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Bialasiewicz, L.

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‘The Death of the West’: Samuel Huntington, Oriana Fallaci and a New ‘Moral’ Geopolitics of Births and Bodies

LUIZA BIALASIEWICZ

Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

*The ‘War on Terror’ has justified a whole new set of re-territorialisations of security and identity, also in the ‘West’. In this paper, I highlight one particularly powerful aspect of the idea of the ‘West under threat’: one wedded to the idea of a demographic-reproductive menace. Such ideas are not only the prerogative of extremist fringes, for the two authors whose work is discussed in this piece are very much part of the mainstream: Samuel Huntington, whose latest book *Who Are We? America’s Great Debate* focuses on the ‘deconstruction’ of American identity and the threat represented by hyper-fertile immigrant populations and Italian writer-journalist Oriana Fallaci, whose two most recent books have launched an offensive against the ‘Islamic Reverse Crusade’ that threatens to ‘submerge and subjugate’ Europe.*

Certainly, the intimations of a ‘threat’ to the West are in no way new, nor are they a unique product of the ‘War on Terror’. What is new, however, is the force with which they are being articulated today and the ways in which they are entering into popular circulation, in both Europe and America. What is more, on both sides of the Atlantic, those raising the sound of alarm for ‘The Death of the West’ prescribe not only a re-affirmation of (Western) ideals, but also – and increasingly – a set of policies for the biological survival of the West. ‘The Death of the West’ is thus not only a parable of political and geopolitical decline, but also a morality play regarding real deaths and, especially, real births.

The rhetoric of the War on Terror has been closely wedded to the idea of the ‘West under threat’. In the imaginations of its ideologues, however, this

Address correspondence to Luiza Bialasiewicz, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK. E-mail: Luiza.Bialasiewicz@rhul.ac.uk

threat does not only come from without – most starkly, from an Islamic Other – but also from within. Many commentators, academic and other, have noted how the War on Terror has justified a whole new set of re-territorialisations of security and identity, also in the ‘West’.¹ What I would like to highlight here is one particularly powerful aspect of the idea of the ‘West under threat’: one wedded to the notion of a demographic-reproductive menace. Increasingly, it is through ideas about reproductive practices and demographic threat that the ‘clash of civilisations’ is being brought home, with women’s bodies becoming the new battleground for the preservation of the identity of the West, the pawn in new, forcible re-territorialisations of identity.

These ideas are not only the prerogative of extremist fringes. The two authors whose recent work is discussed in this piece are very much part of the mainstream. In the US, Samuel Huntington’s latest book, *Who Are We? America’s Great Debate*,² focuses a large part of its accusations of a ‘deconstruction’ of American identity on changes in attitudes among elites towards the reproduction of the body of the nation – and the threat represented by hyper-fertile immigrant populations. In Italy, writer Oriana Fallaci’s books which advance similar arguments (albeit in much more virulent terms) – *La Rabbia e l’Orgoglio* (“The Rage and the Pride”) and *La Forza della Ragione* (“The Force of Reason”)³ – have topped best-seller lists in the past years, and the Berlusconi government had proposed to make her a Senator-for-Life, an honour usually granted only to important political or intellectual figures.

A concern for the decline of the West is not new; certainly not new to the post 9/11 era. Almost a decade ago, Simon Dalby noted the ways in which the dissolution of the Cold War blocs evoked fears of “geopolitical vertigo” and the need for new geopolitical certainties “in which the basic components of global politics can be clearly demarcated, known and hence controlled”.⁴ Indeed, since the early 1990s, the Huntingtonian discourse of the ‘West against the Rest’ has been translated into a new “Cold War against the Other”, a new “geopolitical imagination of spatial exclusion”,⁵ not only abroad but also at home. Whether these new geopolitics of exclusion have been translated into appeals to nation and belonging, the demonisation of immigrant communities, or invocations of the ‘traditional family’ and ‘family values’, all such geo-graphs can be read as a reaction to (what are perceived as being) challenges to mythologised understandings of the West. Also already in the 1990s, for commentators like Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington, the rising tenor of the creed of ‘multiculturalism’ and its challenges to the West’s exceptionalist myths, “threatened to balkanise ‘the West’ as an identity from within. Instead of reading it as an attempt to deepen democracy and equality, neoconservatives saw multiculturalism as threatening ‘de-Westernisation’ of their own narrow mythic visions of the West”.⁶ The ‘Clash of Civilisations’ evoked by Huntington⁷ was, firstly,

internal to Western states – between an ‘us’ (the white, male elite) and a ‘them’ (everyone else): in his essay and later book, the ‘enemies’ Huntington specified were both abroad (Islamic fundamentalists) and at home (foreign capital, immigrants, and multiculturalists). The West described by Huntington as ‘under threat’ referred, as O’Tuathail suggested, “as much to an imaginative and idealised cultural order as it [did] to a geographical place”. To Huntington, the ‘West’ was

not simply a geographical community but a universalistic creed of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, democracy, and free markets. *It is simultaneously a real place and an imaginary cultural order.* ‘The West versus the Rest’ is not simply a spatial struggle between a distinct ‘here’ (the West) and an identifiable ‘there’ (the Rest), but a cultural and spatial struggle that occurs *everywhere*.⁸

The threat to the West was, in other words, double: on the one hand, tied to increasing (and increasingly uncontrollable) flows of capital, goods and people that now ‘penetrated’ the West; on the other, to the increasing circulation and acceptance of ideas that threatened the structure of power-knowledge that constituted the West’s idea of itself.⁹ Intellectuals of statecraft such as Huntington thus anguished over what they perceived as an excessive dependence of the American economy on foreign (at that time, especially Japanese) capital and the fact that a growing percentage of the US population increasingly belonged to other ‘civilisations’, but also over the ‘growing creed of ‘multiculturalism’ among Americans themselves, something which Huntington explicitly associated with “the de-Westernisation of the United States”.¹⁰ As O’Tuathail argued, what such calls imagined was a de-territorialising geographical space that should be hardened against ‘foreign civilisations’ and their insidious influences – and re-territorialised along the lines of a mythologised Western cultural and political order – no less than an attempt to “discipline the real to fit the imaginary”.¹¹ In the attempt to construct such an imaginary Western cultural and political order, lines were inevitably drawn *within* the West itself as well.

The decade that followed witnessed similar developments also in Europe, with European institutions and certain European elites (economic as well as intellectual) becoming the favoured targets both of right-wing factions in Western Europe, as well as Eastern European nationalists: European elites and institutions denounced as a supra-national, bureaucratising and ‘globalising’ force, dictating morality and values purportedly ‘alien’ to the European tradition (if not to ‘Western Civilisation’) and, what is more, threatening Europe’s very survival. For instance, the rhetoric of the separatist Lega Nord in Italy in the past ten years has increasingly moved from independentist declarations directed at the Italian state to attacks levelled against European institutions: in particular, the European Union’s supposed

promotion of a multicultural, multinational polity at the expenses of a 'Europe of the peoples' and of 'European values'.¹² In Poland, the Catholic Right has similarly focussed a large part of its anti-European propaganda on the 'deconstruction' of Polish identity threatened by European accession: fears not only directed at the inevitable loss of Polish political and economic sovereignty within the European Union but also, more broadly, against the threats posed by Europe's 'enforced globalism' (sic).¹³

I note the developments of the past decades in order to remark, again, that the ideas surrounding the 'threat' to the West are in no way new nor are they a unique product of the War on Terror. What is new, however, is the force with which they are being articulated today and the ways in which they are entering into popular circulation, becoming if not a fully accepted then certainly an *important* part of public discourse, in Europe and America. What is more, on both sides of the Atlantic, those raising the sound of alarm for 'the Death of the West' prescribe not only a re-affirmation of certain 'Western' ideals, but also – and increasingly – a set of policies for the *biological* survival of the West. 'The Death of the West' is thus not only a parable of political and geopolitical decline, but also a morality play regarding real deaths and, especially, real births.

Indeed, what renders the ideas surfacing in the work of Huntington and Fallaci so worrying are the ways in which these tap into a much longer lineage of national-imperial anxieties about population growth and decline and the 'degeneration' and 'pollution' of the national body – anxieties that, over the past two centuries, have been used to justify some of the most brutal policies of biopolitical 'purification'.¹⁴ In the pages that follow, I will attempt to highlight the ways in which reproductive practices are again taking on geo-political significance in the attempt to demarcate and preserve the body of the West. I will do so by noting how the putative 'survival' of the West is being scripted *vis-a-vis* two interlinked sets of challenges: 1) the demographic threat of 'fertile' immigrant populations and 2) the threat posed by Western 'traitors' of the West – women and 'cultural elites' who challenge traditional family and reproductive roles.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC THREAT: A 'GEOPOLITICS OF THE WOMB'

Mexican immigration is leading toward the demographic *reconquista* of areas Americans took from Mexico by force in the 1830s and 1840s. ... These changes are driven not just by immigration but also by fertility. ... Governments see it in their interest to encourage emigration, to expand, mobilize and organize their diasporas; [while] developed countries exert influence in world affairs through the export of capital, technology, economic aid, and military power, poor overpopulated countries exert influence through the export of people.¹⁵

The Politics of the Womb, that is, the strategy of exporting human beings and reproducing in abundance, has always been the most direct means for taking control of a territory, of dominating a country, of substituting a people or subjugating it. ... In all European mosques, the Friday prayers are accompanied by an exhortation to all Muslim women to 'give birth to at least five children each'. Well, five children are not that few. In the case of the immigrant with two wives, the five become ten. Or at least ten. In the case of the immigrant with three wives, they become fifteen. Or at least fifteen.¹⁶

Fears of a demographic decline in the West are not new – certainly not new in Europe: over two decades ago, Gunther Grass caricatured the preoccupations of Germans with the declining birth rate in his novel *Kopfgeburt: Oder Die Deutschen Sterben Aus* ("Headbirths, or, The Germans Are Dying Out"), comparing the experiences of two couples, one Turkish and one German.¹⁷ But while the preoccupations satirised by Grass were primarily political-economic (who will pay the pension contributions of an increasingly ageing Europe?), for today's prophets of doom such as Samuel Huntington and Oriana Fallaci (whose citations open this section), the fears of demographic decline hold much broader ramifications. Demographic questions have indeed become coterminous with a whole set of other considerations on the future of the West, with a decline in natality increasingly being read as a symptom of a broader 'decay' of the West and its identity – as well as a direct, geo-political, threat. Within such understandings, it is the bodies of foreign women that figure as a grave danger to the 'pure' body of the West, as the site of a potential demographic 'invasion'. Foreign women (in Europe, Muslim women; in the United States, Catholic Hispanic populations) with their different reproductive mores are represented as 'breeders' that threaten to submerge the nation in a flood of foreign babies. Unlike the civilised Western woman, they are represented as *ipso facto* reproductive beings, prey to their uncontrolled 'biological' impulses.

Now, work on nationalism has long stressed how nations are constituted not only through the construction of imagined communities of belonging but also through the control and disciplining of bodies – and it is women's bodies, in particular, that have long served as key supports to the national ideal. As Nira Yuval-Davis has argued, women have always "reproduced nations, biologically, culturally and symbolically"¹⁸, with women's bodies and the symbolic body of the nation often becoming enmeshed, both discursively and materially. The rhetoric surrounding the protection and preservation of the nation-state has, moreover, always been profoundly gendered, with "the safeguarding of life of/in women written in terms of the security of the nation".¹⁹ Here, woman and nation become one: a symbolic – but also very real – body (the motherland) to be protected against foreign incursion or 'defilement'.²⁰

Perhaps the most evident example of this elision between the body of the nation and the bodies of individual women were the forced natalist policies of various authoritarian regimes where childbearing was institutionally inscribed as the duty of the 'mothers of the nation'. We can think back here, for example, to the honours granted to multi-child families in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, or the ways in which motherhood was ideologically revered in the former Soviet Union and Franco's Spain. But population policies have also been used by states to enforce a particular definition of nationality. As Yuval-Davis has noted, "a central dimension of such policies [is] a concern about the 'genetic pool' of the nation. ... Only by being born into a certain collectivity could one become a full member of it. Control of marriage, procreation and therefore sexuality has always figured high on the nationalist agenda".²¹ The population policies and marriage bans of Nazi Germany²² and the South African apartheid state are among the most notorious examples in this respect, but we should not forget that 'anti-miscegenation' laws prohibited so-called 'interracial' marriage in the United States up until 1967, with the explicit purpose of regulating the 'whiteness' of the nation.²³

Indeed, we need not go back too far in time to note the ways in which women's bodies and their childbearing capacities have been used as political and geo-political supports. Numerous authors have written about the ways in which women's reproductive capacities became an issue of national interest, even national 'survival', in the conflicts that tore apart the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulic has commented at length on the ways in which the 're-nationalising' Croatian state actively promoted natalist policies, passing a law outlawing abortion in 1992 upon fears "that the Croatian nation is soon going to disappear".²⁴ But these issues were made most brutally evident in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina: a war fought, literally, with and on women's bodies. The systematic rape of Bosnian women by Serb soldiers that outraged international opinion made evident all too clearly the link between individual female bodies and the body of the nation: an almost ritual violation of women's bodies marking a both physical and symbolic penetration of the mother(land) of the Other.²⁵

Just as hegemonic state discourses have long inscribed 'proper' and desirable reproductive practices and women's role in assuring the continuity of the nation, so too the inscription of 'deviant' reproductive (and sexual) behaviour has also always been a powerful instrument of social control. Indeed, rhetorics of sexual and reproductive difference have long been used to mark the boundaries of the national body from 'foreign' bodies. In colonial times, Orientalist discourses often defined the Otherness of the native populations precisely through their 'primitive' sexual mores, seen as 'loose' and even animal-like, in comparison to the 'civilised' sexuality of the West. As many commentators have argued, the 'black savage' was at once vilified as a 'sexual beast' unable to control his base impulses, but at the

same time celebrated in popular burlesque representations for his sexual prowess.²⁶ Although such ideas may have faded from the popular imaginary, sexual and reproductive difference is still being used to distinguish non-national Others, often in terms that are not that different from colonial depictions. Some anti-immigrant rhetoric in today's Europe reproduces, indeed, a conflation of racial and sexual difference that is used to explicitly map subject positionings and the right to belong, with discourses around foreign sexual and reproductive mores having become a key Othering strategy. Foreign single men (mostly from the southern shores of the Mediterranean) are commonly depicted as potential rapists and stalkers: their difference scripted as potential danger. Arab and African men, in particular, are scripted as hyper-masculine and, as the figure of the colonial 'savage' previously, construed as 'energetic pursuers of White women'.²⁷ Such imaginaries also often allude to how the 'freedom' of Western society – especially, easy access to alcohol – acts to fuel their 'base instincts', building again on colonial/Orientalised imaginaries of the Other as uncivilised and animal-like. Again, appeals to guarding the bodies and virtue of White women from foreign hands are not new: Kay Anderson, for example, has written extensively on how racist narratives of Chinese immigrants in early 1900s Canada were similarly marked by gender and moral codings related to guarding White women's incolumnity and purity from the depravity and vice represented by the Oriental.²⁸ As I will note subsequently, discourses of 'pollution' and 'defilement' figure prominently in the work of Oriana Fallaci, as do evocations of the 'deviant' (if not 'bestly') sexual behaviour of Muslim immigrants.

Similarly, fears of a demographic 'flood' are long-standing, surfacing intermittently in the rhetoric of anti-immigrant groups and parties across Europe, from the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, to the Front National in France to the British National Party.²⁹ What is worrying, nevertheless, are the ways in which such images are being increasingly adopted in mainstream politics. In Italy, the national government's arguments in the past several years against '*ricongiungimento familiare*' (family re-unification), favouring the short-term immigration of lone male workers only (in a manner much similar to the German and Swiss *gastarbeiter* agreements of the 1960s and 1970s) have played precisely upon fears of a demographic 'invasion'³⁰, evoking fears voiced in colonial contexts almost a hundred years earlier: we can cite again from Anderson's discussion of early immigration controls to Canada, recounting the appeal by the Royal Commissioner for Immigration in 1885: "If they [the Chinese immigrants] came with their women they would come to settle and what with immigration and their extraordinary fecundity, would soon over-run the country".³¹ Today, the immigrant body is still represented as a threat to the (demographic) strength and (biological) integrity of the nation – and it is within such a discursive context that Samuel Huntington and Oriana Fallaci's recent arguments should be located.

Huntington's provocative assertion of a Hispanic demographic *Reconquista* in his latest bestseller – *Who Are We? America's Great Debate* – gave (pseudo) academic credence to ideas that had been circulating on the fringes of American political discourse for over a decade. Right-wing commentators like Pat Buchanan had long been preaching against the dangers of uncontrolled immigration and, more specifically, the threat posed by immigrant 'fertility'. Buchanan's 2002 book, entitled *The Death of the West* (which inspired the title of this paper), was indeed subtitled "How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilisation".³² In its opening paragraphs, Buchanan raised a cry of alarm for "the immigration tsunami rolling over America", threatening "to deconstruct the nation we grew up in", but also part of a broader, global, wave menacing the very survival of the West: a West whose "nations have ceased to reproduce, and [whose] populations have stopped growing and begun to shrink".³³ Beyond pointing a finger at the failures of the West itself (something that I will discuss in the subsequent section), Buchanan identified the Mexican demographic invasion as the greatest external threat facing the United States in the years to come. In a chapter entitled "La Reconquista", the author offered a variety of provocative slogans from the statements of Mexican-American leaders and organisations in an attempt to demonstrate that not only was the invasion a question of numbers, it was *a planned geo-demographic strategy* "of taking back the American SouthWest":

"We're recolonising America. ... It's time to take back what is ours" rants Ricky Sierra of the Chicano National Guard. ... Jose Angel Gutierrez, a political science professor at the University of Texas at Arlington and director of the UTA Mexican-American Study Center, told a university crowd: "We have an aging white America. They are not making babies. They are dying. The explosion is in our population. They are shitting in their pants in fear! I love it!"³⁴)

Buchanan's comments and writings have never commanded attention beyond a limited audience. But it is extremely troubling to find his words – and arguments – repeated in the work of a public intellectual as well-known as Samuel Huntington. Huntington's claims are, at base, identical, albeit couched in a veneer of empirical data and academic credibility: something which grants them legitimacy and renders them even more powerful – and preoccupying. Much like Buchanan, the language Huntington uses to depict the growing numbers of Hispanics in the United States is that of military conquest and occupation. The waves of immigrant arrivals are similarly described as an "invasion", with Mexican and other Hispanic migrants accused of "establishing beachheads" in various parts of the southwestern US.³⁵

The demographic threat is described in what Huntington terms "hard facts":

Hispanics ... will constitute up to 25% of the population by 2040. These changes are driven not just by immigration but also by fertility. In 2002, total fertility rates were estimated at 1.8 for non-Hispanic whites, 2.1 for blacks, and 3.0 for Hispanics. ... As the bulge of Latinos enters peak child-bearing age in a decade or two, the Latinos' share of America's population will soar. ... In 2003 for the first time since the 1850s a majority of newborn children in California were Hispanic. [This impact] is most heavily felt in schools. ... The schools of Los Angeles are becoming Mexican. By 2002, 71.9% of the students in the Los Angeles Unified School District were Hispanic, predominantly Mexican.³⁶

What is more, just as Buchanan, Huntington also attributes an *intentionality* to the demography. On the one hand, Hispanic immigration and especially the procreation of immigrants is *speculative*: Huntington argues that most Hispanic migrants do not come to the United States "because they want to become Americans", as earlier waves of migrants did. "[Hispanic] immigrants become citizens not because they are attracted to America's culture and Creed, but because they are attracted by government social welfare and affirmative action programs. ... Citizenship is becoming ... one more generally available 'federal social benefit'".³⁷ On the other (and this is much more dangerous, to Huntington's mind), the unstated aim of the migrations is to *disrupt the identity – and territorial – integrity of the United States*. This is evident, according to Huntington, in the way in which migrant families become established in the host country. He notes that Mexicans have the lowest naturalisation rates among immigrant groups and very low rates of intermarriage and even in the rare cases of intermarriage, the usual pattern of assimilation into mainstream American culture is changing: that is, assimilation occurs in the opposite direction: "the non-Latino spouse (who may or may not be Anglo) and children resulting from such marriages often identify as Latinos, even when they do not speak Spanish".³⁸ For Huntington, it is not a question of cultural choice but an inherent part of the "deep nature" of the Hispanic (and especially Mexican) migration. Citing from a text by Morris Janowitz, the author warns that:

the strength of [such] Mexican cultural patterns means that the 'natural history' of Mexican immigrants has been and will be at variance with that of other immigrant groups. For sections of the Southwest, it is not premature to speak of a cultural and social irredenta – sectors of the United States which have in effect become Mexicanized and therefore, under political dispute.³⁹

The danger is certainly a numerical one: the fear that Hispanics will soon outnumber white Americans in certain regions of the United States. Indeed, Huntington argues, "Mexican-Americans no longer think of themselves as members of a small minority who must accommodate the dominant group

and adopt its culture. As their numbers increase, they become more committed to their own ethnic identity and culture. Sustained numerical expansion promotes cultural consolidation, and leads them not to minimize but to glory in the differences between their culture and American culture".⁴⁰

But there is a graver danger still: that of *metissage*, of hybridity – the risk, if current trends continue, of not being able to tell the Hispanic America from the ‘real’ America: “scholars and observers have referred to [the US-Mexico] border as ‘melting’, ‘becoming blurred’, ‘moving’ (northward, that is) and as a sort of ‘dotted line’. This produces in the southwestern United States and to a limited extent also in northern Mexico what has been variously termed ‘MexAmerica’, ‘Amexica’ and ‘Mexifornia’”.⁴¹ It is a threat, at base, to what Huntington, following Waeber, terms “societal security”:

the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats’. It is about ‘the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom’. Thus, while national security is concerned, above all, with sovereignty, societal security is concerned above all with identity, the ability of a people to maintain their culture, institutions, and way of life.⁴²

The demographic threat to national social and identity security has also been the focus of writer-journalist Oriana Fallaci’s latest books and although her arguments focus on Italy in particular, the ‘cry of alarm’ she raises is directed at Europe as a whole. Fallaci was a well-known war-correspondent in Italy and abroad since the 1970s. Her articles and especially her books have described, often from a very personal perspective, some of the most chilling aspects of the conflicts of the past decades: from Vietnam to the Lebanese civil war to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Her two most recent books came after over a decade of silence and revealed, to many admirers’ eyes, a very different Fallaci from the engaged reporter of her previous works. Fallaci herself has described the books as “an unrestrainable cry” driven, in her words, by “my rage and my pride”. The first of the two volumes – *La Rabbia e l’Orgoglio* (translated into the English as *The Rage and the Pride*) was, indeed, an expanded version of a long editorial she published in the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera* following the attacks of 11 September 2001. More than a direct reaction to the attacks themselves, however, Fallaci’s comments were directed at the European reaction to the attacks – and at what she described as a broader global temperie ‘revealed’ by the attacks.

The piece, in Fallaci’s words was “a *j’accuse* ... a prosecution or sermon addressed to Europeans. [It was] an unrestrainable cry”.⁴³ It was “a shout: ‘You don’t understand, you don’t want to understand, that a Reverse Crusade is underway. A war of religion they call Holy War, Jihad. You don’t

understand, you don't want to understand, that for those Reverse Crusaders the West is a world to conquer and subjugate to Islam".⁴⁴ In Fallaci's eyes, moreover, the Jihad was not the premise of a fanatical minority and in no way limited to the strategies of terror waged by Al Qaeda and related organisations – it was/is a much more complete and pervasive force that had/has as its prime object "the conquest of the West". Across the world, she argued,

the hate for the West swells like a fire fed by the wind. And the followers of Islamic Fundamentalism multiply like protozoa of a cell which splits to become two cells then four, then eight then sixteen then thirty-two to infinity. ... Extremist fringes?!? Fanatical minorities?!? They are millions and millions, the extremists. They are millions and millions, the fanatics.⁴⁵

A brief contextualisation of Fallaci's impact is perhaps in order for although her comments – in particular, her characterisation of Islam and what she termed the Islamic 'Reverse Crusade' – provoked outrage across Europe and the Arab world, she is certainly not as prominent as Samuel Huntington (who, I believe, needs no introduction to the readers of this journal). *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio* was boycotted in France and the author declared a *persona non grata* by the French authors and publishers association in the occasion of the Paris Book Fair. Fallaci's arguments met with similar reactions in other countries as well. When Poland's best selling daily newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza* published a translation of her infamous 2001 editorial, it was criticised by the Council for Media Ethics for "diffusing anti-islamic psychosis".⁴⁶ Despite (and perhaps also because of) such reactions, Fallaci's first book sold over one million copies in Italy alone, and topped the best-seller list for several months (surpassing the latest *Harry Potter* and *The Da Vinci Code*). The sequel, *La Forza della Ragione* (dedicated "to the dead of Madrid"), obtained a similar reception, selling 800,000 copies the first month of its publication alone.

The weight of Fallaci's words does not only come, nonetheless, from her celebrity status and the popularity of her books. What has made her arguments all the more potent has been their direct adoption by a number of prominent figures in Italy's governing coalition at the time, and her profiling on a number of media outlets associated with (or directly owned by) then-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi as "the voice of reason", giving voice to "things that many people long thought but never had the courage to say".⁴⁷ Indeed, many of Fallaci's arguments fed into ideas that had been circulating on the Italian Right for several years now, most virulently expressed by the Lega Nord (part of the Centre-Right coalition previously in power) but also by a number of figures directly associated with Berlusconi's Forza Italia party.⁴⁸

Fallaci's characterisation of the 'Holy War' waged by global Islam has focused, in particular, on the idea of the 'Reverse Crusade' – a demographic

invasion of Europe conceived in terms much similar to those adopted by Huntington to warn against the Mexican *Reconquista* of the United States. Her arguments are certainly much more violent and openly racist than Huntington's but, I would suggest, the crux remains much the same. As Huntington argues that Mexican immigration is speculative – driven largely by economic motives and certainly not by immigrants' desire "to become Americans" and, in the long term, aimed at (re)creating a Mexican cultural-political space in the American Southwest, so too Fallaci fundamentally questions the motivations of Islamic migrants to Europe:

In what way do they provide the manual labour that the Italian ex-proletariat does not provide anymore? Loafing around the cities with their 'merchandise', their prostitutes, their drugs? ... If they are as poor as their abettors and protectors claim, who gives them the money to come? Where do they find the five or ten thousand dollars per head that pay for the trip? Might it be that this money is supplied by some Ousama Bin Laden for the mere purpose of establishing the Reverse Crusade's settlements and better organizing Islamic terrorism? Might it be that the five or ten thousand dollars per head are lavished by their wealthy sheiks for the purpose of materializing a conquest that is not only a conquest of souls but also a conquest of territory?⁴⁹

This strategy of conquest is, in Fallaci's words, directly demographic:

They breed. ... Italians don't produce babies anymore, the idiots. For decades they have had and still have the lowest birth-rate in the West. Our 'foreign workers', instead, breed and multiply gloriously. At least half of the Moslem women you see in our streets are pregnant or surrounded by streams of children. Yesterday, in Rome, three of them delivered in public. One in a bus, one in a taxi, one along the street.⁵⁰

Unlike Huntington who uses the 'hard facts' of immigration statistics and fertility rates, Fallaci bases her argument of the hyper-fertile Muslim populations essentially on personal anecdotes such as the one above, or the one recounted in her second book, of a North African "I know of", who lives in Tuscany "with two or three wives and a dozen or so children (the number of children is uncertain because a new one is born constantly. So is the number of wives, because they never go out together and besides the chador also wear the *nikab*, that is the mask that covers the face up to the bridge of the nose, so they all look alike".⁵¹ This rhetorical strategy has not detracted, however, from the strength of her argument. Quite the contrary: many commentators have noted that the popularity of her views has come *precisely* from the fact that she 'tells it like it is' – she 'tells stories people can identify with. Everyone can say: yes, I know of a guy like that too'.⁵² What is more, by personifying her arguments, Fallaci places her comments in a

different rhetorical field from those of “intellectualizing” commentators and academics, those that she discounts as “the chattering cicadas” who simply “refuse to wake up to the evidence” – who, in other words, fail to perceive “reality” properly.⁵³ Fallaci’s arguments are presented as, simply, “common sense”: one of her favourite letters from her readers (cited in the preface to the 2004 book) gushes: “thank you for having helped me understand the things I was thinking without realising I was thinking them”.

Again, as for Huntington, the threat profiled by Fallaci, is to ‘societal security’. Immigration is a question of numbers, certainly, but also of radical difference, radical Otherness that threatens the very survival of Italian and European identity: “a threat I fear more than bubonic plague, more than leprosy, more than nerve gas and even nuclear weapons. A threat that hangs over Europe much more than over America. The one which imperils ... the essence itself of Western culture”.⁵⁴ The Muslim “Reverse Crusade” does not require, she argues, “a modern Ferocious Saladin or some kind of Napoleon to take place. With or without Saladins and Napoleons, it is an irreversible fact”.⁵⁵ It happens day by day – birth by birth. The language of conquest and military occupation marks Fallaci’s comments even more strongly than Huntington’s characterisations: in both books, she recounts stories of the “pioneers who establish their bridgeheads, their settlements in my country”, with “Europe, by now, a province or, better yet, a colony of Islam, and Italy the frontline of that colonization”.⁵⁶ The rhetoric is, moreover, heavily gendered, explicitly evoking the symbolic but also material penetration of the body of the nation – and its defilement. Fallaci writes of “invaders” who, with “the hordes of their relatives – mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins, pregnant wives, and possibly the relatives of their relatives” have already transformed “exquisite cities” like Turin into “filthy Kasbahs” – Turin, “which today does not even look like an Italian city: it looks like an African one. [Or] Genoa, where the wonderful palaces ecstatically admired by Rubens are now inhabited by pitiless vandals and die like beautiful women raped by herds of wild boars”.⁵⁷

And just as certain parts of the American Southwest are being transformed into what Huntington terms “MexAmerica” or “Amexica”, Europe, in Fallaci’s words, is fast becoming “Eurabia” – a continent, a civilisation “lost” to an invading culture: the result, certainly, of the demographic flood, but also – and above all – of Europe’s *own* failings: “a Europe without honour and without intellect, ... without dignity and without courage. A sick Europe, that has sold itself like a prostitute to the sultans and caliphs”.⁵⁸

THE ‘TRAITORS OF THE WEST’

Visions of a foreign demographic threat and the dissolution of national identity such as those profiled above are, as I have already noted, certainly

not new. What is new—and striking—about these ideas profiled above is the articulation of who the *real* ‘enemy’ is; who constitutes the true threat to national integrity and security. Indeed, both Fallaci as well as Huntington direct their most vicious critiques not at the ‘breeding immigrants’ (depicted as almost animal-like in their behaviour, certainly by Fallaci) but, rather, at those who Fallaci refers to as the ‘traitors within’ – the *Western* traitors of the West. Without Western failings, they both argue, the immigrant invasion would be powerless. What are these ‘failings’? And who exactly is to blame?

For Huntington, the “threat to American existence” certainly comes from what he terms the “Hispanization” of American society. But it is also dictated by “the popularity in intellectual and political circles of the doctrines of multiculturalism and diversity, ... the assertion of group identities based on race, ethnicity and gender, and the growing commitment of elites to cosmopolitan and transnational identities”.⁵⁹ It is precisely these “challenges to American Anglo-Protestant culture”, according to Huntington, that have brought about the “crisis of American national identity”.⁶⁰ The shift began in the 1960s, when “powerful movements began to challenge the salience, the substance, and the desirability of this concept of America”, driven by “liberal political beliefs fostered among academics, intellectuals, journalists and others; feelings of sympathy and guilt concerning those who they saw as the victims of exclusion, discrimination and oppression”.⁶¹ By the 1990s, those whom Huntington terms “the deconstructionists” had “won”, with the imposition of measures “consciously designed to weaken America’s cultural and creedal identity and to strengthen racial, ethnic, cultural and other subnational identities”. This transformation was tantamount to a national suicide: “such efforts by a nation’s leaders to deconstruct the nation they governed were, quite possibly, without precedent in human history”.⁶²

If the “cult of multiculturalism” constituted the key challenge to “America’s core culture”, it was, Huntington emphatically affirms, in no way a natural development; it never reflected the “real feelings” of the majority of the American population. Rather, the “doctrine of multiculturalism” was imposed “top-down”, it was “taught”:

Instead of schools giving priority to educating children in the English language and the common American culture, they want teachers, as one of them said, to engage in the ‘transforming of schools into authentic culturally democratic sites’ by giving primary emphasis to the cultures of subnational groups.... Achieving this goal came at the expense of teaching the values and culture that Americans have had in common. The multiculturalists’ teaching manuals ignore the mainstream culture of America because for them there is no such thing ... selections about national symbols and songs are almost nonexistent [and] the emphasis is instead on ethnic and racial groups.⁶³

And “the net effect”, Huntington argues, has been “the disappearing of an American culture as a whole”.⁶⁴

But coupled with a deconstruction of America’s “core culture”, the past decades have also brought, however, an increasing ‘denationalisation’ among America’s cultural, intellectual and business elites and their increasing detachment from the “national project”. Their “global involvements and beliefs” have “eroded their sense of belonging to a national community”.⁶⁵ For this “transnational minority”, American nationalism “has acquired pejorative connotations ... on the assumption that it is wrong to vigorously defend one’s native culture and identity and to maintain their purity against foreign influences”.⁶⁶ The concern voiced by Huntington is not only sociological, however. It is existential: America’s “deconstructionist elites” have, in his words, lost their “soul”. Citing from a poem by Sir Walter Scott, “The Lay of the Last Minstrel”, he warns that that “the number of dead or dying souls is small but growing among America’s business, professional and academic elites. Possessing, in Scott’s words, ‘titles, power, and pelf’, they also have decreasing ties with the American nation”.⁶⁷ For economic and power-political reasons, *but also* driven by “cultural relativism and guilt”, they have “betrayed” the national cause, “abandoning commitment to their nation and their fellow citizens and argue the moral superiority of identifying with humanity at large”.⁶⁸ The elites’ “multiculturalist beliefs” are thus both betrayal – and self-hatred: “multiculturalism is in its essence anti-European civilisation. ... It is basically an anti-Western ideology”.⁶⁹

The solution offered by Huntington to this state of affairs – and, indeed, seen by him as essential to America’s very survival as a nation – is a reaffirmation of the country’s “core values”:

Americans of all races and ethnicities could attempt to reinvigorate their core culture. This would mean a recommitment to America as a deeply religious and primarily Christian country, encompassing several religious minorities, adhering to Anglo-Protestant values, speaking English, maintaining its European cultural heritage, and committed to the principles of the Creed.... In a world in which culture and particularly religion shape the allegiances, the alliances, and the antagonisms of people on every continent, Americans could again find their national identity and their national purpose in their culture and religion.

This, he argues, “is the America I know and love. It is also, as the evidence in these pages demonstrates, the America most Americans love and want”.⁷⁰

Certainly, Huntington’s arguments for the preservation of American identity do not explicitly make recourse to prescriptions regarding population policies and the regulation of reproductive behaviour, (beyond the ‘factual’ comments regarding differential fertility rates between the (Hispanic)

immigrant and white populations and their long-term impact on the demographic survival of the nation). But in his call for a reaffirmation of America's "Christian values", Huntington points to an "American public" increasingly concerned about "evidence of moral decay" in society: the "tolerance of deviant sexual behavior, teenage pregnancy, single parent families, mounting divorce rates, high levels of crime" and the decline of "the traditional family".⁷¹ The implicit suggestion (although Huntington, considering his audience, cannot permit himself to go this far) is that a renewal of the American nation also passes through a renewal of the American family and, particularly, sexual-reproductive mores.

In this sense his arguments echo, once again, prescriptions advanced by the Christian right – where the solutions professed do not only include a reaffirmation of the American national project and its 'core Christian values' (as for Huntington), but a series of other *directly biopolitical measures*: the encouragement of natality policies, the outlawing of abortion and the regimentation of contraception. As I noted in the previous section, Pat Buchanan's arguments bear close similarity to Huntington's: not only in accusing the dangers of an 'immigrant invasion' but also and especially in pointing the finger at the 'traitors within'.⁷² For Buchanan as for Huntington, "a new elite [is] now occupying the commanding heights. Through its capture of the institutions that shape and transmit ideas, opinions, beliefs and values – TV, the arts, entertainment, education – this elite is creating a new people. Not only ethnically and racially, but culturally and morally, we are no longer one people or 'one nation under God'. ... What was right and true yesterday is wrong and false today. What was immoral and shameful – promiscuity, abortion, euthanasia, suicide – has become progressive and praiseworthy".⁷³ But as much as the culture war may have transformed America, and as much as "mass immigration risks the balkanization of America", "a graver, more immediate crisis is at hand. The West is dying. Its nations have ceased to reproduce and their populations have stopped growing and begun to shrink. Not since the Black Death carried off a third of Europe in the fourteenth century has there been a graver threat to the survival of Western civilisation".⁷⁴ This threat, however, is not only due to "something happening in the Third World, but because of what is *not* happening at home and in the homes of the First World."⁷⁵ The West has simply stopped reproducing. Why is this so? "The West is in the grip of a 'culture of death'", Buchanan contends, for "prosperity, comfort, self-indulgence" and "rampant individualism" have changed people's attitudes to the sacrifice required to raise a family:

Only the mass re-conversion of Western women to an idea that they seem to have given up – that the good life lies in bearing and raising children and sending them out into the world to continue the family and nation – can prevent the Death of the West.⁷⁶

Indeed, the refusal of Western women to fulfil their reproductive and family roles also has *geopolitical* consequences: “societies organised to ensure the maximum pleasure, freedom and happiness for all their members are, at the same time, advancing the date of their own funerals. Fate may compensate the Chinese, Islamic, and Latin peoples for their hardships and poverty in this century with the domination of the earth in the next”.⁷⁷ For as the West ‘loses its soul’ (here, too, Buchanan deploys the same metaphor as Huntington), other cultures, other peoples remain firm in theirs – something which gives them strength vis-a-vis the increasingly ‘self-indulgent’ and ‘decadent’ West:

The Islamic world retains something the West has lost: a desire to have children and the will to carry on their civilisation, cultures, families, and faith. ... As the [Islamic] millions pour into Europe from North Africa and the Middle East, they will bring their Arab and Islamic culture, traditions, loyalties and faith, and create replicas of their homelands in the heartland of the West. ... In the nineteenth century, Europe invaded and colonised Africa. In the twenty-first century, Africa invades and colonises Europe.⁷⁸

It is just such arguments that form the basis of Oriana Fallaci’s ‘*j’accuse*’ levelled at Europe and European elites: an accusation based, as for Buchanan and Huntington, within a *double* indictment: in the first instance, a “*blindness*” to *external threats* brought by the diffusion of the ‘doctrines’ of multiculturalism and political correctness but also the *moral-political decay* of Europe and its leaders. From Italy to Britain, Fallaci thunders, “identical [are] the faults, the cowardices, the hypocrisies. Identical the blindness, the deafness, the lack of wisdom, the masochism. ... Identical the ignorance and the lack of leadership that favors the Moslem invasion. Identical the fad of the Politically Correct that encourages it”.⁷⁹

First, Fallaci accuses European politicians of ignoring the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism and thus actively consenting to the ‘Reverse Crusade’: “In Europe, [fundamentalism breeds] thanks to the cynicism or the opportunism or the phony liberalism of the Politically Correct followers who manipulate or deny the evidence. (‘Poor little things, look how pitiful they are when they land here with their hopes’). Poor little things?!? In Europe, the mosques ... literally swarm with terrorists or candidate terrorists.”⁸⁰ This ‘blindness’, to Fallaci’s mind (again, as for Buchanan and Huntington), is the fruit of several decades of ‘indoctrination’ that have produced a generation of

cicadas ... those parasites who have replaced the Gospels and the Marxist ideology with the fad of the Politically Correct. ... The fad or rather the hoax that in the name of Brotherhood [*sic*] preaches pacifism at any cost and repudiates even the war we fought against the Nazifascism

of yesterday. The fad or rather the fraudulent mockery that in the name of Humanitarianism [*sic*] reveres the invaders and slanders the defenders, absolves the delinquents and condemns the victims, weeps for the Taliban and curses the Americans, forgives the Palestinians for every wrong and the Israelis for nothing. The fad or rather the demagoguery that in the name of Equality [*sic*] denies merit and success, value and competition. In denying them it places on the same level a Mozart symphony and a hideousness defined 'rap', a Renaissance palace and a tent in the desert.⁸¹

And the European Union, as the institutional embodiment of many of these ideals of 'Brotherhood' and 'Equality', coupled with its outspoken support for a number of 'Arab causes' (and, in Fallaci's eyes, with its *laissez-faire* approach to immigration) has betrayed Europe and Europe's very identity. The EU "is not Europe. It is the suicide of Europe"; it is

a club that shelters more than fifteen million sons of Allah and God knows how many of their terrorists or candidate terrorists or future terrorists. A club that fornicates like a whore with the Arab countries and fills its pockets with their filthy petrodollars.... A club, moreover, that dares to speak of 'Cultural Similarities with the Middle East'.⁸²

But Europe's faults do not end there. Fallaci's invective, in the second instance, is also directed against that which she perceives as the decay and decadence of European society: its abandonment of the values of courage, valour, *patria*: in her words, of "the balls to defend what is yours", "to become people worthy of respect".⁸³ "Instead of future leaders", she intones, "we have mollusks with expensive blue jeans and phony revolutionaries with ski masks. And do you know what? Maybe this is another reason why our Moslem invaders have such an easy game".⁸⁴ Such 'mollusks, for Fallaci, are the product of the same "sluggish and flabby consumer society softened with its abundance" profiled by Buchanan; a society "that lives in the cult of enjoyment, comfort, pleasure, and by Liberty means Licentiousness. The one that ignores the concept of discipline or better self-discipline and consequently does not connect it with the concept of freedom".⁸⁵ No one – not even the late Pope John Paul II – is spared in the accusation:

With the Sons of Allah ... the war will be very tough. Very long, very difficult, very tough. Unless we Europeans stop shitting in our pants and playing the double-game with the enemy, giving up our dignity. An opinion I respectfully offer to the Pope too. ... You wink at individuals who are worse than Stalin, you flirt with the same ones who still would like to build mosques inside the Vatican? Most Holy Father. ... In all respect, you remind me of the German-Jewish bankers who in the

1930s, hoping to save themselves, lent money to Hitler. And who a few years later ended in his crematory ovens.⁸⁶

Fallaci's evocation of the Jewish 'collaborators' of Fascist Germany is particularly disturbing because many of her comments regarding the disciplining and defense of the body of the nation bear all too many similarities precisely to discourses circulating in 1930s Germany. The accusations of decadence and decay leveled by both Fallaci and Buchanan at Western 'consumer society', a society that has forsaken ideals (and, indeed, the very *biological* reproduction of the nation) for material comforts, are strikingly similar to the accusations leveled at the 'merchant mentality' of inter-war Germany: a mentality marked by that which Werner Sombart denounced as '*Komfortismus*' – "the cowardly bourgeois habit of clinging to life, of not wishing to die for great ideals, of shying away from violent conflict".⁸⁷ What is more, the remedies to such 'decay' prescribed by Fallaci and Buchanan – and, in part, Huntington – also pay unfortunate homage to inter-war imaginaries: the redemption of the national soul through the reaffirmation of 'core values' and an ideological – but also a *spatial and biological* – purification of the body of the nation.

CONCLUSIONS

The real clash of civilisations will not be between the West and one or more of the Rest. It will be between the West and the Post-West within the West itself.⁸⁸

For the extent that many assume that freedom and effective governance depend upon civilizational purity, the very inability to locate clean boundaries around western civilization will support cultural wars of purification within.⁸⁹

We should ask ourselves what is the function of the parable of 'The Death of the West' now being recounted on both sides of the Atlantic. The 'enemy at the gates' may be different, but the stories circulating today in Italy and the United States bear striking similarities, certainly in their geographical imagination of the conflicts to come, but also in the biopolitical solutions advanced as a counter-measure. Indeed, what is most potent about these imaginations is not their attempt at hardening territorial boundaries and protecting the national body against a foreign Other: it is their attempt at disciplining the identity – and the bodies – of the West itself. Samuel Huntington's and Oriana Fallaci's most vicious attacks, after all, are directed not at the 'invaders' but at the 'traitors within' – and the redemption of the national soul that they propose passes not only through a cleansing of

foreign bodies but also, and above all, through a purification of the West. Long-standing nativist anxieties are thus re-focused, re-directed away from an (increasingly spectral, de-territorialised) foreign Other and towards a disciplining of *national* difference; towards protecting the body of the nation from *internal* ‘pollution’, ‘defilement’ and, for Fallaci especially, from the monstrosity of ‘hybridity’.⁹⁰

Many commentators have suggested that the ‘War on Terror’ has also been a war *within* the West.⁹¹ I would argue that this has not only been the case in the broader geopolitical sense usually alluded to (the fact that the War on Terror opened up a new divide within the Euro-Atlantic alliance, for one, or the emergence of competing understandings of international right).⁹² The War has not only evoked new geo-graphs aimed at disciplining alliances and allies in the international arena: it has provided a foil for regulating behaviour and belonging also at home. The two processes are, in many ways, inseparable, as Bill Connolly noted already some time back: “to maintain barricades *around* [the West]”, it is first of all necessary “to obscure and contain pluralities *within*”.⁹³ And just as international politics is being increasingly scripted in the spatial grammar of a millennial struggle between Good and Evil, appeals to redeeming the national ‘soul’ growingly mark political discourse on the home front as well – in both America *and* Europe.

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NOTES

1. See, among others, S. Dalby, ‘Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security and America’s New War’, *Geopolitics* 8/3 (2003) pp. 61–86; D. Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 2004); C. Lutz, ‘Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis’, *American Anthropologist* 104 (2002) pp. 733–735.

2. S. Huntington, *Who Are We? America’s Great Debate* (New York: Free Press 2004).

3. O. Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l’Orgoglio* (Milano: Rizzoli 2001; translated as *The Rage and The Pride*, New York: Rizzoli International 2002); also, *La Forza Della Ragione* (Milano: Rizzoli 2004; translated as *The Force of Reason*, New York: Rizzoli International [forthcoming] 2006).

4. S. Dalby, ‘Geopolitics, Knowledge and Power at the End of the Century’, in G. O’Tuathail, S. Dalby and P. Routledge (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader* (London: Routledge 1998) p. 307.

5. S. Dalby, ‘The Environment as Geopolitical Threat: Reading Robert Kaplan’s ‘Coming Anarchy’, *Ecumene* 3/4 (1996) pp. 472–496; see also D. Sibley, *Geographies of Exclusion* (London: Routledge 1995).

6. G. O'Tuathail, 'Introduction: Part III', in O'Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge (note 4) p. 110; see also M. J. Shapiro, 'Samuel Huntington's Moral Geography', *Theory & Event* 2/4 (1999), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/theory_and_event/v002/2.4shapiro.html; W. E. Connolly, 'The New Cult of Civilizational Superiority', *Theory & Event* 2/4 (1999), available http://muse.jhu.edu/theory_and_event/v002/2.4connolly.html (both accessed 12 January 2006).

7. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72/Summer (1993) pp. 22–49 and the book, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1996).

8. G. O'Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1996) p. 247.

9. Feminist international relations theorists such as Cynthia Enloe have commented at length on the semantic threat posed by the (perceived) inability to set boundaries and contain meaning in the post-Cold War era – see Enloe's *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (London: Pandora 1989); also her *The Morning After: Sexual Politics and the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1993), and the more recent *Manoeuvres: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press 2000).

10. The question of 'domestic economic renewal' was also part of the arguments advanced in those years by Edward Luttwak in his specification of the 'geo-economics' that would purportedly structure international relations after the Cold War, but also present in the pronouncements of more sanguine US commentators such as Pat Buchanan; see Luttwak's *The Endangered American Dream* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1993), and his *Turbo Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy* (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1998); also, P. J. Buchanan, *Right from the Beginning* (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing 1988). Huntington's accusations against multiculturalism were most explicitly made in his 'If Not Civilisations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World', *Foreign Affairs* 72 (November–December 1993); see also the analysis in O'Tuathail (note 8).

11. O'Tuathail (note 8) p. 248.

12. For a discussion of this shift see E. Berselli, *Post-Italiani: Cronache di un paese provvisorio* (Milano: Mondadori 2004); L. Bialasiewicz, 'Geographies of Production and the Contexts of Politics: Dislocation and New Ecologies of Fear in the Veneto *città diffusa*', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 24/1 (2006) pp. 41–67; and P. Rumiz, *La secessione leggera* (Roma: Editori Riuniti 1997), as well as his *È Oriente* (Milano: Feltrinelli 2003).

13. A 'globalism' envisioned both in political-economic terms as the threat of a new colonization of Poland, this time by European (read: German) capital, but also as a cultural-political 'brainwashing' of Polish youth into values 'alien' to the Polish nation: the 'cults' of multiculturalism, feminism, and the promotion of sexual and reproductive rights. See, for example, the arguments made in F. Adwent, *Dlaczego Unia Europejska jest Zguba dla Polski* (Warszawa: Antyk 2002); P. Bryksa, *Wstąpienie do UE? Zagrożenie polityczne dla Polski* (Warszawa: Antyk 2002); M. Dybowski, *Szkic o globalizmie, rewolucji psychopedagogicznej i technikach manipulacji* (Warszawa: Antyk 2003).

14. For a discussion of the role of population policies in sustaining what he terms the "myth of security" of the nation-state, see A. Cavalletti, *La Città Biopolitica* (Milano: Bruno Mondadori 2005), but also G. Agamben, *La Potenza del Pensiero* (Vicenza: Neri Pozza 2005).

15. Huntington, (note 2) pp. 221–278.

16. Fallaci, *La Forza Della Ragione* (note 3) pp. 53–55.

17. G. Grass, *Kopfgelbirten, oder Die Deutschen sterben aus* (Frankfurt: Luchterhand Literatur Verlag 1980).

18. N. Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage 1997) p. 2.

19. J. Sharp, 'Gendering Nationhood: A Feminist Engagement with National Identity', in N. Duncan (ed.), *Body/Space. Destabilising Geographies of Gender and Sexuality* (London: Routledge 1996) p. 100.

20. For an overview, see Sharp (note 19). See also A. McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (London: Routledge 1994) and her edited volume (with A. Mufti and E. Shohat), *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1997). Cynthia Enloe, for one, has argued how prevention of the foreign penetration of the motherland – and women's bodies as symbols of it – has long been at the heart of national-state security – see Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*; also her *The Morning After* (note 9).

21. Yuval-Davis (note 18) p. 22.

22. See C. Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics* (London: Cape 1986), as well as L. Pine, *Nazi Family Policy, 1933–1945* (London: Berg 1997).

23. On the regulation of marriage and reproductive practices by the national state, see J. Stevens, *Reproducing the State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1999).

24. S. Drakulic, 'Women and the New Democracy in the Former Yugoslavia', in N. Funk and M. Mueller (eds.), *Gender Politics and Post-Communism: Reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (London: Routledge 1993) p. 125, as well as her *They Would Never Hurt a Fly* (London: Abacus 2004).

25. See the description in B. Allen, *Rape Warfare: Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1996). See also Drakulic, *They Would Never Hurt a Fly* (note 24), and her *As If I Am Not There: A Novel about the Balkans* (London: Abacus 1999).

26. See, among others, J. N. Pieterse, *White on Black: Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1995); for a discussion of the intersections of imperialism, racial policies and gender politics see also A. L. Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Imperial Rule* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2002) as well as her *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1995).

27. See, among others, L. Back, 'The 'White Negro' Revisited: Race and Masculinities in South London', in A. Cornwall and N. Lindisfarne (eds.), *Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies* (London: Routledge 1994) pp. 172–183; and J. Jacobs, 'Tourist Places and Negotiating Modernity: European Women and Romance Tourism in the Sinai', in C. Minca and T. Oakes (eds.), *Travels in Paradox* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield 2006).

28. K. Anderson, *Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourses in Canada, 1875–1980* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press 1991); see also her 'Engendering Race Research: Unsettling the Self-Other Dichotomy', in N. Duncan (note 19) pp. 197–211.

29. See the overview in P. A. Taguieff, *L'illusion populiste* (Paris: Berg International Editeurs 2002); as well as P.-A. Taguieff and G. Delannoi (eds.), *Nationalismes en perspective* (Paris: Berg International Editeurs 2001). For a discussion of the geographical imaginations that mark contemporary racisms in Europe, see A. Pred's excellent *Even in Sweden: Racisms, Racialized Spaces, and the Popular Geographical Imagination* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2000).

30. See the analysis in N. Canetti, 'Immigrati, ecco la legge xenofoba', *L'Unità* (1 March 2002) p. 13; G. Casadio, 'Immigrati, impronte schedate', *La Repubblica* (30 May 2002) p. 2; P. Colaprico 'Immigrati, patto Bossi-Fini. 'Resta solo chi ha un lavoro'', *La Repubblica* (7 August 2001) p. 8. In Britain, fears about the higher birth rate in minority communities have been translated into rhetorical images of floods and swamps not only by ultra-nationalist leaders like Enoch Powell but also by 'respectable' politicians like Margaret Thatcher – see the comments in L. McDowell, *Gender, Identity and Place. Understanding Feminist Geographies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1999) p. 189.

31. Anderson, 'Engendering Race Research: Unsettling the Self-Other Dichotomy' (note 28) p. 201.

32. P. J. Buchanan, *The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant Invasions Imperil Our Country and Civilisation* (New York: St. Martin's Press 2002).

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 9.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

35. Huntington (note 2) p. 226.

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 224–227.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 241.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 246. See also M. Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983).

40. Huntington (note 2) p. 253.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 180–181. See also O. Waever et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter 1993).

43. Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio/The Rage and The Pride* (note 3) p. 21 (all English citations from *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio* come from Fallaci's own English-language translation of the book published in 2002. The translations of citations from Fallaci's subsequent volume – *La Forza della Ragione* – are my own).

44. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 28–29.

46. The *Gazeta* greeted Fallaci's latest oeuvre with a front-page editorial entitled 'Reason obscured by Rage' (a play on the titles of Fallaci's two books), noting how the author's arguments "can make your hair stand on end – and that is Fallaci's aim. But what makes this book so dangerous, is that to this end the author shamelessly distorts both historical facts as well as recent events" – see M. Jedrysik, 'Rozum w Cieniu Furii', *Gazeta Wyborcza* (11 June 2004) p. 1. For reactions in Britain, see P. Willan, 'Writer Ignites Italian Pride and Prejudice', *The Guardian* (3 October 2001) as well as T. Garton Ash, 'I nuovi fantasmi dell'Europa', *La Repubblica* (1 December 2001) p. 45.

47. The Berlusconi-owned weekly glossy newsmagazine *Panorama* dedicated its cover to Fallaci's 2004 book, declaring her "Italy's greatest living writer".

48. Most prominently, the then-president of the Italian Senate, Marcello Pera (see the interview in L. Contu, 'Pera: 'Attaccano la nostra civiltà, fermiamo i fondamentalismi'', *La Repubblica* (30 August 2004) p. 2). Fallaci's attacks against immigrants and, especially, against the 'cultural relativism' and 'permissiveness' of the Italian Left have also been advanced, in even more extreme fashion, by Forza Italia's online political weekly *Ragionpolitica* (<http://www.ragionpolitica.it>, particularly by the publication's director, Father Gianni Baget Bozzo, also a popular TV commentator).

49. Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio/The Rage and The Pride* (note 3) p. 137.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.

51. Fallaci, *La Forza Della Ragione* (note 3) pp. 55–56.

52. On the rhetorical success of Fallaci's simple prose see, among others, F. Cardini writing in the Catholic daily *L'Avvenire*: 'La Fallaci Bis e già un classico (a modo suo)', *L'Avvenire* (3 April 2004).

53. Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio/The Rage and The Pride* (note 3) p. 84.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 128; Fallaci, *La Forza Della Ragione* (note 3) p. 37.

57. Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio/The Rage and The Pride* (note 3) pp. 36, 135. Much could be said about Fallaci's representation of cities as the sites of (identity but not only) pollution and decay, especially the ways in which such understandings draw upon broader anti-urban ideologies that abhor the city as the site of hybridity and 'rootless cosmopolitanism', that imagine the 'metropolis as a whore', as a den of vice and iniquity – paradoxically enough, representations also present in many of the fundamentalist Islamic ideologies that Fallaci attacks (for a discussion of such understandings, see I. Buruma and A. Margalit, *Occidentalism: A Short History of Anti-Westernism* (London: Atlantic Books 2004); on the urban as a site of danger post 9/11 see, among others, S. Graham, 'Introduction: Cities, Warfare, and States of Emergency' in S. Graham (ed.), *Cities, War and Terrorism* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 2004) pp. 1–25, as well as J. Johnson Jr., 'U.S. Immigration Reform, Homeland Defense and Metropolitan Economies in the Post 9–11 environment', *Urban Geography* 23 (2002) pp. 201–212.

58. Fallaci, *La Forza Della Ragione* (note 3) p. 142.

59. Huntington (note 2) p. xvi.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–19.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 141–144.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 173–175.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 264, 269.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 310.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 264.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 269–270.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 20, xvii.

71. *Ibid.*, pp. 343–344.

72. It is curious to note that both Huntington and Buchanan make recourse to (now) largely forgotten French author Julien Benda and his book *La Trahison des Clercs* to describe the 'cultural traitors' of the American nation.

73. Buchanan (note 32) p. 5.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

78. Ibid., p. 118.

79. Fallaci, *La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio/The Rage and The Pride* (note 3) p. 182.

80. Ibid., p. 33.

81. Ibid., pp. 177–178.

82. This comment refers to a conference organised by the EU under the auspices of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; *ibid.*, pp. 182–183, 185.

83. Ibid., p. 22.

84. A not-so-veiled allusion to the G-8 protesters whom Fallaci has viciously attacked in a number of articles; *ibid.*, pp. 176–177.

85. Ibid., p. 173.

86. Ibid., pp. 81–83.

87. See the discussion in Buruma and Margalit (note 57) pp. 52–54.

88. J. Kurth, 'The American Way of Victory', *National Interest* (Summer 2000) p. 5, cited in Buchanan (note 32) p. 243.

89. Connolly (note 6) p. 4.

90. For a discussion of the ways in which hybridity is presented as 'monstrous' in contemporary understandings of terror and terrorism, see A. Rai, 'Of Monsters: Biopower, Terrorism and Excess in Genealogies of Monstrosity', *Cultural Studies* 18/4 (2004) pp. 538–570. Rai (evoking Jacques Derrida) notes that a 'monster' is precisely "the result of a process of hybridization (even miscegenation) that disrupts proper boundaries, blurring identities through the experience of a certain liminality". For a consideration of some of the historical genealogies of such understandings, see also Buruma and Margalit (note 57).

91. Most prominently, E. Balibar, *L'Europe, L'Amerique, La Guerre* (Paris: Editions La Découverte 2003); J. Habermas, *Der gespaltene Westen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 2004); J. Habermas and J. Derrida, 'L'Europa alla ricerca dell'identità perduta', *La Repubblica* (4 June 2003) pp. 44–45; T. Todorov, *Le Nouveau désordre mondial* (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont 2003).

92. See Habermas (note 91); also, L. Bialasiewicz and S. Elden, 'The New Geopolitics of Division and the Problem of a Kantian Europe', *Review of International Studies* 32/4 (2006, forthcoming); L. Bialasiewicz and C. Minca, 'Old Europe, New Europe: For a Geopolitics of Translation', *Area* 37/4 (2005) pp. 365–372; P. Joenniemi, 'Europe 'New' and 'Old': On the US Power of Altercasting', paper presented at the Pan-European International Relations Conference, The Hague, 9–11 September 2004.

93. Connolly (note 6) p. 3, emphasis in original.