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The big world experiment: the mobilization of social capital in migrant communities

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Lisa Peters (1980) graduated cum laude in Psychological Methods at the **University of Amsterdam** in the Netherlands. She conducted the current research at the **Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies** and the **Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam**, both linked to the University of Amsterdam.

Migrant organizations can play an important role in the process of integration; through the social capital that they have at their disposal, these organizations increase the **political participation** of their communities. The **social capital** of organizations is embodied by the organizational **network**.

It is presupposed that this network is used by organizational leaders to **exchange information** and collaborate with each other. However, **empirical support** for this assumption is limited. The **mechanism** of how social capital works is hypothesized rather than studied.

The **aim of this book** is to gain insight into what the social capital of migrant organizations looks like, and, more importantly, the manner in which organizations use their social capital. The latter is investigated by way of a field experiment: **the Big World Experiment**.

THE BIG WORLD EXPERIMENT LISA PETERS

THE BIG
THE MOBILIZATION
WORLD
OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
EXPER
IN MIGRANT
IMMENSE
COMMUNITIES

Lisa Peters

THE BIG WORLD EXPERIMENT

THE MOBILIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN MIGRANT COMMUNITIES

Lisa Peters

THE BIG WORLD EXPERIMENT.
THE MOBILIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN MIGRANT COMMUNITIES

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ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor

aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam

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prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom

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Lisa Peters
Amsterdam, June 2010

Introduction

'*I network, therefore I am.*' This could well be the motto of those of us who are active members of the Internet community. You don't count if you don't have a profile on networking websites such as *Facebook* and *LinkedIn*¹. These are places which map out the social networks of their users by enabling connections between personal profiles. *Facebook* is a digitalized version of groups of friends, and facilitates people getting or staying in touch with their (old) acquaintances. *LinkedIn* has a more instrumental aim, with its core objective being to create a community of professionals who can easily connect to potential new employers, employees or clients, i.e. their personal acquaintances, and the acquaintances of the acquaintances and so on. Yet however promising these potential sources of friends and career improving acquaintances are, in my experience these networks have a major disadvantage: many people create an account, connect to others and form a network, but then *do* nothing with it. Particularly so far as a virtual network that is intended to be influential in a professional sense, such as *LinkedIn*, is concerned, the question arises as to whether it achieves its aim. Do people really use their digital networks when they are looking for a new job? And if so, how do they do this?

The positive aspect of these websites is that users can actually observe what their networks look like. You can not only see how many acquaintances you have, and to whom they are connected, but you are also able to garner important information about them, such as their occupation, hobbies, age and interests. Knowing all this is valuable if, for example, you want to ask for help from friends, but in our everyday 'offline' lives, it is very difficult to gain this kind of insight. Firstly, how many people does a typical individual know? Pool and Kochen (1978 [1958]) have estimated that an average person has between 500 and 1,500 acquaintances (a more recent estimation by Freeman and Thomson (1989) even puts this figure at 5,000 acquaintances per person over a twenty-year period), while different research has shown that we *think* we know about 100 other people (e.g. Gurevitch, 1961). In other words, an individual knows five to 15 times as many people as he/she is generally aware of. Yet, if someone has insight into who are friends, and who are friends of friends etc., this person is more capable of actually using his/her network. People can 'use' their social connections for different purposes, whether as conversational partners, to find a handyman, or to mobilize a large group to protest against social welfare reforms, for example. If you know who is in your network,

¹ <http://www.linkedin.com>
<http://www.facebook.com>

it is easier to be aware of whether there is anyone in it who can help you. Of course, not all contacts are useful in every situation. You wouldn't really ask your colleague to walk your dog at the weekend, but it would make sense to ask him to take part in a carpool if you don't possess a vehicle of your own. The kind of help that you ask for, or that you may want to provide, depends on the type of relationship you have with the person offering (or accepting) it. Some are friends, while others are just mere acquaintances.

Knowing your network thus enables you to use it appropriately, which is why networking websites can be invaluable. In the social sciences, individuals' social networks, the number of acquaintances they have, and who helps who with what are objects of study under the heading 'social capital'. In cases where your friends, or people with whom you have a different kind of relationship, help you out by watering your plants when you are on holiday, babysitting your children when you are late home from work, or assist in finding you a job, it is said that you have called upon your *social capital*. Lin (2001) has defined this concept *as resources which are embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions*. The core of this notion is that if you trust and share norms and values with a person, you can call upon him/her to provide help and enable you to achieve the goals that may, otherwise, have been beyond your reach. A great deal of research has been conducted into the issue of social capital. It has been related to many different topics, ranging from the support provided by family to former prisoners, to the improvement of villages in developing countries (e.g. Woolcock, 1998; Mills & Codd, 2008). What is more, this research has also been carried out on both the individual level, examining the advantages that someone can gain from his/her social capital, and on the collective level, when, for example, the benefits that society as a whole can experience from the social capital residing within it are considered.

When reviewing all of these studies, it is striking that most of the work has predominantly focused on the first part of Lin's definition of social capital, the resources embedded in a social structure. Indeed, the second element, namely the fact that these resources are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions, has generally been neglected. Social capital research is often concerned with either the mapping of social networks², particularly a small element thereof, or with the resources a person has *at his/her disposal*. Whether these resources or networks are actually *accessed or used* remains under explored. That people encounter situations in which they actually deploy their social capital is often assumed, but rarely tested. It is my view that this is a major gap in the study of social sciences which needs to be addressed. Empirical research is required to test the assumptions that are made in the theoretical accounts of social capital. In this work, I take up this challenge. I want to demonstrate what the

² Later in this book I will discuss extensively the way in which social capital is studied. This will show that some authors do not study social capital by means of networks at all, but rather by levels of trust or other indicators.

relationship is between the social capital that is available to actors, and the ways in which they mobilize this potential. The core principles of the concept, and how it is presumed to function, are more or less the same, irrespective of the field in which it is studied. For example, in youth studies, social capital is used to explain child development (Santos, 2007), in developmental studies it is utilized in relation to the development of rural areas (Narayan & Pritchett, 1999), and in economics it is used to explain how people find work (Granovetter, 1974 [1995]). In each of these fields, social capital consists of three aspects (social networks, trust, and norms and values) which are supposed to have a beneficial effect on the actors involved, and more diverse social capital is deemed important. Furthermore, in each of these fields, the presence of social capital (i.e. of either/or social networks, trust, and shared norms and values) is assumed to be indicative of the use thereof. In other words, if one wants to study the use of social capital, there are a wide variety of areas to choose from.

My focus will be on the social capital of ethnic communities in Western liberal democracies. A great deal of research has been carried out into the relationship between social capital and political participation in general, and minority participation in particular. Most of this work focuses on the individual level, where it has been shown that those who have more social capital are also more involved in the political process; for example, they have higher voting rates (e.g. La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Teorell, 2003; Bevelander & Pendakur, 2007; Eggert & Giugni, 2007). Less research has been conducted at the group level, but the studies that do exist also reveal a positive relationship between social capital and political participation (e.g. Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Maloney & Roßteutscher, 2007).

For a considerable period of time now, Western liberal democracies have been struggling with the successful integration of native and immigrant groups. Integration is defined as the degree to and the way in which ethnic minority groups become part of the society which receives them (SCP, 2004, p.132), and to investigate this it is necessary to formulate specific domains in which the integration takes place. Scholars vary in the ways in which they unravel the concept (see, for example, Odé, 2002; Gijsberts, 2004; Heckmann, 2004), but I will use a tripartite classification, distinguishing between social-economic integration, social-cultural integration and political integration.

Integration in the *social-economic* domain refers, predominantly, to the equal inclusion of minority groups in the labor and housing markets and the education system. As this aspect of integration is both the most tangible and the easiest (but not easy!) to influence by policy measures, it is often the main focus of government policies, particularly in the Netherlands and Germany, which are the subjects of this study. *Social-cultural* integration refers to (the divergence of) cultural and religious views, norms and values, social participation and social interaction between the dominant and minority groups in a society, and it is this domain that is emphasized in the political and public

debate³. The third area of integration concerns the *political* domain. Political integration refers to the equal participation of migrants⁴ in the political process. It also concerns the degree to which migrants and their next generations adhere to the democratic norms and values of the host society, for example the extent to which they agree with the principle of equality for men and women, freedom of speech and the separation of Church and State. The third pillar of political integration is political trust, which exists if it is believed that political representatives and government institutions act on behalf of the common good.

The political integration will be considered in depth in this study of social capital, because it is at the heart of the difficulties that host societies, and liberal democracies in particular, have to face. After all, democracy requires that the majority makes the decisions, having due regard for the interests of the minority. Of course, the main way for the minority to voice its interests is by taking part in the political process, and this applies to each community of interests, including ethnic minorities. The question is: how can members of ethnic communities be encouraged to participate?

In most of the studies of the relationship between social capital and political participation, the emphasis is on the role of voluntary associations⁵. These organizations are included in social capital research into political participation, since they are a way for minority groups to voice their interest in the public and political domain. For example, workers have unions which negotiate with employers and governments for favorable labor agreements, the chronically ill come together in patient associations, and in many countries gays and lesbians form pressure groups to fight inequality and discrimination. Moreover, research has shown that even associations that are not primarily interest groups, for example leisure organizations, contribute to social capital and positively correlate with political participation (e.g. Paxton, 2002; Quintelier, 2008).

Voluntary organizations are pre-eminent places, where social capital can be acquired and maintained, because they bring people with different backgrounds together, thus providing a wide variety of potential social connections. What is more, they have a socializing effect since their members need to collaborate and overcome

³ In recent years, politicians have tended to publicly advocate that Islam and the Islamic culture and norms and values are a 'danger to democracy'. Although these politicians seem to support political integration, it is my view that they are really talking about social-cultural integration; their aim is not to get as many migrants as possible to the voting booth, but to oblige them to adhere to what they regard as Western democratic norms and values.

⁴ For the sake of readability, whenever I refer to 'migrants', I am referring to first generation migrants as well as to the generations which follow, even though these people are technically not migrants. Similarly, the phrase 'migrant organizations' refers to organizations which have been established by first or second generation migrants.

⁵ Throughout this book I will use the terms 'association' and 'organization' interchangeably, even though, strictly speaking, the former is a sub-category of the latter. Every formally registered non-profit organization is an organization, but only those that have members or affiliates are associations. Organizations without members are foundations. However, in the current study this distinction is less relevant. Furthermore, most of the ethnic organizations I encountered are associations.

mutual differences. In the process of doing so, trust is built and shared norms and values are developed. Hence, social capital is both produced and reproduced.

Voluntary organizations are assumed to not only (re)produce social capital, and thus have an indirect effect on political participation, but to also boost direct political involvement (Almond & Verba, 1963; Verba & Nie, 1972; Moyser & Parry, 1997; McMiller, 2000)⁶. They are often referred to as ‘schools of democracy’ (after Tocqueville, 1840 [2004]) implying that their members are ‘taught’ democratic norms, values and habits. Members are supposed to learn to deliberate between themselves on an equal footing, subsequently using the knowledge and civic skills they acquire in wider society by taking part in the democratic system. In summary, voluntary organizations are regarded as breeding grounds for social capital as well as being instruments which spur political participation.

Turning back to the political integration of ethnic minorities, it is understandable that scholars have focused on the presence of ethnic organizations. Over time, Western-European countries have encountered such significant numbers of immigrants that in most of these places one can speak of true ethnic communities. Most of these same communities have established a considerable number of voluntary organizations, which serve the needs of their members, i.e. *ethnic organizations*. In the views of some, these bodies are a barrier to integration because they keep the ethnic community away from mainstream society (cf. Penninx & Schrover, 2001; Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2004). However, mindful of the notion that voluntary organizations in general spur political participation, other scholars ascribe a stimulating effect to them.

A group of European researchers have studied the relationship between social capital, voluntary organizations and the political participation of migrants in a range of European cities (Fennema & Tillie, 2001; Berger, Galonska, & Koopmans, 2004; Jacobs, Phalet, & Swyngedouw, 2004; Koopmans, 2004; Odmalm, 2004; Togeby, 2004). The research was prompted by the findings of Fennema and Tillie (1999), namely that the ethnic groups in Amsterdam, which have a dense network of voluntary organizations also demonstrate significant rates of political participation and political trust. In contrast, the groups with few, and sparsely connected voluntary associations rarely participate politically and have limited political trust. These networks of voluntary organizations are constructed by interlocking directorates, which are comprised of people who have seats on the boards of two or more organizations at the same time. This type of network is regarded as the embodiment of the social capital of a community (note that social capital in this sense is regarded on group level.) Researchers maintain that the relationship between social capital and political participation is in line with the Tocquevillean argument: the (board) members learn how to trust within their

⁶ It must be said that some studies reached the opposite conclusion, denying a relationship between voluntary organizations and political participation (for example Clark, Khan, & McLaverty, 2002), but these are largely outnumbered by affirmative studies.

organizations. This social trust then develops into political trust and political participation. Furthermore, what happens *within* these organizations – members develop social trust and civic skills through interaction – also takes place *between* them by means of the board members. At this elite level, those on the board are expected to interact and collaborate and, again, simultaneously develop trust and civic skills. Because of their position as leaders of their own organizations, these individuals can pass on all the information, knowledge and habits they have acquired to their members, thus multiplying the learning effect within these associations.

The empirical evidence that Fennema and Tillie, and the authors of subsequent studies, gathered to back up this line of reasoning is, unfortunately, rather weak, with only the measurement of ‘input’ and ‘outcome’ variables being relied upon. Essentially, it comes down to the network of interlocking directorates on the one hand, and the level of political participation expressed as election turnout on the other. The *mechanism* of how social capital works is hypothesized rather than studied. The research which followed on from this initial work predominantly addressed the individual aspect of the relationship between organizational membership and political participation, without considering in depth the mechanism that connects the two variables. In other words, the studies of the relationship between social capital and political participation suffer from the drawback that is a feature of social capital studies in general: more is assumed than proven, and the research is static instead of dynamic. My aim is to gain insight, in particular regarding the use of social capital, into the ‘black box’ that is positioned between the social capital of ethnic communities and their political participation.

This ‘black box’ contains a number of assumptions that cannot be studied simultaneously. So, in the current study, I had to restrict myself to scrutinizing only those that are based upon the social capital of voluntary associations, and the way in which it functions, instead of, for example, the interaction between organizational leaders and members. There are two main reasons for this approach. Firstly, these assumptions are the logical preconditions for the overall mechanism. Social capital must be present and must ‘function properly’ before it can have any sort of effect. Secondly, by focusing on social capital and the use thereof, I am able to link my research not only to the discussion of the value of ethnic organizations, but also to the wider debate on the use of social capital. My aim is, therefore, to study the social capital of ethnic organizations, and my focus is on the ways in which they use it. The main research question is:

What is the relationship between the social capital that ethnic organizations have at their disposal and the ways in which they mobilize it?

My focus is on the network component of social capital. The social network of organizations can be operationalized in a variety of different ways. In the current study, I will assume that the board of an organization functions as if it were the organization itself. In other words, the organizational board is the personification of the organization, since an organization itself cannot act. It then follows that an organization's social capital is operationalized by a focus on the social capital of the organizational boards. This is achieved by means of two types of complementary networks. The first, the network of interlocking directorates (recall that these are people who have seats on the boards of at least two organizations), reflects the formal network, whereas the second is an informal network that I call the 'contact' network. This is shaped by the contacts that organizations maintain between each other. In other words, it reflects which organizations have socialized with which other organizations, and which associations collaboratively organize events, etc. Together, the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network make up the social capital of organizations.

As this study's aim is to unravel how social capital is mobilized, I have devised the Big World Experiment (BWE), upon which a mobilization network can be based. A mobilization network reflects the sequential steps that are taken in a community mobilization, i.e. the organizations that have successively mobilized each other. The core of the BWE is that a number of organizations are asked to spread a message throughout the community, and which associations they address in doing so is recorded. This procedure is repeated for each consecutive organization involved in the mobilization, and in this way, a mobilization network appears.

The answer to the research question can be found by comparing the social capital, as shaped by the contact network and the network of interlocking directorates, to the mobilized social capital, as reflected in the mobilization network. The amount of social capital that an organization has probably influences the way in which it can mobilize it. In more general terms, the ways that organizations mobilize their communities could also be influenced by the context in which they operate. The context that is relevant in the current study is the political opportunity structure (POS). This refers to the way and degree to which migrant organizations are looked upon, valued, treated and supported by the (local) government of the city and country in which they reside. For example, in some countries, migrant organizations are seen as vehicles of integration and are, therefore, financially supported. In others, migrants are generally expected to assimilate into the dominant culture, and migrant organizations are not recognized. The citizenship regimes (what are the legal rights of individual migrants?) and integration policies (to what degree can migrants as a group adhere to their own culture, or are they expected to adjust to the dominant culture?) together make up the political opportunity structure within which organizations operate. The POS is expected to influence organizations' social capital (for instance, more stimulating policies lead to more organizations and more mutual bonds), as well as the way that they use it. I have, therefore, added a supplementary research question:

What influence does the political opportunity structure have on the social capital of migrant organizations and the ways in which they mobilize it?

The influence of the POS is best explored in a comparative study of cases in which this context variable is distinctly different and all other factors remain constant. My focus is, therefore, on the Turkish communities that are present in two cities: Amsterdam and Berlin (cf. Vermeulen, 2006). The political opportunity structures in these two locations are distinct. Where Berlin is known for having a more restrictive regime, Amsterdam is generally characterized as being more liberal and receptive. Their respective Turkish communities do, however, have many similarities. They have a comparable historical/migratory background, given that they arrived during more or less the same period of time and for the same reasons: economic, then political and, finally, familial. In the 1960s, large groups of Turkish workers were recruited to resolve the labor shortages in Germany and the Netherlands at that time. Then, the second wave of Turkish migrants arrived in the 1980s, after the military coup in their country in November 1980, when many (left-wing) natives fled and found shelter in the places where a great number of them already had family. By the 1990s, the influx of Turkish migrants was mainly comprised of women and children who were joining their husbands and fathers within the scope of the family reunification policies. The two cities' Turkish communities also have a similar demographical composition, as well as comparable educational and occupational skills. The percentage of Kurdish migrants from Turkey is also similar. The Turkish community is larger in absolute terms in Berlin than it is in Amsterdam (in 2005/2006, 117,336 and 38339 respectively⁷), but their relative sizes when the cities' populations are compared are about the same (3.5% in Berlin, 5.2% in Amsterdam). In summary, the similar characteristics of these communities make them suitable for the aims of this study.

Outline of the book

This book has four parts. The first of these contains the theoretical framework. In Chapter 1, I describe the relevance of social capital as represented by migrant organizations in relation to political integration. The research that has been carried out into the relationship between civic communities and political participation is also discussed. Chapter 2 is a theoretical discussion of social capital. I will present a new typology with which to categorize the diverse outlooks on social capital that can be found in the literature. I distinguish two levels of analysis – individual and collective – at which the resources involved in social capital are provided or received. It follows that in

⁷ Data sources: CBS Statline (Amsterdam), Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg (Berlin)

the current study, social capital is provided by individual actors, while the collective profits. The third theoretical chapter discusses the concept of political opportunity structure in detail. It also contains a description of these structures in Amsterdam and Berlin.

The second part of the book deals with the social capital of the migrant organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin. In Chapter 4 I explain how I gathered the data on social capital, and Chapters 5 and 6 I consider the social capital of the organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin, respectively.

The third part of the book begins with a chapter on mobilization. By using the Big World Experiment (Chapter 7), I explain what mobilization is and the way in which it is operationalized. The development of the experiment is discussed in detail, and the results, i.e. the mobilization networks, are presented in Chapters 8 and 9 (again, Amsterdam and Berlin respectively). In these chapters I also compare the social capital to its mobilized counterpart.

In the final part of the book I return to the research questions. What can be said about the relationships between political opportunity structures, social capital and mobilized social capital based upon the data presented in the previous chapters? In Chapter 10, I provide an answer to this question by comparing the results of the Amsterdam and Berlin cases and trying to identify the reasons for any differences or similarities. In the closing chapter, I will return to the wider implications of this study.

1. Voluntary Organizations and the Political Participation of Migrant Communities

Political participation by citizens makes or breaks any democratic system. People need to voice their preferences if their political representatives are to act on their behalf, as they are charged to do. Moreover, for a government to have any legitimacy, it is crucial that its citizens express their approval of it. Accordingly, understanding how political participation can be encouraged is a matter of great concern to politicians, and scientists in their wake.

The factors which influence political involvement can be found at the macro, meso and micro levels (Diehl & Blohm, 2001; Krishna, 2002). The opportunities provided by the government, for example by offering enfranchisement to all (or just a select few), as well as its responsiveness to its citizens' demands, are macro-level factors. On the other hand, micro level factors are individual characteristics which differ from person to person, e.g. behavioral resources, such as time, and personal predispositions like motivation, political interest and political trust. The meso level factors are the stimulating (or not) forces that spring from associational participation. It is this level that has attracted the most attention from social scientists, ever since Alexis de Tocqueville wrote his seminal work, *Democracy in America*, in 1840. Tocqueville not only saw voluntary organizations as stimuli of political participation, but he also regarded them as indispensable elements of any well-functioning democracy. If it were not for voluntary organizations, democracy would be reduced to tyranny.

Amongst democratic nations, [...] all the citizens are independent and feeble; they can do hardly anything by themselves, and none of them can oblige his fellow-men to lend him their assistance. They all, therefore, fall into a state of incapacity, if they do not learn voluntarily to help each other. If men living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy; but they might long preserve their wealth and their cultivation: whereas if they never acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered. A people amongst which individuals should lose the power of achieving great things single-handed, without acquiring the means of producing them by united exertions, would soon relapse into barbarism.

-Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Chapter V

Tocqueville observed that the American people he came across on his travels across the United States displayed an unusual associational inclination. He was astounded by the amount and types of organizations he encountered. According to Tocqueville, there was no activity or goal that was not a reason for an American to form new associations. He wrote that the people in the country had '*carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desires, and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes.*' As well as his appraisal of American associational life, Tocqueville was also impressed by the democratic system that had evolved in the US, where all men were equal and free and people displayed highly cultivated customs in the maintenance of their institutions (Almond, 1980). He naturally related these two observations: it was because of a vibrant associational life that democracy was so well developed. Tocqueville emphasized that this positive relationship went beyond primarily political organizations and he attributed non-political organizations with at least as many democracy-enhancing effects as the political ones experienced. Why he ascribed these effects to associations becomes clear from the following quote:

Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is developed by no other means than by the reciprocal influence of men upon each other. I have shown that these influences are almost null in democratic countries; they must therefore be artificially created, and this can only be accomplished by associations.

- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Chapter V

He regarded associations as places in which citizens could become and remain civilized. The idea that participation in voluntary organizations is beneficial for citizens and society persisted over time, and it became rooted as a tradition in the political and social sciences that is echoed, even now, in the 21st century.

1.1 Civic culture and why voluntary organizations are promoting political participation

In 1963, Almond and Verba presented their study, '*The Civic Culture*', with which they substantiated Tocqueville's theoretical arguments with empirical evidence gathered in five countries (US, Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Mexico). They argued that for a democracy to function well, it is a prerequisite that a civic culture prevails. The term, civic culture, refers to the special way in which "*political elites make decisions, their norms and attitudes, as well as the norms and attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his relation to government and to his fellow citizens*" (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.3). In other words, a civic culture prevails when citizens have favorable attitudes to participation within the

Political participation

What is understood by the term political participation? Based on a thorough morphological analysis, Elsinga (1985) came to a sound definition thereof. He defines it as *'the collection of activities of citizens, aimed at influencing the preparation, development and/or implementation of governmental policies'* (p.39, own translation from Dutch). It is important to recognize that the emphasis in this definition is on the *activities* one undertakes. As Lelieveldt (1999) summarizes, discussing politics, or showing interest in political affairs, cannot therefore be regarded as participation.

Two types of political participation are commonly distinguished in the literature (e.g. Barnes et al., 1979; Elsinga, 1985; Janda, Berry, & Goldman, 1989): conventional and unconventional participation. The former refers to the more classical and generally accepted forms of participation, such as voting (which is sometimes even regarded as a construct separate from conventional and unconventional participation), writing letters and joining in meetings in which the public can comment on things like new policy proposals. Conventional participation refers to orthodox behavior. More unorthodox activities, like boycotting, painting slogans, protest marches, sit-in strikes and squatting, are classified as unconventional participation. Characteristic of these kinds of activities is that they do not conform to the ruling norms and values in a specific society. Unconventional political participation often touches upon, or exceeds, the boundaries of what is deemed legal and legitimate. What is regarded as (un)conventional can, nonetheless, vary in different settings and over time. Moreover, what Kaase and Marsh (1979, p. 149) stress is that conventional and unconventional political participation should not be seen as opposites (p.149). On the contrary, the two concepts have turned out to be positively correlated. A remarkable finding in this respect is that people who participate in unconventional activities also participate in conventional ones, whereas the reverse is not the case (Muller, 1977).

political system and strongly adhere to nonpolitical attitudes, such as trust in other people and social participation in general. *"The maintenance of these more traditional attitudes and their fusion with the participant orientations lead to a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values."* (ibid., p.30) Almond and Verba's empirical material did indeed reveal that people who are members of voluntary organizations differ in terms of their political customs from those who are not: the former consider themselves to be more confident citizens, are more active in politics, and know and care more about the subject.

Why are voluntary organizations thought to produce such civic citizens? This is primarily because these associations are the main intermediaries between individual citizens and the state. Membership in voluntary organizations provides a person with *'a more structured set of political resources, growing out of his varied interests'* (Almond & Verba, 1963, p.245). Voluntary associations can represent the individual in the political arena and ensure his/her political autonomy by presenting alternative venues for governance, as well as organizing and encouraging cooperation between the citizen and the government (Warren, 2001, p.61). Alternatively, a government can also use voluntary organizations to reach its citizens, by utilizing them as channels of communication. So, as a result of their intermediary function, members of voluntary

organizations are indirectly in touch with their government and its policies, thus at least raising political awareness, if not direct political participation.

But there is more to it than this. The general argument first formulated by Tocqueville, which is often referred to as the socialization-argument, is that voluntary organizations are ‘schools of democracy’ (Olsen, 1972; Warren, 2001). These associations unite people of varying backgrounds who are, nevertheless, all pursuing the same goal within a particular organization, whether it be practicing sports, fighting environmental pollution, or providing support services to single mothers living on social security. To be able to achieve their common goals, members may well have to overcome differences in opinions. Members of voluntary organizations are horizontally connected (in principle, no member has more power than another), and as a result of repeated interactions and the confronting of differences, they learn about other outlooks on life, other interests, other activities (including politics) and other concerns. Thus, they broaden their own horizons and become more aware of public affairs and public interests. People encounter those with different convictions and learn to understand and appreciate another perspective. In turn, these social interactions enable the formation of social trust. Furthermore, as the members of one organization interact with (members of) other organizations, this ‘in-group’ trust is transferred to them, thereby creating generalized trust – a prerequisite in a well-functioning democracy. Not only do members of voluntary organizations develop trust more easily than non-members, they also acquire other civic skills and attitudes because of the collaboration that is ongoing within their particular association. They learn to deliberate, compromise, speak in public, express an opinion, and work in groups (Quintelier, 2008), all of which are skills that a citizen is also able to use in the political arena. Moreover, members become aware of their dependence on their fellow members, and thus develop norms of reciprocity. This involves one member doing something for another, with the former trusting that one day this other member, or perhaps even a third person, will return some other favor. In summary, the socialization argument maintains that voluntary organizations can, in a way, be regarded as political systems in miniature, where members can acquire a civic minded attitude, and can practice civic skills that they can then apply in the ‘real world’. They learn to overcome collective action dilemmas within their organizations, and thereby develop collective action potential for problems that they face outside their associations (Fennema & Tillie, 2004).

1.1.1 Type of organizations

Many scholars have tested and affirmed the relationship between associational membership and political participation (e.g. Erbe, 1964; Pollock III, 1982; Hall, 1999; Wollebaek & Selle, 2002; Zmerli, 2002). Indeed, there is very little empirical evidence that does not clearly demonstrate that members of organizations are more trusting and

more politically involved than non-members (one of the exceptions is Freitag, 2003). Several academics do note that unlike Tocqueville's original claim, the production of civic skills cannot be found in every type of organization, political or otherwise (e.g. Eastis, 1998; Billiet & Cambré, 1999; Warren, 2001; Paxton, 2002; Letki, 2004). Stolle and Rochon (1998), for example, found that members of cultural organizations have higher levels of generalized and political trust than those who belong to political associations. The latter group, on the other hand, are the most politically active. Van der Meer and Van Ingen (2009) found that the correlation between associational involvement and political participation is stronger for interest and activist associations than for leisure organizations. McMiller (2000) quotes studies that have shown that people who are members of expressive groups are less politically active than those who are members of instrumental groups (amongst others: Rogers, Bultena, & Barb, 1975), a finding that Quintelier (2008) recently affirmed. Erickson and Nosanchuk (1990) even concluded that *'intense involvement in a very apolitical organization is at best irrelevant to political participation and may even divert people from political activity'*. Although the debate on what kinds of organizations are more productive of civic skills than others obviously has not been settled, most scholars do maintain that being a member of a organization makes people more civically inclined and more politically active than not being a member at all.

1.1.2 Socialization or self-selection?

Recent debates address the question of whether there is actually a socialization process taking place, or if it is more a matter of self-selection: the people who become members of an association already have more civic skills and norms and values than those who do not. The evidence for this proposition is mixed. Some authors, indeed, claim to have shown that the relationship between associational membership and political participation is the result of self-selection (van der Meer & van Ingen, 2009), while others found proof of a more moderate adaptation of the original argument. Hooghe (2008), for example, reports that both self-selection and socialization mechanisms occur: *'It is only because self-selection occurs that associations constitute distinct interaction environments, leading to contact-specific socialization effects'* (p.588). This discussion of self-selection or socialization is far from being resolved and requires more attention in the scientific debate. Although the current study is not concerned with this particular matter, it is important that assumed mechanisms are thoroughly put to the test. As I will show later in this chapter, the self-selection/socialization issue is not the only blind spot in the study of the relationship between associational membership and political participation.

1.2 Quality of governance

In the mid-1990s, Robert Putnam gave a jolt to the civic culture tradition by shifting the focus from relating it to individual political participation to the collective effect of a civic culture on the quality of governance. In fact, Putnam took the extent to which citizens partake in the political process (such as voting turnout) as an *indicator* of civiness instead of the *result* of it. In his well-known book *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Putnam explains the success of governments in different regions in Italy in terms of the presence or absence of a civic community. In the regions where Putnam concluded that there was an active civic community, the government was revealed to be more efficient than in the places where this community was less, or not at all, prevalent. Putnam regards a community as having a civic culture when all of its citizens actively participate in public affairs, not only on their own behalf, but also on behalf of the common good; in other words, citizens have civic virtue. Furthermore, in a civic community, all citizens have both equal political rights as well as equal obligations. Because of this, they are expected to follow the norms of reciprocity and are engaged in self-government. Within such a community, citizens can disagree with each other, and differences of opinion are resolved without conflict because people are helpful, respectful and trustful. These virtues are fostered in the social networks within which each citizen is engaged. The places in which all of the norms and values that are connected to the civic community are predominantly promoted are voluntary associations.

According to Putnam, social capital and the civiness of a community are closely related. He defined social capital (which I will discuss in detail in the next chapter) as the *features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions*' (Putnam, 1993, p.167). This shows that Putnam's characterizations of a civic community and social capital are very much alike. In fact, throughout his book, it is unclear whether he equates the two concepts (as his definitions seem to suggest), whether social capital is a prerequisite for a civic community, or whether it is the result of the presence of a civic community. Given the extensive research into the effect of voluntary organizations on their members, as discussed above, and in particular being mindful of Hooghe's findings (2008), I think it is fair to assume that members of organizations perhaps already possess a degree of social capital, but that their social capital is largely the *result* of their civic associationalism. In any event, it was Putnam who both connected the concepts of civic culture and social capital, and re-emphasized the relevance of civic organizations in relation to democracy. He has certainly put social capital on the scientific agenda as a relevant and vital factor regarding the condition of democratic states, and many scholars have followed his lead, whether in a critical or an appreciative manner.

1.3 Multicultural democracies and the participation of ethnic minorities and immigrants

I began this chapter with the statement that all political scientists agree that any representative democracy requires the involvement and participation of its citizens. This applies as much to monocultural states as it does to multicultural democracies. So far as the latter is concerned, it is important that not only the voices of the cultural majority are heard, but also those of the cultural minorities. Western-European countries have been dealing with large groups of immigrants since the middle of the 20th century, and since that time the (political) integration of allochthonous minority groups has become a salient concern.

The opportunity for minority groups and, in particular, migrant minorities to participate in the political process varies from country to country. In some, it is relatively easy for migrants to become naturalized and obtain all attendant rights, including the right to vote; in others, migrants are allowed to vote even when they have not yet been naturalized. Still other countries hamper the political participation of this group by denying them suffrage whatever the circumstances. However, even if political integration is enabled by a government, it is still up to the minorities to take this opportunity. The level of participation by minorities differs between countries and between groups. Indeed, in some contexts, they are more involved in voting than native citizens. For example, Chui et al. (1991) found that the offspring of migrants in Canada had equal or higher voting participation rates than 'deeply rooted Canadians'. In other contexts, immigrants or ethnic minorities and native citizens demonstrated similar patterns of involvement, as seen in a study in the US by Verba et al. (1993). Of course, evidence of the third possible outcome has also been found: immigrants participating less than natives (Diehl & Blohm, 2001).

As the participation of immigrants in multicultural democracies is generally deemed to be important⁸, many studies have been carried out into the determinants of the political participation of these groups. Some scholars point to features which relate, in particular, to the ethnic minority status of immigrants; for example, a reduced feeling of political efficiency would lead to lower levels of participation, or an increased ethnic group consciousness would be related to greater involvement (and the effects can differ from group to group (London & Hearn, 1977; Uhlaner, Cain, & Kiewiet, 1989; Lien, 1994)). Others, however, dismiss the ethnic factor as an explanatory variable (Jedwab, 2006; Bevelander & Pendakur, 2007). A majority of the studies found that demographic and social-economic characteristics did have an influence on the participation levels of

⁸ Some scholars, such as Junn (1999), do warn that (greater) political participation by immigrants and minorities is only desirable under the circumstances in which '*the process of decision making incorporates difference and when the conceptualization of the citizen is contested and fluid*' (p.1434)

immigrants. In fact, these characteristics have as much an effect on immigrant participation as they do on the likelihood of participation by non-migrants. They include factors such as age, education and income (Verba & Nie, 1972; Bevelander & Pendakur, 2007). On the whole, there is no reason to believe that the general determinants of political participation (i.e. the factors on the micro, meso and macro levels) would not be applicable to immigrants. Thus, since it is universally assumed that social capital and membership of voluntary organizations further political participation, this should also be the case for migrants and ethnic minorities.

1.4 Voluntary organizations and migrant political participation

Studies in both the United States (e.g. McMiller, 2000) and Europe (e.g. Togeby, 1999) have demonstrated a positive relationship between organizational membership and political participation, in particular voting behavior. The research into the political involvement of migrants in Western-Europe was triggered by the fact that there seemed to be noticeable differences between countries (Togeby, 1999). Moreover, different ethnic groups have turned out to have considerably divergent patterns of participation within countries (Fennema & Tillie, 1999). These differences led two Dutch political scientists to set up a rigorous research program. Fennema and Tillie's study took place in Amsterdam, with their student, Maria Berger, and close colleagues conducting the same work in Berlin (Berger, Galonska, & Koopmans, 2002). The core notion of this research paradigm was that an ethnic group's degree of political participation is positively related to the degree of ethnic organization.

1.5 Ethnic communities, ethnic organizations and political participation: the relationship explained

Fennema and Tillie's starting point was the finding that the four major ethnic groups in Amsterdam displayed obviously different patterns of political participation. So far as the turnout in local elections was concerned, (migrants living in the Netherlands for longer than five years have been granted local voting rights since 1985) they found that Turks participated the most (in one year, this figure was even greater than the municipal average), followed by Moroccans, the Surinamese and the Antilleans. This ranking persisted over elections. Moreover, when other indicators of political involvement were considered, such as attending meetings in which neighborhood issues are discussed and lobbying activities, it transpired that the Turks again participated the most, followed by the other three groups in the same order. So far as the degree of political trust and political interest was concerned, the same ranking again emerged.

Reasoning in the tradition of Tocqueville and Putnam, Fennema and Tillie argued that the markedly different levels of political participation by the various ethnic groups in Amsterdam could be explained by the extent of their civicness (who is considered to be part of an ethnic group is based upon the CBS (*Statistics Netherlands*) definition which says that a person belongs to a certain ethnic group when either the individual him/herself or at least one of his/her parents was born in a particular country.) When examining each ethnic community separately, Fennema and Tillie expected those that were more 'civic' to also be more politically active. To establish the degree of civicness, the researchers created a *Civic Community Index (CCI)*, in which the elements refer to the number of voluntary ethnic organizations and the ties that bind them together, i.e. the network of ethnic voluntary organizations. Before I turn to a description of the elements of the CCI, I first want to explain why the focus is on the *network of ethnic voluntary organizations* (these three words are in italics deliberately, as each of them needs attention).

First of all, the emphasis on voluntary organizations obviously has its roots in the assumption that these are the breeding ground for the civicness of their members. Moreover, it is not only assumed that this civicness is furthered by membership of an association, but that the non-members in the community can also profit. Civicness is regarded as 'contagious': members, for example, become more trusting towards fellow members *and* non-members alike (generalized trust). This affects the degree of trust of this latter group in a positive way.

The second emphasis is on the *network* of voluntary organizations. A single organization promotes trust and stimulates community members to active participation, but cooperation between associations is said to do this even better (Fennema, 2004). This notion of the importance of social connectedness has already been underlined by Putnam, who states that '*a dense network of secondary associations both embodies and contributes to effective social collaboration*' (p.90, emphasis added), and that networks are '*an essential form of social capital*' (p.173). Putnam, nevertheless, failed to include any network measures in his analysis of the civic community. Indeed, his only indicator of the 'networks' of secondary associations is the number of sports and cultural associations relative to the number of regional inhabitants. Yet the mere presence or absence of voluntary organizations clearly does not say anything about their interconnectedness. Therefore, when they were assessing the civicness of ethnic communities, Fennema and Tillie focused on the network of interlocking directorates in particular. A network of interlocking directorates arises when members are seated on the boards of two or more organizations simultaneously. For example, the chairman of an organization of stamp collectors is also the treasurer of the biggest mosque in town, thus creating an interlocking directorate. Some organizations may have several board members with dual functions, while others have none. And some people might be active on one board only, while others are busy managing four board memberships. All of these interlocking directorates mean that the organizations form a network together.

Although there are many other characteristics upon which a network can be based⁹, the emphasis in Fennema and Tillie's CCI is on this operationalization, because it reflects the relationships within a community at the elite level. With the principle of 'pillarization' in mind, (a social structure which characterized Dutch society until the 1960s, in which groups of different ideologies provided social services for members of their respective groups, and in which the only contact between the different groups took place by way of agreements made by their leaders), it is thought that the most effective way of communicating within a community is by top-down connections from leaders to the grassroots and horizontal relationships on the elite level. *'Interlocking directorates increase trust between organizations by increasing communication between them'* (Fennema & Tillie, 1999, p.713). A network of organizations is thus thought to multiply the promoting effect that voluntary organizations already have on civicness.

The third point to require attention relates to the qualification of organizations as *'ethnic'*. When immigrants attempt to settle in their country of destination, this process of settlement usually also involves the establishment of voluntary organizations that are aimed at these immigrant populations in particular. Immigrants form organizations to function as their advocates, or to provide a secure social environment in which they can meet others with similar experiences (Jenkins, 1988; Hein, 1997; Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2004; Cordero-Guzmán, Martin, Quiroz-Becerra, & Theodore, 2008). Moreover, immigrants may establish their own organizations because they have needs that are not fulfilled by existing, native associations, such as certain religious requirements. An organization is deemed to be *ethnic* when at least 50 percent of the board members are of the same foreign descent (recall the CBS definition of who is considered ethnic: people who are born, or who have parents born, in a foreign country.)

The Civic Community Index that was used to establish the relationship between civicness and the political participation of ethnic communities consisted of four elements: the number of voluntary organizations within a particular ethnic group that were registered in the files of the Chamber of Commerce; the relative number of organizations compared to group size; the percentage of organizations that have at least one interlocking directorate and the complementary percentage of isolated organizations (those that have no interlocking directorate); and the number of interlocks (i.e. the number of connections between two organizations). Including the latter makes it possible to demonstrate how dense a network is: the more interlocks it

⁹ One common alternative way in which a network between organizations can be based is dual membership. That is, the links between organizations are the result of people being members of more than one organization. For example, someone who is a member of a photography club and a tennis club is then regarded as a link between the two associations. In this case, the network is based upon the rank and file, instead of the elite. The difficulty of a study on the rank and file network, however interesting and important, is that the data are very complicated to gather.

has, the denser it is, and denser networks are potentially more capable of effective communication. On each of these elements, Fennema and Tillie ordered the groups that they had included in their study. The sum of the ranking scores per group produced the ultimate civic community scores, with the lowest mark being assigned to the group with the greatest degree of civicness.

Recall that Fennema and Tillie's research was conducted in Amsterdam. Here, the civic community index revealed clear differences between the four groups under study. The Turkish community had the lowest score, meaning that it could be regarded as the most civic. The Antilleans, on the other hand, were indexed as being the least civic because they scored the highest for each element on the CCI (i.e. they were ranked fourth each time). The Moroccan and Surinamese communities were, in that order, between the two groups referred to. These rankings precisely fitted the order of political participation. Fennema and Tillie thus argued that the theory about the relationship between the degree of civicness and levels of political participation was confirmed: ethnic groups with a more civic community were more politically involved, as evidenced by a high number of ethnic voluntary organizations that were mutually connected via interlocking directorates. In particular, the network of interlocking directorates allows for the rapid development and spread of civic skills and communication throughout the community.

1.5.1 Same idea, different setting

Several scholars have tested this theory about the relationship between ethnic civic communities and ethnic political participation in a variety of cities and countries in Western Europe: studies were carried out in Denmark (Togeby, 2004), Berlin in Germany (Berger, Galonska, & Koopmans, 2004) and Brussels in Belgium (Jacobs, Phalet, & Swyngedouw, 2004). This research was performed as part of a special issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (JEMS). In addition, another group of academics studied immigrant communities and their political participation in Zürich (Switzerland), Stockholm (Sweden), and Oslo (Norway). These studies are performed, respectively, by Eggert & Giugni (2007), Myrberg (forthcoming 2010), and Rogstad (2007).

Of the studies to be published in JEMS, the researchers agreed upon a general model that they would test in the respective countries/cities (later, the other group adopted the model in a slightly moderated form). This model focused more on the individual level than Fennema and Tillie had done in their original study, which only used aggregate data on community structure (network measures) and political participation (community means on diverse measures). Yet this caused the JEMS' researchers some practical difficulties. For example, some of them did not have data about the networks of

interlocking directorates in the various cities. Accordingly, the model that was used was designed to explain, on the *individual level*, how membership of ethnic organizations was related to political involvement. The rationale was that what is true on the aggregate level is expected to have consequences on the individual level as well (Jacobs & Tillie, 2004). So, if the assumption about the former was that the presence of connected ethnic organizations leads to political participation by members of a particular community, the individual hypothesis would be that those who belong to an ethnic association are likely to be more politically involved than those who do not. This hypothesis was tested in the six locations mentioned before, and in the discussion of this research which follows, I will refer to them as the ‘replication studies’.

Even though some of the researchers agreed upon the model to be tested, and others intended to repeat the procedure in their work, the characteristics of the respective cases prevented a uniform approach from being utilized; both the dependent and independent variables differed between studies. All of them aimed to look at ‘political participation’ in the general sense, but in some cities it was not possible to include data about voting behavior because migrants were not allowed to vote (Berlin, Brussels, and Zürich), whereas in others, such as Stockholm, Oslo and Denmark, they could. All of the studies, save for those in Zürich and Stockholm, included data about political interest. The only dependent variable assessed in all of the cases was unconventional political participation,¹⁰ by some termed informal participation, although the way in which this was operationalized varied. The explanatory variables also differed between cases. Four of six studies distinguished ethnic, non-ethnic and trade union membership, whereas in the Stockholm research only the numbers of active and passive memberships were counted, and in Oslo a composed social capital index was used¹¹. All of the studies used demographic variables, including gender, education and employment, but they differed in terms of additional characteristics. Some, for example, included social or institutional trust, or interest or participation in homeland politics. In other words, even though the aim of each study was to examine the relationship between civicness (or social capital) and political participation, a comparison and the opportunity to draw overall conclusions was hindered by this diversity of operationalizations. Nevertheless, each study does have its merits and the conclusions that are reached do encourage further work.

First of all, both the Berlin (Berger et al.) and Zürich studies (Eggert and Giugni) make clear that political activities and political interest are not two sides of the same coin that is termed political participation. Berger et al. demonstrated that people who are active in voluntary organizations tend to be more politically active, but are less

¹⁰ Recall that this refers to political actions, such as writing a letter to a politician or joining a demonstration.

¹¹ Containing items on generalized trust, institutional trust, active or passive membership, socializing with friends and acquaintances, level of political interest and following the news.

interested in politics. Likewise, in the study by Eggert and Giugni, it transpired that involvement in voluntary organizations, and the social capital arising therefrom, encourage political participation more than political interest.

In line with these findings, Myrberg revealed that in Stockholm, organizational membership does promote political participation, as much among the ethnic minorities as the native majority, but that only particular kinds of involvement are improved. In particular, there was no additional effect on conventional participation (voting), which is often regarded as the key indicator of political participation. Associational membership did, however, positively influence the contact that individuals have with the media and government bodies and officials, as well as the participation rates in unconventional political involvement.

Another important finding from the study in Denmark (Togeby, 2004) was that the mechanism that is at work between associational and political participation varies between groups. Membership of an ethnic organization had a positive effect on the informal political participation (e.g. signing a petition and contacting a politician) of the Turks and the Pakistanis, and was the most important explanatory variable for these groups. Yet ethnic membership had no effect on the political participation of the group of ex-Yugoslavs in the country. There were also differences with respect to formal political participation. For the ex-Yugoslavs and the Turks, membership of ethnic bodies had a positive effect on formal political participation, but there was no impact at all among the Pakistanis. In this latter group, *cross-ethnic* membership did, however, have a positive effect, which was absent in the other two groups. Togeby, therefore, concluded that the impact of organizational membership on political participation was mainly found among the Turkish migrants. Togeby (2004) "*There is no doubt that a political mobilization of the Turks has taken place via their organizational networks.*" (p.526). However, she went on to add that it was questionable whether organizational participation actually built social capital among the Turks. She based this on her finding that social trust among them was the lowest of all groups. Moreover, the regression analysis she performed, with social trust as the dependent variable, revealed that ethnic membership had no effect. There was also no significant relationship between social trust and political participation. This was true not only for the Turks, but also for the other groups. The final conclusion that Togeby drew was that the Fennema and Tillie thesis could not be generalized: the relationship between organizational membership and political participation was group specific. Indeed, according to Togeby, '*it would be an exaggeration to talk about [the] generation of social capital*' (p.528).

The study in Stockholm (Myrberg) also highlighted that the mechanism between organizational membership and political participation is not universal. The ethnic majority (i.e. the native population) were mainly influenced by their organizations because they asked them directly to become involved in political actions. In other words, natives are 'recruited' by their organizations. The mechanism in the ethnic population,

however, is based on the Tocquevillean principle of 'schools of democracy'. Myrberg's data showed that members of ethnic organizations benefit from the opportunities that are provided to help them to develop civic skills, for instance by writing official letters or giving a speech. Overall, it has been demonstrated that it is very important to not only rely on input and outcome variables, because what is taking place in-between can vary considerably. This is a point I will pick up on below.

The conclusions that Jacobs et al. draw in the Brussels case are cautionary in nature. They determined that there was no clear and positive effect of ethnic membership and political involvement, whether it be in the form of activities or interest. Only in one ethnic group, the Moroccans, did the authors find an indirect impact of ethnic membership, namely through belonging to cross-ethnic trade unions. Based upon these findings, the researchers recommended that in future work a distinction should be made between ethnic and cross-ethnic social capital.

Furthermore, Jacobs et al. had to draw the conclusion that the Fennema and Tillie thesis was not substantiated by their findings. According to their data, political participation depended more on ties to mainstream society via language proficiency and specific political opportunity structures. An alternative explanation that they suggested, but did not investigate, is that the type of organization is of importance, which is something that Hooghe (2001) had proposed earlier, and is a refrain often put forward as an explanation of the effect that organizational membership has in general.

Rogstad, on the other hand, was able to confirm a relationship between social capital and the political participation of ethnic minorities. In his study in Oslo, he used a composed index of social capital, which included measures of trust, network and engagement in politics. The network aspects of social capital in particular turned out to be relevant. As Rogstad stated: '*the main conclusion to be drawn is that networks are the key to ethnic mobilization*'. However, it was not the membership of formal networks (i.e. organizational membership) to which Rogstad referred. Instead, belonging to informal networks (i.e. friendship networks) seemed to be crucial for conventional political participation (voting). On the other hand, migrants' participation in unconventional activities was increased by membership of both formal and informal networks. Again, the factors that were relevant for political involvement did vary between ethnic groups.

In summary, the replication studies have highlighted that the relationship between ethnic civic communities and ethnic political participation, although present in most cases, is still unclear. In any event, the data provided no grounds for the often-heard fear that ethnic groups are too focused on their communities instead of society as a whole, thereby isolating and even disintegrating themselves. If there was any effect of membership of ethnic organizations it was a positive one, at least with respect to the activities that people undertake. Only political interest declined with increased associational membership in some cases. However, the mechanisms at work differed

between cities as well as between groups, sometimes without obvious reasons. As Eggert and Giugni (2007) conclude, "*We can say that social participation spurs political integration to an important extent, although the mechanisms through which this occurs still need to be clarified.*" I would add that it is not only these mechanisms that need to be investigated. They are only one link in the chain of the steps that are assumed to link ethnic civic communities to ethnic political participation.

Recall that in the initial line of reasoning, it is supposed that the mechanism which makes voluntary organizations crucial for political participation is twofold. On the one hand, it is assumed that immigrants who are members of (ethnic) voluntary associations are more inclined to participate politically. On the other hand, it is argued that this effect is enhanced by ties between organizations, i.e. the organizational network, which is regarded as an indicator of the civiness of the ethnic community as a whole. The connections at board level facilitate the spread of social and political trust through the community, as well as enabling the norms and values regarding the importance of political participation to be passed on. The replication studies discussed focus solely on the first part of the theory and, unfortunately, failed to test the second aspect because of the limitations of their data. However, this second part is at least as important in any attempt to explain the relationship between organizational and political participation, because *'the amount of social capital generated by the membership of an organization is dependent upon the position of the organization in the organizational network'* (Tillie, 2004, p.532; emphasis added). In other words, to fully know the effect of organizational membership on the individual, it is necessary to be aware of the social capital of the organization. An isolated organization yields only a limited amount of surplus value for its members, whereas a connected one not only (potentially) provides the members with its own resources, but also those of other organizations. A study by Paxton (2002) underlines this. She found that *'connected associations had a strong positive influence on democracy, while isolated associations had a strong negative influence on democracy'* (p.273). Thus, with respect to the inconsistency of the findings in the replication studies, one would expect to find that the organizational networks in the various cities are different. In the cases where the positive relationship between membership and political participation is absent, one would expect – following Fennema and Tillie's logic – that there would rarely be a network of interlocking directorates. It is to be hoped that in the near future this kind of hypothesis will be tested. Yet, even if the connectedness of the organizations is taken into account, the *mechanisms* within them and between them continue to be hidden. Fennema and Tillie, who argued that organizational connectedness is crucial for the functioning of an ethnic civic community, did not substantiate their assumptions about the mechanisms of organizational interaction with empirical evidence. It is my view that it is not enough to just study 'static symptoms' like the number of organizations and interlocks on the one hand and outcome figures on the other, when one is actually interested in what is going on within and between those

organizations. At this moment, these processes are unknown; there is a 'black box' between the input and output variables, and it is about time some light was shed on it.

1.6 The black box: what is in it?

From a general community perspective, the black box between ethnic civic community and ethnic political participation concerns the processes of interaction between three groups: the board members of ethnic organizations, normal members, and those who belong to the ethnic group but do not belong to any ethnic association. The theory (Fennema & Tillie, 2008) states that the board members, as representatives of their organizations, interact with each other at the elite level to resolve collective action dilemmas, and by doing so develop social trust. Through their encounters with governmental bodies, they also develop political trust, for example when organizations apply for grants from the municipality or collaborate with the police (see also Lelieveldt & Caiani (2007) who studied the relationships between associations and governments in six European cities). The connections between organizations are supposed to function as channels of communication, through which social and political trust, as well as information in general, is easily exchanged, thereby increasing the degree of trust. The civic skills and social and political trust that the organizational leaders have acquired are subsequently passed on to their members, who also develop civic skills by their participation in the associations (see Figure 1.1 for a schematic representation).




Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of the three levels at which information and trust are assumed to spread.

The organizational members in their turn transfer the trust and information to the non-members of their community. As social trust, political trust and relevant information is present in all layers of the community, so will the political participation of all of the members of this community increase.

1.7 The black box: the first rays of light

The processes which take place between board members and members, and between members and non-members, have been addressed in several studies. The idea that people who are not members of a voluntary organization can still have some access to social capital at the group level via friends who are (and will thus become 'contaminated' with the 'civic virus' and participate politically) is affirmed in a study by Tillie (2004), although further investigations are necessary.

Strömblad and Bengtsson (2008) tried to unravel the relationship between organizational leaders and their members. They found that organizations which are bigger (i.e. have more members) and offer a wide range of activities stimulate their members to become politically active more than smaller organizations with only a single objective do. Furthermore, the organizations that are better engaged in political life tend to support their members more than those that are not. This support included assisting members with bureaucratic, judicial, financial, employment and discrimination issues. This help, in turn, gives members the opportunity to develop political skills, and they tend to be encouraged to take part in the political life of the host society. This study thus provides some of the first evidence of the tenability of the assumption that the social capital of organizational leaders is passed down to members.

The third step in the assumed process, which is in fact the first in the causality of the mechanism as a whole, concerns the development of trust and the exchange of information on the organizational level. To the best of my knowledge, no research has been conducted into this topic, and the aim of the current study is, therefore, to address this.

1.8 Problematic features of the assumptions about the organizational level

Fennema and Tillie operationalized the relationships between organizations with the network of interlocking directorates. They regarded these formal connections as a reflection of inter-organizational trust, and the network of trusting relationships that the interlocks create as the social capital of the community.

Sunier (2001) objected to the way in which Fennema and Tillie had established the elite network, because they had chosen to rely on data from the Chamber of Commerce. This meant that only organizations that were officially registered were included in the study. Their motivation was that the mere fact that people have registered as an organization indicates that they are aware of and adhere to the formal procedures that apply in society. It is '*a formalization of the civic community*' (Fennema & Tillie, 2001, p.33). But Sunier argued that many official organizations exist on paper only and are not

active at all. He maintained that for many of these associations, the only reason to become officially registered is that this is a requirement of any application for a municipal grant. After the money has been secured, the 'organization' has lost its main reason to exist. However, Vermeulen (2006, p.33), who has studied migrant organizations intensively, formed the impression that "*the 'paper' organizations do not form a significant part of the organizational population of the groups studied*". (As I am investigating the same groups as Vermeulen, this threat to the validity of the data I am using is averted. However, in other groups this may remain a possible and serious problem.)

Flap (2001) has cast doubt on the assumption that interlocking directorates can be regarded as indicators of mutual trust between associations, and are thereby valuable social capital for organizations in particular and the community in general. He suggested that they might well be the result of a strategic plan to achieve personal gain on the part of the political leaders and the front men of ethnic associations. I would add to this that it is questionable whether organizations actively use the network of interlocking directorates to either pass on information or collaborate, and there may be other ways in which they are connected that are much more likely channels of communication. Do board members really transfer information from one organization to another? Indeed, it may be that the interlocks represent a formal network that only emerged coincidentally in the foundation process, while the actual contacts and collaborations take place with actors from outside this network. In other words, if a community's social capital is regarded as being a network of trusting relationships between ethnic organizations, what does this network look like and what is it based on?

1.9 Opening up the black box: the primary step

The aim of the current study is to open up the black box in terms of the processes taking place at the organizational level. The objective is to unravel what the organizational networks within ethnic communities look like and how they are used. The organizational network of an ethnic community is *a social organization that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions*, which is Robert Putnam's definition of social capital (1993, p.167). Hence, the current study is a research into the social capital of ethnic communities in general and ethnic organizations in particular. The research questions are, therefore, the following.

1. What does the social capital of ethnic civic communities look like?
2. What is the relationship between the social capital that ethnic organizations have at their disposal and the ways in which they mobilize it?

The next chapter

Putnam's definition of social capital is not undisputed. The concept thereof has been interpreted in numerous different ways, and has been adopted by many scholars in a wide variety of different fields. In the next chapter, I will expound the dominant views on social capital and explain the position of this study in relation to them.

2. Social Capital

Social capital is a popular concept in the social sciences, and has been studied by many scholars with different backgrounds and from different angles. The advantage of this diversity is that the limitations and possibilities of the concept have been highlighted, which allows for an evaluation of its usefulness, including for conscious applications in new research. Such critical appraisal is needed, because the multitude of studies of social capital is accompanied by many divergent definitions of and outlooks on it. In order to create some clarity about this, I will first demonstrate how social capital is generally defined. That is, I will discuss what scholars more or less agree upon as the main components thereof (i.e. networks, trust, and shared norms and values). Despite the fact that there is consensus on these basic elements, there is also confusion about the concept because, on a more detailed level, the interpretations diverge. The most important difference is that between those who regard social capital as an individual asset and those who consider it to be a characteristic of the collective. I will provide insight into the varying outlooks on the issue that can be found in the literature by presenting a typology which clearly distinguishes between collective and individual social capital. This typology also reveals how the various approaches relate to each other.

Moreover, the typology I will produce also includes the outlook on social capital that I will adhere to in this work. It will become clear that this view is the most appropriate in a study of voluntary associations and their mobilization, which is, after all, the aim here. In the previous chapter I discussed the relationship between voluntary organizations, civic communities and political participation. I will start this chapter by explaining how the concepts of civic community, civil society, and social capital are linked.

2.1 The relationship between a civil society, a civic community and social capital

The relationship between civic communities and social capital is so accepted today that these concepts are often used almost interchangeably. Furthermore, as Marsh (2002) pointed out, the notions of civic community and social capital are regularly – intentionally or otherwise – confused with that of civil society, even though this is inappropriate. A close examination of these concepts reveals how easily the confusion

arises. To begin with, a civil society¹² is the sphere which exists between the state, the market and the family (see Figure 2.1) (e.g. Lelieveldt, 1999; Warren, 1999; Dekker, 2002; M. Edwards, 2004), and which is shaped not by individual citizens, but by groups or organizations formed by them.




Figure 2.1 Representation of the civil society in relation to the state, the market, and the family (adapted from Fennema (2004) and Lelieveldt (1999))

The distinction between civil society and the state is based upon the constitutional right of association, which allows organizations to act autonomously (e.g. Dekker, 2002), without government interference. Organizations in a civil society do not act in pursuit of profit, which therefore distinguishes them from commercial enterprises. The associations within civil society are not based on familial relationships or friendships, and this distinguishes them from the private sphere. The fundamental principle that differentiates a civil society from the other three spheres is the principle of voluntariness (Newton, 2001); the associations shaping it are established voluntarily. No government institution, or indeed any other actor, has forced the foundation of these organizations. Furthermore, citizens are free to participate in civil society in general, or in any organization in particular. Membership is by no means a legal requirement. Instead, a person is free to join and leave an association, and is likewise free to join or not join in with any activities initiated by civil society. This is different to the ‘obligatory’ memberships of core institutions like the family, to which one belongs from birth, the state, which one simply cannot avoid, and the workplace, because almost everybody needs to work. The reason why individuals engage with these voluntary associations is that they can collaboratively produce common goods that they are not able to create

¹² Michael Edwards (2004) demonstrates that there are in fact three theoretical positions regarding the meaning of civil society in the literature. The first, analytical, model sees it as a structural given: civil society is a distinct part of society. This model is the most common notion and is also discussed herein. The second, normative, model regards ‘civil society’ as ‘a society that is civil’. It refers to a society which is motivated by a different way of being and living in the world, in which citizens are free, there is tolerance, no discrimination, non-violence, trust and cooperation. The third model sees civil society as the public sphere: an arena for public deliberation, rational dialogue and the exercise of ‘active citizenship’ in pursuit of the common interest. Edwards suggests synthesizing these three models into one, as they are interrelated and each has different strengths and weaknesses.

individually. This applies to more politically related matters, such as interest representation, as well as to social goods, such as a soccer competition.

The conceptualization of civil society as the whole of voluntary organizations does not in itself entail a normative connotation. In my view, it merely describes the presence of citizen-initiated, formalized relationships in the shape of voluntary associations, and nothing more and nothing less. However, civil society is ascribed many roles, with Edwards and Foley (2001) describing three of these in relation to social capital. These roles are more or less generally accepted. Firstly, a civil society has both public and quasi-public functions; it provides educational activities, offers social or even financial support (for example, food banks) and supplies aid through a variety of schemes. It takes on tasks that actors in the governmental, commercial and familial spheres fail to address. Secondly, civil society has representative or contestatory functions. In other words, a civil society can voice the interests of its participants vis-à-vis the government, which can be pressed to act on matters of public interest. Other authors term this function as the mediating role of civil society (e.g. Olsen, 1972; Lelieveldt, 1999). The civil society as mediator not only represents its constituency against the government (i.e. bottom-up), but it also serves as a top-down intermediary by supporting the government in implementing policies. The third function of civil society that Edwards and Foley distinguish has already been discussed in the previous chapter: socialization. This major role, “if not *the* major role” (B. Edwards & Foley, 2001, emphasis in original), refers to the opportunities that voluntary organizations offer to their members to shape their ‘habits of the hearts’. In such associations, members can develop individual and generalized social trust, shared norms and values, and civic skills.

This third role in particular reveals why the concepts of civil society and civic community are often used interchangeably: if one assumes that a civil society *by definition* fulfils the three functions referred to, this implies that the members of the organizations have indeed developed civic skills, and any community in which citizens are civically minded is, logically, a civic community. Yet, I would argue that although it is *likely* that a civil society adopts all three roles, and it is also *likely* that a civil society produces civic citizens, this is not a hard and fast rule. I regard civil society as a domain within the larger entity of a (democratic) society. Whether the former can indeed be equated with a civic community depends upon the internal structure of this civil society¹³ (see also Roßteutscher, 2002). For example, a civil society in which the ruling norm is ‘every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost’ is less likely to produce public goods than one in which participants act upon a motto of ‘I will do you a favor today, and you can return it tomorrow, or any other day’. A civil society in which citizens

¹³ Edwards and Foley (2001) write that the definitional confusion surrounding the concept of civil society stems from variations across the ‘many civil societies’. Chambers and Kymlicka (2002) have even devoted a book to the topic called *Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society*, which includes a contribution on Confucian and Islamic conceptions of civil society (by Madsen and Hanafi respectively).

do not trust anyone outside their own group will not be able to make a united stand against the government in times of oppression.

Moreover, if the voluntary organizations that make up civil society are each characterized by a strictly vertical balance of power, where the leaders decide and the members follow, this can hardly be seen as being a democratic and encouraging environment. So, to have a beneficial effect, voluntary organizations need to have a horizontal internal structure (Putnam, 1995; Stolle & Lewis, 2002). Members of voluntary associations have to find ways to achieve their common goals collectively, and in most cases will only succeed in doing so when they empathize with each other, create a sense of reciprocity, and learn 'the art of compromise' (Newton, 2001). Because of the inherently asymmetrical power relationships, it is difficult to experience trust and reciprocity in vertical structures. In contrast, the members in a horizontal structure are of equal standing, which facilitates the development of mutual trust and social understanding (Putnam, 1993). A horizontal structure embodies previous successes at collaboration (*ibid.*). This means that the fact that a horizontal structure exists at all reveals that, in the past, people must have worked together successfully. This encourages future cooperation. For example, if I see that my fellow PhD-students have formed a discussion group in which they talk about each other's work to everyone's satisfaction, I will be inclined to join in and actively participate. The presence of horizontal interactions also increases the potential costs of avoiding social obligations. If I play a dirty trick on one of my co-members at my volleyball club, I can expect - in a horizontally structured environment - that other members will hear about it, turn their backs on me, and may even exclude me from their team. As the costs of avoiding one's responsibilities increase, the number of those who do so decreases. Another beneficial effect of a horizontal internal structure is that it fosters robust norms of reciprocity. If another team at my club asks me to substitute one of their players in an important match, I will be more willing to do so if the same team has helped me with a similar favor in the past, or I trust that they will help me out in the future. In a vertical structure, the unequal power relationships hinder the asking and returning of favors on a voluntary basis. For example, within the mafia favors are often asked and done, but in those cases it usually concerns 'an offer you can't refuse', which is not voluntary at all. As Warren (2001) explains, vertical structures are characterized by relationships of dependence and '*under the condition of dependence, norms of reciprocity and trust are either superfluous or naïve*' (p.31). Furthermore, horizontal structures facilitate communication and the flow of information, not least about the reputation of other actors in the system. Again, if I know that the other team is reliable when it comes to returning favors, because other people I trust have told me so, I am more likely to trust its members as well and be more willing to help them out.

In summary, horizontally structured voluntary associations are more democratic and enable their members to learn how to collaborate. They thereby lead to the development of trust, foster norms of reciprocity, decrease the number of defectors to

social norms, and facilitate the flow of information among members. In other words, this type of organization actually contributes to the civiness of a community.

The structure and qualitative characteristics of a civil society thus determine whether it is a civic community or not. Putnam (1993) describes a civic community as one in which individuals cooperate to produce collective goods and actively participate in public affairs. It also has a flourishing associational life, with horizontal relationships of reciprocity and mutual trust. Putnam stated that civic communities produce social capital. Social capital, essentially, refers to a social structure which enables actors to achieve more than they would be able to do on their own. It is generally characterized by a network structure of social relationships that are based on trust and shared norms and values (van Deth, 2003). Following the socialization argument that is also discussed in the previous chapter and paragraph, horizontally structured voluntary organizations within a civic community, as a form of civil society, are the ideal environment within which to develop these networks, trust, and norms and values.

The conceptualization of social capital as the trichotomy of networks, trust, and norms and values is indeed generally accepted, but the way in which theorists put it in a larger framework and sequentially translate this into empirical measures varies considerably. For example, some translate the theoretical aspects quite literally into measurement instruments, while others have a looser approach and use more indirect measures to substantiate their theory. One important source of this divergence is the fact that scholars are aiming at different levels of analysis: the collective or the individual. Later in this chapter, and in order to shed light on the confusing and seemingly contradictory uses of the concept, I will use this distinction to classify into four categories the dominant schools of thought on the issue. Furthermore, with this classification, I will be able to reveal which view on the concept I am utilizing in the current research, and why this outlook is the most appropriate for the study of the mobilization of social capital. Before I elaborate on this typology, I will first turn to the origins and the general definition of social capital.

2.2 Defining social capital

The appearance of the concept of social capital as it is understood today can be traced back to L.J. Hanifan, who discussed it in his book on rural school communities which was published in 1920 (Borgatti, 1998). It was not until several decades later that Jane Jacobs (1961), in a study on urban planning, Ulf Hannerz (1969), in a study of ghetto life and poor neighborhoods, and Glenn Loury (1977), in a study of racial income differences, used the concept in their publications. Yet it took until the final quarter of the 20th century before its utilization became more widespread. Almost simultaneously,

Pierre Bourdieu in France and James Coleman in the US (re)introduced the notion in the 1980s (an earlier publication by Bourdieu (e.g. 1972) did not receive much attention because it was initially only published in French). The concept of social capital became even more popular after Putnam presented his studies on government performance in Italy (1993) and the decline of social capital in the United States (2000). Even though many scholars objected to Putnam's approach to the issue, he indisputably put it permanently on the map.

As the numerous publications on social capital prove, defining the concept is a hazardous undertaking. It could be said that there are almost as many definitions as there are researchers. Nan Lin (2001b, p.24), nevertheless, observed that all authors "share the understanding that social capital consists of resources embedded in social relations and social structure, which can be mobilized when an actor wishes to increase the likelihood of success in a purposive action". Portes (1998) came to a similar conclusion: 'the consensus is growing in the literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures' (p.6). Lin and Portes thus emphasized the network component of social capital. Other authors put the emphasis on the need for social trust, reciprocity, and shared norms and values to supplement the element of social networks. Francis Fukuyama (1999), for instance, defined social capital as 'an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals'. In his view, trust and networks arise as a result of social capital, instead of being part of the concept. However, even though scholars stress other elements, in taking all of these views together it can be said that social capital is regarded as a three-pillared concept, consisting of social networks, trust, and norms and values (Schuller, 2001; van Deth, 2003; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). It is difficult to (empirically) separate these three pillars, because the components are strongly interconnected: if people do not share the same norms and values, it is unlikely that they will trust each other and a social network without trusting relationships is very seldom and. (The mafia is often quoted as an example (the only example?) of social capital as a network without trust. I would, however, argue that a social structure of this kind is not, by definition, social capital because, amongst other things, the members of the network do not have a free choice about when or if to leave it). Nevertheless, because most theorists place emphasis on one of the three pillars, they also only operationalize this component, while inferring the presence of the others in some cases, or neglecting them completely in others.

2.3 Social capital in the current study: a general definition

I define social capital, in line with Lin (2001b), whose work I will discuss in more detail below, as a tool with which to gain an advantage through social relationships, made

possible by the resources that are involved in these relationships. Social capital is an asset that can help either a person or a collective: it allows X to achieve ends that he would otherwise not be able to (Fennema & Tillie, 2005). Here, X can refer to an individual as well as a collective (this specification will be shown to be important later on in this chapter.) I consider the network structure to be the most important pillar of social capital, because it is the element 'sine qua non'. As formulated by Lin, social capital is all about the 'resources embedded in the social structure'. The social structure that X has at his/its disposal has only surplus value, i.e. X can only gain an advantage from others when the other 'end' of the social relationship possesses goods or resources, particularly those that X does not have him/itself. In other words, there has to be a network with embedded resources before any actor can benefit at all from what the others possess. I do acknowledge that for X to actually exploit social relationships and their resources, it is necessary that these relationships have a basis of trust and that the same norms and values are being supported. If two actors do not trust each other, they will never allow the other to have access to their resources. Moreover, disagreement about social norms and values can cause problems, for example I would not lend my computer to someone I know does not care about other people's belongings. I will, therefore, focus primarily on the network component of social capital, but always with an eye on the other two elements.

Just like any other kind of capital, social capital is, by definition, a potential or latent characteristic. Someone who owns a large house that has doubled in value since the date of purchase is thought to possess significant financial capital. But it is not until this person sells the house that he will be able to turn this value into actual funds. Likewise, a business owner only profits from the human capital that he has at his disposal when his employees are actually working. In other words, capital is only of *real* value when it is mobilized, activated or used. This also applies to social capital. For example, it was only after I enlisted the help of my relations to find me an apartment after I suddenly became homeless, (and someone indeed offered me a place to stay), that I became aware that my family and friends could help me more than I had expected. This distinction between social capital and mobilized social capital is very important in the current study. The presence or absence of social capital has been studied many times, but there is a gap in the current literature when it comes to how it is used. This study takes up the challenge of filling this hiatus.

2.4 The measurement of social capital; some initial insights

The multitude of definitions of social capital is also reflected in the measurement of the concept. The measures set out in the literature are various, ranging from a question

about social trust, to an inventory of the presence of voluntary organizations, and to unemployment figures, to name just a few. Ideally, one would use a measure that encompasses all three elements of social capital, but such an instrument is still very rare (Paxton, 1999; van Deth, 2003; Sabatini, 2005; Lillbacka, 2006). Only a very few researchers have attempted to create such tools (Van Deth (2003) mentions studies by Anheier (2001) and Bothwell (1997)). By using data reduction techniques ((e.g. Paxton (1999), Smith (1999), and Narayan and Cassidy (2001)), others have endeavored to create a multiple-item measurement which includes all three pillars of social capital. The most common practice, however, is for researchers to focus on one component only. The OECD (2001) recorded that social capital is usually measured with the focus being on trust and levels of engagement *or* interaction in social or group activities. Schuller (2001) also observed that *“the most common measures of social capital look at participation in various forms of engagement, such as membership of voluntary organizations, churches or political parties, or at levels of expressed trust in other people”* (emphasis added). These two examples reveal that there is no consensus about how social capital should be measured, and researchers’ preferences for any particular measure depend on which element they attach the most value to. Some think of social networks as being *the* essential ingredient (a view that I share), while others perceive trust to be the indispensable element for social capital.

The different theoretical conceptions, and the congruent empirical differences, have led to a great deal of misunderstanding. Researchers blame each other for not measuring social capital, while they are all, in fact, convinced that they are doing nothing but. These misconceptions – or the different ideas about how to study social capital - are first and foremost rooted in the fact that scholars are not aiming at the same level of analysis. While some are convinced that social capital refers to individual matters, others advocate that it is a group characteristic (van Deth, 2008). I do not think that it is necessary to single out one ‘best method’ from all of the different forms of understanding of the concept, but I do acknowledge the need for more transparency in the current ‘social capital mish mash’. It is important that authors make clear what they mean by social capital, and upon which level they are focusing; the individual or collective. Last, but certainly not least, one’s research methods must be consistent with one’s definition and level of analysis. As I will show in the following paragraphs, the latter largely influences which measures are (considered) appropriate.

2.5 Individual vs. collective social capital

The root of most of the confusion about social capital lies in the fact that scholars differ in their conceptualization of it as an individual or a collective asset. “It is a category mistake to refer to an individual’s social capital”, stated Stolle and Rochon (1998; p.50).

Newton (2001) held the same absolute opinion: “If social capital is anything, it is a societal not an individual property, and should be studied as a social or collective phenomenon, not at the individual level as if it were a property of isolated citizens” (p.207). Other scholars take the opposite stance. For example, Snijders (1999) advocated that “we are talking about the resources of an individual” (p.29).

Only a few scholars strike a happy medium, stating that social capital is as much about collective as it is about individual goods. Paxton (1999) claims to be the first to acknowledge that social capital can be found at different levels of the social structure simultaneously. In her view, most researchers only regard social capital at the level they are focusing on to be the ‘true’ version of it. Paxton emphasized that the concept can be measured on both the individual and the collective level. She further theorized that social capital on the individual level is linked to social capital on the group level. Other scholars also point to this intertwining of the two levels. For example, Lin (2001b) maintained that institutionalized social relationships with embedded resources benefit individuals within the collective as well as the collective as a whole. I agree with Paxton and Lin: individual and collective social capital are not necessarily mutually exclusive, yet nor is it necessary to always take individual and collective social capital into account simultaneously.

So, although some researchers claim strongly to have a certain perspective on theoretical grounds, most of the time their preferences concern a different level of analysis instead of a theoretically inspired point of view (Barry Wellman in: Borgatti, 1998). The different approaches to social capital not only occur in theory, but also in practice. Stolle and Lewis (Stolle & Lewis, 2002) argued that any difference between individual and collective social capital is not necessarily conceptual or definitional, but lies in the choice of dependent variables. Some researchers focus solely on individuals and individual variables (e.g. Flap & Völker, 2004), while others concern themselves with the collective and only use corresponding measures (e.g. Knack & Keefer, 1997). In many cases, even empirical restrictions shape the outlook on the concept of social capital.

The typology that I will present now as a way of clarifying the ambiguities in the social capital literature is based upon this distinction between the individual and the collective. This distinction is embodied in two dimensions; what I call the ‘providing’ and the ‘receiving’ sides of social capital. The former refers to the ‘location’ where social capital is produced: in the group or from an individual. The latter refers to the entity which profits from the social capital under study. I will expand upon the two dimensions in more detail below. Following my line of thought, each theory about, or interpretation of, social capital can be classified as being either ‘individual’ or ‘collective’ on the two dimensions. This leads to the production of a 2x2 table containing four categories into which each notion of social capital can be classified (see Table 2.1). This table also reflects the fact that I approach social capital as being something which is provided by a single entity, while the collective profits from it. I will return to my classification at

length in my discussion of the four cells after I have introduced what I have labeled the providing and receiving sides of social capital.

2.6 The providing and receiving sides of social capital

The general distinction between individual and collective social capital provides clearer insight into the differences that exist in the literature, but it is not yet satisfactorily explained. Even the academics who appear to consider social capital on the same, either individual or collective, level can still use different operationalizations. Decoster (2000) remarked that ‘in consideration of the data’ it often occurs that social capital is measured on the individual level by one researcher as well as on the collective level by another. But there is also a more theoretical explanation for the confusion that sometimes arises. In my opinion, as well as the general distinction between the collective and the individual, social capital in fact has two sides: providing and receiving. With this distinction, I mean that on the one hand social capital has a ‘source’ or a place where it ‘resides’ (the providing side), and on the other it has an eventual effect on one or more actors (the receiving side). A distinction between individual and collective social capital can be made on both the ‘providing and ‘receiving’ sides. Sequentially, the combination of the two levels on both facets of social capital results in a typology of four outlooks. This is represented in Table 2.1.

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

Table 2.1 Typology of outlooks on social capital

Let us first consider the providing side of social capital, which concerns the ‘location’ thereof. Individual social capital in this circumstance does not mean that it can be found *within* the individual. This is by definition impossible, as the word social implies that it involves more than one person. Instead, it concerns the social capital *of* an individual. Individual social capital can be attributed to a particular actor, and can, therefore, be regarded as ‘personal’. It refers to an individual’s direct social environment. The three pillars of social capital, namely social networks, trust, and shared norms and values can

all be included in this view. However, in studies of the individual as a provider of social capital, the focus is generally on the network aspect thereof (e.g. Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001).

The collective can also be the provider of social capital. In that scenario the focus is on the general characteristics of the collective. Collective social capital cannot be ascribed to a single 'owner'. Unlike what is true for the individual as the provider of social capital, the studies which have the collective in this role are focused on what can be found *within* the collective, rather than concerning themselves with what ties one particular collective to another. The scholars who focus on collective social capital rarely use network measures, instead relying on measures of trust, which reside within the collective, or on the presence or absence of shared norms and values. However, this is not to say that it is not possible to use network measures on the collective level, as I will show later.

The counterpart of the providing aspect of social capital is the receiving side. A focus on this element reveals that researchers use different methods to highlight the concept. Those who regard the individual as the receiving party are concerned with individual indicators of the benefits of social capital. Studies are focused on whether a particular individual is better off when he/she has (more) social capital than someone who has none. Does someone who has a lot of social capital find a better job than someone who has very little? Is someone who is rich in terms of social capital in better health than someone who is poor in that sense?

Other scientists have directed their attention on the collective level to the receiving side of social capital. Here, the question is whether the collective –as a whole– is better off with more social capital or worse off with less. Studies have been conducted into whether: governments perform better when social capital is present; there is less unemployment when there is social capital; or minorities integrate better into society when social capital is present (Boix & Posner, 1998).

Having explained the meaning of the providing and receiving sides of social capital, and how they can be interpreted on the individual and collective levels, I can now turn again to Table 2.1. This table represents the four combinations that follow on from the combining of the two levels on the providing and receiving sides of social capital. Each category has its 'representative' in the scientific world, whose outlooks I will discuss to illustrate what each cell represents. This is necessary because even the classical social capital theorists are interpreted in different ways by a third party. James Coleman, for instance, is typified by some authors as theorizing about individual social capital (e.g. Portes, 1998; Morrow, 1999; Decoster, 2000; Pope, 2003; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004; van Oorschot, Arts, & Gelissen, 2006), while others classify him as being in the opposite 'collective camp' (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, in: Borgatti, 1998; Dekker, 2000;

Field, 2003; van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). This is probably the result of Coleman's unclear definitions, but it may also be due to the lack of clarity in the usual distinction between the individual and the collective. I think my typology can solve this problem.

Other authors have made comparable, but not completely similar, typologies of views of social capital. The classification that Borgatti (1999) mentioned comes close to my proposition. He came up with three combinations: individual ties to benefit the individual, group ties to benefit the individual, and group ties to benefit the group. This typology follows that of Borgatti, Jones and Everett (1998; later on Adler & Kwon, 2002 presented a similar account), and distinguishes between the type of actor (individual or group) and the type of focus (internal or external). An external focus refers to an approach which takes the relationships between the actor (be it an individual or a group) and other actors at the same level into account. An internal focus, on the other hand, denotes a method that takes an introspective view of what happens within the actor. As there is no smaller unit than an individual, this aspect is only possible at the group level. Borgatti et al.'s typology has two limitations. Firstly, it applies to only some of the social capital research that is being carried out, namely those studies that maintain a network approach, i.e. they only take the network aspect of social capital into account. My typology includes all social capital studies, including those that focus on the trust, or norms and values, components. Secondly and more importantly, the authors present a typology consisting of four categories, while they are only able to present theories to fit three of them. Borgatti (1999) fails to discuss individual ties that benefit the group, while in the 1998 publication Borgatti et al. reason that, presumably, no theory centers on the individual focus with an internal focus since '*the individual is normally seen as the indivisible atom of the sociological world*' (p.28). I think it is a serious shortcoming of their typology does not exhaust all logical possibilities. It indicates that their concept of 'type of focus' is not suitable for characterizing social capital literature. Using the typology I present here, I will show that I am able to present examples fitting each of my categories.

2.7 Four outlooks on social capital

I realize that introducing new terminology into a field that is already overflowing with vague and controversial, or even contradictory, concepts does not make things easier. However, I take the view that my distinction clarifies ambiguities, instead of adding to the confusion. As will become clear, this classification of studies can disentangle the various views of social capital. It demonstrates that the researchers who, at first sight, seem to be at odds with each other are, in fact, simply on a different wavelength; they are studying different aspects of the same broad phenomenon. My typology puts all of

these views in clear proportion to each other. More importantly, scrutinizing the four outlooks will reveal that three of them are less appropriate or not appropriate at all when it comes to meeting the aims of the current study. The classical theories of social capital by Putnam, Bourdieu, and Coleman, which are each representative of one of the categories, do not enable the mobilization of social capital by voluntary associations to be closely considered. The fourth outlook, i.e. my approach, has not yet received much attention in the literature, but I will demonstrate that there is a real reason to change this. I will now firstly address the two most clear-cut and common combinations: community – community and individual – individual. Next, I will consider the two other, more complicated, mixes. The position that I hold on to, the individual-collective, is discussed last.

2.7.1 Collective – collective

The collective is the provider and the receiver of social capital; the collective profits from the collective. This view is by some seen as the conventional notion of social capital, especially in the field of political science. Poortinga (2006) stated that scholars who take the collective approach to social capital regard it as an ecological societal construct instead of as a characteristic of individuals. This is manifest in the way in which social capital is defined, as well as in the measures used in the empirical part of these studies, such as gauges of democracy and political rights, freedom of the press, and inverse measures like crime rates (Paldam, 2000).

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

The political scientist Robert Putnam is the outstanding example of a scholar who theorizes and practices on the collective level. Putnam does not deny the existence or importance of individual social capital. Indeed, while he recognized that social capital has *“both an individual and a collective aspect”* (Putnam, 2000; p.20), he simply concentrates on the ‘collective good’, whereas others focus on the ‘private good’ (Putnam in: Borgatti, 1998). He regards the two uses of social capital as complementary, not competitive. His focus on the collective level is clear from his definition of social capital: *“features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”* (Putnam, 1993). The explicit reference to *society* reveals Putnam’s focus on the collective level. He is concerned with the (beneficial) effects that social capital can have on communities as a whole. The first major study in which he applied this idea was a study of government performance in the Italian regions (Putnam, 1993), in which he revealed that areas with more social capital had better performing governing institutions. Using several general measures, like the relative number of voluntary associations and levels of newspaper

readership, he inferred the amount of social capital present in a specific region. As these were aggregate measures, they concerned the collective as a whole and did not refer to individuals. The dependent variable in the study, governmental performance, was also measured on the collective level with an index that included responsiveness and the provision of public services, such as waste management and libraries.

Another study of social capital by Putnam is his work on its decline in the US (Putnam, 2000) with the telling title, *Bowling alone*. Driven by a growing personal unease with a changing social climate in the US, Putnam began to conduct an extensive study of the sources of and possible solutions for this discontent. First, he found that the American people had become less politically involved and more distrustful of their government and each other. At the same time, he observed that people were less socially connected, less involved in voluntary organizations and, in general terms, were less 'civic'. In other words, Putnam saw – in his view – an alarming decline in social capital in the US.

Putnam also took a collective-collective approach in this study. At first sight, it may have seemed to involve individuals' 'lifestyles', but he in fact only used aggregate, average and collective measures to make his case. He presented the *mean* number of memberships of social and civic organizations, the *mean* number of times people did voluntary work, and the percentage of people who thought that 'most people can be trusted' (Putnam, 2000, p.291). As these measures are aggregated over the population, they are no longer individual gauges. This automatically implies that any conclusions cannot be based on individuals either.

Putnam's *definition* of social capital includes all three pillars thereof: trust, norms, and networks. However, he only partially succeeded in converting the theoretical components into appropriate *measures*. His measures of trust (the commonly used GSS and WVS questions¹⁴) and norms and values (a variety of 'political culture' variables (Adam & Rončević, 2003)) may do the trick, even though these are open to criticism (e.g. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000). However, the way Putnam operationalizes networks is, in my view, wide of the mark. Variables such as number of memberships, the number of organizations, the number of hours for which a respondent volunteers, etc. are perhaps *relevant* for the network component of social capital, but no more than that. Furthermore, this is only relevant if one assumes that voluntary organizations do, indeed, produce personal networks for their members (an assumption which Putnam does not put to the test) and citizens who do not belong to voluntary organizations do not have a social network. Moreover, the essence of a network is that it reveals who is connected to whom on any kind of criterion. The simple recording of the

¹⁴ This question goes: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Answer options are: 'most people can be trusted' and 'can't be too careful'. (World Values Survey, 2005)

presence, or absence, of organizations, or the number of memberships that a person holds is by no means a reflection of this essence. If only Putnam had studied the connections between organizations, or the number of friends each respondent had, he would have nailed the concept of networks. Networks can be measured very clearly, and Putnam missed an opportunity to do so in his study. As I will show, other investigators of social capital did focus on the network component thereof in a more appropriate manner.

Francis Fukuyama is another well-known author on the subject of social capital, who, according to Claridge (2007), '*practically equated social capital with trust*' in his earlier publications (Fukuyama, 1995). However, in later work, Fukuyama defines social capital as '*shared norms or values that promote social cooperation, instantiated in actual relationships*' (Fukuyama, 2001; 2002, quote: p.27). This reveals an emphasis on norms and values and not on trust, even though he continued to pay attention to this element. Fukuyama himself explicitly stated that he views social capital as an individual asset (Fukuyama, 2002): "*Social capital is not a public good, it is a private good*" (p. 29-30). It is, therefore, perhaps surprising that in almost all reviewing articles Fukuyama is regarded as theorizing about collective social capital (e.g. Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Borgatti et al., 1998; Paxton, 1999; Poortinga, 2006). If Fukuyama's research is placed in the light of the typology presented here, the apparent paradox can be explained. Fukuyama concerned himself with macro sociological phenomena, such as economic development and the chances for democracy. Thus, the receiving side is the collective. When considering the providing aspect of social capital, he used aggregate measures of trust and other gauges which referred to the collective (e.g. nation states) as a whole (Fukuyama, 1995). In other words, by using aggregate measures, Fukuyama automatically shifted the focus from the individual to the collective.

Fukuyama and Putnam used measures of trust as their indicators of the degree of social capital. In general terms, the trouble with using trust in this way is that it easily becomes detached from the other two components. One of the most common measures – especially concerning collective social capital – is the question in the World Values Survey (WVS): "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Measuring trust in this way, as a separate entity, detaches it from the networks in which it is embedded and which are crucial for social capital. It is my view that levels of trust are only interesting *in relation to* social connections. Putting it bluntly, whether I feel I can trust the rest of the world has no effect on my relationship with my neighbor, who I would like to ask to water my plants when I am away from home, but it *is* important that I can trust him/her to be helpful. I, therefore, prefer a method of measuring social capital that incorporates social structure.

This collective – collective outlook on social capital is not suitable for studying how it is used, or, in this particular case, how voluntary organizations mobilize their community. The main problem with this approach is that the focus is always on the whole, which implies that one never sees what is going on in the inside. At most, one is able to comment upon the final *result* of the mobilization, for example about what percentage of the population was involved in it, but not upon the *process* and who mobilized whom. This is also related to the types of measures that are applied in this area of research, which consider the cultural aspects of social capital (trust and norms and values) more than the structural elements (the network).

It may seem that a focus on the collective prevents the use of practical network measures, although this is not necessarily the case. It is certainly possible to describe a network on the aggregated level by using what is called a socio-centric network approach. The disadvantage, however, is that one really needs to have the data on the complete network (i.e. information about the presence or absence of ties between each pair of actors) to be able to reach sound conclusions. I assume that this is an important reason why social capital researchers using this collective-collective perspective do not focus on the network aspect. In contrast, in research into individual social capital, the focus is predominantly on social networks, with only peripheral attention being paid to norms and values and trust.

2.7.2 Individual – individual

The providing and receiving sides of social capital are individual; the individual profits from the assets of another individual ('I have friends with cars and I am the one who can and will borrow them'). Many social capital studies are aimed at this purely individual level, starting with the works by Bourdieu, who was one of the first scholars to introduce the concept, and by doing so initiated a vast amount of literature. Bourdieu mainly took a theoretical approach to social capital, while the famous scholars, Nan Lin and Ronald Burt, commenced a more empirical line of research in later years.

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

Pierre Bourdieu, one of the ancestors of social capital, regarded it as an individual asset. This leftist French sociologist used the concept in combination with the notions of cultural capital and economic capital. His aim was to explain social hierarchy. According to Bourdieu, one's societal position depends upon one's 'wealth' in these three domains. He defined social capital as "*the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, membership in a group*" (Bourdieu, 1986; p.248). This means that in Bourdieu's view, the richness of an

individual's social capital firstly depends on the number of social connections he/she has to other individuals. The more people one knows, the bigger the chance that one has more resources at one's disposal. Secondly, an individual's social capital depends on the amount and the quality of the resources that the relationships possess. If each 'other' has many resources (money, knowledge etc.) this means that the individual has more social capital at his disposal than if each 'other' has none.

Bourdieu's theory is illustrative of the focus on social networks that is present in the theories of scholars that I classified in this individual-individual category. The other two pillars of social capital, norms and values and trust, are, although important, secondary. Bourdieu regards networks of relationships as the result of an unremitting, but not necessarily conscious, social investment strategy that turns social relationships into social obligations. The "durable obligations subjectively felt" (Bourdieu, 1986; p.249) include feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc., which might be regarded as the trust and norms and values' components of social capital. In Bourdieu's view, however, these are merely prerequisites to profiting from social capital. The actual volume thereof depends upon the size of the individual's social network and the volume of the resources embedded therein.

As for his work on social capital, Bourdieu is more of a theorist than an empiricist (Adam & Rončević, 2003; Claridge, 2007). His broad, yet precise, theory contrasts with the rather modest indicator that he mentioned in his extensive study of taste and distinction (Bourdieu, 1984 [2002]). Bourdieu presented no more than one indicator of social capital, viz. membership of golf clubs (Bourdieu, 1984 [2002]; p.219; Field, 2003; p.14). This is surprising given the fact that he did specify how the volume of one's social capital can be established (size of network and corresponding resources). In my view, Bourdieu's indicator by no means does justice to his own theory or to social capital theory in general, particularly not in the tradition of individual social capital. Other researchers, amongst whom are Ronald Burt (e.g.2000) and Nan Lin (e.g. 2001b), do, however, provide more solid empirical foundations for their social capital theory.

Nan Lin defines social capital as the "*resources embedded in a social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions*" (Lin, 2001b; p.40). The social structure he refers to is not that of a society, community or any other large entity, but rather the social network of individuals. This is clear from the empirical research that Lin has undertaken. For example, one of his studies on social capital –although he did not name it as such at the time – is about occupational status and job attainment. Lin and Dumin (Lin & Dumin, 1986) revealed that someone's occupational status, as well as his/her social resources (read: social capital), facilitate access to prestigious occupations. The amount of social capital an individual had was assessed by (the diversity of) the occupational status of his friends, relatives and acquaintances. In other words, all relevant variables were measured on the individual level. The work of Lin (and Dumin)

is particularly interesting since it involves not only social capital itself, but also the way it is used. It is also worth noting that Lin did not operationalize the trust and norms and values elements of social capital; his sole focus was on the social network and the embedded resources. Although I do not take the individual-individual approach to social capital, I do adopt many of Lin's ideas. As I will show in the discussion of my individual-collective outlook, they are also of use in that perspective.

Burt is another important representative of the individual-individual viewpoint (e.g. 2000). Just like Lin, Burt holds a network driven view of social capital and neglects the trust and norms and values components. But where Lin emphasized the *cultural* aspects of the network (i.e. which characteristics can be ascribed to the actors in the network, such as specific resources), Burt stressed the *structural* features (i.e. what the network looks like). Burt started with the idea that social capital refers to a social structure which can advantage certain individuals or groups in pursuing their goals: "*better connected people enjoy higher returns*" (Burt, 2000; p. 348). The question is then: what does 'better connected' mean? In Burt's view, weak connections between individuals add to their social capital. He argued that particularly those who function as a link between several (two or more) groups of people are thought to possess a greater amount of social capital than those who are only part of one, tightly knit, group. For example, consider the case of a woman named Jessica. She takes part in a book club that she started with her colleagues at the lawyers' office where she works, and she also has a seat on the district council. Assuming that none of her colleagues know any of her fellow councilors, this puts Jessica in a powerful position. First of all, she knows many people who themselves probably possess a diverse range of resources. Furthermore, she has access to the information residing in both groups. This gives her an advantage over the others who only hear about what is happening in their own circle. More importantly, Jessica is the one who can decide what information that she acquires from one group is transferred to the other, and what is not. Such a bridging position between two tightly-knit groups is termed a 'structural hole' by Burt (1992). According to Burt, people 'involved in' a structural hole are 'better' connected and thus have more social capital at their disposal than those who have network closure (i.e. are in a group in which everyone is connected to everybody else)¹⁵.

Burt and Lin measured social capital by means of social networks. As in Bourdieu's theory, the role of trust and norms and values is not nullified as such, but these elements are instead regarded as mediators between the actor and the resources in the network.

¹⁵ Interestingly, Coleman holds the opposite view on closure. In Coleman's opinion, networks that are characterized by 'closure' (i.e. everyone in the network is connected) are rich in terms of social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990). This is because in 'closed' networks each individual has easy access to all of the information residing therein. More importantly, network closure facilitates sanctions that make it less risky for people in the network to trust one another (Burt, 2000).

In other words, trusting relationships facilitate access to the resources in the network (e.g. Völker, 2000). These resources refer to the (im) material support that the actors in the network have to offer. Relationships of trust with acquaintances who can provide these resources increase the opportunity of access thereto and the use thereof. For example, I prefer teaching statistics to a good friend instead of to someone to whom I entertain less friendly feelings. Two colleagues who cannot stand each other will not help each other out, even if they could. The emphasis on the type and content of a relationship is generally present in the work of researchers such as Lin and Flap, and less so in Burt's approach. In general, research in the 'Burt-tradition' focuses on network location instead of network content (Lin, 2001a). In this tradition, networks are analyzed for the presence or absence of bridges (i.e. single connections between groups, like Jessica), and on the strength of ties and the position of certain individuals in a network (central or not). This can provide important information about an individual's social capital, but I nevertheless believe that it is important to also take the qualitative characteristics of a network into account, especially when it comes to social capital, which is all about the resources that can or cannot be used.

Moreover, this individual – individual outlook on social capital must be set aside if one wants to study its use by voluntary organizations, which is the purpose of the current study. It must be said that voluntary associations do play a role in many social capital studies within this perspective, because they often focus on organizational memberships. The numbers of memberships, the types of organizations, or the degree of activity that people display within organizations are all examples of indicators of social capital in this approach. People with more memberships, or a more diverse range of memberships (e.g. being a member of a choir and a bridge society), as well as those who are more actively involved in organizations, are regarded as having more social capital since they get to know and interact with more people (e.g. Wollebaek & Selle, 2002). The point is, however, that in this way, voluntary associations are treated as facilitators of the production of the social capital of their members, and not as separate actors which have social capital themselves. But even if organizations were to be treated as the individual actors, this individual-individual approach would not be able to shed light on the mobilization of the collective of associations, i.e. the community. The mobilization of the community is a collective return of social capital. In other words, the receiving side is the collective. Within the individual-individual approach, attention is given only to what the individual can achieve for him/herself.

2.7.3 Collective - individual

The collective is the provider of social capital; the receiving aspect is on the individual level and the individual profits from the collective. An example of how social capital on the collective level can benefit individuals is a small village in which the ruling norm is that one does not take someone else's property without permission. Even a visitor from abroad, who may not adhere to this particular norm, would be able to leave his bike unlocked in the street without it being stolen. Research that fits into this category concentrates on trust and norms and values instead of on networks. An example of such a measure is a statement like "People in this neighborhood do not share the same values.", to which a negative answer would indicate a higher degree of social capital (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1997).

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

A theorist who, in my opinion, can be categorized in this collective-individual category is James Coleman. As I mentioned earlier, there is a great deal of ambiguity about how to interpret Coleman's ideas about social capital, namely whether he regards it a collective or an individual phenomenon. I suspect that this is due to the way in which Coleman has formulated his theory (his phraseology), referring to the individual and the collective in one statement. Coleman viewed social capital "*as an attribute of the social structure in which a person is embedded, [and it] is not the private property of any of the persons who benefit from it*" (1990, p.315). Judging by this account, with its explicit reference to social capital not being private property, it is clear why many view Coleman as a 'collective' theorist (e.g. Dekker, 2000; van der Gaag & Snijders, 2004). Yet, Coleman also stated that social capital "*facilitate[s] certain actions of actors within the structure*" (1988, p.98) and "*social capital is an important resource for individuals*" (1990, p.317). This has, obviously, led others to interpret Coleman's vision as meaning that social capital is an individual asset (e.g. Morrow, 1999; Decoster, 2000; Stolle & Lewis, 2002; Pope, 2003). Considering his - seemingly contradictory - statements, there is a case for both interpretations. However, using the typology presented here clearly demonstrates that it is not a contradiction. The first statement makes clear that the collective provides the social capital, while the second highlights that the individual profits from it. Yet another quote from Coleman's underlines this:

"[... A]n organization that was initiated for one purpose is available for appropriation for other purposes, constituting important social capital for the individual members, who have available to them the organizational resources for effective opposition." (1988, p.108)

Coleman does not explicitly distinguish the three, commonly accepted, pillars of social capital (the networks, norms and values and trust). Instead, he discusses three of what he calls 'forms of social capital': information channels, obligations and expectations, and social norms. These can be related to the three pillars, but they refer to slightly different things. According to Coleman, what these three forms of social capital have in common is that they are comprised of aspects of social structures and they facilitate the actions of actors therein (Coleman, 1988; p.98). He does not, however, explicitly discuss social networks. The information channels refer to the potential for information that is inherent in social relationships (p.104). More social capital in this sense means more information, and the more information one has, the more powerful one is. The 'information channels' are comparable to the resources embedded in a social structure as formulated by Nan Lin (see previous paragraph). The second form of social capital, obligations and expectations, refers to mutual favors that people can do for each other. If A does something for B (i.e. fulfils an obligation), A can expect B to return the favor in some way in the future. According to Coleman, if this is to happen, one necessary precondition is that the social structure which A and B are in is characterized by trustworthiness (one of the three generally acknowledged elements of social capital). If people do not trust that obligations will be repaid, they will be unwilling to do something for someone else. Furthermore, the exchange of favors is not limited to one-to-one relationships. Groups (collectives) can also have a system of obligations and expectations which are no longer person-bound, but are generally available for anyone. If A does B a favor, this favor can also be 'returned' by C. The third form of social capital that Coleman described – norms – has a collective character. The ruling of norms, i.e. the existence and effectuation thereof with appropriate penalties for defectors, is typically something that takes place at the collective level. The norm that Coleman regarded as the most important is that one should not act out of self but of public interest. This helps communities to overcome public goods' problems. At the same time, individuals are helped by the norms that rule a community. For instance, norms that inhibit theft make life easier for most people (albeit not the thieves) because it means that they can leave their bikes unlocked in the street (as in the example at the beginning of this paragraph).

Furthermore, Coleman (1990) has admitted that the importance of 'a more artificial set of arrangements' (Field, 2003) [i.e. voluntary organizations] would encourage norms and trustworthiness, especially since the family, as the foremost generator of social capital according to him, has been devalued as the cornerstone of society. Yet, his operationalizations do not include any measure that refers to voluntary organizations at all, nor does he discuss voluntary organizations extensively on a theoretical level.

The collective-individual nature of Coleman's theory is expressed most clearly in the 'norms' and 'obligations and expectations' elements of social capital. With respect to the former, the social capital (norm) resides in the collective as people need to agree on particular norms to profit from it. If each individual adheres to his/her own norms,

which deviate from those of the rest of the collective, this person will not benefit. At the same time, the 'norms' element also reveals that social capital can be easily abused: it is tempting for people to reap the benefits of the collective social capital without ever investing in it (free-riding). In most cases, especially with reference to these norms, free-riding is rather easy. One can live in a democracy, and enjoy the freedom that is part of this form of constitution, without endorsing democratic norms. In a trusting community, where people leave their homes unlocked, burglars seize their chance. Since departing from these norms does not usually involve a direct confrontation between two actors (whether the actors is a collective or an individual) it is relatively easy to do. This is different in the case of the other two forms of social capital that Coleman described. The exchange of obligations and expectations and information is not conducted anonymously, and so departing therefrom is more easily sanctioned. Furthermore, the 'obligations and expectations' element of Coleman's theory reflects his collective-individual outlook. The habits of reciprocity are usually also held by the entire collective, of which an individual is a part, while the individual can reap the rewards.

Channels of information are usually of a more individual nature, as the exchange of a piece of information mainly takes place between two individuals. I could ask my (informed) friends where to find a good dentist, how to cook a complicated meal, or what the latest insights in social psychology are. However, especially in the current age of the Internet, the provision of information by an (anonymous) Internet-community is very common. One can collect a lot of data about almost anything, and some of it is often even provided by experts in the field (for example on encyclopedic websites such as Wikipedia.org). In this case, the supply of information is no longer attached to an individual's personal relationships (which would imply individual social capital), but stems from the collective.

When it comes to the empirical support that Coleman presented for his study, he revealed some ambiguities regarding his level of analysis. Coleman (1988) set out the concept of social capital as an explanatory factor in the creation of human capital, which he described as *'the skills and capabilities that make [persons] able to act in new ways'* (1990, p.304). In the empirical part of his research, this came down to an investigation of the effect of social capital on the school dropout rates of second-year students. Instead of operationalizing his three forms of the concept, Coleman presented several indirect measures with which to capture the sophomores' social capital. In particular, he determined the social capital inside and outside the family, with indicators representing the physical presence of the parents, the number of siblings, and the extent to which the parents were embedded in a social structure (measured by the number of times a family moved and the type of school the children attend). With this approach, Coleman defined two sources of social capital: the family and the community. Apart from it being odd that a scientist presents a theory with more or less clear concepts which he subsequently does not even attempt to translate into manageable measures (1988, p.110), and despite

the fact that he uses indicators that are questionable and inaccurate, Coleman's introduction of his measurements adds more ambiguity with respect to his outlook on social capital than was already the case based on his theory. He ultimately uses both collective and individual indicators of social capital. However, since I believe that Coleman's theoretical work is stronger than his empirical research, this does not alter my classification of him as being in the collective-individual category.

Apart from the practical hurdles that this outlook on social capital presents, as evidenced by Coleman's weak empirical foundation, I also abandon this approach on theoretical grounds. This relates to the reason why I regarded the individual-individual approach to be inappropriate for the current study: the beneficiary of the social capital is the individual, instead of the collective. It follows that the fourth outlook on social capital, the individual-collective, fits the aims of my work best.

2.7.4 Individual – collective

The providing side of social capital is on the individual level, the receiving side is on the collective level.

This category is the least common view of social capital, bearing in mind that, to my knowledge, no research has been conducted which fits into it. This does not,

however, mean that it is impossible to think of or carry out such a study. Indeed, I want to argue that the research I will present in this book should be classified as an individual-collective study of social capital. In particular, when voluntary associations are the object of investigation, as is the case here, this approach is most fruitful, and enables the researcher to explore social capital from different angles. I will demonstrate that a single organization can have advantages for the community it is a part of, as well as that a single board member can bring advantages to the organization he/she is a member of. Before then, I will briefly address the issue of the definition of social capital in this category.

		Receiving side	
		Individual	Collective
Providing side	Individual	e.g. Bourdieu Burt Lin	e.g. this study
	Collective	e.g. Coleman	e.g. Putnam Fukuyama

In order to define social capital, I do not need to adjust the generally accepted three pillars of social networks, trust, and norms and values, as, for example, Coleman has done, although I do emphasize the former more than the latter two. In my view, the social capital of an organization consists of the resources that are embedded in its social structure. It is clear that this definition is similar to Lin's: 'access to and the use of resources embedded in a social structure'. The fact that I adopt Lin's definition is only logical, since both the category in which I placed Lin's theory, and the category in which the current view of social capital is situated, regard the providing side as being on the individual level.

In general, it is not hard to imagine how the social capital of an individual actor can benefit the collective. For example, there was a plot of grass in my neighborhood that had been completely neglected by the municipality. The fences around it were rusty, the goal posts were gone and there was only sand and rubbish where there used to be grass. Consequently, very few children played there. One eleven-year-old boy was unhappy about this and started a petition to get the plot renovated. Along with his friends, i.e. his social capital, he went door-to-door and eventually got enough signatures from local residents to convince the city's administrators to take action. A couple of months later, the area had been restored to its former glory. The boy had not only arranged better facilities for himself, but also for all of the other children in the neighborhood. In abstract terms, this implies that the providing side of this social capital is on the individual level, while the receiving side was the community.

The individual actor whose social capital benefits the collective need not be an individual person. Larger entities, such as a company, a municipality or a voluntary organization, can also be taken as individual actors, depending on the aims of the particular research. As this study is about voluntary organizations, I will explain this in more detail in reference to them.

To assume that voluntary organizations have an intermediary role between their members and the state, as discussed in the previous chapter and at the beginning of this one, involves the assumption that these organizations function as separate actors (and for that matter, it also involves the assumption that the state is a single entity). At the same time, an organization itself cannot, of course, act. It is a 'corporate actor' (Lelieveldt, 1999) which is represented by individuals. These individuals are the ones who act as if they are the organization. The question is then one of who these individuals are.

An individual who represents an organization needs to have a relationship with it. This implies that this person has a position within the association (for example, as a member, director, or a board member) and acts according to the role that is ascribed to it, i.e. the norms and expectations that others have about this position (Lelieveldt, 1999). In any study of organizations as actors, the researcher decides which role or behavior he/she regards as being a manifestation of representing the association. According to Lelieveldt (1999), an individual acts as a representative of his/her organization when he/she has contact with individuals and organizations outside his/her own. Each organization can have several representative individuals, which makes the "acting organization a many-headed monster" (p. 58). The most logical choice is to regard the executives as the representatives of the organization; they represent and have the best overview of it. Due to the formalized structure of voluntary organizations, especially when they are officially registered, it is easy to determine who their executives are. In most cases, the board members are the executives, particularly when the organization is

only run by volunteers. In more professional associations there may be paid employees, for example a general manager, who are the effective representatives thereof. In summary, voluntary organizations can be regarded as separate actors when the behavior of their representatives (which are, in most cases, the board members) is regarded as being the expression of the actions of the organizations themselves.

Expanding on the example of the boy who employed his social capital for the benefit of the community, one can think of situations in which a single organization can have a collective profit from its social capital. The current study focuses on ethnic communities in Western democracies. A single ethnic organization may employ its social capital, for example, to organize a pressure group into convincing the local government to meet the specific wishes of this particular group. If this organization succeeds, with the help of connected associations, in these attempts it is not only the organization itself and its members that profit, but also all of the other people who belong to this ethnic community. In other words, when regarded in this way, the receiving side of the social capital is the collective.

Moreover, a focus on voluntary organizations in the individual-collective outlook involves a peculiarity. The outlook can be interpreted as have I just explained: the organization, as an individual actor, provides the social capital that can benefit the collective. But one could also think of the board members, who are regarded as the representatives of the organizations, as the individuals who can bring their personal, individual social capital to the benefit of the organization and its members as a whole (the collective). For instance, a youth club wants to organize a weekly tournament for underprivileged children. The treasurer's best friend happens to be the assessor of a soccer club. In that example, the personal network of the treasurer – or in other words his social capital – is used in the service of the organization and, perhaps, eventually for the collective.

This twofold interpretation of the individual-collective outlook on social capital poses the question of how social capital, as theoretically defined, is operationalized. First of all, this is done herein with an emphasis on the network component, and not so much on the trust and norms and values elements. That is not to say that these aspects are not important; trust in particular is inextricably bound up with a social network structure (Fennema & Tillie, 2005). The fact that there is a network (i.e. social connections) already implies trust, as “it takes at least two to trust” (ibid. 2005, p.229). Social trust is embedded in social relationships, just as shared norms and values are, but the network component is the ‘sine qua non’.

But even when one takes the network element of social capital as the main focus, the question remains: what does the social network of an organization look like? Is it the sum of the networks of the personal acquaintances of each of the board members, even if these acquaintances are not even related to any voluntary association? Or does the

organizational network consist only of the connections that these board members maintain with other organizations? Each method has its merits, and one has to choose one of them based on theoretical and practical considerations. In what follows, I will expand on what kind of networks I regard as representing the social capital of migrant communities.

2.8 Assessing organizational networks

There are many ways to determine an organizational network. It is important at this point to realize that the social network of an organization is not the same as the organizational network. The former describes only a single central organization and the contacts thereof. This is visually represented in Figure 2.2. A network of this kind is called an ego-network: the central organization (point) is the 'ego', and the surrounding points (organizations) are termed the 'alters'¹⁶. Based on an ego-network, one can perform an ego-centric network analysis.




Figure 2.2 An ego-network: the central point is 'ego', the surrounding points are 'alters'. Each point represents an organization, and each line a connection between two organizations.

An organizational network consists of a multitude of ego-networks. The ego-network of each organization in the network is mapped and, at the points at which the ego-networks overlap, they are connected. For example, the ego-network of a women's organization contains, amongst others, a sports club, and the ego-network of this sports club contains a youth association that is not in the ego-network of the women's organization. In this way, a large organizational network can be configured. The analyses of a whole network are described as 'socio-centric', but since this network consists of

¹⁶ In this example, the alters are not connected, but in reality this often will be the case. When alters are connected, it is said that there is network 'closure'. Whether or not there is closure in an ego-network influences the value of the alters for ego. Depending on one's view, closure is an advantage (Coleman, 1990) or a disadvantage (Burt, 2000). Also see note 15 in this chapter.

the separate ego-networks one can also carry out an ego-centric analysis by selecting a single ego-network.

The question now remains as to what the basis of the connections between the organizations is. When are organizations connected? Is it when they are located at the same address, or when they are participating in joint initiatives? The current study uses two approaches to map the social capital of voluntary organizations: the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network.

A common method with which to reconstruct an organizational network is the use of information about dual board memberships, i.e. a network of interlocking directorates (e.g. Mizruchi, 1996). These are networks that are formed by people who are part of more than one organizational board at a time. For example, the chairman of a pigeon fanciers' association, who is also the treasurer of a yacht club, provides the link between these two organizations. Information about board memberships can often be collected from official archives, such as those held by the Chamber of Commerce and similar agencies.

Following the logic of the interlocking directorates that exist in the financial sector, the networks of interlocking directorates between voluntary organizations are regarded as expressions of trust between them. Fennema (1982) argued that at times when the market as a whole fails to create an atmosphere of trust between banks and the industry for large-scale loans, the former establish interlocking directorates with the companies to whom they lend money (i.e. board members of the banks take a seat on the boards of these companies) to at least give the idea that the bank can keep an eye on what is happening to the funds. Even though, in practice, the ability of these 'watch dogs' to control the spending of the company is limited, the link nevertheless increases the creation of trust because of the ease with which information can flow throughout the network (1999). It is thought that a similar process occurs in a network of interlocking directorates between voluntary organizations. Accordingly, such networks provide important information about the social capital of voluntary organizations. I will refer to this type of network as a 'formal network' because of the official character thereof.

The network of interlocking directorates as a reflection of the social capital of organizations has several shortcomings. The most important criticism is that it is unclear whether the official links between organizations are actually used in everyday life. Are these links merely a formality, or do they reflect an intensive interaction between organizations? Research into voluntary associations which uses the networks of interlocking directorates¹⁷ for operationalization purposes is scarce, and that which

¹⁷ Much research has been performed on the (use of) networks of interlocking directorates of industrial corporations, banks etc. (e.g. Rolfe, 1967; Pennings, 1980; Mizruchi, 1996; Peng, Au, & Wang, 2001; Heemskerk, 2007).

does exist does not shed any light on this point (Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Vermeulen, 2006; Berger, 2010); the use of the networks and the embedded resources are assumed, but never tested. In connection with this criticism, the question arises as to whether organizations have other contacts in everyday life that (also) provide resources that are actually used, and should thus be included in an exploration of their social capital. In other words, a particular voluntary organization, for example a music society, may have one formal connection to another organization because its secretary is the chairman of a chess club, but in everyday life it collaborates with at least fifteen other musically involved societies. In fact, the connection to the chess club may not even be addressed at all because of the divergent activities of the two organizations, while the connections with the other music societies are used intensively because of joint projects and shows. Although I assume that many organizations have everyday contacts that are used more than formal contacts, this is not to say that this applies to every association. It may also work the other way around: the everyday contacts may be superficial, and if an organization really needs the support of others (i.e. it needs to address its social capital) it turns only to those organizations to which it is formally connected. In other words, it is worth taking not only the formal, but also the informal connections into account when studying the social capital of voluntary organizations. This is what I call the contact network. I regard the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network as complementary; together they shape the social capital of the individual organizations and that of the community.

This work uses the social capital of Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin as its case studies, and Chapters 5 and 6 contain descriptions of the social capital of these respective communities. The ultimate aim of this study is to understand how social capital is mobilized. In the current study this entails an examination of how information is forwarded throughout a community. It will show how individual actors (single organizations) operate to inform the community. How this process is captured, is explained in Chapter 7. In Chapters 8 and 9 I will provide the empirical findings about the mobilized social capital in the two cities. However, before I turn in the next chapter to the main explanatory factor (political opportunity structures), there is one final feature of social capital and social capital theory that needs to be addressed: the distinction between bonding, bridging and linking social capital.

2.9 Bonding and bridging social capital

As stated above, the four outlooks on social capital need not be regarded as being mutually exclusive, but rather as complementary. Generally, which approach to social capital is the most appropriate depends upon the research's aims, preferences, and the

possibilities offered by the available data. Some researchers will, for whatever reason, always cling on to only one of these outlooks, while others may vary their positions over time. But the different views of social capital also have things in common. As well as a consensus that the three central elements of the concept are social networks, trust, and norms and values, there is a second point upon which theorists agree, irrespective of their point of view, namely the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital.

2.9.1 The introduction of bonding and bridging social capital in the scientific literature

After the jubilant mood caused by Putnam's 1990s reintroduction of the concept of social capital had died down a little, there was a growing body of public opinion that it also has a less beneficial side. Portes and Landolt published generally recognized criticisms of the subject under the revealing title of "The Downside of Social Capital" (Portes & Landolt, 1996). These authors (1996) pointed out that a negative side effect of social capital is that it can lead to the exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions of individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms (Portes & Landolt, 1996; Portes, 1998).

Other comments, expressed in more positive terms, were that social capital is not a one-size-fits-all concept as it was presented initially. This does not necessarily have to mean that social capital has a *negative* impact, but it did sometimes turn out to have a *less positive* effect than expected. Researchers found that some groups which, at first sight, had considerable amounts of social capital, sometimes still lagged behind compared to others with the same amount. For example, members of communities that are characterized by extreme social control, benefit from unconditional support, while their opportunities to do something other than what is expected of them are blocked rather than increased (on the negative outcomes of social capital, see also Castiglione, 2008). The idea was then that the two types of social capital had to be distinguished. One type is better suited to 'getting you by', the other to getting you 'ahead' (de Souza Briggs, 1998).

Within this framework, Gittell and Vidal (1998) presented bonding and bridging social capital¹⁸. The former is defined by them as "*the type [of social capital] that brings closer together people who already know each other*" (p.15). Putnam termed this type of social capital as 'exclusive' because it is '*inward looking and tends to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups*' (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). Groups are homogeneous when based on specific characteristics, such as socio-demographic and socio-economic

¹⁸ Remarkably, Gittell and Vidal (1998) referred to Putnam (1996) as the one who came up with this classification first, whereas Putnam (2000), for his part, referred to Gittell and Vidal as the originators! Later authors usually agree with Putnam.

features (e.g. M. Leonard, 2004; Kim, Subramanian, & Kawachi, 2006). Bonding social capital is further characterized by multi-functional ties and great trust (R. Leonard & Onyx, 2003). It can be found within families, within ethnic communities, and between close friends and neighbors etc. (e.g. Woolcock, 2001). It is this form of social capital that has a predominantly supportive function, helping people to get by. For example, Sampson and Raudenbush (1997) found that homogenous neighborhoods (i.e. with more bonding social capital) had more effective social capital, leading to reduced crime levels. In their study of the implications of social capital for economic development policy, Woolcock and Narayan (2000) argued that bonding social capital serves as an effective way of protection, risk management and solidarity for poor village groups. However, in order to help the poor to develop economically, bridging social capital is necessary.

Gittel and Vidal defined bridging social capital as *“the type that brings together people or groups who previously did not know each other”* (p.15). Putnam described it as linking *“substantial sectors of the community and span[ning] underlying social cleavages”* (1996, p.665). He also added that bridging social capital is inclusive and contains outward looking networks (2000, p.22). The degree of trust in the networks that come under the bridging social capital definition is lower than in bonding networks (R. Leonard & Onyx, 2003), but bridging social capital is obviously also characterized by a minimum degree of trust. A main feature of the actors involved in bridging social capital is that they are dissimilar in terms of key characteristics (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). For example, they belong to a different religious background, they live in different countries, or their jobs have different statuses. One can think of more distant friends, associates, and colleagues and other acquaintances (Woolcock, 2001). With the idea that social capital allows X to achieve ends that he would otherwise not be able to (Fennema & Tillie, 2005), it becomes clear why it is bridging social capital in particular that gets people ahead. If my contacts are just like me, they probably dispose of the same resources that I do. The friends that have the same university degree as I do are at the same stage of life and are on about the same step of their career ladder. If I want to get a new, preferably better, job, these friends are unlikely to have a position available. But if my friends are *not* like me, they can provide me with other resources that I do not have myself. They may work in a different line of business or be older than I am and are, therefore, already in a managerial position, for example. If I want to find a new job, these are the friends that can probably help me to get ahead.

The potentially negative consequences of social capital, first commented on by Portes and Landolt (1996), mainly concerned the bonding form thereof. The (too) close connections involved in bonding social capital can imply heavy social norms. Related collective sanctions can have a restrictive effect on the individuals of a particular community, hindering instead of furthering the positions of the actors involved. Patulny

and Svendsen (2007), however, advocated not seeing bonding social capital as 'bad' and bridging social capital as 'good', but rather pointed to the need to be aware that both kinds can have beneficial as well as detrimental effects. The ideal is to find a perfect mix of the two forms. For that matter, bonding and bridging social capital are often not strictly separable. Some situations represent bonding and bridging social capital at the same time. The black church, in which people of the same race and religion (bonding), but of a different social class (bridging), are brought together is an example of the kind of social capital that Putnam proposed (Putnam, 2000; p.23).

In summarizing the situation, the difference between bonding and bridging social capital is, de facto, based on two characteristics: tie strength and similarity of actors. The latter refers to the socio-demographic and socio-economic features of the people involved. Actors are 'similar' if they are members of the same family, belong to the same ethnic group, or have the same social status. 'Dissimilar' actors differ in terms of these characteristics. Bonding social capital is related to the ties between 'similar' actors and bridging social capital to the ties between 'dissimilar' actors. The strength of the tie between two actors is also connected to the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital. Granovetter (1973) reported that there are three degrees of tie strength: 'weak', 'strong', or 'absent'. With his famous sentence 'the strength of weak ties' Granovetter advocated that weak ties, which lead to dissimilar others (i.e. bridging social capital), have more diverse resources to offer than strong ties do to similar others (i.e. bonding social capital). However, later empirical research has shown that this classification is not particularly strict. Leonard and Onyx (2003) reported that close, multifunctional ties were present as much in bonding as in bridging connections. Apparently, the most fundamental characteristic of bridging social capital is that it concerns 'dissimilar' ties more than it is about tie strength. I, therefore, assume that what makes one type of social capital bridging and the other bonding depends, most of all, on the similarity of the actors. Tie strength is a secondary feature that probably is correlated with, but not decisive for, the similarity of actors.

Some authors, including Fennema and Tillie (2008), advocate that bonding and bridging social capital should not be determined in terms of the characteristics of the actors, as I do, but rather in terms of the network structure. They regard bonding and bridging social capital in terms of the strength of ties (weak or strong) and the degree of network closure (the extent to which the alters of an actor are connected to each other or not). Bonding social capital involves strong ties and high network closure, whereas bridging social capital involves weak ties and low network closure. However, as Granovetter (1973) had already written, the stronger the link between two actors, the more similar they are. This implies that even though Fennema and Tillie claim not to take information about the actors into account, they inevitably do so, even if it is indirectly. Moreover, I am, amongst other things, interested in the connection between migrant communities and society at large. In order to be able to consider this link, I need to take the characteristics of the actors explicitly into account. Therefore, I will not use

this structural approach to bonding and bridging social capital, but will instead continue to focus on the characteristics of the actors involved. The distinction between bonding and bridging social capital in this study will be based upon two characteristics: the ethnicity and the type of organization.

2.9.2 Ethnic bonding and bridging social capital

Bonding social capital with respect to ethnicity refers to the ties an organization maintains with other organizations *within* the community. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, concerns the ties of members of the community to actors *outside* it. For example, when Turkish organizations have ties to other Turkish organizations, this reflects bonding social capital. When an association has ties to non-Turkish organizations (e.g. Moroccan or German ones), it has bridging social capital. Whether an organization has more bonding or bridging social capital with respect to ethnicity can indicate to what extent it is focused on its own group, or instead seeks to interact with society at large.

I expect to find relatively few ethnic bridges in the network of interlocking directorates, but quite a number in the contact network. This is because I assume that establishing formal relationships between organizations involves a greater degree of trust, which is generally the case between organizations of the same ethnicity. Informal connections, on the other hand, can be more casual and, therefore, less trust-based. Furthermore, I expect that associations will collaborate with those organizations that are in their physical neighborhood and that the ethnicity of these neighbors does not play an important role in the decision about whether or not to work together.

2.9.3 Bonding and bridging social capital over organizational type

Bonding social capital that is based on organizational type refers to the contacts that an organization has with other organizations with similar key objectives. In this respect, bridging social capital refers to the ties that an organization has to those of a different nature. So, if a soccer club is only connected to other similar clubs, this organization has bonding social capital. Even though this enables the club to fulfill its main aim, which is probably taking part in a competition, it does not provide the organization with other material¹⁹ resources, apart from more of those that it already has itself (players, pitches etc.). This is different for a soccer club that also maintains contacts with other kinds of associations, i.e. that has bridging social capital regarding the type of organization. For

¹⁹ I am leaving aside here the immaterial resources that an organization may be able to offer, such as helping out with filling in forms and doing the bookkeeping, as they are not directly linked to the type of organization.

example, the club wants to celebrate its 50th anniversary with a musical event. If it also maintains contacts with a music society, it can try to organize something with it instead of hiring an expensive commercial orchestra. Zmerli and Newton (2007) found that many organizations tend to have mainly bonding social capital, which *'restricts the networking capacity of associations, and the ability to function as agents of social integration, insofar as they are mainly in contact with groups that have the same main activity as their own'* (p.171).

2.10 Linking social capital

Woolcock (2001) reasoned that as well as a distinction between bonding and bridging social capital, yet another refinement is needed. He introduced the concept of 'linking' social capital. Linking social capital is defined as *"norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power or authority gradients in society"* (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004, p. 655). Some seem to interpret linking social capital as being connections to individuals in a better position (e.g. Kim et al., 2006), but I regard it as the relationships between actors and formal institutions beyond the community (following Woolcock, 2001; Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). Based upon a number of studies (Lipsky, 1980; Narayan, 2000; Krishna, 2002), Szreter and Woolcock asserted that the links which connect the powerless to the powerful are extremely important for the welfare of the former, especially in poor communities (and as long as the powerful do not exploit these connections). In this context, Putnam (2004) found that in Italy the frequency of the contact between citizens and politicians was negatively correlated with social trust and economic growth because of the exploitative nature of the relationships.

In the current study, the linking social capital of voluntary organizations is relevant. Social capital theory ascribes an important role to the interaction of organizations with governmental bodies because this leads to the development of political trust on the part of the board, which can transfer this to its members. Of course, linking social capital does not occur in a network of interlocking directorates. In their professional capacity, civil servants do not take up a place on the board of any voluntary organization. If they did, these organizations would no longer belong to the realm of civil society. The contact network, on the other hand, can include ties between organizations and the government. When organizations apply for funding, help to implement local government policies, or co-organize events with civil servants, they encounter governmental bodies. This indicates that these organizations have linking social capital. It will be interesting to find out to what degree organizations incorporate their contacts with governmental institutions in the mobilization of the community. I expect this to depend on the attitudes of the organizations vis-à-vis the authorities; that is, whether they regard the

government as a reliable partner (which probably depends on whether they are financially supported). But I expect it to be even more dependent on the treatment of the associations by the authorities; an open, accepting and encouraging environment is more likely to lead to positive relationships between organizations and authorities than a closed, exclusive and less sympathetic one.

This brings me to the next chapter, in which I will discuss the ‘environments’ that the subjects of this study encounter. I focus on the voluntary organizations in the Turkish communities in two European capitals, Amsterdam and Berlin. The relevant environments relate to the political opportunity structures in which these associations operate. In the next chapter, I will first discuss the concept of political opportunity structures on a theoretical level. Thereafter, I will describe what they are like in the two cities under study, which will reveal that they differ considerably.

3. Political Opportunity Structures in Amsterdam and Berlin

In the previous chapters I have discussed this study's areas of interest. In particular, I explained what I understand social capital to be and that the primary focus of my research is on gaining insight into how it is used instead of merely mapping what it 'looks like'. In order to investigate the relationship between social capital and its mobilized form, I will concentrate on networks of voluntary organizations, and in particular on the networks of the Turkish ethnic communities in Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and Berlin (Germany). The reason for studying migrant communities and their voluntary associations relates, in the first place, to the roles that these organizations can play in the integration of immigrants into the host society (e.g. Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak, 2004). West European countries are currently still trying to deal with large groups of immigrants who arrived during the second half of the last century, and the role of migrant organizations is often the topic of debate. Questions such as whether or not such associations should be financially supported by the government of the host society regularly set off heated discussions. Better insight into the workings of the community of migrants and their organizations would, therefore, be helpful when it comes to defining positions in these debates. My focus is on the Turkish communities in Berlin and Amsterdam in particular because their demographic compositions match up. Their migratory backgrounds are very similar, as are their occupational and educational levels. Moreover, both communities are about the same relative size in respect to the total population of the cities in which they reside (see also the Introduction). However, the circumstances that they encounter in their respective locations are considerably different. In other words, the voluntary organizations have to operate within different political opportunity structures. Comparing the same groups in different settings will shed light on what influence the political opportunity structure has on the social capital of the respective migrant communities and the way in which it is mobilized.

The first part of this chapter contains a short exploration of the concept of political opportunity structures. Thereafter, I describe these structures in Berlin and Amsterdam, and will show that circumstances in the two cities are quite different. I will conclude this chapter by once more addressing the research questions set out in the Introduction, and by formulating some hypotheses on the relationship between the political opportunity structure, social capital and mobilized social capital.

3.1 The influx of immigrants: same challenges, different responses

Germany and the Netherlands have a comparative history when it comes to the waves of migration that the countries have faced. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the two nations were both countries of (labor) immigration. In times of economic growth they faced an increasing demand for (unskilled) workers, and the laborers required were to be found abroad. As the economic crisis developed in the early 1970s, the welcome extended to these immigrants abruptly ended. Although no new workers entered their borders, both countries did face an increase in immigration as a result of family reunification: the laborers that had arrived over the two previous decades were entitled to bring their families to join them (1970s and 1980s). Furthermore, both Germany and the Netherlands played host to substantial groups of political refugees, including those who fled the Turkish regime after the military coup in 1980. In both countries – albeit at a different rate - there was a growing awareness of the fact that many of the migrants that had intended to stay for a restricted period of time were, in fact, no longer planning to leave. As it is put in Germany: *“Sie haben Arbeiter gefragt, aber Menschen sind gekommen”* [they asked for workers, but people came]. The presence of these immigrants demanded a reaction and suitable policies from the hosting governments. Both countries had to find ways to deal with the newcomers and learn how to somehow incorporate, integrate, or assimilate – depending on the ruling climate – them into their societies. And despite the similarities in the arrival of and demands for migrant workers, the ways in which the two countries welcomed and integrated them are structurally different. The migrants in Germany and the Netherlands faced almost polar opposite *political opportunity structures* (POS).

3.2 Political opportunity structure; what is it, why is it important and what does it look like in the relevant cases?

From the 1970s onwards, the concept of political opportunity structures was developed by social movement scholars in relation to political conflict and political mobilization (e.g. Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Tarrow, 1988, 1994; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). In particular, scholars sought an explanation for the differences found between groups and places in terms of their level of conflict and political mobilization. At the time, the differences were predominantly explained within two streams of theory: rational choice and cultural determinism (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). These theories focus on the agency of the actors, while the (new) social movement scholars instead highlighted the influence of the political environment in which the actors had to act. The idea of these scholars was that the political structure largely influences the behavior and freedom of movement of the population. The general notion is that in configurations in

which individual actors are provided with easy access to political participation, and have ample opportunities to be heard through conventional channels of communication, the need to express political contention in terms of collective mobilization is dispelled. However, if these conventional channels are blocked, for example because minority groups are excluded from voting, the political configuration leaves the protesters with no option but collective mobilization. In cases where political configuration is completely closed and the insurgents are (near to) being oppressed, there will be no collective mobilization either. In summary, the relationship between the openness of the political structure and collective mobilization is supposed to be curvilinear (see Figure 3.1) (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Meyer, 2004).




Figure 3.1 Relationship between the openness of political structure and collective mobilization

Whereas the tenor of the meaning of political opportunity structures in relation to political mobilization, as described above, is generally agreed upon, a more precise definition of POS is much less univocal. Sidney Tarrow is often quoted. He describes political opportunity structures as *'consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure'* (1994; p. 85). This formally correct, yet also broad, definition leaves ample room for maneuver. The number of definitions of POS is large and they are intrinsically diverse (cf. critical reviews by Tarrow, 1996; Bousetta, 2000; Meyer, 2004; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). This mainly relates to the fact that the concept of POS is no longer only applied to the study of social movements and political conflict for which it was initially developed; it is now also used in other fields of research, such as the foundation of organizations (Morawska, 1996), Euroscepticism (Lees, 2008), and social capital (Maloney, Smith, & Stoker, 2000). Understandably, scholars adjusted their conceptions of POS and the accompanying operationalization to the objects under study. As Meyer (2004) remarked: *'many*

scholars avoid a large conceptual statement of opportunities and simply identify variables they judge to be relevant to the case at hand' (p.134).

The broad concept of POS can also be adjusted, or fine-tuned, to the circumstances of the area of work herein, namely that of migrant mobilization, ethnic political participation and the organizing process of migrant associations. For instance, Patrick Ireland (1994) defined POS in this field as *"the immigrant's legal situation, their social and political rights, citizenship and naturalization laws and broadly-defined integration policies as well as non-policies"* (in Bousetta, 2000). Parallel to for non-immigrant groups, a different degree of ethnic political mobilization and participation of migrants can be expected depending on the type of POS. According to the same logic that underlies Figure 3.1, an exclusive political opportunity structure provokes more political mobilization than an inclusive one does, while a POS that is too exclusive will also temper political action.

A number of researchers have demonstrated the importance of the POS for the establishment, life and development of immigrant organizations and ethnic mobilization (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, 2001; Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2004; Bloemraad, 2005; Vermeulen, 2006). To narrow down the wide-ranging concept of POS, Koopmans (2004) advocated that *'(c)itizenship and integration regimes act as a field-specific political opportunity structure that shapes migrant identities and their patterns of organization and political participation'* (p.452). Together with his colleague, Koopmans proposed a two-dimensional scale in which citizenship and integration regimes make up the two axes (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). The citizenship regimes refer to the degree to which full citizenship is accessible to the individual migrant; how easily can migrants be naturalized, do they have the same rights as natives, and are they regarded as part of the nation? This dimension ranges from the situation where there are no or very few opportunities for immigrants to become naturalized, to a society in which there is easy access to the new nationality. The integration policies, on the other hand, relate to the extent to which immigrants are recognized as a cultural group and are granted the accompanying rights; are migrants expected to fully adjust to the majority's culture or are they allowed to express their own background? How do the authorities respond to the ethnic and religious claims of these groups? Countries are fully exclusive when they do not allow for any expression of the cultural backgrounds of migrants and expect them to fully adjust to the dominant culture. On the other hand, they are inclusive when they stimulate this expression and tolerate different cultures living side by side.

Based on the extremes of the two dimensions, Koopmans and Statham formulated a typology that characterizes a nation's POS. They distinguished four ideal-typical conceptions of political opportunity structures: ethnic segregationism, ethnic assimilationism, civic pluralism (multiculturalism), and civic republicanism (universalism; see also Figure 3.2). The first two are based on the notion that only those with a shared ethnic background (that of the native majority) are entitled to political

rights, and it is difficult, or impossible, for newcomers to become naturalized. With *ethnic segregationism*, migrants are excluded from these political rights, but they are allowed to express their culture. This type of POS was common in the era of the guest worker programs. Governments provided workers with ample opportunities to experience their foreign culture, for example, they were often encouraged to speak their mother tongue and their children were taught in that language. However, because it was




Figure 3.2 Two-dimensional model for citizenship/ political opportunity structures
(from Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy, 2005)

expected that these laborers would return to their homelands within the foreseeable future, they were, at the same time, excluded from the political community. Nevertheless, even after the end of these guest worker programs, this philosophy can still be encountered, for example in conservative regions in Germany and Switzerland (Koopmans & Statham, 2000).

Ethnic assimilationism means that migrants are excluded from possessing political rights until they have become naturalized. Naturalization within this framework is encouraged, as long as migrants demonstrate adherence to the culture of the dominant group. Within such an environment there is no room for the expression of any culture

other than the dominant one. In other words, in this configuration both individual and group rights are hard to obtain. Germany is considered to be a country with such an assimilationist political opportunity structure. The other two conceptions of POS are based on a civic-territorial principle of access to the political system. Within *civic pluralism* (also referred to as multiculturalism in Koopmans et al. (2005)) the assignation of political rights is based on a territorial principle, i.e. once migrants have lived for at least a certain amount of time in the host country they are allowed to vote, and naturalization is relatively easy. For instance, immigrants' children who are born in the host country can be granted citizenship rights because of this. The Netherlands is often given as an example of a country with this type of POS. Furthermore, migrants are allowed, and sometimes even encouraged, to express their own culture. Finally, *civic republicanism* (also labeled 'universalism', *ibid.*) grants political rights to everyone who is living in a particular country, but does not allow the expression of ethnic differences. The notion is that there are universal rights, such as equality, which apply to everybody. This means that, at the same time, there must be strict neutrality with regard to individuals' cultural affinities, and no one can be given preferential treatment, whether they belong to either the native or the immigrant population.

There are two important points to note with regard to this typology. Firstly, given that the typology is based on a 'conceptual space' and the circumstances to which it applies obviously change, it is important to realize that a country's position in this two-dimensional space can vary over time (Koopmans et al., 2005). A new political set-up, for example, can lead to new policies which give the political opportunity structure a twist. Furthermore, one will not encounter any type of POS in its 'pure' form. It is impossible for countries to maintain a strict multicultural system, because even the idea of cultural freedom has its limits when the violation of individual human rights comes into play (for example, in the case of female circumcision). Moreover, nor will a regime that favors assimilation be able to uphold a position that immigrants have to acculturate even in the private sphere. In other words, the four extremes reflect *extremes*, but they are only approximations of reality. Nevertheless, countries do have political opportunity structures that come close to, or are based on, these extremes, and they certainly differ enough from each other to be distinguishable (Koopmans & Statham, 2000).

3.2.1 The political opportunity structure as an 'atmosphere'

I follow Koopmans et al.'s proposition by regarding the POS with respect to migrant mobilization and organization as citizenship regimes and integration policies. Their model provides a straightforward typology that shows how different countries have different ways of treating the migrant population. The two axes serve as bases upon which separate cases can easily be compared. But even by 'narrowing-down' the broad concept of POS to the relevant factors of citizenship regimes and integration policies, the

operationalization of these elements, and the POS as a whole, remains intangible. Case-specific characteristics that are crucial in one example may be absent or at least irrelevant in another. In what follows, I will present descriptions of the political opportunity structures in Berlin (Germany) and Amsterdam (the Netherlands) in as ordered a way as possible. To that end, I have listed a number of characteristics that I find to be generally indicative of the relevant citizenship regimes and integration policies, which apply as much as possible to both cases. I will discuss the political opportunity structures on the basis of the separate characteristics formulated here, but it must be noted that the POS is eventually the sum thereof. The POS can be seen as an 'atmosphere' within which actors can operate, and which can be made concrete by reference to its characteristics. The implication of the notion of the POS as an 'atmosphere' is that this complicates (but does not prevent) its use as an explanatory factor. Because the concept has many facets, it is difficult to demonstrate a direct one-on-one relationship between (particular assets of) the POS and, in this case, social capital and its mobilization. It is the configuration of the POS, namely the 'climate' within which it operates, which stimulates or prohibits the specific development or use of social capital, and only in some instances is it possible to pinpoint exactly which element(s) of the POS was (were) the direct cause(s). I will now describe the political opportunity structures of the two cases at hand. Firstly, I will focus on the general typologies that are ascribed to Germany and the Netherlands, and will thereafter concentrate on Berlin and Amsterdam in detail. Finally, I present a comparison between the two case-studies regarding the influence of the POS on the utilization of social capital in Chapter 10.

3.3 General typologies of POS in the Netherlands and Germany²⁰

In the Netherlands, there is a political opportunity structure that can, generally, be characterized as 'civic pluralist', 'multicultural' or 'inclusive' (respectively, Koopmans & Statham, 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Vermeulen & Berger, 2008). The public debate on integration has hardened since the beginning of this century, but this is not obvious in the country's policies (Koopmans, 2008). The strong conviction that there is a need for the 'preservation of migrants' cultures' has perhaps been diluted, but migrant groups are still offered ample opportunities, and are indeed encouraged, to express their cultural backgrounds (Ersanilli, 2009). Minority language teaching is no longer allowed, but female teachers are still permitted to wear headscarves. Moreover, the government explicitly advocates and welcomes non-natives working in public positions, and there are many forms of public media that are aimed at this group (Koopmans, 2008).

²⁰ I intend to provide a picture of the political opportunity structures in the two countries as they were around the time I performed my field work, i.e. 2005/2006. See also the paragraph 'points of attention'.

Scrutinizing the other axis (the individual rights) on the basis of the model presented above, it transpires that citizenship in the Netherlands is predominantly based on a territorial principle and naturalization is relatively easy. In 2003, the conditions that immigrants had to meet in order to be able to apply for naturalization were strengthened, and from that time onwards applicants cannot have a criminal record and must take a naturalization test. Nevertheless, the naturalization percentages among immigrants and their children are high. Overall, even though the POS in the Netherlands seems to be slowly sliding towards a more universalistic model, it *'remains much closer to the civic pluralist corner'* (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p.28).

The POS in Germany, at least at the federal level, is described as 'ethno-cultural assimilationist' or 'exclusive' (ibid.), although in more recent years there has been a slow shift towards a more inclusive regime: *'Germany now moves (...) along a path somewhere between ethnic assimilationism and civic pluralism'* (Koopmans & Statham, 2000, p.25). However, even though Germany is moving and shifting, it still remains in the assimilationist corner. Firstly, Germany's naturalization policies are harsh (irrespective of the new legislation that was implemented in 2000). The individual right to become a German citizen is only granted under strict rules based on, for example, length of legal stay, renouncement of the nationality of birth, and the ability to live in the country without the need for social benefits. To some extent, Germany is currently facilitating the acquisition of the German nationality – especially for children born there to migrant parents – hence the changing position in the two-dimensional model. However, whether this new legislation actually makes naturalization easier and more attractive is questionable. In any case, the *Einbürgerungsquoten* (the number of people who are naturalized compared to the number of people who could apply) from the *Statistisches Bundesamt* (2009; the Central Statistic Office) indicate that, save for a small increase in 2006, the relative number of naturalizations nationwide has decreased since 2000. In practice, there are still too many hurdles to overcome on the road to German citizenship. Secondly, the assimilationist character of the POS in Germany is also seen with respect to group rights. For example, Germany regards itself as a Christian country, and religions other than Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism are not granted the same, privileges. Furthermore, no policies that are aimed at migrant groups in particular are pursued, and nor is the formation of migrant organizations encouraged. The 'foreigners' (*Ausländer*) are recognized as a separate group, but not many facilities are available to it. Indeed, a comparative study among youths in Germany, France and the Netherlands revealed that young Turks in Germany feel more discriminated against and excluded than their counterparts in the other two countries (Ersanilli, 2009).

It is generally acknowledged that Germany and the Netherlands represent different types of citizenship regimes and have different ways of dealing with the incorporation of migrants (in the next paragraph, I will expand on these classifications since some may regard the contrast between the two countries presented above as being too harsh).

However, in countries with a decentralized governmental system, these citizenship regimes are usually pursued on the national level, whereas other policies may not be. As Vermeulen (2006) and Koopmans (2004) articulated with respect to integration policies, it is necessary to take into account that the political opportunity structure is shaped at the national as well as at the local level of government. In the German case, for example, the policies on the federal and local levels are sometimes not in line. As I will explain later in more detail, it was long the case that at the federal level the prevailing view was one of non-integration, while at the local level some politicians were convinced of the benefits of a more integrative policy (Vermeulen, 2006; Berger, 2010). In the Netherlands, the two policy levels are not so contradictory, but the local government is responsible for 80% of the minority policies pursued (Buyse & Gricevich, 2001). With a national and international comparative study (Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands), Koopmans (2004) demonstrated that variations in the POS are present between cities *within* countries, and that the differences *between* countries are even more pronounced. These are empirical arguments as to why the local as well as the national and federal policy levels have to be taken into account in the determination of the POS.

Vermeulen and Berger (2008) have demonstrated that the POS in the specific cases of the cities of Amsterdam and Berlin are clearly distinct. These divergent political opportunity structures induced me and my colleagues to use these two cities as the basis of a comparative study of migrant organizations. Given the distinct political opportunity structures, one would also expect different reactions from the migrant populations in the two locations. Vermeulen (2006), for example, has proved that the immigrant organizing processes of the same group of migrants (i.e. Turks) differ in the two cities: because of the facilities that the Amsterdam POS had to offer, the Turkish community in that city has developed a more comprehensive organizational network²¹ than the Turkish community in Berlin, where there was no policy of encouragement. A more detailed description of the political opportunity structures in the two cities will follow after I have addressed the issues which need to be taken into account when analyzing a POS.

3.4 Points of attention

The typologies of the POS in Amsterdam/the Netherlands and Berlin/Germany that I present herein are, in many ways, 'ideal typical' (some may even say they are caricatures). I certainly do not intend to present them as 'absolute' qualifications. First of all, even though the analyses of these systems are based upon rather objective measures, it is always possible that one POS has a different effect on different actors. I intend to

²¹ I.e. the network of interlocking directorates.

present the political opportunity structures in the two cities in terms of how they are relevant for the Turkish populations and, in particular, their voluntary associations. Maloney et al.(2001) are right to argue that different associations in the same context may face or perceive different political opportunity structures, for example because a particular system may discriminate against certain types of organizations or specific groups. Berger (2010) demonstrates this in the case of Berlin, where Turks, Italians and *Aussiedler* each have a different status and thus have different opportunities, even though they are all immigrant communities.

A second point concerning the contrasting qualifications of the political opportunity structures in Germany and the Netherlands relates to what is called the 'policy gap'. This notion refers to the situation where a certain policy is formulated, but practitioners eventually deviate from these guidelines. For example, the German authorities are often reproached for having a negative attitude towards migrants, for instance because there is little recognition of their needs and claims, yet low level bureaucrats may, in fact, try to develop positive relationships with these groups. The presence of a policy gap in either or both of the current case studies cannot be ruled out and, moreover, will not be investigated. The typology of the POS in Amsterdam and Berlin presented here is based on characteristics that are, as far as possible, official, objective and verifiable. As a result, the contrast between the two cases is possibly more pronounced than local practices are in fact. I do not regard this as a problem, because even if both practices converge, this will be within limits, and they will not turn out to be completely the same. Another reason why the qualifications provided here should not be adhered to too rigidly is that political opportunity structures change over time. This is particularly relevant in the current case: insight into and the outlook on immigration and integration have been high on the political agenda in recent decades, which has obviously had an impact on the POS. The empirical part of the study herein was performed in 2005 and 2006. At the start of the new millennium in particular, both Germany and the Netherlands and their political opportunity structures went through some considerable changes. In the Netherlands, it is clear that its POS has become more restrictive in the last decade, in particular after the formation of the new LPF party and the murder of its leader, Pim Fortuyn, in 2002. A *laissez-faire* attitude was replaced by a more demanding approach. In Germany, there has been movement in the opposite direction: the very strict regime that marked the POS in the 20th century has relaxed, including the implementation of a more lenient naturalization law which was passed in 2000. However, these 'shifts' in the two-dimensional sphere towards the other end of the spectrum, as suggested by Koopmans and Statham (2000, 2001), should not be exaggerated, especially not when comparing the two cases. Koopmans (2004) has already highlighted that the differences in local political opportunity structures *within* countries are much smaller than the differences *between* countries. He found that even the most liberal city in Germany was more conservative than the least liberal city in the Netherlands. Moreover, in a recent assessment of the political opportunity structures in twelve Western-European nations

in the years 1980, 1990, 2002 and 2007, Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2009) laid bare the idea that the positions of Germany and the Netherlands in the two-dimensional space of the axes of 'individual equality' and 'cultural difference' are changing, but not in relation to each other. Both Germany and the Netherlands are shown to have increased individual equality and decreased the cultural differences between immigrant and native groups. However, Germany's position remains in the section that can be characterized as the most restrictive, while the position of the Netherlands is consolidated in the quadrant reflecting an open POS.




Figure 3.3. Positions of Germany (D) and the Netherlands (Netherlands) in the two-dimensional space of individual and group rights in 1980, 1990, 2002 and 2007 (from Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel, 2009)

In summary, my point is that even though the characterization of Germany/Berlin as restrictive and the Netherlands/Amsterdam as integrative may be too strong, I do use it to emphasize the mutual differences between the two political opportunity structures. This should also be borne in mind with respect to the presentation of the POS in the two specific cities which follows²².

²² As well as my own observations, I base this on various publications by (in order of date of publication) Koopmans and Statham (2000, 2001), Buyse and Gricevich (2001), Hunger and Tränhardt (2001), Østergaard-Nielsen (2001), Penninx and Schrover (2001), Schwarz (2001), Rijkschroeff and Duyvendak

One final point should be noted when it comes to the subsequent descriptions of the political opportunity structures: I will attempt to present the state of affairs at the time that the empirical material was collected (2005-2006). As I did not always possess the data regarding those precise moments, but instead had access to that from earlier or later times, it is difficult to objectively determine the continued effect of policy measures taken in the past. I have, however, made assessments of what the most probable situation in 2005-2006 would have been. For example, the naturalization law that was implemented in 2000 indicates a more open POS, but at the same time, a number of respondents were not particularly appreciative of this legislation, from which one could deduce that the consequences thereof may not be as positive as had, perhaps, been expected. Furthermore, I have already referred to the naturalization figures provided by the Statistical Bureau, which indicate that the willingness on the part of immigrants and their descendants to become German citizens is also dwindling after the relaxation of the naturalization legislation.

In what follows, I will discuss the POS in Amsterdam and Berlin successively. The characteristics upon which these descriptions are based are summarized in Table 3.1. They include the general attitude that the respective authorities display towards migrants, the status of individual rights (for naturalization and voting), the status of integration policies, the treatment of ethnic organizations (for example, whether they receive funding), and the degree to which migrant associations have access to the political system.

3.5 The political opportunity structure in Amsterdam

As already referred to, the POS in Amsterdam is described as being 'civic pluralist'. Ever since the arrival of immigrants, the universal belief in the Netherlands in general, and in Amsterdam in particular, has been that the cultures and identities of the newcomers should be preserved. The famous phrase characterizing the political outlook was 'integration while retaining their own identity and culture'. From the beginning of the 1980s, there has been growing political awareness that the migrants that were brought in to cover temporary labor shortages were not going to leave the country, and in 1983 the national 'Minorities Policy' (Minderhedenbeleid) came into effect, and was the

(2004), Koopmans et al. (2005), Pfaff and Gill (2006), Vermeulen (2006), Yurdakul (2006), Vermeulen and Berger (2008), Berger (2010), Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel (2009).

	Amsterdam	Berlin
general typology	civic pluralist (multicultural)	ethnic assimilationism (shifting towards more integration)
attitude regarding 'other'	cultural identities recognized: preservation of minority cultures after 2002: more demanding	little appreciation and tolerance of cultural diversity: pressure to assimilate and adjust
general discourse	"integration while retaining own identity and culture" Since 2000: emphasis on social-economic integration	long time: "Germany is not a country of immigration" since 2000/2004: more multicultural but still strict demands
status of integration policy	explicit integration policy 80% integration policy at local level	implicit policy integration policy is regional (Berlin is region)
attitude regarding migrant organizations	immigrant organizations helpful for emancipation, so stimulated	the right to establish migrant organization, but under strict state supervision; distrustful attitude Ausländerbeauftragte stimulating role
funding of migrant organizations	initially: every organization eligible for subsidies, except political and religious funding included in the minority policies later: mainly specific activities, often under condition of inter-organizational collaboration	subsidy not included in immigration policy only 'happy few' eligible organizations subsidies only for specific projects carried out by a selection of organizations
minority councils	national Turkish council IOT multi-ethnic migrant councils in several city districts status: consultative, little influence on policy making	no state initiated national council ²³ Ausländerbeiräte on city district level status: marginal and powerless
access to political system	interaction between civil servants and politicians and migrant organizations immigrant organizations included in policy making process	no access to political system, greater demand for politically active community immigrant organizations play marginal role, more room for recognized religious organizations (not Islam) Ausländerbeauftragte (city wide)
migrants in political positions	Turkish politicians in city and city district councils	few Turkish representatives, only in city council
accessibility of nationality	relatively easy, although increasingly strict more and more conditions	difficult and not very common since 2000 new law, facilitating in particular newborns
voting rights for migrants	at municipal level after 5 years of legal residence	no voting rights

Table 3.1 Overview of political opportunity structure indicators in Amsterdam and Berlin in 2005/2006

²³ In November 2006 (after the period of data collection) the Minister of the Interior did set up an Islam Conference. See also page 17.

embodiment of the aforementioned motto. The city of Amsterdam adopted the national policy, and in later years municipal and national policy changes came into effect more or less simultaneously, although not in all respects. For example, in the 1990s, the national Minorities Policy was replaced by a policy of diversity that no longer focused on the emancipation and support of different minority groups and abandoned the notion of arrangement along ethnic lines. Instead, this policy was aimed at stimulating the social-economic positions of deprived people, whether they be natives or immigrants. In practice, however, the local governments retained their focus on specific groups, even though this approach contradicted the general “tough on integration” discourse of national policies at the time (Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008). The local governments were able to do this because about 80% of the country’s policies on integration are pursued at the local level.

The changes in national and local policies were the result of a general hardening of the public attitude towards the presence and integration of immigrants. The rise of a new right-wing political party, the LPF, which took a clear stance on integration and immigration issues, and the murder of its leader (Pim Fortuyn), have accelerated the transition from a more pampering to a more demanding atmosphere. On the other hand, the actual consequences of this new climate are relatively limited at the current time: Koopmans et al. (2009) showed that the overall score of an extensive set of indicators of individual equality and cultural recognition has decreased very little.

The Minorities Policy that was valid for two decades included a prominent position in favor of the establishment and support of migrant organizations. The multicultural ideal implied that it was necessary to provide group specific services and that these were best delivered through migrant associations. In line with the former political arrangement of pillarization (*Verzuiling*), which meant that groups with different philosophies on life (Catholics, Protestants, socialists and ‘liberals’) should each provide their own services, such as newspapers, hospitals, schools and organizations, it was argued that this approach would help migrants to form their own ‘pillar’. They were encouraged to set up organizations under which to unite, and more importantly to make available contacts who the government could address. In the old system of pillarization, the communication between the pillars took place at the elite level, i.e. between the organizations’ leaders, so if newcomers were able to organize themselves, they would also be more approachable. The local government provided subsidies to stimulate the establishment of ethnic associations. In the 1980s and 1990s, every organization was, in principle, eligible for grants, except for political and religious associations because of the separation of the Church and State. However, since large groups of the migrant population were Muslims, and organized themselves along Islamic lines, the Dutch government felt compelled to somehow include religious associations in its policies. These organizations were therefore encouraged to establish social-cultural counterparts which could be financed as secular organizations. In general, the Muslim population has ample opportunities for religious expression, precisely because of the system of

pillarization. The right to a private education, for example, allows the establishment of Islamic schools, as long as they meet the criterion of providing a good education as formulated by the Ministry of Education. Indeed, they even receive financial support from the national government.

The subsidies granted under the *Minorities policy* were mainly fundamental and structural in nature. In more recent years, however, the policy has changed and associations do not often receive the latter type of funding anymore. Instead, only specific activities are financed, on condition that organizations collaborate with those formed by other ethnic groups.

Another way in which the Dutch government tried to keep in contact with immigrant groups was, and is, through migrant councils. In the case of the Turkish community, the *Inspraak Orgaan Turken*, in which different Turkish federations united and collaborated on a number of issues, was established at the national level in 1984. A year later, the Amsterdam government created a local Turkish council, the TDM, in which Turkish organizations of various denominations were brought together. The intention was that because of the different backgrounds of the participating associations, the government would acquire as much information as possible about the Turkish community, which would, in turn, feel represented. Alas, it was precisely the great diversity, or actually the many differences of opinion, between the assembled organizations that made the TDM fall apart: the tension between the participants often became so great that it was not possible to reach agreement. In 2003, the TDM was dissolved²⁴. During the interviews I held in 2005, some respondents said that they were setting up a new Turkish council in Amsterdam (*Inspraakorgaan Turken Amsterdam*, ITA), but although they did receive a small amount of funding in 2006²⁵, this body has not become a major player.

In some city districts, the local government installed migrant councils in which immigrant organizations of different ethnic backgrounds could confer about relevant topics. However, participation is not open to every interested party: it is the city district that decides whether organizations are able to take part. In the Bos en Lommer area of the city, for example, only the organizations that receive subsidies from the city district are approved. The migrant councils in these districts are principally intended to provide (un)asked-for advice to the city districts, and they have very little influence on the development of policy, although research has shown that the impact of the TDM and the IOT in the nineties was greater than that of any individual Turkish organization (Raamnota, 1989). A study by Poppelaars (2007), on the other hand, revealed that local government officials often engage in close contact with migrant organizations because, amongst other things, this facilitates the implementation of (new) policies upon which

²⁴ Source: Gemeentebld 2003 afd. 3A nr. 155/410

²⁵ Source: Evaluatie van de Bijzondere Subsidieverordening Integratie en Participatie (2007). Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, Gemeente Amsterdam

these bodies can provide advice about how mere proposals can be transformed into workable projects (Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008).

The final element of the POS in Amsterdam that is relevant for the functioning of migrant organizations is whether they have any representatives active in local politics. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) demonstrated that the number of black politicians in the US Congress was negatively related to the number of civil rights and black protest and advocacy organizations that are formed each year. The authors hypothesized that black congressional representation is assessed by social movement leaders as a sign of the openness of the normal political structure, implying that conventional ways of influencing politics and policies are more attractive than non-conventional protest activities. This would underline the general curvilinear relationship between the openness of a political structure and the existence of collective mobilization. In the current cases, it would mean that the presence of Turkish politicians at the city district and municipal levels would decrease the need for urgent community mobilization. Table 3.2 sets out the number of Turkish representatives elected in the 2002 and 2006 local elections in Amsterdam. The percentages of the representatives in the councils clearly correspond to the percentage of Turkish inhabitants in the city in the years 2002 and 2006 (respectively 5% and 5.2%).

Year		Amsterdam	Berlin
2002	City council	4 (8.9%)	-
2002	City districts	16 (5.0%)	-
2006	City council	3 (6.6%)	6 (4.0%)
2006	City districts	22 (6.8%)	-

Table 3.2 Number of Turkish representatives in Amsterdam and Berlin (percentage of total; from Vermeulen and Berger, 2008)

With respect to the citizenship regime as it relates to the individual rights of newcomers (the second of the two axes in Koopmans et al.'s model; see Figure 3.1 on p. 67), the accessibility of nationality and the right to vote are crucial indicators. In the Netherlands, both of these elements are national measures that also apply in Amsterdam. The Netherlands used to be known as a country in which it was relatively easy to be naturalized. However, as the political climate has hardened in more recent years, the demand for naturalization has increased. Currently, the main requirements that foreigners who want to become Dutch have to meet are²⁶: at least five years of legal residence in the Netherlands, no criminal record, passing the *inburgeringsexamen* (civic integration examination) which tests speaking, reading, writing and understanding of Dutch, and whether a candidate is '*ingeburgerd*', i.e. has knowledge of the ruling customs

²⁶ As noted in the brochure of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Netherlands (2007): *Hoe kunt u Nederlander worden? (How to become Dutch)* Retrieved in March 2009 from www.ind.nl.

in the country. The final demand is the willingness to renounce one's former nationality, although the candidate is not obliged to do so if the country of origin does not permit this, or if it would lead to a demonstrable loss of rights that would financially damage the candidate (such as loss of an inheritance). The introduction of the civic integration examination in 2007 in particular caused a great deal of concern, and is a stumbling block for many candidates. At the same time, this test is a clear sign that the citizenship regime in the Netherlands has become stricter.

A migrant's right to vote was introduced in the Netherlands in 1986, which made the country one of the first in Europe to include this group in the electoral process. Since then, immigrants who have legally resided in the Netherlands for five years or more are permitted to vote in elections at the local level, i.e. municipal, and in the case of Amsterdam also at the city district level. They also have the right to stand in local elections.

Overall, the political opportunity structure in Amsterdam is characterized by a government that is sympathetic towards migrant organizations and provides them with ample financial and political opportunities, even though the official regime has recently become stricter. Given this favorable attitude, it is expected that the voluntary associations in Amsterdam will have substantial amounts of social capital, i.e. the contact network in Amsterdam is large and there are many ties between actors. This should become clear particularly in comparison to the social capital of organizations in Berlin, which operate within a much harsher political opportunity structure.

3.6 The political opportunity structure in Berlin

The political opportunity structure in Berlin has a considerably different configuration compared to the one in Amsterdam. First of all, the attitude of the German government towards newcomers at the national level is very different to the Dutch approach. The POS in Germany is generally described as ethnic assimilationism: immigrants are allowed to practice their own culture, but they are excluded from the political system. This obviously means that people living in Germany who do not have German nationality are not allowed to vote at any level²⁷. Secondly, it is difficult to obtain German nationality, although the requirements that have to be fulfilled have been relaxed since the start of the century. Until 2000, German nationality was based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*: only for people who have German 'blood' (*sanguis*), i.e. have German ancestors. This implied that the guest workers who arrived in the 1960s from Italy, Turkey and other countries, would never be able to legally become German, and would never be allowed to participate conventionally in the political process. In 2000,

²⁷ The only exception is that EU-citizens without German nationality are allowed to vote at the local level.

however, the legislation concerning naturalization was adapted, mainly regarding the rights of second and subsequent generations of immigrants. Those who want to become naturalized must: have been living in Germany for at least 8 years, have no criminal record, pass a language test, cannot be reliant on social benefits, be willing to give up their former nationality. The new legislation only allows children born in Germany after 2000 to non-German parents who have lived in the country for 8 or more years to have dual citizenship. When they are aged between 18 and 23, these children have to decide whether they want to keep the German or the other nationality, since dual citizenship is not possible for German adults. Despite this liberalization of the naturalization laws, many have protested against the refusal of dual citizenship. One of the slogans used was '*Doppelpass für die Doppelrealität*' (double nationality for the double reality), referring to the fact that many migrants were not able or willing to give up their original nationality, but did want to become German citizens. This is also visible in the fact that the predicted growth of naturalization figures has failed to occur (see above). All in all, naturalization in Germany is still relatively difficult and uncommon, particularly when compared to other EU countries (Koopmans, 2004).

The legal hurdles that apply to naturalization are congruent with the general approach to immigrants in Germany. There is very little appreciation and tolerance of cultural diversity and the pressure to assimilate and adjust to the dominant culture is significant. The general idea in the first few decades after the first influx of migration was that the new arrivals had two choices: 'integration or departure'. For a long time, the German approach was based on the idea that '*Germany is not a country of immigration*' (a well-known phrase in the Helmut Kohl era, 1982-1998), despite the fact that it had for years been one of the most important destinations worldwide for migrants (Immerfall, 2008). It was around the turn of the millennium that the government became convinced of the fact that Germany had to deal with the large groups of immigrants who had arrived in recent decades and who were clearly staying and watching their children grow-up. The reluctance of the German government to change is directly related to the fact that the issue of integration has not been a separate policy domain for many years. The policies that were pursued were always part of other more encompassing policy areas, and generally concerned restrictive measures against the growth of the immigrant population. It was only in 2005 that a more encompassing law was implemented. The initiative for the law was taken by the, at the time, left-wing coalition between the social-democrat party, the SPD, and the green party, *Die Grünen*. The new legislation was the result of a process that had started years before. In 2000, Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder (SPD) wanted to welcome highly skilled computer professionals into the country, and to that end he launched a Green Card Program. This was taken as a starting point for a debate on the position of Germany as a country of immigration. An impartial committee was established by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and was charged with developing solutions and recommendations regarding more encompassing regulation of immigration and integration. At the same time, parties in

congress produced their own draft bills (Goethe Institut, 2009). The result of many years of deliberation and navigation between the demands of parties which wanted to stimulate the influx of highly skilled workers and those which wanted a strict limitation on immigration in general, was a compromise that was reached in 2004. The Immigration and Integration Act was accepted and implemented from the 1st January 2005²⁸. This meant that for the first time in German history political account was taken of the fact that the country was dealing with immigrants and integration issues. In some respects, the act entailed a relaxation of the law, since it included major improvements to the legal positions of migrants, in particular refugees²⁹. On the other hand, it also encompassed other, relatively strict, demands, for example, requiring foreign residents who receive unemployment benefits or '*who ha[ve] not yet managed to integrate into the economic, cultural and social life of the Federal Republic of Germany without state help*'³⁰ to take integration courses. In other words, even though the new legislation suggested some improvements in the position of immigrants, it also involved some tightening of the law. Ultimately, the legislation remained more exclusive than inclusive.

The city-state of Berlin has always adopted relatively progressive integration policies compared to the federal approach. The policy in Berlin was able to deviate from the federal course because such policies in Germany are mainly formulated at the regional level. Berlin is a city-state and thus can formulate her own integration policy. The fact that Berlin's policies were more progressive is attributed to both the role of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* (Commissioner for Foreigners), which was established by the Senate of Berlin in the early 1980s, and in particular to Barbara John, who filled this position. By the time John gave up the role, the political climate regarding migrants in Germany, and Berlin in particular, had become much more multicultural than it had been at the time of her inauguration.

The *Ausländerbeauftragte* has an ambivalent status in Berlin politics. On the one hand, it is the intermediary between politicians and migrants and, as such, has a crucial position; one of its most important tasks is to articulate the interests of migrants. On the other hand, the *Ausländerbeauftragte* has only a limited budget and no formal power. CDU-politician Barbara John (Christian Democrats) was the *Ausländerbeauftragte* for twenty years and is held by many as being personally responsible for the progressive integration course that Berlin took. Despite the restrictive policy measures of the federal CDU government (her own party) and the precarious position of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* in the political arena, John promoted the integration of migrants by stimulating naturalization (Berlin had higher naturalization figures than any other

²⁸ By 2007, the legislation already knew several adjustments, which shows how much the initial law was the result of endless compromises.

²⁹ www.zuwanderung.de of the Federal Ministry of the Interior

³⁰ As stated on the website of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: www.integration-in-deutschland.de

city in Germany) and actively reaching out to migrant groups and their organizations. In practice, this meant that (only) a select group of organizations received funding from the *Ausländerbeauftragte*. The *Ausländerbeauftragte* had access to the (Turkish) community through these strategically chosen bodies, and because it was the main access point to the political system for these migrant organizations, their support legitimized the role and position of the *Ausländerbeauftragte* itself. Other than through the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, migrant organizations have little financial support available to them; subsidies are not included in immigration policy. Sometimes, the *Land Berlin* or the city districts (through the *Stadtteilmanagement* (city district management)) provide small amounts of money, but the lion's share of funds are provided by the *Ausländerbeauftragte*. Furthermore, the subsidies are only handed out for particular projects carried out by the organizations, and not for the organizations themselves. In 2003, Günter Piening (from the green party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) took over the position of the *Ausländerbeauftragte*³¹. The name of the role has also been changed into the *Integrationsbeauftragte*, which emphasizes the foreignness of the immigrant population much less, and instead focuses much more on the integrative aims of the Commissioner.

Save for the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, who is actively reaching out to at least some of the migrant communities, the attitude of the government towards immigrant organizations in Berlin is generally typified as relatively 'hostile' (Gesemann, 2001; Vermeulen, 2006). Migrants have the right to establish associations, but they are under the strict surveillance of the state. This means that their activities are regularly tracked by the *Verfassungsschutz* and board relationships are scrutinized. This also results in some organizations being banned, such as the religious Milli Görüş movement. Islamic organizations in general are, to a large degree, ignored by the (local) authorities: there is hardly any official contact between them and politicians and they do not receive any financial support. It was only in November 2006 that the Minister of the Interior initiated the *Islamkonferenz* (Islam Conference), which is intended to collaboratively further the integration of the Muslim population and lead to a 'German Islam'³². Half of the participants are fifteen (German) regional and federal politicians, while the other half consists of representatives of Muslim organizations (five) and ten '*nicht-organisierte*' Muslims, practicing or otherwise, who are active in the public debate, are not related to any organization, and may take a critical stance towards Islam. The *Islamkonferenz* is not without controversy: even after the first meeting critics cast doubt

³¹ How much Barbara John and the office of *Ausländerbeauftragte* were entwined can be seen from the stream of criticism that came straight after the appointment of Piening and still continues six years later (Köhler, 2004; Geithe, 2009). Moreover, during the interviews that I held in 2005, it was John who was referred to in particular.

³² On the website of the *Islamkonferenz* it says: "*Ziel (...) eine bessere religions- und gesellschaftspolitische Integration der muslimischen Bevölkerung und ein gutes Miteinander aller Menschen in Deutschland, gleich welchen Glaubens.*" www.deutsch-islam-konferenz.de

on the participant organizations (the conservative Muslim communities would only join the *Konferenz* to gain official recognition³³, but have no intention of integrating into German society) and the outcomes (because of internal differences there would never be any consensus on a course of action).

Migrant organizations in Berlin do not have many opportunities to relate to governmental institutions, and there is no federal migrant council as there is in the Netherlands. On the local level, there are '*Ausländerbeiräte*' (migrant councils) in several city districts, but their status is marginal and they are powerless. The city district officials decide which organizations are permitted to participate in the councils, which leads to the exclusion of the more conservative associations. Migrant organizations are not included at all in the policy making process and very little in the implementation of policy. At the city district level, the Quartiersmanagement organizations (meant to solve social inequality problems in Berlin³⁴) collaborate, to a greater or lesser degree, with local associations on specific projects, but this partnership does not have a structural basis.

In general, migrant organizations have limited access to the political system. Not only are they rarely included in the political process, but there are also relatively few migrant, in this case Turkish, politicians. In Table 3.2 above it can be seen that only the city council has a small percentage of Turkish politicians. The figure of 4% is slightly less than the average of 5.5% of Turkish inhabitants in Berlin in 2006. It is argued that the demand for a politically active community is high due to the limited amount of political access (see also Figure 3.1 at the beginning of this chapter), but whether this is indeed the case will be considered later in this book.

The political opportunity structure in Berlin thus distinguishes itself from the one in Amsterdam by being harsher as migrants and their descendants in the former city have less cultural and group rights than in the latter. If contact networks are influenced by the POS in a similar way to how networks of interlocking directorates are affected, one would expect to find a less extensive contact network in Berlin than in Amsterdam. However, an alternative scenario is that because there are fewer financial resources, and because of the negative climate concerning migrants and their organizations, associations have a tendency to flock together. In that case, the contact network in Berlin would be larger and the actors there would have more social capital. In what follows, I

³³ This refers to the recognition of a religion as a *Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts* (corporation of public law). When a religion is officially and legally recognized, which can only be achieved by a decision of a court, it has the right to: raise taxes, receive endowments, be granted pastoral care in public institutions, receive social welfare supported by the state and religious instruction in state schools (Jonker, 2000). Currently, only the Lutheran and Catholic Churches and the Jewish community have the *Körperschaftsstatus*. Several Islamic organizations have attempted to gain, but have been denied, this status.

³⁴ Also see page note 59 on page 146, and page 153.

will theorize a little more on what scenarios can be expected when it comes to the relationships between the POS, social capital and its mobilization.

3.7 Political opportunity structure – social capital – mobilized social capital

The relevance of the POS on the immigrant organizing process in Amsterdam and Berlin has been demonstrated by Vermeulen (2006). He revealed that the political opportunity structures in the two cities are determinative of the number of migrant organizations and the interconnections between them, expressed as interlocking directorates. The inclusive POS in Amsterdam, with the availability of subsidies, facilitated the foundation of organizations. Furthermore, the fact that government officials encouraged Islamic groups to also set up non-religious bodies increased the number of interlocks between them, since in many cases the board members of the new organizations were also on the boards of existing ones. The hostile attitude of the German government, as expressed in the lack of easily accessible funds and a strict surveillance policy, has led migrants to establish fewer organizations, and those that have been formed refrained from making any interconnections. The POS had no clear effect on the *types* of organizations that were established in the two cities, which can be seen from the fact that, in that respect, the two communities evolved in a similar manner.

The current study is concerned with the social capital of migrant organizations (translated into the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network) and the way in which they mobilize it. This process of mobilization cannot be regarded separately from the context in which it exists. The course of the mobilization is determined by the shape of the social capital itself as well as by the larger structure (context), namely the political opportunity structure that sets the institutional boundaries within which the organizations have room to navigate. The theoretical relationships between the context, social capital and mobilized social capital are depicted in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4 Theoretical relationships between POS, social capital and mobilized social capital

3.7.1 Relationship I

Relationship I, which lies between the POS and social capital, has been tested by Vermeulen and his colleagues in terms of the network of interlocking directorates, and was proved to be positive: a stimulating POS leads to more a more extensive and better connected network of shared board memberships. However, the influence of the POS on the other element of what I define as social capital, i.e. the contact network, remains to be examined. This may be either absent, positive or negative, and need not be the same as the relationship between the context and the network of interlocking directorates. A positive relationship could be seen in the fact that the associations that are included in a dialogue with the government (for example through subsidies, migrant councils and the like) have a more extensive circle of acquainted organizations than those who are excluded. If this is indeed the case, and as a result of the city's inclusive POS, this would be confirmed by the organizations in Amsterdam having more social capital than those in Berlin, where there is an exclusive POS. But if the organizations that are included in this dialogue refrain from making contact with other organizations, perhaps because they do not need them because they draw their resources from the government, this would mark a negative relationship between the POS and the contact network. In this scenario, a more exclusive context stimulates the mutual bonds between organizations, resulting in a more extensive contact network. In a more inclusive POS, however, the need to stick together may be less pressing, thus leading to a more confined contact network. This would imply that the actors in Berlin have more social capital than those in Amsterdam and that the former have more ethnic bonding social capital.

3.7.2 Relationships II and III

The process of mobilizing one's social capital can depend on several factors. The most important aspect is the shape of the social capital at hand. In other words, if, for example, an organization has more social capital this means that it could potentially mobilize more organizations than is the case if it has little. If this is the case, it would imply that Relationship II is positive. On the other hand, the opposite may also be true: associations that have many contacts may be more selective in their choices of which other organizations to mobilize, while those that have only a few contacts may be inclined to utilize them all. In that case, the relationship between social capital and its mobilized form is negative. Given what is already known about the networks of interlocking directorates in the two cities, it seems that the community in Amsterdam contains more social capital than the one in Berlin. Assuming that the contact networks resemble these formal networks, a positive relationship between social capital and mobilized social capital would imply that the mobilization in Amsterdam will be more extensive, whereas the opposite scenario would lead to a more comprehensive mobilization in Berlin. However, it first remains to be seen whether the organizations in Berlin do indeed have less social capital.

Furthermore, as the mobilization of a network takes place within a wider context, the political opportunity structure that could affect the shape of the social capital may be an influence on the mobilization process as well, albeit directly (Relationship III) or indirectly. A positive effect of an open POS would be when migrant councils set up by the government stimulate the connections between the participants in such a way that they turn to each other during the mobilization process. This would mean that the actors who are members of any of the migrant councils would address their fellow members. A negative influence of the POS would be that an open structure provides so much room for the organizations that they become pacified: they may not feel the need to mobilize any other organization because they assume that the government will take care of things. From this perspective, the actors may instead address governmental organizations or officials during the mobilization. If this is the case, this should be visible in Amsterdam.

In a closed POS, where associations are left to their own devices, it is to be expected that organizations are used to taking care of business themselves and, because of this, have developed a way of mobilizing many of the community's associations. This would manifest itself when a significant proportion of (ethnic bonding) social capital is mobilized in the Turkish community in Berlin.

Based on the literature on social movements discussed at the beginning of this chapter, one would expect to find a closed POS having a stimulating effect on the mobilization process (because organizations cannot expect anything from the government, they have to take care of things themselves), and an open POS having a

pacifying influence. This would mean that mobilization will proceed more vigorously in Berlin than in Amsterdam.

3.8 To the empirical parts

In the next two sections of this book (Chapters 4-6 and Chapters 7-9) I will present the empirical results of my fieldwork. I will first explain how I gathered the information on the contact networks (Chapter 4), and then in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively, I draw a picture of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin and their social capital. The second empirical part of this work is the true spearhead of this study because it concerns the data on how the two communities mobilize their social capital. In Chapter 7, I explain what I regard as mobilization and how I have tested it by means of an experiment. The two chapters which follow contain the results and the interpretation thereof. The comparison of the two cases can be found in the final part of the book (Chapter 10).

4. Collecting Social Capital Network Data

As I explained in Chapter 2, I consider social networks to be the most important pillar of social capital, ahead of trust and shared norms and values. Furthermore, I argued that the social capital of migrant organizations consists of the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network. The former reveals the formal connections between organizations, while the latter highlights the informal links. The networks of interlocking directorates are based on data gathered by my colleagues (Vermeulen, 2006; Slijper, forthcoming), and I will describe their methods and results at the end of this chapter. Firstly, however, I will explain how I gathered my data on the contact networks and why I used the selected method. The contact networks are reflections of the everyday connections that exist between organizations, and the most straightforward way of listing these is to simply ask respondents who they know. Indeed, the most common method of mapping social networks is the use of surveys or questionnaires. Other approaches, ranging from archival data to participant observation and even experiments, are much less frequently utilized or investigated. I will consider these in Chapter 7. In this chapter, however, I will focus on the (dis)advantages of using questionnaires to gather network data, as well as on the different kinds of this instrument that exist. In fact, the questionnaires about social capital and social networks that are available are all aimed at individuals, and not at any other entities that could be regarded as individual actors, such as organizations. Therefore, based on the findings and recommendations from previous research, I will present a questionnaire that I have designed which is tailored to the specific situation of migrant bodies. Furthermore, this chapter contains an overview of how the questionnaire was implemented, as well as the response rates in Berlin and Amsterdam. In the following two chapters (5 and 6) I will discuss the contact networks in the two cities.

4.1 Towards an appropriate questionnaire

Social capital research revolves around the number and type of alters, and in particular the resources that these can provide. There are several questionnaires available that emphasize one of these three elements.

The most well-known way of mapping social networks is by means of a question that is also included in the General Social Survey and the World Values Survey. It simply

asks the respondent about his/her most important alters³⁵. The exact phrasing in the GSS is: *'Looking back over the last six months -- who are the people with whom you discussed matters important to you?'* (Burt,1985). Up to five people can be named. The advantages of a simple question like this one are that it can easily be incorporated into a longer questionnaire and it takes little time and effort to answer. The disadvantage is that it does not yield an exhaustive picture of the respondent's network because of the limited number of possible answers. But even if respondents did have the opportunity to name as many alters as they wished, a single question would still lead to a serious underestimation of a participant's network and network size, simply because people tend to forget large sections of their circle of acquaintances. I will return to this subject later on in this chapter.

Marin (2004) has raised additional objections to this single question approach to assessing a social network. She compared the responses elicited by the free recall question from the GSS ('name anyone you want', without a restriction on the number of alters) to those generated by a number of questions and prompts (triggers to encourage respondents to think of people with particular features). It transpired that the latter approach yielded a longer list of acquaintances than the simpler query did. Her research also demonstrated that a single question leads egos to mainly name closer ties, alters who they have known for a relatively long time, and those about whom they know more. In other words, they tend to name their bonding social capital at the expense of their bridging social capital. This is an undesirable effect. The solution Marin suggests is to use multiple questions, although she appropriately remarks that even a more extensive questionnaire does not necessarily produce a correct representation of an actual circle of acquaintances, even though it does garner more information. Self-reported data, almost by definition, contains errors and lacunas. It is important for researchers, and network researchers are no exception, to be aware of this, but this knowledge should not prevent them from using this kind of information.

4.1.1 Multifaceted questionnaires

The alternative approach that Marin used to check the validity of the single query network measure was to ask people a series of questions about a number of contexts in which they would be expected to think of different acquaintances. This is an old and well-known trick in the social sciences, for example in psychology. Complex constructs are studied with a range of questions that ask, more or less, the same thing, but each one touches upon a slightly different aspect of the construct. For instance, instead of asking a general question: 'are you happy?' one could also ask: 'are you happy at work?', '... at home?', '... with your friends?' etc. This provides not only a more balanced, but also a

³⁵ Common terminology in social network analysis is the reference to a focal actor as the 'ego' and the actors that are related to the ego as his/her 'alters'.

more complete picture of the construct that the researcher is interested in, in this case happiness. The same applies to questions that ask about people's networks. Instead of asking one general question ('can you name everybody you know?'), several differentiated ones can be used; for example: who are your family members, who are your colleagues and who are your friends? By explicitly pointing respondents in several directions, it is likely that they will, spontaneously, come up with more alters. Depending upon the aim of the research, the questions can be even more focused on a specific domain. A study on work related support could ask 'who are your direct colleagues?', 'who is your boss?' etc. Similarly, in a study like the current one, it is possible to ask about the social capital that is relevant to organizations: 'with which organizations do you share your accommodation?' or 'does your organization ever receive invitations to activities held by other organizations and, if so, which ones?' The questionnaire used in the current study also relied on a series of questions that tapped into different aspects of the daily life of organizations. This led to the respondents coming up with a wider range of alters.

4.1.2 Type of questions: focus on resources or on network

There are two approaches that can be fruitful when it comes to mapping social capital from a network perspective. Given the definition of social capital as 'resources embedded in a social structure', one could focus on the network structure itself. Alternatively, the concentration could be on the embedded resources. Both approaches are accepted methods of research which yield interesting results, but there are some differences between them with respect to the conclusions that can be reached.

4.1.3 Resource and position generators

Research that focuses on the resources available to a respondent (ego) can use what is called a resource or position generator. Both types of questionnaire are used to 'generate' responses which indicate whether or not an ego possesses particular 'expressions' of social capital. As the name implies, the questions in resource generators are very clearly aimed at the (social) resources of ego. 'Do you know anyone who ... owns a car?', '... can give you medical advice?', '... can speak a foreign language?', and '... can borrow you a large sum of money?' (van der Gaag & Snijders, 2003). The most important characteristic of this type of questionnaire is that it contains concrete references to particular assets. Position generators, on the other hand, are based on the idea that different professions are connected to a certain social status within a society, and these also provide access to particular resources. The social capital of a respondent is then deduced from the professions of his/her alters. Position generators include

questions such as: 'Do you know anybody who is a doctor?' 'Do you know anybody who is postman?' 'Do you know anyone who is a manager?' (Lin & Dumin, 1986; van der Gaag, Snijders, & Flap, 2008) .

Resource and position generators are very direct measures with which to uncover social capital; they are instruments that get to the very core of the concept. In light of the aims of the current study, these tools, nevertheless, have two important disadvantages. Firstly, position (and to a lesser extent resource) generators are best tailored to the social capital of individuals (people). They include references to clear characteristics (namely professions) that can be easily connected to specific resources, although this is always based on assumptions, e.g. that a professor has more, or at least different, social capital to a road worker. However, my interest is in the social capital of organizations, and it is much more difficult to create a general typology of features that can be ascribed thereto. Secondly, position and resource generators yield information about whether the ego (whether it is a single person or an organization) has access to specific resources *in general*. What or who is the 'source' of these resources will remain unclear. So, if an attempt is being made to interpret a network of interlocking directorates and compare it to an everyday-life-network, position and resource generators won't provide enough information, but a 'name generator' will. Van der Gaag et al. (2008) concluded likewise that *'when specific questions about the influence of network structure on social capital outcomes need to be studied it [the name generator, LP] is ... the only measurement option, since it is the only method that identifies network members'* (p.45).

4.1.4 Name generators

The other approach to the network measurement of social capital, which focuses on the network structure, overcomes both of the drawbacks of the resource and position generators. Name generating questions can be used to map a network. These are like the question that is posed in the GSS (as referred to above), and they ask for the names of ego's alters. Most questionnaires contain several name generating questions, and the literature on social capital measurement from a network perspective provides many examples. 'Who have you socialized with in the last 6 months?' (Moore, Shiell, Haines, Riley, & Collier, 2005), 'Do you know anyone who you go to for social visits?' (van der Gaag & Snijders, 2003), 'With whom do you discuss work decisions?' (McCallister & Fischer, 1978) are all questions that are part of name generator questionnaires containing between four (Moore et al., 2005) and thirteen (van der Gaag & Snijders, 2003) items.

McCallister and Fischer (1978), who also implemented a name generator questionnaire, concluded that the instrument they had developed was flexible; depending on the aim of the study, more or less emphasis can be placed on specific kinds

of ties. A study of neighborhood cohesion, for example, could use a name generator that contains more questions about (in)direct neighbors related to a range of activities that play an important role in that kind of relationship. The questionnaire used in the current study will, in a similar vein, include questions about the relationships that organizations maintain with other organizations instead of about the internal relationships between the organization and its members. Furthermore, as I have already explained, it is better to use multiple questions which each tap into a different part of an ego's network. A name generator, therefore, should include questions that emphasize similar, yet distinct, aspects of a social network. This notion of covering a wide ranging network is also applied in the questionnaire utilized herein.

Name generators are often combined with name interpreter questions. These delve into the characteristics of the (ties to) alters that an ego has mentioned. Name interpreter questions are meant to shed light on the nature of the relationship between ego and his/her alters, as well as revealing some of the personal characteristics of the latter (see for example Kirke, 1996; Dodds, Muhamad, & Watts, 2003). These questions include: *'how often do you meet [alter]?' and 'what is your relationship with [alter]?' These are measures of the frequency or intensity of the relationship. Queries like 'what is [alter]'s nationality?' or 'what kind of job does [alter] have?' both establish the resources that are embedded in ego's network. Sometimes, the respondent is also asked to indicate the nature of the relationship between the alters that he/she has mentioned: 'are A and B: family, friends, colleagues, etc.?' I have, therefore, used some name interpreting questions in the current study. The respondents were asked to indicate the ethnicity of (of the organization or the contact person) and the frequency of contact with (ranging from daily to almost never) their alters. The responses to these questions were not as clear cut as I had anticipated and, with the benefit of hindsight, I had to dismiss all of this kind of information because there was too much data missing to enable me to reach sound conclusions. Instead, I collected information about the alters after the questionnaires had been completed. The analyses of the bonding and bridging social capital required data about the location, ethnicity and type of organization to which all network actors belonged. This was found in the database of the Chamber of Commerce, on the websites of organizations themselves, and via the use of search engines on the Internet.*

This overview of the measurement of social capital by way of questionnaires provided the framework for the development of the instrument that I utilized in the current study. The next paragraph, therefore, contains a detailed description thereof.

4.2 Current study: the questionnaire

The questionnaire is based on a range of situations and resources that a voluntary organization may encounter or need in its everyday practice. These concerned events in several domains, for example with respect to finances, social cultural issues and politics. Eventually, I selected 18 name-generating questions, most of which were posed during the first part of the interview, while some were interwoven throughout the questionnaire. The complete questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1, but I will now discuss the questions that were asked in more detail.

4.2.1 Name generating questions

The first seven queries in the questionnaire were the most direct name generating questions. Some were introduced with a closed question, in order to assess if a particular event to which it referred had ever taken place. If so, the respondent was asked to answer with this occurrence in mind. If not, the respondent was asked to think of the event as a hypothetical situation. The wording of the questions was slightly adjusted by the interviewer depending on whether the organization had ever experienced the particular circumstance or not. The seven questions were:

1. From which organizations did you receive an invitation to a New Year's reception?
2. Which organizations invited your organization to any kind of Islamic celebration, for example an Iftar meal during Ramadan?
3. If you have questions about a construction permit when you plan to alter the building in which your organization is situated, who would you ask to help you with that?
4. If you receive an invitation to a participation meeting from the municipality or the city district council, which organizations would you pass that invitation on to?
5. When you notice that you are dealing with the poor attendance of your members, which organizations would you discuss this with?
6. When your organization is about to celebrate any kind of anniversary and you want someone to make you promotional material, who would you ask about where is a good place to have this done?
7. When you hear that the municipality is providing new opportunities for migrant organizations to receive funding, who else would you tell about this?

By formulating questions about receiving as well as providing help, I wanted to prevent the respondents from feeling overly dependent and always in need of assistance.

Four other questions were of a more general nature. The respondents were asked if they usually come into contact with national organizations or with associations abroad. Subsequently, they were asked to think about the city level again (Amsterdam or Berlin), and were invited to name the non-Turkish and Dutch/German (respectively) organizations that they are connected to.

After this, the respondents were asked a set of questions about political preferences. In reference to these, the interviewee was asked 'With whom do you discuss your choice of political party during elections?' This question tended to elicit the respondents' personal networks, like 'my brother', instead of any organizational contacts, and was, therefore, later excluded from the analysis.

To get an idea of the professionalism of the organizations and, at the same time, pose yet another question with which to reveal the respondents' networks, two further name generating questions were asked about sending and receiving annual reports.

The final name-generating inquiry asked the respondents to check their diaries and talk about all of the people with whom they had had meetings over the previous week. This approach comes closest to an unobtrusive measuring instrument, and thus provided relatively reliable information without any recall bias.

In the introduction part of the interview, the respondents were asked to keep two instructions in mind. Firstly, they were allowed to name as many alters as they could or wanted to. This runs counter to Snijders' (1999) recommendation that this number should be limited to a maximum of four to lighten the respondents' load and keep the amount of data within manageable proportions. Snijders' point of view is that it is the diversity of resources that an actor has at his/her disposal that determines the 'quantity' of his/her social capital, and not the number of people (or organizations in this case) to whom one is tied. He demonstrated that it is enough to have between two and four alters with a particular resource, because with this number the ego is no longer dependent on one person (organization) providing access to these assets. Snijders would thus advise the use of name generating questions such as "Mention organizations that could help you with [...], and would do so if you asked them to." I, nevertheless, disregarded this suggestion and let the respondents mention as many alters as they could or wanted to. An important reason for this is that I wanted to tap into an as large as possible portion of the respondents' networks, even if they only contained one type of resource. My objective was to map the organizations' networks, and not just the resources embedded in them. This would allow me to later be able to determine which of all of the actors in these networks are mobilized. Since I expected that the organizations would not address all of their alters, it is all the more important to know which of them they *would* activate and which they would not. Accordingly, giving the respondents the opportunity to mention as many names as they wanted to is a necessary prerequisite of this approach. It also allows a distinction to be made between the organizations that maintain many contacts and those which do not. I assumed that

all associations have *some* ties to other associations, and allowing only a fixed, low maximum amount of names may have given the impression that each organization is as well connected as the others that also achieve this maximum number. Letting respondents name everyone they are connected to leaves room for more variation between organizations.

The second instruction was that the respondents were explicitly asked to name only those organizations with which they are actively acquainted and/or know by more than name only. In other words, if the respondent knows of the existence of a certain organization, but has never spoken to any of its board members, he/she was asked not to mention it.

4.3 Recall bias: problem and solution

I have already discussed the disadvantages of single question surveys, and have proposed multifaceted questionnaires as a useful alternative. Yet, the generators with several questions also have their downsides; the wording and the subject-matter of the questions posed can strongly influence the respondents' answers. Hammer (1984) concluded that the main characteristics that determine whether an alter is mentioned are the frequency of the contact (the more often ego and alter meet, the greater the chance that the latter is mentioned), how recent the last encounter was (people who were encountered more recently are remembered better) and how well ego and alter know each other. Hammer added that not *all* alters that meet these three criteria are actually named; people always forget to mention part of their circles of acquaintances. On the whole, people have a tendency to recall bonding social capital over bridging social capital. To keep this proportion of 'forgotten friends' to a minimum, Brewer (2000) demonstrated that a name recognition list should be included in the questionnaire.

Brewer reviewed studies on forgetting in recall-based elicitations of social networks, which, essentially, involve name generators. Among others, Bernard, Killworth and Sailer (1982, in Brewer), Freeman and Romney (1987), and Freeman, Romney and Freeman (1987) compared the recall of personal acquaintances generated by personal interviews to objective records, such as sent e-mails and the attendance lists of university classes. These latter sources provided the respondents' 'true' networks. The studies showed that people forget a great deal of information about who they have been in contact with. For example, Brewer and Webster (1999) interviewed students living in a university hall of residence and found that they failed to mention about 20% of their acquaintances when they were asked to name the friends who lived in the same accommodation. Brewer (2000), therefore, concluded his review with the recommendation that more than multiple elicitation questions should be used when

studying personal and social networks; researchers should also use objective records or recognition lists. Objective recording methods, like checking attendance lists or tracking sent e-mails, are by no means always as useful or available, and the current study is an example of this. I did include the diary-question as an 'unobtrusive' measure, but the responses to it were low: often the organizations had not seen any other organization in the previous week. Name recognition lists on the other hand were within the bounds of the possible.

4.3.1 Name recognition lists

The name recognition list provides the respondent with a structured tool with which to remember his/her acquaintances. As the term implies, it is a list that contains names. In the aforementioned study by Brewer and Webster (1999), in which acquaintanceship relationships within a particular university hall of residence were scrutinized, the researchers tried to increase the number of recalled friends by listing the names of all of the students who lived there and asking the respondents about the people with whom they were acquainted. This strategy did have the desired effect; the respondents remembered more people. As my study is of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin, I included the names of Turkish organizations in my name recognition list.

During the interviews, the name recognition list was presented to the respondent as a handout. The interviewer also read each name out loud. The respondent was asked to indicate, for each of the organizations on the list, whether he/she knew it. If the answer was in the affirmative, he/she was asked whether his/her organization keeps in contact with this other body, and if so, how often. The interviewees were free to give any answer they liked, but all responses were eventually coded into: daily, a couple of times a week, weekly, a couple of times a month, monthly, a couple of times a year and once a year.

Sudman (1985) demonstrated that recognition lists yield a considerably larger proportion of recalled acquaintances than free recall questions. This was an important reason for me to include this tool in my questionnaire. However, I could not burden my respondents with a list of about 200 organizations, and I therefore used a sample that was a quarter of this size³⁶ (following the same sampling procedure and producing the sampled organizations as described below). The name generator questions complemented the name recognition list, and ultimately both provided the data upon which the contact network of the Turkish organizations was based.

³⁶ In Amsterdam the name recognition list contained 45 organizations and in Berlin 50.

4.3.2 Further questions

The questionnaire also contained a query about representatives of the Turkish community. The respondents were asked whether there is any organization or person that they consider to be their proper representative in their city and whether they are directly connected to this, or these, organization(s) or people. The respondents were also asked if there are any organizations with whom they do not want to collaborate. The question about representatives in particular yielded useful information. In the case of unwelcome contacts, most respondents remained vague and named only general groups, such as 'Islamic extremists' or 'undemocratic organizations', without being specific.

The questionnaire also contained six questions about the functioning of the organization, which were indicators of the degree of professionalism thereof. The respondents completed these questions themselves on a separate form that was handed to them. The first question was about the way new board members were found, i.e. through formal or informal channels, or via a vote by members at a general meeting. Furthermore, the participants also indicated the number of times that the board members get together (ranging from more than once a week to less than once a month), the number of hours the respondent spends working for his/her organization (ranging from less than two hours a week to full-time), whether board members get paid (salary, allowance for expenses only, or nothing) and what the size of the membership was (from less than 25 to over 1001). The final question was: "Do you also take part in other organizational boards, and if so, how many?" This question functioned as a check of the network of interlocking directorates.

The questionnaire also included several queries about conventional and unconventional political participation of the organization, but the responses were ultimately not used in the analyses.

Sometimes, and not as a reply to a specific question, the respondents spontaneously started to mention the names of organizations with which they (had) collaborated. These responses are also included in the dataset.

4.4 Implementation of the questionnaire

4.4.1 What is the population?

The current research concerns Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin. The focus is on these communities because of their similar nature (Vermeulen, 2006). The members of both groups emigrated to their respective cities for similar reasons and over a comparable time frame. Moreover, the two Turkish communities are of the same

relative size compared to the total population (in absolute terms, the community in Berlin is much bigger). Furthermore, the organizing process of the Turks in both cities had started to become significant at about the same time (1970s). These similarities enable a useful comparison to be made, especially because the circumstances in which the two communities operate are markedly different (see Chapter 3).

In both Amsterdam and Berlin the number of Turkish associations amounts to about 200. As a starting point for determining the basis upon which I could produce a sample, I used the databases on the networks of interlocking directorates that had been compiled by my colleagues based on archival data (see below). A disadvantage of this data is that it can quickly become out of date because organizations are disbanded, or board members have handed their duties over to a successor. The databases used herein were collected in 2003 and 2004, while I held interviews in 2005, and so I did attempt to update them. In Amsterdam, because the Chamber of Commerce is an easily accessible institution with an electronic database that is kept up to date, it was possible to correct for changes of personnel and the closing down of organizations before taking a sample. This was not the case in Berlin. The *Vereinsregister* is a paper archive, and is completely unfathomable by anyone who has not worked for the institution for at least five years, even if one is admitted to its inner sanctum at all. In Berlin I could, therefore, only find out *after sampling* whether certain organizations still existed. Ultimately, I started out with 239 Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, and 195 in Berlin.

Organizations are regarded as Turkish when at least 50% of the board members are of Turkish descent. A board member is regarded as 'Turkish' when this individual, or at least one of his/her parents, was born in Turkey, or when the name of the organization gives reason to believe that it is serving an (exclusively) Turkish target group. The 'ethnicity' of other organizations was established in a similar fashion: their ethnicity is based on the ethnicity of the board members that make up at least 50% of the board.³⁷ If there is no clear ethnic majority, because the board members all have different backgrounds, or the name of the organization does not give rise to a particular ethnic label, it is classified as 'mixed'.

Sometimes, board members are classified as Turkish because of their place of birth, although they consider themselves and their organization to be Kurdish. As the Kurds do not have an acknowledged homeland, it would not actually be possible to qualify them as Kurdish. However, this group does not generally want to be referred to as Turkish, or any other nationality, because of political reasons. I do not want to go into this highly sensitive issue here, but for pragmatic reasons I decided to qualify the Kurdish organizations as a separate category. It is well known, and the analyses will show, that these organizations clearly separate themselves from the Turkish community. It was

³⁷ For an overview of all categories, see Appendix 2.

actually rather easy to recognize Kurdish associations, since most of them are very explicit in their choice of name.

4.4.2 Sample

Due to issues of time, money and manpower, it was impossible to interview all of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and Berlin. Accordingly, I had to produce a sample, which is difficult to achieve in network studies. The sampling process consisted of the following successive steps. Firstly, all organizations were categorized on the basis of their assumed nature. I deliberately use the word *assumed* since, after having spoken to these organizations it transpired that some of them should have been classified differently. Each organization was assigned to a specific category based on its name and/or the description of its goals because this information was recorded in the databases. There were 27 categories, plus a residual one that contained the organizations about which it was unclear what their main area of concern was. Not every type of organization was found in either Amsterdam or Berlin. The categories are listed in Appendix 2. Simultaneously, I established the number of each organization's interlocks in their respective networks of interlocking directorates. The two characteristics, 'organizational type' and 'number of interlocking directorates', formed the basis of the sample selection. Within each category of organizational type, the organizations were rank ordered based on their connectivity. Depending on the range of the number of alters, this led to a number of groups of organizations of which the two at either end of the spectrum contained the associations that had the most and the least connections. Within every category, two organizations were then picked randomly, one from each group at the extremes. For instance, within the category of sports' organizations in Amsterdam, there were two with two connections, three with one connection and eight without any formal connection. In this example, one of the two organizations with two connections and one isolated organization were (randomly) selected.

4.4.3 Procedure: invitation

All selected organizations received a letter directed to its chairman. In this letter it was explained what the aim of the study was and that the addressee would be telephoned to ask about his or her willingness to participate. If there was no telephone number available, organizations were asked to contact the researchers. If there was a telephone number, but the organizations could not be reached, they received a second letter, making the same request. These requests lead to some responses in Amsterdam, but none in Berlin.

A week after the letters were sent, we (a research assistant and the author) phoned the addressees as we had promised. During the phone call, the caller inquired whether the respondent had received the letter and if the aim of the research was clear. If necessary, further explanations were provided. The respondents were then asked if they were willing to participate in the study. If they refused, we tried to find out why. This was usually related to a lack of time, or general fatigue when it came to (scientific) studies (see also the paragraphs on response figures below). If the respondent agreed to participate we arranged a date and place for an interview.

One month after the first letters were sent out, a new sample was produced because the number of participants was still fairly low. This sample was created following same procedure as in the first round, except that before the selection took place the organizations that had already been chosen were left out.

4.4.4 Procedure: the interviews

The interviews took place at a location that was convenient for the interviewee. Most of the time this meant that it was held at the organization's premises, but they also sometimes took place in a café or at a respondent's home.

The interviewer had a paper version of the interview with her, upon which the respondents' answers were noted. The interview started with a short introduction about the questionnaire and consisted of three parts. First, the interviewer asked the name generating questions and those about voting behavior and representatives of the Turkish community. Then, the respondents completed the part of the questionnaire that dealt with general information about the organization (size, salaries etc.) and its political activities. The final part of the interview contained the name recognition list. On average, the interviews lasted one hour.

On only two or three times did the interviewees' poor command of the language (Dutch or German) pose a problem. In some instances, the involvement of a translator, which the interviewees had arranged themselves on their own initiative, resolved this issue. If there was no translator 'at hand', the interviewer simply tried to make the best of it.

The interviews took place in 2005 in both cities: in Amsterdam from February to April and in Berlin between April and July.

4.5 Response rates in Amsterdam

Based on the sampling procedure described above, I selected 101 organizations which I approached in two rounds (48 in the first, 53 in the second). The total response rate amounted to 37%, which is a very reasonable figure in the social sciences.

The main cause of the non-responses was the fact that we could not reach organizations, whether by telephone, mail, or e-mail. This applied to 45 organizations. Twenty-nine of them received a repeat invitation but to no avail. Two letters were returned to sender. The letters to fourteen organizations were still pending at the end of the interview phase. In spite of a thorough examination and consideration of the updated databases, five organizations turned out to have been dissolved after all, or soon would be.

Five organizations indicated that they were not willing to participate in the study. The reasons they gave were that: they *“did not have the time to do so”*; one stated that it *“participates in so many studies that [it] doesn’t have the time to do [its] core activities”*; and another said that it is *“not a part of the Turkish community (anymore)”*. Nine organizations were willing, but unable, to participate in the study because of issues such as time constraints.

Eventually, we arranged 36 interviews with organizations from the sample. One only agreed to participate if it could fill out a written questionnaire, which it subsequently received and completed. We encountered the 38th (not sampled) organization when we were trying to contact one that we had chosen to include. It transpired that the person we had addressed as the chairman was no longer active in this organization, but had become the secretary of another. We, therefore, then interviewed him in that capacity. Appendix 3A contains an overview of the organizations that were interviewed.

4.6 Response rate in Berlin

I applied the same sampling procedure in Berlin as I had in Amsterdam. Eighty-seven organizations were selected (53 in the first wave, 34 in the second), and 27 were eventually interviewed. This resulted in a response rate of 31%. This was slightly lower than in Amsterdam, but was still a satisfying figure.

The largest group of non-respondents, 22 organizations, was comprised of those that could not be reached by mail (thirteen of these also received a reminder) or any other medium. Nine organizations were unreachable due to incorrect address information at the *Vereinsregister*.

The second largest group consisted of 19 organizations that were willing, but unable, to take part in the study. One logistical problem was that the period of data gathering turned out to partly coincide with the summer holidays that were unexpectedly early that year. Some of the board members to whom I had intended to talk were already away. Other organizations did not want to participate because they did not think they had anything of value to contribute because they did not consider themselves to be Turkish. These groups instead regarded themselves as international or German, and they were not convinced by my argument that their participation would be much appreciated and that it would be very interesting to gain insight into their contacts anyway. Two other organizations did agree to engage in the study but did not show up on the agreed date. One remarkable response came from a (Diyanet) mosque: its board indicated that they were only willing to participate if they received permission from their umbrella organization (DITIB) and advised me to contact this organization first. Unfortunately, I was not able to do so. One mosque contacted me of its own accord to tell me that its board was not willing to participate in any way. They did not provide a particular reason why. Sixteen invitation letters were returned to sender. These organizations could also not be reached by any other means.

Of the 27 interviews that took place, one did not turn out well. It transpired that I had got in touch with the national umbrella organization of the local branch that I thought I had invited. This interview yielded interesting, yet inappropriate information, and was therefore excluded from the analyses. The organizations that were interviewed are listed in Appendix 3B.

4.7 Assessing networks of interlocking directorates

The emphasis in this study is on contact networks, because these contain new information when compared to the networks of interlocking directorates, which have already received considerable attention in studies by Vermeulen (2006) and Berger (2010). On the other hand, the networks of interlocking directorates are just as much a part of the social capital of voluntary organizations and, for that reason, cannot be ignored.

The networks of interlocking directorates of the communities at hand (i.e. the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin) are based on the information recorded in the registers of the Chamber of Commerce (Amsterdam) and the *Vereinsregister* (Chamber of Associations, Berlin). For a detailed description of the methods of data gathering, I refer to the publications of Vermeulen (2006), Berger (2010), and Slijper (forthcoming). Recall that an interlock between two organizations exists when a board member of one of them is simultaneously seated on the board of the other. The network

of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam also contains non-Turkish organizations which have an interlock with at least one Turkish organization. On the other hand, this network in Berlin does not contain any non-Turkish organizations as there was no relevant data available about them. As the Turkish network of interlocking directorates in Berlin was not very extensive anyway, I do not expect this to affect my interpretation thereof.

The network of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam includes 278 organizations (see Table 4.1), of which 239 are Turkish or Kurdish (but born in Turkey) and the other 39 are non-Turkish. Furthermore, of these 278 organizations, 156 had at least one interlocking directorate. The rest (122) did not have any formal connection to any other organizations. The network of interlocking directorates in Berlin contains 195 Turkish organizations. Only 51 of these had at least one interlock. The remaining 148 were not connected to any other organization by means of an interlocking directorate.

	Amsterdam	Berlin
Number of organizations	278	195
Number of Turkish organizations	239	195
Number of unconnected organizations	122	148

Table 4.1 Basic figures on the networks of interlocking directorates in absolute numbers

4.8 Final remarks for the analyses

Overall, I concluded my fieldwork with two samples which form a solid basis for the subsequent analyses. There are, however, some relevant points to be made before I turn to the results. The questionnaire yielded the names of many organizations, yet occasionally respondents also mentioned the names of individuals or consultative/collaborative bodies. When it was unclear whether the individuals were affiliated with an organization, they were removed from the dataset.

With respect to the consultative and collaborative bodies (these are groups of collaborating organizations), there were two options available. Take as an example a consultative body about which a respondent says he has good relationships with 'everybody there'. If the members of these bodies could be traced, they were each noted as alters of ego. If the members could not be found, the consultative body itself was marked as an alter. It is important to note that this could lead to considerable differences in the number of alters and, perhaps, even cause bias since consultative bodies often have at least ten members. Unfortunately, this cannot be prevented. The only consolation is that my experience is that consultative bodies about which no information is known are usually either inactive, or the respondent who mentioned

them is not practically involved with them anyway. This suggests that they would not make a contribution to an ego's social capital anyway.

This brings me to some matters of terminology. Throughout this book I will distinguish between consultative bodies, collaborative bodies and working groups. The former are state initiatives to bring together (migrant) organizations, with the main aim being mutual information exchange. The consultative bodies of migrant organizations are often called migrant councils. With the term collaborative bodies I am referring to groups of organizations that form a collective on their own initiative. These organizations jointly arrange activities or discuss in regular meetings matters that are important to them. Working groups are also collections of organizations, but they are invited to participate by the main organization, which is a voluntary association itself, albeit one of a much greater size. Sometimes the organizers are umbrella organizations. Melville (1999) revealed that the terms peak bodies and umbrella organizations are used interchangeably in the literature. Following Hamilton and Barwick's description of a peak body (1993, p.17), I define these as '*an organization ... with other organizations as members formed to represent the collective views of its members to government, to the community and to other bodies*'. Finally, this definition also includes the organizations that present themselves as umbrella organizations ('*koepelorganisatie*' in Dutch, '*Dachorganisation*' in German).

During the interviews, respondents often named alters that cannot be classified as voluntary organizations, but do appear to be important in their everyday practices and do contribute substantially to their social capital. I am referring here to political parties, governmental and semi-governmental organizations. The former are Dutch or German political parties. If a respondent stated that he/she 'knows all political parties' but was unable to specify them, no political party was noted. The governmental organizations refer to (departments of) the municipality or city districts, whereas semi-governmental organizations are those that either used to be a part of the local government or collaborate with it in such close harmony that it is difficult to see them as independent voluntary organizations.

4.9 The analyses and how the results are presented

I used the social network analysis software, UCINET 6.0 for Windows (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002), to perform the analyses herein. The interviews enabled me to produce a series of ego-centered networks that I was able to combine into a single, larger network both in Amsterdam and Berlin. This means that I was able to perform ego-centered as well as socio-centered analyses, although the latter did entail some inferential limitations (see also Appendix 4).

I examined the in and out degrees of the network actors as indicators of the amount of social capital they have at their disposal. The in-degree is the number of times an organization is named by (other) respondents, while the out-degree is the number of alters a respondent named. Furthermore, I considered the centrality measures of betweenness and closeness. These are indicators of the extent to which actors are either 'at the heart' of everything, or are on the periphery of the organizational network. If an actor has a more central position, he/she/it is regarded to have more social capital. I also take into account the connectedness of the network, which refers to the degree to which all of the actors that are present are connected to each other. The number of components is an indicator of this connectedness. A component is a subgroup of actors that are all, in some way, connected to each other by means of more or fewer steps, but none of them are connected to actors outside the component. On a more individual level, I take into account which actors are cutpoints or bridges. An organization functions as a cutpoint when it is the only actor that connects two subgroups within a component and these would dissolve into two or more parts upon the cutpoint's removal. Similarly, a bridge refers to the situation in which there is only one connection between two subgroups within a component, which would disintegrate upon the bridge's removal. Furthermore, I examined the scores of the organizations on the E-I Index and the Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV), which reveal respectively the degree of bonding and bridging social capital of organizations and the diversity thereof. The E-I index reflects the relationship between the number of alters that are similar to an actor and the number that are dissimilar in terms of a specified characteristic (i.e. ethnicity, type of organization and locality). For example, with respect to the ethnicity of the actors, the E-I index reflects whether an organization has more ethnically bridging or bonding social capital. The IQV is a reflection of the degree to which the alters of a particular organization are different to each other. A higher score indicates more diversity. For example, an organization that has Moroccan, Ghanaian, Dutch and Moluccan alters has a more diverse circle of acquaintances than an association that has only Surinamese connections. In relation to social capital, this implies that the former has a greater likelihood of having a more diverse range of resources than the latter.

I performed the same analyses of the data on the networks of interlocking directorates as I did on the contact networks. I set out the results of the analyses in Appendices 6 and 7. The information that I present in the following chapters is the interpretation of these results and the general impressions I got about the two Turkish communities while doing the interviews.

5. Social Capital in Amsterdam

The social capital and organizational landscape of the Turkish community in Amsterdam cannot be understood in isolation from the ideological divides running through it. The main groups that can be distinguished are left-wing, right-wing and religious, which are the same splits that characterize society in Turkey itself. After interviewing the divergent organizations, which each took a completely different stance, it became clear that there is at least one thing they all agree on: the Turkish community in Amsterdam is multi-dimensional. It is split into several groups that each cling to their own ideology, which is usually in conflict with that of their (Turkish) counterparts. Vermeulen (2006) has already addressed this issue extensively with respect to the organizing processes of Turkish organizations, revealing that the emergence of Turkish civic organizations in Amsterdam was directly linked to the political situation and changes in Turkey. Furthermore, the foundation of an organization by one group often led to the response of the immediate formation of another by a different group. This was also confirmed by several of my respondents.

5.1 The subjective classification by community members

One of the questions I asked my respondents concerned who or what they think is a proper representative of the Turkish community in Amsterdam. The usual answer I got was:

“There can’t be one representative. The Turkish community is too divided”.

Subsequently, they would characterize their community according to a unanimous typology. As one respondent said:

“All organizations are in fact branches of political movements. Every organization represents a particular political movement, and everybody knows this.”

Most respondents distinguished four dominant groups. The leftist organizations, including the Kurds from Turkey³⁸, the Alevi, and the communists and socialists form one of these. They are the opponents to the rightist, nationalistic, organizations that are thought to have strong ties to the Turkish embassy and consulate. Some of these

³⁸ I will not go into the discussion of whether the Kurds should or should not be regarded as Turkish; it did, however, cause a great deal of controversy during the interviews. See also note 87 on page 4.

organizations are directly linked to the Grey Wolves, the extreme-right ultra-nationalist association that is connected to the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). People from other groups call them ‘fascists’. The leftist and, to a lesser extent, the right-wing groups oppose the religious associations, which in turn include several different religious movements that are in opposition to each other. The Diyanet supporters profess to follow a moderate, but nationalistic, form of Islam which is prescribed by the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs. Milli Görüş, another well-represented Islamic movement, is opposed to the Diyanet supporters and their influence in Turkish politics. In some countries, the Milli Görüş group is accused of being extremist, but in Amsterdam its image is more positive. Some regard the organization as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, and accuse its members of putting on a moderate face in Dutch public life while internally still propagating extremist ideas. Yet many policy makers regard the Milli Görüş as a moderate ally. One respondent said: “*Milli Görüş’ leader, Hacı Karacaer, is the right-hand man of the mayor of Amsterdam.*” Finally, some respondents also explicitly mentioned the arts and cultural organizations as a separate group within the Turkish community. As I will demonstrate below, there is a case for this, since several cultural associations are revealed to have a clearly different, more bridging position between the Turkish community and Amsterdam society as a whole.

Several interviewees proved the tenability of this classification with their comments. Diyanet organizations, for example, declared that they do not want to be involved with their Milli Görüş’ counterparts:

“Milli Görüş was set up as an organization that is in political opposition to the ruling Turkish government. My organization does not want to become involved in political conflicts and therefore we would rather not be connected to Milli Görüş or any other religious organization.”

“We claim political neutrality, but other organizations, such as the Milli Görüş and Süleymanlılar don’t. That is why we prefer to keep to ourselves.”

A left-wing organization reacted against opposing counterparts by stating:

“We don’t want any contact with racist and fascist Turkish organizations. So we don’t want to be connected to nationalistic, conservative, fundamentalist organizations such as Milli Görüş.”

Another organization put it more mildly:

“In terms of ideology, we have very little in common with religious organizations of any kind, so there is no need for us to collaborate with them.”

Some of the other respondents’ remarks are also noteworthy with respect to this rough sketch of the ideologies that play a part in understanding the Turkish community. First

of all, two interviewees commented that even though a single representative of the Turkish population could not be nominated, this was not a huge problem because the community as a whole, and each group in its own right, is very well organized. Accordingly, a (single) representative is deemed unnecessary.

The younger board members of newer associations particularly expressed their dissatisfaction with the disagreements within their community. They feel that they are 'modern', implying that their organizations are neither political nor religious, but neutral. In their view, the older generations arranged themselves along political lines, while these youthful respondents try to keep away from any particular ideology, at least within the organization. These interviewees also indicated that although they might be religious, or sympathize with the Grey Wolves, they believe that these individual characteristics should not interfere with organizational life. Perhaps this is a trend that will continue once more second and third generation Turks take over the key roles within civic organizations. This is also what key informants told the Commission Blok during its investigation of the immigration and integration policies of the Netherlands over recent decades (Commissie-Blok, 2003-2004, p.515).

5.1.1 Confirmation by network analyses

The divides between associations not only exist in the minds of the respondents; these divisions are also clearly present in the everyday lives of organizations, as represented in the contact and formal networks. Many tend to stick to 'their own kind'. For example, the Milli Görüş groups in Amsterdam are interconnected to a significant degree. The movement has various organizations for a variety of different target groups, such as women's, youth, and mosque associations. Furthermore, each type of organization within the Milli Görüş movement has its own 'federation' (e.g. the Federation of women's organizations, the Federation of youth organizations). These are all located at the same address, and because of that they are closely connected. The member organizations have close knit relationships with their respective federations as well as with other Milli Görüş associations of the same kind. Respondents said that they would always turn to these associations if they have a question or a problem. For example, the women's organization *MGKT Hilal* in the city district of Bos en Lommer, regularly arranges joint events with other Milli Görüş groups in other city districts. The close ties between these organizations can also be seen from the fact that when we interviewed one of them, the respondent would already know about an interview we had held with someone else on an earlier occasion. The Milli Görüş associations are also well connected on the formal level, i.e. in the network of interlocking directorates. One of the biggest components therein is completely made up of Milli Görüş organizations (except for one Dutch health care agency which shares a board member with the *Milli Görüş Gehandicaptenzorg organization* (for the care of the handicapped)).

The five Diyanet mosques in Amsterdam are also closely connected. As one of the respondents stated, these only want to be involved in the religious experience, and therefore prefer to connect to other Diyanet mosques.

In the right-nationalistic corner, the organizations that share this ideology are also noticeably clustered. The *ULU mosque* and its companion social organizations (youth and women's) are all located at the same address in the city district of Zeeburg. In the formal network, this significant interconnectedness most distinctly manifests itself by way of numerous interlocking directorates. During the interview, the respondents from the *ULU Camii/Tukem* (the latter is the general social organization, but the respondents presented themselves as spokesmen for both organizations simultaneously), declared that it is in touch with 'everybody' in the neighborhood. Nevertheless, when push comes to shove, it has relatively few contacts with the organizations located close to it, and usually arranges activities on its own, without collaborating with other actors.

Organizations in left-wing circles are also highly interconnected. Associations such as the *Democratische Volksvereniging Amsterdam* and the *HTDB* have regular gatherings, as they also do with the (left-wing) women's organization, the *ATKB*, and the Alevi cultural association (*Alevitische Culturele Vereniging Amsterdam*). Many of the Kurdish organizations are located at the same address and hence it is no surprise that they are in close contact. In general, they tend to keep to themselves. According to a Kurdish respondent, this is also because the Turkish organizations do not want any relationships with the Kurdish ones. The following remark, made by one of the respondents upon reading the name of a Kurdish organization on the name recognition list, confirms this:

"The Kurdish Federation, are they Turkish?! I don't want to hear of that!"

The phenomenon of 'birds of a feather flock together' is not typical of the Turkish community in Amsterdam. As I will show in the next chapter, its counterpart in Berlin is also based strongly on divisions on an ideological basis. However, this is not a typical characteristic of Turkish communities only, as Zmerli and Newton (2007) demonstrated in a comparative study of five European cities. They highlighted that most civic organizations have a tendency to connect only to associations of the same ideological background.

5.2 High social capital with respect to the type of alters

Of course, the fact that organizations of a certain kind have the tendency to stick together does not imply they are connected *only* to each other. Most of them, in fact, have a wide range of social capital, and are linked to organizations that are engaged in activities that are different to those that they are engaged in themselves. The core activities of their alters also differ.

It is mostly the smaller, 'specialist', organizations, such as sports' clubs or relief agencies that have a narrow range of types of organizations to draw upon for resources. For example, the football association, the *AGB*, maintains many contacts, but these are mainly with other sports' organizations that use the same arena or with other football clubs across the city. On the other hand, it is also connected to some more general organizations, such as the left-wing laborers association, the *HTIB*, of which the *AGB* used to be a division. The respondent from the *AGB* told me:

"Only occasionally do we keep in contact with other organizations, when we arrange a tournament or something like that, but those contacts are never structural.(...) I don't really care about other organizations. It's not that I don't like them, but I only want to have something to do with them when they can mean something to my own organization."

On the other hand, some small-scale and specialist organizations did have a high level of bridging social capital in the sense that they are connected to many different organizations. This particularly relates to organizations of a 'unique' kind: there are very few other associations of the same type, and these, therefore, have to rely on relationships with other types of organizations. An example is the *Stichting Beth Nahrin*, an Assyrian organization serving the relatively few Assyrians living in the Netherlands. *Beth Nahrin* is the only Assyrian association in Amsterdam. It does have connections to other Assyrian organizations, but these are all abroad. Within Amsterdam, it mainly has bonds with the *HTIB* and related organizations.

The organizations that take part in (state-initiated) consultative bodies, and Amsterdam has several, have a wider range of contacts than those that do not. Several city districts have a migrant council within which migrant organizations of different ethnic backgrounds are united. On the city level, there used to be a deliberative body called the *TDM*, which was established by the local authorities in 1985 and was dissolved in 2003. Several respondents, nevertheless, still referred to this institution. Around the time of the interviews (recall that this was in 2005), a number of organizations were trying to launch a successor to the *TDM*, namely the *Stichting Inspraakorgaan Turken Amsterdam (ITA)*. However, due to internal differences of opinion, this was proving to be a difficult process. As a result, the *ITA* has not yet become a particularly viable body, but it was mentioned several times by respondents. It never became clear to me which organizations were involved in the *ITA* other than the ones which mentioned it. Another state-initiated consultative body is the *Inspraak Orgaan Turken (IOT)*, which is a national representative of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, and not only the one in Amsterdam. The members of the *IOT* are umbrella organizations which each represent different ideological groups.

It is no surprise that such councils add to the diversity of the social capital of their members, since their aim is to gather migrant organizations together to combine forces.

In these circumstances one would expect different types of organizations to be united. One respondent mentioned the positive effect of councils on the social capital of his organization:

"I used to take part in the Turkish Advisory Council. But ever since it was abolished, we have much less contact with other Turkish organizations. We are, therefore, trying to set up a new collaborative body."

As fertile as these councils might be, a relatively small proportion of organizations actually participate therein. In 2005/2006, four city districts had migrant councils, but only a minority of the organizations involved with them were Turkish (save for the one in Bos en Lommer, in which this was the majority nationality). The reasons why associations do not participate in such bodies are often simple, for example because there is nothing like them in their city district, or, in the case of the smaller organizations, because they do not have the time or the manpower to invest in the regular meetings that are held. One respondent said that it was a cultural characteristic of Turks not to take part in consultative bodies.

"The Turkish culture is characterized by shame on the personal level as well as when it comes to organizations. If a Turkish organization has a problem or needs advice, it will try to take care of it itself instead of contacting other organizations that might be able to help. That is also the reason why it is unlikely that several organizations will be found at the same assembly."

A remark like this could lead to the conclusion that organizations can decide whether or not to participate in a council. However, the local authorities have an important influence. For instance, the migrant council in Bos en Lommer (*BOMBL*) is only open to organizations that have received subsidies from the city district, and only those that operate according to its guidelines, such as a demand for collaboration, are eligible for funding. Here, one can see the influence of the political opportunity structure on the social capital of migrant organizations.

Compared to the amount of state-initiatives, the number of self-initiated collaborative bodies is rather low. Two of the few examples that do exist are the collaboration of sports' organizations in the city district of Osdorp, in which the football association, the *AGB*, is a participant, and the action group, the *Keer het tij*, a national anti-discrimination committee, in which several associations in the city district of Oud-West are involved. Within the former, the organizations work actively together because they are jointly responsible for the maintenance of their sports' park. The latter is a huge cooperative which operates nationally. Due to its size and the fact that its members only meet sporadically and do not know each other on a first name basis, the additional value of this collaborative body remains debatable.

5.3 Connections to non-Turkish organizations: ethnically bridging and bonding social capital

The interviews revealed that organizations tend to have more connections to Turkish than to non-Turkish associations, whether they be Dutch or otherwise. On average, about 60% of Turkish organizations' contacts are Turkish (see also Figure 5.1). What is more, if government institutions are left out of the equation, up to 70% of the organizations' alters are Turkish. This highlights that this community is still very inwardly focused.




Figure 5.1 Percentages of ties to organizations of different ethnicities, including governmental organizations.

Some of the organizations are connected to almost no non-Turkish associations. This was particularly the case with religious organizations and those that were keeping a low profile, either because they had just started-up, or they were about to close-down (as they told me). Also social organizations that have very little to offer, other than being places where Turkish men can meet and drink tea, are likewise mainly linked to associations of the same ethnicity. Many of these small-scale organizations are still involved with life in Turkey. For example, relief agencies support poor villages in the regions from which their members have migrated. Indeed, the organizations that tend to be focused on other Turkish organizations are very keen to remind their members of 'their roots'.

Some respondents attributed the absence of links to Dutch organizations to a general lack of time to invest in such relationships. Indeed, many advanced this reason as an explanation for their, generally, small circle of connections. Others indicated that they would like to have more contact with Dutch organizations in particular, but stated that this was practically impossible. For example, in the city district of Bos en Lommer,

several respondents indicated that they would form links to Dutch organizations more if they could. The *Stichting Anatolië* is located in Bos en Lommer:

“Our association has a really good network in our city district and the surrounding districts. We know every organization there. We have good contacts and we jointly organize things very often. This is also very important, to involve more and more ethnicities. But we don’t have much contact with Dutch organizations, mainly because they aren’t really present in Bos en Lommer.”

The respondent of a women’s organization in the same district said:

“I live in Bos en Lommer and I work in Bos en Lommer, but I have never encountered any Dutch organizations.”

Since the organizations that possess mainly ethnic bonding social capital are all rather small, it is all the more surprising that the *HTIB* is also among the associations that have more Turkish than non-Turkish connections. This is contrary to the statements of the *HTIB*’s chairman:

“We are strongly focused on Dutch society and Dutch politics and not so much the Turkish community.”

The network position of the *HTIB* is embedded more at the heart of the Turkish community than it believes itself to be. Perhaps the chairman’s other belief, namely that the *HTIB*

“tries to play a mediating role between the immigrant and native populations in Amsterdam and the Netherlands”

is a better reflection of what is happening. After all, to be able to fulfill a bridging function one has to know one’s grassroots well, while at the same time keeping friendly alliances with ‘the other side’. Given the fact that the *HTIB* has good connections to political and governmental organizations, this indeed seems to be the case. The *HTIB*’s bonding social capital is ‘top-down’, consisting mainly of organizations that are smaller than it is, while its bridging social capital is ‘bottom-up’ as it is connected to several large organizations of other ethnicities as well as to governmental organizations (see also the paragraph on linking social capital).

There are also some organizations that have considerably more ethnic bridging than bonding social capital. Several of these indicated that they are very aware of the significance of having non-Turkish connections. They, more than other organizations, kept repeating their belief in the importance of integration. For some, incorporating non-Turkish board members was a conscious strategy, with a view to acquiring links to the non-Turkish organizations that follow in their wake. A clear example of this is the

cultural organization, *Stichting Aslan*, which was having financial trouble. This was more than enough reason for it to find Dutch board members with the organizational expertise to get it back on track and serve as relationship managers. This has turned out to be an effective strategy given the other organizations that *Aslan* is now collaborating with, many of which are Dutch. The youth association, *MGT Bos en Lommer*, had a similar approach. This Milli Görüş organization served mainly Turkish youngsters, but had begun to try to attract the Moroccan youths living in their city district as well. To get access to the Moroccan community, the *MGT* was now looking for a Moroccan board member. The expectation was that this individual would bring ample connections to his/her community.

The left-wing associations were predominantly found to be closely connected to non-Turkish organizations. Furthermore, the organizations that take part in migrant councils or self-initiated cooperatives more often have bridging social capital. Of course, these councils are usually established precisely to bring together organizations of different migrant groups. Most of these are not, however, connected to non-Turkish organizations through interlocking directorates. In contrast, some organizations are connected to non-Turkish associations at the board level, but have few practical connections to them in everyday life. For example, the Fatih mosque was only interlocked with the mixed social interest organization, *Röportaj*, and not with any Turkish association. This may give the impression that the mosque was more focused on actors from outside the Turkish community, but the interview revealed that 90% of its connections in practice are with Turkish organizations. This indicates that there is a discrepancy between formal networks and everyday practices with respect to ethnicity. The two networks that make up the social capital are complementary on this point.

5.4 A horizontal community

In general, the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam are horizontally connected. The community does not have many associations that are substantially bigger or more professional than the rest. There are some umbrella organizations, but they do not play

HTIB

The *HTIB* was one of the first Turkish organizations in Amsterdam, and was founded by and for migrant workers connected to the communist party in Turkey. It has always had a prominent position in the Turkish community. Due to its left-wing character, Dutch local authorities have often seen the *HTIB* as the ideal partner in the dialogue with the Turkish community. In recent years, however, the *HTIB* has slowly been losing its leading position, as several interviewees indicated. It is regarded by some as an old-fashioned organization that no longer represents the present day, 'modern' Turkish community.

an overly dominant role in organizational life (I will come back to this in due course.) Furthermore, even though there is a multiplicity of ideological groups, most of them stick together as equals, save for the religious bodies. Particularly in an environment like the Netherlands, with its tradition of pillarization, one might expect that each group would know its official representatives, but most of them do not have leading organizations that clearly represent their respective ideologies. This is possibly due to the subsidies that have been provided by the local government in Amsterdam, which were easily accessible by all migrant organizations for a long period of time (Vermeulen, 2006). There was, therefore, no need to join forces, because each organization could look after its own resources. Even though the policy on subsidies has changed (organizations have to meet more requirements to qualify for funding, including the demand for collaboration, and the grants have been cut) the organizations' approaches have not; no association came forward or was established as an umbrella organization.

5.5 The umbrella organizations of religious movements

Only the religious movements have umbrella organizations that serve as their representatives in the public debate³⁹. The member associations occupy themselves with their particular target groups (women, youth etc.) or activities (e.g. mosques providing services of prayer), while the umbrella organization is involved in more general affairs and defending the position of the movement. The Milli Görüş' umbrella organization (*FMGNN*) is very active in Amsterdam, particularly because it is located there. The Diyanet mosques also lean heavily on their umbrella organization (the *Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN*), although it is located in The Hague. The Diyanet and Milli Görüş member organizations (i.e. the mosques) are well connected to their umbrellas as well as to their fellow member associations. From a *network* perspective, the umbrella organizations do not, therefore, have a dominant position over their members. In other words, in a situation where each actor in a network is connected to every other actor therein, the disappearance of one of them does not affect the way in which the remaining actors are connected to each other. This means that none of the actors has power over the others. In contrast, in a network in which one organization is connected to otherwise unconnected associations, this central organization does have more power than the other actors: all information flows through it and its removal would cause the network to disintegrate. Strikingly, even though the connections between the Turkish religious organizations in Amsterdam are shaped according to the former situation (the umbrella bodies do not have a dominant structural position), in

³⁹I only discuss the Diyanet and Milli Görüş movements here. Other religious movements, such as Süleymancılar, are relatively marginal. Furthermore, I did not speak to any organizations belonging to other movements, in spite of several attempts. I take this as an indication that these organizations are, indeed, less active.

Milli Görüş

The Milli Görüş (Turkish for National Vision) is a conservative Sunni movement originating in Turkey, where it was founded with the aim of establishing an Islamic state. It is referred to as being activist-orthodox (van Heelsum, 2001). Several political parties related to the movement have been banned in Turkey. Milli Görüş federations are found all over the world, with each of these branches having slightly different points of view. The counterpart of the Milli Görüş in the Netherlands is generally known to be moderate (more so than the federations in other countries, including Germany) and keen on the integration and emancipation of Turks in Dutch society. Until the board of the Dutch branch changed in 2006, the leaders of the Milli Görüş were regarded by some as being more progressive than its own constituency (den Exter & Hessels, 2003; Vermeulen, 2006). However, the movement is also looked at suspiciously by many, who claim it has two faces: a moderate exterior and a conservative interior.

This *Stichting Federatie Milli Görüş Noord Nederland (FMGNN)* is the umbrella organization for all Milli Görüş groups in the northern part of the Netherlands, including those in Amsterdam. A large number of Milli Görüş organizations were founded in the 1990s in particular (Vermeulen, 2006).

The *FMGNN* is one of the most visible Turkish organizations in Amsterdam and for many people it is felt that it and Hacı Karacaer (the director until 2006) represented them: the interviews revealed that 10 out of 38 respondents regarded Karacaer as a representative of the Turks in the city.

real life they operate according to the latter. The umbrella organizations are crucial to the functioning of their members because they take the lead. For example, the representative from the youth organization, *MGT Bos en Lommer*, explained:

"We are part of the federation of Milli Görüş and therefore we often have contact with the youth federation. This youth federation not only plays a major role in keeping contact with others organizations, it is also involved in the spread of information to and from our organization. They also exert a degree of control over the youth organizations that are connected to the federation, for example they always come to our general meetings."

A respondent from the Milli Görüş women's organization *MGKT Hilal* said something similar about its connection to the Federation:

"I speak to the chairwoman of the Federation of the Milli Görüş women's organizations practically daily. I ask her all sorts of things, about what I can say during a meeting with the municipality and all that stuff, what I should say, and what I should bring with me."

Other Milli Görüş and Diyanet associations spoke of how their respective umbrella organizations are the ones that keep in contact with 'the outside world' (this phrasing was used by several respondents). This tendency is the strongest for the mosques.

There are also some non-religious umbrella organizations, but they have a different relationship with their members. For example, the political organization, *DVA-DIDF* (originally a Marxist association, it says it is 'democratic' these days), which operates

locally, is a member of the national *DIDF*, just as the pressure group, the *HTDB* (which also stresses its democratic caliber), is a member of the national *DSDF*. These umbrella organizations are like the national counterparts instead of the ‘conductors’ of their members. The local branches operate much more on their own account, and are more involved with their direct (social) environments instead of with the vertical relationships with their superiors.

Most small-scale associations are independent and not a member of any umbrella organization. For some of these, the *HTIB* comes closest to fulfilling that role for two key reasons. Firstly, several organizations have sprung up from the *HTIB*. For example, the *Stichting Anatolië* and the *AGB* were initially founded as parts of, or by active (board) members of, the *HTIB*. Secondly, some regard the *HTIB* as their ‘big brother’, to whom they can turn in the case of trouble. This is because it is viewed as being the oldest and wisest organization in Amsterdam. The respondent from the *HTIB* also commented that:

“90% of the first and second generation Turks in the Netherlands know the HITB and people are often referred to us in the coffee houses. We often advise people who want to found a new organization or who have a question regarding their organization. We also keep office hours to help people with questions on the law and bureaucracy.”

5.6 The importance of personnel and personality

The Turkish community does have some organizations that are clearly more dominant than others. These have more connections and are also more central in the contact network. Furthermore, they not only have more social capital, but that which they do possess is also more diverse. These associations are characterized by having a longer history, being (quasi) umbrella organizations, and actively reaching out to other Turkish and non-Turkish associations. Some are active throughout the city of Amsterdam (laborer’s organization *HTIB*, the religious *Milli Görüş Federation FMGNN*), while others are instead active locally, in their respective city districts, but are *known* in the city nevertheless (the educational organization, *STOC*, in the city district of Geuzenveld-Slotermeer, and the pressure group, the *HTDB*, in Oud-West). Another important characteristic of these ‘giants’ is that they are led by strong personalities, or they have board members with strong personal motivations. One respondent spoke about this:

“For Turks, an organization can only be strong and important if it has a strong leader. Only then will it have many followers. This is what you see with Milli Görüş and Hacı Karacaer, for example.”

Karacaer was the head of Milli Görüş at the time of the interviews. He was a charismatic leader who was relatively progressive, which made him an ally of the local politicians and civil servants, but he also knew how to satisfy the local grass roots⁴⁰. The same applies to non-religious organizations, where one can also see the importance of forceful leaders. Vermeulen (2006) pointed to the importance of Nihat Karaman, the leader of the *HTIB*, in bringing the Turkish community together in the 1980s. The current leader of that organization, Mustafa Ayranci, is also very well-known in Amsterdam in both the Turkish community and by the local government. Likewise, the smaller educational organization, *Stichting Turks Onderwijs Centrum (STOC)*, profits from its potent leader, Ismail Ercan, who represents his association at every opportunity, thereby being almost single-handedly responsible for all of the contacts that the *STOC* maintains.

Several dominant organizations have board members who have a (long) history as organizational leaders. Many of them have been on the board of one or more organizations before they took up the position they had at the time of the interviews. Taking all of this information together, it is clear that simply by bringing in their personal social capital, the people who make up the board of an organization obviously contribute to its social capital and, subsequently, to that of the community.

5.7 The relevance of locality

With respect to how organizations use their social capital, their locality may be of crucial importance, i.e. the geographical position of an organization in comparison to the geographical position of its connections. One of the respondents, for instance, took a mental walk through the neighborhood to recall which organizations he knew:

“Around the corner you have ..., and then in the square there’s...”

Several organizations gave the impression that they have so little time to maintain contact with others that it seems plausible that those that they do meet need to be nearby. It transpired that some organizations are indeed mainly connected to neighborhood associations. Some of them are small-scale inactive organizations that, if they are prepared to reach out at all, only connect to others if they are right next door. One social association for men, called the *Ihtiyarlar Sohbet Solune*, which literally means ‘Old People’s Chat Room’, stated:

“The contacts we have with our neighbors are confined to greeting them in passing. That is because we want only one thing: peace. We do not want anything more than to offer our members a place where they can find some company.”

⁴⁰ After he resigned from his post in 2006, a more conservative leader was appointed by the Milli Görüş’ European head quarters in Germany, which considered Karacaer to be too progressive.

People in this organization's locality all go to their 'own' community centers and there is little communication between these. Yet it is not only relatively inactive organizations that have local connections. Some organizations are very active in their city district and have a local, yet extensive circle, of acquainted connections.

Some organizations have a city-wide network, but that mainly relates to the fact that they do not have their own accommodation. These organizations are registered at the address of one of their board members and look for a location when activities are planned. The result is that these associations are not bound to a specific area and their connections are thus spread out over the city. Other organizations, which are connected to associations all over the city, are characterized by the *objective* of serving the entire Turkish community, instead of just Turks living in a specific area. Those such as the *HTIB* have the goal of supporting the Turkish community, and not just organizations in a particular city district. On the other hand, some associations which have a greater than average amount of social capital are very active locally in practice. For example, three organizations in the city district of Bos en Lommer (the community center, the *Stichting Anatolië*, the educational organization, the *Stichting Yunus Emre*, and the Milli Görüş women's organization, the *MGKT Hilal*) all had a great deal of social capital, but the majority of these contacts were located in their near vicinities.

5.8 Linking social capital

The links between the organizations and governmental institutions (i.e. linking social capital) deserve a special mention. The picture is mixed: some organizations have a great deal of linking social capital, while others have none. I distinguished three types of government institutions: political organizations, by which I mean mainstream *Dutch* political parties⁴¹ and politicians, as well as city district councils and councilors; 'true' governmental institutions, such as sub-divisions of the municipality; and semi-governmental organizations that are 'in the field' but were founded on the initiative of, and fully sponsored by, the (local) government. It transpired that the organizations studied herein had very few direct bonds *as an organization* with political parties; only four (leftist) organizations could be said to have such connections⁴². The left leaning laborers' organization, the *HTIB*, was the only one linked to the parties in the city council, while the political organization, the *DVA*, the pressure group, the *HTDB*, and the welfare organization, the *Stichting Anatolië*, all indicated that they were linked to the

⁴¹ Migrant organizations that are concerned with politics but are not a player in the Dutch political arena, form a separate category of voluntary organizations that is not regarded as linking social capital.

⁴² As I did not explicitly ask for the connections between organizations and political actors, it is possible that other organizations are connected to them as well, but they failed to mention this. It was only for the organizations that mentioned the political actors spontaneously that this linking social capital was noted. I assume that these connections are the most relevant for, and are actively maintained, by those organizations that mentioned them of their own accord.

(left-wing) parties in their respective city district councils. Several interviewees did have direct bonds with political parties on a *personal* basis; they had had seats on the city district council, or used to be more generally involved with a political party at the city district level. Michon and Vermeulen (2007) had indeed already reported that over 60 % of the Turkish city (district) councilors were board members of a local Turkish organization. One respondent mentioned to me that his organization had a good relationship with the city district because the chairman used to be a city district councilor.

For many other organizations, the relationships with politicians remain confined to inviting them to events, or accepting their invitations (some organizations indicated that they do this only on the initiative of political parties) at election times. Politicians visit the organizations during evening meetings, where they explain their political programs to the members in attendance. For many organizations, this boils down to only a two-yearly encounter.

The number of organizations that are connected to the second category of governmental institutions, the true government associations, is much higher. Over 80% of the respondents (31 of 38) stated that they were, more or less, intensively linked to a city district and/or the municipality. One could also distinguish the kinds of relationships: financial (subsidies) and interactional.

The seven organizations that are not connected to government associations were very explicit in their desire to not have anything to do with the local authorities. This was usually because of funding issues. Some had been refused financial support in the past, or had received only a small part of the money they had applied for. Because of this, they were disappointed in the subsidy schemes and the local authorities by association. As a response, they refused to have anything to do with them. Other organizations had never even tried to apply for grants because they wanted to keep their autonomy, which they felt would be compromised if they did what the government wanted them to do to be approved for funding; they wanted to show that they were able to manage on their own. For example, the youth organization, the *Stichting Gouden Paraplu*, stated:

"We want to prove ourselves. Too often the subsidies are abused. We want to show that we can do it on our own."

For other organizations, the need to prove themselves was not relevant. Instead, because of their aims, they obtained financial resources through other channels, namely by commercial sponsorship. For example, the respondent from the entrepreneurs' association *Nederlands Turkse Jonge Ondernemers* stated that:

"We are all entrepreneurs and do not need government funding."

Moreover, some of the organizations that do maintain interactional contacts with government organizations do not want to receive funding. As a sports organization said:

"We don't receive funding and we don't ask for it. I think that their leisure activities should be worth something to the members, and when they pay, we don't need subsidies. ... Of course, there are several ways to apply for funding, but I think it's nonsense to ask for money as a sports organization under the pretext of 'integration activities.'"

But for many organizations, an important reason to be connected, or not, to the local authorities is financial.

The interactional relationship between voluntary organizations and governmental institutions can take place at the city district as well as at the central level. That organizations make a distinction between these financial and interactional relationships becomes clear from this quote from a respondent:

"We know the way to the city district officials well, but we do not want any contact with the municipality any more. They have turned down our requests for subsidies!"

It transpired that of the organizations that have any linking social capital, a third are connected solely to city district authorities, and not to those on other levels. This was particularly the case for small organizations. Another third were only linked to the municipality, while the remainder are connected at the city district as well as at the central level. The latter two groups contain small as well as larger organizations. The interactions with the city district's civil servants sometimes consist of negotiations about accommodation, such as the renovation of a sporting body's club house, or even, as one respondent told us, about barring a rival organization from moving in. In other cases, as one youth association commented, the organizations and the local authorities try to solve the problems in the neighborhood together. And sometimes the organizations even compete with the authorities, as the welfare agency, *Stichting Anatolië*, confirmed:

"Stichting Anatolië plays an important role in the city district. Many people always come to our activities, in contrast with the activities that the city district organizes: not many people show up there. That is because people feel at home at our place."

The organizations that have more social capital generally tended to also have more and better connections to government institutions. They mentioned the authorities more often, and their links are the strongest. This may be because of a self-reinforcing mechanism: organizations start looking for contact with the government, for example to

apply for funding. If they receive this money, they can expand their activities and grow. This, in turn, makes them more attractive partners for the government, and they are thus more likely to be included in any policy implementation. Thus, high general social capital and high linking social capital go naturally together.

Half of the respondents indicated that they were in contact with semi-governmental organizations, the third category of government organizations referred to above. Examples of these that are active in Amsterdam are: community work associations, such as the *Stichting Impuls*, the *Stichting Buurtparticipatie*, and the *MDSO*; youth organizations such as the *Stedelijk Jongerenwerk Amsterdam*; and libraries and the *Amsterdam Centrum Buitenlanders*. Sometimes these relationships are a bit strained:

“Stichting Impuls is like a big elephant. They used to receive 90% of the funding from the city district but they don’t anymore and that is why they are almost bankrupt. We do it differently: in collaboration with a couple of organizations we all apply for a little bit of money, which we then use together. We also get funding because we are well-known and we are trustworthy.”

What is striking is that organizations in the city district of Bos en Lommer are above-averagely related to semi-governmental organizations that provide community work. The welfare organization *Stichting Anatolië*, the educational organization *Stichting Yunus Emre*, and the women’s organization *MGKT Hilal* are all very active organizations which are aimed at improving the quality of life in their particular neighborhood and assisting the residents of the city district. Their societal aims, of course, fit the objectives of their semi-governmental counterparts. That their objectives are the dominant explanation for the connections can also be seen from the fact that another organization in Bos en Lommer, a social organization, is not linked to any semi (or any other kind of) governmental institution. In the adjacent city district of De Baarsjes, none of the associations I interviewed are involved with semi-governmental organizations, and only few of the organizations in Geuzenveld Sloterveer, Slotervaart-Overtoomse Veld, and Osdorp were. I mention these city districts because they were all marked by the national government as “Krachtwijken” (‘strong neighborhoods’) in 2007. These are neighborhoods where the quality of the living environment is much lower than average, and they are characterized by “high unemployment, outdated housing and deteriorating public spaces”⁴³. One of the aims of the policy on these challenging areas is to encourage all actors in a civil society to work together to overcome the problems. Given the results of this study, there is a long way to go before that aim is achieved.

⁴³ As stated on the website of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment: www.international.vrom.nl

5.9 The media and the message

Media associations, such as the *Stichting Turkse Televisie Amsterdam STTA* (television) and the *Feza Media* (newspaper), are fairly well known in the community and many organizations indicated that they are actively connected to one or more of them. This was confirmed by the *Galaxi Media*, the sister organization of *Feza Media*, which revealed that most organization contact them because they want information about their activities to be disseminated by the media.

Notably, most organizations only connect to the *Turkish* media, some of which are associated with a local, mixed broadcasting station (*Salto*). At the same time, many respondents commented that the *STTA* is an extension of *Milli Görüş* and it can never provide objective information. Because of the relationship between *Milli Görüş* and this media association, many respondents did not want to be involved with it. Some organizations also disregarded the role of the media in general. As one respondent said:

“One should not use the media to make it known that you are there, but you should become known because of all the good things you do.”

Since the media can play an important role in the mobilization of a community (e.g. Newton, 1999; Walgrave & Manssens, 2000), it will be interesting to see whether these organizations are actually addressed when the community is indeed triggered to mobilize. Whether this is the case is discussed in Chapter 7.

5.10 Comparing the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network

The formal and informal network structures⁴⁴ share a resemblance when it comes to the ideological divisions that run through the Turkish community. The network of interlocking directorates did, however, reveal a more pronounced and more extreme picture than the contact network. The formal network is much more fragmented, i.e. there were more separate components, thus emphasizing the ideological cleavages. The fragmentation is, for the large part, caused by the fact that only half of the organizations share at least one board member with any other organization, while the other half were formally unconnected. As Vermeulen (2006) described, organizations often make a strategic choice to establish new associations with board members who are already seated in another organization. The *Milli Görüş* associations are, in this respect, prototypical, and a respondent from one of them said:

⁴⁴ Recall that these refer to the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network.

“We sometimes work with very large amounts of money, so it is very important that we know new board members well and that we can trust them. That is why we are quite picky when it comes to new board members. I was asked to join this organization because I was already active in the Milli Görüş Federation.”

The tendency to only be connected to *Turkish* organizations is also more pronounced in the network of interlocking directorates: only a small group of organizations share a board member with non-Turkish ones, whereas practically all are connected to non-Turkish organizations in everyday life. Several ethnically bridging organizations in the network of interlocking directorates were cultural associations that were connected to non-Turkish (cultural) counterparts. These organizations also displayed a greater than average interest in integrating into Dutch society by, for example, co-organizing cultural events. On the other hand, another group of cultural organizations had no connections in the network of interlocking directorates. Apparently, these organizations are more concerned with reconfirming the Turkish cultural identity by referring to the homeland and its traditions. By doing this they turn away from non-Turkish associations. The same goes for a large group of social organizations: they are not connected to other (non-Turkish) associations in the formal network, nor do they maintain many bridging connections in everyday life.

Moreover, with regard to the types of organization that are connected, the network of interlocking directorates shows a more distinct picture than the contact network. On average, the organizations in the former connect more to similar counterparts than those in the contact network do. This may also be caused by a strategy that was applied when the organizations were founded. If someone wants to set up a new sports' association, it is convenient to include board members who know about running such an association, and hence formal relationships are logical. On the other hand, in everyday life it may be as obvious to connect to sports' organizations as it is to other kinds.

Furthermore, the contact network and the network of interlocking directorates differed considerably with respect to the locality of related organizations. On the formal level, most were interlocked with organizations in their geographical vicinity. The analysis was conducted on the city district level –the result being that most organizations were officially connected to ones in the same city district– while further scrutiny made clear that many were linked to organizations in the same block or even at the same address. The contact network revealed a much more diverse picture. Organizations were mainly connected to those outside their own city districts, and these alters were spread out over several city districts. In everyday life, the organizations thus have a bigger world than one might expect to find based on the formal network.

5.11 Social capital in Amsterdam summarized

The social capital of the Turkish community in Amsterdam has been revealed to be rich and various. Although there are no clear, leading organizations in the form of umbrella organizations or any others that clearly represent the community, or large parts thereof, there are associations that have more social capital than others. The amount of social capital is related to an organization's history (older ones usually have more), the people who are its face (charismatic leaders), the diversity of the types of other organizations they are connected to (more diverse), and their objectives (serving the community). On the other hand, these 'richer' organizations do not have markedly more ethnically bridging or bonding social capital. In fact, except for a few small examples, most organizations have more ethnically bridging than they have bonding social capital. The majority also have considerable linking social capital.

The two networks (the contact network and the network of interlocking directorates), which when combined form social capital of organizations, have been shown to be complementary rather than alike. Even though they contained the same actors, the connections between them were very different; only a few of the links in the formal network were found in the informal network as well. The contact network is much more extensive in the sense that it highlights that organizations have more connections than could be derived from the network of interlocking directorates. Because the contact network involves more relationships, this network also soothes the clear differences that are highlighted by the network of interlocking directorates. Ideological divides are prominent in the network of interlocking directorates, while in the contact network they are bridged. In a similar fashion, the network of interlocking directorates gives the impression that the Turkish community is inward focused (i.e. bonding), while the contact network reveals that in everyday life ethnic cleavages are often overcome.

This information leads us on to the question of what will happen when the community is mobilized. Will the ideological and ethnic divides be overcome or underlined? Is the relative equality that appears to characterize the Amsterdam Turkish community real or an illusion? These questions and more are answered in Chapter 3.4. Firstly, however, I will next deal with the issue of the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin.

6. Social Capital in Berlin

The ideological differences that characterized the Turkish community in Amsterdam can also be found in the Turkish community in Berlin, which likewise reflects the political and ideological cleavages that the migrants brought with them from their homeland. The leftist workers, the rightist nationalists, the different Islamic factions (Diyanet, Milli Görüş, Alevi etc.), and the Kurds all have their own organizations, and many express the desire to stay away from the associations belonging to other movements (White, 1997). It is not surprising to find the same groups in the two Turkish communities, since the Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin both migrated there at about the same period of time and for the same reasons. Moreover, in relation to this, the two communities have a similar history when it comes to the organizing process. First, in the 1960s and 1970s, leftist and rightist laborers' associations were established, reflecting the opposing political movements in Turkey. Then, after the military coup there in 1980, when all political parties were banned, many politicians and union leaders fled to Western-Europe, where they continued to be involved in their respective organizations. This led to a polarization of the left and the right. In the course of the 1980s, many religious associations of different denominations were also founded (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Vermeulen, 2006). The Turkish community in Berlin is also divided. As one respondent said:

"It's just a fact that we are a split community. Only seldom do we find a common denominator."

However, the ideological cleavages in Berlin are manifest in a different way to those in Amsterdam. The dominant split in the city is not between religious and non-religious ideologies, or between different religious movements, but rather between left and right-wing organizations. The religious associations are, in general, less obvious, as are the differences between them. Furthermore, the Turkish community in Berlin has two umbrella organizations that totally dominate the structure of the organizational network. Several respondents also gave yet another reason as to why the ideological divisions are less pronounced, stating that (and the analyses later confirmed this to some extent) the Turkish organizations in Berlin are clustered based on type, and not on their ideology. One of the respondents, for example, referred to the situation in the Netherlands to underline the differences in the ways in which Turks organized themselves in Germany:

“In the Netherlands, people, Turks, organize themselves along religious, ideological lines, but they’d be better organizing themselves the classical way as workers, irrespective of their background.”

And another respondent, when asked about the best representative of the Turkish community, said:

“That depends on the relevant sphere, whether we are talking about economic, youth, political, religious, social or cultural organizations”.

The interesting thing about the social capital of the Turkish community, as it is explored in the current study, is that the contact network indeed has a tendency to cluster based on the types of organizations, while the network of interlocking directorates clearly reveals the ideological groups.

6.1 The ideological divides in Berlin

Vermeulen (2006) has discussed the differences between the form of the formal Turkish networks in Amsterdam and Berlin extensively. He concluded that the numbers of interlocking directorates do not diverge much, but their shapes are substantially different. Instead of a more horizontally structured, all-inclusive, network as in Amsterdam, the one in Berlin is rather fragmented and clustered around two organizations. Vermeulen’s conclusions are based on a longitudinal analysis, including the study of data spanning several decades. When, for reasons of comparability (the contact network under study reflects only a single moment in time after all), one also considers a network of interlocking directorates over a single year, the image that Vermeulen sketched remains, albeit that it is less pronounced. The network of interlocking directorates in 2003 (the year from which the most recent information was available) reveals that there were hardly any interlocking directorates between organizations. Only twenty percent of organizations were connected, and few had more than one interlock. The five small groups of interlinked organizations that were present did, nevertheless, reflect the separate ideological groups in the Turkish community. They were a left-wing/progressive group of connected organizations, two (different) Islamic groups, an entrepreneurs’ group, and a right-wing/conservative group.

The ideological divides are not as obviously present in the contact network, other than in terms of a marked left-right distinction. The contact network does reveal clustering around particular types of organizations (see also the chart Figure 6.1). Almost 30% of the ties in this network involved social, women’s and welfare organizations. This matches the percentages of actors of these kinds which also add up to slightly more than

30%. A fourth kind of organization involved in an above average amount of ties are the umbrella organizations. There are only a few of these in Berlin, but those that are there do attract a lot of organizations, members as well as non-members: almost 9% percent of the ties in the contact network involved umbrella organizations, and they make up only 4% of the actors. Furthermore, closer examination reveals that two umbrella organizations, the *Türkische Bund Berlin (TBB)* and the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)*, are clearly dominant.




Figure 6.1 Mean percentages of ties to organizational types in the contact network in Berlin

Save for the women's associations, these groups of organizations do not have a clear tendency towards intra-group connections. The women's organizations did, however, clearly connect more to similar organizations than to other types. Furthermore, the religious umbrella organization, the *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)*, had predominantly bonding social capital with respect to the type of organization. This association, which is known for its conservative beliefs, is mainly involved with member organizations and not so much with 'outsiders'. This tendency was also visible for the social organization, the *Türkische Idealisten Gemeinschaft in Berlin*, which has a strong right-wing conservative ideology and is affiliated with the Grey Wolves, as its respondents told me themselves. Organizations belonging to this ideology separate themselves from the wider Turkish community by their own volition, but they are, in any event, rejected by other Turkish associations, especially the left-wing groups. In general, one can see that organizations which take a strong stance for or against a particular topic are more likely to turn to similar counterparts. This also applies to the women's organizations, which make a strong stand for their members and against (religious) oppression. One respondent said:

IFB

The *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)* is an Islamic umbrella organization founded in 1980. It has an extensive infrastructure and offers a great variety of services: mosques, youth and women organizations, as well as real estate management and educational establishments (Spielhaus & Färber, 2006). The *IFB* is at the head of 12 mosques, among which the controversial *Mevlana Mosque* that was accused of, amongst other things, accommodating imams who are preaching hate. It is related to Milli Görüş association *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG)*, which is in Germany known as an extremist Islamic organization that is under surveillance of the German secret police. Because of this connection, the *IFB* is not well accepted by the rest of the Turkish population in Berlin: it is often ignored or openly disregarded. Two respondents told me their organizations only encounter the *IFB* in court, when one or the other started a lawsuit. Another respondent indicated that *"They [the IFB] send us invitations, but we never attend their meetings. We only want contacts with legal groups."* On the other hand, the *IFB* is the only Turkish Islamic organization that has managed to become officially recognized as a *Religionsgemeinschaft* (religious community) and because of that capacity appointed to provide Islamic education in schools in Berlin.

"We don't have much to do with men's and mixed organizations. Not because we don't like them, but because that doesn't fit our aims. However, we do consciously avoid any connections to Islamic organizations. We are religiously neutral. And on top of that political Islam is tantamount to the oppression of women and that is exactly what we are fighting".

A respondent of another women's organization added:

"We do not want to be connected to Islamic women's organizations, because they are still very conservative. What's more, the converted Germans that are active in those are the worst!" [Regarding their conservatism, LP]

Other kinds of organizations were connected to a wide range of types of organizations. Most had more bridging social capital with respect to the type of organization than they did bonding social capital.

6.2 A first introduction to the TGB and TBB

The fact that the category of umbrella organizations was mentioned so often is mainly due to the popularity of the two organizations of that type in Berlin. The *Türkische Bund Berlin (TBB)* and the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)* were mentioned as being important by many respondents, and both umbrellas also regard themselves as significant. One respondent said:

"The TGB and TBB both claim to represent the Turkish immigrant community in Berlin."

These two umbrellas both bring together a large group of member organizations and other sympathizers (individuals as well as organizations), but each is in a different ideological corner. The *TBB* is generally considered to be a left-wing progressive organization, while the *TGB* is known as conservative. The associations that are connected to the respective umbrella organizations can usually be typified in a similar manner.

The *TBB* and *TGB* are regarded by many organizations as being the most important representatives of the Turkish community in Berlin. Some even mentioned them both, recognizing that each has its own merits. For example, one respondent stated that:

“The TBB has a good relationship with Germans, while the TGB has a good relationship with Turks”.

Another thought that:

“The TGB has good diplomatic connections, but is not taken seriously, while the TBB [although of little meaning to the respondent, LP] often hits the streets and is politically active, despite their limited amount of grassroots support”.

Most organizations, however, felt allied to either the *TGB* or the *TBB*. The *TGB* was praised because:

“they are really socially engaged, truly listen and are open.”

Supporters of the *TBB* spoke highly of its ability to make itself known in German public life, its ties to German politicians, and its ability to reach a large audience. Indeed, the latter was actually the main reason for one of the respondents becoming a member.

The *TBB* and *TGB*, and the organizations that ‘belong’ to each of them, are undeniably crucial to the way in which the Turkish community functions. They are decisive in terms of the self-image of Turkish organizations and the way the community is approached by the German government. On the other hand, there are also several (smaller) organizations from other movements that play an important role, amongst which the religious and the Kurdish associations deserve particular attention.

6.3 The TGB and TBB on second sight

The prominent positions of the *TBB* and *TGB* are evident. They clearly have more social capital than any other organization. They each have the most connections (the *TBB* mentioned 122 alters, the *TGB* 100), are the most well-known and are commonly mentioned by other associations (the *TBB* 17 times, the *TGB* 15 times). They are also a cut above all other organizations with respect to their direct circle of acquaintances (which is much bigger), but also in terms of their central position within the community

as a whole (which is much more significant). This applies even more to the *TBB* than it does to the *TGB*.

One of the explanations for the high amount of social capital that these organizations possess lies within their participation in several consultative bodies. The *TBB* and *TGB* play a role in different bodies, within which they both encounter large numbers of other organizations. There is, however, a considerable difference in scale between the respective consultative bodies. The *TGB* is involved in active, yet local, enterprises such as the *Türkische Gesundheitstage*⁴⁵ (Turkish Health Days) and the *Migrationsbeirat* (migrant council) of the city district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. The *TBB* also collaborates locally, but does so in city and *Landes* (federal state) wide deliberative bodies as well. These larger collaborative bodies contain many more organizations and reach a higher level in the political structure (city wide instead of city district only). I will address the special role that deliberative bodies play in Berlin below.

The *TGB*'s high number of alters is also due to the fact that it is the largest organization in Berlin; it has almost twice as many member organizations as the *TBB*. Through its members, it can potentially reach a large audience. Moreover, the membership of the religious umbrella organization, the *DITIB*, and the mosques that are in turn members thereof add to the reach of the *TGB*, as one of the respondents explained.

Furthermore, both the *TBB* and the *TGB* are members of (different) national umbrella organizations. The *TBB* belongs to the more left-wing *Türkische Gemeinde zu Deutschland* (*TGD*). The *TGD* has about 250 member associations, several of which are other umbrella organizations or federations, such as the *Föderation Türkischer Elternvereine in Deutschland* (*FÖTED*). The *TGB* belongs to the more conservative, *Koordinationsrat der türkischen Vereine in Deutschland* (*KtVD*). The *KtVD* comprises about 1200 organizations spread all over Germany and the *TGB* is its regional representative. The respondent from the *TGB* explicitly stated that it became a member of the federal umbrella organization to make sure that everyone can “*speak with one voice*”⁴⁶ at the national level. The *TBB*, on the other hand, is obviously not included, and nor does it want to be. According to the *TBB*'s respondent, the *KtVD* is under the influence of the Turkish state.

⁴⁵ The *Türkische Gesundheitstage* (Turkish Health Days) was brought into being with the aim of contributing to the intercultural opening up of the health care system. With panel discussions (in Turkish for migrants and in German for professionals) and information stands, both the users and providers of health care are informed about the system and the psychology of health care in Germany. It is organized by Turkish associations in collaboration with local governmental organizations.

⁴⁶ “*eine geschlossene Haltung*”

6.3.1 The TGB versus the TBB

The *TGB* and the *TBB* have a typical relationship. The respondent from the latter stated:

“Sometimes we’re partners, most of the time we’re rivals”.

One of the member organizations of the *TBB* said:

“The TBB tries to get in touch with the TGB, but this doesn’t seem to work out”.

The *TGB*, incidentally, sees the relationship less harshly and from a different angle:

“We meet regularly. Sometimes there may be differences of opinion, mostly concerning the way some problems ought to be solved, and in that case we both go our own way”.

These quotes reveal how the two are ‘condemned’ to collaborate once in a while (mainly when they face a common opponent, for example when the German government is proposing legal reforms that are not favorable to migrants), but prefer to go their own, separate ways.

In general, the *TBB* and, to a lesser extent, the *TGB* are organizations that often operate separately from their members. They both send out a strong message, which is either more progressive and focused on German society, or more conservative and focused on the Turkish community, depending on their respective points of view. These ideologies attract smaller organizations which then become members of either umbrella organization or feel (and act upon this) strongly affiliated to it. Many organizations belong to an umbrella because, to a large extent, they experience it as some kind of back-up and a way of positioning their own organization in the jungle of ethnic associations. The affiliation with an umbrella organization thus functions as a kind of hallmark.

6.3.2 Relationships between the umbrella organizations and their members

As umbrella organizations, the *TBB* and the *TGB* act on a higher structural level than their respective members. The member associations are active ‘in the field’, pursuing their own goals and organizing their own activities, while the umbrellas serve as their supportive representatives and interact with other associations, both in and outside the community.

I got the impression that the relationships between the umbrella organizations (the *TGB* as well as the *TBB*) and their members are not always as intensive as one might expect. The *TBB*, for example, sends its members an official newsletter five times a year and four times a year, the chairmen of each individual organization and the board of the

TBB meet. Even though the *TBB* chair stated that each of its members is as important as any other, I did not find that this enthusiasm was reciprocated by everyone (I spoke to several member organizations). One of the *TBB*-members declared that his organization has a “critical connection”⁴⁷ with the *TBB*. More importantly, it was on the verge of merging with another association to create a new organization and there was still doubt about whether they would prolong their membership with the new association. Another organization stated that it became a member of the *TBB* mainly to profit from its media exposure, which meant that it is able to reach more people when necessary. Otherwise this organization went its own way.

The relationship between the *TGB* and its members is not always as close. One member organization stated:

“There are also disadvantages of our membership of the TGB, for example when they tell us what we can and what we cannot do.”

And:

“We’ve been a member for about ten years now, and we sometimes wonder whether we still need it. General meetings only take place a couple of times a year anyway.”

6.3.3 The mutual relationships between member organizations of the *TBB* and *TGB*

The members of the two umbrella organizations are, in practice, not particularly interconnected. In the main, it is only if they are active in the same field that the organizations maintain contact. For example, two of the *TBB*’s members, the *TEBB* (parent’s association) and the *BTBTM* (student body), consult each other about tutors. The *Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln* and the *Türkisch Deutsche Gemeinde*, both members of the *TGB*, are both community centers which even share accommodation. However, in their daily lives, most associations tend to rely on the connections they have built up themselves, away from the umbrella organization. Indeed, organizations have more connections with counterparts that are *not* members of their respective umbrella organizations than they do with fellow members. This implies that membership of an umbrella organization is more instrumental than productive of social capital.

⁴⁷ “Kritische Kontakte”

6.4 The position of religious organizations

Religious associations are not as prominent in the Turkish community as the secular umbrella organizations are, mainly because the relationship between the German state and Islamic groups and Islam in general is strained. Only officially recognized religious organizations ('corporations') enjoy a range of state privileges. These '*Körperschaften des Öffentlichen Rechts*' are entitled to offer religious education in schools, receive public funds, have a say in cultural affairs, and have tithes collected for them by the state (Pfaff & Gill, 2006). However, no Muslim group has been officially recognized yet. An important reason for this is that the conditions for recognition are difficult for any Islamic movement to meet, for example because they require a single organization to have formal rules and a clear institutionalized leader. Islam is, however, a highly decentralized and non-hierarchical religion, with its foundations in the lifestyles of every individual (Spielhaus & Färber, 2006). The fact that there are already many different movements within Islam, and within a single ethnic community such as the Turkish one, makes the relationship between the State and the Islamic community even more complex.

Furthermore, the general discourse regarding Islamic organizations is dismissive and suspicious. Politicians express their fears that Islam and a democratic order are irreconcilable, even if there was a 'German' version. Likewise, some court decisions are perceived by some Muslims as a direct rejection of their religion (ibid.). The *Neutralitätsgesetz* (passed in 2005) bans every kind of religious symbol in public workplaces. Although this legislation applies to every faith and thus, in principle, also forbids a catholic from wearing a cross on a chain, it was perceived as an attack on headscarves. Indeed, the law also set off the debate on this issue in the Turkish community itself.

Religion, nevertheless, still plays an important role for many Turks in Berlin, and their needs are met by numerous organizations covering all Islamic movements. Just like secular groups, Islamic groups can establish voluntary associations that are registered with the *Vereinsregister* (administrative court). Two of these, the Diyanet and the *IFB*, have umbrella organizations in Berlin and are thus more strongly represented, more present and more significant than other religious movements such as the Alevi⁴⁸ and Suleymanciler. The *DITIB* is the umbrella organization which represents Islam for the Diyanet movement, and it is steered by the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs⁴⁹. This organization is important because it is the largest Turkish-Islamic organization in Berlin (Spielhaus & Färber, 2006). It has several mosques spread all over the city, as well

⁴⁸ The main Alevi organization is the *AAKM*. This is relatively big, but not an umbrella organization.

⁴⁹ The Diyanet movement is also represented in the Netherlands. Adherents to it take pride in the fact that because the Turkish Presidency controls the imams and the content of the sermons delivered during Friday prayers (every imam must read the same sermon), the Diyanet religion is the same, irrespective of where in the world someone goes to the mosque.

as numerous social/cultural associations and organizations for specific target groups. The *DITIB* is a member of the *TGB*.

The other important religious umbrella organization is the *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)* which is reputed to be very conservative. It is a controversial association because it is affiliated with the Milli Görüş movement, which is under the surveillance of the German secret police (*Verfassungsschutz*). Yet, the *IFB* is a very important Islamic organization. In 1998 it was, after many long years of struggle and negotiations, recognized as a religious community by the Supreme Court of the federal state of Berlin. This officially allowed the *IFB* to provide Islamic education in primary schools in the city. Other Turkish religious organizations which adhere to a different interpretation of Islam, and are not recognized as a religious community and do not, therefore, enjoy the same privilege, were and are much opposed to this decision. They contend that Islamic education is now too one-sided, as the *IFB* only represents one, rather conservative, Islamic movement (Gesemann, 2001; Dantschke, 2004; Pfaff & Gill, 2006).

6.5 On larger and smaller organizations: the positions of organizations of different sizes

The two umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and the *TBB*, receive the most attention in both the media and scholarly publications. Consequently, the impression may be given that the Turkish community tends to revolve around them and that they shape it to such an extent that smaller associations, or those not affiliated to an umbrella organization, carry little weight. However, as I will demonstrate, these associations are important in their own way and deserve more attention. First of all, the majority of the Turkish organizations in Berlin are not official members of an umbrella organization. Nevertheless, several of them play an important role in the community. Secondly, smaller associations fulfill a different role to that of the umbrella organizations, but it is no less crucial to the functioning of the community's social capital. Instead of representing the Turkish grassroots in the public debate, as umbrella organizations do, the smaller associations offer hands-on support or (social) diversions for the Turks in Berlin.

6.6 Larger organizations I: the Kurdish sub-group

The Kurdish organizations that I interviewed were revealed to have above-average sized circles of acquaintances. The Kurdish parent association, *YEKMAL*, as well as the general Kurdish organization, *Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein KKH*, turned out to have the highest number of alters after the *TGB* and the *TBB*. This is not surprising, since the

latter is the most well-known Kurdish association in Berlin. The *KKH* and *YEKMAL* are, however, not particularly connected to the Turkish community, as only a little more than 10% of their alters were of that nationality. A slightly higher percentage (12% for the *YEKMAL* and 17% for the *KKH*) of their alters was Kurdish. This relatively low number surprised me a little, since Kurdish organizations are generally known for the high degree of their interconnectedness. Furthermore, both organizations explicitly declared that they are first and foremost aimed at the Kurdish population in Berlin⁵⁰, but the greatest proportion of their alters consisted of other migrant organizations, of which almost 60% were non-Turkish and non-Kurdish.

The explanation for the high number of non-Kurdish alters lies in the fact that both the *YEKMAL* and the *KKH* participate in the *Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg*, which includes over fifty organizations, most of which are not Turkish. Furthermore, both organizations are active in several other consultative bodies and collaborative initiatives, such as the *Migrationsbeirat Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (KKH)* and the *Fachgruppe Immigrantinnen und Flüchtlinge (YEKMAL)*. These bodies unite many organizations of different backgrounds, thus leading to high numbers of contacts. As the representative of the *KKH* explained,

“We [the KKH] basically only keep in touch with other Kurdish organizations, except for the Migrationsrat (which we co-founded) and when it regards large-scale events, such as the celebration of May, 1”

In other words, the contact with Kurdish organizations might be low in percentage terms, but it is more intensive than that with their non-Kurdish counterparts.

6.7 Larger organizations II: women’s organizations

The multiplying effect of the collaborative bodies is also visible for other organizations. In the next paragraph I will discuss the special role that consultative bodies and the like play in the Turkish community in Berlin. Here, I want to demonstrate that several organizations which, on the face of it, seem small in scale and inwardly oriented actually turned out to be widely connected. This is mainly due to their collaboration with other organizations in working groups and other joint undertakings. *Akarsu*, for example, is a women’s organization aimed mainly at young migrant women of Turkish descent (although they also try to reach the growing Arabic population in the city district of Kreuzberg). *Akarsu* participates in the *Migrationsbeirat Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*, as well as in several working groups that were convened on the initiative of the city district. Along with numerous leading counterparts it also helps to organize the

⁵⁰ Note that this not only concerns Turkish-Kurdish organizations, but also, for instance, Syrian-Kurdish associations.

Türkische Gesundheitstage. The same applies to the women's organization, the *BTKB* (*Türkische Frauenverein*), which is active in a variety of working groups in its city district, as well as in a *Trägerrunde* of a semi-governmental foundation which offers subsidies and facilities to organizations in the neighborhood (*Werner Düttmann Siedlung*). However, the respondent from the *BTKB* explained that its most important contacts are two cooperative bodies of women's organizations. One is city wide (*Forum Berliner Immigrantinnenprojekte*), and the other is on the regional level (*Landesfrauenrat Berlin*). In general, women's organizations in Berlin collaborate with and support each other notably often. Indeed, the respondent from the *BTKB* explained that the *Forum Berliner Immigrantinnenprojekte* was founded so that the women's associations could join forces, because less money had become available for women's projects over the years. She stated: "We can exert more political pressure through the *Forum*". The respondent from the women's organization, the *TIO*, also mentioned that the participating associations use the *Forum* to take a united stand. This is also what is expressed in the leaflet containing the *Forum's* profile.

(Turkish) women's organizations in Berlin are in a strong position. They are large in number and mostly have an outspoken and visible stance. They are also well known in the community. For example, 65% of my respondents indicated that they know the *Akarsu*, 65% knew the *BTKB* and 58% knew another women's organization, the *Elisi Evi* (not interviewed). This is far above the average of 40%⁵¹. In addition, the popularity of women's organizations was also seen from the great number of times that they were spontaneously referred to by other respondents during the interviews. Furthermore, many of the women's organizations are professional, often having several paid employees. This allows them to profile themselves in the organizational field. Moreover, the mutual collaborations between women's associations strengthen their position.

A possible explanation for the notably strong position of such organizations is that the local government in Berlin did not, for a long time, employ a general migrant policy which furthered migrant organizations in general. Instead, target group specific policies were pursued, aimed at, for example, youths, the handicapped, the elderly or women. The women's organizations in this respect have a privileged position in comparison to other types of associations. Combined with a secular tradition that characterizes part of the (left-wing) Turkish community, these organizations have had the opportunity to develop themselves and obtain a strong position in the organizational landscape.

⁵¹ These figures are based on the responses to the name recognition list (see Chapter 4). Interviewees indicated whether or not they knew each of the organizations on the list. The list contained all types of organizations.

6.8 Larger organizations III: the TDU

A large organization that cannot be left unmentioned is the entrepreneurs' association, the TDU (Türkisch Deutsche Unternehmer Verein), which was founded in 1996 by a group of entrepreneurs. The TDU defines its aims as being 'to support the Turkish (business) community by taking a stand in the economic, political, social and cultural debate and to actively partake in these debates'⁵². In 2008, it had about 250 members (small and medium-sized businesses).

The TDU takes a neutral, intermediate position between the TGB and TBB. It is valued as much by both, and both regard it as being on 'their' side. The ambiguity of the TDU's affiliation is seen, for example, from the fact that a respondent from a TGB member organization was contemplating whether or not the TDU was also a member, which he thought was plausible. The TBB, on the other hand, named the TDU more often than any other organization.

6.9 All the small things: the smaller players

The Turkish community also includes many small organizations which have relatively little social capital. Those that exist for very specific purposes, such as the Türkische Ringerverein (Turkish Wrestling Organization) and the Berlin Mehter Takimi (Janissaries band) have only a small group of organizations around them. Several of these associations are focused on Turkey and the Turkish culture. This may well be an explanation of their small circle of acquaintances, because the number of organizations that have their focus on the homeland has been diminishing over the years. As many respondents have stated, they are no longer concerned about Turkey and 'pure' Turkish culture, but are instead occupied with the situation in Germany and the German-Turkish culture.

It was not only some of the Turkish nationalist organizations that had fewer than average connections to others; left-wing associations also had a limited amount of alters. More than in the case of the right-wing organizations, this was perhaps a conscious choice. For example, the Türkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft is inactive because it no longer regards itself as an organization, but as a lobby movement that does not need a formal structure. The Türkei Zentrum stopped its activities because, according to the respondent, it was founded 40 years ago and was aimed at Turkish migrants who wanted to return to their homeland. As most of these immigrants eventually decided to stay in Germany, this association's goal was no longer relevant and it gradually ceased its activities.

⁵² www.tdu-berlin.de, 2009

6.10 The importance of collaborative bodies

The consultative bodies, working groups and other joint initiatives that I have mentioned above deserve some more attention. Before I delved into Turkish organizational life in Berlin, I had the impression, or perhaps the prejudice, that the city's organizations were left to their own devices. The German government is not known as being particularly generous when it comes to subsidizing migrant associations. The interviews confirmed this impression, initially. When I asked organizations whether they were ever invited to take part in any public inquiry procedure (which is quite a common phenomenon in the Netherlands, the so-called *inspraakbijeekkomsten*), I usually got one of two reactions. Some gave me a scornful laugh: how could I ever think there would be something like that and that they would actually have something to say? Others expressed their appreciative, perhaps even slightly envious, admiration: "if that only could be true; how great would that be!" In other words, I did not imagine that there would be many migrant councils of any kind. But eventually, after continuing to ask questions, I was proved wrong. In fact, I was able to distinguish three types of initiatives: state-initiated councils, migrant organized initiatives and working groups run by German organizations.

6.10.1 State-initiated councils: the Migrationsbeirat

Contrary to my expectations, there were several migrant councils in the city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Neukölln, Charlottenburg and Spandau. The first of these in particular has arranged *Arbeitsgruppen* ('AGs', committees) in various fields (e.g. youth, women, employment), in which migrant and non-migrant organizations try to tackle current problems. In other words, the local government in Berlin does provide opportunities for migrant organizations to make their voices heard.

The Migrationsbeiräte (migrant councils), nevertheless, have two major drawbacks. Firstly, several organizations were skeptical about the impact that such bodies could have. Several respondents 'warned' me that, yes, they had been included in the council where they discuss migrants' affairs, but they did not have any illusions about being able to actually influence politicians or policies. One respondent said:

"It is not like you can actually change things [by participating in the migrant council] but at least you can give your opinion or the opinion of the people you represent"

Several other interviewees complained that the councils are only meant as a sounding board ("*nur Anhörung*"). One respondent said:

“I’m fed up with it! Yet another migrant council! Back in the days I used to work as an adviser for migrants and I was also in something like a migrants’ council. All the solutions we brought up were not accepted. So I’ve been through this for over 30 years now!”

The second drawback, as expressed by some respondents, is that not all organizations have an equal opportunity to participate in the councils. The *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)* explained that it would like to join the *Migrationsbeirat* in its city district (Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg) and has already applied, but it was not accepted. According to the respondent, this was because most of the participants in the *Migrationsbeirat* are left-wing and liberal. The *IFB*, on the other hand, is seen as right-wing and conservative and, so the respondent said, is therefore denied access. For that matter, the respondent objected strongly to the characterization of his organization as right-wing and conservative. He thought that the left-right distinction had been superseded, and he would instead describe his organization as ‘Islamic’ and ‘attentive of its social environment’.

A respondent from an organization that was a member of the *Migrationsbeirat* in Neukölln showed how this exclusion is perceived from the other side. During the meetings of the *Beirat* a common topic of discussion is which mosques

“are okay and which are not. In fact the discussion is about whether one ought to use mosques as a means to approach people one otherwise may never reach, or whether it is better to shut them out because they have wrong ideas and ideologies.”

The respondent hinted that she was inclined to argue the first point, but noted that this discussion is far from being resolved. It does go to the heart of the plea by Fennema and Tillie (1999), namely that it is better to include as many organizations as possible (even the (alleged) non-democratic ones) in the democratic process, because even non-democratic groups will eventually adopt democratic ways in order to achieve their goals since the code of conduct during deliberations demands this.

6.10.2 (Migrant) organization initiated collaborative bodies

As well as the state-initiated councils, there also are several collaborative bodies founded by (migrant) organizations themselves in order to strengthen their position. Some of these have already been commented on in passing, such as the *Forum Berliner Immigrantinnenprojekte*. In comparison to the state initiated councils, these bodies have more support from the member organizations, as can be seen from the active contributions of the participants. Vice versa, the participating organizations feel more

supported by the self-initiated collaborative bodies. In contrast to the governmental councils, they truly 'get things done' together, instead of only being used as a sounding board. For example, the Kurdish parents' association, the *YEKMAL*, is part of a project called the '*Wrangelkiez macht Schule*', which was founded in order to

"set up a better network and to figure out what everybody is doing and which and whose activities overlap or if important facilities are missing in the neighborhood."

Its purpose is to better serve the needs of its grassroots. In similar vein is the *YEKMAL*, one of the four organizations seated in the *Nachbarschaftshaus Centrum e.V.* The organizations join forces and organize events together. They discovered that because of their collective actions each of them has more visitors. Another example is the *Interessengemeinschaft Oranienstraße*, with which the community center, the *Kotti e.V.*, is engaged. The Oranienstraße is a central street in 'Kreuzberg 36' (the area is named '36' after the last digits of the postal code) in which the population consists mainly of migrants. Most of them are Turkish, but more and more people of other nationalities have gone to live there as well. The (migrant) shop owners, as well as the numerous (migrant) organizations that have their offices in the Oranienstraße, formed this interest group. Collaborative bodies like these are often formed at the neighborhood or '*Kiez*' level⁵³, or are based on an outspoken common denominator (as in case of the women's organizations). Yet another initiative is the '*International Children's Fest 23. Nisan*'. The 23rd of April is a Turkish national holiday⁵⁴, and on this day over sixty Turkish and non-Turkish organizations organize various festive activities for children. For the Turkish population in particular, the *Children's Fest* is an important holiday, which unites right and left-wing organizations. Amongst many others, the music organization, the *Berlin Turk Musikisi Konservatari*, the media group, the *AYPA* (whose chairman is in the working group responsible for the festivities), the welfare organization, the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln*, and the Alevi organization, the *AAKM*, all help to arrange the event.

Berlin has one giant migrants' council, the *Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg*, which attracts over 50 migrant organizations of all backgrounds⁵⁵. It is not to be confused with any state-initiated council called the *Migrationsbeirat*. The *Migrationsrat* was founded by 45 migrant organizations in 2004, and its main aim is to represent immigrants of any

⁵³ *Kiez* refers to the small area, of only several blocks, directly surrounding an actor's environment. It is used in colloquial speech with an affectionate undertone, cf. 'hood'. In the last decade it has become a regular expression in the official usage of the administration of Berlin.

⁵⁴ This date was proclaimed as the *Day of the Child* by Atatürk on the day the Turkish national Parliament gathered for the first time after the Independence War.

⁵⁵ This was the score in 2005. Four years later, the number of allied organizations had increased to 65, which shows the appeal of such collaborative bodies.

Arbeiterwohlfahrt

Another important German association, though not an umbrella organization, in Berlin is the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* (*AWO, Worker's Welfare*). The *AWO* was founded in 1919 as part of the Social Democrat party, with the principal task of offering activities in the areas of social work, youth welfare and health care. It provides information, support and education itself and also promotes voluntary work in these domains (Arbeiterwohlfahrt, 2008). Citywide, the *AWO* has several community centers that all have specific aims that can fit the objectives of very many collaborating migrant organizations. For example, women's organizations work together with the youth and family advice centers or the *Frauenladen*, and welfare organizations collaborate with the Migrant Information Centers. The diversity of its activities, and the high degree of institutionalization of the *AWO*, probably makes it an interesting partner for migrant organizations. This also became clear from the interviews, as it was one of the actors that were mentioned most often.

descent to secure legal, social and political emancipation and the integration of the minorities in Berlin-Brandenburg. It does so while taking an impartial and ideologically neutral stance and only concerning itself with the situation in Germany and not that of any country of origin⁵⁶. Any migrant organization can apply for membership as long as it endorses the principles of the *Migrationsrat*. About fifteen of the members are Turkish associations, several of which I have spoken to (the *YEKMAL*, *TBB* and *KKH* were members at the time).

6.10.3 Working groups of German organizations

There is a third kind of working group available to many organizations in Berlin. These are the groups that operate under the wing of *German* umbrella organizations, such as *Der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband* (*DPW*; Charities Association), and even the Christian *Diakonisches Werk*⁵⁷. These organizations, established decades ago by private initiatives and the Evangelical Church respectively, are large institutionalized umbrella organizations that are active in several sub-fields of social welfare, such as migrant work, help for addicts, youth work, and support of the handicapped. The *DPW* and *Diakonisches Werk* are not only active in these spheres themselves; they also bring other organizations working in these fields together in so-called '*Arbeitsgruppen*' (*AGs*), working groups. Of the organizations participating in this study, five indicated that they are members of the *DPW* (*BTKB*, *El Ele*, *Kotti*, *TIO*, and *YEKMAL*) and one is a member of the *Diakonisches Werk* (*Papatya*). Of course, the working groups that they participate in contain many more organizations⁵⁸. Furthermore, the organizations only participate in *AGs* that represent their respective area of work. This means that although, for example,

⁵⁶ As stated at the website: www.migrationsrat.de

⁵⁷ The outreach ministry of the Evangelical Church of Germany

⁵⁸ One respondent explained that an organization affiliated with the *DPW* cannot also be associated with the *Diakonisches Werk*, because of the conflicting ideological backgrounds of the two umbrella organizations.

the welfare organization, *El Ele*, and the Kurdish organization, the *YEKMAL*, are both members of the *DPW*, they never meet because they belong to different working groups.

6.11 The positive effect of collaborative bodies on social capital

What all three types of collaborative bodies have in common is that through them the participating organizations have access to a vast amount of social capital. Even though the organizations in each body are not necessarily constantly and intensively interacting, the mere fact that they are brought together on a regular basis allows the participants to build mutual trust, which can be followed by true collaboration. As the respondent from the *El Ele*, a welfare organization in Neukölln, stated:

“We are part of an ‘Arbeitsgruppe’ of the Quartiersmanagement⁵⁹. There is always a huge stream of e-mails coming from participants in the AG. We only meet each other in person at the Quartiersmanagement, but one couldn’t say that that implies direct collaboration between the various organizations. Only after you have got to know each other personally, you will also collaborate more often”.

Furthermore, organizations that are not taking part in any collective are less connected to other associations than those who are, even when the connections through the collectives are not included. The exceptions to this ‘rule’ are the organizations that can be described as popular. Recall that the popularity of an actor is expressed in the number of times it was mentioned as a contact by other organizations during the interviews. Organizations that were named often are regarded as being more popular. Several of the most popular associations, such as the parents’ organization, the *TEBB*, the healthcare organization, the *BGTM*, and the Diyanet umbrella organization, the *DITIB*, were not particularly involved in deliberative bodies.

6.12 Bonding and bridging over ethnic boundaries

Over a third of the actors in the contact network were German. Slightly fewer were Turkish and less than a third were of other ethnicities. However, the number of *ties to* Turkish organizations was almost 50% (see also Figure 6.2). Half of the respondents had more bonding than bridging social capital. Turkish organizations are apparently more relevant in the everyday lives of these associations than associations with different ethnic backgrounds. The question remains: what kinds of organizations have more ethnically bridging social capital or more ethnically bonding social capital instead?

⁵⁹ The *Quartiersmanagement* is a semi-governmental organization, founded in 1999 (Stotijn, 2006; www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de, 2009). Its aim is to break into and strengthen the neighborhood networks of individual residents as well as of (migrant) organizations.




Figure 6.2 Mean percentages of ties to organizations of different ethnicities.

6.12.1 The relationship between collaborative bodies and ethnic bridging social capital

The collaborative bodies not only provide organizations with a larger circle of acquaintances (i.e. more social capital), but also with a more ethnically diverse group thereof (more bridging social capital). In other words, organizations that take part in collectives have more connections to non-Turkish associations than those who are not members of any deliberative or collaborative bodies. I have already highlighted that the Kurdish organizations have the most diverse range of alters and, in fact, had more connections to non-Kurdish than to Kurdish associations. This is because of their participation in collaborative bodies (even though the respondents in their interviews did not support this finding when remarking that they are mainly connected to Kurdish organizations). This effect was also clear for the women's organizations that are part of the *Forum Immigrantinnen Projekte*, such as *TIO* and *BTKB*. Some of the organizations which were not as involved in collaborative bodies as those already mentioned also had diverse circles of linked associations. For example, only 40% of the connections of the entrepreneurs association *TDU* were Turkish against 60% non-Turkish links, and the Turkish wrestling association, the *Türkischer Ringerverein*, had only 30% of Turkish, against 70% of non-Turkish, alters. The wrestling association, in fact, was mainly connected to other German wrestling clubs.

Many smaller organizations with only a few connections had mainly ethnically bonding social capital. The non-Turkish connections that they were linked to were typically German governmental or religious organizations. For example, apart from the

Evangelical and Catholic academies, the *Türkisch-Islamischer Friedhofs- und Bestattungsverein* is only connected to Turkish organizations. Likewise, the city district authority was the single non-Turkish organization that the social association *Türkisches Sprache und Kultur Zentrum*, indicated that it was linked to.

6.12.2 Bridging on different structural levels

In what has gone before I demonstrated that the umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and the *TBB*, were the central actors in the Turkish community. A focus on the amount of bonding and bridging social capital possessed by each of these umbrellas illustrates that this is the case in both the literal and the figurative sense. Figurative because many associations regard them as being the most important organizations and literal because both have a high number of Turkish alters: almost half of the *TBB*'s alters were Turkish, as were two-third of the connections of the *TGB*. These different proportions reflect the images of the two organizations that prevail: the *TGB* is the one that is primarily aimed at the Turkish community, while the *TBB* is seen as being more open and interactive.

Nevertheless, both organizations have a bridging position in relation to other migrant communities and, more importantly, to German society. The contacts they maintain with non-Turkish organizations take place at a higher structural level. In other words, as umbrella organizations they are conversation partners for similar, hierarchically well placed organizations from other ethnic communities, as well as for high level political and governmental institutions. For example, the *TBB* regularly meets with the leading organization from the Jewish community, and the *TGB* and *TBB* are both focal points for members of the Senate of Berlin.

6.12.3 Street-level bridging

The Turkish community has several small-scale organizations that are connected more to non-Turkish (mostly German) associations than to Turkish ones. The organizations that take up bridging positions at 'street-level' are often run by German managers. This applies, for example, to the welfare organization, El Ele, and the women's organization, Papatya. Strikingly, when I approached the TIO about participating in this study, its respondent was very resolute in saying that the "TIO is no longer a Turkish organization but an international one". Given the fact that the manager of the TIO is German, one might expect it to be on the periphery of the Turkish community and mainly linked to non-Turkish organizations. Nevertheless, 40% of the TIO's contacts were Turkish and, as the respondent told us later on, the majority of the participants in their activities are still of Turkish descent. It turned out to be quite a Turkish organization after all! This shows that whether an organization is Turkish or not is, in some cases, very ambiguous. In this

respect, one respondent expressed the view that he is uncomfortable with the habit of categorizing organizations as Turkish, German or any other ethnicity, a dilemma which several organizations also have trouble with.

“When is an organization German? Maybe the board is German, but the grassroots are not, certainly not in Kreuzberg where many people have a migrant background. And then this idea of ‘migrant’ organizations. Many people were born here in Germany and are not migrants.”

6.13 The fact and the factual: boards and managers

That several organizations that are regarded as ‘Turkish’ turned out to be run by German managers is due to the fact that many associations in Berlin maintain a division between the official board members, i.e. the people listed in the official registers, and those who keep the organizations going in practice, i.e. the daily managers. The board members, or even the board itself, are often only used to legitimize the organization. Indeed, to be allowed to register as an official organization (*‘eingetragene Verein’*) in the Berlin *Vereinsregister*, an association needs a board to officially represent it and a minimum of seven members (www.berlin.de, 2009). In practice, this leads to the situation in which a group of people acts as a board, but only on paper. The manager (*Geschäftsführer*) and any other co-workers are the ones who actually ‘run the shop’. The manager of one organization stated:

“Usually I do not know the boards of the organizations we collaborate with, I only know the employees.”

In some organizations the manager is of a different ethnicity to the board members, as in the aforementioned example of the *TIO*. In others, there is also a distinction between the manager and the board members, but all have the same ethnicity. This is the case for the women’s organization, *Akarsu*, which is run by a Turkish manager, and the Kurdish parents’ association, *YEKMAL*, which has a Kurdish manager. The *TBB* is an example of an organization in which the manager is clearly more important to the public than the board. Kenan Kolat, the manager at the time of my fieldwork, was ‘world famous in Berlin’ and generally regarded as ‘the face of the *TBB*’, while the board kept relatively quiet in the background.

6.14 Professionalism

Along with the divisions between the board and the management comes a significant degree of professionalism. Often the manager and employees are paid, and in many

cases have an educational background in the field of their occupation. For example, Papatya is a shelter for migrant women and girls who are either victims of domestic violence, or have fled their homes and need help for other reasons. The stories that the girls tell are so awful that the work turned out to be too demanding for volunteers, and Papatya now has a paid staff of social workers. Other organizations have paid employees because they offer certified language courses and other types of classes for which they receive official funding. The financing of the organizations by government subsidies is usually project based. Some projects, such as language teaching, are only approved if the employees are skilled workers. This encourages organizations to employ paid personnel, and to thus attain a high degree of professionalism. A high degree of professionalism encourages the continuity of organizations, which makes it easier to develop expertise with respect to politically relevant affairs (Lelieveldt, 1999). Particularly in the example of the TBB, it is clear that this association is able to maintain its strong position because of its paid employees.

6.15 Use and usefulness of linking social capital

The presence or absence of relationships between Turkish organizations and German governmental actors, i.e. linking social capital, is one of the indicators of the integration of the Turkish community into German society. In that context it is relevant to know whether organizations find their way to government agencies and whether the relationships with the government are positively evaluated. In order to study these relationships, I distinguish three types of governmental organizations: local government departments, political actors, and semi-governmental organizations.

6.15.1 The local government agencies: access to and the need for subsidies

One of the ways in which organizations can establish a relationship with local authorities is by applying for grants. I found that only some of them are doing so. Several right-wing organizations refused state funding because they wanted to keep their autonomy and independence. They said that:

“If you get any grants, the state can make demands and we don’t want to meet those demands.”

Remarkably, this argument was also put forward by the left-wing organization, the *Türkei Zentrum*.

Some organizations did not receive funding, although they had applied for it. One decided not to put any more effort into it, but another was still very passionate about this and determined to find a way to be allocated some money. Several organizations, including the entrepreneurs' association, the *TDU*, and the Diyanet organization, the *Türkisch Islamischer Friedhofs- und Bestattungsverein*, indicated that they do not need any funding; they felt that they could support themselves with money from sponsors or member contributions. The pensioners' organization, the *EM-DER*, did receive funding, but nevertheless expressed discontent. The respondent said:

"We receive 35,000 Euros yearly from the Senate. That may seem a lot, but it isn't. It is the Senate that profits from it the most, because now they can show off with our organization, saying "This organization is run by people from the first generation and see what they can do!"

6.15.2 The local government agencies: interactional relationships

The distribution of subsidies did not seem to affect the direct, interactional relationships between organizations and government institutions in a negative way. Almost all of the organizations indicated that they maintain good relationships with the city district office. They co-organize social events and are sometimes invited to New Year's receptions or are even asked to shed light on current issues. Several organizations indicated that they know their '*Bezirksbürgermeister*', the head of the city district, well, as they also do the '*Migrationsbeauftragte*' of their city district or the '*Ausländerbeauftragte*' of the Berlin Senate⁶⁰. One respondent said:

"We often go and see Mrs. Korte [the Migrationsbeauftragte of the city district of Neukölln, LP] to jointly organize something or make use of her extensive circle of acquaintances!"

On average, 10% of the ties in the contact network led to government organizations. In terms of percentages, the smaller organizations with only a few alters (e.g. *EM-DER*, *Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln*) had the most linking social capital, because almost all of them had at least one government alter. Because of their relatively low number of other (non government) kinds of alters, this resulted in a high percentage of governmental links. The *TBB* had a relatively low percentage of governmental alters, but in absolute terms it clearly had the most ties to such institutions. This is obviously due to the fact that the *TBB* had the most alters of all.

⁶⁰ The *Ausländerbeauftragte* (from 2003 onwards named *Integrationsbeauftragte*) is a bureaucratic institution established in 1981. It is responsible for the policy on migrants and integration and the provision of subsidies to migrant organizations. In practice it often serves as an intermediary between the migrant communities and the Berlin government. See also Chapter 3.

Most of the connections between Turkish organizations and the Berlin government were found at the city district level. About 80% of the respondents indicated that they are connected to their respective local authorities, the *Bezirksamt* (borough administration). The municipality, which in the case of Berlin is the same as the federal state⁶¹, is the Senate of Berlin. Less than half of the respondents said that they are related to this administration.

The social organization *Türkischer Idealisten Verein*, had ties to government institutions, but these were Turkish instead of German. Berlin has a number of 'Idealisten Vereine'⁶². These are organizations affiliated with the right-extremist movement commonly called the 'Grey Wolves', which is also known as the 'Idealists' ('*Idealisten*' in German, *Ülkücüler* in Turkish). The '*Idealisten*' strive for an 'ideal' Turkish nation, which they define as Sunni-Islamic and mono-ethnic: only inhabited by 'true' Turks⁶³. A Turk is everyone who lives in the Turkish territory, feels Turkish and calls him/herself Turkish (Zentrum Demokratische Kultur, 2003). Because of their nationalism, Idealist organizations are generally thought to be closely connected to the Turkish embassy and consulate. The Berlin '*Türkischer Idealisten Verein*' confirmed this image.

6.15.3 Political actors

Schöneberg (1985) noted, with respect to the involvement of Turkish organizations in politics, that '*it is striking that the religious and conservative groups put a disclaimer in all their public statements and organizational rules that they are free of all political partisanship and will not engage in any political activities, while the more leftist organizations explicitly take stands on political issues in West Germany and in Turkey*' (p.424). Twenty years later, the attitudes toward politics have changed, but remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the left-wing organizations still take explicit stands on political issues such as the wearing of headscarves. Women's associations and the progressive umbrella organization, the *TBB*, were clearly visible in the heated public debate concerning this matter in about 2005. At the same time, the respondent from the *TBB* described his organization as "*überparteilich*": impartial. Yet, the *TBB* is generally known to be highly institutionalized and to have very strong ties to the German social democratic party, the SPD (e.g. Yurdakul, 2006).

⁶¹ Berlin is one of the three city-states of Germany. The other two are Bremen and Hamburg.

⁶² Obviously, Idealist associations are not only found in Berlin, but also world-wide.

⁶³ Because of their nationalistic, extremist, and mono-ethnic philosophy, the Grey Wolves are not appreciated by a large section of the Turkish community. In wider society (in Germany as well as in other countries) the Idealists are also known for violent attacks against politicians, journalists, and scientists, as well as Turkish and Kurdish civilians. The Idealist organization I spoke to declared that it is only occupied with activities for the Turkish youth, to make them remember their roots, and refrains from joining in, but sympathizes with, the violent branch of the Grey Wolves.

Regarding the right-wing of the community, the umbrella organization, the *TGB*, is associated with the Christian Democrat party (CDU), just as the *TBB* and *SPD* are related (ibid.). I have also noticed in the public domain that conservative groups are no longer taking such an impartial a stance as Schöneberg had observed. They still declare their neutrality, for example regarding the advice they would give to their members about how to vote. Moreover, many respondents said that they invite politicians of all colors to meetings so that their members can make their own decisions. However, around the time of this study, feelings were running high in Berlin regarding the ‘*Armenien-geschichte*’ (the ‘thing’ about Armenia) as one of the respondents said. This referred to the debate on whether or not Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire at the time) had committed genocide at the end of World War I. Several organizations on the right had joined the demonstration against the acknowledgement of the genocide, much to the dissatisfaction of many left-wing associations.

The religious organizations I spoke to did retain their impartiality regarding political issues. They were very strict regarding the separation of religious life and politics. One explained that they had had a lot of trouble in the past finding the right imam. They kept a strict policy that the imam was not allowed to express any political statement, whether during Friday prayers or elsewhere, and they had had to fire several who did not comply with this rule.

My observations have caused me to query Schöneberg’s conclusions. I found that most Turkish organizations, no matter whether they were left or right-wing, were very much involved in politics. This involvement did not, however, necessarily lead to a high number of ties to German political actors. In fact, less than half of the organizations maintained relationships with any political party. One organization explained why it was prudent when it came to close connections to political parties.

“It is better not to be too tightly connected to any political party if you want any money. If you are, you only receive money because you have the same opinion as the party instead of because you are doing a good job. And what will happen if some other party gets in charge?”

6.15.4 Relationships with semi-governmental organizations

The third kind of government agencies, the semi-governmental, mainly attracts organizations that are active in the field of welfare. This is generally because of the nature of these semi-governmental organizations, which are occupied with neighborhood renovations, ending unemployment and stimulating social interaction between citizens. The *Quartiersmanagement (QM)* in particular was mentioned a number of times. Since the *QM* was founded in 1999, it has tried to encourage neighborhood residents and local organizations to collaboratively upgrade their surroundings. Most associations spoke appreciatively of the *QM* in that respect.

6.16 Media associations

Finally, one type of organization deserves special attention. It transpired that many organizations value media associations a great deal. Several named 'the media' as the best representatives of the Turkish community in Berlin. In particular, they praised the Turkish television and radio broadcasters: *TD1*, *AYPA* (both TV), *Metropol FM*, and *Radio Multikulti* (both radio)⁶⁴. The *TD1* broadcast 24 hours a day in German and Turkish and was also transmitted via satellite. It thus had a nationwide audience. *Aypa*, on the other hand, was a small broadcasting association (it actually is recorded in the Guinness Book of Records as the smallest broadcasting station in the world) that was able to produce a weekly one-hour program via a local cable channel. The radio broadcasters have a comparable status to their television counterparts. *Metropol FM* was the first national channel to broadcast in Turkish for the entire day, whereas *Radio Multikulti* had a more modest position, with only a local reach. Several respondents also indicated that they would turn to these media associations if they wanted to bring a particular event to the attention of the public. A study by a market research agency in 2002 showed that 70% of the Turkish-German population listened to *Metropol FM* (Tegtmeier, 2002). The *TD1* likewise had a regular market share of almost 40% of Turks in Berlin. In other words, using the media to reach a larger audience has great potential. Interestingly, most respondents only named Turkish local broadcasters and not German ones. This is probably because the organizations that use the media are aimed primarily at the Turkish population in Berlin.

6.17 The network of interlocking directorates and the contact network compared

Because there was no data available on the interlocking directorates between Turkish and non-Turkish associations, the formal and informal networks in Berlin cannot be compared regarding the amount of ethnically bonding and bridging social capital that they contain. This is unfortunate, in particular because these networks in Amsterdam differed considerably in this respect (see previous chapter). Nevertheless, other features of the networks can be meaningfully compared, some of which I already discussed earlier in this chapter (such as the locality of organizations). Here, I discuss the cause of the fact that the dominant cleavages in both networks were based on the same thing, namely ideology, but this more pronounced in the formal network.

The network of interlocking directorates in Berlin was only scarcely connected. Only twenty percent of the organizations were interlocked. The components of the network

⁶⁴ Currently, most of these broadcasters are finished or are on the verge of closing down. Main reasons are the lack of financial resources and, in the case of *AYPA*, intimidation of the makers (Dantschke, 2003).

were clearly characterized by the ideologies of the actors in each of them (e.g. religious denomination, left-wing). The clear ideological divisions were less pronounced in the contact network, except for the divide between left-wing and right-wing organizations. The respondents indicated that their connections are based on their core activities (they deal with organizations that are similar in that respect) rather than their ideologies. The fact that the network of interlocking directorates was so clearly ideologically divided may be related to the generally low number of interlocks, and both may be the reflection of a certain reservedness when it comes to the formation of formal connections. The German secret service is known to keep an eye on these connections and Berger (2010) has reported that this is a reason for organizations not to enter into interlocking directorates and sometimes even refuse to become officially registered. It follows from this perspective that associations that do form interlocks on the board level do so only with other organizations that they (highly) trust. These are, probably, the organizations that are ideologically closest to them. In their everyday practices, these considerations do not play a role, hence the less divided contact network.

6.18 Summary and how does it work?

To summarize, the Turkish community in Berlin has proved to be dominated by two umbrella organizations which represent two opposing groups: one more progressive and leftist, the other more conservative and right-wing. Other organizations, to a major extent, comply with this dividing line as they clearly identify with either one of them. These dominant organizations have more social capital than any other association. The other types of organizations that play an important role in the community are the women's associations which unite to form a strong bloc, with many mutual connections. Although faith is important in the lives of many individual Turks, the Turkish religious organizations do not have a very prominent position in the organizational field. Kurdish organizations are visible, but they keep away from the wider Turkish community. Furthermore, it became clear that particularly self-initiated collaborative bodies are rich sources of social capital. Organizations that participate in such bodies have more social capital and more ethnically bridging social capital in particular. Most organizations have at least some ethnically bridging social capital, although half of them, nevertheless, still have more bonding social capital. Most organizations also possess linking social capital.

Now it is clear what the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin looks like, the question is: how is it put into operation? How is this potential converted into usable and used social capital? What happens when organizations need to address their social capital? Do organizations indeed use the media as disseminators (*'Multiplikatoren'*) of the information they receive, have available and want to make public? Do the *TBB* and *TGB* function as the pivot of the community? What is the role of German organizations?

And do the organizations address the wealth of social capital captured in the collaborative bodies? How does it work? How is the Turkish community mobilized?

In order to answer these questions, I performed an experiment in which the organizations were triggered to use their social capital. The next part of this book is dedicated to this experiment, its methods and the results. Chapter 7 contains an exploration of the concept of mobilization as well as the explanation of the design of the Big World Experiment. Chapter 8 contains the results of the experiment in Amsterdam. Chapter 9 then discusses the results from Berlin.

7. The Big World Experiment

The sketches of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin that are presented in the previous two chapters relied on formal, archival data (the registers of the Chamber of Commerce and the *Vereinsregister*) and self-reporting (interviews with the representatives of organizations in the two cities). These two data sources have provided insight into the social capital that the organizations have at their disposal. Yet, the actual *working* of social capital is not revealed thereby. The aim of the current research was not just to see what the communities' networks look like, but to instead examine how they function. The contact network has only lifted a corner of the veil, since it provided an interpretation of the network from a more in-depth perspective when compared to the cold facts of the network of interlocking directorates. The organizations were revealed to be more involved and interconnected in real life than they are on paper. But then again, that is what we were *told*, and attitudes and behavior are known to not always go hand in hand. Furthermore, the contact network shows us the full pool of resources that the organizations can fish in, but not all of the connections are as relevant in all circumstances. I, therefore, wanted to discover how the Turkish communities in both Berlin and Amsterdam function when they are triggered to activate their social capital: actions speak louder than words.

In light of social capital theory, and in particular the gaps in it regarding the utilization of social capital itself, shifting the focus from retrospective to behavioral data may seem an obvious step. Finding the most appropriate method of doing this, however, is much less so. Many sociologists will initially think of participant observation (a common tool) as being the most suitable approach. Indeed, it is a regularly used measurement instrument in research into social networks, for example in the well-known study of Italian slums by William F. Whyte (1993 [1943]). However, the method also has several drawbacks which made me decide against using it. (I will come back to these disadvantages below.) I prefer the role of the observer over that of the participant. Before I discuss how the method I used herein, i.e. experimentation, allowed me to operate in my preferred role, I will expand upon what it means when social capital is put into operation. In other words, how can a community become mobilized? What is mobilization?

The entire third section of this book (Chapters 7, 8, and 9) is, consequently, focused on the mobilization of the Turkish community. The current chapter discusses both what I consider to be mobilization and how I used an experiment to study this in the two communities. Chapter 8 contains the results from Amsterdam, while Chapter 9 deals with mobilization in Berlin.

7.1 Defining mobilization at its narrowest: welcome to the jungle

The aim here is to capture how the social capital of the Turkish communities within Amsterdam and Berlin that is presented in the previous chapters works. In other words, the goal is to discover how this social capital is mobilized. The mere word 'mobilized' is more problematic than it seems. In an attempt to define the term in a way that suits my research and research method, I became lost in what I would like to call: the Jungle of Social Movements. Since the introduction of the concept in 1850 by the German sociologist Lorenz von Stein, a vast amount of literature has been published on social movements. From collective action (e.g. Olson, 1965) to resource mobilization (e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1977) to new-social movement theories (e.g. Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995), mobilization is discussed in the context of social movements. Although these theories emphasize different factors in their attempts to explain the rise and fall of various social movements (for instance, social inequality and the political opportunity structure), their general ideas of what a social movement involves usually comes down to the definition by Sydney Tarrow (1994): 'Collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities' (p.3-4). I suppose that for most theorists the interconnection between mobilization and social movements is so obvious that most of them do not explicitly define mobilization at all. One of the exceptions is Morrison (1987), who in his book *Black Political Mobilization* defined it as 'the collective activation and application of community or group resources toward the acquisition of social and political goods. (...) The fact of mobilization suggests that the collectivity in question is isolated from such goods' (p.3). The goods that Morrison refers to, roughly correspond to the common purposes in Tarrow's definition. If people want to achieve these common ends and challenge their opponents, they have to mobilize group members and their resources. Essentially, I do not disagree with these views on mobilization, but I do think that this way of defining it is charged with notions of emancipation, collective identity, social change and claims that are too intense to suit my objectives. I want to use a 'lighter' definition of mobilization that is not as connected to societal issues and interest articulation, but more to the mere activity of 'reaching out'. In other words, I am interested in a more common-or-garden understanding of mobilization. The general definition of the term in the Oxford English Dictionary 'the action or process of assembling, organizing, and utilizing resources etc. for a particular purposes', comes close to what I mean. It concerns the successive contacting of actors – in this particular case: organizations - in order to activate them in the desired way and convince them to perform a desired action⁶⁵.

⁶⁵ Therefore, I regard the terms 'to mobilize' and 'to activate' as interchangeable. This will enhance the readability of this book.

Thus, mobilization herein does not refer to the all-inclusive construction of actors and collective actions within a particular ideological paradigm, such as the women's, gay rights and American civil rights movements. The mobilization that I am discussing is very specific. It is place, time, group and subject bound. It occurs within the borders of Amsterdam and Berlin; happens in a predetermined period of two months; concerns the Turkish and, possibly, the related non-Turkish organizations within the two cities; and it refers to a predetermined action, in particular the spread of a piece of information.

7.2 Mobilizing the collective?

In my quest for a suitable definition of mobilization, I started by looking at the literature on the activation of ethnic communities. I found that scholars in this particular field, such as Hooghe (2005) and Bousetta (2000), also regarded mobilization within the framework of social movements. Studies deal with the way in which migrants are able to articulate their interests concerning, for example, political affairs and discrimination. As Hooghe commented, one of the problems when it comes to the collective mobilization of an ethnic community is that it is often hard to find a common identity. Indeed, the discussion of the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin in Chapters 5 and 6 has shown that they are ideologically divided. Thus, regarding these, or any other migrant community, as a collectively acting group is not self-evident. This is another reason why the definition of mobilization in terms of social movements is unsuitable for the current study. Social movements concern groups of individuals, and organizations with a collective identity (e.g. Melucci, 1985; Kriesi et al., 1995) and a common purpose. These are characteristics that do not directly apply to the Turkish groups that I encountered.

Whether one regards the Turkish community as a collective or not, determines the way in which the mobilization of it is analyzed. A focus on the community as a whole, and the eventual course of the mobilization of it, is illustrative of how it works as a complete entity. Such a network centric approach reveals how organizations are mutually connected, who activates whom and which organizations fulfill a crucial role in this mobilization process. On the other hand, if we regard the 'community' as being comprised of separate actors, namely the organizations, we can also take an 'egocentric' approach in the analysis. Studying an organization and the alters it has mobilized (i.e. individual mobilization) reveals the strategies that individual organizations have applied during the mobilization process. Particularly in relation to social capital, a focus on individual mobilization lays bare how this potential relates to what happens when organizations are stimulated to address their contacts. When the insights into the individual strategies are taken together, how the community 'works' is further revealed,

since associations with a different status will probably employ different strategies. The definition of mobilization, as I have formulated it above, leaves room for the examination of such a process from a network centric as well as an ego-centric approach.

7.3 Kinds of mobilization

The definition of mobilization that I will adhere to herein may be narrow, but it can still refer to a variety of matters. A community can be mobilized on a number of different topics, which may trigger different mobilization patterns. When the community is mobilizing on a political theme, for example, it may address channels that are unlike those that it activates when it is raising funds for a natural disaster, which is also a form of mobilization. I will now discuss different kinds of activation in order to demonstrate how they are all relevant to the functioning of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin. However, reasons of a methodological nature have been decisive when it came to the final choice of the type of mobilization to study. Ultimately, I will reveal that mobilization in the form of information distribution turned out to be most suitable approach, and an experiment is the best way of actually demonstrating the utilization of social capital.

7.3.1 Political mobilization

Political mobilization refers to those instances in which the community is activated in relation to a political topic. For example, at election times, politicians try to convince people to vote. In Amsterdam, for instance, migrants are an important target group in the local elections as they make up almost half of the city's population, and many of them have been granted voting rights at the local level. Migrant organizations are often deployed to reach these immigrant groups; in other words, they are tasked with mobilizing the community. Several interviewees said that their respective organizations have 'political nights' around the time of elections. On such occasions, politicians of different political persuasions are invited to talk about their electoral programs. A wide range of organizations, from social to sports' clubs, held such meetings at election times. This means that their nature is not determinative of their involvement in political events.

Another example of political mobilization is when people are rounded up to join a demonstration. Around the time I was in Berlin, the federal government was implementing controversial policy reforms known as *Hartz-IV* (the final in a series of four stages of reform proposed by a committee set up by the federal government, and presided over by Peter Hartz) which concerned the labor market. The objective of the

reforms was to substantially reduce the unemployment figures within a period of four years (which they failed to do). In short, *Hartz-IV* involved a drastic cutback in the expenditure on unemployment and social security benefits. The result of these measures was that migrants in particular could find themselves in a precarious situation because, for example, many of them were no longer sure of their residence permit. This, obviously, led to much social upheaval, and the migrant communities started to mobilize their members to take to the streets. The migrant organizations played an important role in the mobilizing process.

In the Netherlands, the changing social climate experienced by both migrants and natives after the murder of party leader Pim Fortuyn, just before the elections in 2002, led a group of organizations to found the Platform Keer het Tij. This body arranged several protests, such as demonstrations and conferences, and within only a few years had managed to get over 500 organizations to commit to it. Together, they were able to mobilize large numbers of people to join in with their activities.

The disadvantage of a study on political mobilization is that it is difficult to trigger a realistic mobilization in a controlled manner. Obviously, it is not feasible for a researcher to organize a demonstration, for example. Furthermore, a political mobilization usually involves only part of a community, for instance the opponents of a particular bill take to the streets to protest against it. Although it may be telling that only some members of the community are involved, I wanted to perform a more politically neutral mobilization which would not exclude part of the community in advance.

7.3.2 Economic mobilization

Economic mobilization refers to the activation of the community with respect to financial means. For example, in 1999, Turkey was hit by a major earthquake. People from all over the world held benefit events and raised money for the victims. Interviewees in Berlin, as well as in Amsterdam, told me that they had been part of the fund raising activities that had been going on in their respective cities. Ali Savaşer from the *Türkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft* TDG was proud to tell me about the leading role that he and his organization (at the time he was also a board member of the Berliner Gesellschaft türkischer Mediziner) took. Savaşer initially saw how opposing groups (mainly led by the TBB and the TGB) were all raising money on their own and were unwilling to collaborate. He then decided to take the lead and coordinate the whole community. The TDG had good connections to several highly placed German officials, and Savaşer was convinced that this had led to the success that they had had (i.e. they raised a lot of money). In Amsterdam, the Turkish organizations played a significant role in the fundraising as well. The mosques were important as they were able to reach a large audience and people were already used to donating money in this environment.

Indeed, some associations, such as the IHHA⁶⁶, were founded for fundraising ends. Other organizations had more a coordinating function, such as the educational association STOC, which dealt with the collection of teaching materials. Remarkably, another educational organization, Stichting Yunus Emre, said that they had also collected money at the time, and they sent it to Turkey through the agency of the municipality. The mobilization process that took place is worthy of a study in itself. The disadvantage is that, again, one has to rely on self-reported, retrospective data that almost by definition involves distorted memories and does not, therefore, provide a realistic picture of the mobilization of a community. The probability of actors naming not all, or any other, acquainted organizations other than those they actually did address, or were addressed by, is considerable. Accordingly, this topic was not suitable for the current study. It would not reveal the actual process of mobilization but an idealized version of it.

7.3.3 Resource mobilization

Although all types of mobilization are concerned with people's or organizations' resources (money, votes, support, information etc.), *resource mobilization* is to me a distinct type of action. Here, the term *resource* refers to both the concrete goods that people or organizations have in their possession, and the specific operations that actors own that others do not have or do not own. Through mobilization, the actor looking for help is subsequently able to use these goods or operations. For example, when I was interviewing the political organization HTDB in Amsterdam, a young man from the ATKB (an Alevi organization) returned a stereo that his organization had used during a prayer meeting. In Berlin, the women's organization TIO said that they had some kind of agreement with another women's association, SUSI. For example, TIO wanted to publish a new brochure, but the respondent said she had no idea how the suitable computer programs operate. She, therefore, asked her colleague from SUSI to help. Likewise, SUSI sought assistance with their book keeping from TIO.

Resource mobilization becomes more difficult as the distance between the organization looking for the resource and the provider thereof grows. For example, imagine two organizations that have six intermediaries in the contact network. Perhaps the actor at one end needs something that the other possesses. In order to obtain this resource, the former has to convince a friend of a friend to finally reach the latter. In these circumstances, all of the intermediaries need to be willing and able to contribute to a request that they themselves will not, necessarily, benefit from. This makes resource mobilization on a larger scale a hazardous undertaking and the chances of failure are significant.

⁶⁶ *Internationale Humanitaire Hulp Organisatie*, a Milli Görüş organization in Amsterdam.

Although the investigation of resource mobilization would yield interesting insights into how ego-centric networks work, especially when it is studied while matters are proceeding, it has two disadvantages. One is that because of the vulnerability of long distance resource mobilization, a study of it will, almost by definition, entail only the mobilization of ego-networks and not that of the entire community, the latter being what I am interested in. The second downside is that resource mobilization is very much dependent on the circumstances. It requires a lot of time and luck to encounter the right situations that involve enough organizations, because it is not an everyday matter. Furthermore, the interviews I held contained several questions about examples of resource mobilization, but these were not always well understood or applicable.

7.3.4 Social mobilization

Social mobilization refers to the mobilization of organizations in respect of social affairs and the activation of people. For example, for new organizations it is vital to find and hold on to enough (new) members. It can, therefore, be a useful strategy to mobilize other associations which can, in turn, encourage people to become a member of the new organization. Needless to say, it is important that the new organization addresses those that are in a different field, as similar associations would obviously refuse to let (potential) members be taken away.

Every now and then, major community events take place. For example, in Amsterdam there is the yearly 'Car Free Sunday'. On this particular day, the city is closed to any incoming motorized traffic. The municipality enables citizens and, in particular, voluntary organizations to arrange neighborhood activities in the streets, such as sports' tournaments for children, a barbecue or a boat race. Usually, only a few organizations actually get to the point of setting up such an event, so to make sure that they will have enough participants they may well address/ mobilize their social capital, i.e. other organizations they know.

In Berlin, I witnessed the '*türkischer Tag*' ('*Türk Günü*'; Turkish day). It was a rather nationalistic event (many left-wing organizations I spoke to were, therefore, explicitly opposed to and distanced themselves from it) in the Tiergarten Park, with many Turkish flags and shows by Turkish artists. It was initiated by the TGB, but several other Turkish organizations were mobilized to support the event and make sure it received many visitors.

Although social mobilization may well be the most common type of activation, I nevertheless decided not to investigate it. The decisive factor was not so much the disadvantages attached to it, as the points in favor of another type of mobilization (which I will discuss next). Social activation can preeminently elicit a comprehensive community mobilization. Often, it has a neutral content (save for political events) which means that ideologically different groups are likely to cooperate and, therefore, a large

part of the community will participate. Another advantage is that when the researcher's focus is on the recruitment of visitors for a social event, and this event is attractive to these people (in other words, they will gain something positive from it), the willingness to participate will be high. Furthermore, such a mobilization will probably not only include the organizations, but also their members and perhaps even non-members if they are informed about the event as well. The comprehensiveness of this type of study is perhaps the only disadvantage of it; it includes so many actors that it may put a lot of strain on the researchers. Nevertheless, it is surely worth taking this risk in future research because it will enable several areas of the black box (as discussed in Chapter 1) to be revealed simultaneously.

7.3.5 Information dissemination as mobilization

The notion of information dissemination as mobilization in fact refers to the sharing of information. The aim of this type of activation is to receive or spread a piece of valuable knowledge. An actor may *need* information and, therefore, mobilizes the community so that he can get it. On the other hand, an organization may also *have* information that it spreads throughout its network. The network that is created based on information dissemination is a reflection of the patterns of communication between organizations: who tells whom what?

Information dissemination is not only a separate kind of mobilization, but it is what precedes any other type of activation. Before anyone will be prepared to take action, they need to know what action actually needs to be taken. In other words, people need to become informed and only then can they decide what to *do* with the information. A similar idea is found in the 'critical mass models' of collective action (Granovetter, 1978; Marwell, Oliver, & Ralph, 1988; Macy, 1990, 1991; Kitts, 2000). These state that whether or not people take the risk of participating in a collective action depends on their knowledge about the willingness of others to do so. For many, it is only when they know that there is a 'critical mass', i.e. enough people who have said they will participate, that they will then agree to take part in the mobilization themselves. In line with this, there are relationships between information dissemination on the one hand, and social, resource, political, and economical mobilization on the other. Firstly, the word that action is required has to be spread (e.g. there are activities that people can attend, or discarded, restorable chairs are needed to furnish a new children's home, or a demonstration is being organized, or subsidies are available for collaborating migrant organizations), to enable people to decide whether or not they will take part.

I present two examples of information dissemination amongst organizations. For instance, I posed a hypothetical question during the interviews for this research to which the respondent would tell me who he/she would inform in case he/she would hear that there were new subsidies available for migrant organizations. Financial

support is vital for many migrant organizations, and it was telling to see what they would do with this (hypothetical) knowledge. Some said they would keep the information to themselves, as there would probably be only small sums of money available, so the more organizations that know about it, the less money there would be. Others did intend to share their knowledge; some with only one organization, others with several. It was interesting to find so much variation and realize that the dissemination of information within a community is not self-evident.

Another example of knowledge mobilization is a situation in which there is an incident concerning the unjust treatment of a member of the Turkish community, for instance a young boy might be the victim of a racist attack. This piece of information would spread quickly through the community, and, as a way of making their voices heard, Turkish associations would probably arrange a gathering to commemorate the boy. The news about this assembly would, once again, spread throughout the community like wildfire. Furthermore, these organizations would not only spread the information, but they would also mobilize their grassroots, which again shows how the dissemination of information precedes political or social mobilization. As a matter of fact, one could argue that some kind of information sharing, by definition, has to take place first, before any other kind can occur.

This brings me back to the theory of social capital. In order for any form of mobilization to pass off well, it is important that all three of the elements that are distinguished within the concept of social capital (i.e. networks, trust and shared norms and values) are present and well-developed. As I explained in Chapter 2, I regard the network element as the most crucial, although I do not neglect the roles that trust and shared norms and values play. Especially when it comes to the development of social capital (after all, social capital is something one has to invest in to make it grow and ensure it is maintained; it is not 'just' there (see also Bourdieu, 1986)), it is important to get to know (new) actors and to learn to trust them. In this early phase, it is probably more difficult to mobilize one's ego-network or, indeed, the full network around any topic, as described in the preceding paragraphs. This is because organizations are perhaps still distrustful. A good way of learning whether one can trust others is to test them through knowledge sharing. If you receive trustworthy and valuable information from a particular actor, it is easy to start trusting this person (or organization), and, eventually, join forces with him or it. This is not necessarily a conscious strategy; it is usually a natural process to first exchange information before collaborating.

In summary, information dissemination as a form of mobilization is very important, and I, therefore, decided to use this approach to study the workings of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin. The additional advantage of this type of mobilization is that it is relatively easily performed; the organizations involved only need to spread a piece of information, which does not take much time or effort.

The remainder of this chapter concerns the development of an appropriate measurement instrument with which to track information dissemination. To that end, I

will now introduce the Big World Experiment (BWE), its design, the analyses I have performed and, in closing, some factual information about the findings in Berlin and Amsterdam.

7.4 Testing mobilization: why an experiment is the best way to do the job

The question now is how can the idea of monitoring the mobilization of organizational networks be translated into a feasible research method? In his excellent review of network data and measurement, Marsden (1990) sets out different ways of gathering social network data. He names surveys and questionnaires as the most frequently used tools, but also mentions the more alternative methods: archival sources, diaries, electronic traces, observation (possibly by informants), and experiments. Each of these has its merits and demerits, in particular with respect to what is of relevance here, namely the mapping of mobilization. I will now demonstrate that because of preset choices by the researcher and the shortcomings of these different methods, only the latter tool- experimentation - is eligible herein.

7.4.1 Retrospective data

A key choice that I made in this study was to study mobilization during the process and not in retrospect. This condition ruled out the use of questionnaires, as they are implemented only after the object of interest has passed: "Could you tell me who told you about this event?" The main reason for choosing a real-time method over a retrospective one is that retrospective data-gathering is always subject to memory loss or self over or underestimation by the respondents⁶⁷ (e.g. Bernard, Killworth, Kronenfeld, & Sailer, 1984; Killworth, Johnsen, Bernard, Shelley, & McCarthy, 1990; Brewer & Webster, 1999; Brewer, 2000). The discrepancy between what respondents recall and what their actual behavior was even led Bernard, Killworth and Sailer (1979/80) to reach the conclusion that 'cognitive data may not be used for drawing any conclusions about behavioral social structure'. Although many things can be said in favor of the use of questionnaires (in fact, the first part of this study is based on questionnaires for good reason), it is not suitable for the study of mobilization because of its retrospective nature.

⁶⁷ See also Chapter 4 on the forgetting of friends.

7.4.2 Participant observation

In anthropology, and even in social network analysis, participant observation is a commonly used instrument. W.F. Whyte (1993 [1943]) and Jeremy Boissevain (1974) carried out pioneering social network studies into life in 'an Italian slum' and village life on the island of Malta, respectively. Participant observation essentially allows the researcher to be on top of his subject, which in the current case is the mobilization process. However, to study mobilization by participation, it is best if the researcher knows the actors involved. Participant observation is, after all, highly trust-based. The initial obscurity of the sample one has to work with, thus, poses a problem. After all, at the start of the mobilization process, it is unknown which actors will become involved in it. Effectively, this means that using participant observation with respect to information dissemination would only be possible if the researcher travels 'alongside' the message. To that end, the researcher needs to be familiar with the first actor (in this case organization) who starts the mobilization and, as the message is passed on, the researcher should then be introduced to every alter along the way. Each alter needs to accept the researcher's presence and is expected to do so because of the reputation of the first actor: your friend is my friend. In this way, the information dissemination can be monitored in real time by means of this observational method. Then again, this technique assumes a high degree of trust between the actors in the mobilization and, more importantly, it may even influence the course of it because actors can become more choosy about who they pass information on to. High trust relationships may be preferred over lower trust ones only for that reason, which implies bias in the data. Furthermore, the advantage of the dissemination of a piece of information is that it is an easy task and requires little effort. If an individual is needed to accompany the message, this complicates matters tremendously. Another, related, drawback is that the mobilization of a community is likely to take place at different locations therein simultaneously. A single researcher, this single researcher, would, therefore, not be able to keep track of all of the strands of mobilized actors at the same time. The biggest problem of participant observation, however, is that the researcher is fully dependent on the circumstances: is there a mobilization at the time of the study, and how can he/she find out about this in advance? It is, therefore, best if the researcher stimulates the mobilization process.

A final drawback of this method is more fundamental, and is not only related to the current research aims. Participant observation is, in general, not very precise, or at least not objectively so. This hampers a systematic acquisition of data and, more importantly, hinders a systematic comparison between two cases. The interaction between researcher and subjects in the case of participant observation is hard, if not impossible, to standardize, which easily allows the researcher to (unconsciously) influence the subject into being more or less active during the mobilization process. If there is more than one researcher, this becomes even more problematic. The most appropriate

method, therefore, is the one that can be standardized the most. This leads us onto experimenting.

7.4.3 Experimenting

If the researcher is the initiator of the mobilization, he/she is taking control and is, in fact, implementing an experiment. Experiments are characterized by a controlled environment and manipulation of the independent variable(s) by the investigator (Judd, Smith, & Kidder, 1991). The condition of a controlled environment is best met in the laboratory. However, it is impossible to transfer the community of Turkish organizations into such a setting. Furthermore, to discover how the social capital of organizations is used and works, it was of the utmost importance that they were mobilized in a natural way; they had to be involved in a kind of mobilization that may have taken place even if there was no study ongoing. A field experiment which is implemented in the 'real world', therefore, suits the aims of this study better. Of course, in a natural, as opposed to a laboratory, setting there are always factors that are beyond the control of the researcher. This may influence the course of the mobilization in an unanticipated way. On the other hand, in the current situation, the need for the naturalness of the mobilization outweighs the disadvantage of not being able to control the entire setting.

Experimentation is rather unusual in the political and social sciences, other than psychology (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2006), but, as I will show, it can yield very interesting results⁶⁸. The primary reason for using the experimental method is that it is the most appropriate tool for studying mobilization. At the same time, I want to make a case for a more frequent use of 'unorthodox' research methods, using this study as evidence of the value of such approaches.

7.5 The Big World Experiment

The leading question that the experiment needed to answer was if, and if so which and how, organizations address their social capital when they are urged to do so. Accordingly, selected organizations were provided with a piece of valuable information, and the experiment is designed to show how this was forwarded throughout the community. An analogy for the experiment that I designed is that of an electric shock which runs through an electrical circuit. Think of a switchboard with a large number of

⁶⁸ Examples of the rare field experiments in political science are those in which the way in which people are most encouraged to vote during elections is tested (Gerber & Green, 2000; Gerber, Green, & Shachar, 2003; Ramírez, 2005; Gerber, Green, & Larimer, 2008), and they also include examinations of whether citizens are able to get in touch with their political representatives (Erickson & Kringas, 1975). Erickson and Kringas' study is, for that matter, an adapted Small World Experiment (see below).

serially connected lights, but it is unclear initially which ones are linked. Then, at one location at the edge of the switchboard, the electricity is turned on and, one after another, the lights light up, thus exposing the connections between them. In a similar vein, one could activate a particular organization in a community of organizations and subsequently follow which others are addressed thereby, and then which other organizations are contacted thereafter. Since one 'electric shock' may not be enough to illuminate the mobilization of an entire community, they can be initiated at different points on the 'switchboard'. In other words, to ensure that there are several shocks simultaneously, a set of organizations can initially be approached.

The experiment herein is aimed at revealing how the dissemination of information occurs. Is the whole community reached after a certain period of time has passed? Does every organization receive the valuable information? If so, are these only Turkish organizations, or are non-Turkish associations also mobilized? How many organizations are mobilized? How far does the mobilization extend?

How big is the world of the Turkish organizations?

Given the nature of this question, I have named the experiment that I have created the 'Big World Experiment' (BWE), but its design is also thanks to another scholar, the sociologist Stanley Milgram, and his Small World Experiment in the 1960s.

7.6 Back to the roots: the Small World Experiment

Milgram (1967) developed the Small World Experiment (SWE) after being inspired by the work of Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfred Kochen which was presented in their article '*Contacts and Influence*' (1978 [1958]). Pool and Kochen discussed what they termed the 'small world phenomenon', referring to the, probably familiar, situation of two strangers who meet somewhere and start talking, trying to find some common ground. Suddenly, it transpires that they know the same people, and the phrase: "It's a small world after all!" is then often heard. The question that Pool and Kochen posed was: '*what does the structure of social connections look like that makes these things possible*'? Milgram took this as the starting point of his SWE, because he thought that "*only in action can you fully realize the forces operative in social behavior.*"⁶⁹ The 'Small World problem' was thus challenged empirically instead of theoretically.

Through the SWE, Milgram tried to tackle the question of how many acquaintance links are needed before two randomly selected people can be connected. The experiment was comprised of a group of participants who the researcher asked to

⁶⁹ www.stanleymilgram.com/quotes, last entry on June 30th, 2006.

forward a parcel to a specific target person who was living at the other end of the country. The accompanying instruction stated that the participant was to hand the parcel directly to the target, and if he/she did not know this person on a first name basis, the package should be passed on to a friend who the participant thought was more likely to. If the participant passed the parcel on to a friend, this friend was asked the same question, thus creating a chain from the initial subject to, hopefully and eventually, the target individual.

The results of this experiment were amazing. Most people estimate that it takes about 100 intermediates to link two randomly selected individuals. However, in Milgram's Small World Experiment it took, on average, only five. This finding became known under the title of 'six degrees of separation' since five intermediates corresponds to six steps from the initial participant to the target. These results confirmed the commonplace experience that *'it's a small world after all'*.

That the SWE can be related to the use of social capital becomes clear in the work of Lin⁷⁰, Dayton and Greenwald (1983) who studied the *'instrumental use of relations[hips]'* by way of a Small World Experiment. The researchers used the instrument to show how people employ their contacts, with the emphasis being on the prestige of the social actors involved. Thus, they were in fact studying how people apply their social capital. One of their findings was that those in successful chains (i.e. that reached the intended target) had more contacts than those in unsuccessful ones. Furthermore, the successful chains consisted of people who were 'weakly linked' (i.e. bridging social capital). This was in contrast to the unsuccessful chains, and is a confirmation of Granovetter's notion of 'the strength of weak ties' (see also Chapter 2). Moreover, people who were part of successful chains usually sought out those who they thought had many acquaintances, thus revealing a greater awareness of their personal networks.

The Small World Experiment has thus been applied in a study on social capital in operation, albeit this was not the wording that Lin et al. used at the time. However, the design of the SWE is too limiting for the ends I am pursuing here. The difference is clear in the titles of the two experiments: as Milgram and others tried to demonstrate how small people's social worlds are, I want to show how big they can be. The SWE has a 'closed' ending, as its target is specified beforehand. The idea of my Big World Experiment, however, is not that a single target is reached or mobilized, but that as many as possible or necessary are. Thus, the BWE is 'open-ended'. This clearly required the original experiment to be adapted, which I did on the basis of my own insights and the specificity of the circumstances, although the changes can be substantiated with the findings of other scholars who conducted Small World Experiments.

⁷⁰ Nan Lin later developed a theory on social capital. See also Chapter 2.

7.7 Design of the Big World Experiment

An invitation to a lecture on ‘The Art of Networking’ was the experimental trigger that set off the intended information dissemination. The lecture, which was delivered by the researcher, encompassed the presentation of the results of the first part of the study, dealt with the importance of networking and gave tips about how to enhance one’s networking skills. The group of organizations that initially received the invitation was comprised of those that had been interviewed the year before the lecture was held.

The invitation to the lecture was initially conveyed by telephone. This followed Guiot’s recommendation (1976). Unlike Milgram, who sent his respondents a letter containing a request for participation, Guiot approached them by telephone. He argued that: *“because of the immediacy of this two-way communication means, the telephone seems particularly adequate for securing participation”* (p.504). The result of the researcher taking control was that the response rates increased tremendously, rising from around 30% in the original versions of the experiment (e.g. Milgram, 1967; Bochner, Duncan, Kennedy, & Orr, 1976; Lin et al., 1983), to almost 85% in Guiot’s study. An important finding was that there was no effect on the length of the chains (in this study they were also an average of 6 steps), which led Guiot to conclude that *“the high drop-out rates [that were] characteristic of the earlier studies using the mail procedure, stemmed primarily from [a] lack of motivation rather than [an] inability to select an efficient path”* (Guiot, 1976, p.506). Weimann (1983) achieved similarly high response rates by using the telephone method, which convinced me to also utilize this approach.

During the phone call, the caller⁷¹ kept to a call protocol. This contained all of the information that she was supposed to convey to the respondents, as well as the questions that had to be asked. The protocol also prescribed the order in which these matters should be addressed⁷².

(Most of) the organizations that were selected to be part of the experiment had been interviewed in the earlier data collection phase, and so the callers initially tried to get in touch with the individual who had been spoken to at that time. After identifying the addressee as the person who had been interviewed, he or she was invited to attend the lecture in which the preliminary results of the research project would be presented. In cases where the original interviewee was no longer on the board of the relevant organization, his/her successor was invited.

⁷¹ The author and her assistants conducted the phone calls. I want to thank Fien Peters and Wiebke Schulz for their help and excellent work.

⁷² It turned out that this protocol was sometimes too strict and it was not possible to follow the instructions exactly as prescribed. In those cases it at least provided guidelines as to what should come up during the phone calls.

Immediately after receiving the invitation, the respondents were asked whether they could think of any other organization (or individual) that they thought would be interested in attending the lecture as well. Each respondent could name as many people and organizations as he/she wanted. It is at this point that the BWE deviates most from the Small World Experiment, since the respondents in the latter were asked to connect to only one alter, whereas the number of alters in this study are (theoretically) infinite.

The request for the names of alters was justified by the intention of the researcher to invite as many organizations as possible to the lecture and the wish to convey the invitation personally to all invitees. This was understood and accepted most of the time. Only in some instances did the person we spoke to tell us that he knew that we (the researchers) had a full list of Turkish organizations and we should check that list if we wanted to invite others. Luckily, this did not happen very often.

If any organization (or individual) was mentioned, the caller explicitly asked for the telephone number thereof. At times this was difficult, since respondents often said that they would “pass the message on” when they met up with the other organizations. The caller tried to convince the participants to provide names and numbers by saying that we really wanted to invite everybody personally, and we needed to know how many people would actually be attending the lecture because of the reception that would be taking place afterwards. The main reason why the respondents were pointedly asked for these telephone numbers or other contact information was that it served as a way of verifying that the organization actually had direct contact with the new group that was mentioned. Sometimes we would call back at a later, agreed, time so that people had time to think of names and/or numbers, but most of the time this did not lead to any additional responses.

The telephone conversation was concluded by asking the respondent whether he/she would appreciate receiving an invitation by e-mail or mail and whether he/she would be able to attend the lecture.

7.7.1 The course of the mobilization: continuing the chains

All of the names that were mentioned by the initial invitees were registered, and the organizations (individuals) in question were approached using the same procedure and protocol. Only the introductory information at the start of the telephone conversation differed slightly. Instead of referring directly to the research that would be presented during the lecture (and with that the immediate recognition by the respondents of the researchers), the caller referred to the person and organization that had provided us with the intermediary’s contact information⁷³. The caller then explained that the ‘number provider’ had given us the telephone number because he/she thought that the

⁷³ In some cases we only received an e-mail address instead of a telephone number. Then we would either look up the telephone number or approach the respective organization by e-mail.

addressee might be interested in the lecture. An advantage of this form of introduction was that the addressees were not suspicious about our motives for getting in touch with them. Indeed, it may even have given them a feeling of importance and made them more willing to cooperate.

The remainder of the telephone conversations with the alters proceeded along similar lines to those with the initial invitees. The contact was asked whether there were any other organizations we could invite, what their contact information was and, lastly, whether the addressee would be coming to the lecture.

Any organizations that were named were again approached using the same procedure. This was repeated until the end of the experiment, which was defined by the day upon which the lecture was held.

7.7.2 Possible incorporated bias

Every research method has its drawbacks, and all measures contain systematic and random errors: the influence on the ‘true score’ of the construct under study (Judd et al., 1991). As long as one is aware of both the fact that each method is, to some extent, biased and what the source of this bias is, this factor is inconvenient but not necessarily problematic; the Big World Experiment and the responses it elicited may have been influenced by several factors.

Firstly, the topic of the lecture might have influenced the participants’ thoughts about which actors they wanted to mobilize and even whether they wanted to mobilize at all. The lecture was about the ‘art of networking’ and the results of the first part of the study. Accordingly, actors who are not interested in networking may not feel like forwarding an invitation to a lecture about this topic to others, because they would not want to bother them. However, those that were approached first were part of the study that would be discussed. As most people like to talk or hear about themselves (personal experience) this would probably cancel out the lack of interest in networking. Each of the actors approached later in the mobilization process had the silent recommendation of those who had mobilized them that the lecture was worth attending; why would they have received the invitation otherwise?

The fact that the lecture was partly about the Turkish community could trigger actors to name Turkish organizations more often than their non-Turkish counterparts. The neutral title of the lecture was chosen to anticipate this bias. Moreover, the lecture contained information that would be interesting to all organizations, not only Turkish ones⁷⁴. There is a possibility that this was not enough to circumvent the bias caused by

⁷⁴ That networking is a relevant topic for (migrant) organizations becomes clear from books like *EigenWijs Participeren; een wegwijzer voor zelforganisaties (A guide for self-organizations)* (Jansen & Putten, 2002), which contains information for migrants who are active in these associations about how to run voluntary organizations, develop successful projects, and participate in society.

the topic of the lecture. However, even if the actors were indeed more inclined to mobilize Turkish organizations, this is not a particularly significant problem. After all, I am mapping the working of social capital in the Turkish community.

The second source of possible bias is the fact that the *researcher* was the one who actually performed the mobilization, not the organizations themselves. The researcher or an assistant made the phone calls and conveyed the invitations. This intervention could have influenced the choices made by the initial invitees, as well as the interpretation of the invitation by the successive receivers thereof. I consider prestige to be the main factor of influence in these circumstances; in order to impress the researcher, the sender may want to demonstrate which important organizations he/she is acquainted with, even though these may not be contacts that this association would normally involve in a mobilization. In other words, the potentially disturbing effect of prestige is that participants may display a tendency to over emphasize their weak ties over the strong ones. However, even if this is the case, it is not problematic when it comes to the interpretation of the network. In fact, it would even produce a more interesting result, because the mobilization could then be regarded as an extreme scenario which reveals the maximal connections between organizations within the community.

The prestige of the actors may also affect the receiver of the invitation, but in a positive way. The caller explicitly referred to the actor who had provided the telephone number of the organization approached. The receiver thus heard that it was recommended by the sender, which may have increased the willingness to, in turn, forward the invitation. This indeed turned out to be the case, as the dropout rates decreased as the chains proceeded.

A final factor that has to be taken into consideration is that the mobilization networks which depict mobilizations reflect how they were explicitly reported to the researcher. Whether or not they named others, what people actually did with the invitation, which they always received by mail or e-mail, is unknown: they might have forwarded it on without our knowledge. Moreover, whether organizations discussed the lecture with each other and whether they would or would not attend was beyond the knowledge of the researcher.

Overall, I do not expect the bias to be severe enough to devalue the experiment. As I said at the beginning of this paragraph, it is, however, important to recognize the possible sources thereof and take them into account in the analysis.

7.8 Analyzing the BWE data

The mobilization networks resulting from the BWE were first analyzed by means of (some of) the network measures introduced in Chapter 4. The results from the analyses

can be found in Appendices 6 and 7. The in and out-degree of all actors is taken into account. The mobilization network is directed⁷⁵, so a more precise description of the relationships with the alters is possible compared to what the general ‘degree’ measure allows. In the mobilization network, the in-degree refers to the number of times an organization is named by others as being a future invitee. The out-degree refers to the number of organizations that an actor named, or in other words, the number of organizations that an actor has mobilized. Associations that have more incoming than outgoing ties, for instance, are thought to be popular and have a strong position in the network. The out-degree figures also provide insight into the strategies followed by the actors, for example, some choose to mobilize many alters, while others confine themselves to only one, perhaps crucial, organization.

The betweenness and closeness measures that were applied in the contact network are problematic in the mobilization network. Firstly, of all these measures are only applicable in an *undirected* network, which the mobilization network is not. It is only if the network can be assumed to be undirected that the measures can be meaningfully calculated. This might indeed be the case in the current network (although this remains more speculation than certainty). Organization A refers to organization B, but this does not mean that B would also refer to A. This can be due to the fact that there is a hierarchical relationship between the two organizations. In general, it is assumed that in a hierarchical dyad the receiving actor is hierarchically more highly placed. This also means that actor B is probably less inclined to involve actor A. On the other hand, in the current circumstances, it will be difficult to distinguish this principle of hierarchy from the simple fact that actors were likely to be less inclined to mention the organizations that had already mentioned their name. The caller explicitly stated: “organization A gave us your name”. This must have dissuaded many actors from reciprocating a certain tie, and it therefore cannot be automatically assumed that a directed tie in this case equates to a hierarchical relationship.

The other characteristic of the betweenness and closeness measures that poses a bigger problem is the fact that they are only applicable in connected networks (i.e. networks that consist of only one component). As I will show, the mobilization network in Amsterdam is not connected, and the betweenness and closeness measures were, therefore, not used in relation thereto.

The different components and the cut points within them do, of course, deserve and receive ample attention. By means of the E-I index and the IQV, the components are qualitatively interpreted.

Two additional concepts are important in relation to the data from the Big World Experiment, namely those of ‘chain’ and ‘chain length’. If mobilization is thought of as an

⁷⁵ An undirected network consists of bilateral relationships between actors (A is related to B in a similar way to how B is related to A and the ‘direction’ of the relationship is not relevant). A directed network consists of one-way relationships (e.g. A relates only to B, but B does not relate to A and the direction of the relationship is thus very relevant).

ever growing tree, a chain is a branch thereof, which is formed by organizations that subsequently mobilize the next one in the chain. Chain length then refers to the number of actors that make up this branch.

In the discussion of the mobilization networks, I also make use of a few other basic concepts which I have not yet introduced. The organizations that were addressed first are named the '*starters*'. The actors which mentioned other organizations (starters or not) are termed as '*senders*', since they sent the invitation to others, even though the researcher was the one who actually conveyed it. The alters to whom the invitations were addressed are known as '*receivers*'. '*Closers*', meanwhile, are the organizations that are mentioned but which do not have a Turkish background and/or are located outside of Amsterdam. In this study, they were regarded as the end points of the chains and were therefore not asked to forward the invitation to others, but they were, of course, invited to attend the lecture. The closers form the edges of the mobilization network, just as the non-Turkish and non-Amsterdam organizations made up the borders of the contact networks and networks of interlocking directorates. Organizations that were contacted but were unwilling or unable to provide the names of acquainted organizations are referred to as '*sinks*'.

7.9 Dates of the experiments in Amsterdam and Berlin

The experiments took place in 2006. In Amsterdam, the first phone calls were made on Monday April 3rd and the experiment ended on Thursday April 27th, the day the lecture was held. The BWE in Berlin took place six months later, between Monday 16th of October and November 18th, with the lecture taking place on November 30th. For logistical reasons, and unlike in Amsterdam, the lecture in Berlin could not take place on the final day of the mobilization period. The activation in Berlin was, therefore, ended after a month to ensure that the circumstances in terms of the period within which the mobilization took place were as equal as possible in the two cities.

The fact that the mobilizations in both cities took place in a predetermined time-frame meant that, in some cases, it was terminated before this would have happened 'naturally'. In other words, in principle, organizations were approached as often as necessary in order to invite them to the lecture. Sometimes this meant that we called them ten times. In many cases we would get in touch with them eventually, but this was not always the case. The organizations concerned are treated as sinks, even though we might have reached and would have been able to mobilize them had the experiment lasted longer.

7.10 Samples in Berlin and Amsterdam

The initial samples consisted of the organizations that I had interviewed the year before. The reasons for using the same organizations were fourfold. First of all, the lecture served as a gesture to the participants in the study. In this way they got the chance to hear about and make comments on the research that they were a part of. Secondly, as the lecture concerned the invitees themselves, their enthusiasm or motivation to join in with the experiment and to mobilize appropriate others would be greater than for organizations that had no prior knowledge of the study. Any subsequent actors in the mobilization to whom this ‘interest’ argument does not apply had the extra stimulus of being referred to by a well-known partner organization, which could have persuaded them to participate due to feelings of honor or obligation. The third reason for using the interviewed organizations was that these samples (again, in both Amsterdam and Berlin) had already been revealed to contain organizations with very diverse positions and characteristics. In other words, the mobilization would really start at different ‘ends’ of the community and would be able to show if those with more or less social capital use it differently or in a similar way. This latter argument is important, since Milgram and other Small World Experiment researchers were criticized for using self-selected samples. Milgram’s starting sample, for example, was compiled of people who volunteered after an appeal in a local newspaper. The criticism maintained that only people with a significant number of acquaintances and a high social economic status (SES) would participate, as they are more confident than those with a low SES. In the current research, the random sampling method avoided this problem. Fourthly, using this sample enabled the comparison to be made between social capital (the contact network and network of interlocking directorates) and social capital in operation (the mobilization network), which is a crucial element in the current study.

This strategy meant that in Amsterdam I began by addressing 38 organizations. Using the same line of reasoning, the initial sample in Berlin was 27. However, to optimize the comparisons between the two cities, I decided to add ten organizations to this latter group to make sure that the starting samples were the same size. The additional organizations were deliberately selected, and in the main involved those I had planned to interview but could not because of the schedules of the intended interviewees. Three other organizations were selected by the same sampling procedure that was used to obtain the initial sample (described in Chapter 4). The aim was to fill categories that were possibly under-represented⁷⁶.

⁷⁶ These are the sports organization 1. SV Galatasaray Berlin, TÜDESB (educational organization), Türkische Sozialdemokraten in Berlin e.V. (political organization).

7.11 Missing data and non-response in Amsterdam and Berlin: chains versus actors

In the original Small World Experiments, response rates are equated with the percentage of completed chains (i.e. the chains that reached the target) as opposed to those that did not reach the intended target. Using this percentage basis, the response rates in SWE studies varied from 1.6% in the work by Dodds et al. (2003) to 84.6% in Guiot's research (1976). The overall mean percentage of completed chains is 40.4% (as revealed by a meta-analysis). However, if the number of chains that were *initially started* is used as the percentage base, this mean drops by over eight percentage points, to 32.1%. This is important, because in the current study there is no such thing as a completed chain, and nor is the success of a chain revealed from any target reached. The BWE does not involve a target, and it is therefore not possible to report the response rates using the normal definition. Instead, in this study the *non-response* rate is calculated. This is not simply the opposite of the response rate as it is calculated in former studies. In fact, I abandon the idea that the (non-) response rate is based on the total number of *chains*, and instead base it on the number of *actors* involved in them. Hence, the non-response rate reported here refers to the number of organizations that were unreachable or did not provide any names, compared to the total number of organizations⁷⁷ included in the experiment. In fact, this is the understanding of response rates that is common in the social sciences.

7.12 Non-response and non-contact

The percentage of non-responses in Amsterdam and Berlin are respectively 44.7 and 50.7%. In other words, half of the organizations approached did not participate in the mobilization. How this should be interpreted depends upon why these associations did not get involved. Was it because they have objections in principle to the intended purpose, or simply because they were not there at the time the experiment was implemented? In order to gain more insight into these non-responses, I therefore distinguish between two types, or components, of non-response (following Stoop, 2005): non-response due to non-contact and non-response due to reluctance to cooperate.

The non-response due to non-contact refers to situations in which the intended respondent simply could not be reached. The BWE relies on the telephone method, as

⁷⁷ Also, sometimes people instead of associations were mentioned. Further investigation into their backgrounds demonstrated that in nearly all cases they were prominent members of the Turkish community who could be associated with associations as former board members, or with governmental institutions as politicians. These individuals are therefore included in all of the analyses.

recommended by Guiot, because it yields much higher response rates. Of course, when using the telephone method, one also comes across organizations that do not pick up the phone. In these cases, we tried to reach them by e-mail⁷⁸. No-one, however, responded to this method of approach. As can be seen in Table 7.1, 16.6% of the non-responses in Amsterdam and 18.3 % of those in Berlin were due to unreachable organizations.

	Non-contact	Non-cooperation	Total
Amsterdam (n=96)	16.6	28.1	44.7
Berlin (n=71)	18.3	32.4	50.7

Table 7.1 Non-response in percentages

The second type of non-response (non-response due to reluctance to cooperate) concerns the organizations that were contacted but were not willing or able to provide the names of acquainted associations ('sinks'). In Amsterdam, 28.1% of organizations refused their cooperation compared to 32.4% of those in Berlin. This type of non-response is particularly relevant for the interpretation of the course of the mobilization. Not only did the organizations that did participate show, by their involvement, how the mobilization of a community took place, but those that excluded themselves also provided valuable insights, yet it is difficult to find the reasons for this non-participation. Was it the participants' lack of social capital (i.e. they did not *know* who to name), an unwillingness to participate, or yet another reason? The first explanation seems to be the least plausible, since the interviews revealed that all of the organizations have at least some contacts. On the other hand, it could mean that even though they *said* they had connections, these are not valuable. Or, and this is something that several organizations said, they do not *regard* their connections as being valuable. A frequently heard comment was that "*I cannot think of any names at the moment*". Given the fact that it is known that every organization has at least some connections, this shows that they do not value their social capital as useful. Only one organization in Berlin actually stated that it would not mobilize any other organization because it was '*always working on its own*'. The second reason for non-cooperation (a total unwillingness to participate) was encountered several times as well. We heard comments such as: "*I cannot see the point in naming anyone*", "*It is too much effort to mention anyone*" or "*Everybody is so busy, I wouldn't want to bother them*". Some starters said "*You have a full list of organizations⁷⁹, so I'm sure you can find them yourselves*". Finally, several organizations promised to let us know who they wanted to invite, but never did.

⁷⁸ Only if we were able to identify the organization's e-mail address via the Internet.

⁷⁹ He referred to the name recognition list that was provided during the interviews.

It is worth noting that the majority of the organizations that refused to mobilize any others, both in Berlin and Amsterdam, were *starters*. Indeed, they refused their participation more than organizations further along the chains. Or, putting it another way, organizations further along the chains were more willing to play a part in the mobilization. This is an unexpected finding; it was thought that the starters would have more interest in the lecture topic because it was partly about them and the research they had participated in. On this basis it was thought that they would, therefore, be more willing to invite other associations along. Although I did not pose any questions about why an organization agreed to take part in the mobilization process⁸⁰, I suspect that the actors further along the chains, on the one hand, felt special because they heard the caller tell them that some other organization(s) had thought of them in particular and, on the other, they felt obliged to join in, again because they had been referred by a third party. The starters had no such indebtedness to other organizations, and only perhaps to the researcher. It is possible that this obligation was not as strongly felt, thus leading to lower response rates. The non-response figures per remove in the chains are presented in columns two and three of the table in Appendix 8. This table also contains other information about the number of organizations that were involved in each step of the mobilization.

In the next chapter I will present the results of the mobilization in Amsterdam. I will also consider them in light of the social capital described in Chapter 5. Chapter 9 contains a similar analysis of the results of the experiment in Berlin and a comparison with the social capital as presented in Chapter 6.

⁸⁰ Nor on why the organization approached had chosen the organizations it had chosen. I refrained from such questions so as to not disturb the authenticity of the experiment.

8. Mobilized Social Capital in Amsterdam

In his article about an ethnic movement in Flanders, and taking a policy point of view, Hooghe (2005) comments: “Ethnic organizations only have a real social or political impact if they can be said to constitute an ethnic movement, with at least some kind of common strategy and policy goals” (p. 976). This idea implies that ethnic organizations ideally form an entity that can be mobilized as one body. It also makes the assumption that the members of this entity are all able to mobilize everyone else in it. My goal is not to prove or test whether the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin qualify as ethnic movements, but I do want to show what happens if an ethnic community is triggered to mobilize its members.

We now know what the social capital of the Turkish organizations in the selected cities looks like, and the question is whether, and if so how, they use this potential. In this chapter I will discuss the mobilization network based on the results of the Big World Experiment in Amsterdam and I will also explain how the mobilized social capital relates to the social capital described in Chapter 5.

8.1 What does the mobilization network look like?

A full picture of the mobilization network in Amsterdam can be found in Figure 8.1. Clearly, it is considerably smaller than the contact network or the network of interlocking directorates: it contains 96 actors instead of 391 and 278 respectively. We can also see that the mobilization was not a fluent, all-inclusive affair, but was instead rather fragmented. The network is comprised of ten components⁸¹, of which only two were of a substantial size, containing 30 and 18 actors, respectively.

The largest component is dominated by left-wing associations, with the laborers' organization *HTIB*, at its heart. This group of left-wing organizations, which includes the political organizations the *HTDB* and the *DVA-DIDF*, is connected to a subgroup of Islamic associations through the agency of the government organization, the *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie*, and the umbrella organization, the *Federatie Milli Görüş Noord Nederland* (FMGNN). The latter connects the group of Islamic organizations of different denominations, which surround the *Stichting Objectief Nieuws*, to the group of left-wing associations.

⁸¹ See Appendix 4 for a definition of a component as applied in social network analysis.




Figure 8.1 Mobilization network in Amsterdam. General typology in boxes

HTDB and DVA-DIDF

The *HTDB* and *DVA-DIDF* are both left-wing political organizations, located in the city district of Oud-West. The *HTDB* is the more general association of the two, with a range of social activities for young and old and men and women. It is well known in the Turkish community and was also one of the organizations with the most social capital, which it has realized to a relatively major extent. Its social capital was indeed diverse, including many different types of organizations with different ideological backgrounds, yet in practice the *HTDB* has mobilized mainly ideologically similar organizations (i.e. left-wing), albeit they did have different core objectives.

The *DVA-DIDF* is more explicitly left-wing oriented, which is seen in the statements from its chairman (“*We are free, progressive, democratic and societal.*”) as well as from the main activities it undertakes (e.g. participation in several protest movements). The *DVA-DIDF* had a considerable amount of social capital and has also used it more than other organizations did during the mobilization. The organizations that were mobilized are ideologically like-minded, while most do have different daily occupations.

The other major component, which contains 18 organizations (see Figure 8.1), is comprised of a very well interconnected subgroup of organizations that are all located in the city district of Amsterdam-Noord. The *Stichting De Vrouwenlijn* and *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord* are the central organizations in this component. It also contains a group of Diyanet mosque associations.

Furthermore, another component, which is comprised of seven actors, unites a group of organizations in the city district of Bos en Lommer with a group of youth associations (see Figure 8.1). Two other components consist of a central actor (the soccer association, the *AGB*, and the educational association, *STOC*, respectively) which mobilized five other organizations. These organizations did not, however, mobilize any others. These components are also depicted in Figure 8.1.

The smallest components contained only a few organizations, each of between two and four actors. Each component can be said to have a characteristic that the actors within it share: a similar ideology, type or ethnicity, or they are located in the same city district. The remaining components are a Kurdish component (2), a Bos-en-Lommer component (2), a component of right-wing social organizations (3), an educational component (3), and a ‘Dutch’ component (4). (The number of actors in each is given in parentheses.)

8.2 Leading organizations in the mobilization process

The fact that the mobilization network consists of several separate components highlights that the activation of the Turkish community was fragmented. How a mobilization proceeds depends mainly on how many actors actively participate in it, and how many other organizations they reach during the process. In Amsterdam, 27 organizations actively participated in the Big World Experiment, and on average they each mobilized 3 alters. However, most participants activated only one or two actors,

and only a few mobilized considerably greater numbers of organizations. The actors that can be regarded as the leading organizations in the mobilization network are in the two largest components. The workers' organization, the *HTIB* (in the largest component), and the women's organization, *De Vrouwenlijn* (in the second-largest), were well above the other senders with respect to the number of organizations they mobilized. The latter addressed the most (ten), probably because it has a coordinating function within its city district. *De Vrouwenlijn* was founded in 1999, as a semi-governmental organization with which to encourage the participation of (non-Dutch) women in Dutch society. Over the course of time, it developed into an independent platform within which several women's organizations and individuals collaborate⁸². Furthermore, *De Vrouwenlijn* maintains close connections with (semi-)governmental agencies both inside and outside its city district. This is also reflected in the mobilization network: *De Vrouwenlijn* invited, amongst others, two employees of the semi-governmental organization, the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord*, and a former city councilor. The *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord* is an active player in the field of community work in the city district of Amsterdam-Noord. Its core business is activating, supervising, and advising residents and their organizations, as well as entrepreneurs, about how to improve the livability of their neighborhoods.

The *HTIB* mobilized the consultative body, the *Landelijk Overleg Minderheden (LOM)*, which unites a relatively large group of eight umbrella organizations⁸³ (national representatives) of different ethnic groups. The *HTIB* was, in fact, mobilized more than any other organization.

Two other organizations, the government agency, the *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie* and the semi-governmental association, the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord*, were also mobilized more than was average. As was the case for *De Vrouwenlijn*, the *Adviesraad* and the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord* have the task of uniting and

Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie

The *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie* (Advisory Council Diversity and Integration) is a municipal department charged with the duty of providing the city council with 'asked and unasked-for' advice about municipal diversity policies⁸⁴. It has nine members, appointed in a private capacity, who are professionally and socially involved with Amsterdam society. The contacted representative is the town clerk at the Advisory Council. The Advisory Council is in constant dialogue with members and organizations from the ethnic communities in order to fulfill their tasks. Therefore, the employees are well informed about the dominant actors in these communities. This explains why the *Adviesraad* has mobilized not only two left-wing organizations, but also an Islamic umbrella organization, the *Stichting Federatie Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland (FMGNN)*.

⁸² See their website for a list: <http://devrouwenlijn.web-log.nl/> (last entry: December 2008)

⁸³ The participating organizations in the *LOM* at the time were: *Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen en Tunesiërs*, *Vluchtelingenorganisatie Nederland*, *Inspraak Orgaan Chinezen*, *Surinaams Inspraak Orgaan*, *Overlegorgaan Caribische Nederlanders*, *LIZE* (Southern-European), *Landelijk Overleg Welzijn Molukkers*, and the *Inspraak Orgaan Turken*.

⁸⁴ As stated on their website: <http://www.adviesraaddiversiteit.amsterdam.nl/>

emancipating different groups in society. As the Big World experiment appealed to a related task, i.e. the dissemination of information, it was only natural that these organizations were the main players in the mobilization.

8.3 The persistence of the mobilization: chain length

The length of the chains⁸⁵ in the BWE reflects the persistence of the mobilization. Initially, one might assume that longer chains are indicative of more mobilization, while short ones suggest that the mobilization ceased rapidly. After all, the longer that chains are, the more organizations are reached and, thus, the greater the proportion of the population that is actually mobilized. The mean chain length in the Big World Experiment in Amsterdam was 1.7 steps, with the longest reaching length 4. Based on the assumption that longer chains reflect persistent mobilization, the latter is an encouraging figure, whereas the former may be perceived as low. However, there are two reasons why this conclusion may be somewhat premature.

Firstly, the chains that reached length 4 moved in a somewhat circular fashion. For example, those in the second-largest component started with the Diyanet mosque, the *STISCCAN*, and ended with the contacts of the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord*, amongst which was the *STISCCAN* again. Furthermore, both the *STISCCAN* and the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord* mobilized the women's organization, *El Kübra*. Accordingly, long chains can give the impression of a successful mobilization, while the actual result is, in fact, less promising; it remained within a small section of the Turkish community.

The second reason why a short chain length in a mobilization network stemming from the Big World Experiment is not necessarily a regrettable outcome is that the chains may have reached a closer. Recall that closers are the organizations that are either non-Turkish, or are (active) outside Amsterdam. The chains that reached a closer were deliberately halted. After all, the experiment was meant to map the mobilization of the Turkish community in Amsterdam, and any activation outside this population was not part of the research objective. However, this measure did affect the chain length. If the (ethnic) transition happened early, this automatically meant that the chain did not extend any further and the mobilization stopped. Short chains may be indicators of a mediocre mobilization of the Turkish community, but, on the other hand, they are indicative of a community that is integrated into society at large. Twenty-five percent of the chains in the BWE in Amsterdam ended with non-Turkish closers, the majority of which were second in the chain. This means that these closers were positioned very much at the beginning of the chains, and the relatively limited mean chain length is, generally, thus caused by a high proportion of 'closed' sequences. This highlights that

⁸⁵ Chain length refers to the number of steps the invitation progressed through the community. A chain of length four can, for example, involve five actors: A-B-C-D-E.

several organizations in the community know how to connect to other ethnicities, whether Dutch or different nationalities, even though this may be at the expense of the mobilization of their own community. Before I start an interpretive discussion of the mobilization network, I will first focus on the ethnic bonding and bridging social capital that was addressed.

8.4 Mobilization of ethnic bonding and bridging social capital

The distribution of non-Turkish connections is not evenly spread between the actors in the network. In other words, 44% of the organizations addressed at least some ethnically bridging social capital (12 out of 27), whereas the additional 56% mobilized only ethnically bonding social capital. Six organizations mobilized only non-Turkish actors. The only association to truly address bridging social capital was the students' organization, the *Studenten Unie Nederland*, which mobilized two Moroccan youth associations. The other five organizations only mobilized bridging social capital *on the face of it*. Closer scrutiny revealed that the contacts at the respective organizations often had a different ethnic background to the organizations they were representing.

One of these six organizations that addressed only bridging social capital is the Turkish cultural organization, the *Stichting Aslan*. This is at the centre of the small component that is labeled 'Dutch'. This is because the *Stichting Aslan* mobilized three Dutch organizations that are active in the field of migrant work, but are not necessarily aimed at the Turkish community in particular. This remarkable fact can be explained by the ethnicity of the representative of *Stichting Aslan*: this board member is a native of the Netherlands.

Other organizations mobilized those that were labeled 'Dutch' or 'mixed' based on the ethnicity of the majority of their board members, but on closer inspection it transpired that the representatives of the organizations that were named by the senders were, in fact, Turkish. The women's organization, the *El Kübra*, mobilized *De vrouwenlijn*. This is a mixed organization, but the representative who was contacted was the only Turkish board member. The same applies to the *Stichting Opbouwwerk-Noord*, which is a Dutch semi-governmental organization, but the contact was Turkish (mobilized by *De vrouwenlijn*). His Moroccan colleague was also mobilized, but she was regarded as a 'closer' given her ethnicity. Moreover, the contact at the mixed organization, the *Stichting Witte Tulp*, which is in the 'educational' component, was a Turk, as was the employee of the governmental agency, the *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie*⁸⁶. For each of these associations, the senders could have also (only) picked a non-Turkish

⁸⁶ The fact that the contact from the *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie* was a Turkish employee is the reason why this organization was asked to participate in the experiment and to forward the invitation. Its nature (a governmental organization) and its categorization as Dutch would normally have made it a 'closer'.

contact. That they did not do so highlights that the ethnicity of the individuals within organizations does play a role in the mobilization process. The fact that the Dutch board member of the *Stichting Aslan* mobilized only Dutch organizations confirms this. Overall, the use of ethnically bridging social capital during the experiment was only limited in the Turkish organizations, and bridging social capital sometimes turned out to be semi-bridging after all.

8.5 Addressing bonding and bridging social capital with respect to organizational type

The subgroups and components that were found in the mobilization network are better characterized by ideological or geographical features than by reference to the types of organization. In other words, I distinguish between the ideology of an organization and the main objectives thereof. The former refers to the general point of view or body of ideas that an organization adheres to e.g. 'left-wing' or 'religious'. The classification of 'type of organization' is based on their main objectives: 'sports', 'women' or 'youth', but 'religion' is also relevant in relation to the type of organization because such organizations have an ideology according to which they act. In Chapter 2, I argued that organizations have bridging social capital with respect to organizational type when the type of organization of their alters differ from the type of organization of ego, and even more so when those alters' types are mutually divergent.

The mobilization network revealed that the large majority of senders have indeed addressed (only) bridging social capital with respect to organizational type. The exceptions to the rule were the Diyanet mosque *Fatih*, which only mobilized other Diyanet mosques, the women's organization *El Kübra*, that addressed the women's organization *de Vrouwenlijn*, and the *Stichting Kurdische Bibliotheek*, which mobilized the Kurdish umbrella organization, the *FEDKOM*⁸⁷.

8.6 Bonding in the neighborhood: the use of local connections

Most organizations mobilized acquainted counterparts which were located in different city districts to themselves. However, those in Amsterdam-Noord and Bos en Lommer did clearly prefer to mobilize their neighbors as opposed to organizations elsewhere in the city. Two of the components (see above) contained a subgroup of organizations that had nothing in common but their residence in Bos en Lommer. Moreover, the second-

⁸⁷ Because Kurdish organizations profile themselves explicitly as Kurdish, they are not only classified as 'Kurdish' with respect to ethnicity, but also as to the type of organization, even though they may be involved with more practical matters than the Kurdish issue itself.

largest component not only contained many organizations from Amsterdam-Noord, but these also had a relatively high number of intra-connections. Given these links, it can be assumed that any mobilization of organizations in this city district will include all or most of the others located there. After all, even if a particular organization does not participate in the mobilization, and would, therefore, not forward the piece of information on, it is very likely that the other associations will, nevertheless, circulate it. This interconnectedness is what Coleman and Burt termed 'closure' (see Chapter 2).

A possible explanation for these strong intra-district relationships is the local policies that have been pursued in recent years, which focus more on the local integration of migrant groups. Organizations, therefore, often only receive (project) funding if they are collaborating with other associations. As collaboration is more practical if it takes place in one's neighborhood, this may have stimulated the organizations to form alliances. Furthermore, the semi-governmental association the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord*, which is active in this city district in particular (which also became clear during the experiment), stimulates the collaboration between organizations.

8.7 Moving up: on mobilizing strategies

As I explained in Chapter 7, a comparison of an association's mobilized social capital compared to its social capital sheds light on the activation strategy that this actor has used. In several cases, the sending organizations clearly demonstrate an 'upwardly' mobilizing strategy. I define this as the mobilization of one or more organizations that are hierarchically (based on organizational type) more highly placed. For example, the small-scale media association, the *Stichting Objectief Nieuws*, mobilized the umbrella organization *Federatie Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland (FMGNN)*, which in turn mobilized the hierarchically more highly placed municipal agency, the *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie*. Similarly, the cultural organization, the *Stichting Papyrus*, mobilized the *HTIB*, which, in turn, mobilized the *LOM*, the collaborative body of national representatives of migrant groups. A third example is the women's organization, *El Kübra*, which mobilized the *Vrouwenlijn*, which mobilized the umbrella organization of the Milli Görüş women's association, the *Stichting Milli Görüş Vrouwen Federatie*. All of these are instances whereby, with each step in the chain, an organization was reached that was, in fact, more capable of a 'higher reach' than the sending actor.

For several organizations, their mobilization of the *HTIB* was the 'step higher up', and it was the most popular actor involved in the mobilization process. In other words, no organization received as many invitations as the *HTIB*. Save for the facts that most of the organizations connecting to the *HTIB* can be viewed as being more left-wing, and that it remains to be seen how 'right-wing' organizations and the *HTIB* relate to each

Diyanet mosques

The role of the Diyanet mosques during the mobilization was less than one might have expected. The analysis of social capital has shown that these mosques are highly interconnected and the interviewees indicated that a lot of mutual exchanges take place between them. Yet only the *STISCCAN* activated the *Fatih* mosque (the most prominent Diyanet mosque in Amsterdam), which in turn mobilized its remaining sister organizations. The other Diyanet mosques did not mobilize any other organization.

Mosques are often regarded as, and are, perhaps, also used, as key players in the mobilization of Islamic communities. This may be true when it concerns the mobilization of the visitors to the mosques. The imam has such authority and the mosques still enjoy such large attendances that bigger crowds are relatively easily mobilized. However, the role of mosques as mobilizers of other organizations is shown herein to be only marginal. The religious movements kept to themselves if they mobilized other organizations at all.

other, one could say that the *HTIB* was one of the most accessible contacts in the Turkish community during the mobilization. Given its central position, the *HTIB* perhaps plays the role of an umbrella organization: smaller organizations inform it about relevant matters and it relates to those on a higher structural level. Furthermore, even though several of the interviewed respondents stated - slightly condescendingly - that the role that the *HTIB* had in the 1980s, as the figurehead of the Turkish community in Amsterdam, is over, this mobilization network shows that many organizations still consider the *HTIB* to be an active player.

Following this, it is interesting to see how the true umbrella organizations have acted in the mobilization process. As I explained in Chapter 5, it is mainly the religious umbrella organizations that are significant in Turkish associational life in Amsterdam. Both the Diyanet and the Milli Görüş movements are led by an umbrella organization that functions more as their mouthpiece than its member organizations do. In the case of the Milli Görüş this concerns the *Stichting Federatie Milli Görüş Noord-Nederland (FMGNN)*⁸⁸, which is located and is very active in Amsterdam. The *FMGNN* took an active part in the Big World Experiment (see the biggest component). The Diyanet's umbrella organization, the *Islamitische Stichting Nederland (ISN)*, is based in The Hague, and leads all of the Diyanet mosques in the Netherlands. The *ISN* is also part of the mobilization network (activated by *Stichting Objectief Nieuws*) but, due to its location in The Hague, it was considered to be a closer. Hence, it did not mobilize any other actors. The members of these two umbrella organizations were strikingly inactive during the mobilization. Indeed, although they have been shown to have substantial social capital, most of them stated: "I wouldn't know anybody to invite". Note that they did not even refer to their respective umbrella organizations, even though they and their members are known to

⁸⁸ There also is a sister umbrella organization, the *Stichting Federatie Milli Görüş Zuid-Nederland*, which serves the member organizations in the southern part of the Netherlands. The two federations tend to follow a different course; the one in Noord-Nederland is known to be more liberal than the one in Zuid-Nederland (den Exter & Hessels, 2003).

be closely connected. Only the *Fatih* mosque and the *STISCCAN* (both Diyanet mosques) mobilized one or more sister mosques. The former, in fact, seems to act as the local substitute for its umbrella organization given its central position at the heart of its sister organizations (see Figure 8.1).

A speculative explanation for the inactivity of the religious organizations is that they are primarily occupied with their objectives of practicing Islam and do not want to be involved in community mobilization. I would imagine that they do not regard themselves as relevant actors during a mobilization, but instead leave the coordination to their umbrella organization. On the other hand, this reluctance to play an active part in the mobilization may only concern the activation of other *associations*. By way of contrast, mosques are often regarded as places for information dissemination (or other kinds of mobilization) amongst their *visitors* (Kanmaz & Mokhless, 2002). However, if this is indeed the case, I would imagine that the mosques' boards and their imams would only inform their communities if they were ordered to do so by their umbrella organizations.

8.8 Linking social capital

Linking social capital refers to connections between organizations and political or (semi-)governmental organizations. Whether organizations address their linking social capital or not is also a manifestation of a mobilizing strategy. However, very few used this strategy. Two actors, the cultural organization, the *Stichting Aslan*, and the women's organization, the *De Vrouwenlijn*, mobilized semi-governmental organizations (*Re-start*, *Amsterdam Centrum Buitenlanders* and *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord*). *De Vrouwenlijn* also activated a Turkish former member of the district council in Amsterdam-Noord. The football association, the *AGB*, also mobilized three politicians: Turkish district councilors in Geuzenveld-Slotermeer and Osdorp. Note that the organizations restricted their use of political social capital to *Turkish* politicians. This confirms the observations of Tillie (2000), who found that Turkish voters have a preference for ethnic candidates (within the party of their preference).

The umbrella organization, the *FMGNN*, was the only one which mobilized a government organization, i.e. the *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie*. This *Adviesraad* had a crucial position in the network, since it served as a bridge between two ideologically opposed subgroups: on the one hand the Islamic organizations, and on the other the leftist associations. Furthermore, it was important in the mobilization process because if it were not for the *Adviesraad*, the opposing groups would not be connected at all. It is salient that it took a neutral Dutch (although the representative was Turkish) government go-between to keep an important part of the community together. Given the fact that the *Adviesraad* not only mobilized migrant organizations, but also several civil

servants from other municipal departments, its role as an intermediary also relates to the migrant organizations vis-à-vis the municipality.

8.9 The role of the individual in organizations

I explained in Chapter 2 that in this study I regard social capital as being something that an individual can produce, while the collective can profit from it. The position of the *Adviesraad* as an intermediary in the network has shown that a single organization can be of importance to the community as a whole. Additionally, in several instances the mobilization network revealed that individual board members, or other representatives of an organization, are sometimes crucial to the course of the mobilization and the functioning of their particular association. I have already discussed the determinative role of the ethnicity of contacts within organizations when it comes to Turkish employees in Dutch associations and Dutch board members in Turkish ones. Furthermore, two of the components, both coincidentally star-shaped (see Figure 8.1), underline the importance of the individual in an organization, because they both contain more *individuals* than organizations. The central actors in these two components are the educational organization, the *Stichting Turks Onderwijs Centrum (STOC)* and the football organization, the *AGB*. Both associations forwarded the invitation to several individuals who were not currently representatives of organizations, even though further investigation of these people revealed that they were ‘not just anybody’, e.g. the *STOC* mobilized two people in the employ of educational institutions (university and college). These connections are rooted in the activities of the *STOC*, as it offers language courses and other types of educational support. Another individual used to be related to the Turkish consultative body, the *IOT*, and the fourth was involved in a fairly large relief organization, the *Samenwerkende Moslim Hulp Organisaties (SMHO)*⁸⁹. As the nature of these organizations and that of the *STOC* are not similar, I assume that the relationships between it and these individuals are based on personal familiarity. The *AGB* respondent

STOC

The educational centre, the *STOC*, has used the social capital of its chairman extensively. The *STOC* only mobilized individuals instead of organizations, even though these individuals did have ties to several well-known organizations. Factually, the *STOC* did not employ its social capital as defined in the current study. Furthermore, even though the *STOC* appeared to be a well-known and esteemed actor in the Turkish community, this lip service was not put into practice: none of the organizations have called upon the *STOC*. Most probably, this is caused by the fact that mobilizers stuck to the organizations closest to them (see ‘in case of urgency’) and the *STOC* is, in several respects, an outsider in the community. It is located in Slotervaart Overtoomseveld, in which only a few Turkish organizations are based. It is trying hard to reach out to other ethnicities, Dutch as well as non-Dutch. Furthermore, the chairman is an outspoken and enthusiastic man who is not afraid to attack sacred cows, which might be considered a reason not to include the *STOC*.

invited two of its members⁹⁰ as well as three local politicians that he probably knew through his work: the respondent worked for the city district.

8.10 How do social capital and mobilized social capital relate? Comparing the networks

Now that it is clear which organizations were involved in the mobilization and how the process elapsed, it is possible to address one of the main questions in this research: how does the mobilization network relate to the social capital? Do the actors in the Turkish community rely on the resources they have been revealed to have, or do they draw on other channels when it comes to the crunch? In the rest of this chapter I will compare the mobilization network to the two networks that build social capital.

To begin with, a structural comparison of the ties in the three networks revealed that 50% of those that are found in the mobilization network were also present in the contact network⁹¹. Alternatively, as few as 3.4% of the ties in the contact network were addressed during the mobilization process. The ties in the network of interlocking directorates were used even less. Only a single formal tie, the interlock between the two Kurdish organizations, the *Stichting Kurdische Nationale Bibliotheek* and the *FEDKOM*, was addressed during the mobilization (the former mobilized the latter). This means that not even 1% of the ties in the network of interlocking directorates were also part of the mobilization network. In summary, the organizations involved in the mobilization have scarcely used the potential available to them. However, even though the three networks do not contain the same actors, it is still possible to compare them generally on relevant characteristics. Such comparisons bring some interesting matters to light.

A striking finding resulting from the comparison of social capital and mobilized social capital in Amsterdam is that the ideological divides between leftist, rightist, religious, non-religious, political and non-political organizations are present in each network, but these are not as pronounced in each one. In Chapter 5, I pointed out that the links at the formal level (i.e. the interlocking directorates) in particular reveal the fragmentation of the Turkish community along these lines. In everyday life, however, the divisions were much less clear, even though they were still present. In general, the contact network demonstrated that organizations of a certain ideological background did tend to flock

⁹⁰ The *AGB* was the only organization that also invited members. The relationship between organizational boards and the members of the organizations is an interesting subject for future study.

⁹¹ This is calculated on the basis of ties in the mobilization network between organizations, where at least one was interviewed and was, thus, potentially incorporated in the contact network. I disregarded whether these actors were the receiving or the sending organization in the mobilization network. Note that I, therefore, ignored the directedness of the ties in both the contact and the mobilization networks.

together, but that their everyday practices (being in a neighborhood where other kinds of organizations are located, participating in consultative bodies etc.) ‘forced’ them to connect to other types of associations with respect to ideology, ethnicity and activities. The mobilization network was again characterized by clearer divisions between ideological groups. What can explain this variation between networks?

The fact that the network of interlocking directorates and the mobilization network are both characterized by clear ideological distinctions can both be viewed as expressions of high trust. Organizations invite people they are familiar with to take a seat on the board of a newly founded organization. In other words, they turn to the ones they think they can trust⁹². The network of interlocking directorates shows that organizations usually trust those counterparts that are ideologically close to them. In everyday life, however, it is apparently less relevant to be connected only to highly trusted organizations, since the contact network contained many more, less similar, contacts. In the mobilization process, however, the organizations addressed ideologically similar contacts again; the high-trust relationships are activated. The structural comparison did reveal that the high-trust relationships in the network of interlocking directorates and the mobilization network do not completely correspond. However, the structures of the networks do match up; they have similar characteristics. The question now is why would the organizations have addressed highly trusted connections instead of the numerous, relatively less trusted, ones?

8.11 In case of urgency

I would argue that the organizations have acted during the mobilization as if it was ‘a case of urgency’. I can best explain what I mean with an analogy. Studies have revealed that an individual has an estimated circle of acquaintances which contains about 3000 to 5000 alters (Freeman & Thompson, 1989). Naturally, some of these are more important to ego than others. People have close friends and casual acquaintances, as well as family and professional relationships, and generally we are more attached to some of these groups than to others. In a pilot study that I performed, I found that individuals very often tended to do things with, discuss, and help only a small number of people very often, while most acquaintances are addressed only rarely. Furthermore, whether an alter is important to the individual depends on the circumstances. Different situations need different reactions, and in extreme or unexpected scenarios people rely on what is familiar to them. For example, many diaries have a first page upon which it is stated:

⁹² Studies on the relationship between high trust and similarity between actors (‘homophily’) have been conducted by scholars including McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001), and Yuan and Gay (2006), and are related to the principle of bonding social capital, as explained in Chapter 2.

“notify in case of emergency”. Usually, these are the names and numbers of a partner, parents and siblings. This shows that, in general, people who feel they have only a limited amount of time to inform others about an event make sure that they at least contact the people they are closest to, or those who are the most important with respect to the particular incident. In the case of illness or other emergencies, these are family members for most people, but at times of uncertain career prospects, one might call upon colleagues and university friends.

To a certain extent, this reaction to uncertain situations also applies to the Turkish organizations and their mobilization during the Big World Experiment. The analysis of the social capital revealed that most organizations have a considerable number of related organizations. Just as individuals use different acquaintances for different ends, so do organizations choose their partners, i.e. which of the related associations they contact depends on the demands of the situation. This refers to what I explained in Chapter 7 about the different types of mobilization. The subject of the mobilization, or the nature of the ‘urgency’, has an effect on the assessment by the mobilizer as to who or what organizations are the most important alters and need to be approached. Spreading a piece of information could trigger actors to address different alters when, for instance, drumming up participants for a political protest or silent march against violence (this asks for politically and socially involved organizations), or raising funds to send to the homeland (this needs organizations with money or fund-raising skills).

In a way, the participants in the Big World Experiment were in an ‘urgent’ situation as well. They were asked to name, on the spot, organizations that would be interested in an invitation to a lecture and they had to react almost immediately. The BWE in Amsterdam has revealed that in the case of a communication mobilization in the Turkish community, many organizations are prone to address alters that fit their own ideology; the data demonstrated that they preferred them over, for example, the organizations that they deal with the most in everyday life. Apparently, when it comes to the crunch, organizations act upon a motto such as “close is my shirt, but closer is my skin”. The evaluation of the piece of information (i.e. the invitation) was such that, to use

Milli Görüş organizations

The Milli Görüş organizations have been shown to have a high amount of bonding social capital with respect to the type of organization as well as to ethnicity. Given the idea presented above, that organizations tend to act upon the motto of ‘in case of urgency I connect to the organizations closest to me’, one would expect the Milli Görüş associations to mobilize their sister organizations. Furthermore, given that the Milli Görüş organizations are generally rather active, one would expect to find many of them active in the mobilization. But this was not the case. Only two Milli Görüş organizations took part in the mobilization, the federation and a youth organization, and neither of them turned to its member or sister associations. The Milli Görüş women’s organization, the *MGKT Hilal*, had a high amount of social capital in the neighborhood (Bos en Lommer), but because of its sister organizations, failed to use these connections for the mobilization.

Granovetter's typology, it triggered the addressing of strong ties over the weak ones.

It is important to realize that it is not self-evident that organizations mobilize their ideological bonding social capital. On the contrary, with good reason one might have expected the exact opposite: a contact network dominated by bonding ties and a mobilization network consisting of bridging ties. The line of reasoning for this would be that as long as organizations are fulfilling their primary aim, which is often related to their ideology, they do not need connections to others which do not fit these aims. However, these organizations might be aware that in a community mobilization as many organizations as possible need to be reached, and therefore it would be useful to mobilize ideologically dissimilar associations.

8.12 Ethnically bonding and bridging social capital

A comparison of the amount of ethnically bonding and bridging social capital in the three networks confirms the theory set out above. At the formal level, there were relatively few connections between Turkish and non-Turkish organizations⁹³. The majority of organizations with interlocking directorates were connected to ethnically similar organizations. The day-to-day contacts between them, as indicated by the interviewees, corrected this imbalance somewhat. In other words, the majority of the organizations in the contact network were still connected more to ethnically similar organizations, but to a less extreme extent. The network of interlocking directorates knew many organizations that either bonded or bridged *only*, whereas the contact network demonstrated that most of them have a more diverse circle of acquaintances, even though there is still a tendency to connect to those with the same ethnicity. The mobilization network lays bare the fact that the organizations had a very strong inclination to mobilize Turkish counterparts over those of other ethnicities. This finding, once again, confirms what I referred to above as the 'in case of urgency' reflex. Apparently, organizations are willing to collaborate with all sorts of associations of all sorts of backgrounds, but when something special happens, they prefer to turn to what is familiar.

8.13 The role of collaborative bodies

The strategy of mobilizing one's most familiar organizations is probably the main reason why the mobilization network in Amsterdam is so fragmented. The consultative bodies that unite organizations of different movements, and which could, potentially, unite the

⁹³ For the Kurdish associations the figures refer to the number of connections between them and non-Kurdish organizations.

community are largely ignored. The interviews demonstrated that several organizations do have access to the migrant councils around which immigrant associations of various ethnicities and types gather. Given this plurality, it would be reasonable to assume that mobilizing such councils is a way of easily spreading information and requires little effort. Yet, the councils were rarely addressed during the mobilization. Only the laborers' organization, the *HTIB*, mobilized a collaborative body (the *Landelijk Overleg Minderheden*), through which it reached eight (national) organizations at once. These were mainly non-Turkish associations, except for one, the national Turkish Advisory Council (*Inspraak Orgaan Turken, IOT*). This then exposes a possible explanation for the lack of migrant councils in the mobilization process. Most collaborative or consultative bodies contain organizations of different backgrounds, and addressing these obviously means that not only the highly trusted, but also low trust relationships are mobilized. Given the assumption that the organizations have acted upon a 'case of urgency' scenario, it follows that the consultative bodies are not included in the mobilization.

8.14 Neighbors are convenient for the paperwork, not for the real deal?

The physical location of organizations was expected to play a key role in the mobilization. This is on the basis that they only have limited time and means with which to maintain contact with each other and would, therefore, mainly connect to the organizations that are located close to them. However, the issue of location turned out to have a dominant role in the network of interlocking directorates, hardly any role in the contact network and a more crucial role in only some cases in the mobilization network.

On the formal level, most of the organizations only have, or have more, ties to counterparts that are in the same neighborhood, and are even often based at the same address. This can be interpreted on the basis that the vicinity of organizations is relevant when it comes to the foundation of a new association. Indeed, as Vermeulen (2006) has argued, it is most likely that organizations are geographically close to each other as a result of the organizing process. New organizations not only use the board members of existing ones, but they also often find accommodation in the same building or neighborhood. Hence, the network of interlocking directorates contains many organizations that are physically close to each other.

In the contact network, the organizations were seen to connect to associations all over the city, even if they are locally active. But, again, some of these organizations only turned to others in their neighborhood when they faced the assignment of the mobilization. Those in the city districts of Bos en Lommer and Amsterdam-Noord particularly displayed these intra-neighborhood connections, and indeed seemed to have a more active neighborhood network than other organizations. So, even though

their circles of acquainted organizations do extend beyond the borders of their respective city districts, the associations that are closest literally are also the closest figuratively. The 'urgency' in these cases triggered the intensive connections that organizations maintain, instead of ideological partners.

8.15 The role of governmental organizations

The local government plays an important role in the everyday lives of migrant organizations. It provides financial means through subsidies, often supplies accommodation, and sometimes finds ways to (quasi-)collectively organize events in the city district. Most interviewees claimed to be related to the local government in their respective city districts, as well as to the local government of the municipality (the *Centrale Stad*). Nevertheless, this linking social capital was rarely used in the mobilization process. On the one hand, this could have been because of the phrasing of the question used in the experiment, which states: "*Which other organizations or people could we invite to the lecture as well?*" The explicit reference to *organizations* could have led the participants to regard governmental institutions as being irrelevant in these circumstances. On the other hand, during the interviews there was no explicit reference to government organizations either, with the interviewer only asking in general terms about the connections maintained. Nevertheless, respondents often mentioned government agencies spontaneously. Thus, it is not impossible to imagine that the question in the experiment could have elicited a similar response. Indeed, the experiment did trigger at least some organizations to name district councilors from several city districts (even though all of these were of Turkish descent) or semi-governmental institutions.

The governmental organizations that were addressed during the mobilization turned out to be effective disseminators of the invitation. The *Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie* as well as the *Stichting Opbouwwerk Noord* both mobilized a relatively large number of organizations. More importantly, even though they are government organizations they did mobilize several Turkish associations. In other words, they led the mobilization back into the Turkish community. This means that governmental organizations can play an important role in the mobilization of an ethnic community, even if it is not, officially, a part of it and even if not many recognized this role.

8.16 In summary

The comparison of social capital and mobilized social capital has shown that in Amsterdam the actors have acted according to a 'case of urgency' reflex. Most

organizations have mobilized only highly trusted connections, which were either ideologically similar or geographically close. Furthermore, several actors were revealed to be conscious of their own structural position in relation to that of others, because they mobilized organizations that are more highly placed in the local hierarchy. Since the Turkish community in Amsterdam is not familiar with umbrella organizations, or any other kinds of representative bodies, the mobilization did not proceed in a coordinated or centralized manner; instead, it was fragmented. As the next chapter will show, the mobilization in Berlin occurred in a different way.

9. Mobilized Social Capital in Berlin

In the discussion of the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin in Chapter 6, it became clear that the two umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and the *TBB*, play a key role. They had, by far, the largest amount of social capital at their disposal, and were also the most popular actors in the community. The Kurdish and women's organizations also attracted attention because of their huge amounts of social capital. Furthermore, the numerous collaborative bodies played an important role; numerous organizations were part of one, or more, of the many consultative or collaborative bodies, whether state-initiated, self-initiated or organized by German associations. The Turkish community in Berlin was characterized by ideological divides, of which the left-right division was the most pronounced. The question that arises is: do these characteristics determine the course of a mobilization process? Are the *TBB* and *TGB* the pivots of the community? Are well-known and well-equipped organizations brought into the action more than smaller ones? Are the collaborative bodies utilized as easy-to-use disseminators? And do the opposing groups try to approach each other? The Big World Experiment was used to find answers to these questions.

9.1 The mobilization network in Berlin

The mobilization network in Berlin can be found in Figure 9.1. What is immediately noticeable is that it is comprised of only one large component. The mobilization proceeded in such a way that, ultimately, all participating organizations were connected. Given the knowledge one has about the divides within the community, the question arises as to whether this network includes only organizations with the same ideology (for example, only leftist groups) or have the divisions been overcome?

A close inspection of the component reveals that the network does contain clusters of ideologically similar organizations, but the ideological divides are bridged. The network consists of roughly three groups of organizations: conservative, progressive, and Kurdish.

The conservative group (see Figure 9.1) in the mobilization network is centered on the conservative umbrella organization, the *TGB*, and the social interest organization, the *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum*. The latter is a member of the *TGB* and is an important




Figure 9.1 Mobilization network in Berlin. General typologies in boxes.

The two enlarged points represent collaborative bodies of about 20 and 5 organizations.

community center in the city district of Neukölln. The organizations which mobilized the *TGB* (*Türkischer Ringerverein*, *Berliner Mehter Takimi*, and *Türkischer Friedhofs und Bestattungsverein*) are all members thereof.

The second group (see Figure 9.1) was centered on the progressive umbrella organization, the *TBB*. Half of the senders which mobilized it were members of this organization. This progressive component contains several ‘satellite’ subgroups positioned around the *TBB* and its surrounding organizations. The organizations around the *AAKM* are all Alevi associations. *Odak* and its adjacent organizations are all welfare associations.

The parents’ organization, the *TEBB*, is central in a subgroup containing associations that are active in the field of education. The organization for the elderly, the *EM-DER*, mobilized two media organizations.

Kurdish organizations form the third group in the mobilization network (see Figure 9.1). This group is clustered around two organizations: the educational *Kurdisches Institut für Wissenschaft und Forschung*, which only mobilized Kurdish organizations, and the parents’ association, the *YEKMAL*, a starter which mobilized both Kurdish and non-Kurdish organizations.

The Kurdish subgroup was connected to two even smaller subgroups; one with women’s organizations, including the *TIO* and the *Akarsu*, and one containing political organizations, including the *Omayra*, a social association for the young, culture and education. The Kurdish organizations are commonly known to be politically left-wing, and these alliances are also expressed herein since the political organizations are oriented to the left (the *HDB*, *Progressive Volkseinheit der Türkei in Berlin* and *Allmende*).

9.2 How much social capital is brought into action?

The way in which a mobilization proceeds depends upon how many actors actively participate therein and how many other actors they address. On average, the senders⁹⁴ in the Big World Experiment in Berlin mobilized ten organizations (the precise average was 10.08). This figure is high because it is heavily influenced by four organizations⁹⁵ that mobilized one or another of the collaborative bodies in the network: the *Migrationsrat* and the *Forum Migrantinnenprojekte* (see the enlarged points in Figure 9.1). I will discuss their positions in more detail below. Here, it suffices to note that they, respectively, represent 57 and 20 organizations, and their presence in the mobilization process has, thus, raised the average substantially. If these bodies are regarded as single

⁹⁴ The mean degree score over all network actors, including those that did not mobilize any alter, was 1.83.

⁹⁵ The *Türkische Eltern Bund Berlin* *TEBB*, *Kurdisches Zentrum*, *Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein* and *BTKB*.

actors, the mean number of alters drops to 2.29. Moreover, this latter figure could lead one to the conclusion that the mobilization spreads rapidly throughout the community, because it seems that the number of organizations mobilized more than doubled at each remove. The average is, however, slightly misleading. First of all, there were more organizations which did not participate in the mobilization than did. In other words, of those organizations that were asked to forward the invitation to the lecture, more than half of them did not join in with the experiment. (For a discussion of the non-respondents, see Chapter 6.) Hence, only a few organizations mobilized many others. Secondly, several organizations were mobilized multiple times by different senders. This reduced the number of possible senders in the next remove instead of raising it, as the average suggested. The fact that the mobilization network contains several loops also had consequences for the chain length, i.e. the number of organizations that connected in succession.

Loops are actors who are addressed more than once and by different actors. If several associations mobilize a single actor, this means that the mobilization process keeps returning to it. Since actors were only asked once to take part in the experiment, namely the first time they were mentioned or as a starter, a 'loop' results in the stagnation of the mobilization. Being a loop, does, however, demonstrate that the actor in question is popular. In particular, the *TBB* received many invitations (10) compared to the mean of 1.8, which makes it, by far, the most popular invitee. Furthermore, 30% of the chains led to closers, i.e. non-Turkish actors, and were, therefore, terminated. The consequence of the loops and closers in the network is that the average chain length in the Big World Experiment in Berlin was low: 1.4 steps. As I explained in the preceding chapter, a low average chain length need not be evaluated negatively. As one-third of the chains ended because they reached a non-Turkish actor, this could be regarded as a sign that the Turkish community is integrated with others. On the other hand, another 30% of the chains came up against a loop. Depending on whether these loops have mobilized many or few alters, this is a profitable step in the mobilization. The most popular actor, the *TBB*, did not mobilize any organization; at least not for the record. In e-mail correspondence, the chairman wrote:

*"If you send me the invitation, I can forward it to the corresponding organizations using my e-mail distributor."*⁹⁶

Whether the chairman, in fact, did this, is unknown. In this case, the loop did not have any additional value for the mobilization process. The fact that many organizations did mobilize the *TBB* is, however, telling.

⁹⁶ "Wenn Sie die Einladung mir zukommen lassen, dann kann ich an die entsprechende Organisation über meinen Mail-Verteiler verschicken." [sic]

TDU Türkisch Deutsche Unternehmerbund

On the formal level, the *TDU* shared board members with the *Verein Türkische Dönerhersteller in Europa* (Association of Turkish Döner salesmen in Europe) and the *Verein Türkische Reiseagenturen in Berlin* (association of Turkish travel agencies). This is not extraordinary, but what is the fact that in a longitudinal analysis of the Berlin network of interlocking directorates over the years (the 1990s; as performed by Floris Vermeulen 2006, p.136) the *TDU* took a crucial position in between two opposing ideological groups. Two of the *TDU*'s board members were part of, respectively, the *TGB* and the *TBB*. These two men were both successful businessmen and, while already involved in umbrella organizations, decided to found the *TDU* as an interest organization for entrepreneurs. Their common interest bridged the ideological divide. The interviews brought to the fore that the *TDU* has taken a neutral stance in everyday life ever since. Several respondents talked appreciatively about the *TDU* as a neutral organization, which is important for the Turks in Berlin, and as a proper representative of the Turkish community in the economic domain. The *TDU* is a very professional organization which also maintains good relationships with partners in Berlin, Germany and Turkey. It is, therefore, remarkable that the *TDU* mobilized only one of the two umbrella organizations during the Big World Experiment.

The average chain length does not imply that all actors are only 1.4 steps apart. The mean distance (number of steps⁹⁷) between any two actors in the mobilization network amounted to 5.5 and the longest was 12. This means that in order for two of the most remote organizations to reach each other, it takes 11 intermediaries⁹⁸. This is a significant and inconvenient number in the case of a community mobilization, because for one organization to reach the other it is necessary that all intermediaries cooperate. Whether this is a realistic or feasible demand depends on these intermediaries, the most crucial of whom are those organizations that link two groups in the network which are otherwise unconnected. These are the cut points.

9.3 The cut points

The mobilization network in Berlin contained several organizations that are in crucial positions in it. The subgroups that I distinguished in the first paragraph are only connected through cut points. This means that the connectedness of the network is, in fact, hanging by a thread. The progressive group positioned around the *TBB* is the central actor in the network. Moreover, both the conservative group around the *TGB* and the Kurdish group are linked to this progressive group, although they are not connected to each other.

⁹⁷ More precisely: the distance is the length of the shortest path between two points.

⁹⁸ Note that this figure is based on the assumption that all relationships in the network are undirected. That means that even though the relationship in the mobilization network is explicitly leading from one organization to another due to the nature of the experiment, it is assumed that if the other organization had been approached first, it would have named the first organization as well.

The conservative group is connected to the progressive one through the welfare organization, the *TÖYED*⁹⁹. The *TÖYED* mobilized one organization from each of the two groups: the *TBB* on the one hand, and the *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum* (*TDZ*) on the other¹⁰⁰. On the surface, the *TÖYED* does not seem to be an exceptional organization, but it is remarkable that it is a member of the *TGB*, which it did not mobilize, although it did address the rival umbrella organization, the *TBB*. As I explained in Chapter 6, this is unusual, since the member organizations of the one umbrella organization, in general, refrain from having contact with the other. The fact that the *TÖYED*, nevertheless, did this is possibly related to its chairman's additional roles: he is involved in several welfare organizations in the city district of Neukölln, and in these capacities is linked to politicians, government institutions and voluntary organizations in and outside the city district. In any event, the result of the *TÖYED*'s mobilization strategy is that it has acquired a crucial position in the mobilization network. It is interesting to see, then, that a seemingly inconspicuous organization was an essential link in the mobilization process after all. If it were not for this grass roots level organization, the two main, opposing, Turkish subgroups would not be related. This finding suggests that instead of connections being made at the elite level, as is often assumed, the actual exchange of information and, ultimately, the mobilization take place at the grassroots level. I will elaborate on this below.

An organization which one might expect to be the bridge between the *TGB* and the *TBB* is the *Türkisch Deutsche Unternehmerverein* (*TDU*), which, in terms of social capital, took a neutral position in-between the two umbrella organizations. However, during the mobilization it only addressed the *TBB*.

The connection between the progressive and the Kurdish groups is formed by the parents' association, the *Türkische Eltern Bund Berlin-Brandenburg* (*TEBB*). The *TEBB* and the *TBB* (the central organization in the progressive group) are generally known to be well-related. The *TEBB* is a member of the *TBB*, the chairman of the *TEBB* is active in the *TBB* as well and the *TEBB* often uses the *TBB*'s accommodation for meetings.

The *TEBB* did not directly mobilize any Kurdish organization, even though there are historical ties between it and the Kurdish parents' association, the *YEKMAL*: the latter broke away from the former for political reasons. According to the respondent from the *YEKMAL*, the *TEBB* was supported by the Turkish government, and the Kurdish members felt that because of this there was insufficient interest in their problems. They, therefore, decided to establish their own parents' association. In any event, the connection between the *TEBB* and the Kurdish group runs through the *Migrationsrat*,

⁹⁹*Türkischer Behinderten-, Alten und Rentnerverein, Türk Özürlüler Yaslılar ve Emekliler Dernegi, TÖYED*

¹⁰⁰ The latter also mobilized the *TÖYED*. The good relationships between the *TÖYED* and the *TDZ* are rooted in their mutual objectives of providing social services to neighborhood residents.

the city wide collaborative body established by migrant organizations in which migrant associations of all ethnicities are united (also see page 144).

Whether the *Migrationsrat* should be regarded as a cut point in the network depends upon whether one views it as a single actor or not. The *Migrationsrat* is a collaboration of over 50 organizations, and I regard it as the secretariat of all participating associations, i.e. I view the *Migrationsrat* not as one actor but as the 50 separate organizations belonging to it. Any organization which mobilized the *Migrationsrat*, thus, mobilizes all affiliated organizations. In the visual representation in Figure 9.1, it is represented with a single point for easy reference, but it is enlarged to indicate its unusual status. The consequence of regarding the *Migrationsrat* as distinguishable organizations is that none of its members is a cutpoint in this network. The definition of a cutpoint is that upon its removal, the remaining network will disintegrate into more components than it was originally comprised of. For each of the members of the *Migrationsrat* then, if one is removed, all of the others are still connecting the different parts of the network. In practice, this means that if one of the participants in the *Migrationsrat* does not cooperate in the mobilization, the others may still do so, thus keeping the network together. On the other hand, a good reason for regarding the *Migrationsrat* as a single actor would be that if the *Kurdisches Zentrum*, *Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein*, and the *TEBB* had not mobilized it, none of its members would have received the invitation. They were only addressed because they are part of the *Migrationsrat*. In that sense, the *Migrationsrat* does play a role as a cutpoint; moreover, its role is important. Therefore, I believe that it is important to realize that this collaborative body has a crucial network position, while at the same time acknowledging that its significance is multiplied by the fact that it encompasses so many actors.

9.4 The position of collaborative bodies in the mobilization process

The position of the *Migrationsrat* is interesting, since it signifies the role that a *non-Turkish* actor can play in the mobilization of the Turkish community. It even kept the mobilization network together without mobilizing any other organizations itself: it was mobilized by three organizations from different groups (see Figure 9.1). Notably, several Turkish organizations - some of which also participated in the experiment¹⁰¹ - are members of the *Migrationsrat*, but have not mobilized it. Apparently, addressing this social capital is not an obvious step for all organizations.

¹⁰¹ The Turkish and Kurdish organizations that were part of the mobilization process and members of the *Migrationsrat* were: *Tübiks Türkischer Verein für Wissenschaft und Sozialarbeit*, *Kurdisches Institut für Wissenschaft und Forschung*, *TOKAT DER* and the *TBB*.

TIO

The women's organization, the *TIO*, seemed to be in a state of identity crisis. On the one hand, it rejected the label 'Turkish' organization as it regarded itself as 'international'. Yet, the interview lay bare that the majority of the *TIO*'s connections were to Turkish organizations, showing that it is still very much part of the Turkish community. However, during the mobilization, the *TIO* acted upon its self-image: it mobilized non-Turkish organizations only. Furthermore, its contact was of German descent. Perhaps this has influenced the choices made during the mobilization.

In general, the activation of a collaborative body is an effective strategy in an attempt at mobilization by the community, since it is able to reach many organizations with only a single action¹⁰². As well as the *Migrationsrat*, the *Forum Berliner Migrantinnenprojekte* was another self-initiated collaborative body that is included in the mobilization. The *Forum*, already extensively discussed in Chapter 6, is a collaborative body of about twenty women's organizations which have successfully joined forces. It is an active group that frequently meets, and in which the co-members intensively address each other's resources. For instance, they jointly produced flyers regarding honor killings in order to collectively take a stand in the public debate. All of this makes the *Forum* an obvious choice during mobilization, but in fact it was only activated by one of the participating associations, the women's association *BTKB*. Yet, as was the case for the *Migrationsrat*, several organizations that are members of the *Forum* and are included in the mobilization process did not address this collaborative body¹⁰³. On the other hand, although *TIO* (in the Kurdish group, Figure 9.1) did not mobilize the *Forum*, it did mention three organizations that were each a member thereof. So, in a way, the *TIO* did address at least part of the social capital that is captured in the *Forum*.

In Chapter 6, I distinguished three types of collaborative bodies. As well as those initiated by migrant organizations, there are also state-initiated consultative bodies (i.e. the *Migrationsbeiräte* of the various city districts) and the working groups (AGs) set up by large German associations. There were no state-initiated bodies included in the mobilization network, nor did any organization refer to a working group. What two organizations in the *TBB* group did, however, do, was to mobilize *Der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband (DPW)*, one of the organizations which coordinates such working groups. The women's organization *BTKB*, participates in an AG on women's issues, and the welfare organization, *Odak*, takes part in an AG on addiction prevention and treatment (*Suchthilfe*). Why these associations have mobilized the umbrella organization instead of their AGs is perhaps because of the hierarchical structure of a large organization such as the *DPW*. As the *DPW* is the initiator and coordinator of the AGs, I

¹⁰² Obviously, this is based on the assumption that the mutual relationships within the body are positive and function well, and that information is indeed disseminated amongst all members.

¹⁰³ *Akarsu*, *TIO*, *Hinbun* and the *KKH* were senders that did not mention the *Forum*. Furthermore, *ISI*, *SUSI* and the *Psychosozialen Beratungsstelle für Frauen aus Folgestaaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien* are also members of the *Forum*, but as they were closers, they were not enabled to mobilize the *Forum*.

expect that all of the correspondence between the participants goes through it. The *DPW* is a useful player in community mobilization, since many of Berlin's organizations are active within one or more of the AGs, and the *DPW* thus has a very wide reach among Turkish and non-Turkish associations.

9.5 Ethnic bonding and bridging social capital: it's a Turkish affair

Apart from the collaborative bodies, the organizations barely broke into their ethnically bridging social capital. In summary, there were 10 non-Turkish organizations included in the mobilization process, and they were mobilized by only nine of the 24 senders¹⁰⁴. Two organizations, the women's organization *TIO* and the welfare organization *ODAK*, stood out with regard to their use of ethnically bridging social capital: they both mobilized three non-Turkish others. Characteristic of these organizations is that they are particularly occupied with the integration of migrants into German society. They even see themselves as general organizations that are open to everybody, including non-Turkish migrants and non-migrants. Two-third of the associations only tapped into their ethnically bonding social capital, merely mobilizing Turkish organizations. In other words, the mobilization in the Big World Experiment was, overall, a Turkish affair.

9.6 The role of umbrella organizations

The *TBB* and the *TGB*, the two umbrella organizations which mark the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin, have once again shown themselves to be important in the mobilization process. They are the central actors in two groups within the network. Furthermore, both the *TGB* and the *TBB* are popular, which means that they have many incoming ties (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). At the same time, these umbrella organizations mobilized only a few others; in fact, the *TBB* did not even mobilize a single organization. (Recall that the *TBB* indicated that it distributes information to its members, and possibly other subscribers, through its mailing list, but this is not registered.) The *TGB* took a more active course, because it did mobilize two member organizations - one might have expected it to address all of them¹⁰⁵ - both of which seem to have been consciously selected. One¹⁰⁶ addressee was the local¹⁰⁷ Diyanet umbrella

¹⁰⁴ *Akarsu, BTKB, Hinbun, Kurdisches Zentrum, Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein (KKH), Odak, TEBB, TIO, and YEKMAL.*

¹⁰⁵ Of course, what is reported here regards what was conveyed to the researchers. It is possible that the *TGB* decided to inform all of its member organizations, but this was not explicitly expressed during the telephone call.

¹⁰⁶ The other organization mobilized by the *TGB* is the community center, the *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum*.

¹⁰⁷ The federal umbrella organization of the *DITIB* is located in Cologne.

organization (*DITIB*), which is in charge of 12 mosques in Berlin as well as (an unknown number of) social, sports, cultural and educational associations (Dantschke, 2004). One might have expected this organization to also engage in the dissemination of information, given its function as an umbrella organization. This, however, was not the case because the *DITIB* refused to collaborate in the experiment (“*We are not interested at all, so we don’t want to bother our members*”¹⁰⁸). Overall, the umbrella organizations did play an important, but not very active, role in the mobilization process. The ‘street-level’ associations were much busier in that respect.

9.7 Division of labor

The limited involvement of the umbrella organizations in the mobilization was, in some ways, compensated for by the smaller associations. In fact, one could say that there was a kind of ‘division of labor’. The organizations that are high up in the social hierarchy, i.e. the umbrellas, held back during the mobilization, whereas those in the middle did the ‘hard work’ of spreading the word. Examples of organizations at this level are the community center *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum*, the Kurdish parents’ organization *YEKMAL*, and the parents’ organization *TEBB*, which are each from another group in the network. These are all organizations with good reputations, but no leading status, and they made the mobilization proceed very quickly because they addressed the greatest numbers of alters. Furthermore, what the recipients had in common was that their scale was relatively small, but their nature was diverse; different kinds of organizations were involved, such as social, women’s and sports’ associations.

The organizations at the lower end of the hierarchy are the kinds that received the invitation from the ‘middlemen’. They are small associations aimed at a specific population and mainly occupied with their own, often precise, objectives. For example, the *Makyad* (in the conservative group) is a social organization aimed at Turks from the region of Malatya. These smallest organizations either mobilized their umbrella organization if they were affiliated to one, or did not mobilize any organization at all.

In summary, the associations that are hierarchically higher up tended to pick alters that were also umbrella organizations or were able to reach a wide audience, while the mid-sized associations spread the word ‘on the ground’, and the smallest ones hardly participated in the mobilization at all. These patterns were discernable in each of the three groups in the network.

¹⁰⁸ Initially, the *DITIB* mentioned one of its member mosques, the *Sehitlik Mosque*, but withdrew this at the end. The *Sehitlik mosque* was, however, approached, as it was also mobilized by the *TDZ*. The caller only referred to the latter as the sender of the invitation.

Overall, the preceding presentation of the mobilization network in Berlin has brought several interesting aspects to light, including the fact that although the Turkish community may be divided, in terms of action it is brought together. The image of a community divided stems from the analyses of the social capital presented in Chapter 6. Accordingly, the question now is: how does the social capital of the Turkish community relate to the way it is mobilized?

9.8 How do social capital and mobilized social capital relate? Comparing the networks

A structural comparison of the mobilization and contact networks reveals that, with respect to the percentage of ties that are present in both, 70.0% of the ties in the former network can also be found in the latter. This means that the mobilizing organizations have, for the large part, used familiar channels, which they encounter in everyday life. Alternatively, 9.4% of the ties in the contact network were addressed during the mobilization. So, although the mobilization includes active contacts between organizations, the organizations addressed only a tenth of their social capital. Furthermore, the social capital that was present in the network of interlocking directorates was not addressed at all. This might be explained by the fact that many organizations in Berlin are run by (paid) employees instead of official board members. Indeed, several interviewees who were employees instead of board members declared that they had no idea who the board members of other organizations were, since they only worked with the *employees* ('*Geschäftsführer*', '*Mitarbeiter*') thereof (see also Chapter 6). The difference between the network of interlocking directorates and the mobilization network, combined with the resemblance of the contact and the mobilization networks, suggests that the formal relationships between organizations and their everyday practices are unconnected. The social capital that board members have because of overlapping board memberships is not, apparently, conveyed to the people actually running the organizations.

To sum up, this structural analysis has brought to light the fact that the organizations that have participated in the mobilization have predominantly used familiar channels, but have also used only a small part of the social capital available to them.

9.9 Bridging ideological cleavages while sticking together

The mobilization network in Berlin provided an equivocal picture so far as ideological divides are concerned. On the one hand, most organizations sought out partners that

belong to the same ideological denomination. Indeed, the network component visibly contained a Kurdish, a progressive and a conservative group. On the other hand, the ideologically opposed subgroups were connected by means of a few crucial actors which bridged these ideological divisions. The ideological opposites were, thus, not separate islands, but rather 'peninsulas' connected to each other by a thin strand. A similar picture arose in the contact network, in which organizations of familiar ideologies also flocked together, while the transverse connections between ideological groups were realized predominantly by means of collaborative bodies. As many organizations were part of these bodies, meaning that many 'opposed' organizations met, these connections were quite ubiquitous. The left-right division was dominant over any other (contrasting) ideologies that were present in both the mobilization and the contact networks, but this was more noticeable in the latter than in the former. The picture of the network of interlocking directorates was in sharp contrast; the ideological groups (leftist, rightist as well as religious) were not at all connected on the formal level. What this comparison shows is that the Turkish organizations in Berlin primarily want to operate within ideological groups, but apparently there are (external) forces which encourage them to collaborate.

9.10 Keep it in the family

The degree to which the Turkish community bonds within and over ethnic boundaries differed strikingly between the contact and the mobilization networks¹⁰⁹. The organizations indicated that in their everyday practices they encounter many non-Turkish associations. Indeed, on average, the number of non-Turkish contacts equaled the number of Turkish ones (as expressed by the mean E-I index¹¹⁰: .00; see Appendix 8). A closer examination of the ratio of the Turkish - non-Turkish contacts of the organizations interviewed reveals that, in fact, half of them clearly had more non-Turkish contacts, while the other half had noticeably more Turkish contacts (see the first columns in the table in Appendix 8). This picture changes in the mobilization network. The majority of the organizations have mobilized only Turkish organizations (i.e. had E-I index scores of -1). So, even though most associations had as much ethnically bonding as ethnically bridging social capital, they nevertheless resorted to ethnically similar organizations in the mobilization. In other words, the mobilizing

¹⁰⁹ Recall that when it comes to the network of interlocking directorates, there is no data available on any Turkish - non-Turkish interlocks in Berlin.

¹¹⁰ The E-I index is an expression of the relationship between the number of ties leading to actors with a different characteristic than ego, compared to the number of ties leading to actors that are similar to ego. A +1 score indicates that ego only has alters that are unlike it, whilst a score of -1 indicates that all alters are similar to ego on the specified characteristic.

organizations in Berlin have also acted according to the 'in-case-of urgency-strategy' with regard to their ethnicity.

9.11 The use of bridging social capital regarding organizational type

In Chapter 2 I suggested that the diversity of an association's social capital can be expressed in terms of the ethnicities (as discussed in the previous paragraph) and the types of the organizations to which this association is connected. An actor whose acquaintances are different from each other and from itself is supposed to have more diverse resources at its disposal and, therefore, richer social capital. Zmerli and Newton (2007) found in their study of five European cities that most associations, except the political ones, have bonding social capital in this respect: they connect more to similar than dissimilar organizations (see also pages 63 and 112). This is not what I found in Berlin. The majority of the organizations had more bridging than bonding social capital and, more importantly, they also *mobilized* more bridging social capital. Only the religious umbrella organization, *IFB*, the Idealist organization, *Türkischer Idealisten Gemeinschaft in Berlin*, and several women's associations had more bonding social capital at their disposal and also activated this. This particular result then is more in line with Zmerli and Newton's findings that especially group specific organizations are the least involved in networking activities. But overall, it seems that the Turkish community in Berlin made more crosscutting connections than expected.

9.12 Stability over networks I: the prominent positions of the umbrella organizations

In Chapter 6, I explained that the Turkish community in Berlin is, for the large part, defined by two umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and the *TBB*. They are the key actors in the network of interlocking directorates because they had the most interlocks of all of the Turkish organizations. They were also the key actors in the everyday lives of organizations since they had the most social capital by far. Furthermore, almost all of the interviewed organizations were, or felt, related to one of the umbrellas, and many regarded the two of them as the most relevant and most representative Turkish associations in Berlin. The importance of the two umbrella organizations was again visible in the mobilization network, since the mobilization process was largely focused on the *TGB* and the *TBB*. In particular, the latter was center of many organizations' attention, as evidenced by the many (most) invitations it received. The *TGB* received fewer invitations, but still more than most other actors. In summary, the central positions of the *TGB* and the *TBB* are a constant factor in the networks. The prominent

role that they play on paper, they also play in the perception of the organizations that make up the Turkish community.

During the mobilization process, they have been shown to mainly be the *receivers* of information instead of the senders. Their respective member organizations have forwarded them their invitations, which they either did not redirect (the *TBB*), or passed on to only a relatively small audience (the *TGB*). Having many incoming and few outgoing ties is a typical situation for actors that are highly placed in a hierarchy, as described in much social network analysis literature (e.g. Wasserman and Faust (1994 [2007]); Alexander, (1963)). The actors at the top of the hierarchy receive all the available information and, thus, have a key position in the community: knowledge is power. They decide whether they send information out and, if so, to whom. The Big World Experiment in Berlin did, however, reveal that these key actors were not particularly prone to passing these invitations on. Were it not for some associations lower down in the hierarchy, such as the *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum* and the *YEKMAL*, the mobilization of the community in Berlin in this experiment would have been less extensive if not nearly zero. But despite the relative passiveness of the umbrella organizations, they once again gained a central position, this time in the mobilization network.

Members of the umbrella organizations

The umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and *TBB*, both have a considerable number of member organizations that they represent in the public debate. The responses from these members during the interviews seemed to suggest that they are mainly *official* members, but they do not have much to do with their superiors in everyday practice. Then again, the *TBB* and *TGB* have demonstrated their value and seen their central position reaffirmed during the mobilization. All of the organizations in the mobilization that were members of an umbrella organization have mobilized the relevant umbrella. More than that, many of them have *only* mobilized their umbrella organization and have thus neglected all of the other contacts that they clearly do have. This demonstrates the pull that the umbrella organizations exert on their members and how much they are used to arranging things by means of these organizations. One of the interviewees had indeed stated that her organization uses the umbrella organization mainly for purposes of dissemination, for example to reach a larger audience for activities.

9.13 Stability over networks II: the Kurdish organizations

Like the dominance of the two umbrella organizations over the networks, the subgroup of Kurdish associations is relatively stable, although they are not present in the network of interlocking directorates. Berger (2010) explained that this is a conscious decision by their boards. Her informants told her that they suspect that they are watched over by the German intelligence service, and interlocking directorates would reveal any relationships between organizations. Nevertheless, the Kurdish associations in the

contact network were clustered, as they also were in the mobilization network. Strikingly, 17% of the actors in the mobilization network were Kurdish organizations. This is a high figure when compared to the contact network, in which only 3% of the organizations were Kurdish. It seems that this community is not big, but it is very active.

9.14 The role of religious (umbrella) organizations

The religious umbrella organizations, the *Islamische Föderation Berlin* and the *DITIB* (of Diyanet), and their respective member associations were aloof in the contact network and did not actively participate in the mobilization either. It was only in the network of interlocking directorates that they were clearly represented, since both of them are central in a separate component. Neither the *DITIB* nor the *IFB* mobilized any other organizations¹¹¹, the former because it “*did not want to bother [its] members*”, the latter for reasons that are unknown. Although they both potentially have a wide audience that is obedient to their authority, they failed to mobilize their members. This ‘obedience’ was, for instance, seen in the fact that I approached several member organizations with a request for interviews, but most of them stated that they were only willing to participate if their umbrella organization gave them permission to do so.

This failure to take action has several possible explanations. It can be an expression of a relatively passive attitude, the restraint of religious umbrella organizations when compared to secular associations, or the aversion of associations to interventions from outside. Several religious organizations told me that they only concern themselves with religious affairs and do not get involved with any other issues. Whether this is completely a self-chosen policy is doubtful. Islamic organizations in Berlin are often looked at with Argus’ eyes by their secular counterparts as well as by German (governmental) institutions. The consequence of this may be that Islamic associations withdraw from community life because they feel unwelcome.

9.15 A city-wide community?

The city district of Kreuzberg is known as the most ‘Turkish’ neighborhood in Berlin¹¹². It has a high percentage of Turkish residents and the streetscape is largely dominated by Turkish shops and signs. Over the years, the Turkish population has also settled more

¹¹¹ The *DITIB* did mention one member organization (the *Sehitlik* mosque) but withdraw the name after having second thoughts. I did include the connection in the network picture, but the *Sehitlik Moschee* was only contacted because the *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum* had also named it.

¹¹² Factually, most Turks live in the city district of Mitte, with 8.7% of the residents being Turkish. The city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln also accommodate a similar percentage of Turks (8.2%) (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2007).

IFB

The relatively isolated status of the *IFB* is stable across the networks. It did have interlocking directorates with a mosque and the association that is responsible for Islamic education in Berlin, but these were member organizations and the connections are thus tight and close. Furthermore, the *IFB* is separated from the 'outside' world. This is confirmed in the contact network, in which it is connected mainly to member organizations. For an umbrella organization it had only a few connections and those organizations that it did relate to were relatively small. Only the fact that the *IFB* has gained the position of provider of Islamic education in Berlin schools makes it a crucial organization for the Turkish community. At the same time it has a controversial position therein. Two respondents told me that their organizations only encounter the *IFB* in court, when one or the other starts a lawsuit. Another respondent indicated that "*They [the IFB] send us invitations, but we never attend their meetings. We only want contact with legal [!] groups.*" The exclusion of the *IFB* and its related organizations from the rest of the Turkish community is also reproduced during the mobilization. None of the senders has mobilized the *IFB* and the latter, for its part, has refrained from mobilizing any organizations as well.

dominantly in other districts, such as Neukölln, which is adjacent to Kreuzberg. Moreover, half of the Turkish organizations are located in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Nevertheless, the analyses of the locations of every pair of connected organizations in all three networks revealed that most organizations are related mainly to counterparts that are *not* in the same city district. This is initially visible at the formal level: more organizations share a board member with one or more counterparts outside their city district than within it. Often, interlocking directorates emerge because a newly established organization includes the board members of an existing one on its own board (as was seen in Amsterdam in Chapter 5). In such cases, the two organizations do not usually only share their board members, but also their locations; if they are not located at the same address, they are usually based in the same city district. This mechanism for the creation of the network of interlocking directorates does not seem to be applicable in Berlin, since the actors in that network are not connected to neighbors.

Furthermore, most organizations in the contact network connect more to associations that are outside their city districts than to those that are inside them. The tendency to connect to organizations outside one's city district was again found in the mobilization network; almost half of the actors only mobilized such organizations. This was somewhat unexpected, as during the interviews I got the impression that most associations are active on a (geographical) local basis. Many interviewees indicated that due to time and means constraints they are confined to local activities and connections only. However, the analyses of the contact and mobilization networks contradicted this, so the question arises as to what explanation there is for the fact that most organizations had more contacts outside their city district than inside it.

One explanation is that, on average, 55% of the ties in the contact network led to organizations that were located in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, while many of the

interviewees themselves were based in different, often adjacent, city districts¹¹³. In some instances this is because the organizations do not have permanent accommodation, and they are thus run from the chairmen's home or work address, which is not always in the center of the city, while the activities of the organization take place in the city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Additionally, around a quarter of the interviewees were based in Neukölln, adjacent to Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, while an average of 19% of the ties led to organizations located there. The geographical vicinity may have caused associations in Neukölln to connect more to counterparts in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.

All of this suggests that, on the face of it, the Turkish community is operating city-wide, given that most organizations interact with alters outside their city district, and the formal network is spread out all over the city as well. However, as the majority of ties lead to organizations in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln, the community functions very locally after all.

9.16 The role of collaborative and consultative bodies

In Chapter 6, I distinguished three types of bodies in Berlin: government initiated consultative bodies, working groups arranged by major German organizations, and collaborative bodies initiated by groups of voluntary organizations. Many Turkish organizations in Berlin are members of at least one collaborative or consultative body, and also indicated that their involvement therein was *active*. Membership was seen to add a lot to the amount of an organization's social capital, since these bodies attract members from different ethnic backgrounds. Given this quantity and plurality, one might expect that these bodies would also be useful and effective disseminators of any mobilization, and that they would be intensively used during any mobilization process. This was not, however, quite the case.

The state-initiated consultative bodies were absent from the mobilization process. Several organizations which took part in the mobilization are members of the '*Migrantenbeiräte*' in the city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln, but these bodies are not held in high esteem. The organizations felt that they were invited to join in for show, and not to actually have a say in the course of events. This sentiment is probably the main reason why the mobilizing organizations did not use this channel to spread word of the invitation. These bodies are not seen as active partners.

The working groups initiated by German organizations, such as the *Arbeiter Wohlfahrt (AWO)* and *Der Paritätische Wohlfahrt (DPW)*, were also not addressed as

¹¹³ The sample used in this study unintentionally contained a disproportionately high percentage of organizations outside of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg when compared to the population mean. There is no clear explanation for this.

such. The *DPW* itself was mobilized by two actors: the women's organization, the *BKTB*, and the welfare organization, *Odak*, both of which are participants in *DPW* working groups. The *DPW* had a solid position in the contact network since it was mentioned by many different organizations. The exceptional position that this German organization has in the Turkish community is confirmed in the mobilization network, where it serves as a bridge between the Turkish organization, *Odak*, and the Turkish community (see Figure 9.1).

The collaborative bodies initiated by organizations themselves have proved to be both used and useful. The members thereof had considerably more social capital than non-members, and an additional advantage is that these collaborative bodies are very positively evaluated. The beneficial effect of the collaborative bodies is confirmed in the mobilization network given the central position of the *Migrationsrat* therein. Apparently, allowing people to 'do it themselves' makes them more dedicated and willing to make things work. Initiatives taken by civic actors are, thus, of high value to the community.

9.17 Ambivalent relationships: the local government

During the mobilization process, no government actor was addressed. This is all the more notable considering the fact that the contact network did contain a high percentage of local government agencies, semi-governmental organizations and political parties. Almost all interviewees indicated that they were in contact with their respective city district council, and many worked in close collaboration with local semi-governmental organizations, such as the *Quartiersmanagement (QM)*¹¹⁴. However, this substantial amount of linking social capital was not addressed at all during the mobilization. In addition to the disregard of the government initiated consultative bodies, the local government is completely ignored. Even the *Integrationsbeauftragte*,¹¹⁵ which operates in close collaboration with, and often on behalf of, the migrant organizations, was not contacted during the mobilization in the Big World Experiment. It is possible that the wording of the question posed in the experiment has led participants to exclude the (semi)governmental actors, but in Amsterdam it did trigger some organizations to address linking social capital. This dismisses the issue of the question's wording as an explanation for the lack of linking social capital in this mobilization network. Instead, I suspect that the reason for this exclusion is that the Turkish community in Berlin is used to operating in a self-reliant way in the closed political opportunity structure they find themselves in. The Berlin government does, after all,

¹¹⁴ The *QM* coordinates the development of 'neighborhoods in need' through the activation and integration of civil actors. See also note 59 (p.146) and page 153.

¹¹⁵ Initially called the *Ausländerbeauftragte*. This is the commissioner appointed by the province (*Land*) Berlin-Brandenburg to tackle integration problems within the administration as well as in the public sphere.

have a more distant attitude towards migrant associations, and the latter have developed ways to exist in which they do not need the support of the local authorities. A final possible explanation of the lack of governmental organizations in the mobilization network is that the organizations may assume that they do not need to address governmental organizations because the latter do not need to 'network' to be informed. This supposed independence of the governmental organizations is, however, another confirmation of the distance between the Turkish organizations and the German government.

9.18 The media and the message

In Chapter 6, I mentioned that the local immigrant media, i.e. (Turkish) radio and television broadcasting stations, are important to the Turkish community. They have high ratings within this group and several organizations use the radio stations in particular to bring their activities to the attention of the Turkish residents in Berlin. Given the significant listening and viewing figures of these Turkish radio and television stations, it is possible for organizations to reach a very wide audience. Based upon this, one would expect these media associations to be granted an important role in the process of information dissemination, but this was not the case. There was only one organization that did this during the mobilization: the seniors' organization, *EM-DER*, sent the invitation to *Radio Metropol* and *Radio Multikulti*.

This lack of use of media organizations can be interpreted in several ways. The most plausible explanation is that the organizations have regarded the invitation to the lecture as not being something that they want to make public on the radio; they may believe that their own activities are more 'radio-worthy'. Another possibility is that the radio stations are mainly used for consumption purposes, instead of as a vehicle for mobilization.

9.19 Summary

The Turkish community in Berlin is characterized by a dominant division between left-wing and right-wing groups, which respectively center on the two umbrella organizations, the *TBB* and *TGB*. These umbrella organizations play a crucial role in the community because they represent and guide not only their members, but also many other sympathetic associations. Furthermore, they clearly have the most social capital at their disposal. This is recognized by other organizations, as can be seen from the number of them that have mobilized these umbrella organizations. However, the umbrella organizations were not the ones that spread the mobilization fastest; it was the

mid-sized organizations that did so. Here, the Turkish community demonstrates a division of labor between organizations that act on different hierarchical levels. Although the Turkish organizations maintain inter-ethnic ties, their Turkish connections are addressed during a mobilization. Other notable characteristics of the Turkish community in Berlin are that the collaborative bodies play an important role, in contrast to the consultative bodies that are present but not used. Moreover, religious organizations play a relatively marginal role and Kurdish associations are very much interlinked and very active.

Notwithstanding the marked results presented in this and the previous chapter a word of caution is called for. It is important to realize that the BWE evoked a specific kind of mobilization and, in the light of this, that the results are best interpreted as an indication of the varying roles the contact network and network of interlocking directorates can play in the mobilization of the community. Other triggers, for example more urgent appeals, may induce a mobilization network of a different shape, which is more similar to the network of interlocking directorates than to the contact network. I will expand upon this point in the concluding chapter.

I have now presented the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin in Chapters 5 and 6, and demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8 how this social capital is deployed in a mobilization. Accordingly, the time has come to compare the two communities in order to assess the influence of context and, in particular, the political opportunity structure on the use of social capital. This is the purpose of the next chapter.

10. Comparing Amsterdam and Berlin

The primary aim of this book is to shed light on an undeveloped field of research: social capital in operation. Many studies describe what social capital is and what it is good for, but very little is known about how it functions. The mechanisms between social capital on the one hand and the dependent variable that explains how social capital is used on the other has remained underexposed until now. In this study, I use the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin as examples with which to illuminate the working of social capital. Social capital does not operate in a vacuum, so the context within which it is mobilized needs to be considered. In the case of the social capital of Turkish communities, this implies that the political opportunity structures of the cities that they are located in are taken into account. The theoretical relationships are visualized in Figure 10.1.




Figure 10.1 Theoretical relationships between POS, social capital and mobilized social capital

The Figure contains the three key elements: context, social capital and mobilized social capital. The operationalizations of these are set out in the boxes. The context refers to the political opportunity structure; the social capital is the sum of the network of interlocking directorates¹¹⁶ and the contact network¹¹⁷; and the mobilized social capital

¹¹⁶ The network of interlocking directorates is based on joint board memberships: a person who is seated on the boards of two or more organizations simultaneously.

¹¹⁷ The contact network reflects the connections between the respondents and the organizations they indicated that they maintain contact with.

is reflected in the mobilization network¹¹⁸. The influence of the context on social capital (relationship I) and of both the context (relationship III) and social capital (relationship II) on the way in which social capital is mobilized is scrutinized by means of two sets of questions. Regarding the first relationship, the questions are:

What does the social capital look like in the two cities; is it similar or different and what can explain these differences/similarities?

I compare the contact networks and network of interlocking directorates of the Turkish communities in Berlin and Amsterdam to ascertain to what extent, and why, the networks differ. Vermeulen (2006) has already explained how networks of interlocking directorates are influenced by the political opportunity structure; herein, my main focus is on the element of social capital that concerns the contact networks. I will sometimes refer to the network of interlocking directorates to illustrate the characteristics that the two types of networks clearly share or do not, but the emphasis is on the contact network.

The second set of questions serve as guidelines with which to highlight Relationships II and III:

How do the mobilization processes differ between the two cities and what explains the differences or similarities?

To answer these questions I compare the mobilization networks resulting from the Big World Experiment. I will discuss both sets of questions simultaneously on the basis of the most striking characteristics of the networks, such as the amount of ethnic bonding and bridging social capital, the role of umbrella organizations and the presence of ideological divides. A summary of the points that I will now discuss can be found in Table 10.1. I will start with a comparison of the structural characteristics of the three networks.

10.1 Comparing the structural aspects

The networks of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam and Berlin contained almost as many Turkish organizations, while the organizations in the former city had many more interconnections. Strikingly, the image of the contact networks is the opposite of the

¹¹⁸ The mobilization network is the reflection of the sequentially addressed organizations in the Big World Experiment.

	Amsterdam	Berlin
structural comparison	horizontal networks better connected social capital	vertical networks better connected mobilized social capital
mobilization strategies	'case of urgency' reflex	
	upwards	division of labor
umbrella organizations	only religious; mainly in background	mainly secular; prominent
collaboration in official bodies	scarce, mainly government initiatives; hardly used	plenty, especially own initiatives, were used
linking social capital/ connections with government	present; mobilized, but Turkish contacts	present, not used
ethnic bonding and bridging social capital	relatively less, but mobilized more inter-ethnic contacts	relatively more, mobilized less bridging social capital; few actors connect to many other-ethnic
bonding and bridging social capital regarding organizational type	religious, Kurds and women's bond, others bridge more	
Kurdish associations	strongly interconnected, separated from Turks, active	
religious associations	more clearly present	in social capital, not much in mobilization
locality	interlocks with neighbors, contacts all over, mobilized nearby	more city wide, but practically local in 'Turkish' districts
media connection and use	well known, but practically absent	popular, present, but hardly used
individual and organization	individuals can play crucial role	even more professional

Table 10.1 Summary of the comparison between Amsterdam and Berlin in the order discussed.

networks of interlocking directorates. It revealed that the Turkish organizations in Berlin have a more extensive contact network than those in Amsterdam (even though the network in Berlin was based on fewer respondents!) and there are more connections between the organizations in the Berlin contact network, in both absolute and relative terms. The mean number of alters of the respondents in Berlin was twice as high as that of the respondents in Amsterdam. In the main, the organizations with the greatest numbers of alters, such as the umbrella organizations the *TGB* and the *TBB* with, respectively, 122 and 120, raised this average in Berlin. Compared to the largest number of alters in Amsterdam (the workers' organization, the *HTIB*, named 57), this is a significant amount.

The main explanatory factor behind the greater number of alters in Berlin is the participation of organizations in collaborative bodies which are larger and more

numerous in this city (more on this later). A second possible explanation lies in the political opportunity structure. I would argue that whether or not subsidies are available does have an effect on the interconnectivity of the migrant organizations. In a situation in which only a few grants are obtainable from the government (as was the case in Berlin), the associations which want to arrange events have to find other sources of funding. A logical step is then to connect to other organizations which may have their own channels for gaining finance. On the other hand, if funds are easily available, the need to contact others is less pressing. This was noticeable in Amsterdam.

Another obvious difference between the Amsterdam and Berlin contact networks is that the network in Berlin is concentrated around two leading actors, the umbrella organizations, whereas there are no such 'giants' in Amsterdam. The prominent positions of these umbrella organizations in Berlin, or the absence of them in Amsterdam, determine the shape of the networks overall. The contact network in Amsterdam is more horizontally shaped, whereas that in Berlin has a vertical form. At this point, the influence of government policy is perhaps at its clearest. The strategy of the Berlin *Ausländerbeauftragte* (Commissioner for Foreigners) with respect to her connections to migrant communities has been to focus on a limited number of organizations. These received the lion's share of the available subsidies and were the focal point of the communication between the German government and the Turkish community. As the *TGB* and *TBB* both represented a group of organizations, these were obvious partners. Other organizations had to comply with this situation, which was imposed on them from above. So, what can be seen in Berlin is that, on the one hand, the lack of money available to voluntary associations has led to more interconnections in the community, because organizations had to join forces, while on the other, it was precisely the organizations which did receive funding that had the highest number of connections. This may seem contradictory, but it is not. The subsidized associations are the logical central point of the community because of their financially better off position; other actors may feel they have a chance of profiting from these subsidies too if they connect to the 'rich' organizations.

The policy on subsidies for migrant organizations in Amsterdam was very different, given that grants were available for 'everybody'. This allowed the network there to develop more equally. The easy access to resources reduces the need for large umbrella organizations, and because all organizations have access to more or less the same resources, it is not even possible for one to 'overrule' the others. The result is that no organization is particularly dominant, and all are less powerful than they might otherwise have been.

The situation in Berlin, thus, seems to be an example of the 'survival of the fittest': the circumstances are difficult and only a few organizations have the ability and the opportunity to grow into the major players that are recognized as such by the local government. Because the conditions in Amsterdam are more favorable, and all

organizations basically get the same opportunities, they all grow into medium-sized players and no-one develops into *the* leading organization.

The mobilization networks also displayed the same vertical and horizontal layouts in Berlin and Amsterdam respectively. In the former, the leading organizations received many invitations, although they rarely mobilized any associations themselves; a sign of network hierarchy. The mobilization in Amsterdam did not, however, lay bare a clear hierarchical position for any organization.

The mobilization networks in Berlin and Amsterdam not only differ regarding their horizontality or verticality, but also in terms of other structural network aspects. At first sight it is already clear that the Amsterdam mobilization network consists of separate components while the one in Berlin is a fully connected network (cf. Figures 8.1 and 9.1 on pages 182 and 200). Furthermore, the mobilization in Berlin involved more actors and more ties than the mobilization in Amsterdam. Moreover, the ratio between the number of ties and the number of actors was higher in Berlin, which means that the network is more interconnected. The average number of alters mobilized by one actor is also higher in that city, but this is dramatically influenced by the four actors which have mobilized a collaborative body. This effect is also clear with regard to the number of chains that the Big World Experiment elicited: in fact, the mobilization in Berlin included more chains, but if the collaborative bodies are regarded as one entity, the mobilization in Amsterdam had more. In other words, the fact that these collaborative bodies were mobilized in Berlin has had a huge impact on the extent of the mobilization.

The mobilization networks also resemble each other in several ways. Firstly, the length of the chains was short in both networks. The mean in both cities was not particularly high (around 1.5), although the chains in Amsterdam were, on average, slightly longer than those in Berlin. The reason why the chains are short does, however, differ between the cities. In Amsterdam, many of them reached a closer¹¹⁹ and were thus terminated, while in Berlin many of them looped (i.e. reached an actor that was already involved in the mobilization). In particular, many looped to one of the umbrella organizations. The second similarity between the mobilization networks is that most organizations mobilized only a few others, but some addressed many. The difference is that the organizations that mobilized many alters in Berlin are the mid-sized ones, whereas in Amsterdam those that mobilized a major quantity of alters were the largest associations. Finally, a striking resemblance is that neither the organizations in Amsterdam, nor those in Berlin, drew from the social capital that was present in the networks of interlocking directorates¹²⁰. However, even though the mobilization network and network of interlocking directorates do not, literally, contain the same relationships, I would argue that the networks in the two cases do resemble each other

¹¹⁹ I.e. a non-Turkish organization, or an (Turkish) organization outside Amsterdam.

¹²⁰ Only one organization in Amsterdam addressed another that it shared a board member with. This organization's link was also present in the contact network.

in the sense that they are reflections of high-trust relationships. In both cities, the urgency reflex (discussed below) led the organizations to mobilize alters to which they are closely connected based on ideology, ethnicity or locality. Bonding ties such as these are thought to be characterized by a high degree of trust (cf. Chapter 2). A network of interlocking directorates on the other hand is, almost by definition, a high-trust network. Even in the case where a joint board membership is created primarily for reasons of surveillance of one organization over the other, it is thought that these relationships develop into high-trust connections.

Following up on the issue of trust within the communities, a final structural *difference* between the two cities is that compared to the position in Amsterdam, a much higher percentage of the ties in the mobilization network in Berlin were also present in the contact network: in Berlin 70%, and in Amsterdam 50%, of the relationships in the mobilization network were also part of the contact network. In other words, the actors in Berlin have used many more familiar channels to disseminate the information than their counterparts in Amsterdam did. I argue that this indicates that the connections between associations in Berlin are tighter and more stable and generally have higher mutual trust levels than those in Amsterdam. This impression is reinforced by the fact that several organizations in Amsterdam mobilized their personal social capital rather than the social capital of the organizations. I address this issue below in more detail.

In summary, this structural comparison demonstrated that there seems to be a trade-off between government financial support and the activity of a community. On the one hand, a system of easily available subsidies enabled the Turkish community in Amsterdam to develop a horizontal and equivalent network. On the other, the more restrictive regime in Berlin led to a vertical network, in which clear differences exist between larger, financed associations and smaller, non-subsidized ones. However, when it came to the mobilization of the community, it transpired that the community in Berlin was more active and had a more efficient strategy, which led to an integrated community mobilization. This is in contrast to what happened in Amsterdam, where small groups of organizations mobilized each other, but no actor was able to bind the community together. These findings confirm the theory on the effect of the political opportunity structure presented in Chapter 3 (represented in Figure 3.1 on p.67), which states that the relationship between the openness of the POS and the tendency for collective mobilization is curvilinear (bell-shaped).

In my opinion, there is no such thing as a 'best practice' regarding the subsidizing of migrant organizations, although the call for such judgments may be heard. It all depends upon what one is aiming for. The positive aspect of the way in which organizations are treated in Amsterdam is that every association has, more or less, the same opportunities and no one organization is really favored over others. The downside is that this equal treatment leads to a more fragmented community. In Berlin, the not so generous attitude of the local authorities has led to an active community that displays much self-initiative. The disadvantage, however, is that it is difficult for smaller organizations to

survive, and it is crucial that the dominant associations actually represent all groups in the community, which is not necessarily the case.

10.2 The dominance of ideological cleavages and the 'case of urgency' reflex

The Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin have in common that the ideological cleavages between left-wing and right-wing organizations, religious and secular associations, Kurdish and Grey-wolves' associations and between religious movements of different denominations are all present. These divisions were already visible in the networks of interlocking directorates. Vermeulen (2006) demonstrated that this is not so much to do with the political opportunity structure in which the communities operate, but is instead related to the cultural and political peculiarities (Vermeulen calls them 'group related factors') that these groups brought from their homeland. The political situation in Turkey largely influenced the Turkish organizations that were established and maintained in Amsterdam and Berlin until the late 1990s. Thus, it is not surprising that both contact networks are also characterized by the same ideological cleavages, albeit that these divisions are less pronounced than in the networks of interlocking directorates. The everyday practices of organizations require that they form alliances with other organizations that are ideologically different.

This effect is manifest more clearly in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In the former case, ideologies are slightly tempered in relation to the 'outside' world (government and non-Turkish organizations), because the organizations are dependent on funding from the government, which is provided on the condition of collaboration. Yet, within the community it is very clear which organization 'belongs' to which ideology and the groups do not mingle much. This was also possible because funding has always been available for each organization, irrespective of their background (even Grey Wolves-affiliated associations were subsidized) and no organization was forced to hide its ideology. It is noteworthy that Islamic organizations were also given the opportunity to develop themselves. In fact, they were encouraged by the Dutch government to establish social-cultural organizations so as to become eligible for funding, since religious associations do not receive financial support because of the separation of Church and State. In Berlin, almost the opposite was the case. Islamic organizations are approached in a more suspicious way and they do not receive funding. As a result, these organizations keep a much lower profile than in Amsterdam. Instead, the ideological divide that is most visible in the Turkish community in Berlin is the one between left-wing progressive organizations and right-wing conservative ones.

The ideological divides are also visible in the mobilization networks in the two cities. In both Amsterdam and Berlin the organizations exhibit a tendency to address

counterparts with the same ideological background as themselves. I termed this tendency to favor close connections a ‘case of urgency’ reflex, paralleling the names of relatives or other close relations that people note in their diaries to ‘notify in the case of an emergency’. During the Big World Experiment, the respondents were asked, without prior notice, to name other organizations and they had little time to think of who they thought were suitable partners. This was not a case of *emergency*, but the respondents must have felt a sense of *urgency*.

In Amsterdam, this reflex led to a fragmented mobilization; the mobilization network consisted of several separate components that contained different ideological groups (see Figure 8.1 on page 182 for a picture of the network). Likewise, the organizations in Berlin acted upon the ‘case of urgency’ reflex given the fact that different ideological groups were clearly visible in the network, but these opponents *were* all connected (see Figure 9.1 on page 200).

I would argue that this difference in the mobilization is an effect of the closed political opportunity structure (POS) that the organizations in Berlin face. Even though they may have different views on relevant themes, they still need each other to take a stand vis-à-vis the local authorities and to ensure their survival. They are, in a way, condemned to each other. And even though the Big World Experiment was not initiated by any governmental institution, the mechanisms of mobilization that have been developed over the years, and have become engraved in the actions of the organizations, were also applied in the current case. This is in line with the argument of Maxwell (2008), who found that migrant groups in France were more easily mobilized than similar groups in Great Britain, since in the former case, they encountered a closed political opportunity structure. For instance, POS in France prevented an easy interaction between the Caribbeans and elected and appointed officials. In order to have their issues addressed, they decided to mobilize along ethnic and racial lines. Their counterparts in Great Britain found more resonance through official political channels and, therefore, lacked the motivation for group mobilization.

The Amsterdam case, then, corresponds to Great Britain. As migrant organizations were ‘pampered’ by a system of subsidies and a local government that has always reached out to them as convenient channels of communication and policy implementation, the organizations may have been soothed into sleep. The need to mobilize the community was simply not pressing enough. Indeed, one of the questions during the interviews was “*who would you inform if you received an invitation from the local authorities to any kind of meeting where you can comment on (proposed) local policies?*”, to which several respondents answered “*nobody, because if it is important, they will receive an invitation themselves*”. The political opportunity structure, thus, clearly had an effect on the mobilization process.

10.3 Mobilization strategies

The Turkish communities in Berlin and Amsterdam deployed distinctive mobilization strategies. In Berlin, I characterized the tactic as a 'division of labor' because the key umbrella organizations restrained from active mobilization, while the midsize associations enthusiastically involved themselves in the process and the small-sized, street-level, organizations turned to their respective umbrellas. The Amsterdam mobilization did not reveal this division of labor. If a general strategy in the mobilization process can be pinpointed at all, it is one that organizations on all levels pursued, namely that of mobilizing those that are hierarchically more highly placed because of their size, main activities or reputation.

The different strategies are probably the result of the structure of the social capital. The organizations in Berlin are clearly acting on different levels: the umbrella organizations are much more the mediators between the Turkish community and wider society, whereas the mid-sized associations are more active 'in the field', playing pivotal roles in their neighborhoods. The smallest organizations are mainly self-occupied and their main connections are to the umbrella organizations. In Amsterdam, this division between organizations' tasks is less clear. The community is horizontally structured, and many organizations have an independent and equal position in relation to other, similar kinds of actors. In that sense, each organization can play as big a part in the mobilization as any other. This has resulted in similar mobilizing strategies throughout the community.

10.4 The role of umbrella organizations

The Turkish community in Berlin has all-determining umbrella organizations, whereas the community in Amsterdam does not. The latter has some umbrella organizations, but their natures differ from those in Berlin. Firstly, the most prominent umbrella organizations in Berlin are secular, while those in Amsterdam belong to an Islamic movement, such as the Milli Görüş association, *FMGNN*. Secondly, the umbrella organizations in Berlin are aimed at the local community, while those in Amsterdam are national or regional. Indeed, some of the latter are even based outside Amsterdam. Although not an umbrella organization, the worker's association, *HTIB*, does function as one in the eyes of many. It is a focal point for numerous Turkish organizations as well as for local officials. A third difference is that the umbrella organizations in the Dutch case are mainly the national counterparts of one particular kind of organization (e.g. workers' associations or specific religious organizations) while in Berlin they unite organizations with different backgrounds. Of course, in Berlin one would also not find a right-wing organization being a member of a left-wing umbrella organization, but they do include

women's and sports' clubs, etc. In the Netherlands, the members of most umbrella organizations all have the same objectives. The only difference is that they are located in different parts of town, or even in different cities.

The high status of the umbrella organizations in Berlin is seen not only from their social capital but also from their mobilized social capital. The *TGB* and *TBB* were, for many, a focal point in the mobilization. In Amsterdam, religious umbrella organizations were included in the mobilization, but they did not have a very prominent position (although the *FMGNN* did provide a bridge between the Turkish community and a local governmental department), while the *HTIB*'s role in the mobilization network confirms that it is considered a surrogate umbrella organization by several associations.

As I have already mentioned, the prominence of the umbrella organizations in Berlin is, for a large part, the result of the subsidy and integration policies of the *Ausländerbeauftragte*, which consisted of a dialogue with and the subsidizing of a select number of organizations, including the umbrellas. The *TBB* and *TGB* represent a different part of the Turkish community and were, therefore, the two obvious focal points for the *Ausländerbeauftragte*.

As Islam is not officially recognized in Germany, and the Berlin authorities have long ignored Islamic organizations (evidenced by no contact between them and politicians and their lack of financial support¹²¹), the Turkish religious associations did not have a prominent position in the city. In fact, the Diyanet umbrella organization *DITIB* is itself a member of the *TGB*. In Amsterdam, however, the attitude towards Islamic umbrella organizations has always been much more welcoming. They have been included in advisory councils and encouraged to establish social-cultural organizations to become eligible for funding. It was also recognized that religion and Islamic organizations were an important and relatively easy way to approach some of the guest worker migrants and their descendents who could not be reached otherwise because they are not involved in other aspects of civil society. The Islamic umbrella organizations, thus, became a focal point for local officials in much the same way as other secular associations, which were not umbrella organizations, did. The attitude of the local government towards (religious) immigrants has had an impact on the development of particular umbrella organizations.

¹²¹ In 2006, the federal government initiated the *Runder Tisch von Innenminister Schäuble* (the round table of Minister of Interior Schäuble; its official name is the *Islamkonferenz*): an assembly of representatives of Islamic organizations and government authorities. The conference has caused much controversy, including about who are the proper representatives of the different Islamic movements in Germany, and should, therefore, be involved in the conference, and who are not. It started after the data for this study was gathered and is not particularly aimed at organizations in Berlin. I, therefore, do not regard this as being relevant to the current study.

10.5 The role of collaborative bodies, working groups and consultative bodies

Many organizations in Amsterdam, as well as in Berlin, are part of a joint undertaking, which I have classified as consultative bodies, collaborative bodies and, in Berlin only, working groups. Collaborative bodies refer to the kind of joint undertakings that are initiated by civic (migrant) organizations, while consultative bodies are initiated by the local authorities (migrant councils). The working groups are the collaborative efforts that are organized by major German welfare umbrella organizations in which associations that are active in the same field of welfare work together (e.g. youth, women, addicts).

In both Amsterdam and Berlin I found a positive relationship between the amount of social capital and participation in collaborative bodies. This relationship was present irrespective of the type of body involved, and prevailed even when the contacts from them were left out of the analysis. The Berlin case showed that, in practice, the type of body that the organizations are participating in is very relevant. Respondents explained that the government initiated migrant councils had no influence or authority. Many did not feel like participating (any more) because they felt they counted for nothing. Instead, high value was attached to the bodies established by (migrant) organizations themselves and to the working groups. These bodies are relatively numerous and are used intensively in everyday life, which was confirmed in the mobilization network. Several organizations in Berlin addressed either a collaborative body (*Migrationsrat* or *Forum Berliner Migrantinnenprojekte*) or a German umbrella organization (DPW), while no consultative body was included in the mobilization.

In Amsterdam, there are hardly any collaborative bodies of the kind that are so clearly present in Berlin. They are limited to a cooperation by sports' organizations to organize the maintenance of a common property, and a national anti-discrimination committee which includes organizations from all over the Netherlands (in this latter case, the anonymous relationships, with no physical encounters between participating organizations, can hardly be thought to add to the organization's social capital¹²²). They are not addressed during the mobilization.

The explanation for the absence of such kinds of bodies in Amsterdam may be found right there where the migrant organizations in Berlin turned away from governmental initiatives: if the opportunities provided by the government are inadequate, organizations apparently try to find alternative ways of getting together. In Amsterdam, respondents did not voice discontent with the migrant councils, which are installed for

¹²² This argument parallels the general discussion in the field of social capital as to whether so-called cheque book organizations (of which the membership consists of financial contributions and most members never physically meet other members) such as Greenpeace can be regarded as social capital (cf. Minkoff, 1997; Maloney, 1999; Wollebaek & Selle, 2002).

more than just 'show' (as is felt to be the case in Berlin). The migrant organizations feel that the city districts try to jointly solve current issues and they feel taken more seriously than their counterparts do in Berlin. However, also in Amsterdam, relatively few associations participate in a consultative body, because they only exist in some city districts and the local authorities decide who is welcome and who is not. Accordingly, it is perhaps less surprising that no migrant council is included in the mobilization process in Amsterdam. There, only the worker's organization, *HTIB*, addressed the *Landelijk Overleg Minderheden*, a national body of collaborating organizations representing different ethnic communities in the Netherlands. (This is not a migrants' initiative, but was established as part of the *Wet Overleg Minderheden* to facilitate communication between the government and minority groups (Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2004)).

That the migrant councils were ignored in the mobilization can be regarded as a sign of the dissatisfaction that migrant organizations have with them, even in Amsterdam. Perhaps the aim of the councils to include migrant organizations in the political process is noble, but the practical implications and the lack of power that they have undermine this completely. The local authorities may find it useful to connect to migrant communities through the councils, but as long as they do not make the migrant organizations feel that they are taken seriously, this initiative may cause them to turn their back on the local government.

The question remains as to why the organizations in Berlin took the trouble to set up cooperatives of (ethnic) organizations. Why did they feel this was worthwhile? They could also have accepted the situation and left it at that. I think the answer is twofold. Firstly, Germany has a long tradition of an active non-profit sector, especially in the social welfare domain (Priller & Zimmer, 2001). In particular, German charities (*Wohlfahrtsverbände*) are deeply involved in the implementation of social policies, and often enjoy a privileged position as executive agencies when compared to public bodies and commercial providers. This is the result of the inclusion of the *Wohlfahrtsverbände* in the system of subsidiarity since the 1960s. Subsidiarity refers to the principle that problems ought to be addressed at the lowest appropriate level of organization (Warren, 2001, p.87). This can go beyond purely governmental institutions when voluntary associations are granted functions of government. They can then serve as the social infrastructure, for example when charity organizations are allocated money to spend on poverty control. The consequence of this close working relationship between the *Wohlfahrtsverbände* and the (local) authorities is that the former have considerable financial means. One of the alternative ways of collaboration that the Turkish organizations in Berlin have used is participation in the working groups of the *Wohlfahrtsverbände*. Given the financial resources and the institutional know-how of the charities, they are attractive partners for smaller organizations. Secondly, individual organizations have trouble being heard in the public domain and have difficulty in

finding financial resources. Given these facts, it makes sense that organizations feel the need to join forces since they can be stronger when they are united.

In the collaborative bodies one can clearly see the influence of the political opportunity structure on social capital: it is a negative relationship. In a more open POS, where the migrant voice is better heard and the government is in a constant and (as far as possible) equal dialogue with the migrant organizations, the migrant councils are sufficient to meet the needs of these associations. As a result, they do not join forces in private initiatives and, consequently, have relatively less social capital. In a closed POS, on the other hand, the migrant organizations are triggered to establish other initiatives. The consequence is that their social capital rises.

10.6 Linking social capital

One of the points upon which the Turkish organizations in the German and Dutch cases are similar is fairly counterintuitive: the percentage of linking social capital. Linking social capital refers to the governmental, semi-governmental and political organizations that are incorporated in the contact network (the network of interlocking directorates does not contain any of these organizations by definition). The contacts with the government organizations, i.e. with the city district or municipal authorities, consist of financial and interactional relationships. Both in Amsterdam and Berlin several organizations indicated that they refrain from any financial ties to the local authorities, either because they choose to do so themselves or because they are refused funds by the authorities. Most of the organizations that do not relate to the government in financial respects do not interact with it either. Other organizations do interact with government agencies, if only because they need them for administrative reasons. Some organizations in Berlin and in Amsterdam also jointly organized events with the local authorities.

The percentage of linking social capital is more or less the same in the two cases (both around 13%). Given the open POS in Amsterdam and the closed system in Berlin, one would expect the relationships between governmental and migrant organizations to be more prevalent in the former city than in the latter, but this was not the case. However, this counterintuitive finding was readjusted during the mobilization. The mobilization networks do confirm the expectations of an open political opportunity structure involving interaction between migrant organizations and local authorities, whereas a closed POS does not. In Berlin, no governmental organizations were addressed, while in Amsterdam, municipal employees and politicians were mobilized. Apparently, the consequences of a closed POS become visible when it comes to the crunch: in times of urgency, the government is not an obvious partner if it does not show its involvement on a regular basis.

A remarkable characteristic of the contacts at government institutions, or the politicians who were mobilized in Amsterdam, was that they were all *Turkish*. This implies that an open political opportunity structure makes way for a state-civil society interaction, but that it is even more important for the political structure to be open to migrant representatives as *they* are the ones being addressed by the migrant organizations. In Chapter 3, I hypothesized that *the presence of Turkish politicians on the city district and municipal level would decrease the urgency of community mobilization* (p.80). In Amsterdam, there are more Turkish representatives in local politics. This fact, combined with the fragmented mobilization in the city when compared to the connected mobilization in Berlin seems to confirm this hypothesis.

10.7 Mixing with other organizations I: ethnic bonding and bridging social capital

It is not only the ethnicity of politicians that is relevant for migrant organizations. The ethnicity of other associations also influences their social capital, which is expressed in ethnically bonding and bridging social capital. The former refers to connections between organizations of the same ethnicity, while the latter refers to connections between organizations of different ethnicities.

The Turkish organizations in Amsterdam were rarely connected to non-Turkish ones on the formal level; only a few have an interlocking directorate with a Dutch or non-Turkish association. In Berlin, unfortunately, there was no data available on joint board memberships with non-Turkish organizations. The contact networks, on the other hand, revealed that the Turkish organizations, both in Amsterdam and Berlin, have a vast amount of ethnically bridging social capital, with the associations in the latter city having even more non-Turkish connections. For example, 40% of the actors in the contact network in Amsterdam were not Turkish, while this figure was 63% in Berlin. In other words, only one out of every three actors in the contact network in Berlin is Turkish, while these figures are reversed in Amsterdam. Then again, a focus on the percentage of *ties to* non-Turkish actors equalizes this difference: on average, 40% of the links of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam lead to non-Turks and in Berlin this figure was 47%. This difference between the percentages of non-Turkish actors and the percentages of ties thereto means that in Berlin, the Turkish alters were mentioned more often than the non-Turkish ones, while the Turkish and non-Turkish actors in Amsterdam were mentioned equally. On the group level, the relationships between the Turkish and non-Turkish organizations are, therefore, stronger (there are more connections) in Amsterdam than in Berlin. The community in Berlin is much more focused on itself (has more bonding social capital), even though there are still connections to the outside world.

On the individual level, the respondents in Berlin had more ethnically bridging social capital than the respondents in Amsterdam. The types of organizations with more bonding social capital and those with more bridging social capital are relatively similar in the two cities; in both it was the smaller, group-specific, organizations that had an internal focus. If they connected to non-Turkish organizations at all, these were predominantly government agencies. Strikingly, the most central organizations in both cities, the workers' association *HTIB* in Amsterdam and the umbrella organizations the *TGB* and *TBB* in Berlin, also had a high percentage of Turkish acquainted associations. They, more than any other organizations, fulfill a bridging position between their respective communities and society at large. Moreover, they connect to organizations and authorities outside their community on a higher structural level than the smaller organizations do. Because of the high amount of bonding social capital that these organizations possess, they know which issues are important for their grassroots, and their high-quality bridging social capital allows them to convey this message to actors outside their communities.

Left-wing associations in both cities have more bridging social capital than right wing organizations do. Furthermore, and this might be the key factor for having a great deal of bridging social capital, there is a positive relationship between the membership of an organization in any kind of collaborative body and the amount of its bridging social capital. Because Berlin has several of these collaborations and Amsterdam relatively few, it is probable that this is the main reason why the number of non-Turkish organizations in the Berlin contact network was so high. On the other hand, only some of the Berlin organizations are involved in such collaborations. This implies that only a few associations are linked to a large number of non-Turkish counterparts, and that, on average, the mean amount of ethnically bridging social capital is equal to that in Amsterdam.

To a great extent, the Turkish organizations in Berlin thus owe their high amount of bridging social capital to their participation in collaborative bodies. The self-initiated collaborative bodies, when compared to their state-initiated consultative counterparts, have the greatest impact on the amount and ethnic diversity of the social capital of organizations. In Amsterdam, the collaborative and consultative bodies are less abundant, but the guidelines from the government, stating that subsidies are only granted to inter-ethnically collaborating organizations, could have the effect of increasing the amount of organizations' ethnic bridging social capital, particularly since such a guideline does not exist in Berlin. The empirical evidence has, however, shown that the reality is actually in contrast to this expectation.

Of the total amount of ethnically bridging social capital that the Turkish communities in both Amsterdam and Berlin had at their disposal, a strikingly small amount was mobilized. In Berlin, it was mainly the organizations which mobilized a collaborative body that reached out to non-Turkish actors. In most instances where organizations in

Amsterdam mobilized a non-Turkish actor, the latter turned out to have a Turkish contact. A crucial difference between the cities is that the mobilization process in Berlin did include more non-Turkish actors (mainly due to the large number of non-Turkish organizations included in the *Migrationsrat*), but in Amsterdam the mean percentage of ties to non-Turkish associations was higher. In fact, this is a repetition of what we saw regarding in the contact networks. It means that in Berlin, a small number of Turkish organizations were related to many non-Turkish ones, while in Amsterdam the bridging social capital that was addressed was more spread out between the actors and thus the community. Moreover, in Amsterdam, the greatest percentage of non-Turkish organizations addressed were Dutch, whereas in Berlin the percentage of German actors activated was much lower. This is related to the higher percentage of linking social capital addressed in the former city.

Although non-Turkish actors were addressed in both Amsterdam and Berlin, the tendency for organizations to mobilize bonding social capital was greater. The sense of urgency that leads to a preference for ideologically similar alters is also reflected in the fact that Turkish associations were preferred over non-Turkish ones. As the associations in both cities showed this preference for mobilizing ethnically bonding social capital, the political opportunity structures that are clearly diverging cannot be appointed as the cause of this. Alternatively, this tendency could be inherent to the fact that the Turkish community are minority groups. Comparative research in other groups could confirm (or reject) this hypothesis.

10.8 Mixing with other organizations II: bonding and bridging social capital over organizational type

Bonding social capital based on organizational type refers to the contacts an organization has with counterparts that have similar key objectives. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, refers to the ties an organization has to those of a different nature. Earlier research has shown that organizations mainly have bonding social capital in this respect, which restricts their capacity to function as agents of social integration (Zmerli & Newton, 2007). The current study demonstrates the opposite: the organizations have more bridging than bonding social capital in both contact networks, i.e. organizations connected more to associations that were concerned with activities other than their own. The exceptions were the Milli Görüş organizations in Amsterdam and the Kurdish and Diyanet associations in Berlin.

So, almost all of the organizations in Amsterdam, as well as those in Berlin had a great deal of bridging social capital, and there were no obvious differences between them in terms of this issue. The choice of the types of organizations that actors interact with thus appears to be unconnected to the political opportunity structure. This also applies to

mobilized social capital. Where the Big World Experiment triggered organizations in both cities to address counterparts that are ideologically similar, of the same ethnicity, and geographically close (see the paragraph on locality below), it rarely caused them to mobilize organizations with similar activities, i.e. to address bridging social capital with respect to organizational type. Only Diyanet, Kurdish and women's organizations have a clear tendency to address associations of the same kind; this applies in Amsterdam (the first two) as well as in Berlin (all three). Overall, the results suggest that at least in respect to bonding and bridging social capital regarding the type of organization, there is no need to think that organizations do not function as agents of social integration.

10.9 Two peculiar groups: the Kurdish and the Islamic organizations

The Kurdish and Islamic organizations in the Turkish communities have nothing to do with each other, but they do have important characteristics in common. Both groups of organizations are highly interconnected and both are relatively little connected to (the rest of) the Turkish community.

In both cities, the Kurdish organizations form a community of their own that is highly interlinked and only rarely connects to the Turkish community. This separation is the result of the tensions between the Kurds and the Turks in their homeland of Turkey, where the Kurds are fighting for an independent Kurdistan and feel suppressed by the Turkish majority. This picture of a small Kurdish community on its own also arose in the mobilized social capital: in Amsterdam one (small) Kurdish component appeared, and in Berlin a subgroup of Kurdish, interconnected, organizations was visible. The difference between the cities is that the Kurdish community in Amsterdam seems to be more separate from the Turkish community than is the case in Berlin. The decisive factor for this connection in Berlin is the 'mediation' of the collaborative body, the *Migrationsrat*, in which Turkish and Kurdish organizations participate together. The migrant initiatives founded in Berlin are, thus, a suitable means of uniting the migrant population.

Turkish Islamic organizations in Amsterdam are closely interlinked within their own denomination. Milli Görüş organizations are connected predominantly to other Milli Görüş organizations, as are Diyanet associations to other Diyanet associations. In Berlin, this tendency is also present, especially amongst the IFB organizations (affiliated with Milli Görüş), but the religious associations in this city keep a relatively low profile. In contrast, in Amsterdam the religious organizations are clearly present in the Turkish community and in the public debate. Once again, this difference between the two cases can be related to the divergent integration policies and attitudes towards Islam: the (local) authorities in Amsterdam have also pursued an inclusive policy regarding Islamic organizations, whereas those in Berlin did not. The freedom that religious organizations

enjoy in Amsterdam is also reflected in the mobilization network. The Amsterdam network contains almost 23% of religious organizations versus a little more than 6% in the Berlin network. Religious organizations in Amsterdam are, thus, seen to be a more accepted part of the community and actively involved in civil society, even though some of them did not mobilize any alters themselves.

10.10 The meaning of locality

An organization's locality refers to its geographical position. The locality of associations is important for two reasons, both of which do not concern the position of each of them separately, but emphasize the locality of actors in relation to their contacts. For example, the Turkish organizations in Berlin are concentrated in two city districts, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln, whereas in Amsterdam, they are more spread out across the city. This in itself is not particularly informative, especially if one is not familiar with these cities. But the locality of actors in relation to the geographical position of those that they are connected to does provide valuable information about how a community functions. Is the community active on a very local basis, on neighborhood level, or is it possible to speak of a city-wide community? A focus on the locality thus provides insight into how the social capital functions, which is one of research aims of this study. The second reason concerns the fact that in recent years, 'the neighborhood' has become the subject of many scientific studies, as well as a focal point of government policies (e.g. LaMore, Link, & Blackmond, 2006; Bernard et al., 2007; Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 2009). This growing interest is rooted in the idea that neighborhoods can bring an additional value to the quality of life of their residents and can stimulate social cohesion between them. The local authorities in Amsterdam, for example, have pursued policies to promote the relationships within neighborhoods. Is this policy reflected in the social capital or even in the mobilization? A comparison of the locality of organizations in relation to the locality of their contacts reveals that the compositions of the networks vary between and within the two cities.

Regarding the social capital, the networks of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam revealed that many associations were connected to others nearby, in particular because organizations are concentrated at specific addresses. In the contact network, however, there was no tendency to only connect to neighborhood organizations. Some did have closer everyday connections with a small number of organizations in their vicinity, but this was compensated for with a larger number of acquainted associations located elsewhere. The contact network in Berlin had the same characteristics as in Amsterdam (organizations connected more to those in different neighborhoods to where they are based), but the network of interlocking directorates in Berlin differed to that in

Amsterdam. Instead of a tendency for organizations to be interlocked with others in their neighborhood, those in Berlin are interlocked with organizations all over the city.

These findings are somewhat counterintuitive: one would expect contact networks to be more local and board interlocks to be more city-wide. After all, dual board memberships are not necessarily place bound (for example, someone could be involved in a neighborhood committee around his/her home address and at the same time be the head of a sports organization somewhere else), and it seems more obvious that in our everyday lives we would work with our neighbors. The former assumption was affirmed in Berlin, but not in Amsterdam. Regarding the latter, Vermeulen (2006) has explained that the fact that organizations are geographically close relates to the process of the establishment of new ones. New organizations were founded by board members of other organizations, and when the newly founded association was ideologically close to the existing one, it was often registered at the same address.

As far as the contact networks are concerned, both in Amsterdam and Berlin these contained more connections between actors that were located in different instead of in the same city districts. The mean percentage of ties that stayed within the city district was, however, higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin. The explanation of the unexpectedly high number of physically distant connections lies in what several respondents, in both cities, told me about their everyday practices: because of time, money and manpower constraints it is hard to keep up connections with other organizations, and so those that are located nearby are the only ones they are in *regular* contact with. In other words, the organizations do have a wider variety of connections to others further away, but the ones they are literally close to are also the ones they are figuratively close to. Given the urgency-reflex discussed above, one would then expect that in the mobilization process the neighbors are preferred over the less close connections that are located further away.

This hypothesis that connections located nearby may be stronger and most commonly used is partly confirmed in the mobilization networks. The Big World Experiment triggered the associations in some city districts to turn to their literally close connections. In two city districts in Amsterdam, Amsterdam-Noord and Bos en Lommer, the organizations mobilized each other in a sometimes even circular fashion. In Berlin, there is a cluster of organizations in a neighborhood in the city district of Neukölln (around the community center *Türkisch-Deutsches Zentrum*, see Figure 9.1). The 'neighborhood effect' is much less in Berlin, mainly because many actors mobilized the umbrella organizations (in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg), while they are themselves located elsewhere, and because many of the (non-Turkish) members of the collaborative body, the *Migrationsrat*, are located outside of the 'Turkish' city districts. As there are so many of these members, they carry relatively much more weight and raise the percentage of physically distant ties. The considerable number of interconnections in the city districts in Amsterdam indicate that the policies that the local governments pursued there are fruitful.

10.11 Media use

The mass-media are important channels through which a community mobilization can be realized. Furthermore, newspaper readership and media consumption are often used as indicators of a community's civiness. These are, therefore, two of the reasons to investigate the role of the media in the Turkish community.

Relationships between Turkish organizations and the Turkish media exist in both Amsterdam and Berlin, but in the latter case these connections are closer. Several respondents in Berlin indicated that they actively use the media in their dissemination strategies, for example by announcing an activity on the local radio. Berlin has several Turkish and multi-ethnic radio stations and Turkish newspapers, which all play a part in the everyday lives of a large percentage of the Turkish population. Also the media in Amsterdam are well-known, but they are less popular than in Berlin. In Amsterdam, Turkish radio and television broadcasts are less professional and the supply is lower. Indeed, the Turkish media in Amsterdam are clearly on a much smaller scale than in Berlin. This is perhaps also the reason why the organizations in Amsterdam do not relate to the media as much as those in Berlin do: the impact of this media is often insignificant.

The media that was often mentioned by respondents in Berlin as being reliable partners did not turn out to be important actors in the mobilization process. Only one actor mobilized several radio stations there, and no media were addressed in the mobilization in Amsterdam.

Perhaps the Turkish media were disregarded by most organizations because the current mobilization did not concern an activity of their own. The Big World Experiment asked the organizations to take part in an extraordinary assignment, which required them to respond almost instinctively, using the 'urgency' reflex. It is possible that the mobilization of the media fits into a more conscious mobilization strategy and it is only addressed in cases of real emergencies or to make the community's own events known, and not for the activities of third parties.

10.12 The individual and the organization

As I explained in Chapter 2, in my outlook on social capital, I assume that an individual actor can possess social capital which benefits a collective. This applies to a single association and its social capital, which can be used for the benefit of the community, as well as to a board member who brings his personal connections which add to the social capital of his/her organization. For example, because a board member has good connections at the municipality, his/her organizations may be given privileges which are withheld from others. Until now, there has been little or no research carried out within

this view of social capital, but the cases under study here have affirmed the tenability of this outlook. Moreover, it became clear that the position and functioning of organizations is, to some extent, defined by who is/are their main representative(s).

Firstly, the (mobilized) social capital of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam has demonstrated that some of them are represented by individuals who are the personifications of these associations. These strong characters have a long history in Turkish organizational life in Amsterdam. Their familiarity with, and reputation within, the community enables their organizations to gain a central position. Furthermore, several representatives mobilized their personal, yet important for the community, connections in the Big World Experiment, amongst whom were several politicians. In these instances, the social capital of the organizations themselves, i.e. as expressed in the network of interlocking directorates and contact network, was neglected. The importance of the individual in the organization was also seen from the fact that in a number of cases an organization mobilized an acquainted association that was qualified as 'non-Turkish', but of which the particular representative that was mentioned was of Turkish descent. This applied to politicians, but also, for example, to representatives of mixed welfare organizations. The Turkish employee of a particular non-Turkish welfare organization facilitates inter-ethnic connections, just as a non-Turkish volunteer in a Turkish organization can.

In Berlin, the metamorphosis of individual social capital into the social capital of the collective is, in some cases, at an even more advanced stage. Several organizations have developed such high levels of professionalism (for example, evidenced by the fact that the staff are all paid employees) that the additional value of the social capital of individuals has become assimilated into them. The individual's social capital has become the organization's social capital, and even changes in personnel do not undermine it. For example, Kenan Kolat has for years been the 'face' of the progressive umbrella organization the TBB, but even though he has left the organization, the TBB still has a crucial position within the community. In general, the relationships between the organizations in Berlin are more 'institutionalized', more professional and depend less on personnel.

10.13 In conclusion

The open POS in Amsterdam has led to a more horizontal community structure, relatively strong inter-ethnic connections, better government-civil society interactions, and a prominent position for deviating, but highly interconnected, groups. At the same time, this open system has allowed the Turkish organizations to form a disintegrated community of ideologically opposing groups which are barely connected, even in a community mobilization. The structure of the social capital with its ideological divisions,

ethnic diversity and governmental actors, influenced the mobilization in such a way that these characteristics became more pronounced.

In contrast, Berlin's closed political opportunity structure was decisive in the vertical structure of the Turkish community for the prominence of the umbrella organizations, for the development of collaborative bodies, for the skeptical attitude of organizations vis-à-vis the local government, and for an inward focus. All of this leads to an independent community with a well-organized mobilization in which influential actors are easily reached and a message travels quickly to organizations at all levels. Similar to the case of Amsterdam, the structure of the social capital in Berlin determined the mobilization process. The collaborative bodies were responsible for the widespread mobilization and the inclusion of Turkish and Kurdish organizations in the same process, while the umbrella organizations could serve as focus points for the smaller associations.

This study has thus shown that the structure and content of the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin are influenced by the political opportunity structure in which the communities operate. Furthermore, the way in which the social capital is mobilized depends on both its structure and the POS. In other words, the three relationships depicted in Figure 10.1 (p.219) at the beginning of this chapter are all confirmed. It is not possible to ascribe to the POS a univocal positive, or a negative effect on social capital and its mobilization. In some respects, an open POS is positively related to the social capital of migrant organizations, such as a greater amount of ethnically bridging social capital, while there is a negative relationship with the initiatives taken by the migrant organizations and the inclusiveness of the mobilization. However, the differences between the two cities are clear enough to enable me to say that the POS does influence both social capital and social capital in operation. I will discuss the more general implications of my findings in the Conclusion.

Conclusion

At the end of this book I want to address a number of general issues regarding suggestions for further research, the implications of this work for the theory of social capital and political participation, and the individual-collective outlook on social capital. But first I want to emphasize, once more, the unique selling point of the current study, namely the Big World Experiment. I also want to make a plea for the greater use of experimental research methods and demonstrate that experiments, and in particular the BWE, are closer to reality than is often thought to be the case.

The importance of doing experimental research

Research in the social sciences is generally of a 'static' nature: whatever the phenomenon under study, researchers usually rely on data that provides a picture of a given moment in time, with fixed indicators. This is not particularly troublesome in work that has no other objective than mapping a status quo, but if a study concerns a process, mechanism or causal relationship, this is problematic. Too often correlations are presented as causalities without empirical support. An important cause of this improper use of data is that current research methods in the social sciences do not offer any other options. As long as researchers rely predominantly on large databases or interview data, they can, at most, suggest that a causal relationship is plausible, but they cannot demonstrate it. This kind of data does not provide insight into the actual processes or mechanisms of interest and, in so far as interviewees discuss these processes, the validity of their retrospective information remains questionable. Participant observation provides some solace, but its major disadvantages are that it is time-consuming, the researcher's interference disturbs the 'true' process while his/her observations are, by definition, subjective, and it is usually restricted to only a few case studies.

This problem of a lack of insight into presumed causality also applies to research on social capital. Social capital is generally studied by means of static facts, such as the number of organizations, levels of generalized trust, the size of the circle of acquaintances etc. These facts, combined with a generous dose of assumptions, should provide insight into the process that takes place between social capital and whatever it is supposed to influence. But these processes, the way in which social capital works, and what social capital looks like *in operation*, is rarely, if ever, the object of study. Obviously, in many cases it is difficult to keep track of these processes, particularly in studies on the

collective level, or in large-scale research. But in this study I have shown that it is not impossible; indeed, on the contrary. The Big World Experiment does provide an insider's view of social capital in operation.

Experimentation is not an everyday method in the behavioral and social sciences; certainly not outside the domain of psychology. In that field, experiments are very common and lead to valuable insights that are also applicable outside the laboratory and in the real world. In the rest of the social sciences, however, the idea seems to prevail that what happens outside the 'natural setting', or after a researcher's intervention, does not say anything about 'true' processes in the real world (cf. Babbie, 1975(in Mook); Mook, 1983; Levitt & List, 2007; Benz & Meier, 2008; Falk & Heckman, 2009). However, it is a misconception that experimentation implies an unnatural elicitation of behavior in the sterile environment of a laboratory (even though this kind of experimentation can also yield valuable insights, for example, into the political behavior of citizens). Researchers could also develop field experiments with which to study subjects in their natural environment, while manipulating the relevant variables. I believe that my Big World Experiment is a good example of how experimentation is indeed of value in the social sciences. This approach yielded results that are worthwhile in themselves, and are important supplements to the interview data. Most of all, with the straightforward design of the Big World Experiment, I have been able to shine a light on the working of social capital, which other research has not been able to do. I would, therefore, recommend that other researchers should start considering how experiments can increase their insight into processes that may otherwise remain obscure. Fortunately, it is ever more recognized that experimentation within political science is a fruitful endeavor. This will be even more the case when increased numbers of researchers come to realize that experimental articles are cited with greater frequency than other contemporaneous pieces (Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, & Lupia, 2006).

Real life Big World 'Experiments'

In addition to my plea for more experiments, and in order to demonstrate that field experiments need not be remote from reality, I would also like to elaborate on the relevance of the BWE in relation to naturally elapsing mobilizations. Of course, the nature of an experiment is that the researcher is in charge of the relevant variables, which, in the case of the BWE, meant that I was the one who actually started a mobilization after determining the topic upon which I would mobilize which subjects. In that sense, any experiment is merely an attempt to approximate real life processes, and the limited data obtained serve as a model for what happens in the grander scheme of things. The aim of my BWE was to demonstrate how social capital, expressed as organizational networks, is used. To this end, I focused on the Turkish communities in

two cities, which had the advantages that they are of a manageable size and I already had considerable information about the shapes of their networks. This enabled me to properly record what happened during the mobilization and, thus, interpret how the networks function. Furthermore, the results of the BWE as applied herein can serve as a model for processes that take place naturally. In everyday life there are ‘starters’ that try to reach a large audience and mobilize as many people as possible. The mobilization of the Turkish communities is an example of how the nature of the community, the environment in which it operates, and the value of the information determine the course of the mobilization. These insights can be extrapolated for wider contexts.

For example, in January of 2009, the Israeli army invaded the Gaza strip. This upset many Muslims around the world who sympathized with the Palestinians who were under fire. Who the ‘starters’ were, nobody knows, but it is a fact that a text message and an e-mail were circulated in Muslim communities in the Netherlands. This stated that two German low budget supermarket chains (Aldi and Lidl), which are often used by many less well-off migrants, were supportive of Israel and intended to donate all of their profits on a particular Saturday to the country. The receiver of the message was urged to forward it to as many other people as possible and boycott the supermarket on the indicated date. It even made it to the papers (Groen & Kranenberg, 2009). The supermarkets have not yet reported, however, whether they actually had fewer customers that day.

Another example regards the protests in Iran after the elections in 2009, where hundreds of people demonstrated against the allegedly fraudulent elections and in favor of the opposition. The protests did not seem to have been formally organized (Al Jazeera, 2009, June 14); the protesters were mobilized through the micro-blogging service Twitter¹²³ and word of mouth (Erdbrink, 2009). The fact that Twitter played a role in the mobilization has received much attention, since it was used to inform Iranians and, indeed, people all over the world about what was happening in Iran, while the Internet and other modern channels of communication were cut off. Twitterers posted messages about where and when demonstrations were taking place and what went on during those protests. This information was picked up and subsequently spread amongst the protesters. The twitterers can thus be regarded as the starters of the mobilization. Some went even further than this. Around that time, an e-mail was circulated in which the sender insinuated that the riots in Iran were not initiated by the Iranian people, but rather that the Israeli intelligence services had stirred them up. He wrote:

“...what about the so-called Twitter-protests? Are @StopAhmadi, @IranRiggedElect and @Change_For_Iran, the twitterers who were the first to post tens of thousands of messages, truly Iranian citizens who are fighting against

¹²³ Twitter.com is a website on which subscribers can leave short messages of 140 signs, known as ‘tweets’. People who leave their message are called ‘twitterers’.

injustice and illegitimate elections, or are these undercover actions by the Israeli intelligence and press agencies?'

In other words, the writer of the e-mail is suggesting that the Israeli intelligence services have acted in the role that I, the researcher, took in my Big World Experiment, namely that of an intervening outsider who artificially initiated a mobilization. Although it remains to be seen where the truth lies in this conspiracy theory, the underlying idea does provide food for thought.

Both examples demonstrate that a small piece of information that is referred to at the right places can spread quickly amongst large groups of people and lead to the mobilization of many of them. This, of course, depends on the type of information (the more urgent, the greater the effect), the nature of the community (how are the members connected), and the context (for example, the political opportunity structure). The current study has provided some insight into this which can serve as a guideline for the interpretation of real life events. For example, it became clear that sometimes only a small number of actors are crucial for the mobilization of a community, as exemplified by the position of the umbrella organizations in the Turkish community in Berlin and the fact that they were repeatedly addressed during the mobilization. Something similar was seen during the intended supermarket boycott: it was reported that some people received the same message more than ten times. It would, therefore, be interesting to discover what the roles of these individuals in the community are, and what distinguishes them from the people who did not receive the message.

It is interesting to see how modern technology was used in both examples of the 'natural' mobilization processes referred to above; e-mail, SMS, mobile telephony and the Internet played key roles. These means of communication not only facilitate community mobilizations, but also provide new opportunities to researchers. The ease and speed with which electronic messages are spread, as well as the fact that they are easily tracked and traced, facilitate studies of mobilization on a larger scale than was conducted here. What we need now is for someone to take on this challenge and open up this treasure chest of information.

Variations of the BWE: suggestions for future studies

Even though I am convinced of the additional value of alternative research methods, and experimentation in particular, I acknowledge that these also have their limitations, and that includes the Big World Experiment. In Chapter 7, I have already addressed the possible incorporated biases, so here I want to consider some elements of the experiment that are open to change and can serve as the basis for further research.

First of all, the type of mobilization may have determined the course thereof. In this study, the communities were triggered to perform a mobilization in the shape of

information dissemination (i.e. sending a piece of information) on a specific topic. Variation in the topic may, however, bring to light a difference in the course of the mobilization. If the invitation to a lecture, which was the topic herein, was replaced by information about a recently implemented subsidy policy, or the damaged reputation of one of the organizations, the participants may have addressed other actors. On the other hand, I would not expect to find very different mobilization networks in these cases, because the one that was produced as a result of my invitation to a lecture, which is a neutral piece of information, was already characterized by bonding ties. More sensitive information, however, such as that about financial issues, would lead to the actors limiting themselves to their closest contacts even more.

Instead of altering the type of information to be passed on, one could replace the information dissemination altogether with a resource, political, or economic example to see the effects that other types of mobilization have on the course thereof (also see Chapter 7 for a discussion of the different kinds). These types of mobilization are, however, much more laborious, and it would take a considerable effort to perform a controlled experiment to highlight them. Moreover, the ethics of these experiments should be carefully considered since such concerns may easily become an issue when actors are encouraged to act upon a non-existent incident. For that matter, it is perhaps more convenient to wait and break into a spontaneous mobilization, although this puts the researcher in an undesirably uncertain and dependent position. Nevertheless, any adjusted replication studies would be valuable additions to the current Big World Experiment.

A possible BWE relating to the political mobilization of associations involves a petition on a political theme which needs to be signed by as many organizations as possible and then delivered to the minister responsible; an example is the issue of dual citizenship. This would not only reveal how a community mobilizes itself, but would also demonstrate how it overcomes the gap between citizens and authorities. As this topic is relatively politically neutral (that is, I spoke to both left and right wing organizational leaders who were of the opinion that dual citizenship should be allowed), the whole community can potentially be included in the mobilization. More controversial topics may be used to monitor how sympathizers of different political ideologies deal with these appeals to mobilize and how this differs to what happens with a neutral trigger. I would expect that a neutral political topic, which is nevertheless relevant to all members of the migrant community, will cause organizations to address bridging as well as bonding ties, and indeed probably more bridging ties than was the case in the current study. This is because I believe that a topic which concerns the lives of the individual members of the community, who are also the people who make up the organizations, would lead the organizational leaders to ignore ideological differences. Whether this is a correct assumption is something that only further research can discover.

A second point of attention for future research is the status of the group in which the working of social capital is tested. Ethnic communities obviously have a different ethnic

background to the majority in the host society. It is possible that there is a significant awareness within the migrant group of this divergence, and that people think in terms of 'in-group' and 'out-group'. This awareness may influence the structure of the community's social capital, and, more importantly, it may also affect the way in which it is used. It could lead to a more inward-looking orientation, as the Turkish communities studied herein displayed, but this need not be the case. A comparison of the results of BWEs performed within other migrant groups in the same city would shed light on this, and a comparison with non-migrant groups would, perhaps, do this even more.

Related to this is the question of whether there is a 'typically Turkish' way of using social capital. The current research focused on the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin, which are extraordinary groups in many ways. They are characterized by ideological differences because these were transferred from Turkey. The homeland, the memory of it, and the process of socialization that immigrants experienced there may have an impact on how Turkish migrants operate in their new place of residence. The cultural baggage that migrants possess may also involve certain expectations of the government and each other, which influence the use of social capital. Perhaps the way the Turkish communities interact with, or respond to, a political opportunity structure is not only affected by the POS itself; it may also be influenced by the way in which they are used to responding to the political opportunity structure in their home country. An investigation of the interaction of organizations in Turkey with each other and the local government could provide insight into whether there is a 'typically Turkish' way of using social capital. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Turkish factor has an effect on the mobilization process in addition to or apart from the strong influence of the POS. The ways in which the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin is both shaped and used diverge to such an extent that the additional explanatory value of this cultural factor would be valuable.

Finally, an interesting replication of this study could take place in the somewhat distant future, for example in one or two decades. Longitudinal network analyses have shown that networks (including those of ethnic organizations) are changeable; their structure varies over time. Moreover, apart from the general changes that networks experience over the years, in the particular case of migrant organizations these changes also involve a generational aspect. Some of the younger respondents in Amsterdam have already declared that the ideological divisions that characterize the Turkish community are 'old-fashioned', but these divides are currently still prominent in both Amsterdam and Berlin. The question is whether the organizational elite of the future will, in fact, disregard the ideological and perhaps even the ethnic characteristics of organizations. If the younger respondents are true to their word, a future replication will display a mobilization network in which the ideological groups are not as easily distinguished as was the case herein.

Implications for the theory of the relationship between social capital and political participation

This study was not performed just to prove the utility of experimental methods, but aimed to test some of the assumptions posed in social capital theory about the political participation of migrant groups, or, as I phrased it in the introduction, to open up the black box. This theory states that the groups that possess social capital in the form of interconnected voluntary organizations also demonstrate greater degrees of political participation. The explanation of this relationship is that the (interlocked) board members develop and exchange information, as well as social and political trust, which they pass on to their members, who, in turn, pass it on to non-members. The whole community, thus, becomes more aware of the necessity of political participation. Furthermore, interlocks between organizations have a multiplying effect on the civic learning processes that are supposed to take place in voluntary associations (the 'schools of democracy'). The three general processes that are incorporated in this theory are the process of the transfer of information and trust: (1) between board members from different organizations, (2) from board members to members within an organization, and (3) from members to non-members. This study aimed to provide insight into the first process, because I wanted to start at the beginning: if the first steps in the mechanism do not elapse as expected, this could have consequences for studies about the later steps. (For that matter, experimental research methods are particularly suitable for testing the processes of information and trust transfer from board members to members and from members to non-members. Future research should certainly focus on these latter aspects.) This study has shown that the assumptions that are made regarding this first process are not completely justified.

The theory presupposes that the interlocking directorates function as channels of communication. Therefore, one would expect that the relationships in the network of interlocking directorates in particular are addressed during the mobilization. This study has demonstrated that this is not the case, at least not for the day-to-day mobilization that was tested here. However, what did become clear is that the connections that are addressed in the mobilization are of the same type as the connections in the network of interlocking directorates, namely they are both characterized by a bonding nature and, thus, a high degree of trust. As a rule, organizations have shared board members if they trust each other, and they usually trust those organizations that are similar to them. Moreover, in Amsterdam, the interlocks between associations were the reflection of a foundation strategy: new organizations were founded with board members who were already involved in existing, affiliated organizations. The interlocking directorates in Berlin (which were less numerous than in Amsterdam) were only found between organizations of similar ideological backgrounds. In other words: interlocks reflect significant mutual trust. The mobilization networks mainly contained bonding

relationships, as seen from the fact that the organizations mobilized alters that were ethnically or ideologically the same, or were even personal connections. Most organizations possessed a vast range of acquainted counterparts (as could be seen in the contact networks), but only those that they felt really affiliated to were eventually mobilized. These results suggest that for organizations to intensively communicate or mobilize the community, it is not necessary to share a board member, but it is necessary to trust each other. In other words, the assumption that the *interlocking directorates* serve as channels of information is refuted in the context of this BWE, but there certainly is communication at the board level between organizational leaders. However, close contact between associations in everyday life 'overrule' the close relationships on the formal level.

The refuting of this primary assumption does not imply that the theory of the relationship between social capital and the political participation of migrant communities as a whole may as well be dismissed. We should not throw away the baby with the bathwater. If the social capital of organizations is interpreted in the broader sense, i.e. as a combination of formal and informal connections, the theory does hold true, at least in so far as the assumption about the communication between organizations is concerned. A small part of the 'black box' has, thus, been revealed. The tenability of the other assumptions, however, is still to be proven.

In addition, the role of the network of interlocking directorates should not be dismissed too easily, even though this might be the obvious response given the fact that in neither city the actors addressed this network (save for one organization in Amsterdam). The results presented here stem from a special kind of mobilization that was performed within the scope of a specific experiment. The fact that I instigated the whole mobilization and not a fellow-organization with a lot of money, a distinct point of view on a political topic, or in acute need of help, probably affected the degree to which the participants perceived the mobilization as urgent. I assumed that the invitation to my lecture was a neutral piece of information, but it may have been a provocation to groups that are suspicious of research of any kind and that distrust the university, or, on the contrary, organizations may have considered the invitation trivial. Both groups may have reacted by withdrawing themselves from the mobilization or by addressing other contacts than they would have otherwise. Possibly, in less threatening, more relevant, or more urgent appeals for mobilization, organizations use their connections from the network of interlocking directorates much more than they did during this BWE. Before these alternatives are put to the test, it cannot be ruled out that the contact network and the network of interlocking directorates are called upon in different situations, and the role of the latter network, therefore, cannot be dismissed.

The leading questions in this study concerned the relationship between social capital and its mobilization, as well as the influence of the political opportunity structure on both. With regard to the mobilization networks, it became clear that they differed

significantly from city to city. Amsterdam's had a fragmented structure of bonding ties, while in Berlin, similar bonding ties and clusters were found, but the crucial difference was that in this mobilization network, a few crucial weak links bound these separate groups together. The answer to the question of why two Turkish communities, which have practically the same demographic characteristics and similar migratory backgrounds, nevertheless, act differently during a mobilization, can primarily be found in the relevant political opportunity structures (POS) in the two cities. Moreover, these differ considerably to each other; Amsterdam has a relatively open POS when compared to the closed system in Berlin.

The influence of the political opportunity structure on a community's social capital and the mobilization thereof is reflected in the relationships between associations and the authorities. Based on the social capital, and in particular the contact networks, it is my view that there are no major differences between the Turkish communities in the two cities, since both contain about the same number of governmental actors. But, if push comes to shove, i.e. when the communities are triggered to mobilize themselves, the relationships between Turkish civil society and the authorities vary a great deal. In Amsterdam, several governmental actors were included in the mobilization, while none were addressed in Berlin. This demonstrates that the relationships in the former city are much more positive than in the latter location. Furthermore, other research has shown that the Turks in Amsterdam have higher levels of political trust than those in Berlin (Berger, 2010). Accordingly, it follows that the positive attitudes towards the authorities in the former community, and the not so positive attitudes in the latter, can be explained by the approaches that the respective authorities adopted towards these communities. The political opportunity structure in Amsterdam has always been encouraging when it comes to ethnic organizations, which explains the positive relationships here: you do not bite the hand that feeds you. However, the closed political opportunity structure in Berlin has resulted in less positive relationships between organizations and authorities. Turkish associations did not expect much from the local government and, therefore, refrained from having trusting relationships with it.

Yet, the relationships between Turkish civil society and their respective governments also had consequences for the internal relationships within the communities. The lack of encouragement from and positive relationships with the government in Berlin is compensated for by more abundant links between associations and, strikingly, also between ideological groups. This can be deduced from the fact that the mobilization network in this city was much better connected than the one in Amsterdam. To jointly oppose a government that has pursued an exclusionary policy, the associations were compelled to join forces. Through collaboration, they are able to resolve the problems that each of them is facing, which they cannot manage to do on their own. As a prerequisite for opposing groups deciding to work together, they have to learn to overcome ideological differences. As they are doing so, they develop inter-organizational trust, as is predicted in the theory of voluntary organizations as schools

of democracy. In short, the Turkish organizations in Berlin are more trusting simply because they have had to struggle more in an inimical environment. The situation in Amsterdam, on the other hand, is one in which the positive relationships between organizations and the authorities have reduced the need for trusting relationships to develop between opposing Turkish groups. The support of the government allows the community to maintain internal differences.

In theory, both social and political trust need to prevail amongst organizational leaders in order to be passed on to the members of their associations and make them more (politically) active. However, this contradicts the empirical data presented here and in Berger's work. The seeming contradiction of high social and low political trust (or vice versa), in combination with the level of political activity of the community, can thereby be elucidated. Organizations may not display a greater degree of political trust, but the abundant activities they perform as a reaction to their restrictive environment can be an example to their members and, through them, to non-members alike. The grassroots will, therefore, gain a better sense of the need for and the use of political participation.

Here, I inferred the levels of inter-organizational trust from the way in which the mobilization networks are shaped. I took the presence of bonding and bridging ties as indicators of higher (bonding) or lower (bridging) trust. In order to substantiate the assumption proposed here, it would, however, be worthwhile studying the levels of trust within the communities more directly. Again, this is a suggestion for further research.

On the outlooks on social capital: I network, therefore...

In closing, I want to comment on the theoretical conceptions of social capital and the typology of views about the issue that I have presented in the theoretical part of this book. Combining what I called the providing and receiving sides of social capital on the individual or collective level, I distinguished four outlooks which each represent a combination of the two sides. The reason why I introduced this typology was with the aim of shedding some light on the overwhelming amount of literature that has been written on this topic and in which social capital is approached from apparently contradictory angles. At the end of this book, therefore, I want to discuss whether my classification and, in particular, the outlook that I took as the guiding principle, served their purpose.

The approach to social capital that I have used is the one in which the providing side is on the individual level, while the receiving side is on the collective level. In other words, with this view of social capital it is a collective, here a Turkish community, which benefits from the social capital of the actors that make up this collective, in this case, voluntary associations. The main reason why I adopted this outlook was that I wanted to

demonstrate how the social capital of a community of organizations operates during a mobilization. I reasoned that a community mobilization depends on the individual choices that associations make with regard to which counterparts they would address. In other words, the mobilization, which I regarded as the beneficial outcome, depended on how the individual actors broke into their individual social capital.

Choosing this individual-collective perspective was not the most obvious step because, to my knowledge, there is no previous work that also fits into this category. Initially, the support I had for my decision to pursue this line of research was limited to random examples and a growing sense that what I wanted to demonstrate about social capital could best be captured in this way. However, I believe that this study does provide the empirical evidence for this approach. Individual choices about addressing leading organizations, collaborative bodies, or even personal acquaintances were a major influence on the mobilization process, highlighting that the network (use) of a single organization can have major advantages for the community that it is a part of. At the same time, when taking stock of the aggregated data, the communities in the two cities exhibited clearly different patterns. The individual-collective approach allowed me to switch between these two levels of analysis more than any of the other three outlooks would have done.

I started this book with the phrase '*I network, therefore I am*', as a motto about modern online life. In view of the typology introduced in this book, this remark summarizes an individualistic outlook on social capital. This study has shown that in the offline real world, the actions of one actor can have an impact on the existence and well-being of the collective. In other words, one might as well say: "*I network, therefore we are.*"

Appendices

Appendix 1. Questionnaire

(German version)

Fragebogen Soziales Kapital in Aktion Berlin

Die ersten Fragen beschäftigen sich mit zwei festlichen Ereignissen, die vor kurzer Zeit stattgefunden haben, nämlich Silvester und das Zuckerfest.

Hat ihre Organisation in diesem Jahr einen Neujahrsempfang veranstaltet?

0 ja

0 nein

0 weiß ich nicht(mehr)

WENN JA, War der Empfang nur für Menschen die direkt bei ihrer Organisation angeschlossen sind, (Mitglieder, freiwillige Helfer usw.) oder haben sie auch Personen von außerhalb der Organisation eingeladen?

0 nur für direkt verbundene Personen

0 auch für Menschen außerhalb der Organisation

0 weiß ich nicht

0 nicht zutreffend

Haben sie von anderen Organisationen Einladungen bekommen für einen Neujahrsempfang?

0 ja

0 nein

0 weiß ich nicht

WENN JA, Von welchen Organisationen haben sie eine Einladung erhalten?

[Interviewer: Nachdem der Interviewpartner den Namen von einer Organisation genannt hat, folgende Frage: Haben sie bei dieser Organisation auch eine Kontaktperson, also jemand über den eigentlich immer der Kontakt verläuft? Nächste Frage: Können sie mir sagen zu welcher ethnische Gruppe diese Person zählt? Nächste Frage: Wie oft haben sie im Allgemeinen Kontakt mit dieser Organisation?]

Antwortkategorien sind **1. täglich**

2. mehrmals pro Woche

3. wöchentlich

4. mehrmals pro Monat

5. monatlich

6. mehrmals im Jahr

7. jährlich

8. noch seltener / nie

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Das andere Fest, das ich nannte, ist das Zuckerfest/ der Ramadan.

Feiern sie das Zuckerfest oder organisieren Sie Iftar-Essens?

0 ja

0 nein

WENN JA, Haben sie im letzten Jahr eine Aktivität rund um das Zuckerfest/ Ramadan organisiert?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN NEIN, Organisieren sie normalerweise Aktivitäten rund um das Zuckerfest oder im Ramadan?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN JA, War diese Aktivität nur für Personen die direkt mit ihrer Organisation zu tun haben oder auch für Außenstehende?

- 0 nur für direkt mit der Organisation verbundene Personen*
- 0 auch für Außenstehende*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN NEIN, Würden sie normalerweise nur Personen einladen die direkt bei ihrer Organisation angeschlossen sind oder laden Menschen von außerhalb ein?

- 0 nur für direkt verbundene Personen*
- 0 auch für Außenstehende*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

Haben sie eine oder mehrere Einladung(en) erhalten für eine Feier im Ramadan, z. B. das Zuckerfest?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht mehr [Interviewer: Gibt es Organisationen von denen sie jedes Jahr eine Einladung bekommen?]*

WENN JA, Von welchen Organisationen?

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Die folgenden Fragen beschäftigen sich mit Situationen in denen sie Informationen brauchen und dafür Hilfe von anderen einholt oder in denen sie selbst über Informationen verfügen die sie mit anderen teilen möchten.

Wenn sie Fragen hätten über das Beantragen einer Baugenehmigung um das Gebäude in dem sie untergebracht sind umzubauen, an wen würden sie sich dann wenden? **[Interviewer: Wenn der Interviewpartner angibt, direkt zur Stadtverwaltung zu gehen, frag dann: Könnten sie mit einer solchen Frage auch bei Bekannten Rat einholen?]**

Name	Organisation (evtl.)	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Ist es schon mal vorgekommen, dass sie von einer staatlichen Einrichtung, von der Stadtverwaltung oder von einem Ministerium z. B., eingeladen wurden zu einem ... ?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht/ kann mich nicht erinnern*

WENN JA, haben sie auch andere Personen hierüber informiert?

- 0 ja*

0 nein

0 kann mich nicht mehr erinnern

0 nicht zutreffend

WENN NEIN, Wenn sie sich nun vorstellen, dass sie eine Einladung für einen ... bekommen haben und dass sie diese Information an andere weitergeben möchten, wen würden sie dann informieren?

Name	Organisation	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Wenn sie Probleme haben mit der Teilnahme an ihren Aktivitäten, d.h. ihre Veranstaltungen werden von weniger Menschen besucht als sie sich wünschen, und wenn sie dies besprechen wollten mit Personen außerhalb ihrer Organisation (sie fragen die Meinung eines Außenstehenden), an wen würden sie sich dann wenden? **[Eventuelle verdeutlichen mit: Wenn sie besprechen möchten, was sie dagegen tun können]**

Kontaktperson	Organisation	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Stellen sie sich vor, dass sie für das nächste Vereinsjubiläum z. B. ein T-shirt oder andere Artikel (Tassen, Kulis etc.) mit dem Vereinslogo bedrucken lassen wollen. Dafür möchten sie gerne von anderen wissen, ob sie eine gute Adresse kennen, wo man so etwas machen lassen kann. Wen würden sie in diesem Fall ansprechen?

Name	Organisation	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Wenn sie gehört hätten, dass es eine neue Möglichkeit für Zuwanderer-organisationen gibt um staatliche Zuschüsse zu bekommen, welche Personen oder Organisationen würden sie darüber informieren?

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Jetzt möchte ich gerne ein paar allgemeinere Fragen stellen über ihre Kontakte mit anderen Organisationen.

Bis jetzt haben wir vor allem über Berliner Organisationen gesprochen. Haben sie auch Kontakte zu landesweiten Organisationen (Organisationen die in ganz Deutschland aktiv sind)?

0 ja, **NÄMLICH**

0 nein

0 weiß ich nicht

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Und haben sie auch Kontakte zu Organisationen außerhalb Deutschlands?

0 ja, **NÄMLICH**

0 nein

0 weiß ich nicht

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Dann möchte ich sie jetzt bitten um wieder ausschließlich an Organisationen in Berlin zu denken.

Sprechen sie auch mit anderen türkischen Organisationen über die Position von Türken in Deutschland?
[Interviewer: zur Verdeutlichung: Sie können dafür zurückdenken an das letzte Jahr.]

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*

WENN JA, Sind das meistens formelle oder informelle Gespräche? **[Interviewer: Ich meine, machen sie dafür speziell einen Termin aus oder unterhalten sie sich einfach so, spontan darüber?]**

- 0 meistens formell*
- 0 meistens informell*
- 0 ungefähr gleichviel formelle und informelle Gespräche*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN JA, Wie oft finden solche Gespräche statt?

- 0 praktisch täglich*
- 0 wöchentlich*
- 0 monatlich*
- 0 jährlich*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN JA, Auf wessen Anregung finden solche Gespräche meistens statt?

- 0 eigene Anregung*
- 0 angeregt von anderen*
- 0 ungefähr gleich oft auf eigene Anregung oder die von anderen*
- 0 das weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

Sprechen sie auch mit nicht-türkischen, z.B. italienischen, russischen oder iranischen, Zuwandererorganisationen über die Position von Türken in Deutschland?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*

WENN JA, Können sie ein Beispiel nennen von einem solchen Treffen?

...

[Fortsetzung] Wer war dabei anwesend?

Name	Organisation (evtl.)	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Auf wessen Anregung hin fand dies statt?

- 0 eigene Organisation*
- 0 auf Einladung einer anderen Organisation*
- 0 weiß ich nicht mehr*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

Sprechen sie auch mit deutschen Organisationen über die Position von Türken und der türkischen Gemeinschaft in Deutschland?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*

WENN NEIN, Gibt es dafür einen besonderen Grund?

...

WENN JA, Sind das meistens formelle oder informelle Gespräche?

- 0 eher formell*
- 0 eher informell*
- 0 ungefähr gleich viel*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN JA, Wie oft finden solche Gespräche statt?

- 0 praktisch täglich*
- 0 wöchentlich*
- 0 monatlich*
- 0 jährlich*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN JA, Auf wessen Anregung hin finden solche Gespräche meistens statt?

- 0 meistens eigene Anregung*
- 0 meistens auf Anregung anderer*
- 0 ungefähr gleich viel*
- 0 das weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

Ich möchte nun über Politik sprechen, über Wahlen genauer gesagt.

Wenn morgen Kommunalwahlen stattfänden, würden sie dann wählen gehen?

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein, keine Lust*
- 0 nein, kein Wahlrecht*
- 0 weiß nicht*

Für manche Menschen ist es ganz sicher, dass sie immer dieselbe Partei wählen und dass sie niemals eine andere Partei wählen würden. Andere wägen jedes Mal neu ab, welcher Partei sie ihre Stimme geben. Ich nenne ihnen nun einige Parteien. Würden sie mir von jeder Partei sagen, wie groß die Wahrscheinlichkeit ist, dass sie bei den nächsten Wahlen dieser Partei ihre Stimme geben würden? Nennen sie einfach die entsprechende Zahl auf dieser Karte. Wenn sie eine Partei nicht kennen oder wenn sie es nicht wissen, dann sagen sie das ruhig, dann machen wir mit der nächsten weiter.

- 0 SPD*
- 0 CDU*
- 0 Die Grünen*
- 0 FDP*
- 0 PDS*

Würden sie auch mit anderen sprechen über ihre Entscheidungen? **[Interviewer: Mach explizit, um welche Entscheidungen es geht : wählen überhaupt UND welche Partei]**

- 0 ja*
- 0 nein*
- 0 weiß ich nicht*
- 0 nicht zutreffend*

WENN JA, Met wem würden sie darüber sprechen?

Name	Organisation	Ethnizität	Frequenz

WENN NEIN, Gibt es dafür einen besonderen Grund?

Jetzt möchte ich gerne ein paar Fragen stellen über die Vertreter der türkischen Gemeinschaft in Berlin. In jeder Gemeinschaft gibt es im Allgemeinen Personen oder Organisationen die man wichtiger findet als andere (oder sogar am wichtigsten). Das muss nicht bedeuten, dass man mit diesen Personen oder Verbänden übereinstimmt oder das man sie persönlich kennt. Eine Organisation oder Person kann z. B. wichtig sein, weil sie viel in den Medien auftaucht oder weil sie viele Aktivitäten organisiert.

Ich würde nun gerne wissen, welche Organisationen *sie* wichtige, oder vielleicht den wichtigsten, Vertreter der türkischen Gemeinschaft in Berlin finden?

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Direkt Kontakt?	Frequenz

Warum finden sie diese Organisation(en) wichtig?

Wir haben nun über wichtige Vertreter der türkischen Gemeinde in Berlin gesprochen. Mit einigen dieser Organisationen haben sie direkten Kontakt, mit anderen nicht/ sie haben auch Kontakt mit all diesen Organisationen / sie haben keinen Kontakt mit diesen Organisationen. Ich kann mir allerdings auch vorstellen, dass es Organisationen innerhalb der türkischen Gemeinde gibt, mit denen sie lieber keinen Kontakt haben möchten. Das kann natürlich verschiedene Gründe haben.

Gibt es auch Organisationen innerhalb der türkisch Gemeinschaft in Berlin mit denen sie lieber nicht zusammen arbeiten möchten?

0 ja

0 nein [Interviewer: nachfragen, „Wirklich nicht?“]

0 das möchte ich nicht sagen

WENN JA, Welche Organisationen sind das?

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität

Würden sie mir auch sagen, warum sie nicht mit diesen Organisationen zusammen arbeiten möchten?

...

Wir kommen nun an das Ende unseres Interviews. Ich möchte noch ein paar Fragen stellen über den Aufbau ihrer Organisation.

Erstellen sie einen Jahresbericht?

0 ja

0 nein

0 weiß ich nicht

WENN JA, An wen verschicken sie ihren Jahresbericht?

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Erhalten sie auch Jahresberichte von anderen Organisationen?

0 ja

0 nein

0 weiß ich nicht

WENN JA, Von wem empfangen sie einen Jahresbericht?

Organisation	Kontaktperson	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Wenn ein Posten frei wird im Vorstand von ihrer Organisation, wie suchen sie dann einen Nachfolger?

[Interviewer: Lies die Kategorien (außer „weiß nicht“) einzeln vor]

0 weiß ich nicht

0 Der Vorstand wird aus den Mitgliedern der Organisation/ des Vereins gewählt

0 Wir geben öffentliche Anzeigen auf

Wo geben sie diese Anzeigen auf?

0 türkische Zeitung

0 deutsche Zeitung

0 hängen es auf in Gemeindehäusern

0 hängen es auf in Bibliotheken

0 Anders, nämlich....

0 Wir fragen in unserem persönlichen Umfeld (Freunde und Bekannte)

0 Wir erzählen anderen Organisationen, dass wir ein neues Vorstandsmitglied suchen

0 nicht zutreffend

Ich habe noch ein paar Fragen über ihre Organisation, aber ich möchte sie bitten, sie selbst zu beantworten auf diesem Formular. Wenn sie darüber Fragen haben, dann können sie die natürlich jederzeit stellen.

Bitte kreuzen Sie die am meisten zutreffende Antwort an.

Wie oft versammelt sich der Vorstand von Ihrer Organisation?

Mehr als einmal pro Woche

Einmal in der Woche

Alle zwei Wochen

Alle drei Wochen

Einmal im Monat

Weniger als einmal im Monat

Wie viele Stunden pro Woche sind sie durchschnittlich für Ihre Organisation tätig?

Vollzeit (Mehr als 30 Stunden pro Woche)

Teilzeit (10 bis 30 Stunden pro Woche)

Einige Stunden pro Woche (Weniger als 10 Stunden)

Weniger als 2 Stunden pro Woche

Werden die Vorstandsmitglieder Ihrer Organisation bezahlt?

Ja, sie erhalten ein Gehalt

Ja, sie bekommen ein Vorstandsgehalt

Sie erhalten allein eine Vergütung für Spesen

Nein, sie bekommen nichts

Wie viele Mitglieder hat Ihr Verein, bzw. wenn es sich nicht um einen Verein handelt, wie viele Personen stehen auf ihrer permanenten Versandliste? Wenn Sie es nicht genau wissen, können Sie dann schätzen?

Weniger als 25

25-50

51-100

101-250

251-500

501-1000

1001 und mehr

Sitzen Sie auch noch im Vorstand von anderen Organisationen?

Nein

Ja

Wenn Ja, in wie vielen?

Sie sehen auf dieser Seite einige Aktivitäten, die teilweise von Organisationen wie Ihrer unternommen werden. Können Sie bitte angeben, ob Ihre Organisation diese Aktivitäten schon einmal unternommen hat? Wenn das tatsächlich der Fall ist, können sie dann bitte auch notieren, wie oft Sie das ungefähr getan haben? Sie können dabei zurückdenken an die beiden vorigen Jahre.

		Nein	Ja	Wie oft?
A	Einen Brief an die Regierung oder eine andere staatliche Einrichtung geschrieben. Denken Sie dabei an Beschwerden, Petitionen, Unterschriftenaktionen etc.			
B	Eine Pressekonferenz gehalten oder einen Pressebericht erstellt			
C	Mitgearbeitet an der Ausführung oder Implementierung von Regierungspolitik			
D	Eine Unterschriftenorganisation organisiert			
E	Eine Demonstration oder Zusammenkunft organisiert oder mitgeholfen diese zu organisieren			
F	Teilgenommen an einer Demonstration die von anderen organisiert wurde			
G	Eine lokale Zeitung, Radio- oder Fernsehsender eingeschaltet			
H	Eine Boykottaktion organisiert gegen Produkte, Institutionen oder Länder			
I	In einer Diskussionsrunde oder einem aktuellen Programm aufgetreten um Ihre Meinung zu sagen, z. B. bei			
J	Ein Interview gegeben für eine Zeitung oder Zeitschrift über politische Angelegenheiten			
K	Mitgearbeitet in einer Kampagne um die Teilnahme bei Wahlen zu vergrößern			
L	Eine Besetzungsaktion organisiert oder daran teilgenommen			

Die nächste Frage ist vielleicht ein wenig ungewöhnlich, aber ich möchte sie doch gerne stellen.

Würden sie in ihrem Kalender nachschauen wollen, mit wem (und mit welchen Organisationen) sie in der letzten Woche Kontakt hatten? Wenn sie hiermit nicht einverstanden sind, müssen sie die Frage natürlich nicht beantworten, aber für unsere Studie wäre es äußerst hilfreich.

Kontaktperson	Organisation	Ethnizität	Frequenz

Wir sind nun am Ende von unserem Interview. Sie haben bis jetzt die Namen von Organisationen genannt, mit denen sie auf verschiedene Art zusammen arbeiten oder die sie kennen. Es kann allerdings sein, dass es noch mehr Organisationen gibt mit denen sie Kontakte haben, aber die sie noch nicht genannt haben. Vielleicht weil die Fragen dafür keinen Anlass gegeben haben oder weil sie zufällig nicht an diese Organisationen gedacht haben. Für unsere Studie ist es aber sehr wichtig, dass wir auch diese Namen kennen. Darum will ich jetzt mit ihnen eine Liste durchführen mit türkischen Organisationen in Berlin. Könnten sie bitte von jeder Organisation sagen, ob sie sie kennen und ob sie Kontakt mit ihnen haben und wenn das der Fall ist, wie oft sie mit ihnen in Kontakt stehen?

Exit

Haben sie im Moment noch Fragen über dieses Interview oder möchten sie noch etwas bemerken?

Hier ist meine Visitenkarte. Wenn sie zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt noch Fragen haben sollten oder Anmerkungen machen wollen, können sie mich telefonisch oder per email erreichen.

Appendix 2. Categories of ethnicities, types of organizations, and localities

2A Categories of ethnicities

Amsterdam	Berlin
Dutch	African
Kurdish	Asian
Moroccan	European other
Mixed	Former Yugoslavian
Other	German
Surinamese	Kurdish
Turkish	Latin and South American
	Middle East
	Mixed
	Polish
	Russian
	Turkish

2B Categories of localities

Amsterdam	Berlin
Amsterdam	Berlin-Brandenburg
Amsterdam-Noord	Outside Berlin
Baarsjes	Charlottenburg
Bos en Lommer	Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg
Centrum	Lichtenberg
Geuzenveld Sloterveer	Mitte
Oost Watergraafsmeer	Neukoelln
Osdorp	Pankow
Oud West	Potsdam
Oud Zuid	Reinickendorf
Outside Amsterdam	Schoneberg
Slotervaart Overtoomse Veld	Spandau
Westerpark	Steglitz
Westpoort	Treptow
Zeeburg	Wedding
Zuideramstel	
Zuidoost	

2C Categories of types of organizations

Amsterdam and Berlin

Consultative organizations
Cultural organizations
Education and research organizations
Elderly's organizations
Financial organizations
Governmental organizations
Governmental political organizations
Health care organizations
Interest groups various
Kurdish organizations
Laborers' organizations
Other organizations
Political organizations
Religious Alevi organizations
Religious Christian organizations
Religious Diyanet organizations
Religious IFB organizations (Berlin only)
Religious Milli Görüş organizations
Religious Muslim organizations
Religious organizations other
Semi-governmental organizations
Social interest organizations
Social organizations
Sports organization
Trade/ employer's organizations
Umbrella organizations
Welfare organizations
Women's organizations

Appendix 3. Lists of Respondents in Amsterdam and Berlin

3A List of organizations interviewed in Amsterdam in alphabetical order

Name of the organization	type of organization	Name interviewee – position within organization	Date of interview
Amsterdam Gençler Birliği AGB	sports	Ali Kiliç – Chairman	9 March 2005
Akörense Vereniging Nederland 1995	cultural	İbrahim Gülkara – Chairman	14 March 2005
Stichting Anatolië	welfare	Ekrem Küçüközel - Chairman	14 March 2005
Voetbalvereniging Anatolië	sports	Osman Turkmen - Chairman	16 March 2005
Stichting Annifer	trade/ employers'	Hüseyin Akbıyık - Chairman	15 February 2005
Stichting Arafat	Milli Görüş	Şahin Atar – Chairman	23 February 2005
Stichting Aslan	cultural	Jan Lau - Secretary	17 March 2005
Aya Sofia Moskee Milli Görüş Amsterdam-West	Milli Görüş	Fatih Üçler Dağ – Chairman	16 March 2005
Stichting Beth Nahrin	religious other	Kulhan, Adnan - Secretary	21 March 2005
Cafer-i Sadık Moskee Milli Görüş	Milli Görüş	Ahmet Aydın – Chairman	22 February 2005
DVA-DIDF (Demokratische Volksvereniging Amsterdam)	political	Hasan Ayhan – Chairman	15 March 2005
Vereniging Evimiz	social	Hasan Efesoy - Chairman	3 March 2005
Eyüp Sultan Moskee Stichting Turks Islamitisch Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Amsterdam-Oost	Diyanet	Secretary	18 March 2005
Fatih Moskee (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfı Fatih Camii)	Diyanet	Hüseyin Yamalı - Chairman	16 February 2005
Stichting Galaxi Media	social interest	Metin Kaçmaz – Chairman	1 March 2005
Stichting Gouden Paraplu	welfare	Uğur Eksi – Volunteer	15 February 2005
Hacı Bayram Moskee Diyanet	Diyanet	Ünal Mutlu – Former chairman	21 February 2005
HTDB Hollanda Türkiye Demokratlar Birliği	social interest	Suat Konuk – Board member	7 March 2005
Hollanda Fenerbahçeliler Derneği	social	Ahmet Kiziltepe - Secretary	23 February 2005

Name of the organization	type of organization	Name interviewee - position within organization	Date of interview
HTIB	<i>workers'</i>	Mustafa Ayranci – Chairman	16 February 2005
Stichting Hürriyet	<i>social</i>	Carullah Kalkan - Chairman	8 March 2005
Stichting Internationale Humanitaire Hulporganisatie Amsterdam IHHA	<i>Milli Görüş</i>	Uluçay, Oruc - Secretary	2 March 2005
Stichting Amsterdam Ihtiyarlar Sohbet Salonu	<i>social</i>	Ali Sönmez - Treasurer	17 March 2005
Ka-der	<i>cultural</i>	Nuri Artuntaş - Second Chairman	10 March 2005
Kayseri Sosyal Dayanisma ve Kultur Dernegi/ HOL-KAY-DER.	<i>social</i>	Ibrahim Aksoy - Chair man	22 February 2005
Stichting Kurdische Nationale Bibliotheek en Archief in Nederland	<i>Kurdish</i>	Elvon Helbest – Chairman	17 February 2005
MGKT Hilal Basak Musluman Genc Kadinlar Teskilati	<i>Milli Görüş</i>	Hanife Özer – Coordinator	16 March 2005
MGT Bos en Lommer Musleman Gencler Teskilati	<i>Milli Görüş</i>	Bahattin Aydin – General board member and employee	9 March 2005
Nederlands-Turkse Jonge Ondernemers vereniging	<i>trade/ employers'</i>	Isa Kılıçarslan – Chairman	17 March 2005
Stichting Netwerk van Nederlanders uit Turkije Afkomstig (Netwerk NTA)	<i>social interest</i>	Zeynal Erkut, - Chairman	22 February 2005.
Stichting Objectief Nieuws	<i>trade/ employers'</i>	Adem Köse - Second chairman and treasurer	7 March 2005
Stichting Papyrus Turk Hollanda Edebiyat ve Sanat	<i>cultural</i>	Mehmet Yildirim - Chairman	10 March 2005
STISCCAN (Stichting Islamitisch Sociaal Cultureel Centrum Amsterdam-Noord)	<i>Diyanet</i>	Ali Mercimek - Secretary	24 February 2005
STOC Stichting Turks Onderwijs Centrum	<i>education and research</i>	Ismail Ercan – Chairman	17 February 2005
Stichting Troya	<i>cultural</i>	Ahmed Yıldırım – Chairman	6 April 2005
Tukem/ Ulu Camii	<i>religious Muslim</i>	entire board	23 March 2005
Stichting Yunus Emre	<i>education and research</i>	Zeki Cenan – Coordinator	10 March 2005
Stichting Witboek (Written questionnaire; no interview)	<i>welfare</i>	Hasan Kara – Chairman	22 April 2005

3B List of organizations interviewed in Berlin in alphabetical order

Name of the organization	type of organization	Name interviewee – position within organization	Date of interview
AKARSU - Gesundheit, Bewegung, ausbildungsbegleitende Hilfe und Berufsvorbereitung e.V.	women	Nazire Karaman – Manager	29 June 2005
Anadolu Alevileri Kültür Merkezi – Kulturzentrum Anatolischer Aleviten e.V. AAKM	Alevi	Riza Ataç and Dervis Doğan - Chairman and treasurer	7 July 2005
AYPA e.V.	cultural	Ali Yildirim – Chairman	6 July 2005
Berlin Mehter Takımı e.V.	cultural	Secretary ¹²⁴	26 July 2005
Berlin Türk Musikisi Konservatari (Gesellschaft für Türkische Musik e.V.)	cultural	Halime Karademirli – Manager	9 June 2005
BTBTM Berlin Türk Bilim ve Teknoloji Merkezi / Türkisches Wissenschafts- und Technologiezentrum e.V.	education and research	Gülşen Fidan – Chairwoman	19 July 2005
BTKB (Berlin Türkiye Kadınlar Birliği; Türkischer Frauenverein Berlin e.V.)	women	Emine Can - Manager	25 July 2005
El Ele – Hand in Hand Nachbarschaftsheim e.V.	health care	Christine Skowronska-Koch - Board member and employee	18 July 2005
EM-DER – Seniorenverein	elderly	Erdogan Özdiğer - Chairman	27 July 2005
Freiheitlich Türkisch-Deutscher Freundschaftsverband e.V. Hür-Türk	social	Rolf Reinemann – Chairman	20 July 2005
Islamische Föderation in Berlin e.V. (IFB)	IFB	Burhan Kesici – Spokesman and chairman of the executive council	11 July 2005
KOTTI e.V. Nachbarschaftshaus	welfare	Monika Wagner - Manager	12 July 2005
Kurdistan, Kultur- und Hilfsverein e.V.	Kurdish	Fevzi Aktas – Manager	13 June 2005

¹²⁴ The name of this respondent is unknown.

Name of the organization	type of organization	Name interviewee – position within organization	Date of interview
Papatya Türkisch Deutscher Frauenverein e.V.	<i>women</i>	Eva Kultus – Manager	16 June 2005
Türkische Bund in Berlin Brandenburg e.V. TBB	<i>umbrella</i>	Kenan Kolat - Chairman	21 June 2005
Tio Treff- und Informationsort für Türkische Frauen e.V.	<i>women</i>	Karin Heinrich – Manager	8 July 2005
Turkei Zentrum (future Allmende)	<i>social</i>	Sencer Eren - Chairman	20 June 2005
Türkisch-Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. (TDU)	<i>trade/ employer's</i>	Bahattin Kaya – Chairman, Mumtaz Ergün – Manager	8 July 2005
Türkisch - Deutsche Gesellschaft e.V.	<i>social</i>	Ali Savaşer – Chairman	13 July 2005
Türkischer Elternverein in Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.	<i>welfare</i>	Safer Çınar – Chairman	20 June 2005
Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V.	<i>umbrella</i>	Celal Altun – Secretary	29 June 2005
Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln e.V.	<i>other</i>	Züleyha Cat – Chairwoman	10 June 2005
Türkische Islamitische Friedhofs- und Bestattungsverein	<i>Diyanet</i>	Mr. Çahir	13 July 2005
1. Türkischer Ringerverein Berlin 1981 e.V.	<i>sport</i>	Sabri Adak – Chairman	14 June 2005
Türkisches Sprache und Kultur Zentrum	<i>religious Muslim</i>	Abdullah Onat – Vorsitzender	20 July 2005
Türkische Idealisten Gemeinschaft in Berlin e.V.	<i>social</i>	Ibrahim Yigit – Chairman	26 July 2005.
YEKMAL Verein der Eltern aus Kurdistan in Berlin e.V.	<i>Kurdish</i>	Radwan Osman - board member	24 June 2005

Appendix 4. Key concepts and precautions in social network analysis

Key concepts

Network: 'a finite set or sets of actors and the relation or relations defined on them' (Wasserman & Faust, 1994 [2007]).

Adjacent: Two points that are connected by a line are said to be adjacent.

Walk: sequence of lines between two points.

Path: a walk, in which each line and each point is distinct.

Path length: the number of lines that make up a path.

Distance: the length of the shortest path between two points.

Connected network: Network in which there is a path between every pair of actors. It consists of only one component.

Component: a subgraph (a subgroup) in which there is a path between all pairs of points in the subgraph, and there is no path between a point in the component and any point not in the component (Wasserman & Faust, 1994 [2007]). A connected network consists of only one component, while a disconnected network has several components.

Isolate: a point that is connected to no other point

Cut-point: a point whose removal would increase the number of components by dividing the sub-graph into two or more separate subsets between which there are no connections (Scott, 2001).

Bridge: the line upon whose removal would increase the number of components by dividing the sub-graph into two or more separate subsets between which there are no connections; compare with cut-point.

Undirected network: network in which for each relationship between any pair of points goes that there is no distinction between the tie that leads from point X to point Y and the tie that leads from point Y to point X.

Directed network: a network in which the relations are directed from one agent to another (Scott, 2001).

Ego-network: network that only contains a particular 'ego' (the actor whom it is all about) and the actors it is related to. Often, the relationships between the alters are also included.

Ego: the central actor.

Alter: the actors to which ego is directly connected.

Degree: the number of alters that an ego is directly connected to (Borgatti, Jones, & Everett, 1998). Organizations with a higher degree have more social capital than those who have a lower degree.

In-degree: the number of incoming ties of an actor. An actor that receives has a high in-degree, i.e. has many incoming ties degree, has high prestige or popularity (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1994 [2007]).

Out-degree: the number of outgoing ties of an actors. In general, nodes with a high out-degree are thought to be influential actors (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) because these actors can spread information to many others.

Closeness: reflects how close an actor is to the other actors in the network. Those organizations that have low closeness (thus are close to all other organizations) can be considered to have more social capital than those organizations with high closeness. The closeness score of an actor i is the sum of the distances between this actor and each other actor ($n-1$). This implies that a node that is very close to all other nodes has very small distances to all these nodes and thus has a *low* closeness score. The n Closeness score that is presented here corrects this; a high score thus refers to a central position of the actor.

nCloseness score: This is a percentage comparing a point's closeness in a network in which all other points are its neighbours (i.e. what would be the case for the central node in a star-shaped network) to the closeness in the actual network.

Betweenness: the extent to which a point lies on the shortest path between all combinations of other points in the network. The advantage of being on the shortest path between two actors is that the in-between-actor has the opportunity to prohibit or allow the pair of actors to reach each other. An organization with high betweenness has better chances at profiting from the resources in the network (in other words has more social capital) than an actor with low betweenness.

Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV): introduced by Mueller and Schuessler (1961). Measures the probability that two randomly selected network members are in different categories, controlled for the number of categories (Agresti & Agresti, 1978). The IQV of an actor is defined as:

$$IQV = \frac{1 - \sum p_i^2}{1 - 1/k} \quad \text{Equation 4.1}$$

where k is the number of categories and p_i is the proportion of observations (proportion of alters) in the i th category ($i = 1, \dots, k$). The measure reaches a maximum of 1, when all alters are in a different category (i.e. high heterogeneity), and a minimum of 0, if all alters are in the same category (i.e. homogeneity).

The IQV describes the extent to which alters are alike or dislike *each other* and is, therefore, indicative of the diversity of the connections of an actor.

E-I index: developed by Krackhardt and Stern (1988). Indicates the extent to which ego resembles its alters on a relevant characteristic, for example ethnicity. The E-I index takes the number of external ties of an actor (E_i), subtracts the number of internal ties (I_i) and divides this by the total number of internal and external ties ($E_i + I_i$, which is equal to the degree).

This is captured in Equation 4.2:

$$E-I \text{ index} = \frac{E_i - I_i}{E_i + I_i} \quad \text{Equation 4.2}$$

In the current study, it is a reflection of the amount of bonding and bridging social capital. The index scores range from -1 to +1. An organization with a score of -1 on the E-I index is connected to similar organizations only; the organization only has bonding social capital. An organizations with a score of +1 is connected only to unlike organizations and thus has only bridging social capital. If an organization has as much links to unlike as to like organizations, it has a score of 0.

Precautions/ points of attention:

- For all measures goes that the actor indices can also be aggregated across actors to obtain a single, group-level index, which summarizes how variable or differentiated the set of actors is as a whole with respect to a given measure (Wasserman & Faust, 1994 [2007]). For example, the mean and standard deviation of the degree scores give an idea of the extent to which actors have similar ego network sizes. High standard deviations point out that the network actors are heterogeneous with respect to network position and that the network as a whole is relatively centralized¹²⁵ (i.e. a tendency towards a small group of actors) (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005).
- Not all measures can be calculated in all networks. For example, the betweenness and closeness measures require that all actors in the network are (tightly) connected. The network of interlocking directorates, neither in Amsterdam nor in Berlin, satisfies this demand. The table below presents an overview of which measures can be calculated in which network.

As the contact network and the mobilization network are directed networks, the degree measure can be specified into an in-degree and an out-degree measure. The network of interlocking directorates is undirected and thus only the general degree measure is applicable.

¹²⁵ Aggregated centrality measures are easily confused with the concept of centralization. Centralization measures refer to particular properties of the graph structure as a whole, while single actors can be ascribed scores on the centrality measures which then can be aggregated.

	Network of interlocking directorates	Contact network	Mobilization network
Components	*	*	*
Cut points	*	*	*
Bridges	*	*	*
Degree	*	*	*
In-degree		*	*
Out-degree		*	*
Closeness		*	
Betweenness		*	
IQV	*	*	*
E-I index	*	*	*

- The contact network and the mobilization network are based on sampled data. Several mathematical studies on sample procedures, sample size, and reliability and validity of centrality estimation in network analysis have been done (e.g. Granovetter, 1976; Erickson, Nosanchuk & Lee, 1981; Frank, 1988; Galaskiewicz, 1991). These studies have shown that network sampling is an option when one takes notice of several precautions, such as if possible, taking multiple samples, sampling ordered pairs instead of actors, using as big samples as possible and preferably apply network sampling mainly on large, sparse networks (Galaskiewicz, 1991). Although the results of these studies are promising for the particular type of sampling and subsequent data gathering and data analysis, the current study uses a different kind of sampling and a different way of data gathering, which are not compatible with the earlier studies.
- Costenbader and Valente (2003) (meta-)studied the estimation of eleven centrality measures (amongst which degree, closeness and betweenness) in random network samples of different sizes (10 – 80% of the total network) in order to establish the stability of the measures with respect to non-response. Costenbader and Valente found that especially the in-degree centrality is a stable measure, irrespective of sample size. At a level of 30% (about the response rate in the contact networks in the current study), the average correlation of the in-degree in the sample with the population in-degree was over .80. The out-degree measure was much more sensitive to sampling (at 30% an average correlation of about .40), as were closeness (around .50 at 30%) and betweenness (almost .30 at 30%). All centrality measure estimates performed better at higher levels of sampling (i.e. bigger samples). All in all, Costenbader and Valente encouragingly wrote that '*researchers who do not interview all members of a community or network may still be able to take advantage of some aspects of network theory and techniques*'.
- The results of the sampled in the contact and mobilization networks thus have to be treated with caution, but, as long one is aware of the limitations, can still be used to get a picture of the (mobilized) social capital of the Turkish communities.

Appendix 5. Aggregated measures of the social capital and mobilized social capital indicators in Amsterdam and Berlin

	Amsterdam			Berlin		
	Network of interlocking directorates	Contact network	Mobilization network	Network of interlocking directorates	Contact network	Mobilization network
Number of points	278	391	96	195	451	132 (71)
Number of isolates	122	0	15	148	0	18
Number of lines	172	803	81	54	1093	242 (55)
Components	45	1	10	20	1	1
Cut points	22	-	19	6	-	15
Degree	1.24 (1.70) °	-	-	.28 (.53) ***	-	-
Out-degree mean (sd); [min, max]	-	21.16 (14.00) [6.57]°°°	3 (2.48) [0,10]	-	42.09 (30.40) [9,122]	As 1 .42 (1.11) Apart 1.83 (8.87)
In-degree mean (sd); [min, max]	-	2.06 (2.51) [0,19]°°	1.21 (0.75) [0,6]	-	2.42 (2.44) [0,17]	all senders 2.29 (1.60)
nCloseness	-	38.19 (3.99) ▪	-	-	44.74 (4.74) *	10.08 (19.00)
nBetweenness	-	5.24 (5.38) ▪▪	-	-	7.09 (6.07) **	-
E-I index •	-21 (.92)	-17 (.42)	-30 (.88)	-	00 (.48)	-42 (.82)
IQV	.10 (.23)	.57 (.21)	.15 (.29)	-	.61 (.19)	.24 (.36)
E-I index	.50 (.79)	.53 (.43)	.52 (.69)	.01 (1.00)	.66 (.31)	.52 (.67)
IQV	.23 (.30)	.85 (.13)	.31 (.33)	.05 (.16)	.89 (.07)	.38 (.33)
E-I index	-.11 (.90)	.35 (.42)	.36 (.84)	.28 (.95)	.30 (.42)	.46 (.63)
IQV	.17 (.26)	.80 (.11)	-	.06 (.17)	.78 (.15)	.40 (.37)
Chain length	-	-	1.7 (max.4)	-	-	1.4 [max.:3]
Number of chains	-	-	73	-	-	47

All E-I indices and IQV's are calculated based on the cases for which it was possible to do so.

° If only the interlocks: 2.21 (1.73)

°° Based on all points.

°°° Based only on the interviewees.

▪ Only includes the starters. Incl. all cases: 30.80 (4.20)

▪▪ Idem: .59 (2.31)

* Based on all points: 34.50 (4.51)

** 0.43 (2.20)

*** Based only on those with at least one interlock: 1.15 (.42)

Appendix 6A. Results from the network analyses on the network of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam

Organization	Degree	IQV Ethnicity	E-I Ethnicity	IQV Type of organization	E-I Type of organization	E-I Location
IHHA	9	0	-1	0,51	-0,33	-0,33
Stichting Arafat	7	0	-1	0,26	-0,71	-0,43
Stichting Kurdische Nat. Bibliotheek	4	0	-1	0	-1	-1
HTIB	3	0,52	-0,33	0,69	0,33	-0,33
Stichting Witboek	3	0	-1	0,69	1	1
Hollanda Fenerbahceliler Dernegi	2	0,58	0	0,52	0	1
Stichting Annifer	2	0	-1	0,52	1	1
Stichting Aslan	1	0	1	0	-1	-1
Stichting Papyrus	1	0	1	0	1	1
Fatih Moslee	1	0	1	0	1	1
Haci Bayram Moskee	1	0	-1	0	1	-1
STISCCAN Moskee	1	0	-1	0	1	-1
Eyüp Sultan moskee	1	0	-1	0	1	-1
MGKT Hilal	1	0	-1	0	-1	-1
MGT Bos en Lommer jongeren	1	0	-1	0	-1	1
Cafer I Sadik Moskee	1	0	1	0	1	-1
Yunus Emre	1	0	-1	0	1	-1
DVA	1	0	1	0	1	-1
ULU Camii/Tukem	1	0	-1	0	1	-1
Htiyarlar Sohbet Salonu	1	0	-1	0	1	1
AGB	1	0	-1	0	1	1
Stichting Anatolie	1	0	-1	0	1	-1

NB Only the results of organizations that were interviewed and had at least one interlock are presented.

Appendix 6B. Results from network analyses on the contact network in Amsterdam

Respondent	Out Degree	In Degree	nClose-ness	nBetween-ness	IQV Ethnicity	E-I Ethnicity	IQV Type of organization	E-I Type of organization	E-I Location
AGB	31	2	38,2	10,5	0,51	0,36	0,50	-0,42	-0,16
Akorelse	25	0	39,9	5,5	0,47	-0,52	0,93	1,00	0,68
Anatolie Voetbal	21	0	40,4	3,9	0,58	-0,33	0,93	0,71	0,52
Anatolie	13	0	34,3	2,8	0,79	0,39	0,75	0,08	0,85
Aya Sofia Moskee	21	2	40,3	4,7	0,52	-0,33	0,88	0,33	0,43
Stichting Beth Nahrin	8	1	35,8	0,7	0,47	-0,50	0,88	1,00	0,50
Cafer I Sadik Moskee	16	7	38,4	3,6	0,77	0,00	0,91	0,63	0,13
DVA	30	2	38,5	7,6	0,78	0,67	0,95	0,93	0,07
Eyup Sultan Moskee	27	3	36,0	8,4	0,87	0,33	0,93	0,70	-0,26
Fatih Moskee	19	15	42,3	5,8	0,22	-0,79	0,86	0,37	0,68
Galaxi	19	0	38,4	2,1	0,31	-0,68	0,95	0,90	0,68
Haci Bayram Moskee	10	2	37,9	1,0	0,54	-0,40	0,81	0,20	0,80
Hollanda Fenerbahceller	8	8	41,6	3,4	0,55	0,25	0,75	0,50	0,50
Dermegi									
HTDB	46	8	43,7	14,9	0,75	0,30	0,96	0,91	0,17
HTTB	57	19	49,7	25,7	0,56	-0,37	0,98	0,93	0,83
Hurriyet	10	0	34,5	1,2	0,68	-0,20	0,89	0,80	0,60
IHHA	19	2	35,2	1,1	0,34	-0,67	0,56	-0,33	-0,33
Itiyarlar	6	0	32,8	0,5	0,58	0,00	0,86	0,67	-0,33
Jonge Ondernemers	17	0	36,2	4,8	0,35	-0,65	0,85	0,29	0,88
Kader	9	1	35,2	1,3	0,40	-0,56	0,87	0,78	0,78
MGKT Hilal Basak	47	3	40,2	8,9	0,79	0,11	0,92	0,66	0,02
MGT Bos en Lommer jongeren	31	3	39,2	3,2	0,74	-0,10	0,92	0,61	-0,16
Moskee Ulu/Tukem	13	1	30,7	3,7	0,77	0,39	0,86	0,39	0,39
Netwerk NTA	9	0	35,8	0,8	0,52	-0,33	0,90	0,78	1,00
Objectief Nieuws	14	0	35,0	1,4	0,42	-0,57	0,93	0,86	0,86
Papyrus	9	1	36,5	2,4	0,58	-0,33	0,54	-0,33	0,78
Stichting Anatolie	55	6	44,2	13,2	0,78	0,06	0,96	0,86	-0,06
Stichting Annifer	10	3	31,2	2,9	0,58	0,00	0,62	-0,20	0,80
Stichting Arafat	21	8	39,3	4,1	0,00	-1,00	0,56	-0,33	-0,14
Stichting Gouden Parapl	16	2	37,9	4,3	0,63	-0,13	0,92	1,00	0,63
Stichting Kayseri	7	8	38,6	0,7	0,00	-1,00	0,89	0,71	0,14
Stichting Kurdische Nat. Bibliotheek	13	1	35,6	2,8	0,81	0,54	0,90	0,54	0,39
Stichting Turks	50	11	45,4	18,8	0,77	0,12	0,96	0,80	0,32
Onderwijs Centrum									
Stichting Yunus Emre	34	4	40,8	4,2	0,76	0,00	0,93	0,94	-0,18
STISCCAN Moskee	25	7	42,3	8,9	0,70	0,04	0,95	0,84	0,04
Troya	18	0	35,2	4,5	0,60	-0,22	0,69	-0,11	1,00
Vereniging Evimiz	13	6	41,1	4,4	0,75	-0,08	0,91	0,54	-0,23
Stichting Witboek	7	2	32,9	0,7	0,57	-0,14	0,80	0,71	-0,14

Appendix 6C. Results from network analyses on the mobilization network in Amsterdam

NB Only sending organizations are included in the table.

Organization	Out-Degree	In-Degree	IQV		E-I		IQV		E-I	
			Ethnicity	Degree	Ethnicity	Degree	Type	Location	Type	Location
AGB	5	0	0	-1	0,50	0,2	0	0,2	1	-0,2
Agiad(Annifer)	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Akin Opbouwwerk-Noord medewerker 1	6	1	0	-1	0,81	1	0	1	1	-1
Akorese Vereniging Nederland	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Anatolie stichting	2	1	0,58	0	0,52	1	0	1	1	-1
Anatolie vv	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Aslan	3	0	0	1	0,46	1	0	1	1	1
Beth Nahrin	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Diversiteitsplatform Gemeente Amsterdam	6	1	0,58	0	0,69	0	0	0	0	0
DVA-DIDF	4	2	0	-1	0,78	0,5	0	0,5	0,5	0,5
Fatih Moskee	3	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Hollanda Fenerbahceliler Dernegi	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
HTDB	5	1	0	-1	0,75	1	0	1	0,6	0,6
HTIB	8	6	0,88	0,75	0,23	1	0	1	1	1
Kubra El	1	2	0	1	0	-1	0	-1	-1	-1
Kurdische Nationale Bibliotheek	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
MGT Bos en Lommer	1	1	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Milli Gorus Noord Nederland	1	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Objectief nieuws Stichting	5	0	0,65	-0,20	0,67	1	0	1	1	1
Papyrus Stichting	3	0	0,52	-0,33	0,46	-0,33	0,46	-0,33	0,33	0,33
STISCCAN	2	1	0	-1	0,52	0	0	0	-1	-1
STOC	5	0	0	-1	0,67	0,20	0	0,20	1	1
Studenten Unie Nederland	2	1	0	1	0,52	0	0	0	1	1
VerenigingvriendenvanKaratay	1	1	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Vrouwenlijn de	10	1	0,75	0,80	0,89	0,60	0,89	0,60	-0,4	-0,4
Witboek Stichting	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
Yunus Emre	1	0	0	-1	0	1	0	1	1	-1

Appendix 7A. Results from the network analyses on the network of interlocking directorates in Berlin

Organization	Degree	IQV type of organization	E-I type of organization	E-I location
Tuerkisch Islamischer Friedhofs und Bestattungsverein	3	0	-1	0
Tuerkischer Bund in Berlin TBB	2	0,69	0,33	1
Tuerkische Gemeinde zu Berlin TGB	2	0,52	1	1
Islamische Foederation in Berlin	2	0	-1	1
TDU	2	0	-1	0
Tuerkei Zentrum	1	0	1	1
Tuerkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft	1	0	1	1
BTBTM	1	0	-1	-1
Tuerkischer Ringervere in Berlin	1	0	-1	1
Tuerkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln/Tuerkische Minderheit	1	0	-1	-1

NB The table only contains data on organizations that were interviewed.

Appendix 7B. Results from network analyses on the contact network in Berlin

Respondent	Out Degree	In Degree	nClose-ness	nBetween-ness	IQV		E-I		IQV		E-I	
					ethnicity	IQV	ethnicity	IQV	type of organization	organization	type of organization	organization
AAKM	51	9	49,0	7,2	0,69	0,06	0,97	0,92	0,92	0,92	0,92	-0,29
Akarsu	65	11	49,3	10,5	0,74	0,26	0,95	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	-0,32
Aypa TV	18	10	44,4	5,3	0,64	0,67	0,86	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,00
Berlin Mehter Takimi	9	4	42,3	1,5	0,38	-0,56	0,92	0,78	0,78	0,78	0,78	0,78
Berlin Tuerk Musikisi Konservatari	27	8	43,9	5,2	0,61	-0,04	0,84	0,26	0,26	0,26	0,26	0,41
BTBTM	18	1	41,4	3,0	0,65	-0,11	0,91	0,56	0,56	0,56	0,56	0,44
BTBK	61	12	48,6	13,0	0,76	0,48	0,82	0,18	0,18	0,18	0,18	0,21
Elele	45	1	38,7	6,9	0,75	0,60	0,93	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	-0,47
EM DER	17	10	44,5	2,0	0,45	-0,41	0,92	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,53
IFB	23	5	39,2	6,9	0,40	-0,57	0,67	-0,13	-0,13	-0,13	-0,13	0,22
Kotti	57	3	45,5	8,1	0,76	0,47	0,94	0,61	0,61	0,61	0,61	-0,65
Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein KKH	70	10	46,6	6,1	0,96	0,66	0,89	0,66	0,66	0,66	0,66	0,46
Papayya	37	7	42,7	5,9	0,58	0,62	0,77	0,68	0,68	0,68	0,68	0,78
TBB Tuerkische Bund Berlin	122	17	55,8	24,5	0,81	0,07	0,94	0,89	0,89	0,89	0,89	0,39
TDU Tuerkisch Deutsche Unternehmer Verein	67	12	49,3	15,5	0,70	0,19	0,94	0,52	0,52	0,52	0,52	0,34
TEBB Tuerkische Elternverein Berlin Brandenburg	40	15	50,7	6,2	0,41	-0,55	0,96	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,10
TGB Tuerkische Gemeinde Berlin	100	15	51,7	21,4	0,55	-0,32	0,95	0,88	0,88	0,88	0,88	0,20
TIO	34	4	44,6	3,4	0,82	0,18	0,82	0,18	0,18	0,18	0,18	0,59
Tuerkei Zentrum	14	6	42,9	2,7	0,59	-0,29	0,93	0,71	0,71	0,71	0,71	1,00
Tuerkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft TDG	10	2	39,9	1,8	0,50	-0,40	0,85	1,00	1,00	1,00	1,00	0,40
Tuerkische Gemeinde zu Neukoelln /TurkischeMinderheit	60	7	49,5	12,5	0,65	-0,10	0,97	0,97	0,97	0,97	0,97	-0,17
Tuerkischer Idealisten Gemeinschaft in Berlin	12	0	34,7	1,9	0,32	-0,67	0,75	0,17	0,17	0,17	0,17	0,83
Tuerkischer Ringerverein	13	4	40,5	2,6	0,66	0,39	0,86	0,39	0,39	0,39	0,39	0,54
Tuerkisches Sprache und Kultur Zentrum	19	1	41,9	1,5	0,29	-0,68	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,90	0,79
Tuerkisch Isl. Friedhofs und Bestattungsverein	16	2	41,1	1,3	0,24	-0,75	0,93	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,50
Yekmal	88	7	44,6	10,2	0,96	0,75	0,90	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,75	0,23

Appendix 7C. Results from network analyses on the mobilization network in Berlin

NB Only sending organizations are included in the table.

Organization	Out-Degree	In-Degree	IQV Degree	IQV ethnicity	E-I Ethnicity	IQV Type organization	E-I Type organization	EI Index Location
AAKM	3	0	0	0	-1	0,46	1	-0,33
Akarsu	2	1	0,55	0	0	0,52	0	-1
Berliner Mehter Takimi	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1
BTBTM	2	0	0	0	-1	0,52	1	1
BTKB	22	0	0,84	0,27	0,27	0,59	-0,27	0,27
Dersim Cemaati	1	1	0	0	-1	0	1	-1
DITIB	1	1	0	0	-1	0	-1	1
EM-DER	3	0	0	0	-1	0,46	1	1
Hinbun	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	1
Kurdisches Inst. für Wissenschaft & Forschung	3	4	0	0	-1	0	-1	1
Kurdisches Zentrum	57	3	0,95	0,65	0,65	0,86	0,65	0,40
Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein	57	4	0,95	0,65	0,65	0,86	0,65	0,40
Odak e.V.	3	0	0,49	1	1	0,69	0,33	0,33
Omayra Kultur und Bildung	2	1	0	0	-1	0,52	0	1
TDU	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1
TEBB	60	1	0,95	0,77	0,77	0,86	0,9	0,37
TGB	2	3	0	0	-1	0,52	1	0
Tio	3	2	0,49	1	1	0,46	-0,33	0,33
Türkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1
TÖYED	2	1	0	0	-1	0,52	1	0
Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum	7	2	0	0	-1	0,80	1	-0,14
Türkischer Friedhofs und Bestattungsverein	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1
Türkischer Ringerverein Berlin	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1
YEKMAL	6	3	0,49	-0,33	-0,33	0,52	-0,33	0,33

Appendix 8. Chain data on the mobilization networks

Chain data on the mobilization networks in absolute numbers

			Non-response					
	Position in chain	Number approached	Number of unreachable	Number of sinks	Number of closers	Number of senders	Number of actors mentioned	Number of loops
Amsterdam	1	38	2	16	0	20	54	15
	2	39	11	7	17*	4	5	0
	3	5	0	1	2	2	16	4
	4	12	2	2	6**	2	7	5
	5	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
	Total	96	16	27	25	28	82	24
Berlin	1	37	5	16	0	16	37	15
	2	22	5	1	10	6	15	4
	3	11	4	5	0	2	3	2
	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Total	71	13	22	11***	24	55	21

number approached: number of organizations that were addressed in each step of the chains

number of unreachable: non-response because of non-contact

number of sinks: non-response because of non-cooperation

number of closers: number of organizations that do not have a Turkish background and/or are located outside Amsterdam or Berlin respectively. They were in this study regarded as natural end points of the chains. Closers were invited for the lecture, but were not asked to forward the invitation.

number of senders: number of actors that have mentioned one or more acquaintances.

number of actors mentioned: total number of names mentioned by all senders in each round, irrespective of whether these actors had already been approached in earlier (or the same) round.

number of loops: number of actors that were mentioned more than once.

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Summary (English)

Migrant organizations can play an important role in the process of integration; through the social capital that they have at their disposal, these organizations contribute to the social capital of the members of their communities. The aim of the current study was to investigate what this social capital of organizations is comprised of and how it is used. To this end, the Big World Experiment was developed. In addition, the influence of the political opportunity structure on (the mobilization of) social capital was analyzed.

1. The theory

Just as people have financial capital, they also possess *social* capital. Lin (2001) defines this as ‘the access to and use of resources embedded in a social structure’. While financial capital enables you to buy a car, social capital improves your chances of achieving the goals that would otherwise have been beyond your reach. It refers to your friends and acquaintances and the commodities and services that they put at your disposal, for example whether they are willing to walk your dog, help you find a better job, or lend you money. Scholars generally distinguish three aspects of social capital: networks, trust, and shared norms and values (cf. Van Deth, 2003), although not everyone emphasizes each element in the same way. In the current study, I focused primarily on the network component, because an actor can only access the resources of others if he/she is actually connected to them. This component is, therefore, a necessary prerequisite for the presence of social capital. What is more, in most cases the mere presence of a connection between two actors means that they trust each other and share the same norms and values.

Social capital can involve more than a single individual, as well as actors that are not people. Putnam (1995), for example, argues that the quality of democracy is positively related to the amount of social capital that exists in society. His measure of social capital is the degree of generalized social trust in this society (i.e. whether someone has faith in those he/she does not know personally). Accordingly, Putnam studies social capital on the collective or group level. It is important to distinguish clearly between individual and collective social capital. This is because researchers tend to consider different perspectives without making this explicit, using measurement instruments which fit their view of social capital but would not match any other approach to this issue. When this occurs, it can appear that these scholars are concerned with completely different matters, when in fact they are talking about the same thing, but on a different level. In order to make the differences clearer, I have used a typology in which I distinguish between an individual and collective ‘provider’ and an individual and collective ‘receiver’ of social capital. The ‘provider’ refers to who or what is the source of the social

capital, whereas the 'receiver' is the actor or set of actors who can benefit from it. In Putnam's case, both the provider and the receiver operate on the collective level. Lin, on the other hand, studies the two sides of social capital from the individual perspective. In Coleman's (1990) theory, however, the provider is on the collective and the receiver is on the individual level. In the current study, I used a fourth perspective, which regards the provider as operating on the individual and the receiver on the collective level. This approach is particularly useful in this study because I wanted to investigate how voluntary organizations within ethnic communities (migrant organizations) use their social capital. An organization (the provider) is regarded as an 'individual' or separate actor. If each organization activates its social capital, for example by gathering and passing on information, all of the organizations taken together would be able to inform all of the members of their community. Accordingly, the community (the collective) is regarded as the receiver of social capital.

Immigration and integration are hotly debated topics in Western liberal democracies. Many of these discussions concern the importance of migrant organizations, with some arguing that they hinder the (political) integration of immigrants into the host society, while others maintain that they actually promote it.

According to Almond and Verba (1962), voluntary organizations generally have a stimulating effect on the political attitudes of citizens. They argue that different kinds of people, with opposing views, meet within these organizations and, to make a success of the organization and work towards common goals, have to find ways of overcoming their internal differences. In the process of doing this, they learn democratic skills, such as debating, democratic values, like mutual equality, and also develop social trust. The members then transfer these skills and attitudes into the 'real world', where they are more likely to participate in the political process.

Almond and Verba did not study migrant organizations in particular, but the question arises: why would something which holds true for voluntary organizations in general, not also apply to migrant organizations? Fennema and Tillie (1999) revealed that in the case of Amsterdam, the members of ethnic communities which are more organized have higher rates of political participation than those in communities that are less well organized. In other words, the researchers were able to confirm Almond and Verba's proposition in the particular case of migrant organizations. Fennema and Tillie added that not only does the number of organizations within a community matter, but whether these organizations are connected at board level by means of interlocking directorates is just as relevant. An interlocking directorate refers to an individual who has seats on the boards of two or more organizations at the same time. Fennema and Tillie assumed that these interlocking directorates speed up the process of learning 'lessons in democracy', because the board members of the separate organizations work together and exchange information. Because of these contacts, and the interaction with governmental bodies, the board members also develop social and political trust. They

then pass this on to their members, who in turn pass it on to friends and acquaintances who do not belong to any organization.

Even though this is a convincing line of argument, empirical support for it is limited. The few indicators presented by Fennema and Tillie of the degree of organization on the one hand and the extent of political participation on the other, provide no insight into the processes of information exchange and the passing on of trust. In the current study, I developed a tool named the Big World Experiment with which it is possible to track the exchange of information between organizations, a process which is regarded as one type of mobilization of the social capital of migrant organizations. The research questions which guided the investigation of the organizational network and the mobilization thereof were:

What does the social capital of an ethnic community look like?

How is this social capital mobilized?

The way in which organizations mobilize their social capital not only depends on the way it is shaped, but also on the context in which these organizations operate. The relevant context for migrant organizations is the political opportunity structure. This refers to 'dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action' (Tarrow, 1994). In the specific case of immigrants, Koopmans and Statham (2000) distinguished two dimensions which determine the political opportunity structure (POS): citizenship regimes and integration policies. The first dimension refers to the individual rights of immigrants, such as the right to be naturalized and vote. The second dimension concerns immigrants' rights as a group, for example the right to establish ethnic organizations. A POS is 'closed' if immigrants have few individual and group rights, and 'open' when they have more. It is generally acknowledged that the openness of the political structure influences the *degree* to which people take collective action (e.g. Tilly, 1978). It is likely that this openness also influences the *way* in which collective action is taken. Consequently, it was expected herein that the political opportunity structure would have an effect on the way in which migrant organizations mobilized their social capital. A third research question was therefore:

What is the influence of the political opportunity structure on the social capital of migrant organizations and the way in which they mobilize it?

This was studied by means of a comparison between two cities, one which has an open POS, i.e. Amsterdam, while that of the other is relatively closed, i.e. Berlin. The characteristics of the open POS in Amsterdam include the facts that: migrants who have lived in the city for at least five years have the right to vote in local elections; many migrant organizations receive grants; and the government has actively pursued policies

relating to integration. The POS in Berlin, however, is regarded as closed because: immigrants cannot easily become naturalized; have no voting rights; very few organizations receive subsidies; and integration has only recently become a separate policy field.

Both cities harbour a Turkish community of a considerable size, each of which is well organized and similar with respect to social demographic characteristics. These comparable communities, in different circumstances, therefore lend themselves to an assessment in which the influence of the POS can be evaluated.

2. The methods

In order to answer the research questions set out above, several types of data were required. Firstly, it was important to be clear about what the social capital of migrant organizations looks like. Fennema and Tillie took the network of interlocking directorates as an indicator. Herein, however, social capital was regarded as involving more than this. It is likely that many organizations maintain a great deal of contact with each other, even if this is not formally registered. Accordingly, it is important to take the informal contact network into account, as well as the links at the formal level. The network of interlocking directorates was based on data from the archives of the Chamber of Commerce (Amsterdam) and the *Vereinsregister* (Berlin), both of which contain details of all formally registered Turkish organizations and their board members.

The contact network was determined by interviews held with the representatives of Turkish organizations in the two cities. Using a structured questionnaire, these representatives (preferably the chair) were asked about the contacts that their organizations maintain with other organizations. This produced an 'ego-network' for each organization questioned, and, when taken together, these made up the contact network.

The manner in which social capital is mobilized (the second research question) was investigated by way of a field experiment: the Big World Experiment. This owes its name to the aim of the research: finding out how extensive the world of voluntary organizations is in ethnic communities. In other words, how many organizations are reached during a mobilization process? As part of the experiment, the organizations which were interviewed during the earlier phase of data collection were invited to attend a lecture on the 'art of networking', during which the speaker would present the results of the first part of the study and discuss the significance of networking for voluntary organizations. Furthermore, each invitee was asked whether there were other organizations that he/she thought would also be interested in attending the lecture. If an organization was mentioned, its contact details were duly noted, with the research team

approaching these organizations, inviting them to the lecture, and putting the same question to them. This snowball method resulted in a network of organizations which referred to each other. This was termed the mobilization network.

In each city, the network of interlocking directorates and contact network (the social capital) were compared to the mobilization network (the mobilized social capital). Among the characteristics examined were the shape and nature of the networks, the central actors therein and the amount of bonding and bridging (mobilized) social capital. Bonding social capital refers to the ties between actors which are similar in terms of relevant features (here: ethnicity, type of organization), whereas bridging social capital concerns the links between actors which differ from each other with respect to these same characteristics. Finally, the ties between migrant and governmental organizations were also taken into account.

3. The results

Within the open political opportunity structure in Amsterdam, the social capital of the city's Turkish organizations had developed into a horizontal network; there were no leading organizations operating on a different, higher level. The social capital included relatively many inter-ethnic links (bridging social capital), as well as a great deal of contact between the migrant organizations and local government. The community consists of ideologically opposed groups of organizations. Internally, these groups are closely connected, but there are very few connections between groups. The characteristics of the social capital, including ideological divisions, significant ethnic diversity, and the extent of the contact between organizations and the government, were also obvious in the mobilization network.

Within the closed POS in Berlin, the social capital of the Turkish organizations has a vertical structure; two umbrella organizations are each in a prominent position in the organizational landscape. Each of these has many organizations connected to it, both member as well as sympathizing organizations. These umbrella organizations achieved their pivotal position in the community for a large part because the local government selected them as two of the few focal points for its subsidy policies and as dialogue partners. The relatively dismissive stance of the government has led to it being regarded with skepticism by the Turkish community, and has caused this population to be internally focused. The result is an independent community, with a well-organized mobilization, in which influential actors are easily and frequently reached and a message travels quickly. Similar to the case of Amsterdam, the structure and nature of the social capital in Berlin determined the mobilization process. In the latter city, however, there were several collaborative bodies (more than in Amsterdam) which contributed to the social capital, and some of them played a crucial role during the mobilization. The largest of these, the *Migrationsrat*, had a central position in the mobilization network,

and thereby connected ideologically distinct groups (the different ideological groups were unconnected during the mobilization in Amsterdam). The umbrella organizations served as focal points for the smaller organizations.

It transpired that the openness of the political opportunity structure influenced the structure and nature of the social capital of the Turkish communities in both Amsterdam and Berlin. The POS and the composition of the social capital subsequently affected the way in which the latter was mobilized. It was not possible to determine a univocally positive or negative relationship between the openness of the POS and the (mobilized) social capital. In some respects, an open POS is positively related to the social capital of migrant organizations, for example, as can be seen in the greater amount of ethnically bridging social capital they possess, while there is a negative relationship with the initiatives taken by the migrant organizations. This was more prevalent in the closed political opportunity structure. However, the differences between the two cities were clear enough to enable us to conclude that the POS does influence both social capital and social capital in operation.

4. The conclusions

An alternative research method was used in this study, namely the Big World Experiment. Many social science researchers are hesitant about using experiments, but these fears are unfounded. What is more, by using this unorthodox method, it is possible to actually demonstrate how social capital works, instead of simply making assumptions. This is not possible with other approaches to the issue. With this study I, therefore, want to make a plea for the greater use of experimental methods in the social sciences.

In summary, it transpired that the openness of the political opportunity structure influenced the social capital of migrant organizations. An open POS resulted in a more horizontal network, while a closed POS led to a more vertical network. This also had consequences for the mobilization of a community. In a horizontal structure, the mobilization was more fragmented, while in a vertical arrangement a smoother and more comprehensive mobilization could occur.

So far as the theory is concerned, this study has clarified that it is better to consider the social capital of organizations as the combination of the network of interlocking directorates and the contact network, rather than just as the former. As expected, the two networks complemented each other and overlapped only to a limited extent. Furthermore, many of the contacts from the contact network were addressed during the mobilization process, while those from the network of interlocking directorates were not. On the other hand, it did transpire that the nature of the relationships between the organizations which addressed each other during the mobilization resembled those that

existed in the network of interlocking directorates. The relationships in both the network of interlocking directorates and the mobilization network were characterized by a high degree of similarity between the actors.

This study has also provided empirical evidence of the validity of the individual-collective perspective on social capital (one of the four outlooks in the typology presented herein). By adopting this approach, it is possible to map how individual organizations contribute to the functioning of the social capital of the community as a whole.

Some issues were not addressed in the current study, but certainly deserve attention in the future. The possibility that the topic which triggers the mobilization determines the course thereof is one such example. An investigation of the effect of different kinds of information on the mobilization of social capital could thus be a matter for further research. Other possibilities include: the implementation of the experiment in different ethnic communities, the comparison of the results within migrant communities and the non-migrant majority, the comparison of the working of social capital in migrant communities and in the country of origin, and the influence of board members who are born and raised in the host country on the shape and operation of social capital.

Samenvatting (Nederlands)

Migrantenorganisaties kunnen een belangrijke rol spelen in het integratieproces. Door het sociaal kapitaal dat deze organisaties hebben, dragen zij bij aan het sociaal kapitaal van de leden van hun gemeenschap. In deze studie wordt onderzocht waar het sociaal kapitaal van migrantenorganisaties uit bestaat en hoe zij dit gebruiken. Om dit laatste te onderzoeken, is het Big World Experiment ontwikkeld. Ook wordt de invloed van de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur op (de mobilisatie van) het sociaal kapitaal geanalyseerd.

1. De theorie

Zoals mensen financieel kapitaal hebben, beschikken zij ook over *sociaal* kapitaal. Lin (2001) definieert dit als 'de toegang tot en het gebruik van bronnen die zijn ingebed in een sociale structuur'. Financieel kapitaal stelt je in staat een auto te kopen en op een soortgelijke manier helpt sociaal kapitaal je doelen te bereiken die je alleen niet zou hebben bereikt. Sociaal kapitaal gaat over je vrienden en bekenden en de goederen en diensten die zij jou ter beschikking stellen, bijvoorbeeld of ze bereid zijn je hond uit te laten, je aan een betere baan te helpen, of geld te lenen. Wetenschappers onderscheiden drie aspecten van sociaal kapitaal: netwerken, vertrouwen en gedeelde normen en waarden (vgl. Van Deth, 2003), al legt niet iedereen op alle onderdelen evenveel nadruk. In deze studie richt ik mij primair op het onderdeel netwerken, omdat een actor pas toegang heeft tot hulpbronnen van anderen als hij/zij daadwerkelijk met die anderen verbonden is. De netwerkcomponent is dus een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor de aanwezigheid van sociaal kapitaal. Bovendien is het in vrijwel alle gevallen zo dat als twee actoren met elkaar zijn verbonden, zij elkaar vertrouwen en gedeelde normen hebben.

Sociaal kapitaal kan ook over andere actoren dan personen gaan en bovendien over meer dan één persoon. Zo betoogt Putnam (1995) dat de kwaliteit van de democratie samenhangt met de hoeveelheid sociaal kapitaal in een maatschappij. Het sociaal kapitaal meet hij af aan de mate van veralgemeniseerd sociaal vertrouwen binnen die maatschappij (d.w.z. of iemand ook mensen vertrouwt die hij of zij niet persoonlijk kent). Putnam onderzoekt sociaal kapitaal dus op groepsniveau. Het is belangrijk dat het onderscheid tussen individueel en collectief sociaal kapitaal duidelijk wordt gemaakt, omdat onderzoekers andere perspectieven aannemen, zonder dit expliciet te maken. Zij gebruiken meetinstrumenten die weliswaar aansluiten bij hun perspectief op sociaal kapitaal, maar niet zouden passen bij een ander perspectief. Daardoor lijkt het soms alsof deze onderzoekers zich met hele andere onderwerpen bezighouden, maar eigenlijk hebben ze het over hetzelfde maar op een ander niveau. Om deze verschillen inzichtelijk

te maken, introduceer ik een typologie die onderscheid maakt tussen een individuele en collectieve 'verlener' en een individuele en collectieve 'verkrijger' van sociaal kapitaal. De 'verlener' verwijst naar wie of wat de bron is van het sociaal kapitaal en de 'verkrijger' verwijst naar de actor of set van actoren die van dit sociaal kapitaal kan profiteren. Bij Putnam bevinden zowel de verlener als de verkrijger zich op het collectieve niveau. Daarentegen bestudeert Lin de twee kanten van sociaal kapitaal op het individuele niveau. In Coleman's (1990) visie is het collectief de verlener en het individu de verkrijger. In onderhavige studie wordt het vierde perspectief gebruikt, dat van een individuele verlener en een collectieve verkrijger. Het gaat in deze studie namelijk over hoe vrijwilligersorganisaties binnen etnische gemeenschappen (migrantenorganisaties) hun sociaal kapitaal gebruiken. Een organisatie (de verlener) wordt daarbij als 'individu' of op zichzelf staande actor beschouwd. Als iedere afzonderlijke organisatie haar sociaal kapitaal in werking zet, bijvoorbeeld door het verzamelen en doorgeven van informatie, dan kunnen alle organisaties samen ervoor zorgen dat alle leden van de gemeenschap geïnformeerd worden. De gemeenschap (het collectief) kan in dit perspectief dus gezien worden als de verkrijger van het sociaal kapitaal.

Immigratie en integratie zijn toonaangevende thema's in het publieke debat in westerse liberale democratieën. Een deel van de discussie gaat over het belang van migrantenorganisaties. Sommigen vinden dat migrantenorganisaties de (politieke) integratie belemmeren, terwijl anderen betogen dat deze organisaties de integratie juist bevorderen.

Volgens Almond en Verba (1962) hebben vrijwilligersorganisaties in het algemeen een stimulerende werking op de politieke attitudes en het politieke gedrag van burgers. Zij stellen dat mensen van diverse pluimage en met tegengestelde visies elkaar ontmoeten binnen deze organisaties. Om een succesvolle organisatie te vormen en hun gemeenschappelijke doel te bereiken, moeten de leden hun onderlinge tegenstellingen zien te overbruggen. Daarbij leren zij democratische vaardigheden, zoals debatteren, democratische normen, bijvoorbeeld onderlinge gelijkheid, en ontwikkelen ze sociaal vertrouwen. Al deze vaardigheden en attitudes nemen zij vervolgens mee naar de 'echte wereld' waar ze uiteindelijk beter mee kunnen doen in het politieke proces.

Almond en Verba onderzochten weliswaar niet in het bijzonder migrantenorganisaties, maar waarom zou wat voor organisaties in het algemeen geldt, niet ook gelden voor migrantenorganisaties? Fennema en Tillie (1999) lieten in Amsterdam zien dat leden van etnische gemeenschappen die meer georganiseerd zijn, ook meer politiek participeren dan leden van gemeenschappen die minder goed georganiseerd zijn. Met andere woorden, zij konden de these van Almond en Verba bevestigen in het geval van migrantenorganisaties. De onderzoekers stelden bovendien dat niet alleen het aantal organisaties binnen een gemeenschap van belang is, maar ook of deze organisaties op bestuursniveau een netwerk met elkaar vormen door middel van

dubbelfuncties. Een bestuurlijke dubbelfunctie verwijst naar een persoon die in het bestuur van twee of meer organisaties zit. Fennema en Tillie veronderstellen dat dubbelfuncties het leren van 'lessen in democratie' versnellen, omdat bestuursleden van verschillende organisaties samenwerken en onderling informatie uitwisselen. De bestuursleden ontwikkelen sociaal en politiek vertrouwen door contacten met andere organisatiebesturen en met overheidsinstanties. Zij geven dit door aan hun leden, die dit op hun beurt over kunnen brengen op vrienden en kennissen die geen lid zijn van een organisatie.

Hoewel dit een overtuigende redenering is, is deze theorie empirisch nog weinig onderbouwd. De enkele indicatoren die Fennema en Tillie presenteerden voor organisatiegraad enerzijds en participatie anderzijds, laten niet zien of de processen van informatie-uitwisseling en doorgeven van vertrouwen daadwerkelijk plaatsvinden. In onderhavig onderzoek heb ik een methode ontwikkeld, het Big World Experiment, waarmee het proces van informatie-uitwisseling tussen organisaties wel in beeld gebracht kan worden. Dit proces wordt beschouwd als een vorm van mobilisatie van het sociaal kapitaal van migrantenorganisaties. Door het organisatienetwerk en de mobilisatie ervan daadwerkelijk te bestuderen, kunnen de volgende onderzoeksvragen worden beantwoord:

Hoe ziet het sociaal kapitaal van een etnische gemeenschap eruit?

Hoe wordt dit sociaal kapitaal gemobiliseerd?

Hoe organisaties hun sociaal kapitaal mobiliseren, hangt niet alleen af van hoe hun netwerk eruit ziet, maar ook van de context waarin zij zich bevinden. De relevante context voor migrantenorganisaties is de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur. Dit verwijst naar 'dimensies van de politieke omgeving die burgers aanzetten tot of weerhouden van het ondernemen van collectieve actie' (Tarrow, 1994). In het specifieke geval van immigranten, onderscheiden Koopmans en Statham (2000) twee dimensies die de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur (POS, naar het Engels: *political opportunity structure*) bepalen: burgerschapsregime en integratiebeleid. De eerste dimensie refereert aan de individuele rechten van immigranten, zoals het recht zich te naturaliseren en stemrecht. De tweede dimensie betreft de groepsrechten van immigranten, bijvoorbeeld het recht om etnische organisaties op te richten en daar subsidie voor te krijgen. Een POS wordt 'gesloten' genoemd naarmate immigranten weinig individuele en groepsrechten hebben en 'open' als zij die meer hebben. Het wordt algemeen aangenomen dat de openheid van een POS van invloed is op *de mate* van collectieve actie die wordt ondernomen (o.a. Tilly, 1978). Het is waarschijnlijk dat de openheid van een POS ook invloed heeft op *de wijze* waarop collectieve actie wordt ondernomen. Dit betekent dat in onderhavig onderzoek verwacht wordt dat de POS waarin migrantenorganisaties zich bevinden van invloed is

op de manier waarop migrantenorganisaties hun sociaal kapitaal mobiliseren. Een derde onderzoeksvraag is dus:

Wat is de invloed van de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur op het sociaal kapitaal van migrantenorganisaties en de manier waarop zij dit mobiliseren?

Dit wordt onderzocht door twee steden te vergelijken waarvan de POS in het ene geval als open bekend staat, te weten Amsterdam, en in het andere geval als relatief gesloten, namelijk Berlijn. Kenmerken van de open POS in Amsterdam zijn onder andere het feit dat migranten die langer dan 5 jaar in Amsterdam wonen stemrecht hebben bij lokale verkiezingen, dat veel migrantenorganisaties gesubsidieerd worden en dat er al decennia lang actief beleid gevoerd wordt met betrekking tot integratie. De geslotenheid van de POS in Berlijn blijkt onder andere uit het feit dat immigranten zich moeilijk kunnen laten naturaliseren, dat zij geen stemrecht hebben, dat er weinig geld beschikbaar is voor migrantenorganisaties en dat integratie pas sinds enkele jaren een apart beleidsterrein is.

In beide steden bevindt zich een Turkse gemeenschap van aanzienlijke omvang, met ieder een behoorlijke organisatiegraad en die bovendien vergelijkbaar zijn wat betreft sociaaldemografische kenmerken. Deze vergelijkbare gemeenschappen in verschillende omstandigheden lenen zich daarom goed om de invloed van de POS te onderzoeken.

2. De methoden

Om de onderzoeksvragen te kunnen beantwoorden, zijn verschillende data nodig. Allereerst moet worden geïnventariseerd hoe het sociaal kapitaal van migrantenorganisaties eruitziet. Fennema en Tillie namen het bestuursnetwerk, gebaseerd op bestuurlijke dubbelfuncties als indicator van sociaal kapitaal. In onderhavige studie wordt het sociaal kapitaal van migrantenorganisaties ruimer opgevat. Het is waarschijnlijk dat veel organisaties misschien geen bestuurlijke relaties met andere organisaties hebben, maar in het dagelijks leven wel veel contacten met hen onderhouden. Daarom is het belangrijk niet alleen het formele bestuursnetwerk, maar ook het informele contactennetwerk in kaart te brengen. Voor het bestuursnetwerk is gebruik gemaakt van data uit de archieven van de Kamer van Koophandel (Amsterdam) en het *Vereinsregister* (Berlijn), waarin alle formeel geregistreerde Turkse organisaties en hun bestuurders zijn opgenomen. Het contactennetwerk is gebaseerd op interviews met vertegenwoordigers (bij voorkeur de voorzitter) van Turkse organisaties in Amsterdam en Berlijn, die aan de hand van een gestructureerde vragenlijst werden bevraagd over de contacten die hun organisatie in het dagelijks leven onderhoudt met andere organisaties. Voor iedere ondervraagde organisatie kon op deze manier een 'egonetwerk' worden vastgesteld, en deze egonetwerken vormen samen het contactennetwerk.

Hoe het sociaal kapitaal is gemobiliseerd (de tweede onderzoeksvraag), is onderzocht aan de hand van een veldexperiment: het Big World Experiment. Het dankt zijn naam aan het doel van het experiment: achterhalen hoe groot de wereld van vrijwilligersorganisaties in een etnische gemeenschap is. Met andere woorden, hoeveel organisaties worden geactiveerd tijdens een mobilisatie? Om dit in beeld te brengen werden de organisaties die deel hadden genomen aan de eerder afgenomen interviews uitgenodigd voor een lezing over de 'kunst van het netwerken'. Tijdens de lezing zouden de onderzoeksresultaten van het eerste deel van het onderzoek worden gepresenteerd, en zou het bovendien gaan over het belang van netwerken voor vrijwilligersorganisaties. Iedere genodigde werd bovendien gevraagd of er andere organisaties zijn die zij ook voor de lezing uit zouden willen nodigen. Als hij of zij namen noemde, werden de contactgegevens van deze organisaties genoteerd. Vervolgens benaderde het onderzoeksteam ook deze organisaties, nodigde hen uit voor de lezing en legden hen dezelfde vraag voor. Via deze sneeuwbalmethode werd een netwerk zichtbaar van naar elkaar verwijzende organisaties, dat hier het mobilisatienetwerk wordt genoemd.

De bestuurs- en contactennetwerken (het sociaal kapitaal) zijn per stad vergeleken met het mobilisatienetwerk (het gemobiliseerde sociaal kapitaal). Daarbij is onder andere gekeken naar de vorm en aard van de netwerken, naar centrale actoren in de netwerken en de hoeveelheid verbindend en overbruggend (gemobiliseerd) sociaal kapitaal. Verbindend sociaal kapitaal verwijst naar banden tussen actoren die op elkaar lijken voor wat betreft relevante kenmerken (hier: etniciteit, type organisatie); overbruggend sociaal kapitaal betreft de banden tussen actoren die van elkaar verschillen op deze eigenschappen. Ook is werden de banden tussen de migrantenorganisaties en overheidsinstanties geanalyseerd.

3. De resultaten

Binnen de open politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur in Amsterdam heeft het sociaal kapitaal van Turkse organisaties zich ontwikkeld tot een horizontaal netwerk. Er zijn geen leidende organisaties die op een ander, hoger niveau opereren. Het sociaal kapitaal omvat relatief veel interetnische contacten (overbruggend sociaal kapitaal) en er is veel contact tussen de organisaties en de lokale overheid. De gemeenschap bestaat uit ideologisch afwijkende groepen organisaties. Deze groepen zijn intern hecht verbonden, maar tussen de groepen is er relatief weinig contact. De kenmerken van het sociaal kapitaal, waaronder de ideologische scheidslijnen, de hoge etnische diversiteit en het feit dat er goed contact is tussen de organisaties en de overheid, kwamen ook uitgesproken naar voren in het mobilisatienetwerk.

Binnen de gesloten POS in Berlijn heeft het sociaal kapitaal van de Turkse organisaties een verticale structuur. Twee koepelorganisaties nemen ieder een prominente positie in in het organisatielandschap en weten veel organisaties aan zich te binden, zowel lidorganisaties als sympathiserende organisaties. Deze organisaties hebben zich als spil van de gemeenschap ontwikkeld doordat de overheid hen als aanspreekpunten koos via wie alle contacten verlopen. De relatief afwijzende houding van de overheid heeft er toe geleid dat er een sceptische houding heerst binnen de Turkse gemeenschap ten opzichte van die overheid en dat de gemeenschap sterk naar binnen is gericht. Het is daardoor een onafhankelijke gemeenschap met een gestroomlijnde mobilisatie, waarin de meest centrale organisaties gemakkelijk en veelvuldig werden bereikt en waarin informatie zich snel kan verspreiden. Net als in Amsterdam, werd het verloop van de mobilisatie bepaald door de structuur en aard van het sociaal kapitaal. In Berlijn is er een veelheid aan samenwerkingsverbanden (veel meer dan in Amsterdam) die bijdragen aan het sociaal kapitaal en waarvan er een aantal een cruciale rol speelt tijdens de mobilisatie. De grootste, de *Migrationsrat*, heeft een centrale positie in het mobilisatienetwerk en verbindt daardoor ideologisch verschillende groepen (terwijl deze in de Amsterdamse mobilisatie onverbonden bleven). De koepelorganisaties fungeerden als aanspreekpunt voor vele kleine organisaties.

De openheid van de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur is van invloed gebleken op de structuur en aard van het sociaal kapitaal van de Turkse gemeenschappen in Amsterdam en Berlijn. De POS en de samenstelling van het sociaal kapitaal bepalen vervolgens hoe het sociaal kapitaal wordt gemobiliseerd. Er is geen eenduidig positieve of negatieve samenhang tussen de openheid van de POS en het (gemobiliseerde) sociaal kapitaal. Op sommige aspecten hangt een open POS positief samen met het sociaal kapitaal van migranten organisaties. Zo werkt een open POS meer etnisch overbruggend sociaal kapitaal in de hand. Wat betreft andere aspecten is er daarentegen een negatieve relatie te zien tussen een open POS en het (gemobiliseerde) sociaal kapitaal. De gesloten POS in Berlijn leidt er bijvoorbeeld toe dat migrantenorganisaties veel meer initiatief nemen en samenwerkingsverbanden opzetten. Hoe dan ook zijn de verschillen tussen de twee steden dermate uitgesproken dat het gerechtvaardigd is om te stellen dat de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur het sociaal kapitaal en daarmee ook het gemobiliseerde sociaal kapitaal beïnvloedt.

4. De conclusies

In deze studie is gebruik gemaakt van een alternatieve onderzoeksmethode, het Big World Experiment. Veel onderzoekers in de sociale wetenschappen zijn huiverig voor experimenten, maar hun vrees is niet gegrond. Sterker nog: door gebruik te maken van deze onorthodoxe methode is het mogelijk daadwerkelijk aan te tonen hoe sociaal

kapitaal werkt, in plaats van te moeten volstaan met veronderstellingen hierover. Dit is iets dat met andere methoden niet mogelijk is. Met deze studie wil ik dan ook een pleidooi houden voor het gebruik van meer experimentele methoden in de sociale wetenschappen.

Samengevat is gebleken dat de openheid van de politieke mogelijkhedenstructuur van invloed is op het sociaal kapitaal van migrantenorganisaties. Een open POS leidt tot een meer horizontaal netwerk, terwijl een gesloten POS in een meer verticaal netwerk resulteert. Dit heeft ook gevolgen voor de mobilisatie van een gemeenschap. In een horizontale structuur verloopt de mobilisatie gefragmenteerd, terwijl in een verticale structuur sneller een veelomvattende mobilisatie kan plaatsvinden.

Met betrekking tot de theorie heeft deze studie uitgewezen dat het beter is het sociaal kapitaal van organisaties op te vatten als de combinatie van het bestuurs- en het contactennetwerk dan alleen als het bestuursnetwerk. Zoals werd verwacht, vullen het bestuursnetwerk en het contactennetwerk elkaar aan en overlappen zij slechts in enkele gevallen. Bovendien werden er tijdens de mobilisatie wel contacten uit het contactennetwerk aangesproken, maar niet uit het bestuursnetwerk. Wel bleek dat de aard van de relaties tussen organisaties die elkaar tijdens een mobilisatie benaderden, overeenkomt met die van de relaties in het bestuursnetwerk. De relaties in het bestuursnetwerk en het mobilisatienetwerk worden namelijk beide gekenmerkt door een hogere mate van gelijkheid tussen de actoren.

Ook heeft deze studie aangetoond dat het bestuderen van sociaal kapitaal vanuit het individueel-collectief perspectief (één van de vier invalshoeken in de gepresenteerde typologie), een vruchtbare onderneming is geweest. Door vanuit dit perspectief te werken, is het mogelijk in kaart te brengen hoe individuele organisaties bijdragen aan het functioneren van het sociaal kapitaal van de gemeenschap als geheel.

Er zijn zaken die in deze studie niet aan bod konden komen, maar die in de toekomst zeker aandacht verdienen. Zo zou bijvoorbeeld het onderwerp op basis waarvan de mobilisatie in gang is gezet van invloed kunnen zijn op het verloop ervan. In toekomstig onderzoek zou er kunnen worden gekeken naar het effect van andere informatie op de mobilisatie van sociaal kapitaal. Andere punten van aandacht kunnen zijn: het toepassen van het experiment in andere etnische gemeenschappen, de vergelijking van de resultaten binnen migrantengemeenschappen tegen die binnen de niet-migranten meerderheid, de vergelijking van de werking van sociaal kapitaal in migrantengemeenschappen en in het land van herkomst, en de invloed van in het ontvangende land opgegroeide bestuurders op de vorm en de werking van sociaal kapitaal.

