Station area developments in Tokyo and what the Randstad can learn from it

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Through the organization of focus groups, focused-group interviews and surveys a first step was made in assessing the potential of the Tokyo model for the Randstad. The participants mentioned several aspects about the Tokyo approach which they thought the Randstad could learn from in regards to its own station area development projects. As a second step in assessing the potential of the Tokyo approach some additional interviews were held with actors involved in station area development projects in the Randstad. In these additional interviews a number of hypotheses that were based on the potential incentives and barriers for using the Tokyo approach for station area developments in the Randstad/Netherlands were considered. The hypotheses were derived from the discussions held in the focus groups and focused-group interviews. Prior to the interviews, each interviewee was asked to give their opinion on the hypotheses and send their answers to the researcher concerned. During the interviews the interviewees were asked to elaborate on their expressed opinions. In this chapter the results of these interviews are presented. The first paragraph explains the design of the interviews and the grounds on which the interviewees were selected. The results of the interviews are dealt with in the second, third and fourth paragraph. In the fifth and final paragraph some conclusions are drawn.
11.1 Interview design and actors interviewed

The outcomes of the focus groups and focused-group interviews served as a starting point for conducting some additional interviews. Based upon these outcomes a number of hypotheses were constructed by the researcher reflecting the opinions of the participants involved. The hypotheses were divided into two categories: 1) incentives for station area developments and 2) barriers for station area developments (see box 11-1 and 11-2). As this research focuses on the driving forces behind station area developments, the emphasis was put on the incentives rather than the barriers. Fifteen hypotheses were generated from the focus groups and focused-group interviews, of which 10 concerned incentives and 5 concerned barriers for station area developments. These hypotheses formed the core of the interviews. Prior to the interviews each participant was asked to express their opinion on the hypotheses formulated. For this they could choose from five possible answers: ‘highly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neutral’, ‘disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’. At the end of the interviews each participant was asked if they knew of any additional barriers or incentives for station area developments. The interview method followed was semi-structured, as during the interviews some additional questions were brought up due to the answers given by the interviewees. The objective of these interviews was not to verify whether the hypotheses posed were true, as the actors interviewed were a selected group related to specific cases, making it, because of case-related differences, precarious to draw any general conclusions. Instead the aim was to come up with a new and refined version of the hypotheses based upon the responses of the interviewees. This together with the results of step 1 provides the basis upon which the potential of using the Tokyo approach in the Randstad is assessed in the next chapter.
**Box 11-1  Hypotheses regarding incentives for station area developments**

**Incentives**

1. To stimulate station area developments sub-regional functions have to be relocated to the station.
2. To stimulate station area developments at the sub-regional level land use programmes need to be coordinated with each other and with available public transport services.
3. To stimulate station area developments the choice of programme in station areas should be based on the households and businesses already located in these areas.
4. To stimulate station area developments the province and Dutch Railways (NS) need to draft a corridor strategy.
5. To stimulate station area developments the costs of railway transport and the spatial development of station areas must be covered by area concessions.
6. To stimulate station area developments BDU-subsidies\(^{59}\) must only be allocated to projects that guarantee a solid connection between transport and land use developments.
7. To stimulate station area developments station areas must be favoured above other places in the densification of the existing city.
8. To stimulate station area developments municipalities must reward the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes (e.g. by subsidizing land/rental price or temporarily exemption of real estate tax) and reprimand the establishment of offices and houses elsewhere (e.g. by imposing a fine).
9. To stimulate station area developments provinces and municipalities must guide the real estate/retail market through the provincial ordinance and municipal land use zoning plan.
10. To stimulate station area developments municipalities must provide guarantees to the real estate/retail market about public investments in station areas and about the quality standards to which developments should comply with prior to the start of developments.
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Box 11-2  Hypotheses regarding barriers for station area developments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The strong competitive position of the car compared to public transport is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The lack of societal and governmental support for public transport in the Netherlands is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The existing spatial context (e.g. residential, shopping, working and leisure areas located far from public transport) is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The lack of scarcity (oversupply of office and residential locations) is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Provinces that are not willing or daring enough to overrule municipalities are an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actors interviewed were not randomly chosen, but selected on a number of different grounds (see also figure 11-1):

1. Actors should represent the node and/or the place function of a station as this reflects the identified interaction between transport and land use (see chapters 5 and 6).
2. Actors should be chosen from the government and the private sector as this reflects the identified interaction between the government and the private sector (see chapter 7).
3. Actors should be active in one of the cases studied in the focus groups or focused group interviews in order to prevent case-related differences from influencing the results too much.

Figure 11-1  Overview of actors interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNMENT</th>
<th>PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NODE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport, Public Works &amp; Water Management*</td>
<td>Operator of train services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport agency for the Randstad</td>
<td>Owner of railway infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City region</td>
<td>Engineering consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional transport-land use agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PLACE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing &amp; the Environment*</td>
<td>Owner and operator of station buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>Real estate investor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Real estate developer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Since 2010 the Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water Management and the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment have been part of the new Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment.
In addition to the reasons stated above, the actors illustrated in figure 11-1 are all actors that are able to influence station area developments, albeit to different degrees. For clarification purposes the roles of some of these actors are further explained below:

**National level**

**Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water Management:** grant provider for the development of existing stations or the construction of new stations, and responsible for transport policies.

**Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing & the Environment:** grant provider for improving the spatial quality of station areas, and responsible for land use policies.

**Owner of railway infrastructure:** in the Netherlands the railways are owned and managed by a separate company, i.e. ProRail. This is a semi-public company with the Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water Management (currently Ministry of Infrastructure & the Environment) as its sole shareholder.

**Operator of train services:** in the Netherlands train services are operated by multiple companies. There is, however, only one company carrying out passenger railway services in the Randstad, i.e. Dutch Railways (NS). This is a semi-public company with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder.

**Owner and operator of stations:** in the Netherlands railway stations are owned and operated by one company, i.e. NS real estate department (NS Poort). This company is also the principal passenger railway company in the Netherlands. It is a semi-public company with the Ministry of Finance as its sole shareholder.

**Sub-national level**

Public transport agency for the Randstad: voluntary governmental cooperative for improving cohesion and cooperation in public transport at the Randstad level. It is also referred to as OV Bureau Randstad. Nine different government authorities work together in this bureau.

**Regional level**

**Province:** granter of concessions for public transport (for areas not belonging to the territory of the city region), grant provider, and drafter of spatial policies at the regional level.

**Regional transport- land use agency:** governmental cooperative aimed at the integrated development of public transport and land use in the province of South-Holland. This cooperative is referred to as Projectbureau Stedenbaanplus.

**Sub-regional level**

**City region:** grant provider for regional and local infrastructure (and concession provider for local and regional public transport).
Local level

Municipality: licensing authority (land use zoning plan, building permits) and often responsible for the maintenance and development of public facilities such as station squares, and (often) one of the owners of land in a station area.

11.2 Incentives for station area developments

In this paragraph the results of the interviews concerning the hypotheses regarding the possible incentives for station area developments are discussed. This is done by comparing and contrasting the answers given by the four groups identified in table 11-1, i.e. government-node, government-place, private sector-node, and private sector-place. In addition, the answers given by the government and private sector are compared. Eventually, it is hoped that the responses given by the interviewees will lead to a new and refined version of the hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1**

To stimulate station area developments sub-regional functions have to be relocated to the station.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of hypothesis 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answers given to this hypothesis varied considerably, however, most actors agreed or highly agreed, while only a few actors disagreed (see table 11-1). When specific attention is paid to the actors who supported and who did not support this hypothesis, the contrast between the government and the private sector actors is striking. The former largely disagreed, with one exception, while the latter largely agreed or even strongly agreed with this hypothesis. The public sector disagreed or was neutral in its opinion, as it was against relocation, or a forced relocation of functions, and believed
that sub-regional functions were not a necessary requirement for the development of
a node. The public actor who agreed believed instead that such functions were vital
for the existence of a node. The private sector largely agreed as they believed that sub-
regional functions could contribute to a high-quality environment, that they were
beneficial to railway services, that they stimulated the involvement of other actors, and
they were vital for the existence of the node. Also between the four different groups
(i.e. node-government, place-government, node-private sector, place-private sector)
certain patterns can be identified. Within the public sector the node actors questioned
the extent to which the location of sub-regional functions should be planned or not,
while the place actors questioned whether there was a relation at all between sub-
regional functions and nodal development. Within the private sector, however, the
node actors considered the relation between sub-regional functions and nodal
developments crucial, as it was believed sub-regional functions could act as catalyst
for other developments in station areas. The place actors, on the other hand, stressed
the importance of the wider service area of such functions.

Hypothesis 2
To stimulate station area developments at the sub-regional level land use programmes
need to be coordinated with each other and with available public transport services.

Table 11-2  Results of hypothesis 2

The answers given to this hypothesis were highly uniform as all actors either agreed or
highly agreed with this hypothesis (see table 11-2). Consequently, no differences can
be seen between public and private sector opinions.
Both types of actor agreed with this hypothesis for a number of reasons. They believed
that sub-regional coordination contributed to an efficient use of land and transport,
that it avoided destructive competition between nodes and locations in general, that
it was beneficial for the business case of public transport, that it was beneficial for the
quality, usage and size of the node, that limited future demand for spatial development required coordination, that an integral approach would allow choices and priorities to be made, and that it avoids development dynamics from being undermined by fragmented spatial policies.

Certain patterns can be distinguished between the answers given by the public and the private sector. Within the public sector the node actors stressed the benefits of sub-regional coordination, while the place actors emphasized the disadvantages of not having such coordination. Within the private sector both the node and place actors seemed to highlight the benefits of sub-regional coordination.

**Hypothesis 3**
To stimulate station area developments the choice of programme in station areas should be based on the households and businesses already located in these areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis 3</th>
<th>Results of hypothesis 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
<td>Number of answers given (N=13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answers given to this hypothesis showed a somewhat mixed outcome, most actors were neutral in their opinion, while the remainder either disagreed or agreed (see table 11-3). The actors that tended to disagree with this hypothesis were from the private sector, while the public sector partly agreed and was partly neutral. The private sector disagreed as they believed that households and business located around stations were not always related to the stations, that future households and businesses should be decisive for the choice of programme at a station, that functions covered a larger service area, and a risk that the households and business located around the node would act in their own self-interest rather than in interest of the node. The public sector agreed because they believed that the choice of a programme at a station should be demand-driven and that developments between nodes should be coordinated.
However, some private sector actors were neutral. Some argued that whether the households and businesses around a station should influence the choice of programme at a station depended on the location of the station. While others were neutral, because they simply did not know whether this should be the case or not. Within the public sector the node actors in particular were not sure whether households and businesses should be decisive for the choice of programme at a station or not. The place actors on the other hand regarded this as something strongly related to coordination. Among the node and place actors in the private sector there seemed to be consensus about households and businesses being responsible to some extent for the choice of programme at a station, rather than being decisive.

**Hypothesis 4**

To stimulate station area developments the province and Dutch Railways (NS) need to draft a corridor strategy.

**Table 11-4   Results of hypothesis 4**

Most actors either agreed with this hypothesis or were neutral in their opinion (see table 11-4). However, the opinions of the public and the private sector differed as the former largely agreed while the latter seemed to be less enthusiastic about this hypothesis. The public sector predominantly agreed as they believed that nodes should be developed comprehensively, that drafting a corridor strategy was a natural responsibility of provinces, that the provinces and NS were logical partners in coordinating developments at the sub-regional level, and that a corridor strategy was helpful for developing a hierarchy for nodes. Two additional remarks were made: 1) besides transport operators private developers should also be involved in drafting corridor strategies, 2) corridor strategies should be based on a memorandum of
understanding between the provinces and Dutch Railways. There was one public actor who disagreed with provinces drafting corridor strategies as he believed that regional governments in the Randstad were not in a position to do this. The private sector was predominantly neutral as it believed that corridor strategies did not correspond with passenger needs, that the coordination of land uses between stations did not necessarily require a corridor strategy or vision, and that corridor strategies should also involve the private sector and the end-consumers. The one actor who agreed with this hypothesis believed that corridor strategies could generate a positive return on large infrastructure investments. Within the public sector both node and place actors acknowledged the roles of the provinces and NS in drawing up strategies. They did not question the need for corridor strategies themselves as was done by both node and place actors in the private sector.

**Hypothesis 5**

To stimulate station area developments the costs of railway transport and the spatial development of station areas must be covered by area concessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of answers given (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11-5  Results of hypothesis 5
Chapter 11 - Individual interviews

The opinions on this hypothesis were either neutral or negative, i.e. actors disagreed or, in one case, very much disagreed (see table 11-5). The public and private sector disagreed with this hypothesis as they believed that concessions regarding railway transport and spatial development were not realistic for the Dutch context, were not necessary as there were other means to stimulate station area developments, were difficult to implement due to the involvement of many actors, that they did not stimulate market forces, that they would not work as railways and spatial development were two completely different things, and that they would not make any difference to station area developments.

Within the public sector the node actors stressed the limitations brought forward by the Dutch institutional context, while the place actors emphasized the importance of free market forces. Within the private sector the node actors questioned the usefulness of a concession including railway transport and spatial development for stimulating/organizing things. The place actors also emphasized the limitations of the Dutch institutional context.

**Hypothesis 6**

| To stimulate station area developments BDU-subsidies 61 must only be allocated to projects that guarantee a solid connection between transport and land use developments. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results of hypothesis 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of answers given (N=13)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinions on this hypothesis varied considerably among the actors interviewed (see table 11-6). Within the public sector the answers given were particularly diverse, while the private sector was, with the exception of one person, unanimous, as they agreed or even very much agreed. Some public actors did not agree with the hypothesis for the following reasons. They believed that if these subsidies required certain conditions
to be met then they would become less flexible, and that the national government should not interfere with how these subsidies should be appropriated. Some actors were neutral because they believed that how a subsidy should be spent was a political choice, or referred to future changes in relation to this grant which could potentially lead to a more solid connection between transport and land use developments. The public actors who agreed with this hypothesis did not explicitly state the reasons for this. The private sector agreed because they believed that subsidies that focused exclusively on projects guaranteeing a solid connection between transport and land use developments could be beneficial for quality and connectivity, that this was an instrument that would allow for control, and that it ensures an integral approach to planning. The actor who disagreed was not in favour of such an exclusive focus of these subsidies. Within the public sector both node and place actors varied considerably in their reactions, making it difficult to identify a certain pattern within each group. A recurring theme within the public sector, however, was that they felt that regional and local authorities should be allowed to decide for themselves how to spend these subsidies, instead of limiting this freedom by attaching conditions on how to spend this money. Within the private sector the node actors emphasized the control options of these subsidies, while the place actors stressed the possibilities for gearing them to spatial developments. However, it is necessary to state that prior to the interviews none of the place actors were familiar with these subsidies.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Hypothesis 7} & \\
\textbf{To stimulate station area developments station areas must be favoured above other places in the densification of the existing city.} & \\
\hline
Number of answers given (N=13) & \\
\hline
Highly agree & \\
Agree & \\
Neutral & \\
Disagree & \\
Highly disagree & \\
\hline
0 & 1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Results of hypothesis 7}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{59} BDU-subsidies: Brede Doeluitkering or overall specific grant (see chapter 8).
Most actors agreed or highly agreed with this hypothesis, while only a few actors disagreed or were neutral in their opinion (see table 11-7). Also here the opinions expressed within the public sector varied considerably, while the private sector was unanimous, as they all agreed or even very much agreed to this hypothesis. The public actors remained neutral or disagreed with this hypothesis for the following reasons. They believed that favouring station areas above other places in the densification of the existing city depended on the location of the station and that densification should not be limited to station areas only. Public actors who agreed believed that giving priority to the development of station areas would benefit the existing city, and that densification typically suited the development of station areas. The private sector agreed as they believed that giving priority to the development of station areas would stimulate scarcity, solve accessibility problems, stimulate the development and optimization of the node, and prevent competition with other locations in the city. Within the public sector the node actors mainly agreed by pointing out the added value of a developed station area for the city as a whole. The place actors varied more strongly in their opinion and basically stressed that one should be cautious of using the prioritization of the development of station areas as a universal approach. Within the private sector the node actors stressed the advantages of intensifying station areas, while the place actors focused on pointing out the development potential of certain areas within the existing city.

### Hypothesis 8

To stimulate station area developments municipalities must reward the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes (e.g. by subsidizing land/rental price or temporarily exemption of real estate tax) and reprimand the establishment of offices and houses elsewhere (e.g. by imposing a fine).

### Table 11-8 Results of hypothesis 8

- **Number of answers given (N=13)**
The opinions given on this hypothesis showed a somewhat mixed result, as there were a considerable number of actors who agreed, disagreed and were neutral in their opinion. As a result no single opinion was dominant (see table 11-8). Also within the public and private sector the reactions to this hypothesis differed. As for the public actors, the majority were either neutral or disagreed with this hypothesis. They believed that rewarding the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes and reprimanding their establishment elsewhere was too rigid, that it would cost money (i.e. the rewards), that restrictive policies were more effective than financial incentives in creating scarcity, that subsidies and penalties should only be used to prevent undesired effects, and that it would restrict market freedom. The actors who agreed with the hypothesis did so because they thought that it provided a clear framework for the private sector, and that it was a useful tool with which to govern the market.

The private actors were, with one exception, either neutral or agreed with this hypothesis. They thought that the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes should be stimulated by a powerful policy, that this should be approached positively, that if the policy goal is to stimulate station area developments then the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes needed to be rewarded, and one should look for possible ways to encourage the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes. The actor who disagreed with this hypothesis was against rewards, such as the subsidization of land and rental price, because he believed that without a certain market demand such measures would be ineffective. Several additional remarks were made by the private sector: 1) that the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes should be stimulated by setting restrictions, 2) that subsidies make people lazy as they do not stimulate creativity, 3) that the element of free choice should play a role in stimulating the concentration of offices and houses near public transport nodes, 4) that the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes should be rewarded by other means such as additional development, and 5) some people mentioned that they did not know whether they agreed with the use of the instruments mentioned here. Within the public sector the node actors questioned whether rewarding the location of offices and houses near public transport nodes was the right way to encourage nodal developments. The place actors on the other hand questioned whether this should be enforced by municipalities. Within the private sector the place actors emphasized that the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes should be encouraged in some way, while the node actors stressed the use of other instruments for encouraging nodal developments.
Hypothesis 9
To stimulate station area developments provinces and municipalities must guide the real estate/retail market by the provincial ordinance and municipal land use zoning plan.

Table 11-9 Results of hypothesis 9

The majority of the actors agreed or highly agreed with this hypothesis (see table 11-9). The public actors agreed as they believed that guiding the real estate and retail market by legal instruments was more efficient than using financial instruments, that this was more useful for creating scarcity than using financial instruments, that this would prevent competition between different locations, and that this would help the government in creating clarity. The actor who disagreed believed that there were perhaps other ways for guiding the real estate and retail market. Examples, however, were not mentioned. The private actors agreed because they believed that the costs involved in guiding the real estate and retail market by legal instruments were less compared to the use of financial instruments, that the current instruments available should be made more use of, that using legal instruments to guide the market would reduce uncertainty and risks, and that this would be helpful for supporting a desired direction. The actor who was neutral questioned the role of the province in this and believed that this was a local and thus a municipal matter. Within the public sector the node actors emphasized the benefits of such legal instruments, while the place actors stressed the importance of a government providing clarity regarding what can and what cannot be developed. Within the private sector the node actors stressed, as did the public node actors, the opportunities of stimulating station area developments with such legal instruments. The place actors emphasized the restrictive effects stemming from such instruments.
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Hypothesis 10
To stimulate station area developments municipalities must provide guarantees to the real estate/retail market about public investments in station areas and about the quality standards to which developments should comply with prior to the start of developments.

Table 11-10 Results of hypothesis 10

The opinions given show a similar pattern to the previous hypothesis as the majority of actors agreed or even highly agreed with this hypothesis (see table 11-10). Regarding the public sector, all but one agreed as they believed that private actors should have to satisfy conditions in exchange for public investments, that this would provide long-term certainty for the private sector, that this would reduce risks for the private sector, that quality conditions would prevent stations from becoming the same, and that this would increase transparency of the government. The actor that did not agree feared that if the standards could not be met penalties would follow. One actor remarked that besides the public sector, transport operators should also provide guarantees in advance about the level of services that would be offered at stations. As for the private sector the majority agreed as they believed that this would help to reduce uncertainties, that the government should play a leading role in this, that this would reduce risk profiles and improve project results, and that private actors should be assured of continuity in policies. One actor remarked that the private sector should also provided guarantees about its investments. The actor that disagreed questioned the ability of municipalities to make such guarantees. The actor that was neutral argued that the government and the private sector should collectively develop a good sentiment for the retail/real estate market and should both be willing to invest in it. Within the public sector node actors stressed the importance of certainty to the private sector regarding public investments in station areas, while place actors emphasized the importance of clarity regarding
the quality standards to which a development should comply. Within the private sector node actors stressed the importance of providing clarity and the importance of a government taking the lead in this. The place actors stressed the importance of risk reduction and consistency in policy-making regarding the development of station areas.

### 11.3 Barriers for station area developments

In this paragraph the results concerning the hypotheses on the possible barriers to station area developments are discussed. This is done by comparing and contrasting the answers given by the four groups in figure 11-1, i.e. government-node, government-place, private sector-node, and private sector-place. The hypotheses were deliberately formulated in an extreme way, as it was hoped that this would stimulate discussion.

**Hypothesis 1**
The strong competitive position of the car compared to public transport is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.

**Table 11-11 Results of hypothesis 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Number of answers given (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All but one of the actors interviewed either disagreed or strongly disagreed with this hypothesis, while one actor had a neutral opinion (see table 11-11). The reasons mentioned by the public sector for this were that they believed that despite the popularity of the car strong public transport nodes could be developed, that main public transport nodes were located in places where public transport accessibility is better than car accessibility, that competition between car and public transport would enable the node to develop in an optimal way, that public transport was a necessary
precondition for intensification, and that the competitive position of the car was not that strong in large urban areas. One public actor was neutral as he believed that despite the relevance of multimodal access the car lobby would remain strong. The private actors unanimously disagreed because they believed that the strong competitive position of the car compared to public transport was a choice motivated by politics, that this could be overcome by focusing on improving the quality of public transport, that this could be overcome as long as the reward (e.g. high parking tariffs or free home delivery of goods) was high enough, that the strong competitive position of the car was temporary, and that the strong position of the car should be used to improve the node. Within the public sector node actors argued that there were also nodes where public transport was equal or stronger than the car. The place actors stressed the added value of the combination of the car and public transport for the development of the node. Within the private sector node actors considered high-quality public transport as a prerequisite for overcoming this barrier. The place actors stressed the importance of turning the node itself into an attractive place.

**Hypothesis 2**
The lack of societal and governmental support for public transport in the Netherlands is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.

**Table 11-12**  
Results of hypothesis 2

Although the majority of the actors interviewed disagreed with this hypothesis, there were also some actors that had a neutral opinion or agreed (see table 11-2). The public sector disagreed because of the following reasons: in large urban areas the modal share of the public share was considerable, public transport was an essential means of transport, public transport was a regional policy interest, and the lack of societal and governmental support for public transport was surmountable when a lot of effort
was put into it. In addition, one actor remarked that there was a lack of government support for public transport because of the way it was currently performing. Only one, and in this case public, actor agreed because he believed car accessibility and car possession would still be highly valued despite an increasing support for public transport. Another actor was neutral as he believed that more could be done to encourage people to use public transport. In this he foresaw in particular a role for the municipality (e.g. by preferential measures).

The private sector disagreed as they believed that lack of government and social support was not necessary a problem as other instruments (e.g. high parking fees) could be used to encourage people to use public transport, that large investments in railway infrastructure were planned in the coming years, that the lack of societal and governmental support could be manipulated, that there was considerable support for public transport among left and right wing political parties, and that the lack of government and social support was not causing the problem, but rather the way the public transport sector handled its relationship with the car. In addition, some remarks were made such as the instruments to support public transport could be better, and the public transport sector should innovate and embrace the car.

Within the public sector node actors underlined the societal support for public transport, while place actors emphasized the governmental support for public transport. Within the private sector the node actors pointed out the importance of public transport by referring to the large railway investments that are going to be carried out by the national government to increase the frequencies at certain railway sections. The place actors stressed that it was a lack of good instruments and innovative thinking that hindered nodal developments, rather than a lack of societal and governmental support.
Hypothesis 3
The existing spatial context (e.g. residential, shopping, working and leisure areas located far from public transport) is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.

Table 11-13  Results of hypothesis 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of answers given (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The answers given to this hypothesis show a similar pattern to the previous hypothesis. While the majority of actors disagreed or highly disagreed with this hypothesis, there were some actors who agreed or were neutral in their opinion (see table 11-13). Within the public and private sector there were some differences of opinion. All public actors, except for one, disagreed with this hypothesis for the following reasons. They believed that in the existing spatial context changes were possible, that the dynamics present at nodes offered developmental opportunities especially for shopping and leisure, that nodes were one of the urban sub-centres within urban areas, and that the existing spatial context might offer opportunities for further development. One actor was neutral as he realized that the existing spatial context cannot be easily changed (e.g. relatively few shopping streets are located close to the exit of stations. Some of the private sectors disagreed, while others agreed or were neutral. The reasons why they disagreed were that they thought that station areas should be made more attractive, that areas situated far from public transport would eventually disappear, and the existing spatial context was ultimately also subject to change. The actors who agreed did so because they believed that it was difficult, if not impossible, to change the existing spatial context. The private actor who was neutral believed that the existing spatial context does not necessarily need to affect a station area development. Within the public sector the node actors referred to the areas adjacent to stations when talking about spatial context, while the place actors considered spatial context from a wider perspective (i.e. the city level). Within the private sector opinions varied considerably, which made it difficult to identify a certain pattern between node and place actors.
Chapter 11 - Individual interviews

**Hypothesis 4**
The lack of scarcity (oversupply of office and residential locations) is an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.

Table 11-14  Results of hypothesis 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of answers given (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinions given on this hypothesis showed a somewhat mixed result as there were actors who disagreed with this hypothesis, but also actors who agreed or had a neutral opinion (see table 11-14). The answers given by both public and private actors varied as they both either disagreed or were neutral in their opinion. A few public and private actors, however, also agreed with the hypothesis. The public actors disagreed because they thought that over and undersupply of offices and residences should be prevented instead of scarcity, and that station areas were popular locations and therefore it was questionable whether the government should impose scarcity. In addition, one participant also mentioned that while there was already a lack of development locations, these could not be developed due to environmental regulations (i.e. noise and air pollution). An additional remark was made by one of the actors who argued that this barrier could be surmountable if the province fulfilled its role as director of spatial developments and the national government clearly stated how to prevent oversupply. The public actors who were neutral in their opinion believed this barrier would be surmountable in the future. One actor who agreed with this hypothesis did so because he believed a lack of scarcity was needed for developing nodes and that such scarcity could be created. The private actors disagreed arguing that lack of scarcity was not an insurmountable barrier, that excess office and residential locations were not a barrier to station area developments, but rather that there was a lack of suitable station areas where these locations could be realized, that new offices would still be built due to the numerous bad offices built in the '70s-'80s, and that the strength of a location should be the starting point for a development. The actor who was neutral
in his opinion believed that scarcity can also be created. The actor who agreed with the hypothesis considered the oversupply of offices and residences a problem and as such a barrier for nodal development.

Within the public sector node actors were fairly optimistic about the oversupply of offices and residences, while the place actors on the other hand questioned whether the (artificial) creation of scarcity would prevent an over or undersupply of offices or residences. Within the private sector node actors agreed that there was a lack of scarcity, but the opinions varied towards creating scarcity or not. The place actors stressed that quality of a particular location should be the starting point for developing an area instead of (creating) scarcity.

**Hypothesis 5**
Provinces that are not willing or daring enough to overrule municipalities are an insurmountable barrier for station area developments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of answers given (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinions given on this hypothesis showed a mixed result. There were actors who agreed or were neutral, while there were also actors who disagreed or even highly disagreed (table 11-15).

The answers given to this hypothesis varied considerably among the public and private actors. As for the public sector half of the actors interviewed agreed, while the remaining actors either disagreed or had a neutral opinion. The public actors agreed with the hypothesis for the following reasons. They believed that the current administrative culture and lack of political courage by administrators meant that overruling power was not used when it should have been, and they were unconvinced that provinces would be able to fulfill their policy responsibilities by using this power. Some actors
disagreed because they felt that provinces did dare to use overruling power. However, as one actor argued, overruling powers should be used carefully when provincial interests are at stake. Another actor commented that provinces need to go through a process of learning, daring and willing to apply overruling power.

One public actor was neutral in his opinion as he had no extensive knowledge of this. The private actors agreed because they believed that provinces were afraid to use overruling power, that provinces did not dare to make choices regarding the areas that they wanted to focus on, and that provinces were often hesitant to maintain a position regarding station areas, as the development of station areas was only one of their interests. The private actors who disagreed because they thought that a province should facilitate rather than dominate a station area development, that overruling power should be a last remedy, and that provinces have not had enough time to develop an instinct for when to use overruling power. One actor remarked that he considered the instrument of overruling power as a means to socially engineer society which was something that he disagreed with.

Within the public sector the node actors stressed the current ‘incapability’ of the province to use such powers. The place actors on the other hand emphasized the importance of using this overruling power in a careful manner. Within the private sector the node actors pointed out the fairly modest role that the province has played in spatial planning up to now, while the place actors sketched out the desired role for the province to play in the future.

11.4 Additional incentives and barriers for station area developments

At the end of each interview the actors were asked if they could think of any other incentives or barriers for station area developments that were not mentioned in the hypotheses. Most of the actors gave additional incentives or barriers, while some did not.

There were actors who only stated incentives or barriers, while some did both. The following additional incentives were mentioned by the public actors:

- Railway concession containing requirements concerning the quality of the station area (the current concession does not contain any such spatial conditions).
- Consistent long-term policy vision at the local level
- Alternative financial sources.
- Politicians/policy makers and managers willing to take risks and prepared to think beyond their own responsibilities.
- Municipalities having a vision and willing to share this vision with private actors (according to this actor many municipalities are lacking a vision concerning their station area).
- Deployment of a ‘Taskforce Ruimtewinst’.

Barriers for station area developments mentioned by the public actors were:
Station area developments in Tokyo and what the Randstad can learn from it

- Sector-by-sector organization of spatial planning and transportation.
- The high importance placed on consensus in the Netherlands leads to rather slow decision-making and lengthy negotiations.
- External safety issues (i.e. transportation of hazardous materials) preventing station areas from being developed.
- Government that is non-responsive to market demand.
- Current period (i.e. financial crisis resulting in on programming and a drop in demand) in which station areas are being developed.

Among the private actors the following incentives were mentioned:
- Reduced public and private sector budgets enable choices and priorities to be made.
- Involving captains of industry in organizing the pressure needed for realizing high-quality public transport.

As for the barriers the following were stated by the private actors:
- Public distrust of private sector being able to serve public interests.
- Lack of governmental vision.
- Unclear delineation of responsibilities of actors involved in station area developments.
- Unreliable actors.
- Political discontinuity.
- Long time needed to complete a project therefore making it a risky undertaking.
- Municipalities not daring to make choices regarding its development priorities.
- Unclear position of quality teams in certain projects.

Within the public and private sector certain patterns can be identified. Public node actors stressed the importance of widening the scope of instruments and responsibilities for influencing public transport, while the public place actors underlined the importance of open communication with the private sector. The private actors focused predominantly on existing barriers for station area developments. The node actors stressed the difficulties of trying to merge diverging public and private sector interests, whereas the place actors emphasized the numerous uncertainties and thus the risks involved in carrying out station area development projects.

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60 A quality team is involved in the development of some stations. Their role is to advise on matters such as the functional programming of a station (area).
The incentives mentioned by the public actors contain some elements that could be considered important additions to the existing hypotheses. First, the public actors seem to underline the importance of having a consistent long-term policy vision at the local level which is also shared with private actors. In the hypotheses only a regional vision (i.e. a corridor strategy) was mentioned. Second, it was mentioned that politicians and bureaucrats should be more willing to think beyond their own responsibilities. The other aspects mentioned, i.e. railway concession containing spatial quality requirements, alternative financial sources, and deployment of the ‘Taskforce Ruimtewinst’ could be interpreted as refinements of the current hypotheses. Regarding the incentives mentioned by the private actors, there was one that could be considered an addition to the current hypotheses, namely the one indicating that captains of industry should be involved in organizing high-quality train products. This stresses the importance of involving other actors, in addition to the traditional transport and land use actors, in station area development projects. The other incentive mentioned (i.e. reduced budgets enabled choices and priorities to be made regarding the locations that should be developed) could be considered a further refinement of the current hypotheses.

The additional barriers mentioned by the public sector differ in the sense that they highlight more specifically the limitations of the Dutch institutional context; i.e. the sector-by-sector organization of spatial planning and transportation, the endless consensus decision-making, and a government that is non-responsive to market-demand. This was an aspect that was not specifically brought forward during the workshops nor the group interviews and subsequently not mentioned as a possible barrier. The other barriers (external safety issues, and financial issues) not only apply to station areas, but also to other areas. Regarding the barriers mentioned by the private actors it is interesting to see that they focus in particular on the competencies of public actors; i.e. the public distrust of the private sector in delivering public services, lack of governmental vision, and municipalities not daring to make choices. This is interesting because these perceived barriers were not mentioned, and thus apparently not shared, by the public sector. In turn, no specific barriers were mentioned that could be related to the competencies of the private sector. Does this mean that the role of the private sector is considered sufficient?

Furthermore, barriers were mentioned that related to the tasks of the actors involved; i.e. unclear delineation of responsibilities of actors involved, unreliable actors, and unclear position of quality teams. This is not addressed in the existing barriers, but is apparently an important issue that should not be ignored when trying to bring about station area developments in the Randstad/Netherlands. The other barriers mentioned (political discontinuity, long time needed to complete projects, and distrust of actors) could be interpreted as aspects that are not only applicable to station areas, but to other areas as well. As such, these barriers do not have a specific added value for stimulating station area developments in the Randstad/Netherlands.
11.5 Discussion and conclusions

In this final paragraph some conclusions are drawn based upon the answers given by the four different groups (i.e. government-node, government-place, private sector-node, and private sector-place). The opinions between these groups are compared to identify possible similarities and differences between them. In addition, it is explored whether the differences and similarities identified are reducible to the distinction between node and place or public and private. This is sequentially done for the incentives, barriers and the additional barriers and additional incentives mentioned.

Differences and similarities in actors’ opinion

Incentives

Starting with the hypotheses related to possible incentives for station area developments the following patterns can be identified. First, there were issues on which all actors (predominantly) agreed. There was consensus about the following aspects working as possible incentives for station area developments: sub-regional coordination of transport and land use developments (hypothesis 2), guided control, i.e. by means of legal instruments, of the private sector (hypothesis 9), advance provision of guarantees on public investments and quality terms for the private sector (hypothesis 10). This shared consensus is both interesting and surprising. It is interesting because if both the public and private sector stress the importance of sub-regional coordination, a guided control of the real estate and retail market and clarity in advance of a development, then why is this not happening? Implementing the above-mentioned instruments does not require any substantial changes to existing institutional structures or legal instruments in the Randstad/Netherlands. For example, by means of the existing provincial ordinance sub-regional coordination could be arranged as this provides the legal framework to which municipalities are obliged to conform to. A more guided control of the private sector could be realized by stating in advance which locations will be developed the coming years. Accordingly, and this is important for the Randstad/Netherlands, this should be backed by a legal land use plan prohibiting competing developments to happen outside the previously designated locations. Clarity could be provided by drafting a municipal master plan or structural vision in advance in which the conditions that a developer needs to meet are stipulated prior to the start of a development. On the other hand, the findings are surprising because it is the private sector herself that is asking for a stricter regulation of land use developments and for more ‘pressure’ from the government, where one would expect the opposite (i.e. a demand for more freedom). However, when relating this to market-conscious planning (see chapter 2) this seems to make sense. A stricter regulation of land use developments does not necessary have to limit the freedom of the private sector. As the workings of the planning incentives in chapter 4 have demonstrated, strict land use requirements from the government can go hand in hand with a considerable amount of freedom for the private sector to plan and develop a location.
Second, there was also an issue on which all actors (predominantly) disagreed. There was consensus that an integrated procurement of railways and spatial developments by area concessions would not work as an incentive for station area developments in the Randstad/Netherlands. Public and private actors both believed that due to the Dutch institutional context this was not a realistic instrument to be applied. In addition, it was believed that this would not stimulate market forces; surprisingly this was mentioned by the public sector. Private actors questioned further whether the area concession would be a useful instrument for stimulating/organizing station area developments.

Third, there were issues on which opinions varied either considerably or to some extent. This implied that there was no consensus about whether the following aspects could work as incentives for station area developments or not: relocation of sub-regional functions to station areas (hypothesis 1), making businesses and households already located around stations decisive for the choice of programme to be developed at stations (hypothesis 3), drafting a corridor strategy by the province and NS (hypothesis 4), BDU-subsidies ensuring a solid link between transport and land use developments (hypothesis 6), preferential treatment of station areas for intensifying the existing city (hypothesis 7), and rewarding the establishment of offices and residences near station areas and reprimanding their establishment elsewhere (hypothesis 8). The most contrasting differences in opinion could be identified between the public and the private actors. Private actors seemed to be in favour of relocating sub-regional functions to station areas, using the BDU subsidies to establish solid links between transport and land use developments, and giving station areas preferential treatment in the densification of an existing city. As a result of the above, it could be concluded that the private sector is in fact desperate for more restrictive policies than is at present the case in the Randstad/Netherlands. Apparently, at least this was indicated by some of the private actors interviewed, the current policies/instruments do not provide enough certainty or incentives for the private sector to invest in station areas. Consequently, a need for stronger control was felt.
Interestingly, the public sector seemed to be more hesitant about this, as they for example questioned whether a relocation of sub-regional functions should be planned (i.e. imposed) or not. Such reasoning is surprising as one would expect this from the private rather than the public sector. In a similar way the public sector was hesitant about BDU-subsidies having to provide a solid link between land use and transport developments as they feared this would limit the capacity of local governments to spend this subsidy as they see fit. This reasoning (i.e. pleading for less conditions/rules) is surprising too as one would expect this from the private rather than the public sector. On the other hand, this could also be considered as an act of self interest as BDU-subsidies provide sub-regional and local governments some financial autonomy.\(^{61}\)

The public sector’s stance towards a preferential treatment of station areas in the densification of existing cities also shows their hesitation towards using stronger land use controls. According to some of the public actors one should be careful of applying this preferential treatment as a universal approach to station areas. Apparently not every government actor is convinced of the merits of intensifying station areas. The private sector seemed to be more hesitant about the usefulness of a corridor strategy for sub-regional coordination. They questioned whether such an instrument would be necessary for achieving this. To some extent this is rather surprising as it seems to contradict earlier findings that saw the private sector pleading for stricter regulations, and for more ‘pressure’ from the government. Apparently sub-regional coordination does not need to be regulated.

The public actors on the other hand did seem to be convinced of the potential of such a strategy and acknowledged the role of province and NS in drawing up this strategy. In a similar way the private sector tended to be more hesitant about using households and businesses already located around stations as a deciding factor regarding the choice of programme to be developed at stations. This is not surprising as the private sector operates in markets covering larger service areas and as such develops functions that are targeted at a larger audience. The public sector on the other hand seemed to be more convinced of such an approach.

The results above suggest that the private sector seems to be more aware of what is needed for stimulating station area developments in the Randstad/Netherlands compared to the public sector. This becomes most apparent when the differences in opinion between the public and private sector are compared. Perhaps most illustrative of this are the answers given to hypothesis 1, 6 and 7 (see table 11-16).

\(^{61}\) Local governments in the Netherlands rely on grants from the national government for 90% of their income.
### Differences in opinion between the public and private sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses (number)</th>
<th>Private sector opinion</th>
<th>Public sector opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) To stimulate station area developments sub-regional functions have to be relocated to the station</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Predominantly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) To stimulate station area developments the choice of programme in station areas should be based on the households and businesses already located in these areas.</td>
<td>Neutral/Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral/Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) To stimulate station area developments municipalities must reward the establishment of offices and houses near public transport nodes and reprimand the establishment of offices and houses elsewhere</td>
<td>Neutral/Agree</td>
<td>Neutral/Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) To stimulate station area developments the province and Dutch Railways need to draft a corridor strategy</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) To stimulate station area developments BDU subsidies must only be allocated to projects guaranteeing a solid connection between transport and land use developments</td>
<td>Predominantly agree</td>
<td>Mixed opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) To stimulate station area developments station areas must be favoured above other places in the densification of the existing city</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Mixed opinion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: the number corresponds with the order of the incentives listed in box 11-1.*
Barriers
The barriers demonstrate a somewhat different pattern compared to the incentives, as most actors disagreed with the hypotheses posed. In other words, none of the actors interviewed believed that the barriers mentioned were insurmountable for station area developments. This can be explained by the fact that the participants were not selected at random, but on their (expected) interest in Tokyo. Therefore, one should be very careful in drawing conclusions from these results. For example, actors involved in different modes of transport (i.e. the car) or in different business areas (i.e factory workers) might have responded differently to these hypotheses. On the other hand the opinion of the actors could have been influenced by the way that the hypotheses were formulated. Each hypothesis deliberately ended with “an insurmountable barrier for station area developments” as it was hoped this would provoke considerable discussion from the actors interviewed. There were, however, issues to which all actors seemed to disagree. For example, there seemed to be consensus that the strong competitive position of the car compared to public transport would not necessarily have to be an insurmountable barrier to station area developments. In a similar fashion it was thought that the lack of societal and governmental support for public transport could be overcome. Without ignoring the bias of the actors interviewed, the question could be raised that if both public and private actors seem to agree that public transport is capable of competing with the car than why is this not happening in the Randstad? And if there is sufficient social and political support for public transport then why is the government not putting more emphasis on encouraging the use/the development of public transport in the Randstad?

In addition, there was considerable dissent in opinion among the public and private actors regarding hypotheses 3, 4 and 5. In other words, there was no consensus on whether the following aspects would pose as barriers to station area developments: existing spatial context (hypothesis 3), lack of scarcity (hypothesis 4), and lack of courage/will to use overruling power by regional governments.
Regarding the existing spatial context it is interesting that the private sector seemed to be more skeptical than the public sector about the possibility of overcoming this barrier. Is this perhaps because the public sector in the Randstad/Netherlands still believes in a socially-engineered society?
As for the lack of scarcity the discussion between both the public and private place actors revolved around whether having scarcity could be a solution for the problem of oversupply of offices and residential locations. The public sector questioned whether creating scarcity could prevent an oversupply of offices and residential locations, while the private sector emphasized that not so much excess office and residential locations were a barrier to station area developments, but rather that there was a lack of suitable station areas where these locations could be realized. This deviates from the discussions held in the workshops (see chapter 9) as scarcity was not questioned here, but rather considered an interesting aspect that the Randstad/Netherlands could learn from. Regarding the lack of courage/will of the regional government to use overruling power their opinions varied considerably. Within both the public and private sector
roughly half of the actors interviewed agreed with this hypothesis, while the other half disagreed. Interestingly, the differences in opinion deviated most between the node and place actors within one sector (i.e. government node actors agreed, while government-place actors disagreed). For instance, the public node actors agreed by emphasizing the current ‘incapability’ of the province to use overruling power, while the place actors disagreed as they believed such powers should be used in a careful manner. Within the private sector, the node actors agreed by pointing out the fairly modest role that the regional government had been playing in spatial planning up until now, while the place actors disagreed as they believed the usage of overruling power would contradict with the facilitating role of the regional government. The question which remains, however, is that if the regional government possesses such powerful instruments, then why does it not use these instruments more often?

Additional barriers and incentives
The majority of the actors interviewed gave additional incentives and barriers for station area developments. Interestingly, public actors seemed to focus more on the incentives or on a combination of both, while the private actors seemed to put a stronger emphasis on the barriers. In addition, the public sector seemed to focus mainly on content matters and less on process matters. The private sector on the other hand mainly seemed to focus on process matters. Is this perhaps typical for how the public and the private sector think and act? Furthermore, it was noticed that the additional barriers mentioned by both the public and private actors focused mainly on process aspects. This is consistent with the findings of other research in the Netherlands (Tan & Bertolini, 2010; Rutten, 2011).