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### The big world experiment: the mobilization of social capital in migrant communities

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## 6. Social Capital in Berlin

The ideological differences that characterized the Turkish community in Amsterdam can also be found in the Turkish community in Berlin, which likewise reflects the political and ideological cleavages that the migrants brought with them from their homeland. The leftist workers, the rightist nationalists, the different Islamic factions (Diyanet, Milli Görüş, Alevi etc.), and the Kurds all have their own organizations, and many express the desire to stay away from the associations belonging to other movements (White, 1997). It is not surprising to find the same groups in the two Turkish communities, since the Turks in Amsterdam and Berlin both migrated there at about the same period of time and for the same reasons. Moreover, in relation to this, the two communities have a similar history when it comes to the organizing process. First, in the 1960s and 1970s, leftist and rightist laborers' associations were established, reflecting the opposing political movements in Turkey. Then, after the military coup there in 1980, when all political parties were banned, many politicians and union leaders fled to Western-Europe, where they continued to be involved in their respective organizations. This led to a polarization of the left and the right. In the course of the 1980s, many religious associations of different denominations were also founded (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Vermeulen, 2006). The Turkish community in Berlin is also divided. As one respondent said:

*"It's just a fact that we are a split community. Only seldom do we find a common denominator."*

However, the ideological cleavages in Berlin are manifest in a different way to those in Amsterdam. The dominant split in the city is not between religious and non-religious ideologies, or between different religious movements, but rather between left and right-wing organizations. The religious associations are, in general, less obvious, as are the differences between them. Furthermore, the Turkish community in Berlin has two umbrella organizations that totally dominate the structure of the organizational network. Several respondents also gave yet another reason as to why the ideological divisions are less pronounced, stating that (and the analyses later confirmed this to some extent) the Turkish organizations in Berlin are clustered based on type, and not on their ideology. One of the respondents, for example, referred to the situation in the Netherlands to underline the differences in the ways in which Turks organized themselves in Germany:

*“In the Netherlands, people, Turks, organize themselves along religious, ideological lines, but they’d be better organizing themselves the classical way as workers, irrespective of their background.”*

And another respondent, when asked about the best representative of the Turkish community, said:

*“That depends on the relevant sphere, whether we are talking about economic, youth, political, religious, social or cultural organizations”.*


The interesting thing about the social capital of the Turkish community, as it is explored in the current study, is that the contact network indeed has a tendency to cluster based on the types of organizations, while the network of interlocking directorates clearly reveals the ideological groups.

## **6.1 The ideological divides in Berlin**

Vermeulen (2006) has discussed the differences between the form of the formal Turkish networks in Amsterdam and Berlin extensively. He concluded that the numbers of interlocking directorates do not diverge much, but their shapes are substantially different. Instead of a more horizontally structured, all-inclusive, network as in Amsterdam, the one in Berlin is rather fragmented and clustered around two organizations. Vermeulen’s conclusions are based on a longitudinal analysis, including the study of data spanning several decades. When, for reasons of comparability (the contact network under study reflects only a single moment in time after all), one also considers a network of interlocking directorates over a single year, the image that Vermeulen sketched remains, albeit that it is less pronounced. The network of interlocking directorates in 2003 (the year from which the most recent information was available) reveals that there were hardly any interlocking directorates between organizations. Only twenty percent of organizations were connected, and few had more than one interlock. The five small groups of interlinked organizations that were present did, nevertheless, reflect the separate ideological groups in the Turkish community. They were a left-wing/progressive group of connected organizations, two (different) Islamic groups, an entrepreneurs’ group, and a right-wing/conservative group.

The ideological divides are not as obviously present in the contact network, other than in terms of a marked left-right distinction. The contact network does reveal clustering around particular types of organizations (see also the chart Figure 6.1). Almost 30% of the ties in this network involved social, women’s and welfare organizations. This matches the percentages of actors of these kinds which also add up to slightly more than

30%. A fourth kind of organization involved in an above average amount of ties are the umbrella organizations. There are only a few of these in Berlin, but those that are there do attract a lot of organizations, members as well as non-members: almost 9% percent of the ties in the contact network involved umbrella organizations, and they make up only 4% of the actors. Furthermore, closer examination reveals that two umbrella organizations, the *Türkische Bund Berlin (TBB)* and the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)*, are clearly dominant.



**Figure 6.1 Mean percentages of ties to organizational types in the contact network in Berlin**

Save for the women's associations, these groups of organizations do not have a clear tendency towards intra-group connections. The women's organizations did, however, clearly connect more to similar organizations than to other types. Furthermore, the religious umbrella organization, the *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)*, had predominantly bonding social capital with respect to the type of organization. This association, which is known for its conservative beliefs, is mainly involved with member organizations and not so much with 'outsiders'. This tendency was also visible for the social organization, the *Türkische Idealisten Gemeinschaft in Berlin*, which has a strong right-wing conservative ideology and is affiliated with the Grey Wolves, as its respondents told me themselves. Organizations belonging to this ideology separate themselves from the wider Turkish community by their own volition, but they are, in any event, rejected by other Turkish associations, especially the left-wing groups. In general, one can see that organizations which take a strong stance for or against a particular topic are more likely to turn to similar counterparts. This also applies to the women's organizations, which make a strong stand for their members and against (religious) oppression. One respondent said:

**IFB**

The *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)* is an Islamic umbrella organization founded in 1980. It has an extensive infrastructure and offers a great variety of services: mosques, youth and women organizations, as well as real estate management and educational establishments (Spielhaus & Färber, 2006). The *IFB* is at the head of 12 mosques, among which the controversial *Mevlana Mosque* that was accused of, amongst other things, accommodating imams who are preaching hate. It is related to Milli Görüş association *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş (IGMG)*, which is in Germany known as an extremist Islamic organization that is under surveillance of the German secret police. Because of this connection, the *IFB* is not well accepted by the rest of the Turkish population in Berlin: it is often ignored or openly disregarded. Two respondents told me their organizations only encounter the *IFB* in court, when one or the other started a lawsuit. Another respondent indicated that *"They [the IFB] send us invitations, but we never attend their meetings. We only want contacts with legal groups."* On the other hand, the *IFB* is the only Turkish Islamic organization that has managed to become officially recognized as a *Religionsgemeinschaft* (religious community) and because of that capacity appointed to provide Islamic education in schools in Berlin.

*"We don't have much to do with men's and mixed organizations. Not because we don't like them, but because that doesn't fit our aims. However, we do consciously avoid any connections to Islamic organizations. We are religiously neutral. And on top of that political Islam is tantamount to the oppression of women and that is exactly what we are fighting".*

A respondent of another women's organization added:

*"We do not want to be connected to Islamic women's organizations, because they are still very conservative. What's more, the converted Germans that are active in those are the worst!" [Regarding their conservatism, LP]*

Other kinds of organizations were connected to a wide range of types of organizations. Most had more bridging social capital with respect to the type of organization than they did bonding social capital.

## 6.2 A first introduction to the TGB and TBB

The fact that the category of umbrella organizations was mentioned so often is mainly due to the popularity of the two organizations of that type in Berlin. The *Türkische Bund Berlin (TBB)* and the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (TGB)* were mentioned as being important by many respondents, and both umbrellas also regard themselves as significant. One respondent said:

*"The TGB and TBB both claim to represent the Turkish immigrant community in Berlin."*

These two umbrellas both bring together a large group of member organizations and other sympathizers (individuals as well as organizations), but each is in a different ideological corner. The *TBB* is generally considered to be a left-wing progressive organization, while the *TGB* is known as conservative. The associations that are connected to the respective umbrella organizations can usually be typified in a similar manner.

The *TBB* and *TGB* are regarded by many organizations as being the most important representatives of the Turkish community in Berlin. Some even mentioned them both, recognizing that each has its own merits. For example, one respondent stated that:

*“The TBB has a good relationship with Germans, while the TGB has a good relationship with Turks”.*

Another thought that:

*“The TGB has good diplomatic connections, but is not taken seriously, while the TBB [although of little meaning to the respondent, LP] often hits the streets and is politically active, despite their limited amount of grassroots support”.*

Most organizations, however, felt allied to either the *TGB* or the *TBB*. The *TGB* was praised because:

*“they are really socially engaged, truly listen and are open.”*

Supporters of the *TBB* spoke highly of its ability to make itself known in German public life, its ties to German politicians, and its ability to reach a large audience. Indeed, the latter was actually the main reason for one of the respondents becoming a member.

The *TBB* and *TGB*, and the organizations that ‘belong’ to each of them, are undeniably crucial to the way in which the Turkish community functions. They are decisive in terms of the self-image of Turkish organizations and the way the community is approached by the German government. On the other hand, there are also several (smaller) organizations from other movements that play an important role, amongst which the religious and the Kurdish associations deserve particular attention.

### **6.3 The TGB and TBB on second sight**

The prominent positions of the *TBB* and *TGB* are evident. They clearly have more social capital than any other organization. They each have the most connections (the *TBB* mentioned 122 alters, the *TGB* 100), are the most well-known and are commonly mentioned by other associations (the *TBB* 17 times, the *TGB* 15 times). They are also a cut above all other organizations with respect to their direct circle of acquaintances (which is much bigger), but also in terms of their central position within the community

as a whole (which is much more significant). This applies even more to the *TBB* than it does to the *TGB*.

One of the explanations for the high amount of social capital that these organizations possess lies within their participation in several consultative bodies. The *TBB* and *TGB* play a role in different bodies, within which they both encounter large numbers of other organizations. There is, however, a considerable difference in scale between the respective consultative bodies. The *TGB* is involved in active, yet local, enterprises such as the *Türkische Gesundheitstage*<sup>45</sup> (Turkish Health Days) and the *Migrationsbeirat* (migrant council) of the city district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg. The *TBB* also collaborates locally, but does so in city and *Landes* (federal state) wide deliberative bodies as well. These larger collaborative bodies contain many more organizations and reach a higher level in the political structure (city wide instead of city district only). I will address the special role that deliberative bodies play in Berlin below.

The *TGB*'s high number of alters is also due to the fact that it is the largest organization in Berlin; it has almost twice as many member organizations as the *TBB*. Through its members, it can potentially reach a large audience. Moreover, the membership of the religious umbrella organization, the *DITIB*, and the mosques that are in turn members thereof add to the reach of the *TGB*, as one of the respondents explained.

Furthermore, both the *TBB* and the *TGB* are members of (different) national umbrella organizations. The *TBB* belongs to the more left-wing *Türkische Gemeinde zu Deutschland* (*TGD*). The *TGD* has about 250 member associations, several of which are other umbrella organizations or federations, such as the *Föderation Türkischer Elternvereine in Deutschland* (*FÖTED*). The *TGB* belongs to the more conservative, *Koordinationsrat der türkischen Vereine in Deutschland* (*KtVD*). The *KtVD* comprises about 1200 organizations spread all over Germany and the *TGB* is its regional representative. The respondent from the *TGB* explicitly stated that it became a member of the federal umbrella organization to make sure that everyone can “*speak with one voice*”<sup>46</sup> at the national level. The *TBB*, on the other hand, is obviously not included, and nor does it want to be. According to the *TBB*'s respondent, the *KtVD* is under the influence of the Turkish state.

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<sup>45</sup> The *Türkische Gesundheitstage* (Turkish Health Days) was brought into being with the aim of contributing to the intercultural opening up of the health care system. With panel discussions (in Turkish for migrants and in German for professionals) and information stands, both the users and providers of health care are informed about the system and the psychology of health care in Germany. It is organized by Turkish associations in collaboration with local governmental organizations.

<sup>46</sup> “*eine geschlossene Haltung*”

### 6.3.1 The TGB versus the TBB

The *TGB* and the *TBB* have a typical relationship. The respondent from the latter stated:

*“Sometimes we’re partners, most of the time we’re rivals”.*

One of the member organizations of the *TBB* said:

*“The TBB tries to get in touch with the TGB, but this doesn’t seem to work out”.*

The *TGB*, incidentally, sees the relationship less harshly and from a different angle:

*“We meet regularly. Sometimes there may be differences of opinion, mostly concerning the way some problems ought to be solved, and in that case we both go our own way”.*

These quotes reveal how the two are ‘condemned’ to collaborate once in a while (mainly when they face a common opponent, for example when the German government is proposing legal reforms that are not favorable to migrants), but prefer to go their own, separate ways.

In general, the *TBB* and, to a lesser extent, the *TGB* are organizations that often operate separately from their members. They both send out a strong message, which is either more progressive and focused on German society, or more conservative and focused on the Turkish community, depending on their respective points of view. These ideologies attract smaller organizations which then become members of either umbrella organization or feel (and act upon this) strongly affiliated to it. Many organizations belong to an umbrella because, to a large extent, they experience it as some kind of back-up and a way of positioning their own organization in the jungle of ethnic associations. The affiliation with an umbrella organization thus functions as a kind of hallmark.

### 6.3.2 Relationships between the umbrella organizations and their members

As umbrella organizations, the *TBB* and the *TGB* act on a higher structural level than their respective members. The member associations are active ‘in the field’, pursuing their own goals and organizing their own activities, while the umbrellas serve as their supportive representatives and interact with other associations, both in and outside the community.

I got the impression that the relationships between the umbrella organizations (the *TGB* as well as the *TBB*) and their members are not always as intensive as one might expect. The *TBB*, for example, sends its members an official newsletter five times a year and four times a year, the chairmen of each individual organization and the board of the



*TBB* meet. Even though the *TBB* chair stated that each of its members is as important as any other, I did not find that this enthusiasm was reciprocated by everyone (I spoke to several member organizations). One of the *TBB*-members declared that his organization has a “critical connection”<sup>47</sup> with the *TBB*. More importantly, it was on the verge of merging with another association to create a new organization and there was still doubt about whether they would prolong their membership with the new association. Another organization stated that it became a member of the *TBB* mainly to profit from its media exposure, which meant that it is able to reach more people when necessary. Otherwise this organization went its own way.

The relationship between the *TGB* and its members is not always as close. One member organization stated:

*“There are also disadvantages of our membership of the TGB, for example when they tell us what we can and what we cannot do.”*

And:

*“We’ve been a member for about ten years now, and we sometimes wonder whether we still need it. General meetings only take place a couple of times a year anyway.”*

### **6.3.3 The mutual relationships between member organizations of the TBB and TGB**

The members of the two umbrella organizations are, in practice, not particularly interconnected. In the main, it is only if they are active in the same field that the organizations maintain contact. For example, two of the *TBB*’s members, the *TEBB* (parent’s association) and the *BTBTM* (student body), consult each other about tutors. The *Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln* and the *Türkisch Deutsche Gemeinde*, both members of the *TGB*, are both community centers which even share accommodation. However, in their daily lives, most associations tend to rely on the connections they have built up themselves, away from the umbrella organization. Indeed, organizations have more connections with counterparts that are *not* members of their respective umbrella organizations than they do with fellow members. This implies that membership of an umbrella organization is more instrumental than productive of social capital.

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<sup>47</sup> “Kritische Kontakte”

## 6.4 The position of religious organizations

Religious associations are not as prominent in the Turkish community as the secular umbrella organizations are, mainly because the relationship between the German state and Islamic groups and Islam in general is strained. Only officially recognized religious organizations ('corporations') enjoy a range of state privileges. These '*Körperschaften des Öffentlichen Rechts*' are entitled to offer religious education in schools, receive public funds, have a say in cultural affairs, and have tithes collected for them by the state (Pfaff & Gill, 2006). However, no Muslim group has been officially recognized yet. An important reason for this is that the conditions for recognition are difficult for any Islamic movement to meet, for example because they require a single organization to have formal rules and a clear institutionalized leader. Islam is, however, a highly decentralized and non-hierarchical religion, with its foundations in the lifestyles of every individual (Spielhaus & Färber, 2006). The fact that there are already many different movements within Islam, and within a single ethnic community such as the Turkish one, makes the relationship between the State and the Islamic community even more complex.

Furthermore, the general discourse regarding Islamic organizations is dismissive and suspicious. Politicians express their fears that Islam and a democratic order are irreconcilable, even if there was a 'German' version. Likewise, some court decisions are perceived by some Muslims as a direct rejection of their religion (ibid.). The *Neutralitätsgesetz* (passed in 2005) bans every kind of religious symbol in public workplaces. Although this legislation applies to every faith and thus, in principle, also forbids a catholic from wearing a cross on a chain, it was perceived as an attack on headscarves. Indeed, the law also set off the debate on this issue in the Turkish community itself.

Religion, nevertheless, still plays an important role for many Turks in Berlin, and their needs are met by numerous organizations covering all Islamic movements. Just like secular groups, Islamic groups can establish voluntary associations that are registered with the *Vereinsregister* (administrative court). Two of these, the Diyanet and the *IFB*, have umbrella organizations in Berlin and are thus more strongly represented, more present and more significant than other religious movements such as the Alevi<sup>48</sup> and Suleymanciler. The *DITIB* is the umbrella organization which represents Islam for the Diyanet movement, and it is steered by the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs<sup>49</sup>. This organization is important because it is the largest Turkish-Islamic organization in Berlin (Spielhaus & Färber, 2006). It has several mosques spread all over the city, as well

<sup>48</sup> The main Alevi organization is the *AAKM*. This is relatively big, but not an umbrella organization.

<sup>49</sup> The Diyanet movement is also represented in the Netherlands. Adherents to it take pride in the fact that because the Turkish Presidency controls the imams and the content of the sermons delivered during Friday prayers (every imam must read the same sermon), the Diyanet religion is the same, irrespective of where in the world someone goes to the mosque.

as numerous social/cultural associations and organizations for specific target groups. The *DITIB* is a member of the *TGB*.

The other important religious umbrella organization is the *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)* which is reputed to be very conservative. It is a controversial association because it is affiliated with the Milli Görüş movement, which is under the surveillance of the German secret police (*Verfassungsschutz*). Yet, the *IFB* is a very important Islamic organization. In 1998 it was, after many long years of struggle and negotiations, recognized as a religious community by the Supreme Court of the federal state of Berlin. This officially allowed the *IFB* to provide Islamic education in primary schools in the city. Other Turkish religious organizations which adhere to a different interpretation of Islam, and are not recognized as a religious community and do not, therefore, enjoy the same privilege, were and are much opposed to this decision. They contend that Islamic education is now too one-sided, as the *IFB* only represents one, rather conservative, Islamic movement (Gesemann, 2001; Dantschke, 2004; Pfaff & Gill, 2006).

## **6.5 On larger and smaller organizations: the positions of organizations of different sizes**

The two umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and the *TBB*, receive the most attention in both the media and scholarly publications. Consequently, the impression may be given that the Turkish community tends to revolve around them and that they shape it to such an extent that smaller associations, or those not affiliated to an umbrella organization, carry little weight. However, as I will demonstrate, these associations are important in their own way and deserve more attention. First of all, the majority of the Turkish organizations in Berlin are not official members of an umbrella organization. Nevertheless, several of them play an important role in the community. Secondly, smaller associations fulfill a different role to that of the umbrella organizations, but it is no less crucial to the functioning of the community's social capital. Instead of representing the Turkish grassroots in the public debate, as umbrella organizations do, the smaller associations offer hands-on support or (social) diversions for the Turks in Berlin.

## **6.6 Larger organizations I: the Kurdish sub-group**

The Kurdish organizations that I interviewed were revealed to have above-average sized circles of acquaintances. The Kurdish parent association, *YEKMAL*, as well as the general Kurdish organization, *Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein KKH*, turned out to have the highest number of alters after the *TGB* and the *TBB*. This is not surprising, since the

latter is the most well-known Kurdish association in Berlin. The *KKH* and *YEKMAL* are, however, not particularly connected to the Turkish community, as only a little more than 10% of their alters were of that nationality. A slightly higher percentage (12% for the *YEKMAL* and 17% for the *KKH*) of their alters was Kurdish. This relatively low number surprised me a little, since Kurdish organizations are generally known for the high degree of their interconnectedness. Furthermore, both organizations explicitly declared that they are first and foremost aimed at the Kurdish population in Berlin<sup>50</sup>, but the greatest proportion of their alters consisted of other migrant organizations, of which almost 60% were non-Turkish and non-Kurdish.

The explanation for the high number of non-Kurdish alters lies in the fact that both the *YEKMAL* and the *KKH* participate in the *Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg*, which includes over fifty organizations, most of which are not Turkish. Furthermore, both organizations are active in several other consultative bodies and collaborative initiatives, such as the *Migrationsbeirat Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (KKH)* and the *Fachgruppe Immigrantinnen und Flüchtlinge (YEKMAL)*. These bodies unite many organizations of different backgrounds, thus leading to high numbers of contacts. As the representative of the *KKH* explained,

*“We [the KKH] basically only keep in touch with other Kurdish organizations, except for the Migrationsrat (which we co-founded) and when it regards large-scale events, such as the celebration of May, 1”*

In other words, the contact with Kurdish organizations might be low in percentage terms, but it is more intensive than that with their non-Kurdish counterparts.

## 6.7 Larger organizations II: women’s organizations

The multiplying effect of the collaborative bodies is also visible for other organizations. In the next paragraph I will discuss the special role that consultative bodies and the like play in the Turkish community in Berlin. Here, I want to demonstrate that several organizations which, on the face of it, seem small in scale and inwardly oriented actually turned out to be widely connected. This is mainly due to their collaboration with other organizations in working groups and other joint undertakings. *Akarsu*, for example, is a women’s organization aimed mainly at young migrant women of Turkish descent (although they also try to reach the growing Arabic population in the city district of Kreuzberg). *Akarsu* participates in the *Migrationsbeirat Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*, as well as in several working groups that were convened on the initiative of the city district. Along with numerous leading counterparts it also helps to organize the

<sup>50</sup> Note that this not only concerns Turkish-Kurdish organizations, but also, for instance, Syrian-Kurdish associations.

*Türkische Gesundheitstage*. The same applies to the women's organization, the *BTKB* (*Türkische Frauenverein*), which is active in a variety of working groups in its city district, as well as in a *Trägerrunde* of a semi-governmental foundation which offers subsidies and facilities to organizations in the neighborhood (*Werner Düttmann Siedlung*). However, the respondent from the *BTKB* explained that its most important contacts are two cooperative bodies of women's organizations. One is city wide (*Forum Berliner Immigrantinnenprojekte*), and the other is on the regional level (*Landesfrauenrat Berlin*). In general, women's organizations in Berlin collaborate with and support each other notably often. Indeed, the respondent from the *BTKB* explained that the *Forum Berliner Immigrantinnenprojekte* was founded so that the women's associations could join forces, because less money had become available for women's projects over the years. She stated: "We can exert more political pressure through the *Forum*". The respondent from the women's organization, the *TIO*, also mentioned that the participating associations use the *Forum* to take a united stand. This is also what is expressed in the leaflet containing the *Forum's* profile.

(Turkish) women's organizations in Berlin are in a strong position. They are large in number and mostly have an outspoken and visible stance. They are also well known in the community. For example, 65% of my respondents indicated that they know the *Akarsu*, 65% knew the *BTKB* and 58% knew another women's organization, the *Elisi Evi* (not interviewed). This is far above the average of 40%<sup>51</sup>. In addition, the popularity of women's organizations was also seen from the great number of times that they were spontaneously referred to by other respondents during the interviews. Furthermore, many of the women's organizations are professional, often having several paid employees. This allows them to profile themselves in the organizational field. Moreover, the mutual collaborations between women's associations strengthen their position.

A possible explanation for the notably strong position of such organizations is that the local government in Berlin did not, for a long time, employ a general migrant policy which furthered migrant organizations in general. Instead, target group specific policies were pursued, aimed at, for example, youths, the handicapped, the elderly or women. The women's organizations in this respect have a privileged position in comparison to other types of associations. Combined with a secular tradition that characterizes part of the (left-wing) Turkish community, these organizations have had the opportunity to develop themselves and obtain a strong position in the organizational landscape.

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<sup>51</sup> These figures are based on the responses to the name recognition list (see Chapter 4). Interviewees indicated whether or not they knew each of the organizations on the list. The list contained all types of organizations.

## 6.8 Larger organizations III: the TDU

A large organization that cannot be left unmentioned is the entrepreneurs' association, the TDU (Türkisch Deutsche Unternehmer Verein), which was founded in 1996 by a group of entrepreneurs. The TDU defines its aims as being 'to support the Turkish (business) community by taking a stand in the economic, political, social and cultural debate and to actively partake in these debates'<sup>52</sup>. In 2008, it had about 250 members (small and medium-sized businesses).

The TDU takes a neutral, intermediate position between the TGB and TBB. It is valued as much by both, and both regard it as being on 'their' side. The ambiguity of the TDU's affiliation is seen, for example, from the fact that a respondent from a TGB member organization was contemplating whether or not the TDU was also a member, which he thought was plausible. The TBB, on the other hand, named the TDU more often than any other organization.

## 6.9 All the small things: the smaller players

The Turkish community also includes many small organizations which have relatively little social capital. Those that exist for very specific purposes, such as the Türkische Ringerverein (Turkish Wrestling Organization) and the Berlin Mehter Takimi (Janissaries band) have only a small group of organizations around them. Several of these associations are focused on Turkey and the Turkish culture. This may well be an explanation of their small circle of acquaintances, because the number of organizations that have their focus on the homeland has been diminishing over the years. As many respondents have stated, they are no longer concerned about Turkey and 'pure' Turkish culture, but are instead occupied with the situation in Germany and the German-Turkish culture.

It was not only some of the Turkish nationalist organizations that had fewer than average connections to others; left-wing associations also had a limited amount of alters. More than in the case of the right-wing organizations, this was perhaps a conscious choice. For example, the Türkisch Deutsche Gesellschaft is inactive because it no longer regards itself as an organization, but as a lobby movement that does not need a formal structure. The Türkei Zentrum stopped its activities because, according to the respondent, it was founded 40 years ago and was aimed at Turkish migrants who wanted to return to their homeland. As most of these immigrants eventually decided to stay in Germany, this association's goal was no longer relevant and it gradually ceased its activities.

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<sup>52</sup> [www.tdu-berlin.de](http://www.tdu-berlin.de), 2009

## 6.10 The importance of collaborative bodies

The consultative bodies, working groups and other joint initiatives that I have mentioned above deserve some more attention. Before I delved into Turkish organizational life in Berlin, I had the impression, or perhaps the prejudice, that the city's organizations were left to their own devices. The German government is not known as being particularly generous when it comes to subsidizing migrant associations. The interviews confirmed this impression, initially. When I asked organizations whether they were ever invited to take part in any public inquiry procedure (which is quite a common phenomenon in the Netherlands, the so-called *inspraakbijeekkomsten*), I usually got one of two reactions. Some gave me a scornful laugh: how could I ever think there would be something like that and that they would actually have something to say? Others expressed their appreciative, perhaps even slightly envious, admiration: "if that only could be true; how great would that be!" In other words, I did not imagine that there would be many migrant councils of any kind. But eventually, after continuing to ask questions, I was proved wrong. In fact, I was able to distinguish three types of initiatives: state-initiated councils, migrant organized initiatives and working groups run by German organizations.

### 6.10.1 State-initiated councils: the Migrationsbeirat

Contrary to my expectations, there were several migrant councils in the city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, Neukölln, Charlottenburg and Spandau. The first of these in particular has arranged *Arbeitsgruppen* ('AGs', committees) in various fields (e.g. youth, women, employment), in which migrant and non-migrant organizations try to tackle current problems. In other words, the local government in Berlin does provide opportunities for migrant organizations to make their voices heard.

The Migrationsbeiräte (migrant councils), nevertheless, have two major drawbacks. Firstly, several organizations were skeptical about the impact that such bodies could have. Several respondents 'warned' me that, yes, they had been included in the council where they discuss migrants' affairs, but they did not have any illusions about being able to actually influence politicians or policies. One respondent said:

*"It is not like you can actually change things [by participating in the migrant council] but at least you can give your opinion or the opinion of the people you represent"*

Several other interviewees complained that the councils are only meant as a sounding board ("*nur Anhörung*"). One respondent said:

*“I’m fed up with it! Yet another migrant council! Back in the days I used to work as an adviser for migrants and I was also in something like a migrants’ council. All the solutions we brought up were not accepted. So I’ve been through this for over 30 years now!”*

The second drawback, as expressed by some respondents, is that not all organizations have an equal opportunity to participate in the councils. The *Islamische Föderation Berlin (IFB)* explained that it would like to join the *Migrationsbeirat* in its city district (Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg) and has already applied, but it was not accepted. According to the respondent, this was because most of the participants in the *Migrationsbeirat* are left-wing and liberal. The *IFB*, on the other hand, is seen as right-wing and conservative and, so the respondent said, is therefore denied access. For that matter, the respondent objected strongly to the characterization of his organization as right-wing and conservative. He thought that the left–right distinction had been superseded, and he would instead describe his organization as ‘Islamic’ and ‘attentive of its social environment’.

A respondent from an organization that was a member of the *Migrationsbeirat* in Neukölln showed how this exclusion is perceived from the other side. During the meetings of the *Beirat* a common topic of discussion is which mosques

*“are okay and which are not. In fact the discussion is about whether one ought to use mosques as a means to approach people one otherwise may never reach, or whether it is better to shut them out because they have wrong ideas and ideologies.”*

The respondent hinted that she was inclined to argue the first point, but noted that this discussion is far from being resolved. It does go to the heart of the plea by Fennema and Tillie (1999), namely that it is better to include as many organizations as possible (even the (alleged) non-democratic ones) in the democratic process, because even non-democratic groups will eventually adopt democratic ways in order to achieve their goals since the code of conduct during deliberations demands this.

### **6.10.2 (Migrant) organization initiated collaborative bodies**

As well as the state-initiated councils, there also are several collaborative bodies founded by (migrant) organizations themselves in order to strengthen their position. Some of these have already been commented on in passing, such as the *Forum Berliner Immigrantinnenprojekte*. In comparison to the state initiated councils, these bodies have more support from the member organizations, as can be seen from the active contributions of the participants. Vice versa, the participating organizations feel more



supported by the self-initiated collaborative bodies. In contrast to the governmental councils, they truly 'get things done' together, instead of only being used as a sounding board. For example, the Kurdish parents' association, the *YEKMAL*, is part of a project called the '*Wrangelkiez macht Schule*', which was founded in order to

*"set up a better network and to figure out what everybody is doing and which and whose activities overlap or if important facilities are missing in the neighborhood."*

Its purpose is to better serve the needs of its grassroots. In similar vein is the *YEKMAL*, one of the four organizations seated in the *Nachbarschaftshaus Centrum e.V.* The organizations join forces and organize events together. They discovered that because of their collective actions each of them has more visitors. Another example is the *Interessengemeinschaft Oranienstraße*, with which the community center, the *Kotti e.V.*, is engaged. The Oranienstraße is a central street in 'Kreuzberg 36' (the area is named '36' after the last digits of the postal code) in which the population consists mainly of migrants. Most of them are Turkish, but more and more people of other nationalities have gone to live there as well. The (migrant) shop owners, as well as the numerous (migrant) organizations that have their offices in the Oranienstraße, formed this interest group. Collaborative bodies like these are often formed at the neighborhood or '*Kiez*' level<sup>53</sup>, or are based on an outspoken common denominator (as in case of the women's organizations). Yet another initiative is the '*International Children's Fest 23. Nisan*'. The 23<sup>rd</sup> of April is a Turkish national holiday<sup>54</sup>, and on this day over sixty Turkish and non-Turkish organizations organize various festive activities for children. For the Turkish population in particular, the *Children's Fest* is an important holiday, which unites right and left-wing organizations. Amongst many others, the music organization, the *Berlin Turk Musikisi Konservatari*, the media group, the *AYPA* (whose chairman is in the working group responsible for the festivities), the welfare organization, the *Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln*, and the Alevi organization, the *AAKM*, all help to arrange the event.

Berlin has one giant migrants' council, the *Migrationsrat Berlin-Brandenburg*, which attracts over 50 migrant organizations of all backgrounds<sup>55</sup>. It is not to be confused with any state-initiated council called the *Migrationsbeirat*. The *Migrationsrat* was founded by 45 migrant organizations in 2004, and its main aim is to represent immigrants of any

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<sup>53</sup> *Kiez* refers to the small area, of only several blocks, directly surrounding an actor's environment. It is used in colloquial speech with an affectionate undertone, cf. 'hood'. In the last decade it has become a regular expression in the official usage of the administration of Berlin.

<sup>54</sup> This date was proclaimed as the *Day of the Child* by Atatürk on the day the Turkish national Parliament gathered for the first time after the Independence War.

<sup>55</sup> This was the score in 2005. Four years later, the number of allied organizations had increased to 65, which shows the appeal of such collaborative bodies.

**Arbeiterwohlfahrt**

Another important German association, though not an umbrella organization, in Berlin is the *Arbeiterwohlfahrt* (*AWO*, *Worker's Welfare*). The *AWO* was founded in 1919 as part of the Social Democrat party, with the principal task of offering activities in the areas of social work, youth welfare and health care. It provides information, support and education itself and also promotes voluntary work in these domains (Arbeiterwohlfahrt, 2008). Citywide, the *AWO* has several community centers that all have specific aims that can fit the objectives of very many collaborating migrant organizations. For example, women's organizations work together with the youth and family advice centers or the *Frauenladen*, and welfare organizations collaborate with the Migrant Information Centers. The diversity of its activities, and the high degree of institutionalization of the *AWO*, probably makes it an interesting partner for migrant organizations. This also became clear from the interviews, as it was one of the actors that were mentioned most often.

descent to secure legal, social and political emancipation and the integration of the minorities in Berlin-Brandenburg. It does so while taking an impartial and ideologically neutral stance and only concerning itself with the situation in Germany and not that of any country of origin<sup>56</sup>. Any migrant organization can apply for membership as long as it endorses the principles of the *Migrationsrat*. About fifteen of the members are Turkish associations, several of which I have spoken to (the *YEKMAL*, *TBB* and *KKH* were members at the time).

### 6.10.3 Working groups of German organizations

There is a third kind of working group available to many organizations in Berlin. These are the groups that operate under the wing of *German* umbrella organizations, such as *Der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband* (*DPW*; Charities Association), and even the Christian *Diakonisches Werk*<sup>57</sup>. These organizations, established decades ago by private initiatives and the Evangelical Church respectively, are large institutionalized umbrella organizations that are active in several sub-fields of social welfare, such as migrant work, help for addicts, youth work, and support of the handicapped. The *DPW* and *Diakonisches Werk* are not only active in these spheres themselves; they also bring other organizations working in these fields together in so-called '*Arbeitsgruppen*' (*AGs*), working groups. Of the organizations participating in this study, five indicated that they are members of the *DPW* (*BTKB*, *El Ele*, *Kotti*, *TIO*, and *YEKMAL*) and one is a member of the *Diakonisches Werk* (*Papatya*). Of course, the working groups that they participate in contain many more organizations<sup>58</sup>. Furthermore, the organizations only participate in *AGs* that represent their respective area of work. This means that although, for example,

<sup>56</sup> As stated at the website: [www.migrationsrat.de](http://www.migrationsrat.de)

<sup>57</sup> The outreach ministry of the Evangelical Church of Germany

<sup>58</sup> One respondent explained that an organization affiliated with the *DPW* cannot also be associated with the *Diakonisches Werk*, because of the conflicting ideological backgrounds of the two umbrella organizations.

the welfare organization, *El Ele*, and the Kurdish organization, the *YEKMAL*, are both members of the *DPW*, they never meet because they belong to different working groups.

### **6.11 The positive effect of collaborative bodies on social capital**

What all three types of collaborative bodies have in common is that through them the participating organizations have access to a vast amount of social capital. Even though the organizations in each body are not necessarily constantly and intensively interacting, the mere fact that they are brought together on a regular basis allows the participants to build mutual trust, which can be followed by true collaboration. As the respondent from the *El Ele*, a welfare organization in Neukölln, stated:

*“We are part of an ‘Arbeitsgruppe’ of the Quartiersmanagement<sup>59</sup>. There is always a huge stream of e-mails coming from participants in the AG. We only meet each other in person at the Quartiersmanagement, but one couldn’t say that that implies direct collaboration between the various organizations. Only after you have got to know each other personally, you will also collaborate more often”.*

Furthermore, organizations that are not taking part in any collective are less connected to other associations than those who are, even when the connections through the collectives are not included. The exceptions to this ‘rule’ are the organizations that can be described as popular. Recall that the popularity of an actor is expressed in the number of times it was mentioned as a contact by other organizations during the interviews. Organizations that were named often are regarded as being more popular. Several of the most popular associations, such as the parents’ organization, the *TEBB*, the healthcare organization, the *BGTM*, and the Diyanet umbrella organization, the *DITIB*, were not particularly involved in deliberative bodies.

### **6.12 Bonding and bridging over ethnic boundaries**

Over a third of the actors in the contact network were German. Slightly fewer were Turkish and less than a third were of other ethnicities. However, the number of *ties to* Turkish organizations was almost 50% (see also Figure 6.2). Half of the respondents had more bonding than bridging social capital. Turkish organizations are apparently more relevant in the everyday lives of these associations than associations with different ethnic backgrounds. The question remains: what kinds of organizations have more ethnically bridging social capital or more ethnically bonding social capital instead?

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<sup>59</sup> The *Quartiersmanagement* is a semi-governmental organization, founded in 1999 (Stotijn, 2006; [www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de](http://www.quartiersmanagement-berlin.de), 2009). Its aim is to break into and strengthen the neighborhood networks of individual residents as well as of (migrant) organizations.




Figure 6.2 Mean percentages of ties to organizations of different ethnicities.

### 6.12.1 The relationship between collaborative bodies and ethnic bridging social capital

The collaborative bodies not only provide organizations with a larger circle of acquaintances (i.e. more social capital), but also with a more ethnically diverse group thereof (more bridging social capital). In other words, organizations that take part in collectives have more connections to non-Turkish associations than those who are not members of any deliberative or collaborative bodies. I have already highlighted that the Kurdish organizations have the most diverse range of alters and, in fact, had more connections to non-Kurdish than to Kurdish associations. This is because of their participation in collaborative bodies (even though the respondents in their interviews did not support this finding when remarking that they are mainly connected to Kurdish organizations). This effect was also clear for the women's organizations that are part of the *Forum Immigrantinnen Projekte*, such as *TIO* and *BTKB*. Some of the organizations which were not as involved in collaborative bodies as those already mentioned also had diverse circles of linked associations. For example, only 40% of the connections of the entrepreneurs association *TDU* were Turkish against 60% non-Turkish links, and the Turkish wrestling association, the *Türkischer Ringerverein*, had only 30% of Turkish, against 70% of non-Turkish, alters. The wrestling association, in fact, was mainly connected to other German wrestling clubs.

Many smaller organizations with only a few connections had mainly ethnically bonding social capital. The non-Turkish connections that they were linked to were typically German governmental or religious organizations. For example, apart from the

Evangelical and Catholic academies, the *Türkisch-Islamischer Friedhofs- und Bestattungsverein* is only connected to Turkish organizations. Likewise, the city district authority was the single non-Turkish organization that the social association *Türkisches Sprache und Kultur Zentrum*, indicated that it was linked to.

### **6.12.2 Bridging on different structural levels**

In what has gone before I demonstrated that the umbrella organizations, the *TGB* and the *TBB*, were the central actors in the Turkish community. A focus on the amount of bonding and bridging social capital possessed by each of these umbrellas illustrates that this is the case in both the literal and the figurative sense. Figurative because many associations regard them as being the most important organizations and literal because both have a high number of Turkish alters: almost half of the *TBB*'s alters were Turkish, as were two-third of the connections of the *TGB*. These different proportions reflect the images of the two organizations that prevail: the *TGB* is the one that is primarily aimed at the Turkish community, while the *TBB* is seen as being more open and interactive.

Nevertheless, both organizations have a bridging position in relation to other migrant communities and, more importantly, to German society. The contacts they maintain with non-Turkish organizations take place at a higher structural level. In other words, as umbrella organizations they are conversation partners for similar, hierarchically well placed organizations from other ethnic communities, as well as for high level political and governmental institutions. For example, the *TBB* regularly meets with the leading organization from the Jewish community, and the *TGB* and *TBB* are both focal points for members of the Senate of Berlin.

### **6.12.3 Street-level bridging**

The Turkish community has several small-scale organizations that are connected more to non-Turkish (mostly German) associations than to Turkish ones. The organizations that take up bridging positions at 'street-level' are often run by German managers. This applies, for example, to the welfare organization, El Ele, and the women's organization, Papatya. Strikingly, when I approached the TIO about participating in this study, its respondent was very resolute in saying that the "TIO is no longer a Turkish organization but an international one". Given the fact that the manager of the TIO is German, one might expect it to be on the periphery of the Turkish community and mainly linked to non-Turkish organizations. Nevertheless, 40% of the TIO's contacts were Turkish and, as the respondent told us later on, the majority of the participants in their activities are still of Turkish descent. It turned out to be quite a Turkish organization after all! This shows that whether an organization is Turkish or not is, in some cases, very ambiguous. In this

respect, one respondent expressed the view that he is uncomfortable with the habit of categorizing organizations as Turkish, German or any other ethnicity, a dilemma which several organizations also have trouble with.

*“When is an organization German? Maybe the board is German, but the grassroots are not, certainly not in Kreuzberg where many people have a migrant background. And then this idea of ‘migrant’ organizations. Many people were born here in Germany and are not migrants.”*

### 6.13 The fact and the factual: boards and managers

That several organizations that are regarded as ‘Turkish’ turned out to be run by German managers is due to the fact that many associations in Berlin maintain a division between the official board members, i.e. the people listed in the official registers, and those who keep the organizations going in practice, i.e. the daily managers. The board members, or even the board itself, are often only used to legitimize the organization. Indeed, to be allowed to register as an official organization (*‘eingetragene Verein’*) in the Berlin *Vereinsregister*, an association needs a board to officially represent it and a minimum of seven members (www.berlin.de, 2009). In practice, this leads to the situation in which a group of people acts as a board, but only on paper. The manager (*Geschäftsführer*) and any other co-workers are the ones who actually ‘run the shop’. The manager of one organization stated:

*“Usually I do not know the boards of the organizations we collaborate with, I only know the employees.”*

In some organizations the manager is of a different ethnicity to the board members, as in the aforementioned example of the *TIO*. In others, there is also a distinction between the manager and the board members, but all have the same ethnicity. This is the case for the women’s organization, *Akarsu*, which is run by a Turkish manager, and the Kurdish parents’ association, *YEKMAL*, which has a Kurdish manager. The *TBB* is an example of an organization in which the manager is clearly more important to the public than the board. Kenan Kolat, the manager at the time of my fieldwork, was ‘world famous in Berlin’ and generally regarded as ‘the face of the *TBB*’, while the board kept relatively quiet in the background.

### 6.14 Professionalism

Along with the divisions between the board and the management comes a significant degree of professionalism. Often the manager and employees are paid, and in many

cases have an educational background in the field of their occupation. For example, Papatya is a shelter for migrant women and girls who are either victims of domestic violence, or have fled their homes and need help for other reasons. The stories that the girls tell are so awful that the work turned out to be too demanding for volunteers, and Papatya now has a paid staff of social workers. Other organizations have paid employees because they offer certified language courses and other types of classes for which they receive official funding. The financing of the organizations by government subsidies is usually project based. Some projects, such as language teaching, are only approved if the employees are skilled workers. This encourages organizations to employ paid personnel, and to thus attain a high degree of professionalism. A high degree of professionalism encourages the continuity of organizations, which makes it easier to develop expertise with respect to politically relevant affairs (Lelieveldt, 1999). Particularly in the example of the TBB, it is clear that this association is able to maintain its strong position because of its paid employees.

## **6.15 Use and usefulness of linking social capital**

The presence or absence of relationships between Turkish organizations and German governmental actors, i.e. linking social capital, is one of the indicators of the integration of the Turkish community into German society. In that context it is relevant to know whether organizations find their way to government agencies and whether the relationships with the government are positively evaluated. In order to study these relationships, I distinguish three types of governmental organizations: local government departments, political actors, and semi-governmental organizations.

### **6.15.1 The local government agencies: access to and the need for subsidies**

One of the ways in which organizations can establish a relationship with local authorities is by applying for grants. I found that only some of them are doing so. Several right-wing organizations refused state funding because they wanted to keep their autonomy and independence. They said that:

*“If you get any grants, the state can make demands and we don’t want to meet those demands.”*

Remarkably, this argument was also put forward by the left-wing organization, the *Türkei Zentrum*.

Some organizations did not receive funding, although they had applied for it. One decided not to put any more effort into it, but another was still very passionate about this and determined to find a way to be allocated some money. Several organizations, including the entrepreneurs' association, the *TDU*, and the Diyanet organization, the *Türkisch Islamischer Friedhofs- und Bestattungsverein*, indicated that they do not need any funding; they felt that they could support themselves with money from sponsors or member contributions. The pensioners' organization, the *EM-DER*, did receive funding, but nevertheless expressed discontent. The respondent said:

*"We receive 35,000 Euros yearly from the Senate. That may seem a lot, but it isn't. It is the Senate that profits from it the most, because now they can show off with our organization, saying "This organization is run by people from the first generation and see what they can do!"*

### 6.15.2 The local government agencies: interactional relationships

The distribution of subsidies did not seem to affect the direct, interactional relationships between organizations and government institutions in a negative way. Almost all of the organizations indicated that they maintain good relationships with the city district office. They co-organize social events and are sometimes invited to New Year's receptions or are even asked to shed light on current issues. Several organizations indicated that they know their '*Bezirksbürgermeister*', the head of the city district, well, as they also do the '*Migrationsbeauftragte*' of their city district or the '*Ausländerbeauftragte*' of the Berlin Senate<sup>60</sup>. One respondent said:

*"We often go and see Mrs. Korte [the Migrationsbeauftragte of the city district of Neukölln, LP] to jointly organize something or make use of her extensive circle of acquaintances!"*

On average, 10% of the ties in the contact network led to government organizations. In terms of percentages, the smaller organizations with only a few alters (e.g. *EM-DER*, *Türkische Gemeinde zu Neukölln*) had the most linking social capital, because almost all of them had at least one government alter. Because of their relatively low number of other (non government) kinds of alters, this resulted in a high percentage of governmental links. The *TBB* had a relatively low percentage of governmental alters, but in absolute terms it clearly had the most ties to such institutions. This is obviously due to the fact that the *TBB* had the most alters of all.

<sup>60</sup> The *Ausländerbeauftragte* (from 2003 onwards named *Integrationsbeauftragte*) is a bureaucratic institution established in 1981. It is responsible for the policy on migrants and integration and the provision of subsidies to migrant organizations. In practice it often serves as an intermediary between the migrant communities and the Berlin government. See also Chapter 3.



Most of the connections between Turkish organizations and the Berlin government were found at the city district level. About 80% of the respondents indicated that they are connected to their respective local authorities, the *Bezirksamt* (borough administration). The municipality, which in the case of Berlin is the same as the federal state<sup>61</sup>, is the Senate of Berlin. Less than half of the respondents said that they are related to this administration.

The social organization *Türkischer Idealisten Verein*, had ties to government institutions, but these were Turkish instead of German. Berlin has a number of 'Idealisten Vereine'<sup>62</sup>. These are organizations affiliated with the right-extremist movement commonly called the 'Grey Wolves', which is also known as the 'Idealists' ('*Idealisten*' in German, *Ülkücüler* in Turkish). The '*Idealisten*' strive for an 'ideal' Turkish nation, which they define as Sunni-Islamic and mono-ethnic: only inhabited by 'true' Turks<sup>63</sup>. A Turk is everyone who lives in the Turkish territory, feels Turkish and calls him/herself Turkish (Zentrum Demokratische Kultur, 2003). Because of their nationalism, Idealist organizations are generally thought to be closely connected to the Turkish embassy and consulate. The Berlin '*Türkischer Idealisten Verein*' confirmed this image.

### 6.15.3 Political actors

Schöneberg (1985) noted, with respect to the involvement of Turkish organizations in politics, that *'it is striking that the religious and conservative groups put a disclaimer in all their public statements and organizational rules that they are free of all political partisanship and will not engage in any political activities, while the more leftist organizations explicitly take stands on political issues in West Germany and in Turkey'* (p.424). Twenty years later, the attitudes toward politics have changed, but remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the left-wing organizations still take explicit stands on political issues such as the wearing of headscarves. Women's associations and the progressive umbrella organization, the *TBB*, were clearly visible in the heated public debate concerning this matter in about 2005. At the same time, the respondent from the *TBB* described his organization as "*überparteilich*": impartial. Yet, the *TBB* is generally known to be highly institutionalized and to have very strong ties to the German social democratic party, the SPD (e.g. Yurdakul, 2006).

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<sup>61</sup> Berlin is one of the three city-states of Germany. The other two are Bremen and Hamburg.

<sup>62</sup> Obviously, Idealist associations are not only found in Berlin, but also world-wide.

<sup>63</sup> Because of their nationalistic, extremist, and mono-ethnic philosophy, the Grey Wolves are not appreciated by a large section of the Turkish community. In wider society (in Germany as well as in other countries) the Idealists are also known for violent attacks against politicians, journalists, and scientists, as well as Turkish and Kurdish civilians. The Idealist organization I spoke to declared that it is only occupied with activities for the Turkish youth, to make them remember their roots, and refrains from joining in, but sympathizes with, the violent branch of the Grey Wolves.

Regarding the right-wing of the community, the umbrella organization, the *TGB*, is associated with the Christian Democrat party (CDU), just as the *TBB* and *SPD* are related (*ibid.*). I have also noticed in the public domain that conservative groups are no longer taking such an impartial a stance as Schöneberg had observed. They still declare their neutrality, for example regarding the advice they would give to their members about how to vote. Moreover, many respondents said that they invite politicians of all colors to meetings so that their members can make their own decisions. However, around the time of this study, feelings were running high in Berlin regarding the ‘*Armenien-geschichte*’ (the ‘thing’ about Armenia) as one of the respondents said. This referred to the debate on whether or not Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire at the time) had committed genocide at the end of World War I. Several organizations on the right had joined the demonstration against the acknowledgement of the genocide, much to the dissatisfaction of many left-wing associations.

The religious organizations I spoke to did retain their impartiality regarding political issues. They were very strict regarding the separation of religious life and politics. One explained that they had had a lot of trouble in the past finding the right imam. They kept a strict policy that the imam was not allowed to express any political statement, whether during Friday prayers or elsewhere, and they had had to fire several who did not comply with this rule.

My observations have caused me to query Schöneberg’s conclusions. I found that most Turkish organizations, no matter whether they were left or right-wing, were very much involved in politics. This involvement did not, however, necessarily lead to a high number of ties to German political actors. In fact, less than half of the organizations maintained relationships with any political party. One organization explained why it was prudent when it came to close connections to political parties.

*“It is better not to be too tightly connected to any political party if you want any money. If you are, you only receive money because you have the same opinion as the party instead of because you are doing a good job. And what will happen if some other party gets in charge?”*

#### **6.15.4 Relationships with semi-governmental organizations**

The third kind of government agencies, the semi-governmental, mainly attracts organizations that are active in the field of welfare. This is generally because of the nature of these semi-governmental organizations, which are occupied with neighborhood renovations, ending unemployment and stimulating social interaction between citizens. The *Quartiersmanagement (QM)* in particular was mentioned a number of times. Since the *QM* was founded in 1999, it has tried to encourage neighborhood residents and local organizations to collaboratively upgrade their surroundings. Most associations spoke appreciatively of the *QM* in that respect.

## 6.16 Media associations

Finally, one type of organization deserves special attention. It transpired that many organizations value media associations a great deal. Several named 'the media' as the best representatives of the Turkish community in Berlin. In particular, they praised the Turkish television and radio broadcasters: *TD1*, *AYPA* (both TV), *Metropol FM*, and *Radio Multikulti* (both radio)<sup>64</sup>. The *TD1* broadcast 24 hours a day in German and Turkish and was also transmitted via satellite. It thus had a nationwide audience. *Aypa*, on the other hand, was a small broadcasting association (it actually is recorded in the Guinness Book of Records as the smallest broadcasting station in the world) that was able to produce a weekly one-hour program via a local cable channel. The radio broadcasters have a comparable status to their television counterparts. *Metropol FM* was the first national channel to broadcast in Turkish for the entire day, whereas *Radio Multikulti* had a more modest position, with only a local reach. Several respondents also indicated that they would turn to these media associations if they wanted to bring a particular event to the attention of the public. A study by a market research agency in 2002 showed that 70% of the Turkish-German population listened to *Metropol FM* (Tegtmeier, 2002). The *TD1* likewise had a regular market share of almost 40% of Turks in Berlin. In other words, using the media to reach a larger audience has great potential. Interestingly, most respondents only named Turkish local broadcasters and not German ones. This is probably because the organizations that use the media are aimed primarily at the Turkish population in Berlin.

## 6.17 The network of interlocking directorates and the contact network compared

Because there was no data available on the interlocking directorates between Turkish and non-Turkish associations, the formal and informal networks in Berlin cannot be compared regarding the amount of ethnically bonding and bridging social capital that they contain. This is unfortunate, in particular because these networks in Amsterdam differed considerably in this respect (see previous chapter). Nevertheless, other features of the networks can be meaningfully compared, some of which I already discussed earlier in this chapter (such as the locality of organizations). Here, I discuss the cause of the fact that the dominant cleavages in both networks were based on the same thing, namely ideology, but this more pronounced in the formal network.

The network of interlocking directorates in Berlin was only scarcely connected. Only twenty percent of the organizations were interlocked. The components of the network

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<sup>64</sup> Currently, most of these broadcasters are finished or are on the verge of closing down. Main reasons are the lack of financial resources and, in the case of *AYPA*, intimidation of the makers (Dantschke, 2003).

were clearly characterized by the ideologies of the actors in each of them (e.g. religious denomination, left-wing). The clear ideological divisions were less pronounced in the contact network, except for the divide between left-wing and right-wing organizations. The respondents indicated that their connections are based on their core activities (they deal with organizations that are similar in that respect) rather than their ideologies. The fact that the network of interlocking directorates was so clearly ideologically divided may be related to the generally low number of interlocks, and both may be the reflection of a certain reservedness when it comes to the formation of formal connections. The German secret service is known to keep an eye on these connections and Berger (2010) has reported that this is a reason for organizations not to enter into interlocking directorates and sometimes even refuse to become officially registered. It follows from this perspective that associations that do form interlocks on the board level do so only with other organizations that they (highly) trust. These are, probably, the organizations that are ideologically closest to them. In their everyday practices, these considerations do not play a role, hence the less divided contact network.

## **6.18 Summary and how does it work?**

To summarize, the Turkish community in Berlin has proved to be dominated by two umbrella organizations which represent two opposing groups: one more progressive and leftist, the other more conservative and right-wing. Other organizations, to a major extent, comply with this dividing line as they clearly identify with either one of them. These dominant organizations have more social capital than any other association. The other types of organizations that play an important role in the community are the women's associations which unite to form a strong bloc, with many mutual connections. Although faith is important in the lives of many individual Turks, the Turkish religious organizations do not have a very prominent position in the organizational field. Kurdish organizations are visible, but they keep away from the wider Turkish community. Furthermore, it became clear that particularly self-initiated collaborative bodies are rich sources of social capital. Organizations that participate in such bodies have more social capital and more ethnically bridging social capital in particular. Most organizations have at least some ethnically bridging social capital, although half of them, nevertheless, still have more bonding social capital. Most organizations also possess linking social capital.

Now it is clear what the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin looks like, the question is: how is it put into operation? How is this potential converted into usable and used social capital? What happens when organizations need to address their social capital? Do organizations indeed use the media as disseminators (*'Multiplikatoren'*) of the information they receive, have available and want to make public? Do the *TBB* and *TGB* function as the pivot of the community? What is the role of German organizations?

And do the organizations address the wealth of social capital captured in the collaborative bodies? How does it work? How is the Turkish community mobilized?

In order to answer these questions, I performed an experiment in which the organizations were triggered to use their social capital. The next part of this book is dedicated to this experiment, its methods and the results. Chapter 7 contains an exploration of the concept of mobilization as well as the explanation of the design of the Big World Experiment. Chapter 8 contains the results of the experiment in Amsterdam. Chapter 9 then discusses the results from Berlin.