The place of exclamatives and miratives in grammar: a functional discourse grammar view

Olbertz, H.G.

Published in:
Linguística

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
THE PLACE OF EXCLAMATIVES AND MIRATIVES IN GRAMMAR - A FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSE GRAMMAR VIEW

Hella Olbertz

RESUMO
No arcabouço teórico recentemente desenvolvido pela Gramática Discursivo-Funcional, o conceito de miratividade interferiu com ao que seria considerado uma exclamativa em outras abordagens. Além disso, o próprio conceito de exclamativa é mal definido em vários estudos dentro do paradigma funcional. O objetivo deste trabalho é fornecer uma descrição sistemática das diferenças semânticas, pragmáticas e sintáticas entre mirativas e exclamativas e propor uma explicação para essas diferenças na perspectiva da Gramática Discursivo-Funcional. O estudo está baseado, principalmente, em dados do espanhol equatoriano das terras altas. Afirmações cruciais serão confirmadas por dados adicionais de outras línguas.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: miratividade, exclamatividade, Gramática Discursivo-Funcional, espanhol equatoriano das terras altas

1. INTRODUCTION
In Functional Discourse Grammar, as described in Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008, mirativity is considered to be a basic illocution, where “basic” indicates a direct relation between a given grammatical structure and a default communicative intention (cf. Saddock and Zwicky 1985: 155; Dik 1997 II: 323; Hengeveld et al. 2007: 75-76). The authors claim that mirative illocution differs from declarative illocution in that “the intention behind a Mirative Discourse Act is not to pass on a Communicated Content, as in Declarative Discourse Acts, but pass on surprise about a Communicated Content typically presupposed to be known to the Addressee” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 73). The following example is regarded as a realization of “mirative illocution” in English:

(1) How beautifully she sang! (ibid.)

1. Hella Olbertz é pesquisadora associada em Linguística Teórica, na Universidade de Amsterdam
2. I would like to thank Rusiko Asatiani and Gerjan van Schaik for providing me with detailed information on Georgian and Turkish, respectively. In addition, this paper has profited from discussions at various occasions within the Functional Discourse Grammar community, which I gratefully acknowledge. Special thanks are due to Evelien Keizer and Kees Hengeveld for both their critical comments and their encouragement. In addition, this paper profited from the comments of three anonymous readers of earlier versions. The responsibility for the form and content of this paper is mine.
In most other approaches, example (1) would be viewed as an instance of exclamative illocution, as indeed it was by the late Simon Dik, who defined the semantics-pragmatics of exclamatives as follows: “S wishes A to know that the content of the linguistic expression impresses S as surprising, unexpected, or otherwise worthy of notice” (Dik 1997 II: 239), a definition which is much less specific than that of mirativity quoted above. What adds to the confusion is that Moutaouakil (2005) starts from Dik’s definition to claim that exclamative is not an illocution but rather an expression of subjective modality, on a par with epistemic modality. In fact, Moutaouakil’s concept of exclamatives turns out to be very broad, in the sense that he views all sorts of emphatic utterances as exclamatives. Consider the following examples (Moutaouakil 2005: 356):

(2) a. Elle est BELLE!
   ‘She is nice!’
   b. Est-elle BELLE!
   ‘Is she nice!’
   c. N’est-elle pas BELLE!
   ‘Isn’t she nice!’
   d. Comme elle est BELLE!
   ‘How nice she is!’

As I will argue in this paper, only (2d.) exemplifies an exclamative construction because it is the only example that has a specifically exclamative grammatical structure. The other examples are declarative (2a.) and interrogative (2b.-c.), respectively. The fact that (2b.-c.) are rhetorical questions means that their syntactic form does not correspond to the communicative goal they are meant to fulfil, which is to inform rather than to ask. Put differently, rhetorical interrogative is a “derived” rather than a basic illocution. This does not make rhetorical questions exclamatives, however. Rather, the emphatic intonation contour, which the rhetorical questions in (2b.-c.) have in common with (2a.), had better be accounted for as an emphatic marking (cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 66-68).

It is probably the conflicting uses of “exclamative” that has motivated the creators of Functional Discourse Grammar to avoid this term. Their choice for “mirative” instead, however, leads to a new, apparently unforeseen, problem, i.e. the fact that this term is in use already for something quite different from exclamative illocution. The following two examples are a first illustration of the way I understand the concept of mirativity. In example (3), from Tarma Quechua, mirativity is expressed by means of the morphological marker -na, and in (4), from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish, it is expressed analytically by means of the present perfect form:

   ‘So it turned out that he was a dog.’

(4) [a clerk of a university library has been looking for a journal in the repository]
   Ha habido sólo dos números. (FN, 2003)
   ‘(It turns out) there are only two issues.’
What (1) and (2d.) on the one hand and (3)-(4) on the other have in common is that they express the speaker’s view that the content of the utterance in question is somehow remarkable, and in this sense they all fit in Dik’s (2007) highly unspecific definition of exclamative illocution. They differ, however, with respect to the ways in which the speaker’s affective stance is being expressed. It is this difference which will be the focus of my paper. The most obvious difference between these two sets of examples is their forms: (1) and (2d.) begin with a question word, but have a non-interrogative syntactic structure and non-interrogative intonation, whereas in (3) and (4) there is no question word and the speaker’s stance is expressed in the verbal complex through morphological and syntactic means, respectively. Somewhat less obviously, the propositional content is presupposed in (1) and (2d.), whereas in (3) and (4) it is both the propositional content as well as the speaker’s view on this content that is being transmitted.

It is the aim of this paper to disentangle the concepts of mirativity and exclamative illocution and to propose a way in which both can be accounted for within the framework of Functional Discourse Grammar. More specifically, I will show that miratives differ from exclamatives with respect to their syntax and semantics in such a way that they should be considered concepts of different kinds: the latter is a illocutionary concept, expressing the communicative aim the speaker wants to achieve with his/her utterance, whereas the former is a semantic concept, modifying the propositional content of the linguistic expression.

The essential evidence for my claim comes from Spanish, where mirativity is expressed through grammatical means in one group of dialects only, i.e. Andean Spanish. My account of the mirative will be based on fieldnotes from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish. Given that exclamatives occur in all varieties of Spanish, I will use various corpora for the illustration exclamative constructions in Spanish.3

My paper will be structured as follows: in section 2 I will present the properties of exclamatives and miratives and end in working definitions of both notions. In section 3 I will compare how exclamatives and miratives react to two tests relating to their syntax and semantics. Section 4 will be devoted to a brief sketch of the way semantics and pragmatics are dealt with in Functional Discourse Grammar, after which I will, in section 5, redefine exclamative illocution and mirativity in Functional Discourse Grammar terms. Section 6 will contain my conclusions.

2. EXCLAMATIVES AND MIRATIVITIES
This section will be concerned with the presentation of the properties of exclamatives (2.1.) and miratives (2.2.) in general and in Spanish in particular.

2.1. Exclamatives
In this section I will first discuss the formal expression of exclamatives on the basis of data from various languages, with special emphasis on Spanish, and then go into their semantic and pragmatic properties.

Example (1), which I repeat here for convenience, and example (5) from the internet may serve as a starting point for the discussion of the form of exclamative utterances:

---
3. All corpora will be given in as special section of the references. In the examples, fieldnotes will be rendered as FN, followed by the speaker’s initials (when known) and the year of annotation.
(1) How beautifully she sang!

(5) What a nice guy he was!

Both (1) and (5) are similar to content questions, but they have a number of clearly different properties: (i) the how-exclamative in (1) lacks do-support, and (5) has an uninverted subject-verb order; (ii) the question word has no interrogative function but indicates which is the focus of the communicated content, i.e. how points to beautifully and what to a nice guy; (iii) the intonation is falling and not rising, as would be the case with questions. According to Collins (2005: 5f), examples (1) and (5) illustrate the only unambiguous expressions of the exclamative in English. Following Collins (2005), I consider exclamatives only those linguistic expressions that are formally marked as such, in other words, I will consider only grammaticalized exclamatives. This excludes the examples from Moutaouakil (2005) quoted in (2a.-c.) above.

It seems that cross-linguistically the information-question type illustrated in (1) and (5) above is the most widespread type of formal marking of exclamatives (Michaelis 2001: 1045). The examples below illustrate this type in three genetically unrelated languages; example (6) is from Turkish, (7) from Ecuadorian Quechua, and (8) from Georgian.

(6) Ne aptal korkak bir kiz-im ben ki!
   what stupid timid one girl-1SG I EMPH
   ‘What a stupid timid girl I am!’ (Van Schaaik 2003; pers. com.)

(7) Imashina cai huañushca cusa manchanai-ta micu-n-ari
   how this dead husband terror-ADV eat-3-EMPH
   ‘How terribly this dead husband is eating!’ (Catta 1994: 195)

(8) ra unšno-ø bič’-i=a
   what uncharm-NOM boy-NOM=be.PRS.3SG
   ‘What an ugly guy this is!’ (Asatiani, pers. com.)

Turning to the language in focus, Spanish is said to have exclamative expressions with three different question words: cuánto ‘how much’, cómo ‘how’, and qué ‘what’ (Alonso-Cortés 1999: 4008), illustrated successively in (9)-(11):

(9) ¡Y cuánta gente habrá así!
   ‘And how many people will be like this!’ (MC, Costa Rica 14)

(10) ¡cómo ha pasado el tiempo!
    ‘How the time has passed!’ (MC, Gran Canaria 09)

(11) ¡Qué coraje me da!
    literally: ‘What a fury it gives me!’
    ‘How furious this makes me!’ (Salcedo, 18b)
Apart from the fact that exclamative expressions with *cuánto* and *cómo* are much less frequent than those with *qué*, both (9) and (10) can also be read as rhetorical questions, implying possible answers such as *mucha* ‘many’ in (9), and *rapidísmamente* ‘very quickly’ in (10), such a reading is excluded in the case of (11). Therefore, I will consider true exclamatives only those with *qué*, which correspond to English exclamatives with *how* when followed by an adjective and with *what* when followed by a noun:

(12) ¡*Qué* chauvinista es este señor!  
‘How chauvinistic is this man!’ (MC, Lima 13)

(13) ¡*qué* catarro he pescado!  
‘what a cold I caught!’ (Madrid 1, p. 55)

Although for the purpose of this study, only sentential exclamatives are of interest, it should be mentioned that the vast majority of Spanish exclamatives are non-sentential expressions: of the 127 tokens of *qué*-exclamatives in the Macrocorpus, 121 are verbless expressions. The following example may serve as an illustration:

(14) ¡*Qué* curioso!  
‘How strange!’ (MC, La Paz 05)

Let us now turn to the semantico-pragmatics of exclamatives. The exclamative utterances quoted in this section have the common property of concerning the speaker’s personal evaluation of something s/he physically perceives or has in mind at the moment of speaking. This evaluation is what the speaker primarily communicates, rather than the content itself, which is not asserted but presupposed. This means either that the speaker expects the addressee to be informed about what motivates his or her emotional reaction, or that the content simply is not subject to discussion. This presupposedness implies that the speaker him- or herself is committed to the truth of the propositional content of the exclamative utterance, evidence of which is the fact that exclamatives cannot be modified with either mitigating expressions marking the speaker’s perspective (Marandin 2008: 439) or epistemic modal adverbs:

---

4. The Macrocorpus (746,931 words) contains 4 utterances of the exclamative type with *cuánto*, 27 with *cómo* and 127 with *qué*. This count includes both sentential and non-sentential exclamatives.

5. As shown in the grammar of the Real Academia Española (2009: 3204), *cuánto* forms unambiguously exclamative expressions only when cooccurring with a restricted number of uncountable nouns, such as *frío* ‘cold’ in the following example:

(i) ¡*Cuánto* frío nos espera!  
‘How much cold is awaiting us!’ (Internet, Ecuador)

According to Alonso Cortés (1999: 4007), constructions with *cómo* have an exclusively exclamative reading when the predicate is an adjective in a partitive construction:

(ii) ¡*Cómo* está de dura la situación!  
How hard is the situation!’ (Internet, Ecuador)

However, it turns out that partitive expressions with *cómo* can also form true questions:

(iii) ¿*Cómo* es de grande tu huella?  
‘How big is your (ecological) footprint?’ (Internet, Spain)
Another correlate of the fact that exclamatives do not primarily serve to provide the addressee with information, “but rather to express the speaker’s affective stance or attitude” (Collins 2005: 4), is the fact that exclamatives cannot be felicitously used as an answer to a question (ibid.). Consider in the following contextualization of example (1):

(1) a. –Did you like her concert?  
  ??–How beautifully she sang!

As a consequence, the perlocutionary effect of the utterance on the addressee is different from that of declaratives: in the case of declaratives the addressee is supposed to add information to his/her knowledge of the world or of the situation, whereas in that of exclamatives, the addressee is expected to take note of the speaker’s affective stance towards some piece of information, which may already form part of his/her knowledge.  

Apart from being presupposed the propositional content of exclamatives is scalar in the sense that there is a conventional implicature that a given property or relation obtains to an exceptionally high degree (cf. e.g. Zanutti and Portner 2000: 125; Michaelis 2001: 1040; Marandin 2008: 440). The scalarity of exclamatives is obvious whenever the focal element is or contains a gradable adjective or adverb as is the case in most of the examples given above. When this is not the case, as in examples (11) and (13), a scalar value is nevertheless implicated, which becomes obvious when we reformulate these exlamatives as declaratives:

(11) a. Me da un coraje tremendo.  
  ‘It makes me tremendously furious’

(13) a. He pescado un catarro horrible.  
  ‘I have caught a horrible cold.’

In a number of publications on exclamatives (e.g. Michaelis 2001, Casas 2006, and Marandin 2008), presupposedness and scalarity are considered necessary and sufficient criteria for the identification of exclamatives, and as a consequence constructions like the French example in (16) and the Spanish one in (17) are considered exclamatives:

(i) How nice he can be!
I am indebted to Evelien Keizer for drawing my attention to this point.

(ii) Qué programa más bueno, ¿verdad?
‘What a good programme, isn’t it?’ (MC, Madrid, 14)

In addition, the lack of any perlocutionary effect would imply that any reaction from the addressee to the content of the exclamative would be out of place, which turns out to be the case for some language users, but not for all. I tested this by means of the following example and its translations

---

6. When exclamatives contain modal verbs, these can have a non-epistemic reading only. In the following example can expresses facultative modality:

i) How nice he can be!

7. Beyssade & Marandin (2006) even claim that exclamatives do not aim at any perlocutionary effect at all: “It is intended as expressing Speaker’s own opinion and Addressee is only involved as witness of such an opinion” (2006: 58). However, this analysis fails to account for the use of tag-questions with exclamatives, such as in (i).

(i) Qué programa más bueno, ¿verdad?
‘What a good programme, isn’t it?’ (MC, Madrid, 14)
(16) Il est si beau! (Marandin 2008: 438)
   ‘He is so cute!’

(17) ¡El coche es más largo que la Hostia! (Casas 2006: 302)
   ‘That car is bigger than the holy shit!’

Collins (2005: 6) argues that so and such in English and its equivalents in other languages can be used in imperatives and questions as well and is therefore not characteristic of exclamatives. The same holds for si in the French examples in (16) and for the Spanish pseudo-comparative construction in (17):

(16) a. Ne roule pas si vite!
   ‘Don’t drive so fast!’

(16) b. Est-il vraiment si beau?
   ‘Is he really so cute?’

(17) a. ¡No seas más tonto que la Hostia!
   ‘Don’t be more stupid than the holy shit!’

(17) b. ¿No ves que soy más vieja que la Hostia?
   ‘Don’t you see that I am older than the holy shit?’

In section 3 below I will show that there is still another, purely syntactic difference between these “pseudo-exclamatives” and the exclusively exclamative constructions presented above.

To sum up, we have seen that in Germanic and Romance languages as well as in three further genetically unrelated languages, and probably in many others (cf. Michaelis 2001), there is a specific grammaticalized expression of exclamative illocution, which is similar to but different from a content question. Exclamatives serve the purpose of expressing that in the speaker’s view a given content is remarkable in the sense that some relation or property obtains to an unusually high degree. The propositional content of the exclamative utterance is presupposed. This presupposedness probably is the reason why exclamative expressions tend to be non-sentential in languages such as Spanish and English (cf. Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008: 73-74 on miratives).8

2.2. Miratives

In this section I will first present the notion of mirativity as expressed in various languages and then focus on the case of Ecuadorian Highland Spanish (henceforward: EHS), presenting the properties of mirative expressions in this dialect. I will end this section with a preliminary definition of mirativity.

8. Collins (2005: 13) finds that in his corpora of spoken English, 84.3% of the what-exclamatives (204 of a total of 242), and 50.3% (158/314) of the how-exclamatives are non-sentential expressions. We saw above that in the case of Spanish the frequency of verbless constructions is even higher. Quechua has non-sentential exclamatives as well (Parker 1969: 136 on Ayacucho Quechua; Adelaar 1977: 255 on Tarma) but they are insufficiently described to allow for more than guessing at the quantitative relation between the sentential and non-sentential type. Georgian has no verbless exclamatives at all, and in Turkish it is impossible to distinguish between sentential and non-sentential exclamatives given the lack of a copula.
In his seminal paper on mirativity, DeLancey (1997) discusses the morpheme lõ in Hare (Athapascan), which generally expresses inferential evidentiality. In the example given below, however, lõ is used in a context that does not allow for an inferential reading, given the fact that it is a case of direct perception:

(18) [the speaker has been molested for some time by falling branches; when looking up, he discovers the source of the harassment sitting in a tree above him]

heee,    gúhde    daweda!  ch’ifi    dach’ída    lõ!
hey     up.there    sit.3SG.IPFV    guy    sitting    INFER
‘Hey, he’s sitting up there! The guy’s sitting up there!’ (DeLancey 1997: 39)

In this case the morpheme lõ expresses the fact that the speaker has just discovered what he describes, a notion which turns out to be grammatically relevant in different genetically unrelated languages, and which DeLancey (1997) terms “mirativity”.

In several languages, the situation is similar to the case of Hare in that mirativity is a secondary meaning of linguistic formatives serving the primary purpose of expressing evidentiality. Examples of this type are the Albanian Admirative, which expresses “sarcasm, inference, reporting etc.” (Friedman 2003: 192), Mapuche, where the suffix (i)rrke “combines the meanings of a reportative and sudden discovery [= mirativity, H.O.,” (Adelaar with Muysken 2004: 534f), and Western Apache lāā (Athabaskan), which is a cognate of Hare lõ (De Reuse 2003).

In addition, there are quite a few languages in which perfect aspect or past tense morphemes serve the additional purpose of expressing mirativity. In the Permic language Komi (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000), for instance, the so-called past2 has a resultative and inferential function, but can also express mirativity. In example (19) the mirative is the only possible reading, given the fact that what is described here is direct perception and has present time reference:

(19) Mis’a,  gaškö,  te  munin  n’in.  A  tani  na  völömyd.
   I_think perhaps you go:PST1:2SG already but here still be:PST2:2SG
   ‘I thought you had already gone. But here still you are.’
   (Juškov 1970: 97, quoted from Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000: 501)

Similarly, the perfect in Tajik expresses tense/aspect, various modal and evidential meanings and a mirative meaning (Perry 2000), such as illustrated in the following example:

(20) odami  xub  buda-ast
    man  good  he-has-been
    ‘it turns out he’s a good man (after all)’ (Perry 2000: 235)

---

9. Aikhenvald (2004: 195-215) mentions a number of cases in which indirect evidentials of various kinds have “mirative overtones”, particularly when used in the first person singular. As Curnow (2002) shows, the use of indirect evidentials with first person reference generally implies that the referent was in some way unconscious when participating in the state of affairs described. Therefore, with first person evidentials, surprise is a natural side effect rather than being a grammatically coded phenomenon. I refrain from considering such cases, because I am only interested in the systematic grammatical marking of mirativity.
A well-known though not uncontroversial case is the perfect aspect morpheme -mIş \(^{10}\) in Turkish (cf. Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986), which has three non-aspectual functions: it serves to express inference, hearsay and mirativity, the interpretation depending on the linguistic or non-linguistic context. \(^{11}\) Example (21) has a mirative reading, given the fact that it is the speaker’s evaluation of an event, i.e. the piano recital, at which he is present.

\[(21) \text{Kız-mız } \text{çok } \text{iyi } \text{piyano } \text{çal-iyor-muş} \]

daughter-2PL.POSS very good piano play-PRS-mIş

‘Your daughter plays the piano very well!’ (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986: 162)

In Quechua studies, the mirative has become known as “sudden discovery tense”, a term coined by Adelaar in his (1977) description of Tarma Quechua. \(^{12}\) Most Quechua dialects are similar to the languages discussed above in that both mirativity and hearsay are additional functions of perfect aspect or past tense markers. In Ecuadorian Quechua the perfect, also termed “narrative past”, is expressed by the morpheme -shka. \(^{13}\) Consider the following example from Ecuadorian Quechua:

\[(22) \text{kipi } \text{llashak-mi } \text{ka-shka-ø} \]

bundle heavy-AFF be-PRF-3SG

‘the bundle is heavy indeed’ (cf. Muysken 1977: 60)

It is through contact with Quechua that the mirative has been introduced into Andean Spanish (Muysken 1985; Granda 2002). Example (23) from rural EHS illustrates the parallel between the Spanish and the Quechua constructions:

\[(23) \text{[while eating a broth]} \]

**EHS:** Rico  ha_sido.\(^{14}\)  
  good  be.PRF.3SG

**Quechua:** Alli-mi  ga-shka-ø.  
  good-AFF  be-PRF-3SG

‘It is good (indeed)’ (Muysken 1985: 391)

---

10. The capital vowel in -mIş indicates that the realization of this sound depends on to vowel harmony.
11. Although the case of Turkish -mIş as illustrated in (21) has been quoted in the literature on mirativity as a paradigmatic case, it should be noted that Aksu-Koç & Slobin (1986: 162) themselves refer to surprise as one of the possible “pragmatic extensions” of the use of -mIş. Johanson (2000) argues that, although in the context of direct perception the use of indirectives can “often be interpreted in terms of sudden discovery, unexpectedness, surprise, new knowledge, perception contrary to one’s expectations etc.” (2000: 82), DeLancey (1997) overexploits this function of -mIş for the purpose of introducing mirativity as a grammatical category. With respect to example (21) Johanson describes the additional information expressed by -mIş simply as ‘as I hear’, and terms this kind of usage ‘perceptive’ (2000: 75). A similar view is held by Van Schaaik (pers. com.).
12. Tarma Quechua forms part of a small dialect group, termed Quechua I, as opposed to the much larger Quechua II (cf. Adelaar with Muysken 2004: 183-191). The dialects quoted in the remainder of this paper belong to the Quechua II group.
13. It is above all in narratives that -shka fulfils a hearsay function. In this function it competes with other grammatical and lexical expressions of reportative evidentiality. See e.g. Cole (1982) for Ecuadorian Quechua and Hannß (2004) for Cuzco Quechua.
14. Apart from the fact that in “general Spanish”, i.e. geographically relatively unmarked urban Spanish, the mirative use of the perfect does not exist, the Spanish expression in this example is deviant in an additional respect: instead of the participle of the unmarked copula sido, one would expect that of the contingent copula estado. This deviant copula use is one of the features of rural EHS that betrays the intimate contact with Quechua.
In a structurally analogous way the perfect is used for the expression of mirativity in both languages.\footnote{Interestingly, the pluperfect rather than the perfect is used for the expression of mirativity in the South-Andean area, i.e. in the Spanish spoken in Bolivia, Peru and northern Argentine. A plausible explanation of this difference has been given by Granda (2002).}

The remainder of this section will be devoted to the use of the mirative in urban Ecuadorian Highland Spanish. To begin with, let us consider an additional example:

(24) [speaker points at fruit that looks like yellowish apples]

\[ \text{Mire, compró estos, los probé ... y ... ¡han sido peras!} \]

‘Look, she bought these, I tasted them ... and ... they are pears!’ (FN, G., 2003)

As the last part of this example, which contains the relevant use of the present perfect marker, has unequivocal present time reference, it is more obvious than in example (4), quoted in the introduction to this paper, that a temporal or aspectual interpretation of the perfect is out of the question. In other words, the mirative is the only possible reading in this case. In the following example, the perfect is even used with future time reference:

(24) El año que viene ha sido bisiesto.

‘Next year is a leap year (I just realize it).’ (Toscano Mateus 1953: 260)

This case is remarkable because the time reference expressed by subject referent \textit{el año que viene}, literally ‘the year that comes’, outrightly contradicts the tense-aspect semantics of the perfect.

It is only for past time reference that there is a specific form of the mirative, i.e. the pluperfect:

(26) [speaker narrates that he had to sleep in a windy cave; he tried to find out where the wind came from]

\[ \text{pero no había habido huecos en la roca.} \]

‘but it turned out there were no holes in the rock’ (Kany 1970: 208)

The examples of mirative expressions we have considered so far in this section all have declarative illocution. However, in EHS the mirative perfect can also be used in questions:

(27) ¿y el hijo de la señora Anita no ha estado aquí?

‘and Mrs. Anita’s son is not here?’ (Bustamante 1991: 203)

The context of this example is such that the speaker knows the answer, i.e. the question in (27) is a rhetorical question. De Reuse (2003: 88) provides a similar example from Western Apache:
This means that in EHS, as well as in Western Apache, mirativity can be expressed in both declarative and interrogative utterances, the latter comprising at least rhetorical questions.

In conclusion, the data presented in this section have several characteristics in common: (i) in all cases, the mirative is a secondary or tertiary meaning of some grammatical distinction; (ii) in all cases, either evidentiality or perfect aspect or past tense are the primary meanings; (iii) the mirative tends to concern permanent or contingent states, examples being Qiang (LaPolla 2003: 67), Tajik (Perry 2000: 235f), Permic (Leinonen & Vilkuna 2000: 428f), and, obviously, Ecuadorian Highland Spanish. The last property is probably related to the “territory-sharing” between evidential and mirative. While most previous descriptions of the mirative in the literature concern only declarative utterances, it is certain at least for EHS and for Western Apache that the use of the mirative is not restricted to declarative illocution.

As regards the semantics of the mirative, the data presented in this section allow for the conclusion that mirativity is the linguistic marking of an utterance as conveying information which is not previously known to the speaker (DeLancey 2001: 369-370), or, more precisely, of the speaker’s “sudden awareness of a fact hitherto unknown, unappreciated or not considered relevant to the present” (Perry 2000: 237), which, as a general rule, entails surprise.

3. MIRATIVES VERSUS EXCLAMATIVES

In this section I will compare the Spanish realizations of the mirative and the exclamative with each other, in order to show that mirative and exclamative utterances are different with respect to their semantics and syntax. The semantic difference concerns polarity, and the syntactic difference concerns the possibility of relativizing mirative and exclamative utterances.

Starting with the semantics of miratives and exclamatives, we have seen that mirative expressions may be both positively and negatively polar: examples (26) and (27) contain a negation, while the remainder of the mirative examples has positive polarity. Example (29) is an additional case of a negatively polar mirative:

(29) [reaction of an informant to an instruction of how to fill in a questionnaire]
¡No ha sido difícil!
‘Oh, it’s not difficult (I just realize this)’ (FN, C.D, 2003)

The exclamative examples quoted so far are all positively polar. The negation of an exclamative yields an ungrammatical result, both in Spanish and in English:

16. The analysis of Muysken’s corpus of Salcedo reveals that in rural EHS in contact with Quechua the present perfect may have an evidential function in certain contexts, too. However, in contrast to what has been claimed by Palacios (2007), I have not found any convincing evidence that this use has entered the regional standard, i.e. educated urban EHS.
For a negative value in exclamatives the speaker has to resort to lexical means of expression:

(30) a. *¡Qué cuidada no estás! 17
   ‘*How careful you aren’t!’

(30) b. ¡Qué poco cuidada estás!
       ‘How little careful you are!’

(30) c. ¡Qué descuidada estás!
       ‘How careless you are!’
       (José Donoso, Casa de campo. 1978, Chile [CREA])

From this example we can conclude that in Spanish and English exclamatives have an inherently positive polarity. But the restriction of exclamatives to positive polarity holds for German, Dutch, French, Turkish (Van Schaaik, pers. com.), and Georgian (Asatiani, pers. com.), too, which means that it may well be an intrinsic semantic property of exclamatives. Obviously, this does not hold for miratives. 18

Turning to syntax, consider the following mirative example:

(30) [speaker tells that she suddenly stumbled when walking through the jungle]
   Me agarré de un árbol, que no había sido.
   ‘I held on to a tree, which turned out not to be one.’ (FN, I.D., 2003)

In this example the mirative expression is contained in a relative clause, more specifically, in a non-restrictive relative clause. Exclamatives, however, do not occur in non-restrictive relative clauses. Consider the exclamative in (32), which is relativized in (32a.):

(32) [I would arrive at the bridge across the Tiber and I would pass it surrounded by]
   los ángeles de Bernini [...] ¡Qué hermosos eran y qué tristes!
   ‘[...] the angels by Bernini [...] How beautiful they were and how sad!’
   (Manuel Mujica Lainez, El escarabajo. 1982, Argentine [CREA])

(32) a.*los ángeles de Bernini, que ¡qué hermosos eran y qué tristes!
   ‘*the angels by Bernini, which, how beautiful they were and how sad!’

The exclamative non-restrictive relative clause in (32a.) is ungrammatical, as is its English translation. Conversely, (32b.) is grammatical; here, the exclamative is reformulated as a “pseudo-exclamative” of the type discussed at the end of section 2.1., which is in fact a scalar declarative:

17. In data from 18th and 19th century literature, expressions like (30a.) do occur with a certain frequency. However, in these cases the negation particle no does not have a polar value, but rather serves as an emphatic marker:
   (i) ¡Qué aspavientos y qué extremos no hizo la santa señora!
   ‘What a ridiculous fuss the good lady made!’ (José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi, Periquillo Sarniento. 1802, Mexico [Davies])

18. However, in Tarma Quechua, one of the few languages known to have a grammatical formative with an exclusively mirative function, miratives are restricted to affirmative contexts (Adelaar, pers. com.).
(32) b. los ángeles de Bernini que eran tan hermosos y tan tristes.
‘the angels by Bernini, which were so beautiful and so sad.

Lyons (1977: 760) mentions the fact that “[n]on-restrictive relative clauses may have a different illocutionary force associated with them from that which is associated with the rest of the text-sentence within which they occur.” Lyons illustrates this with a declarative non-restrictive relative clause in the context of a question. Example (33a.) below shows that the reverse is not possible, i.e. to have a non-restrictive relative clause with an interrogative illocutionary force within the context of a declarative sentence.

(33) hay funcionarios encargados de las diversas zonas que son muy pocos;
‘there are men in charge of the various zones, who are very few’ (MC, Bogotá 01)

(33) a.*hay funcionarios encargados de las diversas zonas que ¿son muy pocos?
*‘there are men in charge of the various zones, who, are they very few?’

Given the fact that it is equally impossible to have exclamatives or questions in non-restrictive relative clauses in German, Dutch, French, Turkish, and Georgian, we may conclude (i) that, cross-linguistically, non-restrictive relative clauses tend to have a declarative illocution\(^{19}\) and (ii) that exclamatives differ from miratives in that they cannot appear in non-restrictive relative clauses.

I hope to have shown with these two tests that exclamative is an illocution, and that mirativity is not. Before proposing a possible way of accounting for this difference in Functional Discourse Grammar, I will give a brief sketch of the relevant features of this theory.

4. PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSE GRAMMAR
Like its predecessor, Dikian Functional Grammar, Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008) aims at providing a typologically adequate grammatical component to fit into a wider overall model of verbal interaction. A crucial difference between the two models is in their starting points: while Functional Grammar is a bottom-up model starting off with predicates as “the basic building blocks” (Dik 1997: I, 58) around which the model is gradually built up, Functional Discourse Grammar is a top-down model, which takes the speaker’s communicative intention as its starting point.

The grammatical component, i.e. the component the theory is essentially concerned with, basically consists of formulation and encoding rules. Formulation is concerned with the pragmatic and semantic rules underlying linguistic expressions. Encoding concerns the conversion of underlying pragmatic and semantic structures into morphosyntactic and phonological structures. Both formulation

\[^{19}\text{Apart from declaratives, we also find optatives in non-restrictive relative clauses:}\]

[i] [the man who looked like a ram went to the station, accompanied by] el poeta a quien Dios tenga en su gloria
literally: “the poet, whom God may have in his glory”

“the poet, may he rest in peace and rise with glory” (Carlos Rojas, El ingenioso hidalgo y poeta Federico García Lorca asciende a los infernos. 1982, Spain [CREA]) I would like to thank Kees Hengeveld for drawing my attention to this point.
and encoding are considered to be language specific, because “no universal pragmatic, semantic, morphosyntactic or phonological rules are postulated until their universality has been demonstrated through empirical research” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2010: 368). Apart from this strictly linguistic component Functional Discourse Grammar (henceforward FDG) assumes the existence of a conceptual component and a contextual component both of which interact with the grammatical component. The grammatical component feeds into the output component, which is concerned with the “etics” of linguistic expressions, i.e. their concrete, ever variable, acoustic or signed form. Schematically the relation between these components can be represented as in figure 1, quoted from Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2010: 368).

![Figure 1: The basic structure of Functional Discourse Grammar](image)

The conceptual component is “the driving force of the grammatical component as a whole” in the sense that it is “responsible for the development of both a communicative intention relevant for the current speech event and the associated conceptualizations with respect to relevant events in the external real or imaginary world” (Hengeveld 2005: 57). The contextual component contains relevant information on the wider discourse and the setting in which the current speech event takes place. The following example may serve to illustrate the way the contextual component works:

(34) – Where is she?
– Outside.

In this example, the context given in the question suffices to render the holophrastic answer comprehensible. In addition, the contextual component will identify the referent of she in the question and may give a clue as to where outside is meant to be.

The grammatical component is organised at four levels, (i) interpersonal, (ii) representational, (iii) morphosyntactic, and (iv) phonological. Each level has an internally hierarchical structure consisting of different layers. Each layer has basically the same structure, being built up of heads and modifiers (σ), variables (v), functions (φ), and operators (π):
Heads and modifiers, both of which may be internally complex, represent lexical means of expression, whereas operators and functions concern grammatical formatives. The difference between functions and operators is that functions are relational whereas operators are not. More specifically, functions establish relations either between units at the same layer or between layers and the levels they form part of, depending on the scope of the item they are attached to. Operators, on the other hand, exclusively concern the unit that is in their scope.

The morphosyntactic and the phonological levels are related to linguistic encoding and as such are not relevant for our present purpose. The interpersonal level relates to interactional and the representational level to semantic aspects of grammar. The following examples quoted from Hengeveld (2005: 59) may serve to illustrate the relevance of these two levels to language use:

(36) A. Get out of here!  
   B. Don’t talk to me like that!

(37) A. There are lots of traffic lights in this town.  
   B. I didn’t notice that!

In example (36) the anaphoric pronoun that in B’s reaction refers to the communicative strategy chosen by his/her interlocutor, which indicates that there is an interpersonal level which is relevant to linguistic interaction. In (37) B’s anaphoric that refers to the semantic content of A’s message, i.e. his or her description of the external world, which is indicative of the relevance of the representational level.

The remainder of this section will be devoted to a very concise description of the interpersonal and representational levels, simplifying matters that are not strictly relevant to the present subject. For more details, the reader is referred to the general overview in Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2010, fc) and to Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008) for a full description of the theory.

At the interpersonal level we are interested in the relation between the interlocutors, the illocution and the content of the interaction. In FDG the relation between these is captured at the layer of the discourse act, a strongly simplified representation of which, lacking indications of modifiers and operators is given in (38):

(38) A₁: [(F₁: ILL (F₁)) (P₁)ₕ (P₂)ₜ (C₁: [(T₁) (R₁)] (C₁))] (A₁)
properties and relations) (T) and reference (R). These subacts may be marked for pragmatic functions such as Topic and Focus. In a FDG analysis, Moutouakil's pseudo-exclamative examples in (2a.-c.) are in fact emphatic discourse acts with focal ascriptive subacts. A simplified representation of example (2a.), repeated here as (39a.), could be (39b.):

(39) a. *Elle est BELLE!*

‘She is nice!’

(39) b. Emph A₁: [(F₁; DECL (F₁)) (P₁) (P₁) (C₁; (T₁; [–belle–] (T₁))Foc (R₁; [–elle–] (R₁)) (C₁)) (A₁)]

Let us now turn to the most important features of the representational level in FDG. The structure in (40) is a simplified sketch of the representational level, again without any indications of functions, modifiers and operators:

(40) p₁; (ep₁; [e₁; [(f₁) (x₁)] (e₁)] (ep₁)) (p₁)

The highest layer at this level consists of propositional contents (p), i.e. “mental constructs, such as pieces of knowledge, beliefs, and hopes” (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2010: 377) of some subject referent. Propositional contents may contain episodes (ep), i.e. sets of thematically, temporally and locationally coherent states-of-affairs, consisting of at least one state of affairs (e). Individual or sets of states-of-affairs differ from propositions in the sense that they can be physically perceived and presented, and can consequently be located in time and place, none of which applies to propositions. At the level of the state of affairs, we find so-called “configurational properties”, typically consisting of predicates (f) and first-order-entities (x). The semantic difference between propositions on the one hand and (sets of) states-of-affairs on the other is reflected in the operators that can possibly apply to each of them. While propositions can be modified for different shades of subjective modality and evidentiality, such as Inferential, Dubitative and Doxastic, episodes and states-of-affairs can be specified for tense, aspect and objective modality, the latter concerning the relative probability of the occurrence of an event, potentially based on external evidence.

The interpersonal and the representational levels are intended to capture distinct aspects of communicative interaction, but it should be emphasized that they are intimately interrelated. Moreover, although Functional Discourse Grammar strives for psychological adequacy, it is not intended to be a speaker model, more specifically, there is no claim that the interpersonal and representational levels should apply sequentially in actual language production.

5. EXCLAMATIVE ILLOCUTION AND MIRATIVITY IN FUNCTIONAL DISCOURSE GRAMMAR

The first issue I will address in this section is the place of exclamative illocution in FDG (5.1). Turning to mirativity (5.2), I will first discuss the question whether mirativity corresponds to the interpersonal or to the representational level of grammar, and then go into its relation to other knowledge-related distinctions.

---

20. The dashes marking the words in the representations of the ascriptive and referential subacts indicate that final forms are given, which would have to be the output of the morphosyntactic component.
5.1. Exclamative illocution

Hengeveld and Mackenzie (2008: 72-75) give a description of exclamative illocution that is partly in line with my descriptions given of exclamatives in sections 2.1 and 3., a considerable difference being that, in my view mistakenly, the two authors term exclamative “mirative”. The definition of exclamative illocution, whenever grammatically relevant in a language, should read as follows:

\[(41) \text{EXCLamative: the speaker expresses his/her affective stance about the propositional content evoked by the communicated content, implicating that some property or relation contained in the proposition obtains to a high degree.}\]

There are two further differences: first, the definition in (41) accounts for the conversational implicature of scalarity of exclamatives and, secondly, I refrain from restricting exclamative illocution to the expression of surprise, as do Hengeveld and Mackenzie, because the emotional reaction expressed by means of exclamatives can also be anger, such as in (11) and (12), or discontent, such as in (6) and (30c.).

The representation of an exclamative discourse act in FDG would have to be as follows:

\[(41) A_1: [(F_1: EXCL (F_1)) (P_1 \_S (P_2) \_A (C_1)) (A_1)]\]

In this structure (A) represents the discourse act, (F) the abstract illocutionary predicate, (P_1) and (P_2) the participants in the interaction, and (C) the communicated content.

5.2. Mirativity

In order to locate mirativity in FDG, the first question that has to be answered concerns the level at which mirativity operates. If mirativity operates on the interpersonal level, as does exclamative illocution, it modifies the communicated content, and if it operates at the representational level, it modifies the propositional content. Let us first consider the difference between communicated contents and propositional contents as described by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008: 144):

\[A \text{ major difference between Communicated Contents and Propositional Contents is that Communicated Contents are Speaker-bound, whereas Propositional Contents are not, at least not necessarily. This means that Propositional Contents can be attributed without problems to persons other than the Speaker.}\]

Examples (43) and (44) show that mirativity can be expressed when the source of the proposition is not the speaker. In the elicited example (43), mirativity, expressed by the past perfect, applies to a propositional content that is attributed to a third person singular subject rather than to the speaker:

\[(43) \text{[F. had invited a lot of people to a garden party, which was going to begin at 3 p.m.]}\]
\[\text{pero a las dos vió que algunos amigos ya habían estado allí}\]
\[\text{‘but at two p.m. he saw some friends were already there!’}\]
The authentic example (44) from Jarawara (Arawá) (Dixon 2004) may serve as additional evidence. Dixon provides the following contextual information: “One day, the village chief, Okombi, thought he was given a cup of cachaça. When he raised the cup to his lips he discovered that it was just water. The surprise he experienced was coded by using IPn [immediate past eyewitness, H.O.] in decribing this event:"

(44) Okombi	 faha	 hi-fa-hani	 ama-ke
Okombi  water  OBJ-drink-IPN  extent-decl
‘Okombi (to his surprise) drank water’ (Dixon 2004: 172)

For mirativity in FDG, this means that it does not operate on the communicated content at the interpersonal level, but must be accounted for at the representational level.

At the representational level, there are a considerable number of operators that are similar to mirativity in the sense that they are related to the subject’s knowledge with respect to the propositional content. Hengeveld & Mackenzie subdivide operators at the propositional layer “into distinctions concerned with the degree and the type of commitment with respect to a Propositional Content (subjective epistemic modality) and distinctions concerned with the source of the Propositional Content (evidential modality)” (2008: 153). The question with which of these two mirativity should be associated is a hotly debated issue.

Mirativity has often been associated with evidentiality in the literature because of the fact that evidentials and miratives tend to share the same expression format (cf. section 2.2 above). The frequently quoted “unprepared mind” (Aksu-Koç & Slobin 1986: 164) seems to be what miratives have in common with evidentials: the speaker has not participated either in the event (evidential modality) or in the developments that lead to the situation described (mirativity), and thus feels psychologically distanced from the event or situation s/he is describing. Lazard’s (2001: 362) proposal to include mirativity and evidential meanings in a wider category to be called “mediative” is in line with this view, where “mediative” corresponds to the meaning “as it appears”; the “mediative” is the marked case, which contrasts with the unmarked case, i.e. the lack of evidential or mirative marking. On the other hand, Plungian (2001) takes the stance that the mirative meaning is not evidential, given the fact that “it does not mark the way of access to P, but the extent to which the speaker is ready to perceive P”, i.e. it is modal in the sense that “it deals with a special kind of judgement: a judgement concerning the speaker’s expectations” (Plungian 2001: 355). The disadvantage of Lazard’s proposal is that it blurs the concept of evidentiality in order to accommodate mirativity. Plungian’s proposal is preferable, since it leaves the decision of the precise nature of mirativity open to further research.

Mirativity is independent of not only of evidential modality but also of epistemic modality given that mirativity is not concerned with the Speaker’s or the subject referent’s commitment to the truth of a possible fact, but rather with his or her knowledge status with respect to the propositional content. Therefore I propose to add Mirative modality (Mir) as the sole representative of an independent set of modal operators to the layer of the propositional content. The definition of Mirative modality, whenever grammatically relevant in a language, would then be:

21. Theoretically, mirativity could also apply to other entities at the representational level, i.e. either the episode or the state of affairs. However, given the subjective semantics of mirativity, only the propositional content is a serious option.
(45) Mir(ative) indicates that the propositional content does not coincide with the expectations of its source, i.e. the speaker or another person.

In an FDG frame at the layer of the propositional content (Hengeveld & Mackenzie 2008:156), Mirative modality would have to be represented as follows:

(46) Mir \( p_1 \): \([(ep_1) \ldots (ep_{1+N})] \{\Phi\} : [\sigma (p_1) \phi] (p_1)\)

This representation should be read as any mirative proposition containing any number of episodes with any function, to be modified by any propositional satellite with any function.

6. CONCLUSION
I have argued that the way in which the concept of mirativity is used by Hengeveld & Mackenzie (2008) is based on a misunderstanding. What Hengeveld and Mackenzie refer to with the term “mirative” is in fact exclamative illocution. Mirative is a semantic distinction, which in FDG should be accounted for as a modal operator at the representational level.

I have shown that there are at least three reasons for assuming that mirative and exclamative are different concepts: first, unlike exclamative illocution, mirative propositional contents can have negative polarity; secondly, mirative propositional contents can occur in non-restrictive relative clauses, which exclamative illocution cannot; finally, mirative propositional contents may occur within acts with declarative or interrogative illocution, which proves that they cannot be an illocution themselves.

**Non-standard abbreviations in glosses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFF</th>
<th>affirmative validation</th>
<th>EMPH</th>
<th>emphasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INFER</td>
<td>inferential</td>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>mirative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>nominalizer</td>
<td>PCTP</td>
<td>participle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREP</td>
<td>preposition marking human object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variables in representations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>discourse act</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>communicated content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>state of affairs</td>
<td>ep</td>
<td>episode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>predicate</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>(abstract) illocutionary predicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>proposition</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>participant in verbal interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>referential subact</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>ascriptive subact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ</td>
<td>modifier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Other abbreviations in representations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>addressee function</th>
<th>ASP</th>
<th>aspect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECL</td>
<td>declarative illocution</td>
<td>EMPH</td>
<td>emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXCL</td>
<td>exclamative illocution</td>
<td>Foc</td>
<td>focus function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILL</td>
<td>any illocution</td>
<td>Mir</td>
<td>mirative operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>speaker function</td>
<td>π</td>
<td>any operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ϕ</td>
<td>any function</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT
The concept of mirativity has come to interfere in the recently developed framework of Functional Discourse Grammar with what would be considered to be exclamative elsewhere. In addition, the concept of exclamative itself turns out to be ill-defined in various studies within the functional paradigm. The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic description of the semantic, pragmatic and syntactic differences between miratives and exclamatives, and propose a way in which these differences can be accounted for within Functional Discourse Grammar. This study is mainly based on data from Ecuadorian Highland Spanish; crucial claims will be supported with additional data from other languages.

KEYWORDS: mirative, exclamative, Functional Discourse Grammar, Ecuadorian Highland Spanish

REFERENCES


ALONSO CORTÉS, Ángel. 1999. Las construcciones exclamativas. La interjección y las expresiones vocativas. Ignacio Bosque & Violeta Demonte (dirs.), 3993-4050


**CORPORA**


[Salcedo] Unpublished corpus of Spanish in contact with Quechua compiled by Pieter Muysken in 1978 in and near the town of Salcedo, province of Cotopaxi, Ecuador.