

Online Appendix

Appendix A. Political leaders

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Appendix A. Political leaders

Table A1. Political leaders

Country	Leader	Function	Election date	E	A	C	Es	O
Afghanistan	Ashraf Ghani	President	28-Sep-19	3.33	0.63	2.17	0.00	2.33
Albania	Edi Rama	PM	25-Jun-17	2.83	1.83	2.00	1.33	2.83
Argentina	Alberto Fernández	President	27-Oct-19	2.50	2.00	2.67	1.33	2.50
Australia	Scott Morrison	PM	18-May-19	3.39	1.22	2.47	2.20	0.67
Austria	Sebastian Kurz	PM	15-Oct-17	2.50	1.89	3.21	3.07	2.16
Bangladesh	Sheikh Hasina	PM	30-Dec-18	2.38	2.00	3.50	3.25	2.63
Botswana	Mokgweetsi Masisi	PM	23-Oct-19	2.94	3.04	3.00	2.81	2.56
Brazil	Jair Bolsonaro	President	7-Oct-18	2.75	1.15	1.83	1.03	1.60
Bulgaria	Boyko Borisov	PM	26-Mar-17	3.00	1.33	1.83	1.17	2.02
Cameroon	Paul Biya	President	7-Oct-18	0.80	2.50	2.40	2.78	0.90
Canada	Justin Trudeau	PM	21-Oct-19	3.69	2.69	1.63	2.69	3.33
Chile	Sebastián Piñera	President	19-Nov-17	2.75	2.00	2.88	2.25	1.38
Colombia	Iván Duque Márquez	President	27-May-18	2.22	1.95	3.19	3.02	1.26
Cyprus	Nicos Anastasiades	President	28-Jan-18	2.00	0.78	2.03	1.48	1.75
Czech Republic	Andrej Babiš	PM	20-Oct-17	2.86	1.14	2.86	1.82	2.50
Denmark	Mette Frederiksen	PM	5-Jun-19	2.75	1.88	3.25	3.13	2.00
Ecuador	Lenín Moreno	President	19-Feb-17	1.36	2.71	1.93	2.43	1.00
Estonia	Jüri Ratas	PM	3-Mar-19	2.25	3.25	2.50	3.25	2.25
Fiji	Frank Bainimarama	PM	14-Nov-18	3.50	1.67	2.85	1.10	1.67
France	Emmanuel Macron	President	23-Apr-17	2.70	2.40	3.20	2.70	3.10
Germany	Angela Merkel	PM	24-Sep-17	0.56	2.41	3.80	3.73	1.65
Ghana	Nana Akufo-Addo	President	7-Dec-16	3.58	2.75	3.75	2.00	3.33
Greece	Kyriakos Mitsotakis	PM	7-Jul-19	1.44	2.22	2.83	2.30	2.00
Guatemala	Alejandro Giammattei	President	11-Aug-19	2.15	1.00	1.88	1.30	1.30
Hungary	Viktor Orbán	PM	8-Apr-18	3.10	0.80	3.33	2.00	2.10
Iceland	Katrín Jakobsdóttir	PM	29-Oct-16	3.13	2.88	3.42	3.50	3.25
India	Narendra Modi	PM	19-May-19	2.69	1.25	2.88	2.50	2.35
Indonesia	Joko Widodo	President	17-Apr-19	1.86	2.66	3.19	3.31	2.63
Iran	Hassan Rouhani	President	19-May-17	2.42	1.88	3.54	3.42	2.38
Ireland	Leo Varadkar	PM	8-Feb-20	2.00	2.30	3.60	3.10	2.50
Israel	Benjamin Netanyahu	PM	9-Apr-19	3.09	0.97	2.54	1.97	2.50
Japan	Shinzō Abe	PM	21-Jul-19	2.65	0.95	1.90	1.00	1.65
Kosovo	Albin Kurti	PM	11-Jun-17	3.08	2.13	3.58	2.92	2.88
Lithuania	Gitanas Nausėda	President	12-May-19	2.00	2.17	3.33	2.17	2.83
Madagascar	Andry Rajoelina	President	7-Nov-18	3.50	2.38	1.25	2.13	2.13
Mexico	Andrés Manuel López Obrador	President	1-Jul-18	2.54	1.43	2.14	1.75	1.96
Mozambique	Filipe Nyusi	President	15-Oct-19	1.20	1.70	1.30	2.00	0.90
New Zealand	Jacinda Ardern	PM	23-Sep-17	3.33	3.21	3.45	3.40	3.40
Nicaragua	Daniel Ortega	President	6-Nov-16	0.83	0.33	2.17	0.67	0.67
Norway	Erna Solberg	PM	11-Sep-17	2.14	2.43	3.14	3.57	1.64
Pakistan	Imran Khan	PM	25-Jul-18	2.88	1.75	2.38	1.88	2.75
Philippines	Rodrigo Duterte	PM	13-May-19	2.55	1.25	1.64	0.82	2.14
Portugal	António Costa	PM	6-Oct-19	2.65	2.12	2.88	2.13	2.50
Romania	Klaus Iohannis	President	10-Nov-19	0.75	1.50	3.42	3.38	1.25
Russia	Vladimir Putin	President	18-Mar-18	2.24	2.00	2.92	2.92	1.93
Serbia	Aleksandar Vučić	President	2-Apr-17	2.30	1.20	2.10	0.90	1.60
Slovenia	Janez Janša	PM	3-Jun-18	2.20	0.70	2.70	1.50	1.10
South Africa	Cyril Ramaphosa	PM	8-May-19	3.00	3.23	3.20	3.10	3.00
South Korea	Moon Jae-in	President	9-May-17	1.60	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.80
Spain	Pedro Sánchez	PM	28-Apr-19	2.31	2.74	2.53	2.83	2.06
Sweden	Stefan Löfven	PM	9-Sep-18	0.75	2.63	3.25	2.75	1.13
Thailand	Prayut Chan-o-cha	PM	24-Mar-19	2.76	0.89	2.11	0.65	1.05
The Netherlands	Mark Rutte	PM	15-Mar-17	3.19	2.63	3.04	3.06	2.33
Timor Leste	Francisco 'Lú-Olo' Guterres	President	20-Mar-17	1.67	2.50	2.67	3.00	2.33
Turkey	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	President	24-Jun-18	3.16	0.63	2.69	0.75	2.06
UK	Boris Johnson	PM	12-Dec-19	3.69	1.24	0.88	1.42	2.81
Ukraine	Volodymyr Zelensky	President	31-Mar-19	2.70	2.58	2.13	2.25	3.00
Uruguay	Luis Lacalle Pou	President	27-Oct-19	3.29	1.93	3.39	2.57	2.67
USA	Donald Trump	President	8-Nov-16	3.61	0.18	0.68	0.43	1.88
Uzbekistan	Shavkat Mirziyoyev	President	4-Dec-16	2.38	1.50	3.35	2.05	2.33
Zimbabwe	Emmerson Mnangagwa	President	30-Jul-18	0.83	1.33	2.17	2.50	0.67

Source: The Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Study (NEGex). Format date dd-mmm-yy.

Appendix B. Additional results

Table B1. Factor loadings of personality traits

Component	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Agreeableness	0.55		0.29
Conscientiousness	0.50		0.49
Emotional Stability	0.58		0.18
Extraversion		0.74	0.40
Openness		0.64	0.32
Eigenvalues	2.43	1.58	
Proportion	0.49	0.32	

Loadings smaller than 0.45 were omitted. N=61.

Table B2. Descriptive statistics

Variable	Coding	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Travel restrictions (average)	0-4 ordinal scale; average score	61	2.17	0.62	0.00	3.08
Travel restrictions (days at min)	0-4 ordinal scale; days at 0	61	54.66	31.59	6.00	182.00
Debt relief (average)	0-2 ordinal scale; average score	61	0.80	0.42	0.00	2.00
Debt relief (days at min)	0-2 ordinal scale; days at 0	61	95.25	37.92	0.00	182.00
Gvt Response index (average)	0-100 index; average score	61	42.23	7.86	7.40	55.78
Gvt Response index (days at min)	0-100 index; days at 0	61	32.03	19.11	0.00	74.00
Extraversion	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	2.46	0.81	0.56	3.69
Agreeableness	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	1.86	0.78	0.18	3.25
Conscientiousness	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	2.65	0.73	0.68	3.80
Emotional stability	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	2.22	0.92	0.00	3.73
Openness	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	2.08	0.72	0.67	3.40
“Stability”	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	2.24	0.70	0.43	3.35
“Plasticity”	0 (very low) to 4 (very high)	61	2.27	0.68	0.75	3.51
Populist	0 (no), 1 (yes)	61	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00
Deaths per 10,000 people	Continuous	61	1.03	1.58	0.00	6.59
Hospital beds per 1,000 people	Continuous	58	3.70	2.85	0.20	13.40
Percent population over 65	Percent	60	12.48	6.80	2.58	27.58
Days first 100 cases	Continuous	61	21993.7	17.9	21965	22063
Debt-GDP	Percent	58	52.82	39.02	5.31	198.44
Regime Type	-10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic)	60	6.95	4.50	-9.00	10.00
Tourism	Percent	60	10.98	11.84	0.81	64.00
Decentralisation	0 (highly centralized) to 4 (highly decentralized)	46	1.70	1.48	0.00	4.8
Political System	0 (parliamentary), 1 (presidential)	61	1.48	0.50	0.00	1.00
Female Candidate	0 (no), 1 (yes)	61	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00
Individualism	0-100 index	39	43.08	22.48	6.00	90.00
Time from election	Continuous	61	711.98	369.29	143	1340

Table B3. Correlates of Average Policies (*magnitude of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.17* (0.10)	0.17* (0.09)	1.21 (2.20)	0.40 (1.79)
Plasticity	0.16 (0.12)	0.08 (0.12)	0.11 (0.08)	0.11 (0.08)	4.52** (1.92)	3.74** (1.52)
Populist	0.07 (0.19)	0.03 (0.19)	0.04 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)	-4.16 (2.74)	0.11 (2.35)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	<-0.01 (0.03)	-0.88** (0.37)	0.69 (0.59)
Deaths/10000	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.10* (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03* (0.02)	0.74 (0.87)	-0.45 (0.32)
Hospital Beds/1000	0.06 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)	<0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.04)	0.89 (0.59)	0.62 (0.79)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01* (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.05)
Debt/GDP	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Regime Type	0.05* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.35 (0.47)	0.11 (0.29)
Tourism	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.95 (0.95)	-0.33 (0.91)
Constant	1.38** (0.55)	1.47*** (0.53)	-0.07 (0.34)	-0.03 (0.32)	20.02** (8.25)	26.66*** (6.17)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.20	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.41	0.19

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B4. Correlates of Days at Minimum of Policies (*promptness of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	0.11 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.10 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.15)
Plasticity	-0.18* (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.13)
Populist	0.01 (0.16)	0.05 (0.02)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.17 (0.23)	-0.20 (0.03)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	0.03 (0.02)	(0.15)	-0.03* (0.01)	(0.09)	0.02 (0.03)	(0.18)
Deaths/10000	0.02 (0.06)	0.04** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.11* (0.06)
Hospital Beds/1000	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.07** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
Tourism	<0.01 (0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.17** (0.08)	-0.15* (0.08)
Constant	3.96*** (0.46)	4.07*** (0.43)	5.38*** (0.26)	5.31*** (0.24)	4.35*** (0.71)	4.18*** (0.50)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>Pseudo R</i> ²	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B5. Correlates with Presidential System (*magnitude of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	-0.05 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.14)	0.13 (0.10)	0.14 (0.09)	1.27 (2.25)	-0.06 (1.81)
Plasticity	0.16 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)	0.08 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)	4.55** (1.96)	3.22** (1.57)
Populist	0.06 (0.20)	0.03 (0.19)	0.03 (0.13)	0.07 (0.12)	-4.18 (2.78)	-0.10 (2.34)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05* (0.03)	<-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.82* (0.48)	-0.68* (0.37)
Deaths/10000	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.10 (0.06)	0.06 (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.70 (0.91)	0.85 (0.81)
Hospital Beds/1000	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.84 (0.66)	1.03 (0.65)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.22** (0.08)	0.09* (0.05)
Debt/GDP	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Regime Type	0.05* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.36 (0.48)	0.10 (0.29)
Tourism	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.94 (0.97)	-0.33 (0.90)
Presidential System	-0.01 (0.21)	0.02 (0.20)	-0.31** (0.14)	-0.22 (0.13)	0.65 (3.31)	-3.35 (2.58)
Constant	1.40** (0.61)	1.45** (0.60)	0.30 (0.37)	0.26 (0.35)	19.19* (9.38)	31.03*** (6.99)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.20	0.24	0.32	0.29	0.41	0.22

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B6. Correlates with Presidential System (*promptness of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	0.16 (0.13)	0.10 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.14)
Plasticity	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.24 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.13)
Populist	0.03 (0.16)	0.07 (0.15)	0.02 (0.10)	<0.01 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.18)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05* (0.03)
Deaths/10000	0.00 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.11*** (0.04)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.14** (0.06)
Hospital Beds/1000	-0.10** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
Tourism	<0.01 (0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.17** (0.08)	-0.15** (0.07)
Presidential System	0.30* (0.17)	0.29* (0.16)	0.21* (0.12)	0.11 (0.11)	0.28 (0.28)	0.43** (0.21)
Constant	3.56*** (0.50)	3.66*** (0.48)	5.14*** (0.28)	5.17*** (0.27)	4.06*** (0.74)	3.67*** (0.53)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.04

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B7. Correlates with Female Leader (*magnitude of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.14)	0.18* (0.11)	0.17* (0.10)	1.36 (2.30)	0.31 (1.88)
Plasticity	0.16 (0.12)	0.08 (0.12)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	4.49** (1.96)	3.74** (1.54)
Populist	0.10 (0.20)	0.04 (0.19)	0.03 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)	-4.25 (2.80)	0.16 (2.39)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.05** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.85** (0.40)	-0.47 (0.34)
Deaths/10000	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.66 (0.94)	0.67 (0.84)
Hospital Beds/1000	0.08 (0.05)	0.08* (0.05)	<-0.01 (0.03)	<-0.01 (0.03)	0.84 (0.62)	0.73 (0.62)
Days since First 100 Cases	0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.22*** (0.08)	0.08 (0.05)
Debt/GDP	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Regime Type	0.05* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.34 (0.48)	0.11 (0.29)
Tourism	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.91 (0.98)	-0.34 (0.92)
Female Leader	0.37 (0.33)	0.21 (0.31)	-0.07 (0.23)	0.02 (0.21)	-1.23 (4.79)	0.73 (4.06)
Constant	1.42** (0.55)	1.51*** (0.54)	-0.08 (0.35)	-0.02 (0.32)	19.76** (8.44)	26.83*** (6.30)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.22	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.41	0.19

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B8. Correlates with Female Leader (*promptness of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	0.14 (0.13)	0.09 (0.12)	-0.14* (0.08)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.08 (0.20)	-0.11 (0.15)
Plasticity	-0.20* (0.11)	-0.14 (0.10)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.21 (0.13)
Populist	-0.02 (0.17)	0.03 (0.15)	0.02 (0.10)	<-0.01 (0.09)	-0.19 (0.23)	-0.23 (0.18)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	0.03 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Deaths/10000	<-0.01 (0.06)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.13* (0.06)
Hospital Beds/1000	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.08* (0.05)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
Tourism	<0.01 (0.01)	<-0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.16* (0.09)	-0.13* (0.08)
Female Leader	-0.30 (0.28)	-0.29 (0.25)	0.07 (0.18)	0.02 (0.16)	-0.18 (0.40)	-0.38 (0.32)
Constant	3.95*** (0.46)	4.04*** (0.43)	5.39*** (0.26)	5.32*** (0.24)	4.32*** (0.70)	4.13*** (0.50)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.03

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B9. Correlates with Individualism (*magnitude of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	-0.20 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.14)	0.09 (0.12)	0.18* (0.09)	1.28 (2.05)	0.53 (1.82)
Plasticity	0.09 (0.21)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.14)	0.12 (0.08)	3.01 (2.22)	4.06** (1.67)
Populist	<0.01 (0.27)	0.04 (0.19)	0.02 (0.18)	0.07 (0.12)	-3.11 (2.87)	-0.08 (2.40)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.05* (0.03)	<-0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.42 (0.46)	-0.39 (0.35)
Deaths/10000	<-0.01 (0.08)	-0.10* (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	1.05 (0.86)	0.65 (0.79)
Hospital Beds/1000	0.15* (0.08)	0.07 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	<-0.01 (0.03)	0.82 (0.70)	0.70 (0.60)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	-0.24 (0.24)	0.07 (0.05)
Debt/GDP	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Regime Type	0.08** (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.53 (0.44)	0.12 (0.30)
Tourism	0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					0.61 (1.02)	-0.20 (0.96)
Individualism	0.00 (0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)
Constant	2.03 (1.69)	1.47*** (0.54)	0.67 (1.09)	-0.03 (0.33)	65.32*** (22.37)	26.70*** (6.37)
<i>N</i>	38	61	38	61	34	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.33	0.25	0.15	0.26	0.31	0.21

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B10. Correlates with Individualism (*promptness of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	0.23 (0.16)	0.04 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.11)	-0.14* (0.07)	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.16 (0.15)
Plasticity	-0.24 (0.19)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.40 (0.27)	-0.23 (0.14)
Populist	0.10 (0.22)	0.06 (0.15)	0.01 (0.16)	<0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.29)	-0.20 (0.18)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.03)
Deaths/10000	0.02 (0.07)	0.08 (0.05)	-0.08* (0.05)	-0.06** (0.03)	-0.06 (0.10)	-0.11* (0.06)
Hospital Beds/1000	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.08** (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.05)
Days since First 100 Cases	<-0.01 (0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.02)
Tourism	-0.02 (0.02)	<0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.20* (0.12)	-0.16* (0.08)
Individualism	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)
Constant	4.04** (1.58)	4.05*** (0.43)	4.59*** (0.92)	5.32*** (0.24)	4.59 (2.84)	4.20*** (0.51)
<i>N</i>	38	61	38	61	34	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11. Correlates with Days since Election (*magnitude of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	-0.06 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.14)	0.17 (0.10)	0.17* (0.09)	1.07 (2.30)	0.50 (1.76)
Plasticity	0.14 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)	0.11 (0.09)	0.11 (0.08)	4.47** (1.96)	3.74** (1.50)
Populist	0.12 (0.19)	0.07 (0.19)	0.04 (0.13)	0.08 (0.12)	-4.09 (2.79)	0.43 (2.32)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	-0.05* (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.88** (0.38)	-0.51 (0.32)
Deaths/10000	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)	0.79 (0.91)	0.76 (0.79)
Hospital Beds/1000	0.08* (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)	<-0.01 (0.03)	<-0.01 (0.03)	0.94 (0.62)	0.91 (0.60)
Days since First 100 Cases	0.01 (<0.01)	0.01* (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.22** (0.08)	0.08 (0.05)
Debt/GDP	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)
Regime Type	0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.34 (0.48)	0.08 (0.29)
Tourism	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.93 (0.97)	-0.44 (0.91)
Days since election	<-0.01* (0.01)	<-0.01 (0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Constant	1.60*** (0.55)	1.57*** (0.53)	-0.06 (0.37)	-0.03 (0.33)	21.41** (9.85)	29.63*** (6.38)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.26	0.27	0.24	0.25	0.41	0.23

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12. Correlates with Days since Election (*promptness of response*)

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
Stability	0.12 (0.12)	0.05 (0.12)	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.03 (0.21)	-0.15 (0.15)
Plasticity	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.10 (0.06)	-0.20 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.13)
Populist	-0.02 (0.16)	0.03 (0.15)	0.02 (0.10)	<0.01 (0.09)	-0.17 (0.23)	-0.21 (0.18)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	0.03 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Deaths/10000	0.01 (0.06)	0.08* (0.05)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.13* (0.08)	-0.12* (0.06)
Hospital Beds/1000	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.10* (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)	0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)
Tourism	<-0.01 (0.01)	<-0.01 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.18** (0.08)	-0.14* (0.08)
Days since election	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)
Constant	3.80*** (0.49)	3.98*** (0.45)	5.42*** (0.28)	5.37*** (0.25)	3.85*** (0.86)	4.01*** (0.54)
<i>N</i>	54	61	54	61	41	61
<i>R</i> ²	0.06	0.03	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.03

The results in the first columns for each indicator were estimated from complete case data (listwise deletion) and those in the second columns were estimated using imputed data.

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table B13. Correlates of Policies – Adjusted measures of Candidates' Personality Traits

	International Travel Controls		Financial Relief		Overall Government Response	
	Magnitude	Promptness	Magnitude	Promptness	Magnitude	Promptness
Stability	-0.01 (0.15)	0.10 (0.13)	0.23** (0.10)	-0.17** (0.08)	1.75 (2.32)	-0.09 (0.20)
Plasticity	0.17 (0.12)	-0.19* (0.11)	0.13 (0.08)	-0.13** (0.06)	4.64** (1.90)	-0.21 (0.17)
Populist	0.08 (0.19)	0.00 (0.16)	0.07 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.10)	-3.94 (2.73)	-0.17 (0.23)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	-0.04 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.87** (0.37)	0.02 (0.03)
Deaths/10000	-0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.79 (0.87)	-0.11 (0.08)
Hospital Beds/1000	0.06 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.89 (0.58)	-0.08 (0.05)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.20** (0.08)	<0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	0.05* (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.34 (0.46)	0.02 (0.04)
Tourism	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)				
Decentralization					-0.92 (0.95)	-0.17** (0.08)
Constant	1.65*** (0.41)	3.80*** (0.36)	0.60*** (0.21)	4.80*** (0.17)	33.62*** (7.08)	3.62*** (0.61)
<i>N</i>	54	54	54	54	41	41
<i>R</i> ²	0.20	0.02	0.29	0.05	0.42	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


Table B14. Correlates of Regressions with Interactions

	International Travel Controls (Promptness)	Overall Government Response (Magnitude)	Financial Relief (Magnitude)	International Travel Controls (Promptness)
Stability	0.10 (0.13)	0.68 (2.34)	-0.03 (0.15)	0.15 (0.12)
Plasticity	-0.13 (0.16)	6.73* (3.65)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.32* (0.18)
Plasticity * Tourism	-0.01 (0.01)			
Plasticity * Decentralization		-1.10 (1.53)		
Stability * Presidential System			0.26 (0.18)	
Plasticity * Presidential System				0.27 (0.24)
Populist	0.00 (0.16)	-4.27 (2.76)	0.02 (0.12)	0.03 (0.15)
Proportion of Population over 65 y.o.	0.03 (0.02)	-0.88** (0.38)	<0.01 (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Deaths/10000	0.02 (0.06)	0.90 (0.91)	0.07 (0.05)	<-0.01 (0.06)
Hospital Beds/1000	-0.07* (0.04)	0.89 (0.59)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.10** (0.04)
Days since First 100 Cases	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.21** (0.08)	<-0.01 (<0.01)	<-0.01 (<0.01)
Debt/GDP	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	<0.01 (<0.01)	<0.01 (<0.01)
Regime Type	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.30 (0.48)	<-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)
Tourism	0.02 (0.03)			
Decentralization		1.52 (3.59)		
Parliamentary System (Ref.)			-	-
Presidential System			-0.88** (0.42)	-0.35 (0.58)
Constant	3.83*** (0.54)	17.29* (9.15)	0.71 (0.46)	4.17*** (0.62)
<i>N</i>	54	41	54	54
<i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.42	0.35	0.03

Standard errors in parentheses.


* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure B1. Personality traits of political leaders




Source: The Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Study (NEGex). N=61.

Figure B2. Substantive Impact of Stability on Financial Relief (Average)




The markers represent predictive margins derived from the OLS regression in Figure 6 (top panel). Bars represent confidence intervals at the 84% level (corresponding to $p < 0.05$, see MacGregor-Fors & Payton, 2013).

Figure B3. Substantive Impact of Personality on Financial Relief (Days)




The markers represent predictive margins derived from the negative binomial regressions in Figure 4 (bottom panel). Bars represent confidence intervals at the 84% level (corresponding to $p < 0.05$, see MacGregor-Fors & Payton, 2013).

Figure B4. Substantive Impact of Plasticity on Overall Government Response (Average)




The markers represent predictive margins derived from the OLS regression in Figure 4 (top panel). Bars represent confidence intervals at the 76% level (corresponding to $p < 0.1$, see MacGregor-Fors & Payton 2013).

Figure B5. Moderation of Political System on the Impact of Stability on Financial Relief (Average)



The mid-line represents predictive margins derived from an OLS regression. Bars represent confidence intervals at the 84% level (corresponding to $p < 0.05$, see MacGregor-Fors & Payton, 2013).

Figure B6. Moderation of Political System on the Impact of Plasticity on International Travel Controls (Days)



The mid-line represents predictive margins derived from a negative binomial regression. Bars represent confidence intervals at the 76% level (corresponding to $p < 0.1$, see MacGregor-Fors & Payton, 2013).

Figure C2. Heat map for weekly averages on debt relief



Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker initiative. Data for the period between January 1 and June 30, 2020. Weekly averages. Pale blue indicates lower scores (weaker response) and deep purple higher scores (stronger response) on debt relief. Original index varies between 0 and 2.

Figure C3. Heat map for weekly averages on government response index

