The big world experiment: the mobilization of social capital in migrant communities
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10. Comparing Amsterdam and Berlin

The primary aim of this book is to shed light on an undeveloped field of research: social capital in operation. Many studies describe what social capital is and what it is good for, but very little is known about how it functions. The mechanisms between social capital on the one hand and the dependent variable that explains how social capital is used on the other has remained underexposed until now. In this study, I use the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin as examples with which to illuminate the working of social capital. Social capital does not operate in a vacuum, so the context within which it is mobilized needs to be considered. In the case of the social capital of Turkish communities, this implies that the political opportunity structures of the cities that they are located in are taken into account. The theoretical relationships are visualized in Figure 10.1.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 10.1 Theoretical relationships between POS, social capital and mobilized social capital**

The Figure contains the three key elements: context, social capital and mobilized social capital. The operationalizations of these are set out in the boxes. The context refers to the political opportunity structure; the social capital is the sum of the network of interlocking directorates\(^{116}\) and the contact network\(^{117}\); and the mobilized social capital

\(^{116}\) The network of interlocking directorates is based on joint board memberships: a person who is seated on the boards of two or more organizations simultaneously.

\(^{117}\) The contact network reflects the connections between the respondents and the organizations they indicated that they maintain contact with.
is reflected in the mobilization network\textsuperscript{118}. The influence of the context on social capital (relationship I) and of both the context (relationship III) and social capital (relationship II) on the way in which social capital is mobilized is scrutinized by means of two sets of questions. Regarding the first relationship, the questions are:

What does the social capital look like in the two cities; is it similar or different and what can explain these differences/similarities?

I compare the contact networks and network of interlocking directorates of the Turkish communities in Berlin and Amsterdam to ascertain to what extent, and why, the networks differ. Vermeulen (2006) has already explained how networks of interlocking directorates are influenced by the political opportunity structure; herein, my main focus is on the element of social capital that concerns the contact networks. I will sometimes refer to the network of interlocking directorates to illustrate the characteristics that the two types of networks clearly share or do not, but the emphasis is on the contact network.

The second set of questions serve as guidelines with which to highlight Relationships II and III:

How do the mobilization processes differ between the two cities and what explains the differences or similarities?

To answer these questions I compare the mobilization networks resulting from the Big World Experiment. I will discuss both sets of questions simultaneously on the basis of the most striking characteristics of the networks, such as the amount of ethnic bonding and bridging social capital, the role of umbrella organizations and the presence of ideological divides. A summary of the points that I will now discuss can be found in Table 10.1. I will start with a comparison of the structural characteristics of the three networks.

10.1 Comparing the structural aspects

The networks of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam and Berlin contained almost as many Turkish organizations, while the organizations in the former city had many more interconnections. Strikingly, the image of the contact networks is the opposite of the...
networks of interlocking directorates. It revealed that the Turkish organizations in Berlin have a more extensive contact network than those in Amsterdam (even though the network in Berlin was based on fewer respondents!) and there are more connections between the organizations in the Berlin contact network, in both absolute and relative terms. The mean number of alters of the respondents in Berlin was twice as high as that of the respondents in Amsterdam. In the main, the organizations with the greatest numbers of alters, such as the umbrella organizations the TGB and the TBB with, respectively, 122 and 120, raised this average in Berlin. Compared to the largest number of alters in Amsterdam (the workers' organization, the HTIB, named 57), this is a significant amount.

The main explanatory factor behind the greater number of alters in Berlin is the participation of organizations in collaborative bodies which are larger and more
numerous in this city (more on this later). A second possible explanation lies in the political opportunity structure. I would argue that whether or not subsidies are available does have an effect on the interconnectivity of the migrant organizations. In a situation in which only a few grants are obtainable from the government (as was the case in Berlin), the associations which want to arrange events have to find other sources of funding. A logical step is then to connect to other organizations which may have their own channels for gaining finance. On the other hand, if funds are easily available, the need to contact others is less pressing. This was noticeable in Amsterdam.

Another obvious difference between the Amsterdam and Berlin contact networks is that the network in Berlin is concentrated around two leading actors, the umbrella organizations, whereas there are no such ‘giants’ in Amsterdam. The prominent positions of these umbrella organizations in Berlin, or the absence of them in Amsterdam, determine the shape of the networks overall. The contact network in Amsterdam is more horizontally shaped, whereas that in Berlin has a vertical form. At this point, the influence of government policy is perhaps at its clearest. The strategy of the Berlin Ausländerbeauftragte (Commissioner for Foreigners) with respect to her connections to migrant communities has been to focus on a limited number of organizations. These received the lion’s share of the available subsidies and were the focal point of the communication between the German government and the Turkish community. As the TGB and TBB both represented a group of organizations, these were obvious partners. Other organizations had to comply with this situation, which was imposed on them from above. So, what can be seen in Berlin is that, on the one hand, the lack of money available to voluntary associations has led to more interconnections in the community, because organizations had to join forces, while on the other, it was precisely the organizations which did receive funding that had the highest number of connections. This may seem contradictory, but it is not. The subsidized associations are the logical central point of the community because of their financially better off position; other actors may feel they have a chance of profiting from these subsidies too if they connect to the ‘rich’ organizations.

The policy on subsidies for migrant organizations in Amsterdam was very different, given that grants were available for ‘everybody’. This allowed the network there to develop more equally. The easy access to resources reduces the need for large umbrella organizations, and because all organizations have access to more or less the same resources, it is not even possible for one to ‘overrule’ the others. The result is that no organization is particularly dominant, and all are less powerful than they might otherwise have been.

The situation in Berlin, thus, seems to be an example of the ‘survival of the fittest’: the circumstances are difficult and only a few organizations have the ability and the opportunity to grow into the major players that are recognized as such by the local government. Because the conditions in Amsterdam are more favorable, and all
organizations basically get the same opportunities, they all grow into medium-sized players and no-one develops into the leading organization.

The mobilization networks also displayed the same vertical and horizontal layouts in Berlin and Amsterdam respectively. In the former, the leading organizations received many invitations, although they rarely mobilized any associations themselves; a sign of network hierarchy. The mobilization in Amsterdam did not, however, lay bare a clear hierarchical position for any organization.

The mobilization networks in Berlin and Amsterdam not only differ regarding their horizontality or verticality, but also in terms of other structural network aspects. At first sight it is already clear that the Amsterdam mobilization network consists of separate components while the one in Berlin is a fully connected network (cf. Figures 8.1 and 9.1 on pages 182 and 200). Furthermore, the mobilization in Berlin involved more actors and more ties than the mobilization in Amsterdam. Moreover, the ratio between the number of ties and the number of actors was higher in Berlin, which means that the network is more interconnected. The average number of alters mobilized by one actor is also higher in that city, but this is dramatically influenced by the four actors which have mobilized a collaborative body. This effect is also clear with regard to the number of chains that the Big World Experiment elicited: in fact, the mobilization in Berlin included more chains, but if the collaborative bodies are regarded as one entity, the mobilization in Amsterdam had more. In other words, the fact that these collaborative bodies were mobilized in Berlin has had a huge impact on the extent of the mobilization.

The mobilization networks also resemble each other in several ways. Firstly, the length of the chains was short in both networks. The mean in both cities was not particularly high (around 1.5), although the chains in Amsterdam were, on average, slightly longer than those in Berlin. The reason why the chains are short, however, differ between the cities. In Amsterdam, many of them reached a closer\(^\text{119}\) and were thus terminated, while in Berlin many of them looped (i.e. reached an actor that was already involved in the mobilization). In particular, many looped to one of the umbrella organizations. The second similarity between the mobilization networks is that most organizations mobilized only a few others, but some addressed many. The difference is that the organizations that mobilized many alters in Berlin are the mid-sized ones, whereas in Amsterdam those that mobilized a major quantity of alters were the largest associations. Finally, a striking resemblance is that neither the organizations in Amsterdam, nor those in Berlin, drew from the social capital that was present in the networks of interlocking directorates\(^\text{120}\). However, even though the mobilization network and network of interlocking directorates do not, literally, contain the same relationships, I would argue that the networks in the two cases do resemble each other

\(^{119}\) I.e. a non-Turkish organization, or an (Turkish) organization outside Amsterdam.

\(^{120}\) Only one organization in Amsterdam addressed another that it shared a board member with. This organization's link was also present in the contact network.
in the sense that they are reflections of high-trust relationships. In both cities, the urgency reflex (discussed below) led the organizations to mobilize alters to which they are closely connected based on ideology, ethnicity or locality. Bonding ties such as these are thought to be characterized by a high degree of trust (cf. Chapter 2). A network of interlocking directorates on the other hand is, almost by definition, a high-trust network. Even in the case where a joint board membership is created primarily for reasons of surveillance of one organization over the other, it is thought that these relationships develop into high-trust connections.

Following up on the issue of trust within the communities, a final structural difference between the two cities is that compared to the position in Amsterdam, a much higher percentage of the ties in the mobilization network in Berlin were also present in the contact network: in Berlin 70%, and in Amsterdam 50%, of the relationships in the mobilization network were also part of the contact network. In other words, the actors in Berlin have used many more familiar channels to disseminate the information than their counterparts in Amsterdam did. I argue that this indicates that the connections between associations in Berlin are tighter and more stable and generally have higher mutual trust levels than those in Amsterdam. This impression is reinforced by the fact that several organizations in Amsterdam mobilized their personal social capital rather than the social capital of the organizations. I address this issue below in more detail.

In summary, this structural comparison demonstrated that there seems to be a trade-off between government financial support and the activity of a community. On the one hand, a system of easily available subsidies enabled the Turkish community in Amsterdam to develop a horizontal and equivalent network. On the other, the more restrictive regime in Berlin led to a vertical network, in which clear differences exist between larger, financed associations and smaller, non-subsidized ones. However, when it came to the mobilization of the community, it transpired that the community in Berlin was more active and had a more efficient strategy, which led to an integrated community mobilization. This is in contrast to what happened in Amsterdam, where small groups of organizations mobilized each other, but no actor was able to bind the community together. These findings confirm the theory on the effect of the political opportunity structure presented in Chapter 3 (represented in Figure 3.1 on p.67), which states that the relationship between the openness of the POS and the tendency for collective mobilization is curvilinear (bell-shaped).

In my opinion, there is no such thing as a ‘best practice’ regarding the subsidizing of migrant organizations, although the call for such judgments may be heard. It all depends upon what one is aiming for. The positive aspect of the way in which organizations are treated in Amsterdam is that every association has, more or less, the same opportunities and no one organization is really favored over others. The downside is that this equal treatment leads to a more fragmented community. In Berlin, the not so generous attitude of the local authorities has led to an active community that displays much self-initiative. The disadvantage, however, is that it is difficult for smaller organizations to
survive, and it is crucial that the dominant associations actually represent all groups in the community, which is not necessarily the case.

10.2 The dominance of ideological cleavages and the ‘case of urgency’ reflex

The Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin have in common that the ideological cleavages between left-wing and right-wing organizations, religious and secular associations, Kurdish and Grey-wolves’ associations and between religious movements of different denominations are all present. These divisions were already visible in the networks of interlocking directorates. Vermeulen (2006) demonstrated that this is not so much to do with the political opportunity structure in which the communities operate, but is instead related to the cultural and political peculiarities (Vermeulen calls them ‘group related factors’) that these groups brought from their homeland. The political situation in Turkey largely influenced the Turkish organizations that were established and maintained in Amsterdam and Berlin until the late 1990s. Thus, it is not surprising that both contact networks are also characterized by the same ideological cleavages, albeit that these divisions are less pronounced than in the networks of interlocking directorates. The everyday practices of organizations require that they form alliances with other organizations that are ideologically different.

This effect is manifest more clearly in Amsterdam than in Berlin. In the former case, ideologies are slightly tempered in relation to the ‘outside’ world (government and non-Turkish organizations), because the organizations are dependent on funding from the government, which is provided on the condition of collaboration. Yet, within the community it is very clear which organization ‘belongs’ to which ideology and the groups do not mingle much. This was also possible because funding has always been available for each organization, irrespective of their background (even Grey Wolves-affiliated associations were subsidized) and no organization was forced to hide its ideology. It is noteworthy that Islamic organizations were also given the opportunity to develop themselves. In fact, they were encouraged by the Dutch government to establish social-cultural organizations so as to become eligible for funding, since religious associations do not receive financial support because of the separation of Church and State. In Berlin, almost the opposite was the case. Islamic organizations are approached in a more suspicious way and they do not receive funding. As a result, these organizations keep a much lower profile than in Amsterdam. Instead, the ideological divide that is most visible in the Turkish community in Berlin is the one between left-wing progressive organizations and right-wing conservative ones.

The ideological divides are also visible in the mobilization networks in the two cities. In both Amsterdam and Berlin the organizations exhibit a tendency to address
counterparts with the same ideological background as themselves. I termed this tendency to favor close connections a ‘case of urgency’ reflex, paralleling the names of relatives or other close relations that people note in their diaries to ‘notify in the case of an emergency’. During the Big World Experiment, the respondents were asked, without prior notice, to name other organizations and they had little time to think of who they thought were suitable partners. This was not a case of emergency, but the respondents must have felt a sense of urgency.

In Amsterdam, this reflex led to a fragmented mobilization; the mobilization network consisted of several separate components that contained different ideological groups (see Figure 8.1 on page 182 for a picture of the network). Likewise, the organizations in Berlin acted upon the ‘case of urgency’ reflex given the fact that different ideological groups were clearly visible in the network, but these opponents were all connected (see Figure 9.1 on page 200).

I would argue that this difference in the mobilization is an effect of the closed political opportunity structure (POS) that the organizations in Berlin face. Even though they may have different views on relevant themes, they still need each other to take a stand vis-à-vis the local authorities and to ensure their survival. They are, in a way, condemned to each other. And even though the Big World Experiment was not initiated by any governmental institution, the mechanisms of mobilization that have been developed over the years, and have become engraved in the actions of the organizations, were also applied in the current case. This is in line with the argument of Maxwell (2008), who found that migrant groups in France were more easily mobilized than similar groups in Great Britain, since in the former case, they encountered a closed political opportunity structure. For instance, POS in France prevented an easy interaction between the Caribbeans and elected and appointed officials. In order to have their issues addressed, they decided to mobilize along ethnic and racial lines. Their counterparts in Great Britain found more resonance through official political channels and, therefore, lacked the motivation for group mobilization.

The Amsterdam case, then, corresponds to Great Britain. As migrant organizations were ‘pampered’ by a system of subsidies and a local government that has always reached out to them as convenient channels of communication and policy implementation, the organizations may have been soothed into sleep. The need to mobilize the community was simply not pressing enough. Indeed, one of the questions during the interviews was “who would you inform if you received an invitation from the local authorities to any kind of meeting where you can comment on (proposed) local policies?”, to which several respondents answered “nobody, because if it is important, they will receive an invitation themselves”. The political opportunity structure, thus, clearly had an effect on the mobilization process.
10.3 Mobilization strategies

The Turkish communities in Berlin and Amsterdam deployed distinctive mobilization strategies. In Berlin, I characterized the tactic as a 'division of labor' because the key umbrella organizations restrained from active mobilization, while the midsize associations enthusiastically involved themselves in the process and the small-sized, street-level, organizations turned to their respective umbrellas. The Amsterdam mobilization did not reveal this division of labor. If a general strategy in the mobilization process can be pinpointed at all, it is one that organizations on all levels pursued, namely that of mobilizing those that are hierarchically more highly placed because of their size, main activities or reputation.

The different strategies are probably the result of the structure of the social capital. The organizations in Berlin are clearly acting on different levels: the umbrella organizations are much more the mediators between the Turkish community and wider society, whereas the midsized associations are more active 'in the field', playing pivotal roles in their neighborhoods. The smallest organizations are mainly self-occupied and their main connections are to the umbrella organizations. In Amsterdam, this division between organizations’ tasks is less clear. The community is horizontally structured, and many organizations have an independent and equal position in relation to other, similar kinds of actors. In that sense, each organization can play as big a part in the mobilization as any other. This has resulted in similar mobilizing strategies throughout the community.

10.4 The role of umbrella organizations

The Turkish community in Berlin has all-determining umbrella organizations, whereas the community in Amsterdam does not. The latter has some umbrella organizations, but their natures differ from those in Berlin. Firstly, the most prominent umbrella organizations in Berlin are secular, while those in Amsterdam belong to an Islamic movement, such as the Milli Görüş association, FMGNN. Secondly, the umbrella organizations in Berlin are aimed at the local community, while those in Amsterdam are national or regional. Indeed, some of the latter are even based outside Amsterdam. Although not an umbrella organization, the worker’s association, HTIB, does function as one in the eyes of many. It is a focal point for numerous Turkish organizations as well as for local officials. A third difference is that the umbrella organizations in the Dutch case are mainly the national counterparts of one particular kind of organization (e.g. workers’ associations or specific religious organizations) while in Berlin they unite organizations with different backgrounds. Of course, in Berlin one would also not find a right-wing organization being a member of a left-wing umbrella organization, but they do include
women’s and sports’ clubs, etc. In the Netherlands, the members of most umbrella organizations all have the same objectives. The only difference is that they are located in different parts of town, or even in different cities.

The high status of the umbrella organizations in Berlin is seen not only from their social capital but also from their mobilized social capital. The TGB and TBB were, for many, a focal point in the mobilization. In Amsterdam, religious umbrella organizations were included in the mobilization, but they did not have a very prominent position (although the FMGNN did provide a bridge between the Turkish community and a local governmental department), while the HTIB’s role in the mobilization network confirms that it is considered a surrogate umbrella organization by several associations.

As I have already mentioned, the prominence of the umbrella organizations in Berlin is, for a large part, the result of the subsidy and integration policies of the Ausländerbeauftragte, which consisted of a dialogue with and the subsidizing of a select number of organizations, including the umbrellas. The TBB and TGB represent a different part of the Turkish community and were, therefore, the two obvious focal points for the Ausländerbeauftragte.

As Islam is not officially recognized in Germany, and the Berlin authorities have long ignored Islamic organizations (evidenced by no contact between them and politicians and their lack of financial support121), the Turkish religious associations did not have a prominent position in the city. In fact, the Diyanet umbrella organization DITIB is itself a member of the TGB. In Amsterdam, however, the attitude towards Islamic umbrella organizations has always been much more welcoming. They have been included in advisory councils and encouraged to establish social-cultural organizations to become eligible for funding. It was also recognized that religion and Islamic organizations were an important and relatively easy way to approach some of the guest worker migrants and their descendents who could not be reached otherwise because they are not involved in other aspects of civil society. The Islamic umbrella organizations, thus, became a focal point for local officials in much the same way as other secular associations, which were not umbrella organizations, did. The attitude of the local government towards (religious) immigrants has had an impact on the development of particular umbrella organizations.

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121 In 2006, the federal government initiated the Runder Tisch von Innenminister Schäuble (the round table of Minister of Interior Schäuble; its official name is the Islamkonferenz): an assembly of representatives of Islamic organizations and government authorities. The conference has caused much controversy, including about who are the proper representatives of the different Islamic movements in Germany, and should, therefore, be involved in the conference, and who are not. It started after the data for this study was gathered and is not particularly aimed at organizations in Berlin. I, therefore, do not regard this as being relevant to the current study.
10.5 The role of collaborative bodies, working groups and consultative bodies

Many organizations in Amsterdam, as well as in Berlin, are part of a joint undertaking, which I have classified as consultative bodies, collaborative bodies and, in Berlin only, working groups. Collaborative bodies refer to the kind of joint undertakings that are initiated by civic (migrant) organizations, while consultative bodies are initiated by the local authorities (migrant councils). The working groups are the collaborative efforts that are organized by major German welfare umbrella organizations in which associations that are active in the same field of welfare work together (e.g. youth, women, addicts).

In both Amsterdam and Berlin I found a positive relationship between the amount of social capital and participation in collaborative bodies. This relationship was present irrespective of the type of body involved, and prevailed even when the contacts from them were left out of the analysis. The Berlin case showed that, in practice, the type of body that the organizations are participating in is very relevant. Respondents explained that the government initiated migrant councils had no influence or authority. Many did not feel like participating (any more) because they felt they counted for nothing. Instead, high value was attached to the bodies established by (migrant) organizations themselves and to the working groups. These bodies are relatively numerous and are used intensively in everyday life, which was confirmed in the mobilization network. Several organizations in Berlin addressed either a collaborative body (Mirgationsrat or Forum Berliner Migrantinnenprojekte) or a German umbrella organization (DPW), while no consultative body was included in the mobilization.

In Amsterdam, there are hardly any collaborative bodies of the kind that are so clearly present in Berlin. They are limited to a cooperation by sports’ organizations to organize the maintenance of a common property, and a national anti-discrimination committee which includes organizations from all over the Netherlands (in this latter case, the anonymous relationships, with no physical encounters between participating organizations, can hardly be thought to add to the organization’s social capital\textsuperscript{122}). They are not addressed during the mobilization.

The explanation for the absence of such kinds of bodies in Amsterdam may be found right there where the migrant organizations in Berlin turned away from governmental initiatives: if the opportunities provided by the government are inadequate, organizations apparently try to find alternative ways of getting together. In Amsterdam, respondents did not voice discontent with the migrant councils, which are installed for

\textsuperscript{122} This argument parallels the general discussion in the field of social capital as to whether so-called cheque book organizations (of which the membership consists of financial contributions and most members never physically meet other members) such as Greenpeace can be regarded as social capital (cf. Minkoff, 1997; Maloney, 1999; Wollebaek & Selle, 2002).
more than just 'show' (as is felt to be the case in Berlin). The migrant organizations feel that the city districts try to jointly solve current issues and they feel taken more seriously than their counterparts do in Berlin. However, also in Amsterdam, relatively few associations participate in a consultative body, because they only exist in some city districts and the local authorities decide who is welcome and who is not. Accordingly, it is perhaps less surprising that no migrant council is included in the mobilization process in Amsterdam. There, only the worker's organization, HTIB, addressed the Landelijk Overleg Minderheden, a national body of collaborating organizations representing different ethnic communities in the Netherlands. (This is not a migrants' initiative, but was established as part of the Wet Overleg Minderheden to facilitate communication between the government and minority groups (Rijkschroeff & Duyvendak, 2004)).

That the migrant councils were ignored in the mobilization can be regarded as a sign of the dissatisfaction that migrant organizations have with them, even in Amsterdam. Perhaps the aim of the councils to include migrant organizations in the political process is noble, but the practical implications and the lack of power that they have undermine this completely. The local authorities may find it useful to connect to migrant communities through the councils, but as long as they do not make the migrant organizations feel that they are taken seriously, this initiative may cause them to turn their back on the local government.

The question remains as to why the organizations in Berlin took the trouble to set up cooperatives of (ethnic) organizations. Why did they feel this was worthwhile? They could also have accepted the situation and left it at that. I think the answer is twofold. Firstly, Germany has a long tradition of an active non-profit sector, especially in the social welfare domain (Priller & Zimmer, 2001). In particular, German charities (Wohlfahrtsverbände) are deeply involved in the implementation of social policies, and often enjoy a privileged position as executive agencies when compared to public bodies and commercial providers. This is the result of the inclusion of the Wohlfahrtsverbände in the system of subsidiarity since the 1960s. Subsidiarity refers to the principle that problems ought to be addressed at the lowest appropriate level of organization (Warren, 2001, p.87). This can go beyond purely governmental institutions when voluntary associations are granted functions of government. They can then serve as the social infrastructure, for example when charity organizations are allocated money to spend on poverty control. The consequence of this close working relationship between the Wohlfahrtsverbände and the (local) authorities is that the former have considerable financial means. One of the alternative ways of collaboration that the Turkish organizations in Berlin have used is participation in the working groups of the Wohlfahrtsverbände. Given the financial resources and the institutional know-how of the charities, they are attractive partners for smaller organizations. Secondly, individual organizations have trouble being heard in the public domain and have difficulty in
finding financial resources. Given these facts, it makes sense that organizations feel the need to join forces since they can be stronger when they are united.

In the collaborative bodies one can clearly see the influence of the political opportunity structure on social capital: it is a negative relationship. In a more open POS, where the migrant voice is better heard and the government is in a constant and (as far as possible) equal dialogue with the migrant organizations, the migrant councils are sufficient to meet the needs of these associations. As a result, they do not join forces in private initiatives and, consequently, have relatively less social capital. In a closed POS, on the other hand, the migrant organizations are triggered to establish other initiatives. The consequence is that their social capital rises.

### 10.6 Linking social capital

One of the points upon which the Turkish organizations in the German and Dutch cases are similar is fairly counterintuitive: the percentage of linking social capital. Linking social capital refers to the governmental, semi-governmental and political organizations that are incorporated in the contact network (the network of interlocking directorates does not contain any of these organizations by definition). The contacts with the government organizations, i.e. with the city district or municipal authorities, consist of financial and interactional relationships. Both in Amsterdam and Berlin several organizations indicated that they refrain from any financial ties to the local authorities, either because they choose to do so themselves or because they are refused funds by the authorities. Most of the organizations that do not relate to the government in financial respects do not interact with it either. Other organizations do interact with government agencies, if only because they need them for administrative reasons. Some organizations in Berlin and in Amsterdam also jointly organized events with the local authorities.

The percentage of linking social capital is more or less the same in the two cases (both around 13%). Given the open POS in Amsterdam and the closed system in Berlin, one would expect the relationships between governmental and migrant organizations to be more prevalent in the former city than in the latter, but this was not the case. However, this counterintuitive finding was readjusted during the mobilization. The mobilization networks do confirm the expectations of an open political opportunity structure involving interaction between migrant organizations and local authorities, whereas a closed POS does not. In Berlin, no governmental organizations were addressed, while in Amsterdam, municipal employees and politicians were mobilized. Apparently, the consequences of a closed POS become visible when it comes to the crunch: in times of urgency, the government is not an obvious partner if it does not show its involvement on a regular basis.
A remarkable characteristic of the contacts at government institutions, or the politicians who were mobilized in Amsterdam, was that they were all Turkish. This implies that an open political opportunity structure makes way for a state-civil society interaction, but that it is even more important for the political structure to be open to migrant representatives as they are the ones being addressed by the migrant organizations. In Chapter 3, I hypothesized that the presence of Turkish politicians on the city district and municipal level would decrease the urgency of community mobilization (p.80). In Amsterdam, there are more Turkish representatives in local politics. This fact, combined with the fragmented mobilization in the city when compared to the connected mobilization in Berlin seems to confirm this hypothesis.

10.7 Mixing with other organizations I: ethnic bonding and bridging social capital

It is not only the ethnicity of politicians that is relevant for migrant organizations. The ethnicity of other associations also influences their social capital, which is expressed in ethnically bonding and bridging social capital. The former refers to connections between organizations of the same ethnicity, while the latter refers to connections between organizations of different ethnicities.

The Turkish organizations in Amsterdam were rarely connected to non-Turkish ones on the formal level; only a few have an interlocking directorate with a Dutch or non-Turkish association. In Berlin, unfortunately, there was no data available on joint board memberships with non-Turkish organizations. The contact networks, on the other hand, revealed that the Turkish organizations, both in Amsterdam and Berlin, have a vast amount of ethnically bridging social capital, with the associations in the latter city having even more non-Turkish connections. For example, 40% of the actors in the contact network in Amsterdam were not Turkish, while this figure was 63% in Berlin. In other words, only one out of every three actors in the contact network in Berlin is Turkish, while these figures are reversed in Amsterdam. Then again, a focus on the percentage of ties to non-Turkish actors equalizes this difference: on average, 40% of the links of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam lead to non-Turks and in Berlin this figure was 47%. This difference between the percentages of non-Turkish actors and the percentages of ties thereto means that in Berlin, the Turkish alters were mentioned more often than the non-Turkish ones, while the Turkish and non-Turkish actors in Amsterdam were mentioned equally. On the group level, the relationships between the Turkish and non-Turkish organizations are, therefore, stronger (there are more connections) in Amsterdam than in Berlin. The community in Berlin is much more focused on itself (has more bonding social capital), even though there are still connections to the outside world.
On the individual level, the respondents in Berlin had more ethnically bridging social capital than the respondents in Amsterdam. The types of organizations with more bonding social capital and those with more bridging social capital are relatively similar in the two cities; in both it was the smaller, group-specific, organizations that had an internal focus. If they connected to non-Turkish organizations at all, these were predominantly government agencies. Strikingly, the most central organizations in both cities, the workers’ association HTIB in Amsterdam and the umbrella organizations the TGB and TBB in Berlin, also had a high percentage of Turkish acquainted associations. They, more than any other organizations, fulfill a bridging position between their respective communities and society at large. Moreover, they connect to organizations and authorities outside their community on a higher structural level than the smaller organizations do. Because of the high amount of bonding social capital that these organizations possess, they know which issues are important for their grassroots, and their high-quality bridging social capital allows them to convey this message to actors outside their communities.

Left-wing associations in both cities have more bridging social capital than right wing organizations do. Furthermore, and this might be the key factor for having a great deal of bridging social capital, there is a positive relationship between the membership of an organization in any kind of collaborative body and the amount of its bridging social capital. Because Berlin has several of these collaborations and Amsterdam relatively few, it is probable that this is the main reason why the number of non-Turkish organizations in the Berlin contact network was so high. On the other hand, only some of the Berlin organizations are involved in such collaborations. This implies that only a few associations are linked to a large number of non-Turkish counterparts, and that, on average, the mean amount of ethnically bridging social capital is equal to that in Amsterdam.

To a great extent, the Turkish organizations in Berlin thus owe their high amount of bridging social capital to their participation in collaborative bodies. The self-initiated collaborative bodies, when compared to their state-initiated consultative counterparts, have the greatest impact on the amount and ethnic diversity of the social capital of organizations. In Amsterdam, the collaborative and consultative bodies are less abundant, but the guidelines from the government, stating that subsidies are only granted to inter-ethnically collaborating organizations, could have the effect of increasing the amount of organizations’ ethnic bridging social capital, particularly since such a guideline does not exist in Berlin. The empirical evidence has, however, shown that the reality is actually in contrast to this expectation.

Of the total amount of ethnically bridging social capital that the Turkish communities in both Amsterdam and Berlin had at their disposal, a strikingly small amount was mobilized. In Berlin, it was mainly the organizations which mobilized a collaborative body that reached out to non-Turkish actors. In most instances where organizations in
Amsterdam mobilized a non-Turkish actor, the latter turned out to have a Turkish contact. A crucial difference between the cities is that the mobilization process in Berlin did include more non-Turkish actors (mainly due to the large number of non-Turkish organizations included in the *Migrationsrat*), but in Amsterdam the mean percentage of ties to non-Turkish associations was higher. In fact, this is a repetition of what we saw regarding in the contact networks. It means that in Berlin, a small number of Turkish organizations were related to many non-Turkish ones, while in Amsterdam the bridging social capital that was addressed was more spread out between the actors and thus the community. Moreover, in Amsterdam, the greatest percentage of non-Turkish organizations addressed were Dutch, whereas in Berlin the percentage of German actors activated was much lower. This is related to the higher percentage of linking social capital addressed in the former city.

Although non-Turkish actors were addressed in both Amsterdam and Berlin, the tendency for organizations to mobilize bonding social capital was greater. The sense of urgency that leads to a preference for ideologically similar alters is also reflected in the fact that Turkish associations were preferred over non-Turkish ones. As the associations in both cities showed this preference for mobilizing ethnically bonding social capital, the political opportunity structures that are clearly diverging cannot be appointed as the cause of this. Alternatively, this tendency could be inherent to the fact that the Turkish community are minority groups. Comparative research in other groups could confirm (or reject) this hypothesis.

### 10.8 Mixing with other organizations II: bonding and bridging social capital over organizational type

Bonding social capital based on organizational type refers to the contacts an organization has with counterparts that have similar key objectives. Bridging social capital, on the other hand, refers to the ties an organization has to those of a different nature. Earlier research has shown that organizations mainly have bonding social capital in this respect, which restricts their capacity to function as agents of social integration (Zmerli & Newton, 2007). The current study demonstrates the opposite: the organizations have more bridging than bonding social capital in both contact networks, i.e. organizations connected more to associations that were concerned with activities other than their own. The exceptions were the Milli Görüş organizations in Amsterdam and the Kurdish and Diyanet associations in Berlin.

So, almost all of the organizations in Amsterdam, as well as those in Berlin had a great deal of bridging social capital, and there were no obvious differences between them in terms of this issue. The choice of the types of organizations that actors interact with thus appears to be unconnected to the political opportunity structure. This also applies to
mobilized social capital. Where the Big World Experiment triggered organizations in both cities to address counterparts that are ideologically similar, of the same ethnicity, and geographically close (see the paragraph on locality below), it rarely caused them to mobilize organizations with similar activities, i.e. to address bridging social capital with respect to organizational type. Only Diyanet, Kurdish and women’s organizations have a clear tendency to address associations of the same kind; this applies in Amsterdam (the first two) as well as in Berlin (all three). Overall, the results suggest that at least in respect to bonding and bridging social capital regarding the type of organization, there is no need to think that organizations do not function as agents of social integration.

10.9 Two peculiar groups: the Kurdish and the Islamic organizations

The Kurdish and Islamic organizations in the Turkish communities have nothing to do with each other, but they do have important characteristics in common. Both groups of organizations are highly interconnected and both are relatively little connected to (the rest of) the Turkish community.

In both cities, the Kurdish organizations form a community of their own that is highly interlinked and only rarely connects to the Turkish community. This separation is the result of the tensions between the Kurds and the Turks in their homeland of Turkey, where the Kurds are fighting for an independent Kurdistan and feel suppressed by the Turkish majority. This picture of a small Kurdish community on its own also arose in the mobilized social capital: in Amsterdam one (small) Kurdish component appeared, and in Berlin a subgroup of Kurdish, interconnected, organizations was visible. The difference between the cities is that the Kurdish community in Amsterdam seems to be more separate from the Turkish community than is the case in Berlin. The decisive factor for this connection in Berlin is the ‘mediation’ of the collaborative body, the Migrationsrat, in which Turkish and Kurdish organizations participate together. The migrant initiatives founded in Berlin are, thus, a suitable means of uniting the migrant population.

Turkish Islamic organizations in Amsterdam are closely interlinked within their own denomination. Milli Görüş organizations are connected predominantly to other Milli Görüş organizations, as are Diyanet associations to other Diyanet associations. In Berlin, this tendency is also present, especially amongst the IFB organizations (affiliated with Milli Görüş), but the religious associations in this city keep a relatively low profile. In contrast, in Amsterdam the religious organizations are clearly present in the Turkish community and in the public debate. Once again, this difference between the two cases can be related to the divergent integration policies and attitudes towards Islam: the (local) authorities in Amsterdam have also pursued an inclusive policy regarding Islamic organizations, whereas those in Berlin did not. The freedom that religious organizations
enjoy in Amsterdam is also reflected in the mobilization network. The Amsterdam network contains almost 23% of religious organizations versus a little more than 6% in the Berlin network. Religious organizations in Amsterdam are, thus, seen to be a more accepted part of the community and actively involved in civil society, even though some of them did not mobilize any alters themselves.

10.10 The meaning of locality

An organization’s locality refers to its geographical position. The locality of associations is important for two reasons, both of which do not concern the position of each of them separately, but emphasize the locality of actors in relation to their contacts. For example, the Turkish organizations in Berlin are concentrated in two city districts, Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg and Neukölln, whereas in Amsterdam, they are more spread out across the city. This in itself is not particularly informative, especially if one is not familiar with these cities. But the locality of actors in relation to the geographical position of those that they are connected to does provide valuable information about how a community functions. Is the community active on a very local basis, on neighborhood level, or is it possible to speak of a city-wide community? A focus on the locality thus provides insight into how the social capital functions, which is one of research aims of this study. The second reason concerns the fact that in recent years, ‘the neighborhood’ has become the subject of many scientific studies, as well as a focal point of government policies (e.g. LaMore, Link, & Blackmond, 2006; Bernard et al., 2007; Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 2009). This growing interest is rooted in the idea that neighborhoods can bring an additional value to the quality of life of their residents and can stimulate social cohesion between them. The local authorities in Amsterdam, for example, have pursued policies to promote the relationships within neighborhoods. Is this policy reflected in the social capital or even in the mobilization? A comparison of the locality of organizations in relation to the locality of their contacts reveals that the compositions of the networks vary between and within the two cities.

Regarding the social capital, the networks of interlocking directorates in Amsterdam revealed that many associations were connected to others nearby, in particular because organizations are concentrated at specific addresses. In the contact network, however, there was no tendency to only connect to neighborhood organizations. Some did have closer everyday connections with a small number of organizations in their vicinity, but this was compensated for with a larger number of acquainted associations located elsewhere. The contact network in Berlin had the same characteristics as in Amsterdam (organizations connected more to those in different neighborhoods to where they are based), but the network of interlocking directorates in Berlin differed to that in
Amsterdam. Instead of a tendency for organizations to be interlocked with others in their neighborhood, those in Berlin are interlocked with organizations all over the city.

These findings are somewhat counterintuitive: one would expect contact networks to be more local and board interlocks to be more city-wide. After all, dual board memberships are not necessarily place bound (for example, someone could be involved in a neighborhood committee around his/her home address and at the same time be the head of a sports organization somewhere else), and it seems more obvious that in our everyday lives we would work with our neighbors. The former assumption was affirmed in Berlin, but not in Amsterdam. Regarding the latter, Vermeulen (2006) has explained that the fact that organizations are geographically close relates to the process of the establishment of new ones. New organizations were founded by board members of other organizations, and when the newly founded association was ideologically close to the existing one, it was often registered at the same address.

As far as the contact networks are concerned, both in Amsterdam and Berlin these contained more connections between actors that were located in different instead of in the same city districts. The mean percentage of ties that stayed within the city district was, however, higher in Amsterdam than in Berlin. The explanation of the unexpectedly high number of physically distant connections lies in what several respondents, in both cities, told me about their everyday practices: because of time, money and manpower constraints it is hard to keep up connections with other organizations, and so those that are located nearby are the only ones they are in regular contact with. In other words, the organizations do have a wider variety of connections to others further away, but the ones they are literally close to are also the ones they are figuratively close to. Given the urgency-reflex discussed above, one would then expect that in the mobilization process the neighbors are preferred over the less close connections that are located further away.

This hypothesis that connections located nearby may be stronger and most commonly used is partly confirmed in the mobilization networks. The Big World Experiment triggered the associations in some city districts to turn to their literally close connections. In two city districts in Amsterdam, Amsterdam-Noord and Bos en Lommer, the organizations mobilized each other in a sometimes even circular fashion. In Berlin, there is a cluster of organizations in a neighborhood in the city district of Neukölln (around the community center Türkisch-Deutsches Zentrum, see Figure 9.1). The ‘neighborhood effect’ is much less in Berlin, mainly because many actors mobilized the umbrella organizations (in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg), while they are themselves located elsewhere, and because many of the (non-Turkish) members of the collaborative body, the Migrationsrat, are located outside of the ‘Turkish’ city districts. As there are so many of these members, they carry relatively much more weight and raise the percentage of physically distant ties. The considerable number of interconnections in the city districts in Amsterdam indicate that the policies that the local governments pursued there are fruitful.
10.11 Media use

The mass-media are important channels through which a community mobilization can be realized. Furthermore, newspaper readership and media consumption are often used as indicators of a community’s civicness. These are, therefore, two of the reasons to investigate the role of the media in the Turkish community.

Relationships between Turkish organizations and the Turkish media exist in both Amsterdam and Berlin, but in the latter case these connections are closer. Several respondents in Berlin indicated that they actively use the media in their dissemination strategies, for example by announcing an activity on the local radio. Berlin has several Turkish and multi-ethnic radio stations and Turkish newspapers, which all play a part in the everyday lives of a large percentage of the Turkish population. Also the media in Amsterdam are well-known, but they are less popular than in Berlin. In Amsterdam, Turkish radio and television broadcasts are less professional and the supply is lower. Indeed, the Turkish media in Amsterdam are clearly on a much smaller scale than in Berlin. This is perhaps also the reason why the organizations in Amsterdam do not relate to the media as much as those in Berlin do: the impact of this media is often insignificant.

The media that was often mentioned by respondents in Berlin as being reliable partners did not turn out to be important actors in the mobilization process. Only one actor mobilized several radio stations there, and no media were addressed in the mobilization in Amsterdam.

Perhaps the Turkish media were disregarded by most organizations because the current mobilization did not concern an activity of their own. The Big World Experiment asked the organizations to take part in an extraordinary assignment, which required them to respond almost instinctively, using the ‘urgency’ reflex. It is possible that the mobilization of the media fits into a more conscious mobilization strategy and it is only addressed in cases of real emergencies or to make the community’s own events known, and not for the activities of third parties.

10.12 The individual and the organization

As I explained in Chapter 2, in my outlook on social capital, I assume that an individual actor can possess social capital which benefits a collective. This applies to a single association and its social capital, which can be used for the benefit of the community, as well as to a board member who brings his personal connections which add to the social capital of his/her organization. For example, because a board member has good connections at the municipality, his/her organizations may be given privileges which are withheld from others. Until now, there has been little or no research carried out within
this view of social capital, but the cases under study here have affirmed the tenability of this outlook. Moreover, it became clear that the position and functioning of organizations is, to some extent, defined by who is/are their main representative(s).

Firstly, the (mobilized) social capital of the Turkish organizations in Amsterdam has demonstrated that some of them are represented by individuals who are the personifications of these associations. These strong characters have a long history in Turkish organizational life in Amsterdam. Their familiarity with, and reputation within, the community enables their organizations to gain a central position. Furthermore, several representatives mobilized their personal, yet important for the community, connections in the Big World Experiment, amongst whom were several politicians. In these instances, the social capital of the organizations themselves, i.e. as expressed in the network of interlocking directorates and contact network, was neglected. The importance of the individual in the organization was also seen from the fact that in a number of cases an organization mobilized an acquainted association that was qualified as ‘non-Turkish’, but of which the particular representative that was mentioned was of Turkish descent. This applied to politicians, but also, for example, to representatives of mixed welfare organizations. The Turkish employee of a particular non-Turkish welfare organization facilitates inter-ethnic connections, just as a non-Turkish volunteer in a Turkish organization can.

In Berlin, the metamorphosis of individual social capital into the social capital of the collective is, in some cases, at an even more advanced stage. Several organizations have developed such high levels of professionalism (for example, evidenced by the fact that the staff are all paid employees) that the additional value of the social capital of individuals has become assimilated into them. The individual’s social capital has become the organization’s social capital, and even changes in personnel do not undermine it. For example, Kenan Kolat has for years been the ‘face’ of the progressive umbrella organization the TBB, but even though he has left the organization, the TBB still has a crucial position within the community. In general, the relationships between the organizations in Berlin are more ‘institutionalized’, more professional and depend less on personnel.

10.13 In conclusion

The open POS in Amsterdam has led to a more horizontal community structure, relatively strong inter-ethnic connections, better government-civil society interactions, and a prominent position for deviating, but highly interconnected, groups. At the same time, this open system has allowed the Turkish organizations to form a disintegrated community of ideologically opposing groups which are barely connected, even in a community mobilization. The structure of the social capital with its ideological divisions,
ethnic diversity and governmental actors, influenced the mobilization in such a way that these characteristics became more pronounced.

In contrast, Berlin’s closed political opportunity structure was decisive in the vertical structure of the Turkish community for the prominence of the umbrella organizations, for the development of collaborative bodies, for the skeptical attitude of organizations vis-à-vis the local government, and for an inward focus. All of this leads to an independent community with a well-organized mobilization in which influential actors are easily reached and a message travels quickly to organizations at all levels. Similar to the case of Amsterdam, the structure of the social capital in Berlin determined the mobilization process. The collaborative bodies were responsible for the widespread mobilization and the inclusion of Turkish and Kurdish organizations in the same process, while the umbrella organizations could serve as focus points for the smaller associations.

This study has thus shown that the structure and content of the social capital of the Turkish communities in Amsterdam and Berlin are influenced by the political opportunity structure in which the communities operate. Furthermore, the way in which the social capital is mobilized depends on both its structure and the POS. In other words, the three relationships depicted in Figure 10.1 (p.219) at the beginning of this chapter are all confirmed. It is not possible to ascribe to the POS a univocal positive, or a negative effect on social capital and its mobilization. In some respects, an open POS is positively related to the social capital of migrant organizations, such as a greater amount of ethnically bridging social capital, while there is a negative relationship with the initiatives taken by the migrant organizations and the inclusiveness of the mobilization. However, the differences between the two cities are clear enough to enable me to say that the POS does influence both social capital and social capital in operation. I will discuss the more general implications of my findings in the Conclusion.