The big world experiment: the mobilization of social capital in migrant communities
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In the discussion of the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin in Chapter 6, it became clear that the two umbrella organizations, the TGB and the TBB, play a key role. They had, by far, the largest amount of social capital at their disposal, and were also the most popular actors in the community. The Kurdish and women’s organizations also attracted attention because of their huge amounts of social capital. Furthermore, the numerous collaborative bodies played an important role; numerous organizations were part of one, or more, of the many consultative or collaborative bodies, whether state-initiated, self-initiated or organized by German associations. The Turkish community in Berlin was characterized by ideological divides, of which the left-right division was the most pronounced. The question that arises is: do these characteristics determine the course of a mobilization process? Are the TBB and TGB the pivots of the community? Are well-known and well-equipped organizations brought into the action more than smaller ones? Are the collaborative bodies utilized as easy-to-use disseminators? And do the opposing groups try to approach each other? The Big World Experiment was used to find answers to these questions.

### 9.1 The mobilization network in Berlin

The mobilization network in Berlin can be found in Figure 9.1. What is immediately noticeable is that it is comprised of only one large component. The mobilization proceeded in such a way that, ultimately, all participating organizations were connected. Given the knowledge one has about the divides within the community, the question arises as to whether this network includes only organizations with the same ideology (for example, only leftist groups) or have the divisions been overcome?

A close inspection of the component reveals that the network does contain clusters of ideologically similar organizations, but the ideological divides are bridged. The network consists of roughly three groups of organizations: conservative, progressive, and Kurdish.

The conservative group (see Figure 9.1) in the mobilization network is centered on the conservative umbrella organization, the TGB, and the social interest organization, the Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum. The latter is a member of the TGB and is an important
Figure 9.1 Mobilization network in Berlin. General typologies in boxes. The two enlarged points represent collaborative bodies of about 20 and 5 organizations.
community center in the city district of Neukölln. The organizations which mobilized the TGB (Türkischer Ringerverein, Berliner Mehter Takimi, and Türkischer Friedhofs und Bestattungsverein) are all members thereof.

The second group (see Figure 9.1) was centered on the progressive umbrella organization, the TBB. Half of the senders which mobilized it were members of this organization. This progressive component contains several ‘satellite’ subgroups positioned around the TBB and its surrounding organizations. The organizations around the AAKM are all Alevi associations. Odak and its adjacent organizations are all welfare associations.

The parents’ organization, the TEBB, is central in a subgroup containing associations that are active in the field of education. The organization for the elderly, the EM-DER, mobilized two media organizations.

Kurdish organizations form the third group in the mobilization network (see Figure 9.1). This group is clustered around two organizations: the educational Kurdisches Institut für Wissenschaft und Forschung, which only mobilized Kurdish organizations, and the parents’ association, the YEKMAL, a starter which mobilized both Kurdish and non-Kurdish organizations.

The Kurdish subgroup was connected to two even smaller subgroups; one with women’s organizations, including the TIO and the Akarsu, and one containing political organizations, including the Omayra, a social association for the young, culture and education. The Kurdish organizations are commonly known to be politically left-wing, and these alliances are also expressed herein since the political organizations are oriented to the left (the HDB, Progressive Volkseinheit der Türkei in Berlin and Allmende).

### 9.2 How much social capital is brought into action?

The way in which a mobilization proceeds depends upon how many actors actively participate therein and how many other actors they address. On average, the senders\(^9^4\) in the Big World Experiment in Berlin mobilized ten organizations (the precise average was 10.08). This figure is high because it is heavily influenced by four organizations\(^9^5\) that mobilized one or another of the collaborative bodies in the network: the Migrationsrat and the Forum Migrantinnenprojekte (see the enlarged points in Figure 9.1). I will discuss their positions in more detail below. Here, it suffices to note that they, respectively, represent 57 and 20 organizations, and their presence in the mobilization process has, thus, raised the average substantially. If these bodies are regarded as single

\(^{94}\) The mean degree score over all network actors, including those that did not mobilize any alter, was 1.83.

\(^{95}\) The Türkische Eltern Bund Berlin TEBB, Kurdisches Zentrum, Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein and BTKB.
actors, the mean number of alters drops to 2.29. Moreover, this latter figure could lead one to the conclusion that the mobilization spreads rapidly throughout the community, because it seems that the number of organizations mobilized more than doubled at each remove. The average is, however, slightly misleading. First of all, there were more organizations which did not participate in the mobilization than did. In other words, of those organizations that were asked to forward the invitation to the lecture, more than half of them did not join in with the experiment. (For a discussion of the non-respondents, see Chapter 6.) Hence, only a few organizations mobilized many others. Secondly, several organizations were mobilized multiple times by different senders. This reduced the number of possible senders in the next remove instead of raising it, as the average suggested. The fact that the mobilization network contains several loops also had consequences for the chain length, i.e. the number of organizations that connected in succession.

Loops are actors who are addressed more than once and by different actors. If several associations mobilize a single actor, this means that the mobilization process keeps returning to it. Since actors were only asked once to take part in the experiment, namely the first time they were mentioned or as a starter, a ‘loop’ results in the stagnation of the mobilization. Being a loop, does, however, demonstrate that the actor in question is popular. In particular, the TBB received many invitations (10) compared to the mean of 1.8, which makes it, by far, the most popular invitee. Furthermore, 30% of the chains led to closers, i.e. non-Turkish actors, and were, therefore, terminated. The consequence of the loops and closers in the network is that the average chain length in the Big World Experiment in Berlin was low: 1.4 steps. As I explained in the preceding chapter, a low average chain length need not be evaluated negatively. As one-third of the chains ended because they reached a non-Turkish actor, this could be regarded as a sign that the Turkish community is integrated with others. On the other hand, another 30% of the chains came up against a loop. Depending on whether these loops have mobilized many or few alters, this is a profitable step in the mobilization. The most popular actor, the TBB, did not mobilize any organization; at least not for the record. In e-mail correspondence, the chairman wrote:

“If you send me the invitation, I can forward it to the corresponding organizations using my e-mail distributor.” 96

Whether the chairman, in fact, did this, is unknown. In this case, the loop did not have any additional value for the mobilization process. The fact that many organizations did mobilize the TBB is, however, telling.

96 “Wenn Sie die Einladung mir zukommen lassen, dann kann ich an die entsprechende Organisation über meinen Mail-Verteiler verschicken.”[sic]
The average chain length does not imply that all actors are only 1.4 steps apart. The mean distance (number of steps\textsuperscript{97}) between any two actors in the mobilization network amounted to 5.5 and the longest was 12. This means that in order for two of the most remote organizations to reach each other, it takes 11 intermediaries\textsuperscript{98}. This is a significant and inconvenient number in the case of a community mobilization, because for one organization to reach the other it is necessary that all intermediaries cooperate. Whether this is a realistic or feasible demand depends on these intermediaries, the most crucial of whom are those organizations that link two groups in the network which are otherwise unconnected. These are the cut points.

### 9.3 The cut points

The mobilization network in Berlin contained several organizations that are in crucial positions in it. The subgroups that I distinguished in the first paragraph are only connected through cut points. This means that the connectedness of the network is, in fact, hanging by a thread. The progressive group positioned around the TBB is the central actor in the network. Moreover, both the conservative group around the TGB and the Kurdish group are linked to this progressive group, although they are not connected to each other.

\textsuperscript{97} More precisely: the distance is the length of the shortest path between two points.

\textsuperscript{98} Note that this figure is based on the assumption that all relationships in the network are undirected. That means that even though the relationship in the mobilization network is explicitly leading from one organization to another due to the nature of the experiment, it is assumed that if the other organization had been approached first, it would have named the first organization as well.
The conservative group is connected to the progressive one through the welfare organization, the TÖYED\textsuperscript{99}. The TÖYED mobilized one organization from each of the two groups: the TBB on the one hand, and the Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum (TDZ) on the other\textsuperscript{100}. On the surface, the TÖYED does not seem to be an exceptional organization, but it is remarkable that it is a member of the TGB, which it did not mobilize, although it did address the rival umbrella organization, the TBB. As I explained in Chapter 6, this is unusual, since the member organizations of the one umbrella organization, in general, refrain from having contact with the other. The fact that the TÖYED, nevertheless, did this is possibly related to its chairman’s additional roles: he is involved in several welfare organizations in the city district of Neukölln, and in these capacities is linked to politicians, government institutions and voluntary organizations in and outside the city district. In any event, the result of the TÖYED's mobilization strategy is that it has acquired a crucial position in the mobilization network. It is interesting to see, then, that a seemingly inconspicuous organization was an essential link in the mobilization process after all. If it were not for this grassroots level organization, the two main, opposing, Turkish subgroups would not be related. This finding suggests that instead of connections being made at the elite level, as is often assumed, the actual exchange of information and, ultimately, the mobilization take place at the grassroots level. I will elaborate on this below.

An organization which one might expect to be the bridge between the TGB and the TBB is the Türkisch Deutsche Unternehmerverein (TDU), which, in terms of social capital, took a neutral position in-between the two umbrella organizations. However, during the mobilization it only addressed the TBB.

The connection between the progressive and the Kurdish groups is formed by the parents' association, the Türkische Eltern Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (TEBB). The TEBB and the TBB (the central organization in the progressive group) are generally known to be well-related. The TEBB is a member of the TBB, the chairman of the TEBB is active in the TBB as well and the TEBB often uses the TBB's accommodation for meetings.

The TEBB did not directly mobilize any Kurdish organization, even though there are historical ties between it and the Kurdish parents' association, the YEKMAL: the latter broke away from the former for political reasons. According to the respondent from the YEKMAL, the TEBB was supported by the Turkish government, and the Kurdish members felt that because of this there was insufficient interest in their problems. They, therefore, decided to establish their own parents' association. In any event, the connection between the TEBB and the Kurdish group runs through the Migrationsrat,
the city wide collaborative body established by migrant organizations in which migrant associations of all ethnicities are united (also see page 144).

Whether the *Migrationsrat* should be regarded as a cut point in the network depends upon whether one views it as a single actor or not. The *Migrationsrat* is a collaboration of over 50 organizations, and I regard it as the secretariat of all participating associations, i.e. I view the *Migrationsrat* not as one actor but as the 50 separate organizations belonging to it. Any organization which mobilized the *Migrationsrat*, thus, mobilizes all affiliated organizations. In the visual representation in Figure 9.1, it is represented with a single point for easy reference, but it is enlarged to indicate its unusual status. The consequence of regarding the *Migrationsrat* as distinguishable organizations is that none of its members is a cutpoint in this network. The definition of a cutpoint is that upon its removal, the remaining network will disintegrate into more components than it was originally comprised of. For each of the members of the *Migrationsrat* then, if one is removed, all of the others are still connecting the different parts of the network. In practice, this means that if one of the participants in the *Migrationsrat* does not cooperate in the mobilization, the others may still do so, thus keeping the network together. On the other hand, a good reason for regarding the *Migrationsrat* as a single actor would be that if the *Kurdisches Zentrum, Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein*, and the *TEBB* had not mobilized it, none of its members would have received the invitation. They were only addressed because they are part of the *Migrationsrat*. In that sense, the *Migrationsrat* does play a role as a cutpoint; moreover, its role is important. Therefore, I believe that it is important to realize that this collaborative body has a crucial network position, while at the same time acknowledging that its significance is multiplied by the fact that it encompasses so many actors.

### 9.4 The position of collaborative bodies in the mobilization process

The position of the *Migrationsrat* is interesting, since it signifies the role that a non-Turkish actor can play in the mobilization of the Turkish community. It even kept the mobilization network together without mobilizing any other organizations itself: it was mobilized by three organizations from different groups (see Figure 9.1). Notably, several Turkish organizations - some of which also participated in the experiment\(^{101}\) - are members of the *Migrationsrat*, but have not mobilized it. Apparently, addressing this social capital is not an obvious step for all organizations.

\(^{101}\) The Turkish and Kurdish organizations that were part of the mobilization process and members of the *Migrationsrat* were: *Tübiks Türkischer Verein für Wissenschaft und Sozialarbeit, Kurdisches Institut für Wissenschaft und Forschung, TOKAT DER* and the *TEBB*. 
Chapter 9

**TIO**
The women’s organization, the *TIO*, seemed to be in a state of identity crisis. On the one hand, it rejected the label ‘Turkish’ organization as it regarded itself as ‘international’. Yet, the interview lay bare that the majority of the *TIO*’s connections were to Turkish organizations, showing that it is still very much part of the Turkish community. However, during the mobilization, the *TIO* acted upon its self-image: it mobilized non-Turkish organizations only. Furthermore, its contact was of German descent. Perhaps this has influenced the choices made during the mobilization.

In general, the activation of a collaborative body is an effective strategy in an attempt at mobilization by the community, since it is able to reach many organizations with only a single action. As well as the *Migrationsrat*, the *Forum Berliner Migrantinnenprojekte* was another self-initiated collaborative body that is included in the mobilization. The *Forum*, already extensively discussed in Chapter 6, is a collaborative body of about twenty women’s organizations which have successfully joined forces. It is an active group that frequently meets, and in which the co-members intensively address each other’s resources. For instance, they jointly produced flyers regarding honor killings in order to collectively take a stand in the public debate. All of this makes the *Forum* an obvious choice during mobilization, but in fact it was only activated by one of the participating associations, the women’s association *BTKB*. Yet, as was the case for the *Migrationsrat*, several organizations that are members of the *Forum* and are included in the mobilization process did not address this collaborative body. On the other hand, although *TIO* (in the Kurdish group, Figure 9.1) did not mobilize the *Forum*, it did mention three organizations that were each a member thereof. So, in a way, the *TIO* did address at least part of the social capital that is captured in the *Forum*.

In Chapter 6, I distinguished three types of collaborative bodies. As well as those initiated by migrant organizations, there are also state-initiated consultative bodies (i.e. the *Migrationsbeiräte* of the various city districts) and the working groups (AGs) set up by large German associations. There were no state-initiated bodies included in the mobilization network, nor did any organization refer to a working group. What two organizations in the *TBB* group did, however, do, was to mobilize *Der Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband (DPW)*, one of the organizations which coordinates such working groups. The women’s organization *BTKB*, participates in an AG on women’s issues, and the welfare organization, *Odak*, takes part in an AG on addiction prevention and treatment (*Suchthilfe*). Why these associations have mobilized the umbrella organization instead of their AGs is perhaps because of the hierarchical structure of a large organization such as the *DPW*. As the *DPW* is the initiator and coordinator of the AGs, I

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102 Obviously, this is based on the assumption that the mutual relationships within the body are positive and function well, and that information is indeed disseminated amongst all members.

103 *Akarsu, TIO, Hinbun* and the *KKH* were senders that did not mention the *Forum*. Furthermore, *ISI, SUSI* and the Psychosozialen *Beratungsstelle für Frauen aus Folgestaaten des ehemaligen Jugoslawien* are also members of the *Forum*, but as they were closers, they were not enabled to mobilize the *Forum*.
expect that all of the correspondence between the participants goes through it. The DPW is a useful player in community mobilization, since many of Berlin’s organizations are active within one or more of the AGs, and the DPW thus has a very wide reach among Turkish and non-Turkish associations.

9.5 Ethnic bonding and bridging social capital: it’s a Turkish affair

Apart from the collaborative bodies, the organizations barely broke into their ethnically bridging social capital. In summary, there were 10 non-Turkish organizations included in the mobilization process, and they were mobilized by only nine of the 24 senders. Two organizations, the women’s organization TIO and the welfare organization ODAK, stood out with regard to their use of ethnically bridging social capital: they both mobilized three non-Turkish others. Characteristic of these organizations is that they are particularly occupied with the integration of migrants into German society. They even see themselves as general organizations that are open to everybody, including non-Turkish migrants and non-migrants. Two-third of the associations only tapped into their ethnically bonding social capital, merely mobilizing Turkish organizations. In other words, the mobilization in the Big World Experiment was, overall, a Turkish affair.

9.6 The role of umbrella organizations

The TBB and the TGB, the two umbrella organizations which mark the social capital of the Turkish community in Berlin, have once again shown themselves to be important in the mobilization process. They are the central actors in two groups within the network. Furthermore, both the TGB and the TBB are popular, which means that they have many incoming ties (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). At the same time, these umbrella organizations mobilized only a few others; in fact, the TBB did not even mobilize a single organization. (Recall that the TBB indicated that it distributes information to its members, and possibly other subscribers, through its mailing list, but this is not registered.) The TGB took a more active course, because it did mobilize two member organizations - one might have expected it to address all of them - both of which seem to have been consciously selected. One addressee was the local Diyanet umbrella

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104 Akarsu, BTKB, Hinbun, Kurdisches Zentrum, Kurdistan Kultur und Hilfsverein (KKH), Odak, TEBB, TIO, and YEKMAL.

105 Of course, what is reported here regards what was conveyed to the researchers. It is possible that the TGB decided to inform all of its member organizations, but this was not explicitly expressed during the telephone call.

106 The other organization mobilized by the TGB is the community center, the Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum.

107 The federal umbrella organization of the DITIB is located in Cologne.
organization (DITIB), which is in charge of 12 mosques in Berlin as well as (an unknown number of) social, sports, cultural and educational associations (Dantschke, 2004). One might have expected this organization to also engage in the dissemination of information, given its function as an umbrella organization. This, however, was not the case because the DITIB refused to collaborate in the experiment (“We are not interested at all, so we don’t want to bother our members”\textsuperscript{108}). Overall, the umbrella organizations did play an important, but not very active, role in the mobilization process. The ‘street-level’ associations were much busier in that respect.

### 9.7 Division of labor

The limited involvement of the umbrella organizations in the mobilization was, in some ways, compensated for by the smaller associations. In fact, one could say that there was a kind of ‘division of labor’. The organizations that are high up in the social hierarchy, i.e. the umbrellas, held back during the mobilization, whereas those in the middle did the ‘hard work’ of spreading the word. Examples of organizations at this level are the community center Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum, the Kurdish parents’ organization YEKMAL, and the parents’ organization TEBB, which are each from another group in the network. These are all organizations with good reputations, but no leading status, and they made the mobilization proceed very quickly because they addressed the greatest numbers of alters. Furthermore, what the recipients had in common was that their scale was relatively small, but their nature was diverse; different kinds of organizations were involved, such as social, women’s and sports’ associations.

The organizations at the lower end of the hierarchy are the kinds that received the invitation from the ‘middlemen’. They are small associations aimed at a specific population and mainly occupied with their own, often precise, objectives. For example, the Makyad (in the conservative group) is a social organization aimed at Turks from the region of Malatya. These smallest organizations either mobilized their umbrella organization if they were affiliated to one, or did not mobilize any organization at all.

In summary, the associations that are hierarchically higher up tended to pick alters that were also umbrella organizations or were able to reach a wide audience, while the mid-sized associations spread the word ‘on the ground’, and the smallest ones hardly participated in the mobilization at all. These patterns were discernable in each of the three groups in the network.

\textsuperscript{108} Initially, the DITIB mentioned one of its member mosques, the Sehitlik Mosque, but withdrew this at the end. The Sehitlik mosque was, however, approached, as it was also mobilized by the TDZ. The caller only referred to the latter as the sender of the invitation.
Overall, the preceding presentation of the mobilization network in Berlin has brought several interesting aspects to light, including the fact that although the Turkish community may be divided, in terms of action it is brought together. The image of a community divided stems from the analyses of the social capital presented in Chapter 6. Accordingly, the question now is: how does the social capital of the Turkish community relate to the way it is mobilized?

9.8 How do social capital and mobilized social capital relate?

Comparing the networks

A structural comparison of the mobilization and contact networks reveals that, with respect to the percentage of ties that are present in both, 70.0% of the ties in the former network can also be found in the latter. This means that the mobilizing organizations have, for the large part, used familiar channels, which they encounter in everyday life. Alternatively, 9.4% of the ties in the contact network were addressed during the mobilization. So, although the mobilization includes active contacts between organizations, the organizations addressed only a tenth of their social capital. Furthermore, the social capital that was present in the network of interlocking directorates was not addressed at all. This might be explained by the fact that many organizations in Berlin are run by (paid) employees instead of official board members. Indeed, several interviewees who were employees instead of board members declared that they had no idea who the board members of other organizations were, since they only worked with the employees (‘Geschäftsführer’, ‘Mitarbeiter’) thereof (see also Chapter 6). The difference between the network of interlocking directorates and the mobilization network, combined with the resemblance of the contact and the mobilization networks, suggests that the formal relationships between organizations and their everyday practices are unconnected. The social capital that board members have because of overlapping board memberships is not, apparently, conveyed to the people actually running the organizations.

To sum up, this structural analysis has brought to light the fact that the organizations that have participated in the mobilization have predominantly used familiar channels, but have also used only a small part of the social capital available to them.

9.9 Bridging ideological cleavages while sticking together

The mobilization network in Berlin provided an equivocal picture so far as ideological divides are concerned. On the one hand, most organizations sought out partners that
belong to the same ideological denomination. Indeed, the network component visibly contained a Kurdish, a progressive and a conservative group. On the other hand, the ideologically opposed subgroups were connected by means of a few crucial actors which bridged these ideological divisions. The ideological opposites were, thus, not separate islands, but rather ‘peninsulas’ connected to each other by a thin strand. A similar picture arose in the contact network, in which organizations of familiar ideologies also flock together, while the transverse connections between ideological groups were realized predominantly by means of collaborative bodies. As many organizations were part of these bodies, meaning that many ‘opposed’ organizations met, these connections were quite ubiquitous. The left-right division was dominant over any other (contrasting) ideologies that were present in both the mobilization and the contact networks, but this was more noticeable in the latter than in the former. The picture of the network of interlocking directorates was in sharp contrast; the ideological groups (leftist, rightist as well as religious) were not at all connected on the formal level. What this comparison shows is that the Turkish organizations in Berlin primarily want to operate within ideological groups, but apparently there are (external) forces which encourage them to collaborate.

9.10 Keep it in the family

The degree to which the Turkish community bonds within and over ethnic boundaries differed strikingly between the contact and the mobilization networks\textsuperscript{109}. The organizations indicated that in their everyday practices they encounter many non-Turkish associations. Indeed, on average, the number of non-Turkish contacts equaled the number of Turkish ones (as expressed by the mean E-I index\textsuperscript{110}: .00; see Appendix 8). A closer examination of the ratio of the Turkish - non-Turkish contacts of the organizations interviewed reveals that, in fact, half of them clearly had more non-Turkish contacts, while the other half had noticeably more Turkish contacts (see the first columns in the table in Appendix 8). This picture changes in the mobilization network. The majority of the organizations have mobilized only Turkish organizations (i.e. had E-I index scores of -1). So, even though most associations had as much ethnically bonding as ethnically bridging social capital, they nevertheless resorted to ethnically similar organizations in the mobilization. In other words, the mobilizing

\textsuperscript{109} Recall that when it comes to the network of interlocking directorates, there is no data available on any Turkish – non-Turkish interlocks in Berlin.

\textsuperscript{110} The E-I index is an expression of the relationship between the number of ties leading to actors with a different characteristic than ego, compared to the number of ties leading to actors that are similar to ego. A +1 score indicates that ego only has alters that are unlike it, whilst a score of -1 indicates that all alters are similar to ego on the specified characteristic.
organizations in Berlin have also acted according to the ‘in-case-of urgency-strategy’ with regard to their ethnicity.

9.11 The use of bridging social capital regarding organizational type

In Chapter 2 I suggested that the diversity of an association’s social capital can be expressed in terms of the ethnicities (as discussed in the previous paragraph) and the types of the organizations to which this association is connected. An actor whose acquaintances are different from each other and from itself is supposed to have more diverse resources at its disposal and, therefore, richer social capital. Zmerli and Newton (2007) found in their study of five European cities that most associations, except the political ones, have bonding social capital in this respect: they connect more to similar than dissimilar organizations (see also pages 63 and 112). This is not what I found in Berlin. The majority of the organizations had more bridging than bonding social capital and, more importantly, they also mobilized more bridging social capital. Only the religious umbrella organization, IFB, the Idealist organization, Türkischer Idealisten Gemeinschaft in Berlin, and several women’s associations had more bonding social capital at their disposal and also activated this. This particular result then is more in line with Zmerli and Newton’s findings that especially group specific organizations are the least involved in networking activities. But overall, it seems that the Turkish community in Berlin made more crosscutting connections than expected.

9.12 Stability over networks I: the prominent positions of the umbrella organizations

In Chapter 6, I explained that the Turkish community in Berlin is, for the large part, defined by two umbrella organizations, the TGB and the TBB. They are the key actors in the network of interlocking directorates because they had the most interlocks of all of the Turkish organizations. They were also the key actors in the everyday lives of organizations since they had the most social capital by far. Furthermore, almost all of the interviewed organizations were, or felt, related to one of the umbrellas, and many regarded the two of them as the most relevant and most representative Turkish associations in Berlin. The importance of the two umbrella organizations was again visible in the mobilization network, since the mobilization process was largely focused on the TGB and the TBB. In particular, the latter was center of many organizations’ attention, as evidenced by the many (most) invitations it received. The TGB received fewer invitations, but still more than most other actors. In summary, the central positions of the TGB and the TBB are a constant factor in the networks. The prominent
role that they play on paper, they also play in the perception of the organizations that make up the Turkish community.

During the mobilization process, they have been shown to mainly be the receivers of information instead of the senders. Their respective member organizations have forwarded them their invitations, which they either did not redirect (the TBB), or passed on to only a relatively small audience (the TGB). Having many incoming and few outgoing ties is a typical situation for actors that are highly placed in a hierarchy, as described in much social network analysis literature (e.g. Wasserman and Faust (1994 [2007]); Alexander, (1963)). The actors at the top of the hierarchy receive all the available information and, thus, have a key position in the community: knowledge is power. They decide whether they send information out and, if so, to whom. The Big World Experiment in Berlin did, however, reveal that these key actors were not particularly prone to passing these invitations on. Were it not for some associations lower down in the hierarchy, such as the Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum and the YEKMAL, the mobilization of the community in Berlin in this experiment would have been less extensive if not nearly zero. But despite the relative passiveness of the umbrella organizations, they once again gained a central position, this time in the mobilization network.

Members of the umbrella organizations
The umbrella organizations, the TGB and TBB, both have a considerable number of member organizations that they represent in the public debate. The responses from these members during the interviews seemed to suggest that they are mainly official members, but they do not have much to do with their superiors in everyday practice. Then again, the TBB and TGB have demonstrated their value and seen their central position reaffirmed during the mobilization. All of the organizations in the mobilization that were members of an umbrella organization have mobilized the relevant umbrella. More than that, many of them have only mobilized their umbrella organization and have thus neglected all of the other contacts that they clearly do have. This demonstrates the pull that the umbrella organizations exert on their members and how much they are used to arranging things by means of these organizations. One of the interviewees had indeed stated that her organization uses the umbrella organization mainly for purposes of dissemination, for example to reach a larger audience for activities.

9.13 Stability over networks II: the Kurdish organizations

Like the dominance of the two umbrella organizations over the networks, the subgroup of Kurdish associations is relatively stable, although they are not present in the network of interlocking directorates. Berger (2010) explained that this is a conscious decision by their boards. Her informants told her that they suspect that they are watched over by the German intelligence service, and interlocking directorates would reveal any relationships between organizations. Nevertheless, the Kurdish associations in the
contact network were clustered, as they also were in the mobilization network. Strikingly, 17% of the actors in the mobilization network were Kurdish organizations. This is a high figure when compared to the contact network, in which only 3% of the organizations were Kurdish. It seems that this community is not big, but it is very active.

9.14 The role of religious (umbrella) organizations

The religious umbrella organizations, the *Islamische Föderation Berlin* and the *DITIB* (of Diyanet), and their respective member associations were aloof in the contact network and did not actively participate in the mobilization either. It was only in the network of interlocking directorates that they were clearly represented, since both of them are central in a separate component. Neither the *DITIB* nor the *IFB* mobilized any other organizations, the former because it "did not want to bother [its] members", the latter for reasons that are unknown. Although they both potentially have a wide audience that is obedient to their authority, they failed to mobilize their members. This ‘obedience’ was, for instance, seen in the fact that I approached several member organizations with a request for interviews, but most of them stated that they were only willing to participate if their umbrella organization gave them permission to do so.

This failure to take action has several possible explanations. It can be an expression of a relatively passive attitude, the restraint of religious umbrella organizations when compared to secular associations, or the aversion of associations to interventions from outside. Several religious organizations told me that they only concern themselves with religious affairs and do not get involved with any other issues. Whether this is completely a self-chosen policy is doubtful. Islamic organizations in Berlin are often looked at with Argus’ eyes by their secular counterparts as well as by German (governmental) institutions. The consequence of this may be that Islamic associations withdraw from community life because they feel unwelcome.

9.15 A city-wide community?

The city district of Kreuzberg is known as the most ‘Turkish’ neighborhood in Berlin. It has a high percentage of Turkish residents and the streetscape is largely dominated by Turkish shops and signs. Over the years, the Turkish population has also settled more

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111 The *DITIB* did mention one member organization (the *Sehitlik* mosque) but withdrew the name after having second thoughts. I did include the connection in the network picture, but the *Sehitlik Moschee* was only contacted because the *Türkisch Deutsches Zentrum* had also named it.

112 Factually, most Turks live in the city district of Mitte, with 8.7% of the residents being Turkish. The city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln also accommodate a similar percentage of Turks (8.2%) (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2007).
dominantly in other districts, such as Neukölln, which is adjacent to Kreuzberg. Moreover, half of the Turkish organizations are located in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Nevertheless, the analyses of the locations of every pair of connected organizations in all three networks revealed that most organizations are related mainly to counterparts that are not in the same city district. This is initially visible at the formal level: more organizations share a board member with one or more counterparts outside their city district than within it. Often, interlocking directorates emerge because a newly established organization includes the board members of an existing one on its own board (as was seen in Amsterdam in Chapter 5). In such cases, the two organizations do not usually only share their board members, but also their locations; if they are not located at the same address, they are usually based in the same city district. This mechanism for the creation of the network of interlocking directorates does not seem to be applicable in Berlin, since the actors in that network are not connected to neighbors.

Furthermore, most organizations in the contact network connect more to associations that are outside their city districts than to those that are inside them. The tendency to connect to organizations outside one’s city district was again found in the mobilization network; almost half of the actors only mobilized such organizations. This was somewhat unexpected, as during the interviews I got the impression that most associations are active on a (geographical) local basis. Many interviewees indicated that due to time and means constraints they are confined to local activities and connections only. However, the analyses of the contact and mobilization networks contradicted this, so the question arises as to what explanation there is for the fact that most organizations had more contacts outside their city district than inside it.

One explanation is that, on average, 55% of the ties in the contact network led to organizations that were located in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, while many of the

| IFB |
The relatively isolated status of the IFB is stable across the networks. It did have interlocking directorates with a mosque and the association that is responsible for Islamic education in Berlin, but these were member organizations and the connections are thus tight and close. Furthermore, the IFB is separated from the ‘outside’ world. This is confirmed in the contact network, in which it is connected mainly to member organizations. For an umbrella organization it had only a few connections and those organizations that it did relate to were relatively small. Only the fact that the IFB has gained the position of provider of Islamic education in Berlin schools makes it a crucial organization for the Turkish community. At the same time it has a controversial position therein. Two respondents told me that their organizations only encounter the IFB in court, when one or the other starts a lawsuit. Another respondent indicated that “They [the IFB] send us invitations, but we never attend their meetings. We only want contact with legal [!] groups.” The exclusion of the IFB and its related organizations from the rest of the Turkish community is also reproduced during the mobilization. None of the senders has mobilized the IFB and the latter, for its part, has refrained from mobilizing any organizations as well.
interviewees themselves were based in different, often adjacent, city districts. In some instances this is because the organizations do not have permanent accommodation, and they are thus run from the chairmen’s home or work address, which is not always in the center of the city, while the activities of the organization take place in the city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Additionally, around a quarter of the interviewees were based in Neukölln, adjacent to Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, while an average of 19% of the ties led to organizations located there. The geographical vicinity may have caused associations in Neukölln to connect more to counterparts in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg.

All of this suggests that, on the face of it, the Turkish community is operating city-wide, given that most organizations interact with alters outside their city district, and the formal network is spread out all over the city as well. However, as the majority of ties lead to organizations in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln, the community functions very locally after all.

9.16 The role of collaborative and consultative bodies

In Chapter 6, I distinguished three types of bodies in Berlin: government initiated consultative bodies, working groups arranged by major German organizations, and collaborative bodies initiated by groups of voluntary organizations. Many Turkish organizations in Berlin are members of at least one collaborative or consultative body, and also indicated that their involvement therein was active. Membership was seen to add a lot to the amount of an organization’s social capital, since these bodies attract members from different ethnic backgrounds. Given this quantity and plurality, one might expect that these bodies would also be useful and effective disseminators of any mobilization, and that they would be intensively used during any mobilization process. This was not, however, quite the case.

The state-initiated consultative bodies were absent from the mobilization process. Several organizations which took part in the mobilization are members of the ‘Migrantenbeiräte’ in the city districts of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln, but these bodies are not held in high esteem. The organizations felt that they were invited to join in for show, and not to actually have a say in the course of events. This sentiment is probably the main reason why the mobilizing organizations did not use this channel to spread word of the invitation. These bodies are not seen as active partners.

The working groups initiated by German organizations, such as the Arbeiter Wohlfahrt (AWO) and Der Paritätische Wohlfahrt (DPW), were also not addressed as

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113 The sample used in this study unintentionally contained a disproportionately high percentage of organizations outside of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg when compared to the population mean. There is no clear explanation for this.
such. The *DPW* itself was mobilized by two actors: the women’s organization, the *BKTB*, and the welfare organization, *Odak*, both of which are participants in *DPW* working groups. The *DPW* had a solid position in the contact network since it was mentioned by many different organizations. The exceptional position that this German organization has in the Turkish community is confirmed in the mobilization network, where it serves as a bridge between the Turkish organization, *Odak*, and the Turkish community (see Figure 9.1).

The collaborative bodies initiated by organizations themselves have proved to be both used and useful. The members thereof had considerably more social capital than non-members, and an additional advantage is that these collaborative bodies are very positively evaluated. The beneficial effect of the collaborative bodies is confirmed in the mobilization network given the central position of the *Migrationsrat* therein. Apparently, allowing people to ‘do it themselves’ makes them more dedicated and willing to make things work. Initiatives taken by civic actors are, thus, of high value to the community.

### 9.17 Ambivalent relationships: the local government

During the mobilization process, no government actor was addressed. This is all the more notable considering the fact that the contact network did contain a high percentage of local government agencies, semi-governmental organizations and political parties. Almost all interviewees indicated that they were in contact with their respective city district council, and many worked in close collaboration with local semi-governmental organizations, such as the *Quartiersmanagement (QM)*\(^{114}\). However, this substantial amount of linking social capital was not addressed at all during the mobilization. In addition to the disregard of the government initiated consultative bodies, the local government is completely ignored. Even the *Integrationsbeauftragte*,\(^{115}\) which operates in close collaboration with, and often on behalf of, the migrant organizations, was not contacted during the mobilization in the Big World Experiment. It is possible that the wording of the question posed in the experiment has led participants to exclude the (semi)governmental actors, but in Amsterdam it did trigger some organizations to address linking social capital. This dismisses the issue of the question’s wording as an explanation for the lack of linking social capital in this mobilization network. Instead, I suspect that the reason for this exclusion is that the Turkish community in Berlin is used to operating in a self-reliant way in the closed political opportunity structure they find themselves in. The Berlin government does, after all,

\(^{114}\) The *QM* coordinates the development of ‘neighborhoods in need’ through the activation and integration of civil actors. See also note 59 (p.146) and page 153.

\(^{115}\) Initially called the *Ausländerbeauftragte*. This is the commissioner appointed by the province (*Land*) Berlin-Brandenburg to tackle integration problems within the administration as well as in the public sphere.
have a more distant attitude towards migrant associations, and the latter have developed ways to exist in which they do not need the support of the local authorities. A final possible explanation of the lack of governmental organizations in the mobilization network is that the organizations may assume that they do not need to address governmental organizations because the latter do not need to ‘network’ to be informed. This supposed independence of the governmental organizations is, however, another confirmation of the distance between the Turkish organizations and the German government.

### 9.18 The media and the message

In Chapter 6, I mentioned that the local immigrant media, i.e. (Turkish) radio and television broadcasting stations, are important to the Turkish community. They have high ratings within this group and several organizations use the radio stations in particular to bring their activities to the attention of the Turkish residents in Berlin. Given the significant listening and viewing figures of these Turkish radio and television stations, it is possible for organizations to reach a very wide audience. Based upon this, one would expect these media associations to be granted an important role in the process of information dissemination, but this was not the case. There was only one organization that did this during the mobilization: the seniors’ organization, **EM-DER**, sent the invitation to *Radio Metropol* and *Radio Multikulti*.

This lack of use of media organizations can be interpreted in several ways. The most plausible explanation is that the organizations have regarded the invitation to the lecture as not being something that they want to make public on the radio; they may believe that their own activities are more ‘radio-worthy’. Another possibility is that the radio stations are mainly used for consumption purposes, instead of as a vehicle for mobilization.

### 9.19 Summary

The Turkish community in Berlin is characterized by a dominant division between left-wing and right-wing groups, which respectively center on the two umbrella organizations, the **TBB** and **TGB**. These umbrella organizations play a crucial role in the community because they represent and guide not only their members, but also many other sympathetic associations. Furthermore, they clearly have the most social capital at their disposal. This is recognized by other organizations, as can be seen from the number of them that have mobilized these umbrella organizations. However, the umbrella organizations were not the ones that spread the mobilization fastest; it was the
mid-sized organizations that did so. Here, the Turkish community demonstrates a
division of labor between organizations that act on different hierarchical levels.
Although the Turkish organizations maintain inter-ethnic ties, their Turkish connections
are addressed during a mobilization. Other notable characteristics of the Turkish
community in Berlin are that the collaborative bodies play an important role, in contrast
to the consultative bodies that are present but not used. Moreover, religious
organizations play a relatively marginal role and Kurdish associations are very much
interlinked and very active.

Notwithstanding the marked results presented in this and the previous chapter a
word of caution is called for. It is important to realize that the BWE evoked a specific
kind of mobilization and, in the light of this, that the results are best interpreted as an
indication of the varying roles the contact network and network of interlocking
directorates can play in the mobilization of the community. Other triggers, for example
more urgent appeals, may induce a mobilization network of a different shape, which is
more similar to the network of interlocking directorates than to the contact network. I
will expand upon this point in the concluding chapter.

I have now presented the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and
Berlin in Chapters 5 and 6, and demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8 how this social capital
is deployed in a mobilization. Accordingly, the time has come to compare the two
communities in order to assess the influence of context and, in particular, the political
opportunity structure on the use of social capital. This is the purpose of the next chapter.