsequent two elections the Green League adopted a vote seeking strategy with the declared goal in 2007 (Arter 2007) of becoming the country's fourth largest party by surpassing the votes received by the Left Alliance.

Using multiple sources for our coding meant that we were able to track the evolution of party strategies between elections. For example, we coded *Syriza*, in line with DALP, as policy seeking at the election of May 2012, but as office seeking at the election of January 2015 when the party had a clear and very public strategy of seeking office. Similarly, on the basis of other studies we coded the *Sweden Democrats* as vote seeking in 2010 when the party entered Parliament for the first time. From 2011 and under the leadership of Jimmie Akesson the party sought to move away from a nationalist image and to broaden its policy appeal beyond the issue of immigration with which it had been primarily identified to that point. On the basis of these changes, we coded the party as policy seeking at the election of 2014.

We have a total of 238 data points for the goal maximising strategies of parties in our data set. Of these 121 (51%) were office seeking, 80 (34%) were policy seeking, and 37 (15%) were vote seeking.

Government experience

We categorised government experience with a dummy variable taking the value 1 for parties who had experience of government at the time of each election covered by our data set and 0 in the case of parties with no government experience at the time of each election. Our source was the *Government Experience – Supplement to the Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2018* – https://www.cpds-data.org/index.php/data#Supplement. We have a total of 252 data points for parties in our data set. Of these 135 parties (54%) had government experience at the time of an election and 117 (46%) did not.

Ideology

We categorised all parties at each election in our data set as one of four groups – radical right, centre-right, centre-left, and radical left on the basis of assessments made in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES – https://www.chesdata.eu/ches-stats). We deployed expert views on the *lrgen* variable which measures the overall ideological position of parties on a scale of 0 to 10. We took the expert measurements for parties closest to the date of elections covered in our data set. Parties with scores between 0-2.49 were coded as radical left-wing parties, those between 2.5-3.99 as centre-left parties, those between 5.0-7.49 as centre-right parties, and those between 7.5-10 as radical right-wing parties. For those parties scored at between 4 and 4.99 on the scale we made an assessment based on scholarly articles on relevant elections about the programmatic position of parties. For example, the Belgian *Centre Democratie Humaniste* (CDH) was coded in CHES for 2010 at 4.5, and *PASOK* in Greece at 4.4 also in 2010. On the basis of secondary evaluations of party programmes we coded CDH as centre-right and *PASOK* as centre left. We have a total of 252 data points for party ideology in our data set of which 39 (16%) were coded as radical right, 103 (42%) were coded as centre-right, 65 (27%) were coded as centre-left, and 36 (15%) were coded as radical left.

GAL/TAN scale

We coded parties into four groups on the basis of respectively scores on the GAL/TAN scale of between 0 and 2.49 (most alternative/libertarian), 2.5-4,.99, 5.0-7.49, and 7.5 and above

(most authoritarian/nationalistic). We have a total of 198 observations for parties on the GAL/TAN scale. Of these 46 (23%) fell into the first most alternative libertarian group, 67 (34%) into the second group, 50 (25%) fell into the third group, and 35 (18%) fell in the fourth most authoritarian/nationalistic group.

Party polarization

We measure party polarization at each election using expert evaluations of parties' manifesto positions with data from the Manifesto Project (2020). Our measure is the distance between the most right-wing and most left-wing parties on the variable *rile* describing parties' left-right position. For example, our measure for the Norwegian election of 2009 is 46.87, the distance between the measures for the Socialist Left Party (-40.11) and the Progress Party (6.76). On this data the least polarized election in our data set is the Irish election of 2007 (13.3) and the most polarized is the Swiss election of 2007 (106.2).

Absolute disproportionality index

We measure electoral disproportionality with the *Absolute Disproportionality Index* also known as the Loosemore–Hanby index. It computes the absolute difference between votes cast and seats obtained using the formula:

$$D = 1/2\ \Sigma\ [vi - si]$$

where *vi* is vote percentage and *si* is seat percentage. The data was secured from the Comparative Political Data Set for all elections up to and including 2016 – https://www.cpds-data.org/ - and calculated by the authors for the German election of 2017. Values for the Index ranged from 0.25 in the case of the Swedish election of 2010 to 1.86 in the Belgian election of 2014.

Regulation of CSO's political activity

To measure each country's framework for regulating the political activity of organised civil society we built on the framework used by Civicus (2018) in comparing the regulatory framework in Ireland with that in three other countries. The Civicus report identified three categories of regulation. First, the absence of any regulations of CSO's political activity or of conditions for qualifying for charitable status or registration for tax exemptions. In these regulatory regimes there were normally no restrictions on CSOs receiving funding from overseas or on the subject of CSO's campaigning or representative activity. We coded this as *no regulation*.

The second category describes what we term *partial* regulatory regimes. In these cases CSOs are largely free to campaign politically and even to recommend political parties to voters, but they forego some of this freedom if they choose to register for tax exemptions from the state or for charitable status. In addition, CSOs focusing on some areas of campaigning may not be registered for tax exemptions. This is the case in Germany where in addition all CSOs who

register for tax exemptions are prohibited from using their assets for the benefit of a specific political party.

The third regulatory regime, which we term *full regulation*, involves close regulation of the political activity of CSOs. Restrictions on the political activity of CSOs are mentioned in the country's electoral law, there are extensive restrictions on the receipt of funding from overseas, and on the amount of funding that can be received for the purpose of influencing public policy. These restrictions apply to all CSOs, charitable or otherwise and CSOs active in the field of human rights advocacy are not able to register for charitable status at all.

In addition to the Civicus report (2018) which covered four of the countries in our study, our sources for coding CSO regulation included data shared with us from the Index of NGO Regulation (see Bloodgood et al. 2014), country reports published by the Expert Council on NGO Law (https://www.coe.int/en/web/ingo/home), and country reports in the International Journal of Not for Profit Law (e.g. Hazdi-Miceva Evans 2015). Of the 14 countries covered by our data set, we coded 8 countries (covering 137 of our observations for political parties) as having no regulation of CSO's political activity, 4 (covering 72 political party observations) as having partial regulation, and 2 (covering 43 observations for political parties) as having full regulation.

Party system

Our measure of the party system comprises the number of parties at each election in the dataset that obtained at least 2% of the nationwide vote. Observations range from 4 in the elections in Portugal in 2015 and the United Kingdom in 2010, to 11 in the case of the Belgian elections of 2010 and 2014 and the Greek election of May 2015. Data is sourced from http://www.parlgov.org/.

System of government

Our measures of the system of government are drawn from Lijphart (2012). We created two dummy variables for a) executive power is dominated by the executive or parties in parliament, and b) whether the overall system of government in a country is unitary or federal in character. Our data was sourced directly from Lijphart for the period to 2010 and updated for institutional and electoral events after 2010. No events post-2010 changed classifications based on data up to 2010. For example, the election in Norway in 2013 resulted in a four-party coalition government confirming our classification of Norway as party as opposed to executive dominated at the level of executive power.

Cultural diversity

At any moment in time individual countries will experience differing degrees of diversity on different measures and, over time, some types of diversity will change at different rates than others (Patsiurko et al. 2012). Because of this and in order to capture as much as possible of the reality of diversity in contemporary Western European societies we operationalized cultural diversity at each election as an additive measure of two indices:

- The ethnic fractionalization index (EFI), measuring the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country are not from the same ethnic group. This data is sourced from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) maintained by Harvard University (Drazanova 2019).

- The religious density index (RDI) devised by the Pew Research Center in the United States, measuring the proportion of a country's population in each of eight major religious groups. The RDI for the countries covered in this paper was estimated using data from the Religious Characteristics of States Data Set maintained by the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) (Brown and James 2019).

Measures of cultural diversity ranged from 0.338 in Greece in 2007 to 1.134 in Belgium in 2014.

Appendix C – country level control variables

Control variables

In order to assess the robustness of our findings we ran all our models with individual control variables and random effects in place of multilevel fixed effects. Controls were included separately and individually for *party polarization*, *party size*, the *electoral and party systems*, the *system of government*, the *regulation of CSO's political activity* and for a country's *cultural diversity*. Only the electoral system and regulation of CSO's political activity were significant when included individually in Model 4 and were then included together in a regression of that model. The results are shown in Table C.1. All substantive conclusions are robust to the inclusion of significant country control variables instead of fixed effects.

Table C.1 – Full model with significant country controls; random effects

	Model 4a
Centralisation	-.042 (.061)
Candidate selection	.022 (.022)
Party age standardised	.021 (.032)
Social movement origin	.009 (.065)
Office seeking	-.138 (.091)
Policy seeking	-.085 (.087)
Government experience	.209***(.075)
Ideology (ref. category, centre-right)	
Radical right	-.145 (.095)
Centre-left	.244*** (.066)
Radical left	.311*** (.086)
Electoral system disproportionality	-.141** (.062)
No regulation of CSO'	.226*** (.084)
Partial regulation of CSO'	.326*** (.089)
Constant	.787
Within country R2	.3375
N	190

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$, two sided

Apart from the effect of radical right parties compared to centre-right parties, which lost its significance, there were no substantive changes in the significance of our independent variables. We conclude that the findings of our full model in Table 1 of the main paper are robust to the inclusion of country controls in place of fixed effects

Appendix D – outlying values of connective density and other robustness checks

Outlying values of connective density

Our data set includes 242 estimates of connective density with a mean value of 1.0899 and a standard deviation of .4068. None of the estimates for connective density were more than three standard deviations from the mean and so to assess the impact of outlying values we excluded all estimates of connective density that were more than two standard deviations from the mean. This means that outlying values of connective density are those of 1.91 or above, or below 0.27.

A total of six observed values for parties met this definition:

- The *Kristelig Folkparti* in Norway in 2013 with a connective density of 2.09 and the *Christian Unie* in the Netherlands in 2006 with a connective density of 2.00 were excluded for values greater than two standard deviations from the mean.

- The *Front National* in Belgium in 2007 (connective density of 0.15), the *Lijst Dedecker* in Belgium in 2010 (0.00), the *Ticnio League* in Swizterland in 2011 (0.25), and the *Liberal Alliance* in Denmark in 2011 (0.17) were excluded for values lower than two standard deviations from the mean.

Table D.1 shows the results of running a regression of our full model excluding these outlying values. Excluding outlying values of connective density led to a modest increase (3.4%) in within country R2. All substantive effects were the same as for the full model in the main paper with the exception of radical right parties whose connective density was no longer significantly lower than that of centre-right parties. We conclude that our findings are robust to the exclusion of outlying values of our dependent variable.

Table D.1 Full model excluding outlying values of connective density

	Full model (4)
Centralisation	.019 (.055)
Candidate selection	.003 (.025)
Party age standardised	.042 (.029)
Social movement origin	-.008 (.060)
Office seeking	-.103 (.078)
Policy seeking	-.042 (.076)
Government experience	.226*** (.069)
Ideology (ref. category, centre right)	
Radical right	-.113 (.087)
Centre-left	.268*** (.061)
Radical left	.421*** (.078)
Constant	.866
within country R2	.3610
N	186

* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p <.01, two sided:

Alternative operationalization of party ideology

In the main paper we chose to operationalize party ideology with the single left-right scale (lrgen) as the best way to operationalize party ideology in our models because it, unlike the GAL/TAN scale, results in a largely coherent and inclusive grouping of parties by party family. For example, on the lrgen scale (Bakker 2015) parties of the centre or mainstream left consistently score between 2.5 and 4 and therefore comprise a coherent group or party family. On the GAL/TAN scale (also Bakker 2015) the scores for this group of parties are much more dispersed with a corresponding loss of coherence in ideological positioning.

As a robustness check we ran our models incorporating the GAL/TAN score in place of our operationalization of party ideology. We coded parties into four groups on the basis of respectively scores on the GAL/TAN scale of between 0 and 2.49 (most alternative/libertarian), 2.5-4,.99, 5.0-7.49, and 7.5 and above (most authoritarian/nationalistic). We created dummy variables for each category. Taking the third of these groups (GAL/TAN = 5.0-7.49) as broadly equivalent to the centre-right party family, we ran models 3 (ideology) and 4 (full model) with the new dummy variables taking the third group as our reference category. The results are shown in Table D2.

In model 3 the most alternative/libertarian group of parties had significantly higher connective density compared to the reference category, and the most authoritarian/nationalistic group of parties had significantly lower connective density than the reference category (both at the .05 level). However, in our full model only the most alternative/libertarian group of parties had a significantly different level of connective density than the reference category (positive at the .05 level). The amount of in-country variation explained by the full model with GAL/TAN was substantially lower than the full model with our measure of party ideology (.209 compared to .327) and government experience was no longer significant.

Table D.2 – Alternative Operationalization of Party Ideology

	Model 3	Model 4
Centralisation		-.049 (069)
Candidate selection		.029 (.027)
Party age standardised		.059 (.038)
Social movement origin		.090 (.065)
Office seeking		.010 (.091)
Policy seeking		.089 (.087)
Government experience		.099 (.072)
GAL/TAN group one	.161** (.070)	.178** (.089)
GAL/TAN group two	.094 (.062)	.070 (.063)
GAL/TAN group four	-.157** (.073)	-.002 (.092)
Constant	1.03	.780
Within country R2	.1139	.2091
N	181	160

* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p <.01, two sided:

Test of all models on selected cases

In order to facilitate a direct comparison of within country R^2 we ran all models on only those cases with data on all independent variables. Results are shown in Table D.3. All substantive effects were robust to this test. Model 1 explained 7.52%% of within country variation, Model 2 8.85%, Model 3 27.14%, and Model 4 33.41%.

Table D.3
Test of all models on selected cases

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Centralisation	-.133** (.062)	-	-	-.015 (.058)
Candidate selection	.049* (.027)	-	-	-.008 (.027)
Party age standardised	-	.041 (.035)	-	.036 (.031)
Social movement origin	-	.114** (.057)	-	-.034 (.064)
Office seeking	-	-.058 (.094)	-	-.108 (.083)
Policy seeking	-	.066 (.088)	-	-.038 (.080)
Government experience	-	.181**(.073)	-	.209*** (.073)
Ideology (ref. category, centre right)				
Radical right	-	-	-.305*** (.074)	-.170* (.091)
Centre-left	-	-	.235*** (.051)	.265*** (.065)
Radical left	-	-	.249*** (.066)	.370*** (.081)
Constant	.931	.950	1.03	.971
Within country R2	.0752	.1057	.2714	.3281
N	190	190	190	190

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p <.01$, two sided

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Notes

[1] The CCS surveys do not have information on whether candidates were elected for 2 (Denmark and Ireland) of the 14 countries and 8 of the 29 elections covered by our data set.

[2] Estimated by the Pedersen Index in which the absolute values of the change in vote share of all parties between two elections is summed and divided by two.

[3] This was the for the Scottish Nationalist Party (N=1) at the UK election of 2010. Two other measurements for elected candidates were also higher than the maximum value for the full sample – the Finnish Green League (N=3) had a value on the DV of 2.33 at the Finish election of 2011 and elected candidates for the Swiss Social Democrats in 2011 had a connective density of 2.14 (N=24).
[4] 1.17 vs. 0.96 for the full sample of candidates compared to 1.18 vs. 1.00 for the sample of elected candidates only.
[5] The Left-Party Trade Union Data Set hosted by PAIRDEM, (Allern and Bale 2017).