The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

Hissink Muller, B.M.

Citation for published version (APA):
Hissink Muller, B. M. (2013). The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union
In the European Union they use a concept called ‘territorial cohesion’. This book shows that experts do not know what it means either.

In the Treaty of Lisbon ‘territorial cohesion’ is stated as a cohesion objective of the European Union, researchers in the planning community conduct research on territorial cohesion, and some even say that territorial cohesion policy is a form of spatial planning. However, it is not clear what ‘territorial cohesion’ means, what European spatial planning is about, and what should be done with both in government.

In a search for meaning, the research that led to this book undertook a Foucaultian fieldwork in philosophy guided by three broad and fundamental questions: i) what are the concept’s meanings and knowledge? ii) how is it used? and iii) how do these sides relate? The concrete study of rationality and power construction resulted in a discourse analytical output that is meant to evoke value-rational deliberation and action in social and spatial science.
The Place where Streams seek Ground
Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage
of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union
THE PLACE WHERE STREAMS SEEK GROUND
TOWARDS A NEW TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTALITY: THE MEANING AND USAGE OF THE CONCEPT OF TERRITORIAL COHESION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus
prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom
ten overstaan van een door het college
voor promoties ingestelde commissie,
in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel
op vrijdag 13 december 2013, te 10 uur

door

BASTIAAN MATTHIJS HISSINK MULLER

geboren te Amsterdam
Promotiecommissie

Promotor: Prof.dr. W.G.M. Salet

Overige leden: Prof. dr. A.K.F. Faludi
                Prof. dr. em. A.M.J. Kreukels
                Prof. dr. E. Gualini
                Prof. dr. em. L.A. de Klerk
                Prof. dr. E.R. Engelen
                dr. J. de Vries

Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 9

Introduction 11

**Book I The Frameworks** 15

Part I Substantive framework: the concept of territorial cohesion in the institutional framework of the European Union 19

Chapter 1 Territorial cohesion topics in the European Union 21
   1.1 Territorial cohesion on the informal ESDP stage 21
   1.2 Territorial cohesion on the official Treaties stage 22
   1.3 Territorial cohesion on the formal Cohesion Policy stage 23
   1.4 Table of paradoxes 24
   1.5 Conclusion 25

Part II Analytical framework: governmentality 27

Chapter 2 Governmentality analytics 29
   2.1 Power 29
   2.2 Governmentality 33
   2.3 Conclusion 36

Chapter 3 European spatial planning and power performances 37
   3.1 Forms of power performativity in two directions 37
   3.2 Power in European spatial planning per sphere of action 39
   3.3 Conclusion 43

Part III Methodological framework: discourse analysis 45

Chapter 4 Situating discourse analysis 49
   4.1 Placing discourse analysis onto- and epistemologically 49
   4.2 Delineate discourse 54
   4.3 No discourse analysis of spatial reality 57
   4.4 Is this discourse analysis only policy analysis? 59
   4.5 Linking practices and language 61
   4.6 Round-up: from biological to historical metaphors 64

Chapter 5 Mapping meaning 65
   5.1 Language and thought 65
   5.2 The triangle of problematic signification 66
   5.3 Mapping definitions: from meaning to knowledge 68
   5.4 Concluding towards usages 71
Chapter 13 The Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

13.1 Overviewing clear-cut and interweaved promotions in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

13.2 The aggregated settlement of positions for the concept in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

13.3 Territorial cohesion’s influence on the future direction of Regional/Cohesion policy

13.4 The two main conclusions of the concept’s usage in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

Chapter 14 The European Funds usage area

14.1 Overviewing past full and entangled squabbles in the European Funds usage area

14.2 The snarled labyrinth of aggregated positions for the concept’s disputes in the European Funds usage area

14.3 The fuzzy line of in/formality through the European Funds usage area

14.4 The guerrilla of territorial cohesion and expansion in the European Funds usage area

14.5 Territorial cohesion’s fivefold contested channeling of European funds up- and downstream

14.6 The three main conclusions of the concept’s usage in the European Funds usage area

Chapter 15 The whole territorial cohesion usage field

15.1 The overlaps of metanarratives from different usage areas

15.2 The contested “ownness” of territorial cohesion

15.3 The topical order of usage areas for metanarratives

15.4 The territorial cohesion battlefield

15.5 Implications of the concept’s usage in government

15.6 Conclusions on the concept’s usage towards its discourse

Part III Territorial cohesion discourse

Chapter 16 The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

16.1 The framework, the maps, the pointers

16.2 Territorial cohesion’s dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies

16.3 The power and knowledge effects of territorial cohesion

16.4 Conclusions on the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions

Chapter 17 The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

17.1 Territorial cohesion as Discursive Nodal Point of many discourses

17.2 Demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse

17.3 Conclusion on the demarcation and structure of the territorial cohesion discourse

Part IV Conclusion: research output

Chapter 18 Concluding the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion

18.1 The ethereal order of territorial cohesion meanings and knowledges

18.2 The earthly chaos of the concept’s power practices

18.3 The concept’s hermeneutic horizon

18.4 The territorial cohesion discourse as ivory tower

18.5 Critiquing territorial cohesion expertise to create more freedom for thinking (differently)

18.6 A reflective questioning of territorial cohesion

References

Summary

Samenvatting

Appendices: see www.hissinkmuller.nl/bmhissinkmuller/AppendicesPhDThesis.pdf
Acknowledgements

Many people made this PhD-thesis possible. I would like to thank them. First and foremost my supervisor W.G.M. Salet. After he gave me the possibility to do the research, he ensured that I could write my own book within the boundaries of what was practically possible, even though these boundaries extended more than once. I suspect he was not as sure as he would have liked about whether my research would lead to the end result of a PhD eventually, yet, he remained patient to let, in his words, "the chicken breed its egg". Moreover, he even made "bad news" talks pleasant. I always left his room with a smile on my face.

I also thank J.C. Droogleever Fortuijn, not only for hiring me as a lecturer in urban and regional planning, but also for making the decision to give me less teaching hours during the first half year of my position. Otherwise, I would not have finished this thesis within the set time constraints. A significant part of the research for this thesis could not have been conducted if H. Pluckel had not hired me as a trainee at the Regio Randstad Office in the House of The Dutch Provinces in Brussels. Although my research is probably less applicable to planning or lobby practice than some other projects, he let me follow my own path, while merely asking for some presentations of my research for his colleagues in return for all of his connections to people I interviewed, debates about related topics, and advice for wandering about in the "European Union Brussels". I thank him for that. I also thank each of the employees that worked at "the House" those three months, especially for the down to earth insights about the workings of the European Union, and of course I also thank each of the officials, officers, representatives, and administrators I interviewed.

Many others helped me by giving information, intellectual inspiration, or guidance. I therefore thank E. Gualini for giving the research topic of this PhD-thesis to me at the start of my master thesis, T. Richardson for advising me to buy the well-known book he made with O.B. Jensen, B. Waterhout for enthusiastically giving answers to some of my questions and giving documents of his own while leading me to others, and A.F.C.J. van Gestel for his insight into ESPON. I would also like to thank M. Neuman for showing me that a different way of conducting research in this field might be deviant but perhaps better suit strong points and D. Evers for telling me that my main results are not deviant at all. I thank P. Pekelharing for being the supervisor of my master thesis in political and social philosophy. His supervision for that thesis helped me to make this thesis by giving me another perspective on research and by helping me to put the thoughts I have in my mind into words on paper. Also E. van Lieshout gave me another perspective on research. I want to thank him for saying just the rights words to me for me to become better at governing myself in this part of my life. The same holds for E. Warmerdam, who never stopped ridiculing me about my scientific goals by shouting 'defend your territory Bas', while I was sparring for instance, and brought ideas to the fore which solved intellectual problems I had because they were to the point, simple, and the product of an independent way of thinking many territorial cohesion experts could learn from. L. Jongkind also helped me a lot with writing more clearly, I thank her, and W.W.T. Tan showed me that at least in English there is still much room for improvement by editing my Summary. A.P. Blessing did the same by quickly checking these acknowledgements, as did R. Thomas for the back cover, I thank them too. And I of course cannot keep away from thanking A.K.F. Faludi, A.M.J. Kreukels, E. Gualini, L.A. de Klerk, E.R. Engelen, and J. de Vries in advance for going through the many hard to read pages of my book to, hopefully, ask me exciting questions during my PhD-defence.

I would like to thank each of the colleagues inside and outside the University of Amsterdam that made this "PhD-thing" an accompanied, and therefore sometimes even joyous, ride. However, I am quite sure I cannot list them all, not even each of the many roommates I had. My sole excuse for this is that I spent more time than usual to write my PhD. Hence, and I beg your pardon for this, I will not list them to prevent me from forgetting someone. Still, I would like to single out M.C.G te Brömmelstroet and N. Haran. I do not so much thank them for being my paranimfs, but more for bonding with me into a camaraderie of three odd ones out.
I would also like to thank all of my friends and fellow fighters for asking about how my research and writing went, at just the right times – but mostly, for not asking this at the wrong times. Not only because I then needed to not think about it, but mostly because both they and I think we have better things to do. Last but not least I really want to thank my family. I thank my cousin for working his Linux-magic to very quickly put the appendices of this thesis on-line. And I cannot thank my parents and grandfather enough for making it possible to study, advise me, just being there, and to keep believing in my AAA-rating.
Introduction

Personal kick-off

When I introduce myself to students in urban and regional planning or human geography at the University of Amsterdam, I also tell them what my PhD-research is about, but this shortly and simplistically, because most of the times I deem it as pretty irrelevant for the course. Yet, to give them a glimpse of an idea I always do thus: I start by saying that ‘I do research on a concept that is used in the European Union, and this concept is ‘territorial cohesion’, then I wait for a few seconds before I say ‘…and then I always wait until you have a question mark above your heads’ – this does not have to be truthful to (social) reality of course – ‘…but my goal is to show that the experts do not know what it means either’ – after which often smiles follow.

Formal continuation

This book in front of you is written for a degree of Doctor of Philosophy (i.e. PhD) and lays down a thesis on territorial cohesion from the departure-point of spatial planning and European spatial planning in particular – as a thorn in its side that is. As the research for this thesis analyses a concept which is used in the European Union, the main question which guides the endeavour therefore is: what is the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union?

Although this is a broad question indeed, it is a fundamental one which for long remained unanswered too. During the research the question was specified, as it will be for the reader while reading this book too. The
main question for starters implies two subquestions: i) what is the meaning of territorial cohesion and ii) how is the concept used in the European Union? You could see both these questions as attending to the same issue in two different ways, that is, what does territorial cohesion mean in the sense of its definition and what does the concept mean in practice. Furthermore, a third subquestion can be added when you see these ways as two sides of the same coin: iii) how do the concept's meaning and usage relate? This could be seen as a third way to ask what territorial cohesion means, now in the form of what does this meaning and usage of the concept mean? The answer to this third subquestion will be the main outcome of the research and, to get a bit ahead of the matter, revolves around the territorial cohesion discourse.

Before we get to this though, much needs to be done. Namely, how to get a grip on concepts, such as territorial cohesion and perhaps many more, whose meaning is not clear even though experts use them? How for instance to prevent following Don Quichotte (De Cervantes Saavedra, 1605) and polemically "fight windmills"? Fuelled by the academic interest in social science's opaque concepts, this research then conducts a discourse analysis, because it emphasises the tendencies of qualitative research to dig deeper in and give meaning to what happens in social reality and how people think about it (Bryman, 2008: 300, 385-387). This method of analysis therefore suits a research that wants to know what territorial cohesion meaning and usage mean very well.

Yet, when measured against criteria to evaluate social scientific research which appear in Bryman's (2008) manual Social Research Methods, characteristics of discourse analysis could be called "strengths" or "weaknesses". Due to the subjective nature of discourse analysis and the central role interpretation plays during the analysis, it for instance is questionable whether conducting the research again would deliver the same results (Bryman, 2008: 501). In general this research copes with this low reliability by being reflexive and thorough (Bryman, 2008: 31). The 'thick description' this leads to then asks for a clear sectioning of the book that makes it as easy as possible for the reader to follow the argument put forward.

The main sectioning derives from the problem when you see the territorial cohesion discourse as if it were a painting that must be described or even explained in language, that is, where to start? The answer to this question then follows common scientific practice. Before this research's picture of territorial cohesion is drawn, the frame of it is namely unfolded. What leads to the main division of the text in Book II The Analysis and Book I The Frameworks respectively.

The further sectioning within this main division can be laid out below by structuring it according to a methodical logic, that is, by showing how each section has part in the reasoned way in which this research copes with the strengths and weaknesses of discourse analysis. It could for instance suffer from a low ecological validity, because – not an experimental setting, but – its focus on thoughts and the interpretation needed for this could lead to a research on an artefact of the researcher instead of the "real world" (Bryman, 2008: 33, 510). The three parts of Book I cope with this as they together introduce territorial cohesion as research topic by framing it.

Part I then gives the substantive framework about the European Union context and the concept's when-whereabouts to place the research object in its "real world" (Chapter 1). Part II clarifies the analytical framework in the sense of the fundamental posture that underpins the research's analysis of territorial cohesion, what thus explicitly illuminates the roots of any way in which the researcher could have constructed the research object (Chapter 2 and 3). Part III finally explains the methodological framework by stating how this research describes its object (Chapter 4 until 8). Yet, the crux for discourse analysis lies in the reflection on the construction of research objects with scepticism towards any "real world knowledge" in social science (Chapter 4).

Note though, that descriptions of the world become scientific due to their use of methods. Another weakness of using discourse analysis in social science then is almost as problematic as its low reliability, that is, its low replicability. Discourse analysis namely almost always lacks explicit procedures that can be followed (Bryman, 2008: 501). The main way in which the methodological framework brought forward in Part III deals with this is by three in-depth operationalisations of this research's discourse analysis (Chapter 5, 6, and 7), each

*I thank Eric Warmerdam (well-known trainer and owner of Seconds Out Kick&Boxing Gym in Almere) for coming up with this metaphor and the idea it represents.
revolving around one of the subquestions mentioned above. This to show that the research’s interpretations follow a strict frame; another way this research deals with the low replicability is, if not by prescribing procedures for how to interpret text, then by in detail demonstrating the systemic ways in which this research interprets, so that it can at least in principle be done again (Appendix A). Yet, as operationalisation ensures that a research actually measures what it says to measure, it also is the common way to strengthen measurement validity of course (Bryman, 32, 143).

Then again, as pointed out when Book I ends with the aims of this research (Chapter 8), discourse analysis could by typified as a reflection on what is measured and thought to be measured (e.g. by others). In this case Book II showcases such a reflection when it concerns territorial cohesion. It does so with three parts again, this time each takes one of the three operationalised steps of the discourse analysis. Part I treats territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge (Chapter 9 and 10), Part II the usage of the concept in practices (Chapter 11 until 15), Part III the relationship between both in a discourse (Chapter 16 and 17), and Part IV concludes this analysis (Chapter 18). Especially the research done for Part II is carried out very thoroughly to strengthen the reliability, because even though these practices are substantively framed, an extra interpretation was necessary. That is to say, the described usage of the concept is not only an interpretation, just as the description of its meaning and knowledge, but also an interpretation of reconstructed practices instead of these practices themselves (Appendix C until F).

The central role interpretation plays in discourse analysis also weakens this research’s internal validity. This is even the case when you take into account that this research does not aim to find and/or explain causal relationships, the measuring rod for internal validity, but whether its conclusions are correct (Bryman, 2008: 32, 34). These conclusions then mostly hinge on the thoroughness of Parts I and II and reflexiveness of Part III. This division of labour comes from the way in which the three discourse analytical steps are taken. They namely should not be seen as successive steps, but the first two as simultaneous steps after which the third connects them; metaphorically speaking this does not involve a walk, but first a jump forwards with two feet besides each other, followed by a jump upwards in which the feet hit each other. The correctness of the conclusions is thus based on the solidity of the first ‘jump’ and the explicit awareness of the speculative nature of the conclusions in the latter, which are therefore raised as hypotheses only.

Yet, even if the conclusions of this discourse analysis of territorial cohesion are correct, they only hold for the concept. Such a difficulty to generalise beyond territorial cohesion then points to a weakness, that is, a relatively low external validity (Bryman, 2008: 33). This research therefore ends with a call to reflect on its outcomes to understand what this territorial cohesion discourse means (e.g. for researchers). The last section does so by proposing a in qualitative research common way for it: a generalisation moderatum (Bryman, 2008: 392), this by comparing the hypothetical conclusions of this research with cognate theories and fitting them in reflections about the relationship between knowledge and power in our society.
Book I The Frameworks

van Rijn (1661) The conspiracy of Claudius Civilis
Book I  The Frameworks

Introduction

Rembrandt’s (1661) The Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis can be used hyperbolically to signal the way this research is carried out. This representation of how Claudius Civilis’ organises the Batavian rebellion against the Roman Empire then does not have to do justice to what really happened in history, neither does this research then have to be a fan of conspiracies nor to proclaim that the European Union is ruled by one or as a Pax Romana. To boot, this research especially wishes to stay away from its nationalistic meanings as far as possible. The image is used nevertheless, and this to exaggerate the reality of different and uncommon viewpoints, not only Batavian ones against the Roman Empire, but also when it concerns the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union. This research namely plays such a role in that it offers a view from an outside.

Each of the three Parts of this Book I The Frameworks reflects this view from outside. Part I on the substantive framework namely introduces to what this research is an outsider, that is, the concept of territorial cohesion in the institutional framework of the European Union. Part II on the analytical framework then explains the outsiders’ stance involved with governmentality and Part III on the methodological framework how then to proceed with discourse analysis. It is within these frameworks that the territorial cohesion Geschichte will be drawn (see Book II The Analysis)
Introduction

As the subtitle of this thesis reads, its research is about 'the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union'. However, it is far from clear what territorial cohesion is about. To get an idea of the research object treated in-depth in this book, we should therefore introduce the concept and its European context.

The Europe in which this concept can be placed is not well-known. Perhaps most people, at least those who watch football, identify Europe more with the Champions League anthem than with the European Union anthem (i.e. Schiller's and Beethoven's Ode an die Freude). Yet, the latter organisation has more to do with the "territorial cohesion tune": the European Union is the concept's European context. You might also think territorial cohesion deals with territory, and that the concept then surely refers to the territorial boundaries of this organisation, such as the border controls resulting from the geographical demarcation of the European Union. Then again, territorial cohesion does not have much to do with the experiences lived on the frontiers "where Fortress Europe ends" either (e.g. van der Linde&Segers, 2004: 425). Still, with the European Union as European context and a shying away from geo-political issues, much is open for what territorial cohesion does deal with.
As one of the main tasks of this research is to get a clearer idea of what the case of territorial cohesion is about, we are confronted with a problem: how to clearly introduce a research-object when the whole research is set up for that purpose alone? Part I cuts this “Gordian knot” by providing an initial substantive framework for what will follow. It namely places territorial cohesion topics in the basic institutional framework of the European Union to point the reader to the substance matter spoken of in this thesis.
Chapter 1 Territorial cohesion topics in the European Union

Introduction

This research cannot provide a definition of its research object, as it is set up to deal with the confusion around territorial cohesion of which a multitude of definitions is a part. To "throw a bone" to you as a reader nonetheless, putting together how the Oxford Dictionary defines 'territorial' and 'cohesion' might give a starting point. 'Cohesion': 'the action or fact of forming a united whole', 'territorial': 'relating to the ownership of an area of land or sea.' Hence, the concept is concerned with this forming when related to such ownership. While this might give you an idea, it remains vague.

This research therefore maps the multitude of territorial cohesion meanings on the one hand and the usages of the concept on the other. Especially because of these usages, the basic institutional framework of the European Union is of importance. As Jensen & Richardson (2003: 24) pose for the field of spatial policy, power struggles illustrate the significance of the underlying tensions of this organisation in which the concept will be placed. This chapter therefore sketches the ambiguous emergence of 'territorial cohesion' by going from the particular case towards the more general. It namely introduces the places and times where these words can be read, the topics that the concept deals with, and the scene set by its institutional context. This sequence will be followed more than once, because territorial cohesion seems to have emerged several times. That is, on the stage of the ESDP (§1.1), then the one of Treaties (§1.2), and later on the stage of Cohesion Policy (§1.3).

Already these emergences bring forward divergent views on territorial cohesion qua timing and content and suggest that the differences in the concept’s topics relate to the differences in its institutional context. To counterpose some of the choices involved in this puzzle, a table of paradoxes can be drawn up (§1.4). This helps to conclude on the substantive framework that consists of territorial cohesion and its institutional context (§1.5). It namely shows the reader some difficulties this book has to deal with.

1.1 Territorial cohesion on the informal ESDP stage

1.1.1 A European spatial planning promotion

One could untangle the confusion around territorial cohesion chronologically by beginning from its origin (i.e. Herkunft). Faludi & Waterhout (2002: 57) then say that already throughout the process leading to the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (CEC, 1999a) 'territorial cohesion' was referred to from the start in 1992 on (i.e. during the first held Committee on Spatial Development). However, while the Committee of the Regions called to foster the concept with its opinion on spatial planning in Europe in 1997 (Tatzberger, 2003), shortly thereafter this Committee also linked the concept to the Common Agriculture Policy and, with the European Commission, to intermodality and intermodal freight transport (CoR, 1999a; 1999b). Still, the promotion of territorial cohesion with spatial planning continued. The concept stood central in the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) for instance – financed by the European Commission since 2002, this network of spatial research institutes should define the concept. Besides spatial planning, every time another topic of territorial cohesion appears in the institutions of the European Union though.

Note thereby that the European Commission is a core institution of the European Union, as it can be seen as its executive and civil service. A series of Directorates-General, headed by Commissioners (and their personal Cabinets), make up its bureaucratic structure. Although it is not in the core of the organisation, the Committee of the Regions is a standard European Union institution too. This Committee has a strategic role to play, because it acts as a source of interest-representation and decision-making structure for the wide diversity of regions (Wiehler & Stumm, 1995: 247). Yet, a central feature of the scene of territorial cohesion seems to be the
ESDP process. While the European Commission cooperated in it, this process is outside the formal institutions (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). The informality of this process links the concept to a feature of its institutional context: the infranationalism of the European Union.

1.1.2 A bureaucracy without a centre of power
While the institutions of the European Union work closely together, most lack in-depth expertise in many technical areas, due to small staff sizes,* and their bureaucrats maintain close communication with lobbyists (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 34). Large sectors of the European Union's norm creation are therefore carried out at the level of a "second-order governance". Weiler (1999: 98) calls this 'infranationalism', which consists of "middle-range officials" of the European Union and Member States who work closely with a variety of private and semi-public bodies. According to Jensen&Richardson (2003: 26), this epitomises the 'comitology approach', which involves commissions, directorates, committees, government departments and other related structures (e.g. the Committee on Spatial Development). For the institutional framework of the European Union this then entails: medium-to-low-levels of institutionalisation, a network practice and informal style, a low actor- and event-visibility and process-transparency, and possibly a low procedural and legal guarantee (Weiler, 1999: 284-285; Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 26). Yet, not only its informal bureaucratic ways characterise the European Union organisation, also the absent centre of power does. Hence, according to Nugent (1999: 349), none imposes an ordered pattern on what happens, making its overall policy picture rather ragged and patchy.

1.2 Territorial cohesion on the official Treaties stage

1.2.1 A services promotion
What confuses the situation of territorial cohesion more is that besides its spatial planning topic(s) on the infranational stage, the concept appears differently on an official stage. That is to say, the official acquaintance with the concept was in 1997: territorial cohesion came into a new agreement on competencies for the European Union, under Article 16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, concerning Services of General Economic Interest. This context thus seems to add yet another topic. Moreover, while in 2000 the Council of Europe's European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning promoted 'territorial cohesion' (CEMAT, 2000; Faludi&Waterhout, 2002: 164). No surprise therefore, that in the beginning of the 2000s one could voice that 'territorial cohesion' is not a new concept; as the German heavyweight administrative institution Akademie für Raumforschung und Landesplanung did for example (ARL, 2003). Whether territorial cohesion is the same concept within as outside the official sphere of the European Union is another question though: what may the European Union do when it concerns territorial cohesion? Albeit an awkward situation for territorial cohesion, this seems to align with its institutional framework.

1.2.2 The official European Union organisation
What is now called the 'European Union' was created by intergovernmental agreement between sovereign states in Europe. Besides the already introduced European Commission and Committee of the Regions, this supranational organisation has four other standard institutions. Three of these six form the core: the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. Besides this core, three other official institutions should be mentioned as well: the European Council, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Court of Justice.

The Council of the European Union is the supreme legislative authority. The executives of every Member State meet here (i.e. national ministers depending on the topic), and, as Jensen&Richardson (2003: 33) put forward, if this Council acts as a unified body it can be critical for policy outcomes. While the Council of the

* Apart from the European Council for instance, which draws on civil servants from the member state governments.
Territorial cohesion topics in the European Union

European Union does influence the European Commission, the Commission (mostly) initiates proposals on which this Council acts. The European Parliament is the only legislative institution that is directly elected. This democratic institution has cross-national party groupings, although it is also pressured by local and regional authorities and specialist interest groups (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 35). The European Council is the standard institution where Member States' heads of government and foreign ministers assemble in summit meetings. While this Council has no legislative power, as collective "presidency" it does have a strategic role. The European Court of Justice should be mentioned too, because according to Hooghe & Marks (2001: 26) its innovative and constituting jurisprudence transformed the European Union with a supranational legal order.

At the moment this supranational level, with its three core and other standard institutions, is integrated beyond intergovernmentalism alone. 'Competencies for operating public policies have increasingly been transferred upwards to the level of the European Union by new treaties' (Wessels, 1996: 34), such as the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. However, the European Union is not federal either, but more a 'fusion model' (Wessels & Rometsch, 1996: 27, 36). It namely has features of both, but is neither purely intergovernmental nor purely a federation. Hence, the constant question of who may do what.

1.3 Territorial cohesion on the formal Cohesion Policy stage

1.3.1 A cohesion policy promotion

Without clarity on what its topics are or what the European Union may do with it, many uttering 'territorial cohesion' considered it as a new concept in the beginning of the 2000s. According to Healey (2001a) for instance, the concept was first used in the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a). This report comes from the only Directorate-General of the European Commission that "takes care of the losers": the one making regional policy (Masser, Svidén & Wegener, 1992: 107). And if Waterhout (2003) is right, this was the first time in a European policy context that the concept has been given some substance. This again adds more topics and another institutional context. The context is a formal policy stage: Cohesion Policy. Territorial cohesion would then revolve around cohesion issues, although it is not really clear what this entails. Moreover, to follow Healey (2001a) further, the concept was in the Second Cohesion Report related to the ESDP and issues raised in the Study Programme on European Spatial Planning. This makes the concept even more complex, as its different topics (e.g. services, cohesion) and institutional contexts (e.g. spatial development and regional policy) might relate.

The continual promotion of the concept in examples of the European Union's domestication of what before could have been described as international relations (Hooghe & Marks, 2001: 89) adds to territorial cohesion's complexity. These namely show that an institutional context further removed from the core institutions does not necessarily mean a more marginal topic. In the years around the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a) for instance, the Conference of Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR, 2001; 2002a), the Final Statement of Atlantic Arc Cities, and the position paper of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions all related the concept to economic and social cohesion (Tatzberger, 2003). These are clearly two cohesion issues as territorial cohesion topics. Meanwhile the European Association of Elected Representatives from Mountain Areas, the Conference of Maritime Regions of Europe's Islands Commission, and EUROMONTANA, amongst others, called for the inclusion of the concept in the Constitutional Treaty. And in 2003 'territorial cohesion' appeared centre stage in the draft of this new agreement on Community competencies: in Article I-3 on economic and social cohesion (OJEC, 2004). Hence, the longer you look at the continual promotion of the concept, the more complex both its content and institutional context seems to become.

---

a Treaty reforms such as the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, incremental adaptations using Art. 235 EEC and legal “mutations” by the European Court of Justice (Wessels, 1996).

b Although the European Union and European Community were not exactly the same during the time this research talks about, in this thesis they are used interchangeably, especially when it concerns the European Union/Community level. This because we are only concerned in the first pillar of the European Union (i.e. the Community instead of judicial cooperation or common foreign policy).
1.3.2 From multiple levels and vague boundaries to cascades of interests
We saw that the concept’s context forms its emergences. As Hooghe&Marks (2001: 28) say, the institutional framework of the European Union is not stable and has dispersed competencies, interlocking institutions, and shifting agendas for multiple openings for interests. Besides the abovementioned ‘messy’ and ambiguous vertical fusion of national and European Union competences, the formal stage of Cohesion Policy adds another feature to this: a highly differentiated ‘mixture’ of public instruments located on several levels (Wessels, 1996: 34). Also for this policy Hooghe&Marks (2001: 90) thereby emphasise the subnational and transnational levels, as they have influence too with their informal embassies in Brussels and direct relations to supranational institutions. The promotion of territorial cohesion with economic and social cohesion by particular regional lobbies evidences that. The concept’s European context should thus also be understood as a multi-level institutional structure.

Something else apparent on the Cohesion Policy stage returns in the institutional framework of the European Union as well: the bonding between various territorial cohesion topics and the loose links between these topics and the concept’s places in its context. That is to say, the boundaries between the standard institutions of the European Union are vague. Following Jensen&Richardson (2003: 35), they cannot be seen as homogenous bodies, as different interests are at work within each and between them. This not only holds between the three core institutions and others (e.g. Richardson, 1996), but also within the institutions (e.g. Shore, 2000), between interests operating at the European level (e.g. lobbies) or within each policy area through the levels (e.g. Andersen&Eliassen, 1993; Greenwood&Grote&Ront, 1992; Scott, 1995). Moreover, the European Council, Commission, and Parliament work closely together in a contested lobbying environment (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 34). As no formal inter-institutional space exists where the institutions can engage in debate, decision-making (ultimately) continues through informal processes and political conflict (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 36). What could therefore really characterise the institutional framework of the European Union is that “everything streams” (i.e. παντα ρει). Not only with its fusion model, absent centre, and infranationalism, but also as a “cascades of interests” instead of institutions on one-level. That is, the concept’s context lacks inertia and direction – or better, harbours an overflow of flux and directions (see Chapter 4 of Part III).

1.4 Table of paradoxes

Although territorial cohesion has features in common with its institutional context (e.g. change, many directions/topics, vagueness, complexity), we are foremost concerned with the concept itself. After the introduction of various territorial cohesion emergences, promotions, and topics above, an overview of the substantive problematics of this research might then come in handy. For a concept with many divergences and complexities, a short lay-out of important but seemingly contradictory statements concerning territorial cohesion could do the trick. Some paradoxes (implicitly) uttered above are therefore in random order put in a table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘territorial cohesion’ is a new concept</th>
<th>‘territorial cohesion’ is not a new concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘territorial cohesion’ is cohesion policy</td>
<td>‘territorial cohesion’ is spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘territorial cohesion’ entails a Community competency for Services of General Economic Interest</td>
<td>‘territorial cohesion’ entails more Community competency for Cohesion Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘territorial cohesion’ has been given substance</td>
<td>‘territorial cohesion’ has no definition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notwithstanding its paradoxes, the content of this table does give leads, as it leaves us with many questions. In which ways is territorial cohesion a new concept or not? How does it belong to which in/formal policy? What does it actually mean? That is, just as at the beginning of this chapter, these questions again ask what will be treated below, but now within a substantive framework that offers some guidance.

* Heraclitos (ca. 545-457 BCE) means παντα ρει, ‘everything flows’ or ‘everything streams’ (e.g. Kant, 1987; Lapou, 1966; Nietzsche, 1998; Heidegger&Fink 1994).
1.5 Conclusion

This chapter gave an initial substantive framework to direct the reader towards what this territorial cohesion research is about. However, probably you will not have a clear idea now of what the concept means. Yet, you do know that its substance matter is complex and uncertain and that it was continually promoted nonetheless. The argument here thus runs that this combination gives the more reason to treat territorial cohesion more in-depth, as this research does below.

Some directions for this can be deciphered from the places where 'territorial cohesion' emerged in the institutional framework of the European Union. In this organisation struggles play out in many arenas on different scales and different administrative levels (e.g. Dabinett & Richardson, 1999). The promotion of the concept then occurs in an institutional framework with shifting agendas for multiple openings for interests. That is to say, basically the European Union has six standard institutions: a core made up of a supreme legislative authority in the Council of the European Union, an initiative executive in the European Commission, and a representation of "the people" in the European Parliament, which is completed by the European Council, the Committee of the Regions, and the European Court of Justice. Without mentioning the procedures of these six standard institutions, they themselves already suggest the complex intricacies of decision-making in the European Union. What is more, the institutional framework of this organisation can be characterised as a multi-level structure where heterogeneous institutions cooperate closely, infranationalism and comitology are rampant, and no centre of power imposes an order.

Territorial cohesion can then be traced in an institutional context where "everything flows". The concept emerged infranationally on the ESDP stage early on, then officially on the Treaty stage, and later on the formal stage of Cohesion Policy. With its place being uncertain, the concept's newness is questioned. Something similar could be at work between these places and the concept's multiple contents of spatial development, services, economic and social cohesion issues. That is, the institutional places of the concept's do not seem to determine the territorial cohesion topics. What is more, polarisation can be put besides this uncertainty and complexity, as one can even question whether the concept is defined or not. Still, the shown territorial cohesion topics, the concept's institutional places, and the ensuing problematics give an idea about the research object of this study.

To clarify territorial cohesion though, it is studied through analytical and methodological frameworks, which are expounded first (see Part II and III).
Part II  Analytical framework: governmentality

Introduction

In every research, including this one on the concept of territorial cohesion, the researcher shows himself. His basic attitude comes forward through his look. To preclude the critique that this implicitly affects the research outcomes, one can better be open about it from the start and reflect on its influence at the end. This looking must not be confused with seeing though. It is not the sight by which he for research ‘turns towards beings as “objects” and grasps them’ (i.e. οραν) (Heidegger, 1943: 103, 147). Instead of being about how the researcher sees the world – not even speaking of how he thinks it actually works –, it is about that ‘in which the one who looks shows himself, appears, and “is there”’ (i.e. θεαν) (Heidegger, 1943: 103). Mingling both would lead us into premature theoretical discussions (i.e. from θεαν-οραν to θεορια). In a sense, this looking of the researcher is more in line with paintings of Mondriaan than sur-/realistic portrayals of objects (e.g. Dali, Vermeer) or im-/expressionistic displays (e.g. Monet, van Gogh). That is to say, even though abstract, the researcher’s look is clear, sharp, and organised, as his basic attitude is an analytical stance.

Discussions which might be rampant since the ‘recent breakdown of the foundational assumptions about human action inherited from classical social theory’ (Bernacki, in Adams/Clemens/Lihola 2005: 75). When you understand ‘theory’ as the encountering look, the perceptual relation of man towards Being (Heidegger, 1943: 147), it might become easier to understand why unfounded theories seem to be preferred above none at all – theories namely look to see and see to grasp beings.
Hence, the question of 'What is the analytical stance of this research?' The analytical stance permeating the divisions of this territorial cohesion research is explicated below in its analytical framework and departure-point – the question of how this research conducts its analysis of the concept is answered thereafter in Part III on the methodological framework. The separations in this analytical framework come forth from Foucault. His understanding of power and governmentality analytics in particular forms the discursive context of this research treated in Chapter 2. The departure-point of spatial planning and European spatial planning in particular also forms this context. Note though, that this analytical framework and departure-point seem to bite each other. Friedmann (1998: 249) for instance calls planning’s ambivalence about power its biggest problem (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 353; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, in Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Yet, how better to deal with this tension than through Foucault’s thinking? That is to say, if the spatiality of it cannot only be useful for planning (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, in Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002), but his thinking might even be fuelled by the thought that “[t]he anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space” (Foucault, cited in Massey, 1992: 65). Chapter 3 therefore treats the linkage of governmentality and European spatial planning in power performances. The reader should thereby keep in mind that both these chapters of Part II are part of a sceptic exercise in withholding judgement.
Chapter 2 Governmentality analytics

Introduction

Insofar its analytical framework makes up this research's analytical stance, it revolves around power. This is one of the most controversial concepts (Lukes, 1974: 26; Korpi, 1985: 31) and one of the most difficult to define and impossible to measure terms (Schmitter, in Joerges&Meny&Weiler, 2001). Yet, according to Flyvbjerg (2002: 354), the intellectual tradition strong on issues of power runs from Aristotle via Machiavelli and Nietzsche to Foucault. We follow this path to answer the question of 'What is the analytical framework of this research?'. This starting with a sketch of theories of power with two axes (§2.1.1) to distinguish the clarity and sharpness of Foucault's look (§2.1.2). The understanding of government (§2.2.1) and organisation of governmentality analytics (§2.2.2) this entails follows thereafter. At the end we conclude with how this analytical framework (§2.3.1) suits a research on the concept of territorial cohesion (§2.3.2).

2.1 Power

2.1.1 Power theories in an exercise-possession and capacity-relation cross

Foucault's power look does not exist in a vacuum. Quite the contrary, there are many other understandings of power. Yet, Foucault's thinking differs in essential ways. Because his account could be called "alternative", we will first treat more common theories of power as a contrast to let Foucault stand out more clearly.

Most understandings of power can be categorised roughly with two axes. One axis comes forward in Lukes (1974: 12), who separates these understandings in those that treat the exercise or possession of power. Korpi's (1985: 31, 33) identification of two schools then hints at the other axis, because according to him you either follow the behavioural tradition which looks at the exercise of power or take the alternative path by studying resources or dispositions of power. Instead of leading us to the study of the possession of power, the splitting in two of this "alternative path" directs us to that other axis. Fairclough (2003: 41) namely distinguishes understandings of power in the sense of on what power depends (e.g. resources) or secures outcomes (e.g. dispositions). He thereby implicitly shows the nowadays common division between understandings of power as capacity or relation respectively (e.g. Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 217). The question then becomes to what these exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes lead when it concerns understandings of power.

When both axes are crossed and some theories of power placed within the four compartments, a landscape of understandings of power appears, as shown in the figure below.

---

As far as this power is concerned, it is first necessary to distinguish that which is exerted over things and gives the ability to modify, use, consume, or destroy them -- a power which stems from aptitudes directly inherent in the body or relayed by external instruments. Let us say that here it is the question of "capacity." On the other hand, what characterizes the power we are analyzing is that it brings into play relations between individuals (or groups). The term "power" then designates relationships between parties and by that I am not thinking of a zero-sum game, but simply, and for the moment staying in the most general terms, of an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another" (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 217).

---

29
Understanding power as social hierarchy is for instance clearly relational (e.g. Brown & Gilman, 1960; Fairclough, 2003: 75). When these (hierarchical) relationships are built to influence change as a collective, it can be placed in the relation-possession compartment. Booher & Innes’ (2002; Innes, 2004: 13) ‘network power’ is an example of this (i.e. the glue for collaboration over time). Power understood as capacity on the other hand, comes according to Korpi (1985: 34) from economists, because they often see property (e.g. human capital) as power resource. Co-operation thereby becomes, for instance, an emerging resource for parties to enhance their power over others (Heiskala, 2001: 243). This looks similar as Booher & Innes’ (2002) ‘network power’, but then within the capacity-possession compartment. As with every categorisation, especially rough ones, sometimes it is ambiguous in which compartment a theory fits. One could for instance place Gramsci’s (1971) ‘hegemony’, in which power depends upon achieving acceptance (e.g. through ideology) (Fairclough, 2003: 45), anywhere on the capacity-relation axis. You could namely think of this acceptance as a base of power created by relations. Moreover, some theories do not only “hover” on a single but on both axes. Weber’s (1922/1978: 53) well-known approach to power can for instance exemplify each category. He namely talks about the probability that one actor within a social relationship can carry out his will (even) despite resistance (Korpi, 1985: 31-32, 41n2). But because Weber’s approach is zero-sum (i.e. more power for me is less for you), and therefore distributive, it shows power as capacity to possess as well (Heiskala, 2001: 242-243). What is then the use of this landscape of understandings of power that is categorised by crossing the exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes?

For starters, it gives us an overview from which we can identify the current dominant theories of power, that is, those that adhere to a capacity way of thinking. Power is thereby identified and centralised with a body – mostly the State – in a juridico-econonical and theoretical a-historic or non-historicist manner (Foucault, 2003: 265). This form of power often implies that a body claims power – and related means – that inheres in and lies behind a legal system; when this body is a state: a monopoly of independent territorial power and the means of violence (Dean, 1999: 9). That is, often this capacity is possessed. Another way this domination of capacity-possession understandings of power comes to the fore, is in political economic studies that concentrate on capital (i.e. something owned, wealth, normally summed in units of money). These often point to the capitalist class, such as Olsen & O’Connor (in O’Connor & Olsen, 1998: 6, 22) do, as ‘the most powerful actor in society by virtue of its control over economic resources’ (i.e. the means of production), what relates to ‘the growing asymmetry in power between capital and labour’. The cross of the exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes then allows us to question the dominance of theories of power in the capacity-possession compartment.

* The juridical model of sovereignty is to reflect presupposes that the individual is a subject with natural rights or primitive powers; it sets itself the task of accounting for the ideal genesis of the State, and finally, it makes the law the basic manifestation of power’ (Foucault, 2001: 265).
Governmentality analytics

For instance, what if that juridical system 'is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power [that are employed] on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus' (Foucault, 1980b: 89; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, in Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002)? And what if capital neither is the simple principle with which we can understand our recent history nor has the privilege of materiality, but is theoretically unsatisfactory because it cannot explain realities (e.g. of limitation) (Pasquino, 1978, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 106-107)? Notwithstanding their dominance, the capacity-possession theories would then prevent us to understand today's power due to what they make us see. They could for example presuppose and obscure institutional contexts, overextend the concept of distribution, and reduce justice to distributive justice, just as the distributive paradigm does that Young (1990) tries – not to replace, but – to displace. Obviously, the cross of the exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes also shows alternatives to this dominance, as there are three other compartments. Lukes (1974: 31) for instance holds that studies of power as capacity focus on the 'power to', and therefore ignore the 'power over', that is, 'the fact that it is exercised over people'. One could thus also, opposite from power as possessed capacity, theorise about power exercised in relations.

2.1.2 Foucault's power theory: relational action

It can be said that Foucault takes an alternative path to the dominant power capacity-possession understandings, this on multiple counts. What he does not do, however, is offering a context-free, ahistorical, objective description of power, that is, a theory (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 184). What he does do, is taking a path that combines the two axes opposite to the dominant understandings. Foucault clearly studies how power is exercised in relations.

---

1. It is true that for quite some time our understanding of recent history has been made to turn on the axis of capital and of its correlate, the bourgeoisie, and that the history of knowledge and institutions has begun to be made to revolve around these concepts. People thought they had found a simple, and hence all the more seductive, principle to make sense of and give an explanation for all those great figures of oppression and exalt which have perturbed the surface of our social history for about the past two centuries. A strange paradox: capital, a metaphysical substance, had in addition what was or came to be the privilege of materiality. Everything else was mere shadow-play. For twenty years now this schema has begun to be called in question, as being theoretically unsatisfactory and politically untenable. Theoretically unsatisfactory, in that as soon as it was sought to apply this schema in a detailed analysis, it revealed itself to be false, that is, incapable of accounting for the problems that formed the core of these analyses: consider the realities of the prison or of confinement in general. Politically untenable, because it failed to account for a great number of struggles which, since the sixties at least, have traversed our Western societies. It could only do so at the cost of envisaging an interpretation on them which gradually became intolerable to the very people who were engaged in struggle. Behind the monolithic, uninterrupted and omnipresent genealogy of capital, there appeared the polymorphous universe of what we have since begun to call technologies of power (Pasquino, 1979, in Burchell; Gordon & Miller, 1991: 106-107).

2. In order to make a concrete analysis of power relations, we must abandon the juridical model of sovereignty. Instead, we should be trying to study power not on the basis of the primitive terms of the relationship, but on the basis of the relationship itself, to the extent that it is the relationship itself that determines the elements on which it bears, rather than asking what are the specific characteristics that these or those powers have surrendered in order to let themselves become subjects, we have to look at how relations of subjugation can manufacture subjects. Similarly, rather than looking for the single form or the central point from which all forms of power derive, either by way of consequence or development, we must begin by letting them operate in their multiplicity, their difference, their specificity, and their irreversibility; we must therefore study them as relations of force that intersect, refer to one another, converge, or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another. And, finally, rather than privileging the law as manifestation of power, we would do better to try to identify the different techniques of constraint that it implements" (Foucault, 2003: 265).
This follows from a rather sharp marking. For Foucault (in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 219-220) power does not only exclusively exist when it is put into action, but 'action is the exercise of power' too (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, in Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Yet, as such power is 'integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures' (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 219-220). 'For let us not deceive ourselves; if we speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others' (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 217). The exercise of power thus relates people – reminiscent of Lukes (1974). This in a certain way though: it is 'not simply a relationship between partners, but a way in which certain actions modify others' (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 219-220). That is to say, power does not directly act upon others, because what defines a relationship of power is that it is an action upon an action, 'a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions' (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 220). This simultaneous focus on action and relations comes forward in the example so often used to typify Foucault's work: the Panopticon. This is a design for institutional buildings Foucault (1977) used as a metaphor for the (internalised) disciplining in our societies through observation and normalisation. From the middle of this circular building one could namely oversee the others without them seeing this surveyor, making everyone act (normal) as if they are under constant surveillance. Important from Foucault's work for now though, is that in it he also shows himself through a looking for such relational action.

When you adopt this Foucaultian look, you do not see how power relations are 'reconstituted "above" society' (e.g., as locatable entities), as you understand action in relations, and thus also power, as 'rooted deep in the social nexus' (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 222). Note though, that power itself is thereby neither necessarily a (manifest) conflict, negative sanction (Korpi, 1985: 31), nor a hierarchy, because actions upon actions occur positively in equal and harmonious relationships too (e.g., those of the market place). Yet, insofar (equal) social relations are power relations, they are in that aspect mobile though "nongelegitarian". Such relations are namely integrated in power mechanisms. They thus involve 'the operation of the political technologies throughout the social body', and these are the rituals that set up asymmetries in relations (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 185). Hence, to understand power in its day to day materiality, one should isolate, identify, and analyse the web of nongelegitarian relationships set up by political technologies (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 185).

The contrast between common theories of power and Foucault's thinking then comes forward most clearly when you oppose the dominant understandings and Foucault's power look, as shown in the Table below.

---

Korpi (1985: 31), argues likewise for power resources: 'Conflict, exchange, and exploitation are thus different types of interaction involving the use of power resources. Since exchange forms the very base of economic life in the free-market of capitalist democracies, it is a crucial area for the understanding of the role of power in and thus the nature of these societies.'
To grasp these contrasts in a nutshell: with a Foucaultian look you for instance should not carry out a political analysis of economics (i.e. political economy), but an analysis of the economy of power relations (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 208). The question then becomes what to think of political technologies, or more in general: the organisation of this clearly relational and sharply active look.

2.2 Governmentality

2.2.1 Power-rationality: redefining 'gouvernement' as rational activity

As explained above, the Foucaultian look sees power as relational action in society. Yet, although alternative to the dominant theories of power, this alone does not form an analytical framework. We still do not know how to isolate, identify, and analyse the web of nonegalitarian relationships set up by political technologies. Some separations in this framework need to be organised as well. Foucault (in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 220) initiates this by coining the term 'conduct' (e.g. for behaviour, handling) to understand power relations. As they form actions upon actions, we are concerned with 'the conduct of conduct' – this is how he broadly understands government of self, others, or all (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 220-1; Burchell, in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 19; Dean, 1999: 10; Lemke, 2000: 2-3; MacKinnon, 2000: 295). Here Foucault’s look can be separated from contemporary restricted senses of government as the state or political action proper.

Instead, to follow Dears’s (1999: 209) definition, government is: ‘[a]ny more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.’ An analysis of ‘government’ then concerns itself with many facets, such as the quantitative and qualitative means of calculation, the type of governor and knowledge, the techniques of government, the governed entity and how it is conceived, the ends sought and what all of this leads to. After thus separating many facets of government in the broad sense, the question becomes how to organise them into an analytical framework.

The organisation of government facets in Foucault’s look of power hinges on a power-rationality relationship, the relationship between ‘gouverner’ and ‘mentalité’ that is – something he denotes with the neologism ‘gouvernementalité’ (Gordon, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 7). With this term you can distinguish particular mentalities, arts, and regimes of government and administration (Dean, 1999: 2). Every mentality of government, or governmental rationality, namely involves a ‘calculating pre-occupation with activities directed at shaping, channelling, and guiding the conduct of others’ (Hunt&Wickham, 1994: 26; Raco&Imrie, 2000: 2189). Such ‘rational activities’ therefore include every form of thinking that strives to be relatively clear and systematic about how things are or how they ought to be. That is, how we think about governing, the different mentalities of governments, the representations of bodies of knowledge, and the belief

---

Note that having the form in which people behave as base to understand power relations entails that, as Lukes (1974: 39) already posed, it does not matter whether the exercise of power is conscious or not.

This focus on techniques and know-how can also be found in the problem-solving model of human action as explained by Biernacki (in Adams&Clemens&Shola Orloff, 2005: 86).
and opinion in which we are immersed (Dean, 1999: 16). This emphasis of governmentality on thinking thus fundamentally organizes the Foucaultian analytical framework.

However, this thoughtful look should not lead to theoretical exercises. On the contrary, the idea of mentalities of government emphasises the way in which thought is involved, linked to, and embedded in institutions and practices of government; more precisely: where this thought is collective and relatively taken for granted (Dean, 1999: 16). Yet, you should not forget that one needs to grasp what one governs. Governmentality studies therefore view 'practices of government in their complex and variable relations to the different ways in which 'truth' is produced in social, cultural and political practices' (Dean, 1999: 18). This becomes the more important when 'the activity of governing comes to be called into question, the moments and the situations in which government becomes a problem' (Dean, 1999: 27). Such situations and moments are, according to Dean (1999: 27), the key starting point for an analytics of government that, instead of 'starting from a global theory of the state or of power relations [..]' directs us to examine the different and particular contexts in which such a government is called into question, in which actors and agents of all sorts must pose the question of how to govern. Hence, because governmentality forms an analytical instead of theoretical framework, it allows the researcher to study power practices without a prefigured way of seeing.

### 2.2.2 Foucaultian analytics of government

Although the governmentality framework does not prefigure power relations, it does analyse them in a particular way: through the antagonism of strategies, that is, the goal-oriented rationalities that can be defined by the choice of winning solutions (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 208, 224-225).\(^1\) Because of this, it organizes the government facets mentioned above (i.e. calculation, governor, knowledge, techniques, governed entity, ends, consequences) into an analytical framework in a particular way too – one based upon the governing-mentality duo of course. Their relationship namely returns in both of the two main components of government: the various rationalities that give rise to goals or objectives of governing and the mechanisms or technologies that allow these goals to be put into practice' (Rose & Miller, 1992; Rose, in Barry & Osborne & Rose, 1996: 42, 43; Murdoch, 2000: 505; Uitermark, 2005: 146). The explanation of the role of technologies, programmes, and knowledge in this strategic action of power relations below further places those facets in the Foucaultian analytics of government.

In this analytical framework the facets of techniques and ends come forward in the technological component of government. The reason behind this is that here 'to govern' entails more than simply "to exercise authority". 'It is to believe that government is not only necessary but possible' (Dean, 1999: 33). And if 'government is to achieve ends, or seeks to realize values, it must use technical means. Those technical means are a condition of governing and often impose limits over what it is possible to do' (Dean, 1999: 31). Technologies are not merely techniques to achieve ends though. They entail the ways of thinking about (the usage of) such techniques (i.e. techne-logy). Modern city planning (e.g. with zoning) can be seen as an example of them, the sociological normalisation of the population (e.g. with standard needs) as another (Fischler, 1998: 393, 400, 402). Because such techniques set up nonegalitarian relationships in society (e.g. standard above marginal needs), they are inherently political. Hence, government uses political technologies.

Such a technical treatment of government can therefore also question technologies: to what end? As far as governing is concerned with "making things better", it is irreducibly utopian. A means, then, by which regimes of government might be made intelligible is to isolate their ultimate ends and their utopian goals. This is, if one likes, the telos of government. Every theory or programme of government presupposes an end of this kind (Dean, 1999). Besides ways of thinking about techniques to reach goals, goal giving rationalities thus

---

\(^1\) The word strategy is currently employed in three ways. First, to designate the means employed to attain a certain end; it is a question of rationality functioning to arrive at an objective. Second, to designate the manner in which a partner in a certain game acts with regard to what he thinks should be the action of the others and what he considers the others think to be doing. Third, to designate the procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive the opponent of his means of combat and to reduce him to giving up the struggle; it is a question therefore of the means destined to obtain victory. These three meanings come together in situations of confrontation – war or games – where the objective is to act upon an adversary in such a manner as to render the struggle impossible for him. A strategy is defined by the choice of winning solutions. But it must be borne in mind that this is a very special type of situation and that there are others in which the distinctions between the different sense of the word strategy must be maintained (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982: 224-225).
return here (i.e. the other component of government). That is to say, according to Lemke (2000: 2) it is not even possible to study technologies of power ‘without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them’.

In the governmentality framework, thought is not only involved in giving goals and using techniques to achieve them, as there are also programmes. Programmes are the deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought that endeavour to transform practices (Gordon, 1980; Foucault, 1980, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999: 22). It is here that the government facets of calculation and governed entity come to the fore. The ways in which programmes systematically grasp together the technical achievement of goals (e.g. winning solutions) entails this calculation. These are ‘all the attempts to regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices in the name of a specific set of ends articulated with different degrees of explicitness and cogency’ (Dean, 1999: 32). Regimes of practices thus entail the government facet of governed entity. Following Murdoch (1997: 309), we therefore have to turn to government practices if we want to know how government is thought to be possible.

Note though, that an analytics of government is not concerned with ‘causality’ as it is mostly understood in human, social, political sciences (e.g. Kurki, 2003). It is concerned with ‘conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed’ (Dean, 1999: 21). And insofar the term ‘institutional practices’ denotes the routinised and ritualised ways we do things in certain places and times, regimes of practices are institutional practices – although never identical with a particular institution or system. When government has an intrinsically programmatic character, an analysis of it should therefore attend to ‘all the more or less explicit, purposive attempts to organize and reorganize institutional spaces, their routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of actors in specific ways’ (Dean, 1999: 32; Raco&Imrie, 2000: 2190). The consequences of such programmes on regimes of practices are then another facet the analytics of government can study. With the governmentality framework you namely analyse those programmes that strategically mould practices in which techniques meet goals.’

Regimes of practices cannot only be associated with and become the object of programmes, but depend on forms of knowledge as well (Gordon, 1980; Foucault, 1980, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999: 22). That is to say, forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of government are an explicit mental organisation of practices as governed entity; when knowledge changes due to such activities it falls under the government facet of consequences too of course. We then for instance have to understand ‘how the objects of policy are problematized and rendered amendable to administration via particular forms of expertise and knowledge practices’ (Miller&Rose, 1990; Murdoch, 1997: 310). Examples of this are the ‘forms of individual and collective identity through which governing operates and which specific practices and programmes of government try to form’ (Dean, 1999: 32). An analytics of government therefore sharply separates knowledge of reality as governed entity from the reality a programme wants us to see.

Expertise thus plays a pivotal role in the governmentality framework with its emphasis on rationality. Simply put: ‘experts mediate between the actions of political authorities and the objects – jurisdictions, persons, groups, etc. – that fall under their responsibility’ (Rose, 1993; in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 40, 50; Uitermark, 2005: 146). While the programmes of the reform of conduct are a penetrating feature of the existence of regimes of practices, forms of knowledge define the field of operation and codify what can be known (see Chapter 4 on discourse). They do not only play this role for the constitution of domains as governable and administrable though (Dean, 1999: 29). Knowledge does the same for another government facet: the type of governor. An analytics of government namely also wants to understand ‘how different agents are assembled with specific powers’, or more in general, ‘how different locales are constituted authoritative and powerful’ (Dean, 1999: 29). The analytical distinction between the actual government and the one a programme wants us to see returns here too of course (e.g. as a distinguished identity). Hence, with this Foucaultian analytical framework you can study...
strategies through the programmes that systematise technologies and goals in both the thought of and actual regimes of practices – in one word: governmentalities.

2.3 Conclusion

2.3.1 The analytical framework: governmentality analytics
To answer the question of 'What is the analytical framework of this research?', this chapter expounded this part of the analytical stance of this research on the concept of territorial cohesion. Hereby Foucault’s look of power was adopted as a clear alternative to the dominant capacity-possession theories of power. Yet, instead of offering a theory of the exercise of power in relations, it sharply marks power as an analysable structure of actions upon possible actions. A governmentality analytics then organises the many facets of such webs of nonegalitarian relationships, as shown in the rough organisation of the governmentality framework below.

This mainly entails understanding government broadly and emphasising the relationship between governing and rationality. When you thus leave prefigured ways of seeing power behind, the pivotal role expertise plays in the antagonism of strategies comes forward. This in the systematic thought of government: the political rationalities that give rise to goals and the technologies to reach them. What is more, programmes systematise how these techniques and goals meet to transform regimes of practices that depend on the knowledge arising from and informing government. The knowledge organising government and the governed entity therefore fits in the analytical framework of governmentality as the difference between what actually happens and how we are programmed.

2.3.2 Governmentality, the European Union, and territorial cohesion
Studies of governmentality are characterised by their concreteness (Dean, 1999: 3). They are not theory-based, but problem-centred and present-oriented. Therefore there is not one governmentality paradigm. Besides that such an analytical framework sounds suitting in today’s “theoretical un-/multi-paradigmatic times”, one could argue for its particular usefulness in research on the European Union. Here the activity of (unofficial) government is in flux and problematised most of the time (see §1.3.2 on mvp us). This due to, amongst others, the “newness” of the European Union, its changing policy “patchwork” in integration (Héritier, 1999), and reorientations for an analysis of it as almost permanent process of institutionalisation (Stone Sweet&Sandholtz&Fligstein, 2001), transformation (Cowles&Caporaso&Risse, 2001), or Europeanisation (Featherstone&Radaelli, 2003). And if Faludi (in Faludi, 2007) is right in that much of the discussion on territorial cohesion ‘will depend on the rapidly changing currents of European politics,’ this reasoning for a governmentality framework even goes more for research on this concept.
Chapter 3 European spatial planning and power performances

Introduction

Insofar its departure-point makes up this research’s analytical stance, it revolves around spatial planning, a discursive context formed by more than merely ways of looking (e.g. theories, facts). The question then becomes: ‘How does spatial planning as departure-point align with the analytical framework of governmentality?’ To sketch their linkage this chapter emphasises the difference between programmes and regimes of power practices (§3.1.1) and four of the former that appear in European spatial planning to study the latter (§3.1.2). These are auctoritas, potestas, pecunia, and politique spirituelle. Below each programme is treated separately before they are linked (§3.2). The conclusion then shows how this departure-point fits the analytical framework and how they result in the starting-point for this research (§3.3).

3.1 Forms of power performativity in two directions

3.1.1 An analysis in the plural: programmes and regimes of power practices

Hacker&Pierson (2002: 313) pose ‘that assessments of power need [to] consider multiple mechanisms of influence’. Nothing comes more as a matter of course in this research’s analytical framework, as governmentality studies conduct an analysis in the plural. This because ‘there is already a plurality of regimes of practices in a given territory, each composed from a multiplicity of in principle unlimited and heterogeneous elements bound together by a variety of relations and capable of polymorphous connections with one another’ (Dean, 1999: 27). The question could then become which of all those mechanisms of power to study.

However, before we can answer this question, we need to take a small step back. In the governmentality framework, government is namely conceived as an activity that ‘seeks to reconcile the failures and difficulties of governing’ (Rose&Miller, 1992: 181). It does so by becoming programmatic (e.g. with official documents, committees) to transform practices through calculative and normalising forms of intervention (e.g. rules, norms, processes of authorities) (Raco&Imrie, 2000: 2190). These heterogeneous forms of rule thus (also) take place via discursive and material media (Barnett, 2001: 16; Murdoch, 2003: 51). The language used to express the ways in which power is exercised in the European Union might therefore not so much reflect the actual power practices but their programmes. Hence, the difference between programmes and practices becomes essential when you choose mechanisms of power to study.

In governmentality studies this difference comes forward clearly with the economico-juridical form of power. They see such a way of thinking about power (i.e. what is its origin and source, who holds and possesses it, when is it legitimate) as arising from changes in practices of government rather than the converse: as the reflection of a once dominant set of (monarchical) power relations (Gordon, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 4). That is to say, the economico-juridical form of power is a programme for how to govern some of the contemporary power practices. Governmentality studies on the other hand often emphasise the administrative rationalities in the workings of government (Foucault, 1978, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991). Yet, one does not become unimportant in favour of the other. It just means that one should not reduce the language to show the powers at issue to the language of the making and internal functioning of these governmental apparatus alone (Dean, 1999: 34). Hence, the generalisation to make here, is that a governmentality analytics does not so much study mechanisms of power, but related programmes and regimes of power practices.
3.1.2 Two-directional power performances in European spatial planning: auctoritas, potestas, pecunia, politique spirituelle

As the departure-point of this research’s analytical stance, spatial planning points to related programmes and regimes of power practices to study. In a governmentality framework, spatial planning can namely be considered as a political technology – with goals systematised in programmes for thought of and actual practices (see §2.2.2). As such it has power effects, because ‘[a]ny planning decision is inherently discriminatory’ (e.g. leading to simultaneous ‘expansion’ and ‘exclusion’) (Plotkin, 1987; Janin Rivolin, in Faludi, 2005a: 102). Yet, Massy (1992: 70, 84) has a similar argument with a twist: while spatial organisation might influence how society works and changes, it alters ‘the future course of the histories that have produced it’. Spatial planning thus not only has power effects, but they also affect it.

This two-directional movement is of course a brute simplification of an agonistic reality where both movements might happen simultaneously in a “field of struggle”, influence each other, or can be parts of a strategy or dominant set of power relations (e.g. as tactical means). No wonder, therefore, that Flyvbjerg & Richardson (in Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002: 20) stress that we should look at planning processes and events ‘as the playing out of strategies and conflicts rather than debates or arguments’. The ways in which power effects by and on spatial planning play out is not a (rational) given; perhaps it is because of this that Allmendinger (2001: 130) emphasises institutional contexts as structural for planning in “postmodern times”. We can nonetheless ask which leads this political technology gives to study the involved programmes and regimes of power practices.

As in particular European spatial planning is the departure-point of this research, we can start with the common definition Williams (1996: 7) gave for ‘spatial policy’: ‘any policy which is spatially specific or is in effect spatial in practice, whether or not it is deliberately designed to be, and any policy which is designed to influence land-use decisions, to be integrated with local planning strategies or to be implemented by local and regional authorities as part of their spatial planning responsibilities.’ At least insofar it concerns the European Union we can deduce three points from this. Firstly, spatial planning points to policy programmes, something in line with the emphasis of governmentality on administrative rationalities. Second, as governmentality studies do, spatial planning seems to presume a plurality of regimes of practices in a given territory. Thirdly, there seems to be no clear “official” demarcation of what spatial planning is. Also the latter is in line with a governmentality framework. Due to the absence of a legally legitimised and institutionalised European spatial planning power, Jensen & Richardson (2003: 127) spotlight the performativity of power in it. The difference between programmes and the actual power practices is thus well-known in spatial planning too. Hence, when it concerns the forms of the exercise of power, the actual “power games” around programmes might be the issue for both governmentality and European spatial planning.

A governmentality framework has in itself no prefigured way of seeing power relations. Yet, four common ways (of thinking) in which power comes forward in European spatial planning (e.g. see Jensen & Richardson, 2003) can figure as types of programmes; as long at least one keeps in mind that ‘established ways of thinking and doing are the products of time- and place-specific systems of power-relations, the products of fields of strategic interaction’ (Fischler, 1998: 394). Here these types are labelled as: i) auctoritas, ii) potestas, iii) pecunia, and iv) politique spirituelle, and direct us to spheres of action where those transformations of regimes of power practices occur that this research studies. To characterise the main features of these programme types, also the exercise-possesion and capacity-relation cross of power understandings helps (see Chapter 2), as shown in the table below.

---

3 This spotlight on power in performance as a negative of legally legitimised and institutionalised power should be analytically distinguished from power relations “versus” power-capacity; even if only because power-capacities exist without legitimisation or institutionalisation too.
Auctoritas then exemplifies the possession of a power capacity, as it has much to do with juridical questions such as who “has” power or is the “governor” (e.g. which government level has the power to decide). Potestas relates to this, as it stands for the administrative power of the bureaucracy (e.g. as expressed in policy). No matter whether embodied as belonging to “the governor” or class of mandarins, it shows the exercise of a power capacity. Another way in which conduct can be conducted is through money (e.g. the leverage of spending power) — a power capacity labelled pecunia here to underscore the long-lasting office of this possession. Besides these three capacities, the guidance of the minds of those “playing the game” might also structure possible actions. One can understand this mental politics as exercised in relations, as systematic thought shapes the thinking in the game. Again, both governmentality studies and European spatial planning seem to emphasise such a politique spirituelle nowadays (see §3.2.4). The departure-point of European spatial planning thus points to these four spheres to study power in a Foucaultian way, that is, in the programmes of government and the regimes of actually performed power practices. Below they are treated separately in this order (§3.2.1 to §3.2.4) and linked thereafter (§3.2.5).

3.2 Power in European spatial planning per sphere of action

3.2.1 Auctoritas: “I got the power”

Auctoritas as juridical form of power depends on the law as a medium that stabilises behavioural expectations and constrains defection (e.g. due to sanctions for non-compliance) (Eriksen, in Joerges&Meny&Weiler, 2001). A government institution must thus act in accordance with the legal competencies it has to form a stable state for behaviour. As an economic construction, the European Union can be viewed thus (e.g. as the Single European Market). However, what if it does not have such a clear political identity? Then problems arise when further integration is no longer about perfecting uniform market rules, but about coping with the problems and constraints created in other policy areas due to economic integration (Scharpf, 2001; Biedenkopf&Geremek&Michalski, 2004; Camagni, in Faludi, 2007). For instance, economically wise, the weaker a state’s spatial policy control, the higher its advantage might be in intra-European competition (Ritter, 2003: 9). For the European Union to play a role in solving such issues (it causes), it might need some competency in the affected policy areas. As the European Union does not have a competency for spatial planning, the question becomes whether it will be one of these policy areas.

Besides that the European Commission’s believe in the moral superiority of supranationalism (Shore, 2000) might simply hold for spatial planning too, two other arguments are made in the discursive context of this research. Eser&Konstadakopoulos (2000: 783, 786) hold that we witnessed ‘an incremental extension of the European Union’s competence in the area of spatial planning’, and Jensen&Richardson (2003: 139) that ‘many of the basic elements of European spatial planning are already in place’. Obviously, a spatial planning from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme type</th>
<th>Main features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>auctoritas</td>
<td>juridical, power capacity, possession, governor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potestas</td>
<td>administrative, power capacity, exercised, policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pecunia</td>
<td>financial, power capacity, possession, money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politique spirituelle</td>
<td>mental, relational, exercise, thought</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Auctoritas | juridical power to authorize some other act, in and of itself it has no sense. |
| Potestas | the power to enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine, or judge; a public agency or corporation with administrative powers in a specified field. |
| In French, ‘politics’ and ‘policy’ are translated with the same word, that is, ‘politique’. |
| A Mandarin was a bureaucrat in imperial China. Note though that with potestas this research does not look at individual bureaucrats. An individual administrator assisting in the formulation of a policy, for instance, ‘cannot even comprehend one policy entirely’ (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 160). |
| Pecunia is Latin for ‘money’, derived from ‘pecus’, meaning ‘cattle as wealth’. |
the European Union might conflict with the institutionalised (sub)national planning systems (e.g. concerning landownership, planning control, building regulations) (Williams, 1996). This also leads to a vital dimension of the competency issue: the question of subsidiarity – or better: its infilling (Leitner, 1997: 126; Weiler, 1999; Jensen & Richardson, 2003). This is for instance shown by the European Commission's intervention rationale of Community Benefits (i.e. the added value of its actions) in discussions with Member States who want to hold sole competency for planning (e.g. in the case of national infrastructure projects that are components of Trans-European (Transport) Networks (TEN-(T))) (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 137). What thus clearly comes forward through auctoritas in European spatial planning, is a sphere of action “behind the throne”, a power play performed to transform power relations in spatial planning practices. In a governmentality framework you then only analyse such juridical programmes of competencies in relation with these regimes of practices.

3.2.2 Potestas: power through policy

With potestas as administrative form of power one could think of policies for which the European Union has a competency. An example of this is Cohesion policy, which also contributed to the transformation, or even Europeanisation, of domestic policies (Bachtler & Polverari, in Faludi, 2007). However, Faludi & Waterhout (2002: xi) state that ‘if planning is about strategy, then competency is a non-issue’. When in European spatial planning, potestas might thus be exercised without a competency, the question becomes how this happens.

Tewdwr-Jones & Williams (2001: 40) pose that informality and voluntary co-operation have circumscribed this lack of legal remit for spatial planning powers in the European Union. The informal and voluntary European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) is for instance a framework for co-ordination between Member States and the European Union. According to Jensen & Richardson (2003: 92) it already anticipates a broader European level of planning activity and a cascade of spatial policy making and implementation in the longer term. This shows an administrative rationality in which spatial policy will be implemented in accordance to the ESDP’s shared vision of the European territory (CSD, 1998), one that Jensen (1997) argues is market- and competition-oriented. As such it fits the European Union as a market-oriented integration system. Or, as Giannakourou (1996) poses vice versa, the economic and institutional properties and dilemmas of this European integration process circumscribe the conceptual identity and normative value of European spatial policy. Hence, no matter whether it is an informal potestas that will become formal or not, as sphere of action European spatial policy might already transform the power relations in spatial planning practices. In a governmentality framework one then analyses the administrative programmes of European spatial policy that do this in relation with these regimes of practices.

For European spatial planning the potestas type of programmes do not end with European spatial policy though. As noted above, European spatial planning presumes a plurality of regimes of practices in the sense of policies that are in effect spatial in practice. Because the spatial impacts of many policies might have previously been overlooked in their implementation and evaluation (Davies, 1994), this opens a path to many administrative programmes and regimes of practices. The more so when you account for what the Member States' Ministers responsible for spatial development noted in 2005: ‘EU policies have an impact on territorial developments in two ways: that is, directly (e.g. by providing information, subsidies, restrictions) and indirectly (e.g. by stimulating economic activity, introducing territorial concepts, creating administrative relationships, redrawing mental maps) (EU Council, 2005a: 5). This even shows more than that in a governmentality perspective one can analyse the administrative programmes of the various policies transforming power relations in spatial planning practices. It also brings us to pecunia (e.g. subsidies) and politique spirituelle (e.g. information) as spheres of action in which other programmes and regimes of practices might do the same.

*The principle of subsidiarity currently applied within the EU states that power and authority should be located at the national scale, and that the transfer to the supranational scale should only occur if it seems efficient and necessary (Leitner, 1997: 126).*
3.2.3 Pecunia non olet: cash rules everything around me
With pecunia as financial form of power one can think of a coordination without centralisation in itself: how the provision of grants with conditions can ensure that decisions accord with an agenda (e.g. as the European Union’s regional policy does) (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). As ‘spatial planning is linked to the allocation of structural funds’ (Yeh, in Campbell, 2005: 412), it might go beyond (policy) discussion towards implementation (e.g. of urban projects) (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 37). Financial programmes of European (or other) funding thus direct us to another sphere of action in which transformations of power relations in spatial planning practices are performed.

The little European funding going through Interreg exemplifies the importance of this sphere of action for European spatial planning (Camagni, in Faludi, 2007). Since 1988 Interreg would namely strengthen region-building by means of stronger institutionalised cross-border co-operation (Veggeland, 1996: 78). It thereby forms a framework for regional and urban spatial development in Europe (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 38). Power effects also flow vice versa though. The motives and rationales that drive local and regional authorities in their “bidding for European funds” might namely be spatial planning flavoured (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 182). Especially since Interreg took on the ESDP, European funds can thus secure spatial programmes without the European Union having a competency for spatial planning or an own formulated spatial policy (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 137). Hence, power effects on and by spatial planning practices come forward in European (or other) funding. And in a governmentality framework you also analyse this type of programmes in relationship with the regimes of power practices performed in the sphere of action they point to.

3.2.4 Politique spirituelle: guidance by mind games
Also with politique spirituelle one can think of a coordination without centralisation: how discourses and ideas ensure that decisions accord with an agenda (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). It then does not matter whether this mental form of power comes forward through business lobbying (Hacker & Pierson, 2002: 280, 281), professional reputation (Faludi, 2004d: 163), the usage of results of scientific inquiry in policy (Clarke & Majone, 1985: 16), or political ideas that direct and give meaning to certain capabilities and capacities in political organisations (Olsen, 2002: 926). What does matter is that mental programmes underline the strategic aspect of communication, both in the power over and in it (i.e. who may speak and how and the best argument) (Pellizzoni, 2001: 60-61, 62). Yet, why is this “soft” form of power important enough to direct us to a fourth sphere of action?

In the discursive context of this study as formed by European spatial planning, the strong arguments that appear for this inclusion are about the power effects through spatial planning practices. Spatial planning is according to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 396) for instance less about legislation, prescriptions, or money than the ‘joint struggle for good ideas and better co-operation and communication’ (e.g. to influence sectoral policies on various levels; e.g. see Böhme, 1999). Without cohesive government (i.e. auctoritas, potestas) and fiscal support (i.e. pecunia), there can according to Yeh (in Campbell, 2005: 412) be not much else for European spatial planning but this discussion and facilitation of greater understanding and information exchange. According to Faludi (2002b: 907), European spatial planning will even only become relevant if it is about strategy and new discourses concerning European space. This would make it less surprising if the ESDP indeed mostly worked indirectly by shaping the minds of the players involved in spatial development as Faludi & Waterhout (2002) pose. Hence, if also mental programmes transform power relations in spatial planning practices, one can analyse them and related regimes of practices in a governmentality framework too.

Note though, that from this discursive context already three basically different elements of this type of programmes come forward: frames, representation, and planning concepts. Frames would structure...
Chapter 3

representation, as they provide ‘guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting’ by selecting and organizing a complex reality (Rein & Schön, 1986: 4). What exemplifies this, are presupposed identities and actors, such as European Cities (e.g. Le Gales, 2002), City-Regions (e.g. Salet & Thornley & Kreukels, 2003), or Regions (e.g. Le Gales & Lesquesne, 1998) in international competition (e.g. Newman & Thornley, 1996; Sassen, 2000). The actual representations in spatial planning then often portray partial views of lived spaces in policy making (e.g. with infographics)⁷ (Morely & Robins, 1995; Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 42-43, 216). This already points to what separates planning concepts from frames and representations: they explicitly claim reality by positing priorities and interests (Van Duinen, 2004: 23). That is to say, planning concepts are not only an interpretation of the actual spatial organisation of an area, but also an assessment of its desirability; Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2007) calls these the cognitive and intentional dimensions, amongst others, of planning concepts. Frames, representations, and policy concepts – to generalise beyond planning only – as elements of programmes thus direct us to the different though possibly related practices of framing, representing, and the usage of policy concepts (see Part III on this research’s methodology for more).

For now though, two things stand out: i) the importance of *politique spirituelle* in European spatial planning and ii) the double of it. That is, planning systems might not only be Europeanised subtly through the ways in which planning strategies at national, regional and local levels integrate ‘the ESDP’s language and framing of spatial relations and policy options’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 22). What is more, mental programmes are explicitly for government.⁵ To analyse them in a governmentality framework, you should thus strictly distinguish aspects that appear to be similar: mental programmes and regimes of mental power practices.

### 3.2.5 Linkages between spheres of action

From the programme types of *auctoritas*, *potestas*, *pecunia*, and *politique spirituelle* we are directed to certain actions spheres. Especially the latter comes into view, as the mental type of programmes seem to be a focus of both governmentality and European spatial planning. For each of them holds though, that they seldom float loosely in power relations. Moreover, their programmes and regimes of power practices can interlink in many ways.

In old-fashioned state government *auctoritas* and *potestas* often do so as the authority to make policy and the capacity to administer it. A European Union competency for spatial planning might then, for instance, conflict with the balancing of various separate and potentially exclusive spatial objectives in policy-making at different levels (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Also the link between *potestas* and *pecunia* is clear, because what can be at stake is the way in which policies backed by very large amounts of money will be targeted (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 6). *Politique spirituelle* and *potestas* then interlink when mind games steer a specific policy in a certain direction (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). This works *vice versa* too, as this mental politics can be ‘institutionalized only if it is reproduced by policy-makers’ who conform to or perceive it (Radaelli, 1999: 769). However, even in lieu of central control (e.g. *auctoritas*, *potestas*), *politique spirituelle* and *pecunia* incentives can also coordinate actions together (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). This interlinkage might be very common in European spatial planning, as Jensen & Richardson (2003: 182) say that regional authorities use its language to be seriously considered for Interreg funding. Note though, that in each instance it is not known beforehand which sphere of action’s power practices influence the ones of another (e.g. the making of policy can further the competency for it). The ways in which two, three, or all four spheres of action interlink to transform power practices thus depends on the case studied – *in casu* territorial cohesion.

Still, its separation between governing and rationality might persuade you that a governmentality framework puts up *politique spirituelle* as gluing the other three spheres of action together (e.g. thought interlinks

---

⁷ Infographics “representationally” visualises a territory to guide the viewer and user to see a particular and informative idea about it clearly exposed, that is, the information of the territory goes through a “perspectival” mould for representation (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 216).

⁵ The explicitness of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development when it concerns common issues in co-operative governance for building competitive regions for instance: “Whether it is sought to relate relations between municipalities, relations between the public and private sectors or vertical relations between levels of government, enough time must be allowed to establish shared references, a common ‘language’ and a minimum degree of trust in the undertakings for the different parties” (OECD, 2005: 205: 127).
European spatial planning and power performances

Eising & Kohler-Koch (in Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999: 275, 277) namely do reason that for convergence in the European community’s heterogeneous composition and complex institutional set-up[1], it puts a premium on the ability to provide convincing policy concepts and their interpretation, either for the content of policy or its process. This because they facilitate a platform for or belief in solidarity, reciprocity, and consensus (Faludi, 2002b: 904; Schön, in Campbell, 2005: 396). Griggs & Howard (2002: 106) add the important role for frames to concepts, since problem solving in policy arenas would increasingly take place within ‘policy frames’; these comprise ‘a hierarchy of norms and codes for interpreting problems [and (contradictory) evidence and for] guiding behaviour within the policy process’ (Murdoch, 2003: 50). However, due to their vagueness, normative relevance and prescriptive elements, such “bridging concepts” are often disputed and subject to divergent interpretation (Eising & Kohler-Koch, in Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999: 277; Faludi, 2002b: 904). For this reason they are criticised in academic literature (Kraike, 2001; Copus, 2001; Faludi, 2004e: 393). In a governmentality framework on the other hand, you study these policy concepts and frames as – not what actually happens or true knowledge, but as – elements in another type of programmes. And although mental programmes can be meant to govern practices by gluing spheres of action together (e.g. with multi-interpretable concepts), whether they are glued together thus depends on (the thinking in) the power practices of each sphere on a per case basis.

3.3 Conclusion

3.3.1 The fit between spatial planning and governmentality

To answer the question of ‘How does spatial planning as departure-point align with the analytical framework of governmentality?’, this chapter expounded the analytical stance of this research on the concept of territorial cohesion insofar it is formed by its departure-point. In the analytical framework spatial planning can then be considered as a political technology, and especially European spatial planning fits this governmentality framework. Both namely start from the plurality of regimes of practices in a territory and thereby more emphasise the actual “power games” that are performed than the common ways in which power is expressed. Hereby four types of programmes come forward when you consider European spatial planning processes and events as the playing out of strategies and conflicts: i) auctoritas as in competencies, ii) potestas as in spatial and other policies, iii) pecunia as in funding, and iv) politique spirituelle as in frames, representations, and concepts. The European Union does not have the first form of power, European spatial planning centres around the in/formal second, can be implemented through the third, and the last was and is perhaps the most ajar for it. These expressed forms of power therefore direct us to four spheres of action in which transformations of power relations in spatial planning practices might, might already have, or already happened respectively. They thus help to carve out the research object from the departure-point of this study by organising the data-gathering and -analysis (see Appendix A), particularly when it concerns the usage of the concept of territorial cohesion (see Chapter 6).

3.3.2 Resultant analytical stance as starting-point

While this research considers the concept of territorial cohesion from the departure-point of spatial planning, it always does so in the analytical framework of governmentality. Such an analytical stance entails an analysis in the plural: of juridical, administrative, financial, and mental programmes in relationship with regimes of power practices. Three things thereby make it more complex: i) these programmes point to spheres of action that can interlink in many ways, ii) the involved power practices can be effects on and by spatial planning, and iii) (expert) thought plays both a double role as practice and explicit programme to govern and a pivotal role as connection between government action and the governed entity. Hence, notwithstanding the governmentality
framework and direction from the four expressed forms of power, now new questions rise, methodological ones that is. Part III will therefore deal with the question of how to draw these divisions and relations when it concerns the government and rationality of the concept of territorial cohesion.
Part III Methodological framework: discourse analysis

Introduction

The main question of this research asks: what is the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union? As scientific research cannot answer such a question unmethodically, it needs a methodological framework. This is what this Part of the research’s frame unfolds: discourse analysis and why this method is chosen.

For starters, the concept of territorial cohesion consists of the words 'territorial cohesion' as its signifier and the marked meaning they stand for. As might be common for signs, 'territorial cohesion' seems to be far from meaningless, as it appears to mean too much (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 32). Moreover, analysing the concept and what it means and reporting back what is found might leave us with nothing but text. A situation which starts to look like Tansey’s (1990) portrayal of “there is no outside-text” Derrida (Derrida, 1967: 158) and “literature breaks the relation between sign and meaning” De Man (De Man, 1967, in De Man, 1983: 12, 17), who perform their eternal dance in the infinity formed by the edge on a mountain of words whose top and bottom are not visible. As a consequence, there would be no final ground guaranteeing ‘the ultimate meaning of language’ (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 32).

This research on the concept of territorial cohesion does not concern itself with absolutes such as the Abyss (Χάος/Khaos) and Ground*, but seeks to investigate the contemporary (non-)existing ground for territorial cohesion, even if de/constructed, uncovered by outlining the dance on the territorial cohesion tune. Foucault

* See for example Heidegger (2001).
is welcome here, although he is (by others) related to post-structuralism, which views signs and meaning as inseparable but not united. He criticises Derrida by pointing to a route out of the realm of text. Foucault argues that if a teaching holds that only the text, that is: not the words but their lattice, tells "the meaning of being", its masters would be given 'that unlimited sovereignty that allows it indefinitely to re-say the text' (Foucault, 2006: 573). This does not entail a reference to the real world beyond text(s) as a way out, nor does it offer some ground to stand on for research on the concept of territorial cohesion.

The problems of analysing the concept of territorial cohesion are that many things appear uncertain, complex, and conflicting. How to deal with this? Which method to follow, which process or technical means of collecting and analysing data (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 310)? And which methodology, which coherent set of rules to follow grounded in a specific view on the nature of 'reality' (i.e. ontology) and basis on which knowledge claims are made (i.e. epistemology) (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 310)? Hence, even when absolute Chaos and Ground are not sought for, they come up again in every scientific and/or academic research. A pragmatic way to deal with the methodology of this research is by offering a choice of a strong and a weak version of the argument. In the strong version the shown methodological approaches are posed as the only sound ones for social science due to ontological and epistemological reasons. The weak argument, however, merely suggests that the chosen approaches conveniently suit an investigation of the concept of territorial cohesion as methodological framework. What, then, is the path that should be followed when doing this research goes beyond simply ordering the concept by following when it is mentioned – e.g. how to further analyse the statements on territorial cohesion? To give an idea, the methodological problematic will be introduced in the following paragraphs.

An important and consequential consideration is honesty. In the footsteps of interpretative approaches to human geography, the research does not deal with inert matter as natural science but with 'intersubjective understanding(s) of other people,' who consciously respond to how researchers understand them (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 16). An implication here is that we do not as empiricists, positivists, and critical realists try to do experimental science in search of law but interpret in the search for meaning (Geertz, 1973/1975: 5). This understanding has involved an embrace of qualitative methods, such as discourse analysis (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 22). To prevent cultural and linguistic pitfalls after this scientific turn, practices are considered as more fundamental than theoretical discourses. Although meanings are cultural and communicated linguistically, the 'ways of acting and thinking at once' should thus discipline interpretation (Foucault, in Foucault, 1997b: 463; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 115). A problematic question arises here for the concept of territorial cohesion: what are its practices if there actually are any?

Although discourse analysis can be accused of scepticism, the approach should not be confused with perspectivisms such as 'ontological nihilism' or 'epistemological solipsism': 'The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external of thought, or with the realism-idealism opposition' (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). It does have to do with their specificity as objects being constructed in terms depending on the structuring of a discursive field. 'What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence' (Laclau&Mouffe, 1985: 108). Ergo, 'it is how we attach meaning and significance to things that is discursive, and it seems difficult to imagine how to think, communicate or act without doing this' (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 64). Then again, if discourses are seen to represent aspects of the world – e.g. 'processes, relations and structures of the material world, the 'mental world' of thoughts, feelings, beliefs[,] the social world' (Fairclough, 2003: 123-124) – then an essential acknowledgement for social science hinted at above is that its 'object is a subject' (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 32). This distinction between social reality and actual physical conditions leads to an agnostic attitude of the researcher 'about both the existence of social problems under investigation and the truth of any claims made by informants about them' (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 28).°

° This distinction of objects as objects and subjects as objects makes a common argument made by (critical) realists irrelevant: although when you walk on the street you surely would not ponder about the choice of realism/relativism when a car comes at you, especially when it goes too fast, you will have a hard time to (literally) bump your head against a State or, for that matter, justice, laws, society, money, values, free will, etc.
At first glance though, territorial cohesion and an analysis of the concept do not only have to do with social reality but also with spatial reality. These realities intertwine and affect each other through time, as both the struggle for control over territory and over historical and social meaning form a part of the history made by human beings. According to Said (2003: 331-332) ‘[t]he task for the critical scholar is not to separate one struggle from another, but to connect them, despite the contrast between the overpowering materiality of the former and the apparent otherworldly refinements of the latter’. This materiality does not represent itself, as a spatial entity is ‘represented by means of power relations expressed in strategies, discourses and institutional settings’ (Beauregard, 1995: 60; Richardson & Jensen, 2003). Planning space can therefore be seen as an expression of a “will to order” (e.g. Boyer, 1983; Diken, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Sennett, 1990; Wilson, 1992). Hence, this planning research follows Perry’s (1995: 237) thinking of ‘planning as a spatial and strategic discourse [rather] than as a science or knowledge of space’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). A discourse analytical approach to the developing formation of the concept of territorial cohesion thus becomes challenging, as it does not only interpret texts and the social world, but the tangible objects they refer to and the connections between these three realms as well.

The interrelated problems of this research which has the concept of territorial cohesion as research object have to be treated in this Book I’s Part III about the used methodology. The questions are: i) which practices does the concept have to discipline interpretations in search for meaning, ii) what are the effects if social science’s object is a subject, and iii) how to link text, the social world, and tangible reality? The framework presented to deal with these problems is meant for a discourse analysis of socio-spatial relations and focuses on territorial cohesion from the viewpoint of the emerging European spatial policy field. The methodology is based upon a type of discourse analysis that follows Foucault (e.g. 1969, 1971 in Bouchard, 1977; in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; in Lotringer, 1989, 1990) and can be compared to the approach of Hajer (e.g. 1995; in Faludi & Salet, 2000). It has exemplars in Richardson & Jensen (2003) and Jensen & Richardson (2003) and might add to the recently increasing usage of discourse analysis and constructionist approaches by related research disciplines such as European Integration Studies (Diez, 2001: 5-6) and Urban Studies (Jacobs, 2006: 39). Building hereon, the discourse analytical methods try to reveal ‘how new modes of policy thinking, institutional structures and practices are being constructed, challenging those that have evolved in the different EU member-states [in] a complex milieu of power struggles and contested meanings which extends across Europe and reaches from local to transnational policy arenas’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003: 8). The discourse analytical methodology used will be explained in the forthcoming chapters.

This Part III on the methodological framework of discourse analysis takes five steps, one step per chapter, to further explain what this chosen approach entails for research on the concept of territorial cohesion. It first (Chapter 4) situates the methodology with the general questions of: i) how to place discourse analysis in scientific debates, ii) what is it (i.e. its definition) and what not, iii) for what is discourse analysis used, and iv) what are the possibilities and limitations of the used discourse analysis? In the next three steps this methodology is further operationalised to research territorial cohesion through an analytical separation of its meanings and usages whose related networks form the discourse. That is, by showing how to map the definitions of territorial cohesion in Sinn and Bedeutung (Chapter 5) and in its power practices through Narrative Policy Analysis (Chapter 6), to come up with the rules demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse which relates the concept’s meanings and usages as Discursive Nodal Point (Chapter 7); for the interested reader the actual methods used to do this discourse analysis (e.g. how to analyse and gather information and discipline interpretation) are discussed in Appendix A. The last step taken in Part III’s explanation of the discourse analytical methodology concludes by pointing out the aims of this approach (Chapter 8).

\footnote{For an argument of a revival of strategic spatial planning see Faludi & Salet (2000).}
Chapter 4  Situating discourse analysis

Introduction

An understanding of how this research applies the discourse analytical approach to the developing formation of the concept of territorial cohesion needs a general explanation of its methodology. The chapter below presents such an explanation by first placing discourse analysis in science through the methodology’s onto- and epistemological traces which show the way to an alternative analytical route for what is called ‘social science’ (§4.1). Secondly, what discourse analysis analyses, that is: discourse, will be delineated more precisely by defining it and outlining the interpretative kind of analysis involved (§4.2). Thereafter, however, two peculiarities for how this research uses discourse analysis come up and point to the possibilities and limitations of the methodology. Both have to do with two interrelated problems sketched in the Introduction of this Part III on the methodological framework: the relations between text, the social world, and tangible reality are treated in a section on discourse of – not social, but – spatial reality (§4.3), both in general and for planning, and a section on the similarities of and differences between discourse analysis and policy analysis touches upon the uncertainties around territorial cohesion practices (§4.4). To end this description which situates the discourse analytical approach, the fifth section shows how discourse analysis links practices and language (§4.5) and the sixth rounds up this general explanation with a characterisation of the methodology by using biological and historical metaphors (§4.6).

4.1 Placing discourse analysis onto- and epistemologically

4.1.1 Facts, phenomena, knowledge: science or discourse?

Science may today well be the dominant way to know the existing world, objectively state how the world actually is, and arrive at facts by following certain methodologies. Directly discussing methodology without paying attention to ontology would be inept though, as the appropriateness of a particular set of scientific methods for a research object turns on assumptions about the nature of the ‘reality’ they are meant to discover (e.g. its causal relations). A neglect of ontology might therefore lead to a research field which badly matches its methodology for doing research and its assumptions about the researched object – e.g. the development of one can outrun the other (Hall, in Mahoney&Rueschemeyer, 2003: 373–374, 398). Before the discourse analytical methodology is presented, its ontological assumptions should therefore be brought forward. This is done below by placing discourse analysis in the discussions which go from the assumptions of empiricism/positivism, phenomenology, via the linguistic turn, towards a philosophy of social science.

Empiricist/positivist assumptions can lead to problems because they see the nature of the researched reality basically as an ‘objective one that is “out there” awaiting impartial exploration and discovery’ (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 586–587), and after this folding of onto- and epistemology the step to methodology quickly follows. Such tendencies can have perverse effects in and with social science, the more so if social science models drive the study of organisations (Behling, 1980; Audet&Landry&Déry, 1986). That is to say, if these empiricist/positivist assumptions conceal subjective views or become problematic by acknowledging change. Indeed, with some doubt about the existence of social facts and stability, the study of ‘phenomena such as sensemaking, meaning construction, power, and conflicts becomes very awkward to handle using any immutable objectivist framework’ (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 586–587). Hence, the need for a (constant) revaluation of what reality exists, what knowledge is, and how to link them through research – i.e. properly ground ontology, epistemology, and methodology for research.

* For the field of comparative politics Hall states that the important theories build on ontological views that point to distant events, sequencing, and complex interaction to explain political outcomes while the important methodologies are still based on views which see political phenomena caused by ‘a few powerful factors operating independently of context’ (Hall, in Mahoney&Rueschemeyer, 2003: 398).
When you seek to ground methodology, doubting the existence of facts is something else than doubting their appearance – after all, when you do research you have to have something as research object. Yet, looking at "facts" as (mere) phenomena indicates a phenomenological turn away from (objectivistic) ontologies. The premise of phenomenology is, namely, that reality exists (only) as it is perceived in human consciousness: when we bracket off the actual world and 'try to arrive at something which cannot be so bracketed off,' we shall see that consciousness itself is the one absolute' (Hamlyn, 1987: 321). Phenomenology thus bases the knowledge of phenomena on the subject, something of which Husserl speaks of as the constitution of objectivity through subjective activity: 'It is true that the world transcends and thus is not reducible to the consciousness we have of it, but that is precisely the meaning consciousness bestows on it' (Carr, in Popkin, 1998: 677). For science, which claims objectivism, this would of course be highly problematic, in particular the problem of the subject for the social sciences (see below). And it is phenomenology which is concerned with how the subjective bestowal of meaning occurs.

Phenomenology "mystically" looks away from objects for an epistemological ground and perplexes itself when it stands for the subject, speechless about the appearance of this base as meaning-giver. A way to circumvent this problem is by turning to intersubjectivity. This is what the sociology of knowledge (e.g. of Dewey, Mannheim) seems to do under the guise of materialism. Knowledge is here ‘no longer exclusively a resultant of the thinking individual, [but] both reflective moments (thought and knowledge) are associated with a worldly context which in different theories are elaborated into different concepts of ‘existential determination’ (Seinsverbundenheit)’ (Salet, 1982: 185). Hence, various opposing/overlapping knowledges would hereby be determined by the materiality of social reality. However, although this turns epistemological groundings (partly) away from the subject, does this not strange even science in intersubjectivity – e.g. not a subjective but partialist perspectivism? Namely, if knowledge ‘originates and develops in relation to certain collective experiences, social situations and the specific Weltanschauungen (philosophies of life) which accompany it’ (Salet, 1982: 186), does that not entail that all knowledge goes as long as it is intersubjectively constituted? What is more, the sociology of knowledge does not fold onto- and epistemology as empiricist/positivist approaches do, but hands over the problem of differentiating between the thought and knowledge of the social world and the social world itself. How, then, to prevent that every sociology of knowledge runs in circles: grounding knowledge on the social and understanding how it knows the social through the sociology of knowledge again? The sociology of knowledge thus seems to trap knowledge and social science in a self-referentiality for reflection.

After from ontology passing through phenomenology into the sociology of knowledge in the search for an epistemological ground, Hoggart&Lees&Davies (2002: 163-164) notice a linguistic turn as way out of the sociology of knowledge’s self-referentiality: it would be a system of language which socialises us. The usage of (technical) jargon, for instance, makes one part of a profession, and such a system of language determines which words to utter, when, and how. Particularly interesting herein is that Hoggart&Lees&Davies (2002: 163-164) see academic discourse as authorising and professionalising. The academia is of course no unity and, just as the sociology of knowledge teaches us, the fields herein are made. 'They acquire coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon subject matter. Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined as even its most committed partisans – usually scholars, professors, experts, and the like – claim it is' (Said, 2003: 50). When neither the research object nor the ones who study the field define the subject matter, does a linguistic turn therefore imply that a language system does – i.e. what matter who is speaking (Foucault, 1969, in Bouchard, 1977: 138)? An additional problem to define an academic field of study is that they can change entirely ‘as to make an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost impossible’ (Said, 2003: 50). It thus seems that a linguistic turn would make the sociology of knowledge’s self-referential epistemological ground into a hall of mirrors by adding systems of that which signifies and refers, that is: language (see Chapter 5 on mapping meanings), to the social world and knowledge about it, thereby constantly reflecting research objects and subject-matters of transforming fields of study. However, an awkward point about seeing language as a socialising system herein is, that an analysis of these systems cannot base itself solely on language, as it needs an understanding of the
social as well (how else to know that and how language socialises?). In such a complexly intertwined context Hoggart & Lees & Davies (2002: 163-164) point to discourse analysis as methodology ‘used to investigate how scientific knowledge is socially constructed’ (Lacour & Woolgar, 1979; Demeritt, 1996). Discourse analysis can thus not so much be placed on bedrock onto- and epistemological grounds, but in traces through our thinking that accept the shaky position offered to us by the interrelatedness of social facts, phenomena, and knowledge through language.

Then again, for scientific research such a methodological placing of discourse analysis in the linguistic interrelation of facts, phenomena, and knowledge might be unsatisfactory and especially go too hasty when traced through the sociology of knowledge. Namely, as Sayer (2000: 32) insinuates, one should not substitute ‘the sociology of science for the philosophy of science, and to treat knowledge as a function of power’. The philosophy of science comes up with the names of Popper and Kuhn for the archetypical images of change in science. While Popper (1959/1992) prescribes scientists to seek for falsification instead of verification of their theories to advance through discoveries (i.e. while induction leads to theories through generalisation, one counterexample through deduction is logically decisive), Kuhn’s (1962/1970) scientific revolutions describe how through time scientists merely replace exemplars: one paradigm for another (i.e. incommensurable frameworks follow each other wherein normal science develops towards anomalies). To offer a middle ground between the tensions of pre-/description and scientific advance/paradigms, Lakatos came up with a model which combines Popper and Kuhn by distinguishing hard-core postulates from the auxiliary hypotheses which protect the former against falsification (Lossew, 1993: 202-206). However, this would even make natural science a normative enterprise whereby the canons of particular research programmes judge this differentiation and the success of any explanation (Lakatos, in Hacking, 1981: 117; Emigh, 1997: 659).

Moreover, although such research may well entail both inductive as deductive reasoning, ‘induction alone cannot be used in developing explanations because facts do not exist outside of the framework for analyzing them’ (Emigh, 1997: 660). That is to say, also hard-core postulates are theoretical explanations of facts and thus arrived at with an a priori framework instead of solely having an a posteriori base. Philosophically seen this is not enough for science, especially for the empirical natural sciences – or rather: too much to handle, as this would make science’s epistemological base unscientific (e.g. philosophic). For the social sciences the problematic of explaining reality becomes even more tricky than for the natural sciences due to their – not single (i.e. humans understanding nature), but – double hermeneutic (Giddens, 1987; Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 210): both the researchers’ interpretations and the interpretations of the people whom the researchers study determine ‘what are to be counted as “relevant” facts within a given discipline’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 33). Flyvbjerg shows through Foucault how this double hermeneutic has to do with social science’s research object: subjects. That is to say, humankind herein has the double role of meaning giver (e.g. by deciding on what counts as an object) and objects which are to be given meaning, a double role which ‘drives the study of human activity into an “essential instability”’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 36). All human sciences thus treat as their object (i.e. what is given to representation) that which forms these objects (i.e. what renders representation possible, but is still representation). The human sciences, therefore, do not so much seek to ‘generalize themselves or make themselves more precise as to be constantly demystifying themselves’ (Foucault, 1973: 344, 364) – e.g. representing ever-more mechanisms instead of ever-better theories (Elsör, 1989: 173; Hedström & Swedberg, 1996: 283). Although social science could differ from natural science in that it can be

---

a. Anomaly: when a type of phenomena resists our best attempts to apply our principles of intelligibility (Lossew, 1993).

b. Deduction: ‘approach to science that proceeds from theory formulation to testing empirically’ (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 308).

Falsification: proving a scientific theory is wrong (Lossew, 1993).

Incommensurability: scientific theories are incommensurable if they cannot be compared for knowing which one is more accurate (Lossew, 1993).

Induction: ‘process of research that proceeds from research investigations to theory’ (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 110).

Verification: proving a scientific theory is right (Lossew, 1993).


Read Kant (1781/1998) for starters.
implicated in the construction of practices besides discovering and naming already existing ones, this is thus not, as Sayer (2000: 44) holds, the ‘difference between natural and social science which makes the relativism (rightly or wrongly) associated from Kuhn (1970) different from that associated with Foucault’. The difference between Kuhn’s and Foucault’s relativism is based on the ontological and epistemological difference of the natural and social sciences’ research object, making social science an unstable activity – reminding us of the sociology of knowledge’s self-referentiality. Moreover, associated herewith is that change in social science does not evolve through scientific revolutions but intellectual waves: researchers follow and abandon fashions, but there are no paradigm shifts because no collective accumulation of knowledge took place within the dominant wave (Dreyfus, 1982; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 30). While you could call this situation preparadigmatic (Kuhn, 1962), if the instability of social science is essential, its development will never be paradigmatic. Hence, in line with Popper (1959) who holds that theories are not scientific if they are not falsifiable, Foucault’s question for social science is whether it is reasonable at all to use the label “science” for this kind of activity. Even the expression “body of knowledge” is too pretentious for Foucault’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 30): ‘let us say, to be more neutral still...body of discourse’ (Foucault, 1973: 344).

The reduction of social science to a body of discourse would clearly be crucial for the methodology of discourse analysis and extend its range of application. With such an epistemological grounding it would namely provide a suitting methodology for showing what is purported to be science is not scientific at all and/or based on non-scientific grounds. Discourse analysis would also be useful for analysing activities whose un/scientific and knowledge status is not set (yet), because if social science is just a body of discourse too, you can always apply this methodology, no matter the (eventual) status of the activity. As a consequence of these traces through the philosophy of social science, we can swap the question for discourse analysis which came to us through the sociology of knowledge after the linguistic turn, that is: ‘how is scientific knowledge socially constructed?’, for the one of ‘how is a discourse constructed as “social-scientific”?’. Due to the difference of objects and subjects as research object and a focus on words as signs of what is said some mirrors are taken out of the hall of social science: no facts, no body of knowledge (connaissance), just discourse. Leaving us with the all important question ‘what is discourse?’, treated in section 4.2.1 on its definition, and, in this perspective, the question of ‘what is knowledge?’, touched upon in the section below. Save to say though, the traces of discourse analysis through science still lay bare our shaky research position, whereby the methodology sees discourse as holding social facts, phenomena, and knowledge and the analysis places them between parentheses. What is thus much needed is an analytical route to follow for analysing the later to be defined ‘discourse’.

4.1.2 Alternative analytical route for what is called ‘social science’

To give an analytical route to follow for applying discourse analysis after destabilising the common way of doing research this methodology can first be placed in another path arrived at through juxtaposition. As we saw above, Popper (1959/1992) stands for the importance of the falsification of scientific theory, which puts social science in a difficult position, as philosophically seen it cannot arrive at scientific theories. Nonetheless, the activity of social science often still concerns itself with ‘abstractions, basic principles, theories, and general criteria for the evaluation of existing conditions in society’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125). It is this unreflected ‘will to knowledge’ that Foucault criticises, as it ‘distracts us from the concrete operations of power’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125). To understand power, Foucault sets the task ‘to break with this mode of questioning [and] instead inquire how power actually functions’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125) (see Part II on the analytical framework above for a discussion on governmentality and power). The old term of phronesis can be dug up for this task, leading to a phronetic approach to social science which carries out ‘analyses and interpretations of the status of values and interests in society’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60; also see Owens & Rayner & Bina, 2004; Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). Hereby phronetic researchers ‘see no neutral ground, no “view from nowhere,” for their work’. There is therefore no unified

---

*Phronesis can be characterised as ‘praxis’. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original concept has no analogous contemporary term (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 17). Phronesis goes beyond both analytical and technical knowledge (techné) and involves judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuous social and political actor’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 157).
Situating discourse analysis

"we" when asking and answering the value-rational questions *phronesis* entails: 'Where are we going?', 'Is this desirable?', and 'What should be done?' (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60-61). Even in the attempt to answer the primary and descriptive question, phronetic research always focuses on the actual practical activities and knowledges in everyday situations which constitute a given field of interests (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134). A social science which is carried out phronetically thus offers a methodological path for discourse analysis if it will inquire the values and interests shown in practical activities and knowledges to know how power actually functions.

One of those things that can happen in everyday life is policy making (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). However, the ethical analysis of policy making involved in phronetic research requires an abandoning of many central tenets of positivism, something which could undermine 'the carefully tended technocratic image of the analyst and its comfortable role in the policymaking system (Amy, 1984: 582). Moreover, when the moral underpinnings of policy issues are the focus, these are often linked with larger ideological controversies [which] politicians are even more hesitant to address' (Amy, 1984: 585). A policy analyst on the phronetic path can use discourse analysis, because with the daily activities and knowledges of policy making leading the way this methodology does not need to (beforehand) decide on the status of the knowledge involved (e.g. un/scientific) – although this might form a key outcome (see §4.4 on policy analysis).

Within the phronetic approach discourse analysis seeks to know practices of power and knowledges and thus does not throw away knowledge. Quite the contrary: such research follows Foucault. According to Deleuze (2000: 109), the conversion of phenomenology into epistemology is even his major achievement. After the traces of discourse analysis through social science turned social facts into phenomena, a conversion to knowledge therefore easily follows. Hereby the difference comes forward between *connaissance* as the body of knowledge of a particular discipline and *savoir* as underlying all knowledge at any time. Although even the activity called social science can be understood as a body of discourse instead of *connaissance*, in general seeing and speaking always mean *savoir*. Everything is knowledge, [and] there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge’ (Deleuze, 2000: 109) – there is therefore no need for *a priori* or *a posteriori* discussions of a phenomena-constraining subject. That said, we should know that knowledge is irreducibly double ‘since it involves speaking and seeing, language and light[,] but we do not see what we speak about, nor do we speak about what we see’ (Deleuze, 2000: 109); as a result signs are broken in two: words are signs of what is said and images are signs of what is shown. At first sight this Foucauldian conversion leads to another folding of ontological and epistemology, this time in favour of knowledge over facts, away from empiricist/positivist assumptions. However, Foucault did convert phenomenology and not ontology into epistemology. This research can thus easily pose that it does not question the existence of facts, merely the tangibility of social facts.

But what status does the social world have then? To answer this question discourse analysis can take the cultural turn along with hermeneutics and interpretative human geography ‘fuelled by an ontological understanding of the world as meaningful and therefore textlike, in the sense that its meanings must always be interpreted’ (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 22). It are, then, the sections below which downplay the risk of being accused of with the discourse analytical hammer seeing everything as a discursive nail, as they deal with how this methodology differentiates knowledges, comprehends spatial reality, and links language and practices.

* By *connaissance* I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savoir* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this evocation to be formulated (Foucault, 1972: 156), Baker, 1998: 139).
Yet, the methodology already seems to be appropriate for a research on the concept of territorial cohesion (by a phronetic policy analyst), because discourse analysis can study how the territorial cohesion field gets coherence and integrity and its knowledges and their status are constructed. Hereby it comes up with the framework in which ‘territorial cohesion facts’ exist by, with the recognition of social science’s double hermeneutic, not only acknowledging but also laying bare the essentially instable research position involved. As a phronetic inquiry of the values and interests shown in the practical territorial cohesion activities and knowledges befits (see Chapter 2 on the analytical framework inside which power practices exist), no view from nowhere but a decentered outsider’s perspective on the field of interests is taken to know how power actually functions. In spite of this apparent match between the concept of territorial cohesion as research object and discourse analysis as methodology, a central problem remains: how to define the territorial cohesion field of interests, what are territorial cohesion (policy making) practices? Before treating this problem though (see §4.4 on policy analysis and 4.5 on linking practices and language), it should be clear what a ‘discourse’ is and how to analyse it – perhaps this even gives a perspective for identifying territorial cohesion practices.

4.2 Delineate discourse

4.2.1 Definition of ‘discourse’

If discourse ‘delimits what can be said and what not’ (Wæver, 1997: 5; Diez, 2001: 11), what is it? It is necessary to give a definition which more precisely delineates ‘discourse’ before there can be put forward an interpretative kind of analysis of such a delimiting entity. In the style of the Foucaultian tradition followed in this research discourses refer to systems of knowledge (connaissance) and their associated practices (Barker, 1998: 139-140; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308). These practices are the ensemble ‘through which the world is made meaningful and intelligible to oneself and others’ (Johnston&Gregory&Smith, 1994: 136; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308) – e.g. not the practices to which ‘territorial cohesion’ would refer, but those that give the concept meaning. Meaning-making practices can thus be distinguished from power practices, a separation which opens up the possibility to see how they relate (see section 1.5 on linking practice and language).

However, to be more precise, ‘discourse’ can be used in two ways: as an abstract noun, meaning language and other types of semiosis as elements of social life and, as mostly meant in this research, more concretely as a count noun, meaning particular ways of representing some part of the physical, social, psychological world (Fairclough, 2003: 17, 26). Discourses as systems of knowledge are, namely, ‘frameworks that embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action’ (Johnston&Gregory&Smith, 1994: 136; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308). Moreover, discourses do not only differ in the part of the world they represent, there are also alternative and often competing ones differing in how the same events are represented: how they represent processes and relations, actors, time and place of events, what they ex-/include with which level of abstraction/concreteness (Fairclough, 2003: 17). Discourses are therefore embedded in practices, situated between other discourses, heterogeneous, as they consist of different parts, regulated, as they are a frame, and performative, as they are (partly) a practice themselves (Johnston&Gregory&Smith, 1994; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308).

A common feature of discourse analytical research has been its textual orientation (Richardson&Jensen, 2003). Thereby, for instance, seeking to provide critical scrutiny of texts and utterances of policy makers and other key actors, like much of the discourse-based research in urban policy which draws on Fairclough or Foucault (Jacobs, 2006: 39). Nevertheless, social scientists working in the influential tradition of Foucault generally pay little close attention to the linguistic features of texts (Foucault, 1972; Fairclough, 1992; 2003: 2). But what to look for in texts when you are not that interested in language? Discourse? Also, what to do

---

* The author, for instance, has no ties to the European Union beyond the ones any other citizen of one of its Member States has, nor to any other organisation for that matter, and does not do research for the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON).

* Semiosis: any practice involving signs.
when we can find many different representations of the world in any text, but ‘would not call each separate representation a separate discourse’ (Fairclough, 2003: 124). Discourses as systems of knowledges and their associated practices namely transcend such “concrete and local” representations, and a particular discourse can generate many specific representations (Fairclough, 2003: 124). Hence, to delineate what a discourse is beyond the abovementioned definition, the kind of interpretative analysis involved needs to be considered, especially because such an analysis presents the discourse as its outcome (see the section below).

Still, what follows from above is that discourses can be outlined according to their own features. That is, what makes a discourse coherent is that it forms the ground wherein disagreement can arise (discursively) due to common observations, concepts, theoretical backgrounds, and/or beliefs (Nelson, 1990: 241; Saarikoski, 2002: 8). A discourse’s own features are also pointed at by how it differs from others in degree of repetition, commonality, stability over time, and ‘scale’ (i.e. how much of the world is included) (Fairclough, 2003: 125). Discourses are therefore – not only limited in, but also – different in ‘the range of representations they can generate’ (Fairclough, 2003: 125). Of course, for this research the question discourse analysis tries to answer is what these limiting and differentiating features are for territorial cohesion – i.e. what are the concept's system of knowledge and its associated practices?

4.2.2 Re/Construct: interpretative analysis

The interpretative kind of analysis involved in analysing a system of knowledge and its associated practices (i.e. a discourse) can be characterised as a methodology in the epistemological challenge of social constructionism to positivism. Social constructionism namely challenges the positivistic assumptions that the relationship between ‘knowledge of the nature of the world and its actual nature’ is straightforward and thus unproblematic and that objective, unbiased understanding is possible, as the categories which ‘divided up, describe, and give meaning to the world are socially, culturally and historically contingent’ (Burr, 1995; Hastings, 1996: 193). With a ‘critical stance toward seemingly natural or common sense ‘knowledge’ of the world’ (Hastings, 1996: 192; e.g. see Manning, 1985; Kemeny, 1992) constructionist approaches therefore hold that practices and symbols construct and sustain “social reality” and its issues, problems, and organisations as ostensible pre-existing givens (Berger&Luckmann, 1966; Morgan&Smircich, 1980; Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588). How, then, to reconstruct this construction with research?

With the use of a hermeneutic methodology it is the researcher who can interpret how “social reality” was constructed by recovering the practices and categories which constructed it (Berger&Luckmann, 1967; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 28). However, that hermeneutical approaches can be caught in words might become problematic. That is, when hermeneutics researches how problems are identified and constructed, it does so by accounting ‘for the emergence, organization, and maintenance of claims making activity’, that is, the linguistic categories and rhetorical practices (Burningham&Cooper, 1999: 304; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 29). What is more, when such research follows Geertz’s approach to textual analysis, it digs through layers of meaning to get (to) the underlying message: ‘the system of rules that structure the construction of the text’ (Geertz, 1973/1975; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 156). Such an interpretative search for meaning seems both to go too far and not far enough, as its recognition that people are ‘suspended in webs of signification’ might on the one hand lead to interpretation without end, while, on the other hand, how it does this, that is: by ‘sorting out the structures of signification’, could limit interpretative research to linguistic research (Geertz, 1973/1975: 5, 9; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 156). The possible consequences for hermeneutics increase when the research does not start with activities but the claims making activity instead. Yet, if the goal of interpretative approaches is the generation of descriptions, insights, and explanations of events to reveal the system of interpretations and meaning and the structuring and organising processes (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588), why should interpretation be limited to language?

Discourse analysis is not limited to language, nor does it (beforehand) see language as the determining factor. As method discourse analysis can even be considered a reaction to an overemphasis on language: although also its focus is on talk and texts, they are seen as part of practices (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 28). However, that hermeneutical approaches can be caught in words might become problematic. That is, when hermeneutics researches how problems are identified and constructed, it does so by accounting ‘for the emergence, organization, and maintenance of claims making activity’, that is, the linguistic categories and rhetorical practices (Burningham&Cooper, 1999: 304; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 29). What is more, when such research follows Geertz’s approach to textual analysis, it digs through layers of meaning to get (to) the underlying message: ‘the system of rules that structure the construction of the text’ (Geertz, 1973/1975; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 156). Such an interpretative search for meaning seems both to go too far and not far enough, as its recognition that people are ‘suspended in webs of signification’ might on the one hand lead to interpretation without end, while, on the other hand, how it does this, that is: by ‘sorting out the structures of signification’, could limit interpretative research to linguistic research (Geertz, 1973/1975: 5, 9; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 156). The possible consequences for hermeneutics increase when the research does not start with activities but the claims making activity instead. Yet, if the goal of interpretative approaches is the generation of descriptions, insights, and explanations of events to reveal the system of interpretations and meaning and the structuring and organising processes (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588), why should interpretation be limited to language?
Chapter 4

163). While it sees language – not as reflecting, but – as constructing and organising social reality just as hermeneutics does, it approaches the use of language and strategies of argument as 'forms of discourse that help create and reproduce social meaning' (Tonkiss, 1998b: 246; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 163). Hence, discourse analysts view language – not as the only, but – as one domain in which knowledge of the social world is shaped (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 163). Moreover, if they are 'Foucaultian constructionists', they analyse discourses as level on which language, knowledge, and power are fundamentally interconnected (Foucault, 1997b; Burr, 1995; Hastings, 1996: 192). By differentiating language and knowledge you can distinguish between 'construction' and 'construal', something social constructionists not always do (Fairclough, 2003: 8-9). Although texts construe (e.g. represent, imagine) the social world in ways, these construals neither automatically, regularly, nor single-effectually change its construction, as this depends upon contextual factors (e.g. how the social world already is, different interpretations of the text) (Fairclough&Jessop&Sayer, 2002; Fairclough, 2003: 8-9). Because the discourse analysis of this research is in the style of the Foucaultian tradition, it places language besides knowledge and power (e.g. as helpful) instead of in the centre of attention. However, how to research the relationship between language and the social world if not through straightforward constructionism?

How the discourse analysis used in this research para-doxa-cly differs from more common ways of seeing the social world affects how this methodology analyses it. Perhaps following commons sense, most see social structures and social agents as causal “powers” of events and texts, whereby social agents texture texts by setting up relations between elements of texts (Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000; Fairclough, 2003: 22). Politics, for instance, can then be considered as ‘an arena in which different interest groups seek to establish a particular narrative or version of events as a means to pursue political objectives’ (Jacobs, 2006: 39). However, such a prior objectification of the social world does not suit a Foucaultian methodology, because, as explained above (see §4.1.1 on social science), this approach reduces the most scientific activity to know these “social facts” (i.e. social science) to a body of discourse due to the essential instability of studying humans and the related absence of a collective accumulation of knowledge. This research cannot, therefore, base events and texts on social structures or social agents as facts, because the common categories in use (e.g. government, civil society, capitalist, individual) would thereby obscure an understanding of how power actually functions. On the contrary, subjects, whether categorised as structures or agents, should be seen as a part of the discursive field: ‘Discourse is not a place into which subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions’ (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991). Hence, just as a play creates its stage and actors instead of that a stage and actors create their play, structure and agency are a part of the discourse (e.g. its performance) and do not stand outside of it (e.g. as its origin).6 This discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion therefore does not research how social structures and social agents affect texts on territorial cohesion and related events and vice versa, but how the territorial cohesion discourse interconnects language, knowledge, and power.

Although language, knowledge, and power fundamentally interconnect at the level of discourse, a Foucaultian discourse analysis does not pose that everything solely exists as discourse. On the contrary, it looks at discourses as tactical elements operating in the field of force relations (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 124) (see Chapter 7 on tactical reciprocity). Tactical elements, however, which must be viewed as a series of interrupted segments and whose function in force relations is neither uniform nor stable (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123). The fit of a discourse in a strategy is, namely, neither one-to-one nor fixed beforehand: the same discursive elements can be put into operation in various strategies, ‘[different and even opposing discourses may coexist within the same strategy], so one cannot expect that discourses disclose by themselves what strategy they are part of’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123, 124).7 A research of discourses should thus not divide discourses up according to their strength, acceptance/exclusion, or validity, because, respectively, the same discourse can dominate or be dominated, it is about how discourses operate and seeing them in a tactical and strategic way (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123-124). One should deal with them otherwise: as a multiplicity of discursive elements whose distribution must be reconstructed in a concrete study of rationality and power (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123). For territorial cohesion such

---

6 This idea is rooted in both the intentional search for the origin or the contradictory position which states something as causative.
7 The same holds for the relations of discourses to moral divisions, ideology, and domination (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 124).
a discourse analysis may involve a re/construction of structures as outcomes of rule-based processes that lead to particular interpretations of the concept (Agar, 1986; Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588). What it definitely entails though, is a mapping of the words 'territorial cohesion' as a tactical element in particular force relations.

And so this section delineated discourse analysis by defining discourses as systems of knowledge and their associated practices, which should be analysed as tactical elements in force relations framing particular representations of the (social) world. To identify territorial cohesion’s ground for (discursive) disagreement this research should therefore interpret how language, knowledge, and power – not in themselves or separately, but through interconnection construct the concept by reconstructing the distribution of its discursive elements in a concrete study. Such a methodological approach to discourse leads, then, to a particular way of mapping the field of interests when it concerns the concept of territorial cohesion: territorial cohesion practices can be distinguished in meaning-making and power practices, knowledge shows traces of the former, and with the latter they form a tactical element embedded in particular force relations. However, before this chapter explains the viewpoint taken to see the particular ways in which territorial cohesion knowledges and practices connect (see §4.5 on linking practices and language), it first needs to deal with two distinctive features of the concept: knowledges of territorial cohesion at least partly represent spatial reality instead of or besides social reality (see §4.3 on spatial reality below) and the concept may mostly be embedded in policy-making practices (see §4.4 on discourse and policy analysis).

4.3 No discourse analysis of spatial reality

4.3.1 Physical objects as research object of non-natural sciences

Insofar territorial cohesion has to do with social reality the methodology of discourse analysis suits a research on the concept which reconstructs how interconnections of language, knowledge, and power construct it as a tactical element in force relations. What, however, if territorial cohesion (also) has to do with spatial reality? Neither the double hermeneutic nor the essential instability involved in studying humans complicates research of spatial reality, because it has a fundamentally different status: while the research object of social science is a subject, the one of 'spatial science' is an object. For instance, while discourse constructs the social world, the construction of actual physical conditions needs more; just as the creation of money is less tangible than the creation of gold bars (e.g. Zarlenga, 2002). However, the tangible reality of the natural sciences differs from the spatial reality of, for instance, geography – e.g. studying the molecular composition of bricks or stones requires another approach than studying streets or mountains. What this entails for how discourse analysis can study the links between text, the social world, and tangible reality in general and for planning in particular points for this research towards the analysis of policies.

4.3.2 In general: representing and/or mapping spatial reality?

Massey (1992) puts forward the problem of representing spatial reality with Jameson’s view that the spatial is unrepresentable and should be mapped and Laclau’s view that the spatial is unmappable and spatial discourses attempt to represent it. Either way, a limitation for discourse analysis is therefore that it cannot analyse spatial reality but at most merely the knowledge of it. Arguably, knowledge of spatial reality primarily falls on the seeing side of the irreducible double of knowledge (i.e. light, not language). Not only words but also images can thus be included in the conceptualisation of discourse (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). The problem that spatial reality cannot be represented n/or mapped gets particular importance in politics, as herein a range of discourses are simultaneously at work ‘in which the meaning and identity of political actors are referred to a particular place, a portion of a real space, whether it be a neighbourhood, a city, region, or national territory, and where as a result

---

Note though, that the words ‘spatial science’ are not uttered here to in one sweep characterise all sciences which are also concerned with space, as urban planning and geography are concerned with both the social and the spatial for example. ‘Spatial science’ is meant literally here: merely the sciences concerned with space. ‘Spatial science’ could thus, just as ‘social science’, be a part of a “spatio-social science” which, for instance, researches how people re/order space.
a certain degree of political closure is effected or at least reinforced’ (Low, 1997: 255; Richardson & Jensen, 2003: 13). What discourse analysis thus can do is to reconstruct how systems of linguistic and pictorial knowledge of spatial reality function as tactical elements in force relations while the meaning-making practices involved are thoroughly problematic. Hence, although discourse analysis cannot study tangible reality, it can show how text/images, the social world, and knowledge of the tangible world link; something which tallies a research which looks at how people try to reshape spatial reality itself through, for instance, planning – leaving the question on the status of the kind of knowledge involved (e.g. compared to the natural and social sciences) in the open.

4.3.3 Planning: reshaping spatial reality

This spatial planning research on the concept of territorial cohesion sees planning as strategic discourse (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). The government issue this leads to is that of the “knowledge policy” in operation shown by epistemologies (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). That is to say, planning can be seen as world making in the sense that the used ‘words, signs and symbols become the frame of mind for social agents as well as being the outcome of the historical and contextual conditions under which they are articulated’ (Fischler, 1995; Richardson & Jensen, 2003). In spatial planning spatial metaphors as hybrid of words and images come up here as way to enforce certain spatial qualities and exclude others – e.g. ‘blue bananas’, ‘bunches of grapes’, ‘the pentagon’, ‘golden triangles’ for European space (Williams, 1993; 1996; Jensen & Richardson, 2003). The images these spatial metaphors speak of ‘work by providing principles of spatial organisation that stick in planners’ minds, enticing them to act and assisting public dialogue’ (Faludi, 1996). Moreover, of this type of ‘framing with images’ many metropolitan examples are known in which these Leitbilder are important as tool and goal of strategic spatial planning (Faludi, 1996; Salet & Thornley & Kreukels, 2003). To study the concept of territorial cohesion in the acknowledgement of all these words, signs, and symbols this research follows Jensen & Richardson (2003) in their turn to discourse analysis to deal with the interconnections of space, discourse, and power-rationalities (see Chapter 2 on the analytical framework of governmentality). Such a turn might well be a necessity to not only analyse the knowledge of spatial reality but also the reshaping of it: ‘If discourse is necessary for attaching meaning to things in everyday life, then analysis of discourse is inseparable from the analysis of space. In fact, analysis of space requires analysis of discourse if we are to understand how spaces come to be as they are, how people exist and act within them, and how our ideas and ways of thinking are affected by what happens in spaces’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Discourse thus produces lived spaces while actions within lived spaces shape discourse.

4.3.4 Towards policy analysis

When the social world takes place in the tangible reality it reshapes partly through discourse, what role does text/image have herein? According to Zukin (1998; Jensen & Richardson, 2003), ‘sets of meanings of the social imaginary are conceptualized in symbolic languages [and] these meanings are materialized and become real in all sorts of spatial and social practices, from urban design to housing policy’. Then again, not only are not all practices policy, policies are not only practices. As part of their integrated multi-level analysis of governance of European space, Böhme & Richardson & Dabinett & Jensen (2004: 1180) therefore ask: ‘How is space captured in policy ideas and reproduced in policy language and practice?’ In itself spatial policy is therefore not more spatial than any other kind of policy, but a language and practice which deals with space. Hence, before treating the way the Foucaultian kind of methodology links practices and language, it should be made clear how the used discourse analysis differs from and relates to policy analysis.
4.4 Is this discourse analysis only policy analysis?

4.4.1 Why compare discourse analysis and policy analysis?
Possibilities and limitations for the discourse analysis in this research come from this methodology in general and how this research uses it. While a general limitation is that no discourse analysis can analyse tangible reality, this research could reduce discourse analysis to merely a kind of policy analysis if territorial cohesion language and practices are only policy making and the kinds of analysis become isomorphic. Critical methodological issues for this research on the concept of territorial cohesion are, therefore, the differences between discourse analysis and policy analysis and how their similarities offer a common ground to relate them, in particular for spatial policy.

4.4.2 A major difference between discourse analysis and policy analysis
A major difference comes up between policy analysis and the Foucaultian discourse analytical approach shown above when you see the former as comprising ‘those activities aimed at developing knowledge relevant to the formulation and implementation of public policy’ (Torgerson, 1986: 33). Instead of helping the formulation and implementation of policy, a discourse analysis on the alternative analytical route of phronesis namely (also) aims to study the ethics involved in making and using knowledge. And not only the professional and political interests of policymakers (e.g. the administrator, legislator, bureaucracy), but even those of the policy analyst itself resist the potential challenges of moral evaluation, threatened as they are by ethical inquiry (Amy, 1984: 573). However, you could argue that these understandings of policy analysis are outdated and a feature of the dominance of positivism in approaches to policy analysis which saw it as an area of social science (Amy, 1984: 575). The more so since the policy analysis ‘enshrouded in a neo-positivist conception of knowledge and the technocratic [concept] of policy making long associated with it’ (Fischer, in Fischer&Forester, 1993: 37) was challenged later on by a constructionist understanding of policy ‘issues’ or ‘problems’ as historical and cultural specific instead of pre-existing givens to be discovered by policy makers (Edelman, 1988; Rochefort&Cobb, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 193, 194). Such a constructionist turn remembers us of a trait of discourse analysis. The difference remains though, that when discourse analysis analyses the field of interests insofar they are concerned with policy, this does not only include the interests of policy making, but also those of policy analysis, even if the latter uses constructionist approaches and/or does not help policy making.

4.4.3 The constructionist and argumentative turn to policy discourse and \textit{Realrationalität}: a common ground to relate discourse analysis and policy analysis
Building upon social constructionism, the argumentative turn in policy analysis argued ‘that the policy process should be understood as a process of argumentation’ (Fischer&Forester, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 194). Both the constructionism involved and seeing language from the viewpoint of arguments can as similarities of discourse analysis and policy analysis form a common ground to relate them. That is, because the argumentative turn ‘suggests that successful policy making depends on constructing shared or accepted understandings of the “real”’, it implies an examination of how particular versions of reality are promoted in the process and language advances and legitimises these selective and contingent accounts (Hoppe, in Fischer&Forester, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 194). Although discourse analysis and policy analysis are essentially different activities, the argumentative turn aligns policy analysis partly to discourse analysis. This in the sense of how the latter approaches the use of language and strategies of argument as ‘forms of discourse that help create and reproduce social meaning’ (Tonkiss, 1999b: 246; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 163). Moreover, the argumentative turn in policy analysis can exemplify how constructions of problems have political functions, because it goes beyond general constructionist observations and ‘demands the analysis of the ways in which particular constructions of social problems are used for particular (political) purposes’ (Hajer, in Fischer&Forester, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 194). Discourse analysis can also perform such an analysis, thereby analysing language and practices as ‘complementary ways of revealing these struggles for control over meaning in policy-making and implementation’ (Richardson&Jensen, 2003).
Chapter 4

Vice versa the argumentative turn also links policy analysis to the broader language and practices studied with discourse analysis, because it ‘highlights the instrumentality of the process of problem construction [to] sustaining systems of belief about the nature of social reality’ (Hastings, 1996: 194). For instance, the existence of (certain) actors appears to be such a believes sustained by the policy sciences – e.g. leading to a study of territorial cohesion as a discourse brought forth by (a coalition of) actors (see Chapter 6 on the mapping of the usages of the concept). A discourse analytical methodology can thus be used for policy analysis, and policy analysis can in its turn point to the more general systems of knowledge also scrutinised by discourse analysis. However, how should this common ground of discourse analysis and policy analysis be understood?

Although discourse analysis and policy analysis differ, policy can be seen as a (everyday) place where systems of knowledge and their associated practices come together. The common ground for discourse analysis and policy analysis becomes, then, ‘policy discourse’. Policy discourses complexly hold values, thoughts, and practices and by forming bundles of exchanges between these elements (e.g. scientific and lay knowledge, unspoken actions, power relations) give shape to particular policy-making processes or debates (Sharp & Richardson, 2001; Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Richardson & Jensen, 2003). The analysis of policy discourse thus concretely studies rationality and power through an inquiry into the rationalities at work in policy making; thereby understanding policy making as an exposure and focus of conflict on a field of power struggles between different interests where knowledge and truth are contested (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). This, what Flyvbjerg (1998) has called Reale rationalität, points to contingent power relations which create space for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths (Pavlich, 1995), thereby accepting and marginalising rationalities, knowledges and practices (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Hence, a policy discourse analysis should reconstruct the distribution of the multiplicity of tactical discursive elements in particular force relations of policy making.

Yet, even if a part of the territorial cohesion discourse is policy discourse, the mapping of the words ‘territorial cohesion’ hereby does not need to beforehand decide on how large and/or influential this part is. On the contrary, also the performativity of the territorial cohesion discourse can, namely, be explored by focusing on how discourse creates conditions for thought, communication, and action and how different configurations of power and rationality shape and are shaped by policy processes (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). That is to say, the role played by policy and policy analysis in the territorial cohesion discourse can thus be presented as an outcome of this research’s discourse analysis. Important to note hereby is, that to not only study policy but also the ways in which policy is analysed or even made into a scientific research object, one should look at the above discussed common ground of discourse analysis and policy analysis from a viewpoint outside the “policy sciences” – e.g. not study policy and the actors who make it but how a discourse constructs both policy and actors as such.

4.4.4 Spatial policy discourse analysis

Entities of spatial policy discourse can be analysed through the three spheres of language, practices, and power-rationality too (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). However, spatial policy is a particular kind of policy, as it deals with spatial reality (see §4.3 on spatial reality). An important issue for research is, then, ‘how spatialities, or framings of space and spatial relations, are constructed in spatial policy discourses’ (Bohme & Richardson & Dabinett & Jensen, 2004: 1180). Besides looking for how power-rationality configurations shape and are shaped by policy processes, the exploration of the performativity of a spatial policy discourse should therefore focus on how words and actions frame and represent spaces on the basis of certain relations between power and rationality (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). The capture of representations of space in language and images placed within policy processes hereby reveals power relations by showing, for instance, how different spatial visions are contested and different interests compete over the shape of policy. The methodological framework must, however, also be able to probe ‘the ways in which spaces and places are re-presented in policy discourses in order to bring about certain changes of socio-spatial relations and prevent others’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). New changes may need new discourses, since the old re-presentations of spatial reality were to bring about past changes. Besides
looking for how policy languages and practices manifest and reproduce a spatial policy discourse, a spatial policy discourse analysis should therefore also analyse ‘the relations between power and rationality as a new discourse emerges in a contested policy space and possibly attains hegemonic status’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). Also to understand the (possible) spatial implications of policy making the Foucaultian approach appears, then, as a well-travelled path for crossing the gap between practices and language that link space with the operation of discourses and power – with Bentham’s panopticon as archetypal example (Foucault, 1979a; 1990; Philo, 1987; Flynn, 1993; Lyon, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Marks, 1995; Sibley; 1995; Casey, 1996; Jensen, 1997; Jensen & Richardson, 2003) (see §4.5 on linking practices and language).

This research on the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with the European government level. For this level the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (CEC, 1999a) can give a glimpse of a spatial policy discourse, as it shows an European spatial policy framework which would work indirectly by shaping the minds of the players involved in spatial development: the new terms leave room for interpretation and maps were up until the very last moment an issue of controversy in the process of making the ESDP and policy maps eliminated altogether (Faludi, in Faludi & Salet, 2000; Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). In spite of the common usage of Leitbilder in spatial planning on lower government levels, spatial reality appears on the EU level thus mostly to be represented by ambiguous (policy) language; if spatial reality is first represented by images, this would entail an extra translation from what we see to what we speak about. Hence, limitations for how this research uses discourse analysis might not so much come from policy analytical methodology, but follow insofar territorial cohesion is only concerned with the making of vague (spatial) policy (see the next Chapters). Moreover, methodologically seen it is possible for discourse analysis to analyse (spatial) policy.

4.5 Linking practices and language

4.5.1 Different practices: discourse and power

To come to the end of the general account of the methodological approach used in this research on the concept of territorial cohesion, the way in which this Foucaultian discourse analysis links practices and language should be discussed; thereby giving the general structure in which the discussions above on spatial reality and policy (analysis) fall. First of all, it is important not to conflate discourse and practices, but to separate them without denying that discourse itself is a practice: ‘discursive practices are a subset of social practices [and discourses] invariably have conditions and effects (both ideational/textual and material) that differ from those that they acknowledge and intend’ (Fairclough, 1992; Sayer, 2000: 45). As phronetic research attempts to know how power actually functions (see §4.1.2 on an alternative analytical route), other social practices of interest in this research are power practices, and therefore the relationship between discursive and power practices as ways of acting and thinking at once. By in their articulation and institutionalisation analysing language as a practice and power practices associated to a system of knowledge, the core ideas at stake in, for instance, shaping places (e.g. making European space) can be identified (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Hence, a crucial question for researching the actual functioning of power in a discourse analytical study of territorial cohesion is: what are the actual practical activities and knowledges which constitute the concept’s field of interests? Methodologically seen the identification of the territorial cohesion field of interests in a discourse analytical study can be divided in two parts. On the one hand how the discourse analytical methodology used in this research which identifies the practices and knowledges constituting a field of interests moves towards the abstract notion of power-rationality explained in Chapter 2 on the analytical framework – e.g. the rationalities at work in policy making (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). On the other hand how this study of the concept of territorial cohesion revolves around statements. Below both are discussed consecutively.
4.5.2 Not political economic but Foucaultian discourse analysis

Since a discourse expresses a conceptualisation of reality and knowledge that may try to gain hegemony, it can be seen as a ‘will to knowledge’ that ‘attempts to embed and naturalise particular values and ways of seeing and understanding the world [through the] institutionalisation and fusion of articulation processes and practice forms [and thereby] generates new forms of knowledge and rationality, and frames what are considered to be legitimate social actions’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Two strands of discourse analysis can then be distinguished which differ essentially in how they structure these interconnections of practice, power, rationality, knowledge, and language: political economic informed analysis and Foucaultian-inspired research (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). Before presenting the Foucaultian approach chosen for this research, it can first be described by what it is not.

The political economic informed analysis includes ‘critical discourse analysis’ associated with Fairclough and studies of ‘discourse coalitions’ advanced by others (e.g. Dryzek; Hager, in Fischer & Forester, 1993; Davoudi & Healey, 1995; Newman, 1996; Rydin, 1998). Both emanate from Marxian writings ‘that extolled the significance of ideology and political economy in enabling powerful vested interests groups to impose hegemony’ (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). It follows that this political economic strand of discourse analysis emphasises ‘the material and economic factors that shape policy discourses [and] the linguistic strategies that are deployed by key actors to shape policy agendas’ (Harrison & Munton & Collins, 2004; Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41, 45). Such discourse analyses differ from a Foucaultian approach in that they imply a prior abstract and theoretical objectification of social reality distracting us from the concrete operations of power. That is, they say how their research object looks like (e.g. through theory) before they study it (see §4.1.2 on an alternative analytical route and 4.2.2 on interpretative analysis). Why, for instance, study the material and economic factors instead of political technologies and/or label some and not others as actors?

Obviously, the Foucault-inspired strand of discourse analysis draws on Foucault (e.g. Foucault, 1972; 1978, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991; 1980a). It differs from the political economic strand in two major ways. Firstly, power is not reduced to individual agency, but the exercise of power is seen as ‘contingent on the relationships formed between individuals within and beyond organizations’ (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41) – i.e. the Foucaultian approach does not fill in how power works with an abstract or theoretical objectification before it starts its analysis of practices (see Part II on the analytical framework). Secondly, language is not seen as a reflection of power relations, but their relationship is seen as recursive (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). Language practices thus both shape and are shaped by the power relations in power practices (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). Then again, for analysis the Foucaultian approach puts language secondary to knowledge.

To be precise, power relations are a disposition of force-points and the lines between them and can change through time. When the forms in which these clouds of force-points appear are drawn through, such a chaotic reality of power can be grasped inside knowledge's tranquillity. The informal outside is a battle, a turbulent, stormy zone where particular points and the relations of forces between these points are tossed about’ (Deleuze, 2000: 121). Knowledge (i.e. what can be seen and said) is then more stable and stratifies light and language: ‘Strata merely collected and solidified the visual dust and the sonic echo of the battle raging above them’ (Deleuze, 2000: 121). Hence, power produces knowledge which crystallises and fixes parts of the power relations in forms, as knowledge's relationship to the informal outside of power relations 'has the task of reassessing the forces established, and the strata of knowledge 'have the task of constantly producing levels that force something new to be seen or said' (Deleuze, 2000: 120). So, language, as "sonic echo" merely helps to create and reproduce meaning, as it plays 'an instrumental role in establishing 'regimes of truth' (Foucault, 1980a) by which social problems are formulated and addressed' (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41) – e.g. the regime of truth formed by social science as a body of discourse (see §4.1.1 on science and discourse, 5.3.3 on meaning and knowledge, and Appendix A; §A.1.6 on regimes of truth). The system of knowledge and its associated practices (i.e. a discourse) takes centre stage herein, but not simply as surface projection of power mechanisms, as 'via discourse and interpretation, rationality and power become interwoven' (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123). A Foucaultian discourse analysis thus identifies a field of interests by looking for the interconnected
linguistic, meaning-making, discursive, and power practices in their association with a system of knowledge, that is: by reconstructing the discourse which forms the interwoven power-rationality. However, although this methodology to identify a field of interests gives us a framework to identify the discourse of territorial cohesion, it does not tell us why these are territorial cohesion practices and knowledges – i.e. what are the arguments that something has to do with territorial cohesion or even belongs to the concept?

4.5.3 From argumentation to territorial cohesion pro/positions

When this discourse analytical research reconstructs the distribution of the discursive elements of territorial cohesion it would involve a mapping of territorial cohesion arguments as tactical elements in the force relations of the concept’s field of interests. The research’s methodology namely takes a look at the practical use of language and strategies of argument; the more so after the argumentative turn in policy analysis if policy making is an important part of territorial cohesion. In general, the generic structure of an argument primarily combines ‘Grounds’ as the argument’s premise, the ‘Claim’, and ‘Warrants’ as ‘what justifies the inference from the Grounds to the Claim’ (Toulmin, 1958; Van Eemeren&Grootendorst&Jackson&Jacons, 1997; Gieve, 2000; Fairclough, 2003: 81). What could identify territorial cohesion arguments, then, is that Warrants are often discourse-specific, even though they are often implicit too (Gieve 2000; Fairclough, 2003: 82). The territorial cohesion discourse, that is: its system of knowledge and associated practices, could in that case be recognised as entity by its warrants, and therefore the territorial cohesion field of interests thereby as well (via the practices and knowledges which constitute it). However, as will be shown below (see Book II), with territorial cohesion there are hardly any argumentations made for something to belong to the concept or having to do with it (e.g. no implicit Warrants). This is a major limitation for this discourse analytical research, as this has the consequence that it might not only analyse the making of vague (spatial) policy, but also not (complete) argumentations. Hence, this research may merely reconstruct the positions in the territorial cohesion field of interests around which argumentations could be made (i.e. their ground).

From Greek, θέσις (thesis) means ‘position’. Mostly, this is used to refer to intellectual propositions (e.g. giving meaning, forming knowledge) instead of strategic positions taken in struggles (e.g. stages, battle, cooperation). However, the emphasis could also lay on the latter – which are also rational, since strategic and thus goal-led. Furthermore, the focus could be on both in their relationship. This discourse analytical research on territorial cohesion may then relate the stratifying intellectual positions in meaning-making practices and strategic ones in power practices taken with, on, in, and/or under the concept. When studied for how the concept of territorial cohesion solidifies force relations and knowledges, these pro/positions will together form the entity of territorial cohesion statements: a “creature” which cannot only be defined as a field of interests but as a discourse as well – as there is thought in practices and thinking is a practice too (e.g. a perilous act (Foucault, in Bouchard, 1997: 5)). However, are the daily practices in which ‘territorial cohesion’ is uttered and thought of, used and defined an already existing field of interests, is it a concept in creation and thus an entity in the making, or is it an undecided upon and/or footloose concept without any significant power practices? Besides that these questions point to the appropriateness of a constructionist stance for territorial cohesion research, they also lead to another one: how to interpret the “line” demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse, showing the possible ground, and perhaps even value, of the concept of territorial cohesion? After this chapter situated the methodological framework by explaining what a discourse is and what the involved interpretative analysis entails, the next chapters will therefore display the essentially unstable position of this research in answering the questions above with a treatment of the operationalisation for the fishing out of the meanings and usages of the concept and the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse; and Appendix A goes beyond explaining what to do by showing how to do it, that is, the methods used for doing the interpretative analysis involved.
4.6 Round-up: from biological to historical metaphors

4.6.1 Discourse analysis situated
This methodological chapter situated discourse analysis in an ontological understanding of the world as meaningful and the constructionist epistemology of a "social science" which researches how a changing social reality makes sense and conflict traditions which suit a research on the usages and meanings of territorial cohesion with all their uncertainties, complexities, and conflicts. To deal with the double hermeneutic and essential instability involved in as a subject studying subjects, discourse analysis thereby passed both phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge to find itself on the phronetic path which analyses and interprets the status of values and interests in society with a focus on actual practices and knowledges. A discourse can namely be defined as a system of knowledge (i.e. a framework of linguistic and pictorial representations of the world) and its associated practices (i.e. interconnections of linguistic, discursive, meaning-making, and power practices) which operates as a tactical element in a field of force relations. An analysis hereof entails an interpretative search for meaning by reconstructing the distribution of the multiplicity of discursive elements in a concrete study of rationality and power, in casu a mapping of 'territorial cohesion'. Insofar the concept has to do with spatial reality though, this methodology thus shows a limitation, as it cannot analyse spatial reality itself, merely the thoroughly problematic knowledge of and policy for it. Yet, this does make it possible for discourse analysis to not only analyse policy but also policy analysis as a part of the territorial cohesion field of interests, especially when both kinds of analysis have a common ground in the emphasis on arguments and Realrationalität to construct (policy) problems. Hereby the limitations for this discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion might more come from the research object (see the next Chapters and Book II) when it is concerned with the making of vague (spatial) policy without any (complete) argumentation.

4.6.2 Main methodological problem characterised biologically and historically
How to study the interconnections of language, rationality, knowledge, power, and practices forms the most intricate part of the discourse analytical methodology used in this research and directs us to the next chapters. The Foucaultian approach used namely does not beforehand state how these interconnections should be seen in every particular case: i) the relationship between language and power is recursive, ii) the exercise of power is contingent on the relationships formed between individuals within and beyond organisations, iii) knowledge reassesses the established forces in forms (i.e. what can be seen and said), and iv) discourse and interpretation interweave rationality and power. A picture of territorial cohesion statements which solidify these interconnections with the concept could thus result as an outcome of this research.

The question then becomes: what is the pictured "territorial cohesion creature"? A question which asks for a genealogy of morphing "genes": re-usage of old bits, dominant and recessive treats, mutations. A research of the evolution of territorial cohesion's "DNA helix" though, which interprets the genotype through analysing the phenotype; or such research could borrow from the biological school of behaviourism (e.g. van Ginneken, 2009: 52-53). However, a description of human processes (e.g. as supraorganism) should, at least in social science as a body of discourse, not be biological but historical. That is, just as discourse is not life (Foucault, 1969: 210-211), territorial cohesion is not a living being, but nonetheless appears to make its own Geschichte. Hence, the importance of perspectivism and interpretation to analyse present movements and relative inertnesses and tracing the whole and its parts. The analysis of this entity of repeatable (and repeated) linguistic articulations, existing and/or possible practices, and power-rationality configurations can be operationalised around, respectively, the mapping of the analytically separated territorial cohesion meanings, usages of the concept, and the discourse they form. The next three chapters therefore operationalise this discourse analytical methodology for the concept of territorial cohesion; note that during the research each of these steps shown here uses the methods which are explained in Appendix A. These three chapters thus elaborate on how the maps and picture of the concept of territorial cohesion will look like.
Chapter 5  Mapping meaning

Introduction

As the first sub-question of this research is 'What is the meaning of territorial cohesion?', we have to know how to answer this question, that is, how to operationalise this step of this research's discourse analysis. As shown below, it revolves around mapping territorial cohesion propositions, what has to deal with how the concept's meaning is worded in language. This calls to mind the situation caught by the almost untranslatable Greek term λόγος (logos) that defined a large field of meanings connecting speech and reason, name and object (Heidegger, 1957: 32; Heidegger, 2000). What may be overobvious in this "post-Tower of Babel era", especially with the 'Euro-English' spoken in the EU (Williams, 1996), is Nietzsche's (1969: 191) idea that 'there is a philosophical mythology concealed in language' due to which we are continually tempted to think of things as being simpler than they are (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134).

To arrive at the vocabulary with which Book II can write down the map of territorial cohesion's complication of meaning nonetheless, this chapter takes three steps. They successively treat what to operationalise, how to, and the actual operationalisation. The primary step to reconstruct the meaning side of the concept's multiplicity of discursive elements thereby elaborates on what this research maps when mapping territorial cohesion propositions (§5.1). The triangle of signification details how to outline the concerned traces of meaning-making practices (§5.2). The selection of expert language and territorial cohesion definitions shows then how far the concept can be destined to a system of knowledge (connaissance) (§5.3). A conclusion ends this operationalisation by cutting out the mapping of territorial cohesion meaning with the next chapter on mapping usages of the concept (§5.4).

5.1 Language and thought

5.1.1 Meanings as statements in thought

When doing a Foucaultian discourse analysis, emphasis should not merely be on the texts themselves (i.e. traces of linguistic practices), but on the "substance(s)" of their words – that what comes closer to the thought 'territorial cohesion' than to the words 'territorial cohesion'. That is to say, we are after the concept's meaning as a category of thought, we follow Foucault and seek statements instead of utterances (Deleuze, 2000) (see §4.5.3 on territorial cohesion pro/positions). Although this might be plain by now, the catch is that '[w]ritten texts often consist in themselves of nothing but Statements' (Fairclough, 2003: 109). So we need to select utterances to interpret in order to analyse relevant statements (see §5.3.1 on definitions). No matter whether meaning comes as trace about through meaning-making practices of difference, contextual influences (Nellhaus, 1998; Sayer, 2000: 37), and/or the interplay of the production of the text, the text itself, and the reception of it, it are 'meanings that have social effects rather than texts as such' (Fairclough, 2003: 10–11). Hence, this research focuses on meaning, and thereby understands language and strategies of argument as forms of discourse that help to create and reproduce it (see §4.2.2 on language and interpretive analysis). The question is then what the status of these meanings is when it concerns the statements of territorial cohesion propositions.

5.1.2 Mapping territorial cohesion's proto-/conceptual area

When 'the social effects of texts are mediated by meaning-making' (Fairclough, 2003: 11), then the territorial cohesion texts forming the data of this research solely have an effect on power practices through the practices which make and uphold the concept's meaning. What does it mean hereby; that territorial cohesion is without an established "single meaning" which changed through time (see Appendix A; §A.2.3 on documenting changes in meaning)? That is, what area of meaning to map? Of course, territorial cohesion is something which goes...
beyond merely words. What actually lies beyond this is not clear though. While it is sometimes defined and used in inquiries into seemingly diverse phenomena (see Book II), the question is whether territorial cohesion is defined clearly and guides inquiry effectively enough as concepts do, and, moreover, whether it actually is a general idea at all (Merton, in Powell & Robbins, 1984: 267; Hedström & Swedberg, 1996: 299-300). Perhaps territorial cohesion is partly (stuck) in its development before reaching a full-blown conceptual phase, as a proto-concept that is, with the characteristics of being an early, rudimentary, particularized, and largely unexplicated idea which is occasionally used in empirical research instead of guiding it (Merton, in Powell & Robbins, 1984: 267; Hedström & Swedberg, 1996: 299-300). Territorial cohesion might thus fall in between the development phases of proto-concept (i.e. setting up meaning) and concept (i.e. upholding meaning), while its meaning-making practices have features of both. Hence, at least insofar formed by propositions, the territorial cohesion ground on which argumentations can be built is not yet solid but solidifying at most. When mapping what is said with territorial cohesion (again see Appendix A; §A.2.2 on what to look for), it is this inerting distribution of the concept’s multiplicity of discursive elements which this research attempts to reconstruct.

5.2 The triangle of problematic signification

5.2.1 Triangle of signification: words, ideas, facts

The question of how exactly to map (traces of) territorial cohesion meaning-making practices is here answered by giving an operationalisation tool: the triangle of signification. When looking for the meaning of the (proto-)concept of territorial cohesion you can namely distinguish the Sinn and Bedeutung of the words ‘territorial cohesion’: that what is denoted in thought (i.e. ideas) and what is denoted in actual reality (i.e. facts) (Frege, 1892; Geach & Black, 1988; Stokhof, 2000: 64). Besides words as signifiers, these two meanings of the word ‘meaning’ return in the signification process as signified and referent respectively, as the signification process takes place through networks of triangles of signification (i.e. signifier-signified-referent) (Nellhaus, 1998; Sayer, 2000: 37). To make it more complex, ‘what is a signifier or signified in one triangle may become the referent in another’ (Nellhaus, 1998; Sayer, 2000: 37); this could be an essential characteristic of social science due to its object (i.e. a subject; see §4.1.1 on science or discourse). An example where a referent becomes a signifier is that, although it may well be a fundamentally different enterprise ‘to analyze and discuss what democracy is than to discuss what should be the indicators of democracy’ (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005: 522), no indicator of democracy is purely a tangible object and therefore itself both a referent of ‘democracy’ and a signified of something else. Despite these difficulties, the triangle of signification as operationalisation tool thus distinguishes ‘territorial cohesion’ as signifier, what it signifies, and what it refers to as the elements of meaning to map. The question about their three relations in this triangle of signification begs then.

The relation between words and facts: language and reality are not isomorphic because language is ‘about the sense the world makes to us [and sense] is not tightly correlated with physical characteristics’ (Sayer, 2000: 38). This sense leads us to meaning (i.e. signifieds and referents). Or better, words and many meanings, because while ‘meanings are typically “worded” in various ways and different wordings thereby also change meanings, with territorial cohesion we are of course more interested in how ‘words typically have various meanings’ (Fairclough, 1992: 185; Sayer, 2000: 36). Instead of futilely looking for which pre-existing presence the meaning of territorial cohesion has in certain words and expressions, we therefore look for how the relations that are set up between them have such meanings as an effect (Merleau-Ponty 1964; Fairclough, 2003: 23). Yet, the focus of this research lies on the relation between Sinn and Bedeutung, between meaning as the signified idea and referred to fact. Although it is important not to incline to ‘a simple correspondence notion of discourse and reality’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003), the turn away from materialism towards discourse should namely neither eliminate the object in favour of a preoccupation with the ‘horizontal’ relation between signifiers (equivalent to words or images) and signifieds (equivalent to concept), together forming signs, in abstraction from any relation

* Obviously, this separation between thought and actual reality is an analytical construction, as thought itself is actually real as well.
to referents’ (Sayer, 2000: 36). The triangle of signification thus operationalises this (part of the) research in a mapping of the construction of the concept’s variable ideas and facts, with the words ‘territorial cohesion’ as constant. The next task is to find out how variable these ideas and facts are.

5.2.2 Problematic signification: a case for un/arbitrariness
Constructionist epistemologies owe considerable debt to the “de Saussurian” insight ‘that there is an arbitrary relation between the linguistic categories humans use to divide up the world, and the real nature of the world itself’ (Belsey, 1980; Eagleton, 1984; Burr, 1995; Hastings, 1996: 194-195). The concept of territorial cohesion would therefore have no necessary or intrinsic link with the objects it purports to explain (Hastings, 1996: 194-195). This insight leads to a constructionist turn towards episteme via an empirical route: ‘the world outside of human consciousness is not reflected in language, instead linguistic categories actually construct or constitute how reality is perceived’ (Hastings, 1996: 194-195). However, language is not knowledge – it are thus linguistic and epistemic categories which do the constructing – and that (also) language constructs our perception of reality does not make that mere randomness rules the relation between words and facts. To be precise, even though there is no necessity in the relationship between signifier and referent, no total, perfect, and automatic correspondence between the utterance and meaning, nor meaning in single signs in isolation, it does not follow that there are no relatively stable meanings and that their relation to the world is arbitrary (Sayer, 2000: 38). Something else follows from these premises.

A problem for determining whether the relations between the signifier, signified, and referent are always un/arbitrary is that the relation between language and the world ‘can only be thought about from within discourse’ (Sayer, 2000: 36). Logically this argument arguably entails that we cannot perceive language and/or the world an sich, so neither their relation to one another without the intervention of knowledge – not when discourses are understood as systems of knowledge and their associated practices at least (see §4.2.1 on the Foucaultian delineation of ‘discourse’). Hereby knowledge stands on its own as the stratified pattern of forms (see §4.5.2 on knowledge). Conversely, inherent to meaning is that it is represented through signification (e.g. as signified or referent). Meaning is relational – opening up the possibility that it is knowledge which is represented as meaning. As a consequence, our position inside discourse allows us to look at our knowledge of language, ideas, the world, and their relations and at how meaning is made thereby (§5.3.3 elaborates on meaning, knowledge, and discourse). Space and time demonstrate this point. They are central to our understanding of the world – especially in a spatial planning research on territorial cohesion – and differently constructed in different texts and “text-like” worlds of societies and physical environments; contested constructions of space and time (e.g. class struggles in workplaces) interconnect in different space-times which co-exist in any social order (Harvey, 1996; Fairclough, 2003: 151). When space and time are constructed in texts and social and spatial worlds, what is definitively constructed is their meaning. Discourse analysis thus does not deny the existence of every idea, logic, and rationality, it merely poses that seen through the triangle of signification words denote a by power relations structured aggregation of signifieds and referents as particular collection of meaning. Hence, what follows from the premises that words, ideas, and facts do not correspond out of necessity and that language and knowledge construct our perception of reality, is that in the abstract the triangular relations between signifiers, signifieds, and referents are problematic. Whether it are un/arbitrary relations should be explored on a per case basis, as this research does with the concept of territorial cohesion.

Note that de Saussure can be put against Bourdieu (e.g. 1999: 53) when it concerns the arbitrariness of the language we use. This research as a whole thus stands closer to Bourdieu than de Saussure – i.e. one should go beyond “scholarly relativism” and investigate the tensions between semantic, logical, and political arbitrariness (see the conclusion of this chapter).

The argument to use de Saussure to map territorial cohesion propositions nevertheless, is that although this particular discourse analytical step goes beyond language, it stays within semantics.
5.3 Mapping definitions: from meaning to knowledge

5.3.1 Making a common ground of expertise
When this research maps the concept of territorial cohesion with the triangle of signification, what language does it map? Not the genres and styles of linguistic and expressive conventions or visual forms thereof (e.g. maps, infographics), and it goes beyond intertextuality and the concept as neologism (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Besides key words and territorial cohesion's recent conceptual history (see Chapter 6 on usages), it namely maps the different things said in a particular language style: expertise (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). It is essential to note that just as all forms of fellowship, expertise depends 'upon meanings which are shared and can be taken as given': an implicit and assumed 'common ground' (Fairclough, 2003: 55). With the (proto-)concept of territorial cohesion, its definitions demarcate this common ground of developing meaning by drawing the conceptual borders to be filled and discriminating between meanings. The question then becomes what can define territorial cohesion's common ground of meaning.

There are several ways in which a common ground of meaning can be defined. Social science is a prime example of this. It is concerned with knowledge and has concept definition as a common operationalisation problem. Although in social science 'conceptual definitions can have major implications for how a variable is measured or human behaviour interpreted[,] even core concepts lack agreed understanding' (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 58). This problem arises because concepts are abstractions instead of artefacts and they thus have to be constructed with a particular theoretical framework (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 58) - with a framework which objectifies reality before researching it that is (see section 1.2.2 on interpretative analysis). In social science different abstract objectifications of social reality differently define a concept. Within a realm of expertise the construction of a concept's common ground of meaning formed by definitions can go beyond social science though (see Appendix A: §A.1.6 on expert texts). Any action oriented towards social reality namely also requires expertise. The ever so complex social relations need some discursive simplification which constitutes specific subsets as its 'social, material and spatio-temporal horizon of action' (Jessop, 2002). When such discursive simplifications (e.g. economic or political imaginaries) solidify they can confine, for instance, policy making in limits of knowledge. To make the most out of available knowledge, policy making might focus on small variations from present policy (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 162). Together the scientific problem of concept definition and the discursive simplification of an instrumental spatio-temporal horizon of action open up a competition between definitions over the common ground of meaning. Language is hereby not a conduit for concepts (e.g. territorial cohesion), but a political activity in its own right, as it helps to institutionalise structures of meaning that channel political thought or action in certain directions (Connolly, 1983: 1; Jacobs, 2006: 40). This research on territorial cohesion therefore maps how in the concept's realm of expertise the expert language, abstract (scientific) objectifications of social reality, and the horizon of (policy) action construct territorial cohesion meaning. Building on Fairclough (2003: 55), the research question would then be on how experts with definitions significantly shape the nature and content of the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning.

5.3.2 Different kinds of statements: building-stones for definitions
With territorial cohesion definitions in a central role in mapping the concept's common ground of meaning, it is worth asking what they are made of. A definition is a typical statement, as it demarcates a piece of meaning. Furthermore, Fairclough (2003: 109) distinguishes three other types of statements: those about what is and/or was the case (i.e. realis statements), predictions and hypotheses (i.e. irrealis statements), and evaluations (e.g. value statements). However, as clear as these types may be, to actually distinguish them in text constitutes a difficult task in the view of contemporary culture as a promotional and consumer culture where the distinctions blur between realis statements on the one hand and irrealis and value statements on the other (Featherstone, 1991; Wernick, 1991; Fairclough, 2003: 115). As far as the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with policy this becomes the more tricky for mapping its propositions, because especially contemporary policy texts
would blur facts and predictions, hypothesis, and evaluations with their commands 'often implied in, disguised as, or buried under piles of ostensibly value-free, objective, pseudo-scientific facts' (Graham, 2001; Fairclough, 2003: 115). Still, these two typifications can be crossed to further operationalise this research: definitions consist of realis, irrealis, or value statements which demarcate meaning.

You can also typify definitions by distinguishing explicit from implicit ones. Filtering explicit definitions out of texts is a straightforward affair. Just document what, for instance, follows the wording of 'territorial cohesion means' or 'the meaning of territorial cohesion is'. With implicit definitions this is more problematic though. You have to find out how other wordings demarcate territorial cohesion meaning without them saying so. Verschueren (1999) can be useful herein, in that he differentiates four types of implicitness: assumptions, logical implications, and non-/standard conversational implicatures (Fairclough, 2003: 59-60); note that just the first two are of interest to us, as we are not interested in conversations in general or linguistic customs in a particular case, not even when this case is territorial cohesion. What is very suited here, is that the types of assumptions match the three types of statements as building stones for definitions: about what exists (i.e. existential assumptions), is or can be or will be the case (i.e. propositional assumptions), and about what is good or desirable (i.e. value assumptions) (Fairclough, 2003: 56). But how to recognise these assumptions which demarcate the concept's meaning in the intertextual territorial cohesion text and how to trace what is logically implied by words? When ordering the territorial cohesion definitions into the concept's taxonomy of meaning, they should not be filled-in through logical speculation but by interpretively describing the data (see Appendix A: §4.2.3 on using the methodical guidelines for interpreting territorial cohesion pro/positions). Even if the data might fog their differences, the building stones with which interpretively to map territorial cohesion definitions can thus be typified in threefold: fundamentally they always demarcate meaning, which is possible with qua substance, realis, irrealis, or value statements proposed, qua form, explicitly or via assumption or logical implication.

5.3.3 The lingo: from territorial cohesion definitions towards a system of knowledge?
When mapping the meanings included and excluded by the territorial cohesion definitions (e.g. through hyponymy and antonymy): the question becomes which territorial cohesion meanings are identifiable as the same or similar (e.g. through synonymy)\(^4\) (Fairclough, 2003: 130). The triangle of signification comes into play here as operationalisation tool. With the words 'territorial cohesion' as constant, one can distinguish the included meanings according to the variables of meaning, the Sinn the signifier 'territorial cohesion' signifies and the Bedeutung to which the territorial cohesion sign refers. As Book II demonstrates, this leads to a nested taxonomy of, respectively, different kinds of territorial cohesion meaning and different territorial cohesion meanings inside a kind of territorial cohesion meaning. Although the kinds of meaning are not be ignored through speculation but through description, they can nonetheless together be understood hierarchically: as a grid to put different meanings in. The operationalisation of one third of this research on the concept of territorial cohesion then gives a simple vocabulary to present its discourse analysis of the linguistic data (i.e. text), signification events (i.e. linguistic and meaning-making practices), and the defining phenomena (i.e. definitions), in short: kinds of meanings.

So the territorial cohesion discourse can be differentiated by how semantic relations classify a part of the world – e.g. the types of assumptions can be discourse-relative (Fairclough, 2003: 132-133). We should thereby 'look particularly closely at how things are being classified, because it are the classificatory schemes or systems of classification which function as instruments of construction while being ignored as such: they are drawn upon to impose a preconstructed and taken for granted 'di-visions' (on the social) through which particular 'visions' of the world are continuously generated' (Bourdieu&Wacquant 1992; Fairclough, 2003: 130, 138). This research therefore maps the concept's kinds of meanings as a system with which the words 'territorial cohesion'

---

\(^4\) **Hyponym:** a text whose semantic range totally falls inside the semantic range of another word (e.g. red, blue, yellow are hyponyms of colour).

**Antonym:** a text whose semantic range entails it totally lies outside the semantic range of another (opposite) word (e.g. long, heavy, male are antonyms of short, light, female).

**Synonym:** a text whose semantic range is (nearly) the same with the semantic range of another word (e.g. plain, easy, elementary are synonyms of simple).
classify ideas and facts: it uses the triangle of signification to order the explicit and assumed or logically implied realis, irrealis, and value statements which demarcate territorial cohesion meaning into the concept's taxonomy of Sinn and Bedeutung. It is Fairclough (2003: 130) who holds that what is contested when different discourses come into conflict is this (performatrice) power of preconstructed semantic systems to generate visions which may sustain or remake the world in their image. The operationalisation needed to map territorial cohesion propositions would then end here. However, this research is not concerned with contesting discourses but interested in the contests over and in the single discourse of territorial cohesion. As mentioned above and more importantly, it is interested in the concept's episteme instead of being a semantic study of its meaning in language.

Although this operationalisation thus maps the concept's kinds of meanings as a system, the system of territorial cohesion meaning does not constitute a system of knowledge by itself. Whether this is the case depends of course on the research object of territorial cohesion as (proto-)concept mapped in Book II (e.g. does it guide or is it occasionally used in empirical research?). Still, this mapping of territorial cohesion meaning is necessary, because with text as data (see Appendix A; §A.3.1 on collecting data) the only way to arrive at the system of territorial cohesion knowledge runs through the ordering of the concept's meaning. Why so? Because when you leave behind the signifying words 'territorial cohesion' as the by language structured "sonic echoes" (see §4.5.2 on knowledge), the concept's signified ideas and referred to facts then remain as its common ground of meaning which can enclose and/or be filled with knowledge. It is thus the signification process implied by meaning which allows this research to go from intertextual text to system of knowledge (also see §10.1).

While the system in the concept's common ground of meaning classifies how the words 'territorial cohesion', its Sinn, and its Bedeutung relate, it is the order in which territorial cohesion ideas and facts are solidified into epistemic strata which is the concept's system of knowledge; due to this research's iterative methodical process (see Appendix A; §A.2.4 on analytic retroduction) these two systems have the same structure (e.g. the analysis of some knowledge can result in a correction of the interpreted system of meaning). This research therefore tracks down how the propositions of territorial cohesion definitions (might) stratify into a new body of knowledge: the particular territorial cohesion discipline (connaissance). A possible conclusion of this research could then be that there is no real territorial cohesion knowledge or system thereof (yet), and thus no real territorial cohesion discourse in the Foucaultian sense.

5.3.4 Criticising territorial cohesion knowledge

It is important to note that in this research the rule-governed subject-object relationship which is knowledge arises as to be the criticised research object (see §4.1.2 on connaissance and Chapter 7 on demarcating a discourse). We can thereby build upon how our social scientific regime of truth unfolds contradictions or ruptures in the discourses which help to establish it (see Appendix A; §A.1.6 on expertise). Social science's "epistematisation" of subjects is namely problematic. It makes knowledge about the subject as research object without bringing the knowing subject himself into play (see §4.1.1 on social science's essential instability). Book II displays how the textual evidence of such contradictions or ruptures appear in the "ideaification" of territorial cohesion, its objectification, and their relationship. The concept's definitions can be contradictory for instance, or its system of territorial cohesion knowledge can harbour disagreements over single knowledge claims. The latter is also possible in a positivist conception whereby all real knowledge is scientific: 'restricted to the observation of facts, to logical inference, and to the determination of regular relationships among facts' (Torgerson, 1986: 36). However, the discriminating point made here is, that a framework selects evidence and provides it with meaning and interpretation – i.e. the frame determines 'what counts as a fact and what interpretations are taken to be relevant' (Rein&Schön, 1994: 41; Hajer, 1995; Saarikoski, 2002: 3, 7). Knowledge thus forms perception because knowledge relates ideas and facts. Solidified epistemic strata therefore do not only force that something new will be seen and said (see §4.5.2 on knowledge), but also frame how these ideas and facts will be seen or said. Hence, if not only single knowledge claims about territorial cohesion contradict but even the framework wherein such
knowledge claims are made is inconsistent in itself (e.g. leading to incompatible facts or interpretations), then
the critique on the territorial cohesion discourse becomes even more fundamental.

5.4 Concluding towards usages

5.4.1 Systematic mapping: mapping systems
This chapter operationalised this research's fundamental critique of the territorial cohesion discourse as an
inherently inconsistent framework of, or even merely for, contradicting knowledge claims. Meaning implies a
signification process, it thereby allows us to go from the linguistic data of the intertextual territorial cohesion
text to the concept's system of knowledge. That is, to the order in which its ideas and facts thought about (i.e.
what to map) are solidified into epistemic strata. The operationalisation tool used for this is the triangle of
signification (i.e. how to map) which distinguishes elements of meaning: words as signifiers, ideas as signifieds,
and facts as referents. When the wording of 'territorial cohesion' is the constant, the common ground of meaning
where expertise depends on can then be formed as a nested system of kinds of meanings which places variable
territorial cohesion ideas above the concept's variable facts. Such taxonomy of Sinn and Bedeutung results from
the mapping of the signification events in the linguistic and meaning-making practices of expert language,
abstract (scientific) objectification of social reality, and (policy) action-oriented discursive simplification inside
the concept's realm of expertise. Territorial cohesion definitions are the marks of these practices, as these
phenomena explicitly and through assumption or logical implication demarcate meaning with realis, irrealis,
or value statements. Whether the ( proto-) concept solidified into a system of meaning, and if so, with arbitrary
or unarbitrary relations between words, ideas, and facts, or even stratified into a system of territorial cohesion
knowledge (connaissance) remains to be seen though, as that depends on the research object.

5.4.2 Meaning on itself is nothing?
The hermeneutic horizon of meaning of the concept's realm of expertise cannot be distinguished by solely
mapping the "ethereal substance" of territorial cohesion meaning. As with every horizon, the "earthly matter"
needs to be mapped too, that is: the concept's practical usage. Moreover, in Flyvbjerg's phronetic approach
practice even is the fundamental: to get beyond the problem of language, the analysis of practices must discipline
discourse analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134). However, despite that this phronetic research on the concept of
territorial cohesion agrees with the maxim that there is something outside discourse (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134),
it poses that practices associated with a system of knowledge are actually a constitutive part of a discourse's
existence (see §4.2.1 on the delineation of discourse). What makes discourses performative besides descriptive,
is that they are embedded in 'social practices, codes of behaviour, institutions and constructed environments'
(Sayer, 2000: 44). This research thus does not so much discipline its discourse analysis with the analysis of
practices, but analyses (policy) power practices as an essential part of the territorial cohesion discourse. The
questions which remain are then, whether the concept has power practices or merely linguistic, meaning-
making, and discursive practices, and if so, how these practices relate mutually and to territorial cohesion
meaning/knowledge. The next chapters therefore deal with how Book II can give an answer to this.
Chapter 6  Mapping usage

Introduction

As the second sub-question of this research is 'How is the concept used in the European Union?', we also have to know how to operationalise this step of this research's discourse analysis. This time the operationalisation revolves around mapping territorial cohesion positions, what has to deal with how the concept's usage plays out in concrete behaviour.

To arrive at the vocabulary with which Book II can write down the map of territorial cohesion's conceptual history, this chapter takes three steps. Just as the previous chapter they successively treat what to operationalise, how to, and the actual operationalisation. Here the primary step to take to reconstruct the usage side of the concept's multiplicity of discursive elements also elaborates on what this research maps, this time when mapping territorial cohesion positions and by questioning the nature of power practices and reinterpreting them (§6.1). Narrative Policy Analysis then enables this research to order the traces of the patterns in territorial cohesion power practices (§6.2). The selection and processing of expert stories shows how the extended use of this tool gives an overview of the whole territorial cohesion usage field (§6.3). The conclusion of this chapter clarifies the role the thus created overview plays in this research by pointing to the next chapter on demarcating territorial cohesion as Discursive Nodal Point (§6.4).

6.1 Reinterpreting (policy) power practices

6.1.1 Analyse what actually happens

What helps to sketch the territorial cohesion power practices of which to map the concept's usages is the distinction between the 'actual' (i.e. what happens), 'potential' (i.e. what is possible), and 'empirical' (i.e. what we know about reality) (Fairclough, 2003: 14). This research namely also concerns itself with knowing what actually happens to be able to think how social structures and practices allow and constrain what can happen (Fairclough, 2003: 14). However, tracing what actually happens in power practices out of the ordered text involves a reinterpretation of what is already said and hidden about concrete behaviour. This because what is mostly said about power practices – like policy, but definitively with territorial cohesion – has some distracting flaws which prohibit it from forming a reliable leading interpretation (see Appendix A; §A.2.4 on distinguishing interpretations). This section argues that the taking of causal agency lies at the heart of the problem, as then the outcome of the looking becomes arbitrary, there is no check on it, and interpretation runs wild (Dewey, in Boydston, 1984: 243, 248; Roe, 1994: 188). Before the next section tells how to start from the acts which are performed and to consider their consequences (Dewey, in Boydston, 1984: 243; Roe, 1994: 188), this section therefore explains how causes and agency conceal what actually happens by treating the form and order of final goals, intentions and incontextual preferences, and actors.

Pursued goals can be seen as the causes which drive what happens. However, to know what actually happens, one should not "backtrack" too far into such origins. That is, when you 'have information about the proximate goal specific to an act that explains the form of the act, why hypothesize that a more general goal or value is the independent "ultimate motive" and the proximate goal is only the expression of this motive in the circumstances of action' (Biernacki, in Adams&Clemens&Shola Orloff, 2005: 88)? In the policy sphere, and thus possibly in a major part of the (potential) power practices of territorial cohesion, such abstract ends (e.g. salvation, peace, welfare, profit maximisation; see §2.2.2) can merely be analysed incompletely at most, because they 'are often only distantly and loosely operative in the specific analysis of policy problems' (e.g. beset by internal contradictions) (Lindblom, 1979: 519). Moreover, even more mundane policy objectives can be used as means in another policy, and although agreement is then easily reached, such objectives themselves have
no ultimate validity other than they are agreed upon’ (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 157, 160). Instead of explaining what happens with an extrinsic frame of terminal functionality, it is thus simpler and more direct to start from the evidence immanent in the action’s unfolding: it are ‘the publicly accessible schemas that are immediately implicated in the organization of the action itself’ which define the pragmatics’ orienting puzzles, anomalies, and problems (Biernacki, in Adams&Clemens&Shola Orloff, 2005: 87). When mapping the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion, this research is therefore not teleologically oriented, but concerned with the vectors of what happens in power practices, that is, with courses of direction (e.g. puzzle-solving behaviour towards proximate goals).

However, if you map vectors as courses of direction, you should not presume that intentions bring about congruent outcomes. Accidental correspondence between preferences and outcomes and an inverse causality are other possibilities. That is to say, at least ‘public policies have complex and interactive effects; therefore ‘policy outcomes do not always reflect intentions’ and enacted policies ‘reshape political processes, preferences, and strategies’, due to which ‘major public policies are not just effects but also causes’ (e.g. policy feedback) (Hacker&Pfeirson, 2002: 285-286). Even in those cases that intentions would produce an outcome, preferences hardly grasp them due to the adjustments at a margin: ‘That one value is preferred in one decision situation does not mean that it will be preferred in another decision situation in which it can be had only at great sacrifice of another value’ (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 157). A general ranking of values which do not shift from decision to decision thus ignores the relevant marginal preferences (Lindblom, 1959). Only studies of particular policies can order the proximate objectives and marginal values, that is, as what actually happens. What actually happens thus comes about as little due to intentions or on the basis of incontextual preferences as for abstract final goals. The question then becomes what to make of the ones to whom these intentions and preferences are usually ascribed to.

As with a flying flock of birds (e.g. van Ginneken, 2009: 52-53), it is difficult to actually point down who the actors are in power practices (i.e. the whole flock or individual birds). Is in the case of the concept of territorial cohesion for instance the European Union an actor, or the European Commission, the European Commission’s DG Regio perhaps, or a unit of DG Regio? Indeed, “government” is frequently just a rubric for loosely coupled officials contributing at different times and in complexly unpredictable ways to an outcome or decision’ (Roe, 1994: 129). No wonder then, that governmental organisations ‘are internally divided in horizontal and vertical patterns’ (Salet, 1982: 190) and ‘governments do not always know their intentions’ (Roe, 1994: 129). Even if ‘it is also essential that in a social context the presence of other rationalizing and (more or less) controlling parties should be acknowledged besides governments (Salet, 1982: 190), these other parties arguably suffer from the same “un-actor-like” existence. What is more, one could also move beyond methodological individualism and ask whether individuals are actors: do the parts of him which function in, for instance, his work as official constitute the actor, are it the forces acting on the sub-individual level which matter in themselves (Foucault, 1977, in Foucault 1980a: 208) or do they need to form a ‘plural subject’ or ‘we-intentionality’ (e.g. Gilbert, 1989; Roe, 1994: 189)? Although strange at first sight, leaving the actor and its intentions and (incontextual) preferences behind altogether could thus be the reasonable thing to do.a

A phronetic research of what actually happens analyses and interprets interests in power practices. But what to study then if not actors and intentions? If ‘we never desire against our interest, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it’ (Deleuze&Foucault, 1972, in Bouchard, 1977: 214), the answer becomes simple: you study desires (i.e. impulsive drives) which create interests (i.e. perceived benefits) (Smith, 2007: 69). Although desires can thereby be considered as scattered over (the unconscious of) one or more individuals, because desires are a part of a society’s infrastructure, individuals do not own them (Smith, 2007: 74). It therefore is not an actor who intends its course of action, but desires which group interests, and interests

---

a Actor-Network Theory for instance emphasises interaction between non-human ‘actants’ (i.e. forces) to understand change, whereby actors can even be seen as network-effects (e.g. Law, 1992; Latour in Law&Hassard, 1999).

b Instead of for instance endlessly discussing the level of aggregation on which to place “actorhood” (e.g. network-groupings) (Elster, 2000: 693, 694; Bates&Greif&Levi&Rosenthal&Weingast, 2000: 698).

74
can be pursued in a rational way (Smith, 2007: 74). Discourse analysis then studies text for these rational trails of desires in their vectors or standstill of power practices (e.g. maintaining the status quo through non-decision). However, researching interests as rationalised desires begs the question of how to study territorial cohesion interests in power practices and deal with the perplexity of proximate goals and – possibly marginal, but surely – contextual values.

6.1.2 Streams happen: the garbage-can model and bricolage

Understanding rationalised desires as an "organised anarchy" in the form of a garbage-can, streams, and bricolage helps to map the usages of the concept. You then do not begin by presupposing the organisation of territorial cohesion power practices as a coherent structure. Instead, you pose that they more look like a garbage-can with problematic preferences (i.e. action forms preferences), unclear technology (i.e. practices operate by trial and error, learning by experience, and pragmatic invention), and fluid participation (i.e. the boundaries of the decision structures are flexible) (Cohen&March&Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1995; Husar, 2006: 103). The acts performed in power practices can thereby be pictured as streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities which run through such an organisation, each having 'a life on its own' (Kingdon, 1995; Husar, 2006: 103). In a sense these streams even are the organisation of interests (i.e. rationalised desires): 'a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work' (Cohen&March&Olsen, 1972; Husar, 2006: 103). However, streams do follow describable patterns. The outcomes are a function of the mix of the garbage in the can and how it is processed (Kingdon, 1995). When you know these patterns, you can interpret the structures and then think about the potential consequences (e.g. possible power practices). Hence, this research does not ask for which abstract goals territorial cohesion aims, what intentions and contextual preferences lay behind it, nor who make the concept as it is – not even in the sense of participants as in Kingdon's garbage-can model. Instead, this research maps what is in the territorial cohesion garbage-can and how the streams move inside it (and into and out of it). That is, it researches the interests and (marginal) contextual values at play in the problems, solutions, and boundaries of decision structures of territorial cohesion power practices and the development of such usages of the concept towards proximate goals through various windows of opportunity.

However, the territorial cohesion power practices are not without history – i.e. no tabula rasa here. For policy Kingdon (1984) for example imagines that in the streams of the garbage-can 'proposals are floated, revised, combined and floated again' (Husar, 2006: 103). Policy-making could then borrow and copy bits and pieces of ideas from elsewhere, draw upon and amend locally tried and tested approaches, and cannibalise theories, research, and trends in a complex process of influence, text production, and dissemination (Ball, 1998: 126; Nixon&Walker&Baron, 2002: 238; Davoudi, 2006: 18). Insofar the concept's usage involves policy, territorial cohesion might therefore take on board some features which Ball (1998: 126) ascribes to most policies: they are ramshackle, compromise hit- and miss affairs, reworked, tinkered with, nuanced, and re-created in contexts of practice (Nixon&Walker&Baron, 2002: 238; Davoudi, 2006: 18). The usage of such techniques extends beyond policy though. The anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1966) coined the term 'bricolage' for new forms and order created from tools and materials at hand to address new tasks and challenges (Ferneley&Bell, 2006: 232-233)\(^a\). For this research bricolage is then not so much a statement on how reality always works or how power practices actually happen (e.g. in policy), but more a way to think of the "garbage" in the "territorial cohesion can". Just as genealogy studies how every individual evolved from bits of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of many ancestors and an occasional mutation, this research analyses the concept's usage as a bricolage of many problems, solutions, and boundaries of decision structures and, perhaps, some (pragmatic) inventions indigenous to territorial cohesion itself. As answer to the question of 'What to operationalise?' an almost indescribable chaos then appears: the nature of territorial cohesion power practices to map is understood as a garbage-can of mixing streams and you look at the usage of the concept in this as bricolage. To order things more clearly one therefore

\(^a\) A term later adopted by improvisational theorists (e.g. Innes&Booher, 1999; Weick, 1993).
is in a dire need of a tool with which to interpret the "territorial cohesion genotype" rather violently from the concept's "textual phenotype".

6.2 Not Hajer but Roe

6.2.1 Mapping particular power practices

This research maps the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion that appear in power practices in a particular way. It does not map resources of agent and institutional practices, nor which agents are in and who's out, but the patterns of (in/formal) power practices with a focus on their conflicts while contextualising and eventualising them (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Its discourse analysis thereby emphasises how power relations are most effective 'when they are embodied in what we take as the unquestioned giveness of the world, in our commonsense understanding of reality' (Roe, 1994: 14). What is more, just as Jensen & Richardson (2003) argue concerning the institutionalisation of European spatial planning as a "rational, science-based policy field": the boundaries between invalid and valid knowledge are vital and result from the construction of forms and fields of knowledge. Hence, the need to go beyond merely opinion (i.e. para-doxa) by reinterpreting power practices (see §6.1) in order to interpret how they affect the construction of truth and knowledge claims (e.g. on reasonable territorial cohesion practices) (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). While this research's way of seeing power practices thus clearly relates to mapping the concept's system of meaning/knowledge (see Chapter 5) and demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse (see Chapter 7), the consequences for analysing how an emerging discourse becomes institutionalised in (new) power practices should still be explained. The sections below will do this by first caricaturing the path which is not followed (i.e. "Hajerian" discourse analysis) to thereafter with more contrast clarify the tool used to interpret the concept's usage (i.e. Roe's Narrative Policy Analysis).

6.2.2 More common: Foucaultian discourse analysis a la Hajer

To make Foucault's abstracter work (see Chapter 4) more applicable to study concrete political events, Hajer introduces the "middle range" concepts of 'storylines' and 'discourse coalitions' (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Storylines as central concept is thereby defined as the 'generative statements that bring together previously unrelated elements of discourse and thus allow for new understandings and create new meanings' (Hajer, in Salet & Faludi, 2000: 139) defines this central concept as a 'variety of actors [that] through their utterances reinforce a particular way of talking that is reproduced via an identifiable set of storylines and discursive practices in a given policy domain'. Storylines do this due to 'their essentially figurative or metaphorical nature which allows for a diversity of interpretations', and it would be such multi-interpretable storylines, instead of shared belief systems for instance, that 'hold together the coalitions behind transnational policy discourses' (Hajer, in Salet & Faludi, 2000: 140). Although this compressed characterisation of Hajerian discourse analysis uses a thick brush, some elements common to many discourse analyses, especially policy discourse analyses, come forward from which this research's discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion fundamentally deviates.

With 'discourse coalitions' Hajer re-introduces the role of agency into discourse analysis, which is according to Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) necessary to understand how particular discourses emerge, develop and change. However, as argued above, such a reintroduction of agency would prevent understanding (e.g. how actors are socially constructed through discourse). Also the presumed 'given policy domain' is problematic if one studies change. While Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) takes territorial cohesion as a given policy domain where discursive production takes place, this research on the other hand poses that with the emerging concept of territorial cohesion its (policy) domain is not a "given" either. That is, the creation of it should be researched. What also sets this research on the concept of territorial cohesion apart is that it is not concerned with ways of talking. Where Hajer stresses utterances and their figurative or metaphorical nature, this research focuses on the meaning of what is said in the sense of knowledge and power; its operationalisation to map territorial cohesion
power practices does share the focus on stories though. One could thus by and large characterise this research as on a level of abstraction higher than Hajer's more common brand of (policy) discourse analysis. This because it understands actors solely as part of common understandings of social reality, studies the creation of a policy domain, and abstracts statements from talk. Simply put for the sake of clarity: this research's discourse analysis stands "closer to Foucault".

6.2.3 Roe's Narrative Policy Analysis

This research studies territorial cohesion power practices by using Roe's Narrative Policy Analysis. "Narrative Policy Analysis applies contemporary literary theory to extremely difficult public policy issues" (Roe, 1994: 1). Territorial cohesion is such an issue, because it is uncertain, complex, and polarised (see Chapter 1 and 5 and Book II). That is, the uncertainty of the concept's usage derives from its emergence without a solid ground, the complexity arises from its internal intricacy and interdependence with other policy issues, and the polarisation crystallizes as the concentration of groups around extremes in the issue' (Roe, 1994: 2-3). The interrelation of territorial cohesion's uncertainties, complexities, and polarisations make the analysis especially difficult (e.g. complexity and polarisation lead to uncertainty and the reduction of uncertainty and/or polarisation increase complexity) (Roe, 1994: 2-3). Territorial cohesion therefore unmistakably exemplifies a policy issue so complex and uncertain that it is impossible to identify objectively weaker/stronger arguments (Roe, 1994: 72-73). As a consequence, the asymmetrical narratives in the concept's usage are 'the only index we have that unequal power relations are working themselves out through these policy narratives' (Roe, 1994: 72-73). Hence, when this research cannot study the power practices themselves, it can only study stories as indication of what actually happens. However, such a turn to stories does not entail a lapse from realism into relativism, nor does it imply, as in Hajerian discourse analysis, 'that what is "behind" the narratives are the power relations that form them' (Roe, 1994: 10, 72-73). On the contrary, for Narrative Policy Analysis 'what is "in front of" us is power in form of winning and losing narratives' (Roe, 1994: 72-73). When all else in the territorial cohesion controversy remains uncertain, 'our knowledge of asymmetrical narratives is our knowledge of power' (Roe, 1994: 72-73).

Just as the territorial cohesion power practices are not without history, the usage of the concept does not take place in a void. The social context of the usages even partly forms the concept's role. Although there might solely be linguistic, meaning-making, and discursive territorial cohesion practices – i.e. a possible conclusion of this research's discourse analysis –, when it concerns the established social context in which the concept emerges (e.g. policy domains), the actual existence of power practices is, arguably, more probable. With the concept's usage as bricolage, a central question then becomes whether territorial cohesion has own power practices at all or merely shows a struggle over the re-formation of "old" power practices.

This research hereby applies Narrative Policy Analysis to both the concept's usage and its social context. In general, European policy can namely be understood as part of a discursive formation of European governance that is linked to a set of metanarratives on basic questions of 'what the world is about' (Diez, 2001: 6) – e.g. the Metanarratives of the Free Market, State, Civil Society, Science. Narrative Policy Analysis however, is about small-M metanarratives. These are the policy narratives 'that do not seek to homogenize or stifle conflict', but 'embrace, however temporarily, the major oppositions in a controversy, without in the process slighting any of that opposition' (Roe, 1994: 52). Also such policy articulations enable and reproduce the larger discursive structure of "large-M" metanarratives, and are thus 'part, and not merely a consequence, of the latter' (Diez, 2001: 6-7). Narrative Policy Analysis then allows one to both reinterpret the power practices that exist in the more fixed social context of the concept's usage and to index territorial cohesion's uncertain, complex, and polarised power practices with metanarratives.

6.2.4 The three steps of Narrative Policy Analysis

With Narrative Policy Analysis as the proper operationalisation tool to map the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion, the question becomes how to use it as such. There are three steps. Following Roe (1994: 72-73):
Chapter 6

155) you start with the conventional definitions of the stories told with territorial cohesion and identify the policy narratives that conform to this definition: ‘If they are stories, they have beginnings, middles, and ends, as in scenarios; if arguments, they have premises and conclusions.’ You thereby look for those scenarios/arguments in the textual data that dominate the issue of territorial cohesion, that is, those policy narratives that ‘underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policymaking in situations of many unknowns, high intricacy, and little, if any agreement’ (Roe, 1994: 155). Note that these identified stories are linguistic events when told, but themselves merely the only phenomena we have to know what actually happens in the chaotic events of territorial cohesion power practices. The next step of Narrative Policy Analysis also identifies, but this time those narratives that do not conform to the definition of policy narratives above (i.e. nonstories) or ‘run counter to the controversy’s dominant policy narratives’ (i.e. counterstories) (Roe, 1994: 155). The last step is essential though: you compare the two sets of narratives (i.e. stories and nonstories/counterstories) ‘in order to generate a metanarrative “told” by the comparison’ (Roe, 1994: 155). The generation of a metanarrative thus heavily leans on interpretation. A precept coming from semiotics and gestalt psychology hereby governs the interpreting: ‘a thing is defined by what it is not’ (Roe, 1994: 155). The stories and nonstories or counterstories which are not the metanarrative then together construct the metanarrative which embraces the controversy’s major opposed assumptions (Roe, 1994: 52, 161). Where policy narratives seek to ensure the assumptions for decision making in territorial cohesion’s uncertain and complex power practices, this research then approximates objectivity with Narrative Policy Analysis by identifying the concept’s systematic uncertainty ‘apparent only at the aggregate level as the certainties of expert, but opposing, viewpoints’ (Roe, 1994: 161).

6.2.5 The unknown rules of the territorial cohesion game

This research’s discourse analysis thus maps the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion as patterns of (in/formal) power practices. It thereby contextualises and eventualises the conflicts in a more abstract way than the Hajerian discourse analyses which presume actors and a policy domain as givens and focus on language to show how storylines form discourse coalitions. Instead, this research uses Roe’s Narrative Policy Analysis because of territorial cohesion’s interrelated uncertainty, complexity, and polarisation. These namely make our knowledge of asymmetrical narratives the only available index of the power relations in what actually happens with the concept’s usage – besides the reinterpreted power practices of the more fixed social context in which the concept plays or might play a role that is. To identify the systematic uncertainty (i.e. the opposing expert viewpoints) in the conventional definitions of the stories told, one would with Narrative Policy Analysis interpret the metanarrative which embraces the major opposed assumptions of the dominant scenarios/arguments and the nonstories or counterstories in the territorial cohesion controversy. In the concept’s case these assumptions are mostly concerned with one step of a conventional policy analysis: ‘defining the policy problem of interest’ (Roe, 1994: 156). A Narrative Policy Analysis of territorial cohesion thus mostly maps problem statements. A conclusion thereof could then resonate with what Roe says about the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: ‘By being always preoccupied with determining which story “was” correct, we evade the more urgent exercise of having to deal with there still being no “story” to tell’ (Roe, 1994: 157-158). The consequence would be similar too: we may wonder whether the arena and the rules of the territorial cohesion game are known (Roe, 1994: 158).

6.3 Extending the use of Roe

6.3.1 From digression to extending

As stories are the only index of the unequal power relations at play in the mixing streams of the territorial cohesion garbage-can, this research uses Narrative Policy Analysis to map the major opposed assumptions of the uncertain, complex, and polarised usage of the concept. For Roe (1994: 156) the goal of Narrative Policy Analysis always is to generate a metanarrative that makes it possible for opponents to act on an issue over which they still disagree. That is, although Roe (1994: 156) stresses that this metanarrative does not end the uncertainty,
complexity, or polarisation, the metanarrative does underwrite and stabilise a set of common assumptions due to which it can function as a policy narrative for decision-making. However, instead of coming up with a metanarrative as new agenda, this research uses Narrative Policy Analysis for other aims – even opposed ones (see Chapter 8). Another way in which this research digresses from Roe’s (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis, is that it extends the application of this tool beyond the policy sphere to other forms of political power practices. While this is necessary simply because the concept appears in other spheres too, the research’s methodology also allows for such an extension due to its ontological understanding of the meaningful world outside text as “text-like”. Territorial cohesion controversies outside policy can therefore also be studied through their stories. Using Roe’s (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis for other goals and spheres of application thus extends its usage.

Besides extending the use of Roe’s (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis, this research also merely uses this tool to answer a mundane question: ‘What are the territorial cohesion power practices?’, or in other words: ‘For what is the concept used and how?’. To know the concept’s game, how assumptions of territorial cohesion problems form its common ground for decision-making, one needs to describe these inertnesses through interpretive analysis instead of (simultaneously) being solution-oriented to further decision-making. This mapping of strategic positions reveals the systematic uncertainty of the concept’s bricolage by outlining the – not one, but multiple metanarratives which embrace the major opposed assumptions in territorial cohesion controversies. The actual operationalisation in which Narrative Policy Analysis fits to map the usages of the concept below will further explain this extended and mundane use in four consecutive stages and one in-between alert: i) drawing the agendas, ii) recognising the topics, iii) structuring the order, and iv) outlining the field, and a battlefield generalisation for positions instead of actors.

6.3.2 Stage one: drawing the agendas

Every political organisation exploits some kinds of conflict and suppresses others, organises some into and some out of politics, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias (Schattschneider, 1960: 71; Lukes, 1975: 16). To thereby understand how the contested definition of a single policy concept plays a part in the emergence of a new policy field, Böhme & Richardson & Dabinett & Jensen (2004: 1181) would look at how a particular concept enters a policy arena and ‘reaches the status of an agreed aim or need, and thus becomes established as a hegemonic concept’. However, as mentioned above, the concept of territorial cohesion seems to create a new policy arena, mostly out of various old ones (i.e. bricolage), and to appear in other arenas than policy too (e.g. politics proper, science). For the political organisation of territorial cohesion the question therefore becomes which topics are included in the concept’s mobilisation of bias and therefore mark out its usage – and this research separates usage before it is related to territorial cohesion definitions (see Chapter 5 and 7). The first stage in mapping the usage of the concept then revolves around agenda-setting.

For any political system agenda-setting is a crucial stage in the policy process, as an issue needs first to be placed onto the active agenda of a governmental institution before policy can be made for it (Peters, 1996: 61; Husar, 2006: 103). Also for territorial cohesion this could be a difficult task which requires substantial political mobilisation and luck (Peters, 1996: 61; Husar, 2006: 103), but what remains a question is how far it forms a new issue or a bricolage of old ones already on the active agenda. Either way, an important distinction hereby is the one between placing an issue on an agenda and doing this in a particular form (Peters, 1996: 63; Husar, 2006: 95). In European policy different (administrative and legislative) organisations often have different conceptualisations of the same issue, and ‘having a favourite item placed on the agenda, but in a form that is not acceptable, must be counted as a defeat’ (Peters, 1996: 63; Husar, 2006: 95). The concept of territorial cohesion could thus also be used to put an issue which is already on an active policy agenda on the same or another agenda in a different form.

For the use of Roe’s (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis beyond policy, Kingdon’s (1984) garbage-can model helps to extend what you can draw of territorial cohesion’s agenda-setting; note that the refinements below are here merely meant to demonstrate that you can look at different spheres in the same way (i.e. agenda-
Chapter 6

setting). Kingdon's model considers agenda-setting as consisting of three elements: problems, policies, and politics, whereby each constitutes a largely independent process stream (Kingdon, 1984; Richardson, 1996: 16; Huser, 2006: 103). This opens up the possibility to draw what happens on the territorial cohesion agendas of policy and politics proper, and its scientific agenda too when science concerns itself with the re/cognition of territorial cohesion problems. What is more, besides that these process streams do follow patterns in the territorial cohesion garbage-can (e.g. with structure couplings, system constraints), the proposals that survive also conform to criteria of technical feasibility, budgetary workability, dominant values, and current national moods (Kingdon, 1984: 21; Richardson, 1996: 17; Huser, 2006: 103). Hence, this adds the possibility to draw territorial cohesion's financial and more general agendas (i.e. budgets, values, moods), or how these as criteria frame the concept's agenda-setting process, and opens up yet another way to draw the concept's scientific agenda when science researches territorial cohesion's technical feasibility.

Especially that with Kingdon's (1984) garbage-can model the problem stream of agenda-setting and the criteria of technical feasibility make it possible to (indirectly) draw the scientific agenda-setting is essential, because this research on the concept of territorial cohesion focuses on the relation between, simply put, politics and science. While also in science itself the choice of research topics has an important influence on the current state of scientific knowledge, such choices become enormously complex in the case of science in policy contexts (Clark&Majone, 1985: 13-14). As Clark&Majone (1985: 13) pose for instance: then 'scientists choose what studies to perform, institutions choose what work will be on their agenda, program managers choose what research to fund, and policymakers what problems to tackle (and in what order)'. However, this research does not aim for the sophisticated level of detail which untangles such a complex agenda-setting process into the agendas of preconceived policy, political, financial, and scientific spheres. Nor does it order this agenda-setting according to streams of problems, policy, and politics and the various criteria met by the proposals which survive them. Instead, this part of the research's discourse analysis simply interprets the territorial cohesion agenda, whereby it does not matter much whether the issues on it derive from policy, politics, finances, and/or science; other discourse analytical parts are more concerned with science (see §5.3) and its relationship with politics (see Chapter 7). This actual operationalisation is thus about the basal ordering of the different usages of the concept which re-/mobilise bias in the power practices of the European Union – what nonetheless leads to some refinement according to the concept's stories and the different ways in which territorial cohesion power practices are performed.

6.3.3 ALERT: not actors but positions

A major way in which the actual operationalisation of this research deviates from Roe's (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis, is that it considers the concept of territorial cohesion as a disputed battle ground in itself. That is, the contest in the territorial cohesion game is not only about what the concept's area of action is (i.e. "the where" of positions), but also about what its (chief) actors are (i.e. "the who" of positions). The strategic positions shown in territorial cohesion stories on various topics thus do not belong to certain actors (e.g. as with storylines in a Hajerian discourse analysis). Of course, one can think of actors moving from position to position and therefore of strategic positions as for actors to take or keep. Metaphorically speaking, an armed group can, within its constraints and on the ground of their goals, strengths, coalitions, et cetera, choose its strategic place on a battlefield (e.g. hiding in a cave, over-viewing from a mountain top, in the midst of an open plain, along a well-travelled road, moving constantly). Different groups could use these same positions for different goals, also when the battle is not fought very intensely and the struggle continues in colder forms (e.g. placing a castle near a river-crossing, fortifying a place of residence, become nomadic). Nevertheless, these strategic positions should not be identified with the acting groups.

Quite the contrary, because stories are this research's only index of power relations, the "actors" are understood as part of the stories themselves. What is more, taking the strategic position to recognise one and

\[\text{As Elster (2000: 692-693) for instance holds for historic explanations on high levels of aggregation: "Some of the actors that enter into the explanations are huge collectives – clans, the elite, North, South, and so on. When these are endowed with beliefs and goals are assumed to engage in complex strategic calculations, credibility breaks down."} \]
not another as an actor when it concerns territorial cohesion could be self-fulfilling (e.g. the same actor in the concept's area of action is not the same as an actor when it concerns territorial cohesion could be self-fulfilling (e.g. the same actor in the concept's area of action as in other “games”). The territorial cohesion stories then also show the construction of actors, as the forces in power practices constitute both positions and actors (i.e. grouped forces); note that every strategic position is also a position in another concept's area of action and vice versa. The stories therefore are partly relinquished by their usage (e.g. by the creation of new positions through reshaping the landscape with walls, fortifications, bridges). Contradicting stories are also part of territorial cohesion’s area of action, as well as the expansion of the concept’s system of meaning/knowledge (see Chapter 5).
6.3.5 Stage three: structuring the order
When you will know the territorial cohesion topics through the concept's metanarratives, the question becomes how to structure the ordering of all the stories involved; due to the hermeneutic circle involved in archival work the structure below comes forth out of the processing of the research's data as demonstrated in Book II. You start with analytically separating different usage areas. Hereby Wittgenstein's (1968) idea of family resemblance helps to regroup relevant similarities: as long as stories have enough similar characteristics they form a "family" (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005: 504). There are no necessary conditions that put a story in one usage area instead of another, because 'no single trait is shared by all members of the family' (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005: 504). What makes it especially decisive which similarities of the stories you take as irrelevant for ordering them, is that these usage areas do not only relate but also overlap. Through analytic retroduction (see Appendix A; A.2.4) this research then comes up with the relevant similarities according to the contextual appearance of a story in a sphere where power practices are performed in a certain way (e.g. auctoritas, potestas; see Chapter 3). Note though, that this analytical separation of usage areas is an abstraction: although usage areas are characterised as containing stories with certain traits, the way they were distinguished was due to these traits, and the usage areas therefore did not first exist as an entity in itself to which these stories were ascribed to later. In addition, after sorting texts into usage areas, you still have to construct different information out of the same sets of data “within” them.

Besides the territorial cohesion stories embraced by the metanarratives, there also appear four other types of stories in the usage areas. To start with those on the highest abstraction level: each usage area is characterised by the general stories which frame all stories within it – these framing stories come very close to the "large-M" metanarratives from §6.2.3 above (e.g. "the European Union has competencies" comes close to "the State"). One level of abstraction lower you can distinguish those that structure all the territorial cohesion stories embraced by the metanarratives. These structuring stories are on the concept of territorial cohesion itself and show the strategic meta-positions on the usage of the concept in an usage area (e.g. territorial cohesion is un/important). However, in every usage area there also appear stories on similar or even the same topics as the territorial cohesion stories without mentioning the concept. These help to understand the role of the concept's practices, as they show the immediate social context of the (inherently contextual) territorial cohesion positions – thereby, for instance, indicating a leeway for an area of action to extend. For this reason the dynamics of the narratives of which these contextual stories are a part need to be ordered; from here on the term 'narrative' is only meant in this – compared to Roe (1994) more – specific way. The usage area's narratives with an own dynamic are the counterparts of its territorial cohesion metanarratives in that they have their own structuring stories while embracing the usage area's dominant stories and counter-/nonstories which do not mention the concept. These narratives can then indicate which forces led or might lead to the strategic positions interpreted from the territorial cohesion stories, because their dynamics existed (long) before and during the concept's usage for similar topics. Important struggles might then be about which part of a usage area should be within the domain of territorial cohesion, as shown by discussions on whether a (part of a) narrative should be "colonised" as a territorial cohesion metanarrative (e.g. a re-formation of "old" power practices). To end this refinement of the stories in the usage areas, those stories on territorial cohesion or its immediate context can be noted that link topics. In the struggles as mentioned above, these connecting stories can indicate a joining of forces and/or the specification of a position depending on their role and development. However, the four layers of abstraction which mainly structure the ordering of all the stories are: i) usage areas in which ii) general stories frame all stories within it, iii) others structure the territorial cohesion stories and those in the concept's immediate context, and iv) territorial cohesion metanarratives and narratives with an own dynamic.

6.3.6 Stage four: outlining the field
After constructing ordered usage areas from stories on territorial cohesion and its immediate context, the question becomes how to come up with the whole territorial cohesion usage field. It is the territorial cohesion metanarratives as parts of the usage areas that together do this, because the schemas of metanarratives reveal for
which topics the concept is used. However, to outline the concept's whole usage field out of its context in which often the same topics appear (i.e. in the narratives with an own dynamic), one should also describe the ways in which the concept's usage stands out.

How the concept is used depends on the contextual role it plays in time. This research interprets the patterns of this after mapping the strategic positions from all the stories through the years, both those on territorial cohesion and its immediate context. Eventualisation is important hereby, because although together the metanarratives and narratives point out where the territorial cohesion positions aggregate, they do not show which are strong/weak. One should thus place stories in their social context of events (e.g. the agreement on the European Spatial Development Perspective, the concept's appearance in the draft Constitutional Treaty, the publication of a new Cohesion Report) to see how what are assumed to be territorial cohesion problems give the concept an own ground for decision-making. The changing stories in such an overview indicate how the usage of the concept develops on certain topics. One should then focus on the developments in territorial cohesion's conceptual history of which the pattern stands out from the contextual dynamics of the concept, especially those that (in usage areas) alter the borders of the whole territorial cohesion usage field. The latter namely both show the range of territorial cohesion power practices and suggest the possibilities for them later on. When you interpret the patterns of the collection of metanarratives thus, you can outline the whole territorial cohesion usage field according to the "ownness" of the concept's usage.

The actual operationalisation of the basic mapping of the usages of the concept thus allows the construction of different information from the same sets of data (i.e. documents) interpreted and analysed to map the concept's meanings in territorial cohesion propositions (see Chapter 5). The concept's whole usage field namely marks out the (possible) territorial cohesion power practices from the intertextual territorial cohesion text as an area of action full of territorial cohesion positions on which argumentations can be built indirectly (see Chapter 7). The following elaborate vocabulary thereby presents the significant data (i.e. text), social events (i.e. power practices) and indexive phenomena (i.e. stories): the territorial cohesion area of action, the concept's whole usage field, usages areas, general/framing stories, structuring stories, territorial cohesion metanarratives, narratives with an own dynamic, and the (connecting) territorial cohesion stories and (connecting) stories in the concept's immediate context.

6.4 Concluding towards discourse

6.4.1 Creating an overview

This chapter operationalised this research’s violently basal mapping of the territorial cohesion garbage-can and bricolage usage of the concept that is needed to come up with its whole usage field from the mixing streams of problems, solutions, and boundaries of decision structures (i.e. what to map). To know for what and how the concept is used in its policy, political, financial, and/or scientific spheres, Narrative Policy Analysis functions as a central tool in the unfolding of territorial cohesion's uncertainty, complexity, and polarisation in four stages (i.e. how to map). The first stage draws the extensive territorial cohesion agenda on which the agenda-setting of the European Union re/places many issues in various forms. From the conventional definitions of all the stories involved the second stage then recognises the territorial cohesion topics by interpreting the metanarratives. They embrace the major opposed assumptions of the dominant arguments (i.e. premises) and their counter- and nonstories in the concept's controversies. To structure the order of these opposing expert viewpoints on territorial cohesion the third stage distinguishes four layers of abstraction. Family resemblance thereby analytically separates usage areas (i) also characterised by general stories which frame all the stories within it (ii). The metanarratives and their counterparts that do not mention territorial cohesion (i.e. narratives with an own dynamic) fit herein (iv) and are structured by stories on the concept and its immediate context themselves (iii). Schemes of coded problems statements which put these three types of stories (and those connecting topics) against time then present this layered order. They also allow the final mapping stage to interpretively outline
the whole usage field formed by the collection of territorial cohesion metanarratives. However, to separate this territorial cohesion field out of a context of similar topics, the patterns of the concept's usage should with eventualisation be identified from the streams moving in the collection of metanarratives towards proximate goals through windows of opportunity. Whether territorial cohesion's conceptual history developed "ownness" in the courses of direction of what happens in power practices remains to be seen though, as (also) that depends on the research object.

6.4.2 What's the use of mapping usages?
This research's (also) studies the intertextual territorial cohesion data to discourse analytically trace the rational trails of grouped desires (i.e. interests) and (marginal) contextual values displayed by the concept's battlefield. Besides the reinterpreted social context in which the concept plays or might play a role, stories appear as the only available phenomena to index the power relations in what actually happens. In the social events of the European Union's vectors and standstill of power practices the contextualised landscape of the concept's usage then depicts the usage areas in which different kinds of battles wage over territorial cohesion topics. To topographically mark out the (possible) domain of the concept, this research maps the whole territorial cohesion usage field, whereby the metanarratives indicate the points around which oppositions group (i.e. counter/stories) and positions fade or are explored (i.e. nonstories).

However, while agenda-setting settles the topics to battle (later on), their strategic positions cover the concept's area of action, and the relevant power practices are therefore mapped, the question of what are territorial cohesion power practices still remains. A major struggle is namely not merely about what the limits of the territorial cohesion arena are, but whether the concept rules the games played in it. Hence, the usage of mapping territorial cohesion positions is that it opens up a critique of the concept: the concept's systematic uncertainty also entails an indecision about which power practices constitute the territorial cohesion discourse by being associated to its system of knowledge. The operationalisation question then becomes how to link the mapped power and knowledge (e.g. how the ways in which the concept's usages re-/mobilise bias in the European Union's power practices produce territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge and vice versa and territorial cohesion argumentations build on a contested ground of positions). The next chapter therefore deals with how Book II can answer to this.
Chapter 7  Demarcating the Discursive Nodal Point

Introduction

The third sub-question of this research is 'How do the concept's meaning and usage relate?'. We therefore have to know how to operationalise this step of this research's discourse analysis as well. Now it revolves around demarcating the territorial cohesion pro/positions, what thus has to deal with the interplay between the concept's meanings and usages.

To arrive at the vocabulary with which Book II can write down the concept's hermeneutic horizon this chapter takes three steps as well. Also here these successively treat what to operationalise, how to, and the actual operationalisation. To reconstruct the picture which rejoins the analytically separated meaning and usage sides of the concept's multiplicity of discursive elements, the primary step to take is elaborating on what this research traces when drawing the territorial cohesion discourse (§7.1). The Discursive Nodal Point-perspective thereby helps to structure the network of interdependencies as formed by the practices relating territorial cohesion meanings and usages (§7.2). For the application of this tool towards the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse its extension from point to surface shows how to fathom the outlooks of multiple territorial cohesion discourses. The actual operationalisation nonetheless points out the criteria with which to individualise the discourse this research is concerned with (§7.3). The conclusion of this chapter finally points out how the results of such a discourse analysis credit the value of seeing territorial cohesion through a discourse analytical framework (§7.4).

7.1 Trace the discursive practices relating meaning and usage

7.1.1 Linking meaning/knowledge and practice through discursive interdependencies

Three related descriptions of modern societies signify the importance of discursive practices. To begin with, Fairclough (2003: 30) says that complex modern societies network practices together across different spheres and scales of social life (e.g. global economy, national education, local family life). Fairclough (2003: 34) also holds that much (inter)action in modern societies is 'mediated,' 'action at a distance' depending upon some communication technology. Relating both these descriptions into a conglomerate, Hejl (1987: 327) considers coexisting systems as interdependent while each functions according to own 'codes' and procedural routines, that is, they are synreferential (Diez, 2001: 17). When you put these three descriptions together, more follows than that texts are a crucial part of the networking relations of modern societies (Fairclough, 2003: 30). Although reference by texts allows for mediation, something must mediate between the text an sich and its social context (Fairclough, 2003: 37). The argument here is that discourses inhabit this (inter)mediating level, and that their discursive practices link meaning-making and power practices as shown by the textual traces of linguistic practices. Yet, more important for the formation of a discourse (i.e. a system of knowledge and its associated practices) is that discursive practices also link each of these practices and meaning and knowledge itself.

This research focuses on the events in discursive practices that link territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge (see Chapter 5) and the concept's power practices (see Chapter 6). Simply put, this entails tracing the links between social science and politics. Although one should not mistake the process that social science describes and predicts for its own products, social theory can influence practice (Sayer, 2000: 34). In general also the other direction of influence seems obvious, because if social science would have had a broader base, arguably its content should have been more varied in addressed questions, underlying assumptions, and reasonable theories (Nelson, 1990: 266; Saarikoski, 2002: 11). Especially policy science is accused of this link. Kariel (1972: 106) for instance holds that it attunes to a settled and predefined political reality and remains on the side of accredited interests: while making the prevailing problems of society those of itself, the task of...
policy science becomes ‘to search for the type of knowledge which can be used to govern effectively within established political frameworks to integrate men in established systems’ (Torgerson, 1986: 38). Since decades, policy analysis then not so much appears as an antagonistic relationship of knowledge and politics, but as a theory and practice rooted in inherently political choices (Torgerson, 1986: 37, 39, 45). Besides that, because of this relationship between politics and science, ‘scientific’ policy making might turn out to be not true to science at all (Lindblom, 1979: 524), the link does not have to lie in that researchers influence practices or vice versa, but in that both depend on shared concepts (Sayer, 2000: 34). Discourse analysis should thus go beyond the simplified relationship of politics and social science and study those interdependencies which link knowledge that can be scientific and power practices which can be political.

Foucaultian discourse analysis does not research interdependencies by focussing on cause-effect relationships (e.g. the origin of policies, politics influencing science or vice versa) due to its ‘general scepticism towards the existence of ‘real world knowledge’ outside discourse’ (Diez, 2001: 12). It does focus on the possibilities of articulation (e.g. of European policy) which emerge out of discursive interdependencies (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 58; Wæver, 1998: 116; Diez, 2001: 12). These interdependencies are established by discursive practices and due to them a system of knowledge and its associated practices together form a discourse. The question then becomes how to study these discursive interdependencies and practices.

Foucault (in Shapiro, 1984) leads the way by (also) treating ‘discourse’ as individualisable group of statements and the regulated practices that account for a number of statements (Fairclough, 2003: 123). A discourse should then not be understood on the level of the articulated (policy) statements themselves (e.g. territorial cohesion pro/positions), but as the structure of rules regulating them (Larsen, 1997; Diez, 2001: 13). Just as texts indicate linguistic practices, definitions meaning-making practices, and strategic positions power practices, these rules of discursive interdependence indicate discursive practices. A Foucaultian discourse analysis analyses a domain of statements (i.e. a substantial part of the material discourses are made up of) thus in order to discern the rules which govern them as a group (Larsen, 1997; Diez, 2001: 13; Fairclough, 2003: 123). When formulated on this meta-level, such rules thereby point out the necessary and forbidden articulations this research looks for (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123), because they deny/accept texts inside the realm of territorial cohesion expertise; note that these rules only exist as a descriptive interpretation of the statements though. Hence, this research looks for how knowledge and power are linked in the network of territorial cohesion pro/positions. It thereby traces the discursive practices by setting up the rules which catch the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion meanings and the concept's usages.

7.1.2 Seen from spatial policy: one or more territorial cohesion discourses?
A discourse does not merely represent the world with a certain commonality, inclusiveness, and continuity, as one also distinguishes discourses according to how their particular knowledges are of social significance (Fairclough, 2003: 126). Discourses thus constitute ‘nodal points’ (Fairclough, 2003: 126) in the relationships between language, meaning, and power. However, a complexity is that a discourse can – except at the level of the most specific and localised discourses – itself be seen as a combination of other discourses articulated together in particular ways (Fairclough, 2003: 127). In this research there are at least three ways in which this is possible for the territorial cohesion discourse. To begin with, if at the moment the territorial cohesion discourse is in the making, and if new discourses emerge through combining existing discourses (Fairclough, 2003: 127), then “the” territorial cohesion discourse might only exists in the plural. This will not be problematic for this research though, as then its outcome would simply be that there is not (yet) a single territorial cohesion discourse.

Territorial cohesion's relationship with spatial policy explains another way in which the territorial cohesion discourse can consist of multiple territorial cohesion discourses. One could namely suggest that the new concept of territorial cohesion is a part or sub-discourse of the emerging European spatial policy discourse or vice versa, or that (the) territorial cohesion and spatial policy discourses overlap or mutually use or complement

---

* What might be interesting for the science of spatial planning is that one could argue that a discourse could also become socially significant due to its effects on the tangible world as *extra-discoursal sphere.*
Demarcating the Discursive Nodal Point

each other. Either way, this relationship between the one and several territorial cohesion discourses stands out because it concerns two levels of discourse: a single system of territorial cohesion knowledge with its associated practices which harbours several territorial cohesion policy discourses. As the policy sphere, or even spatial policy sphere, might form a major part of the territorial cohesion power practices, a bit more attention should be paid hereto.

For the level of policy discourse, Jensen & Richardson (2003) hold that spatial policy processes, no matter which governmental level, are pursued in a field of discursive conflict where a constellation of discourses, in harmony and competition, shape the relations of power and knowledge and affect the fine grain of policy making. This thus provides the discursive context for, just as the concept of territorial cohesion, the emergence of European spatial policy – of which Jensen & Richardson (2003) say that it still develops through transient and recurring areas of conflict between policy discourses (e.g. in the informal process which lead to the European Spatial Development Perspective and was thereafter revived). To institutionalise European spatial policy as a rational science-based policy field, one then needs to construct new fields of knowledge which frame, transform, and exclude certain forms of knowledge (Böhme & Richardson & Dabinett & Jensen, 2004: 1181). However, at the stage of the construction of policy processes it is not enough to set ground rules for the creation of knowledge (e.g. to process certain data, use particular methodologies), also agenda setting takes place (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). With such a disparate and multi-level policy field, a key question becomes how it is discursively formed and how the necessities for action are formulated (Dabinett & Richardson, 2005: 204). Although a hegemonic spatial policy discourse might gradually emerge through contested re-/formation in successive policy processes and reflect an amalgam of successful policy discourses and unresolved conflicts, the point here is that there is a striking harmony in the rhetoric of each of them (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). The conditioning of various specific im/possible ideas, practices, and solutions thereby signifies the construction of the rationality of policy discourses (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). This therefore points to the higher level of discourse by linking a system of knowledge and its associated practices. A lesson for the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse coming from spatial policy discourses is thus, that when, dramatically put, various power-rationalities fight epistemic contests, the web of their discursive interdependencies has to be tightly knit (i.e. no interaction, no fight). Territorial cohesion’s field of knowledge and action as “battle-arena” could then, more or less harmoniously, be shaped rhetorically in such a way that it forms a single discourse nonetheless (e.g. as ‘nodal point’ for various policy discourses).

A third way in which the territorial cohesion discourse can exist out of several discourses comes from the research perspective instead of the object: the concept’s relationship with the science of spatial policy through this research. Insofar this science is multidisciplinary (e.g. by consisting of those aspects of other disciplines which are concerned with space) it might namely project a multi-discoursive perspective on its objects. To prevent that this research constructs multiple territorial cohesion discourses just because of its viewpoint (i.e. the science of spatial policy), it should in this case focus on the “ownness” of the territorial cohesion discourse in the way it combines other discourses.

This Foucaultian discourse analysis thus goes beyond the simple relationship between politics and social science as it focuses on the possibilities of articulation emerging out of those discursive interdependencies that form a discourse. When this structure of rules regulates statements through discursive practices, a system of knowledge and its associated practices can be interpreted from already articulated (policy) statements. However, this research which has the concept of territorial cohesion as research object complexes such an interpretation, as an outcome of it might be that the there appear several territorial cohesion discourses. ‘Three possible conclusions that do not mutually exclude each other may then follow: i) “the” territorial cohesion discourse did not develop into a definite stage just yet, ii) the territorial cohesion discourse (also) harbours territorial cohesion policy discourses, or iii) the “ownness” of the territorial cohesion discourse lays in the way it combines other discourses. Such conclusions are not problematic, as long as this research is clear about what its objectives are: descriptively interpreting the rules of the discursive practices which link the system of territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge and the concept’s power practices. Since the concept’s network of pro/positions
varies indefinitely and widely at the moment, the question then becomes which rationalities that link powers and knowledges to include in the territorial cohesion discourse. The next sections therefore deal with how to trace the rules of territorial cohesion's discursive interdependencies.

7.2 Territorial cohesion as Discursive Nodal Point

7.2.1 Demarcating a discourse: the outward and in-depth

To get to the rules of the hermeneutic horizon which demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse this research maps the links between the concept's meanings and usages in a particular way. It sees the mapped meanings as the conceptualisation of knowledge validity (Jensen & Richardson, 2003) and, if territorial cohesion knowledge forms appear, it identifies how the statements of the included texts represent a particular gaze, that is, a particular part of the world with a particular perspective (Fairclough, 2003: 129), which therefore forms territorial cohesion's truth criteria. After also mapping the field of interests (e.g. weak/dominant values and norms) (Jensen & Richardson, 2003), the two maps can be compared to the forms of red and blue lines that, when you look at them with the apt 3D-glasses, turn into a three dimensional image. However, instead of presenting two dimensions three-dimensionally, the “3D-glasses” operationalising the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse should image the power-knowledge network as the third dimension which connects interests and meanings/knowledges. The question to reconstruct the discourse which forms the concept's interwoven power-rationality then becomes what these “glasses” look like. They should namely enable us to see the construction of truth and knowledge claims in the mapped territorial cohesion pro/positions we look at (Jensen & Richardson, 2003).

Before treating the operationalisation tool itself, two aspects of the territorial cohesion discourse lying outside its view should be dealt with. To begin with, borders are only really possible to draw when seen from both sides (Wittgenstein, 1998: 9). This makes the exploration of the line demarcating the concept's networked intellectual and political positions the more difficult. The discursive power inherent in the framing of a debate through some fundamental commonalities therefore needs to be analysed in connection with alternative positions that do not follow this common ‘trunk’ (Diez, 2001: 13-14). For its analysis of alternative positions this research mostly depends on the mapping of territorial cohesion meanings and usages out of the concept's context (i.e. before it traces the discourse's demarcation-line). The resulting maps come up with very fuzzy limit-lines of territorial cohesion pro/positions though (see Book II). This could highlight that the structuring of the concept's discursive interdependencies is a (discursive) practice, one which marginalises alternative positions during the re/insertion of the trunk into the present debate (Milliken, 1999: 243; Diez, 2001: 14). The contrasts between the intellectual and political positions can then point to pro/positions which are weakly linked in the concept's power-knowledge network (e.g. as possible alternatives). By thus dealing with both sides of the border, this research sets up purely hypothetical rules of the ongoing demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse. It should therefore both be aware of what is absent on the maps presented to view and what becomes invisible or blurry by looking through the “glasses” of its operationalisation tool. The problem how to situate the territorial cohesion discourse amongst other types of discourse remains though (see §7.3.2 on criteria of correlation).

Another aspect lying outside the view of the operationalisation tool is the depth of the territorial cohesion discourse. When discourses are multi-layered, one can namely distinguish the “branches” (i.e. discursive interdependencies) from the trunk (i.e. discursive structures) (Wæver, 1997: 117; Diez, 2001: 14). Although one can with the operationalisation tool explained below specify the kind of changes of the territorial cohesion discourse that are more likely to occur than others (Diez, 2001: 14), one cannot see whether this is ‘change in

---

Footnotes:

a Note that this metaphor only works with the old-fashioned stereoscopic 3D-glasses: when you look with one blue and one red lens at the same (moving) image which is twice presented, those presentations are placed a bit apart and differently coloured (i.e. blue and red).

b ‘The [Tractatus will] draw a limit to thinking, or rather—not to thinking, but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought)’ (Wittgenstein, 1998: 9).
continuity’ (Wæver, 1997: 6) or a more radical movement. The discourse’s depth is thus relative and implies a comparison with other discourses (e.g. it could be essential for European spatial planning). Even if under normal circumstances the deepest discursive structures are maintained (e.g. because altering them has heavy (political) costs) (Wæver, 1998: 117), territorial cohesion could be one of the basic concepts that alters them (Diez, 2001: 15). The status of the territorial cohesion discourse then depends on its strategic integration in the total system of relations and can be weighed on the basis of other rational grounds of practices (see possible future research, e.g. as proposed in §18.6). This research therefore hones the “glasses” of the operationalisation tool for their right strength during the final stage of its discourse analysis (i.e. a comparison with other discourses), and thereafter calls for a retrospect thereof.

7.2.2 Discursive Nodal Point as tool to order thoughts

The question of how to trace territorial cohesion’s discursive interdependencies is here answered by giving an operationalisation tool: the Discursive Nodal Point. This tool allows us to structure the territorial cohesion debate by understanding the concept as essentially contested (Connolly, 1983) however central in the political debate (Diez, 2001: 16, 18). It then is in a Discursive Nodal Point that discourses tie together. What makes this the more complex, is that discourses in themselves already constitute ‘nodal points’ in the relationship between language, meaning, and power (Fairclough, 2003: 126). Notwithstanding the intricacy of looking for a Discursive Nodal Point as a nodal point of ‘nodal points’, that the territorial cohesion discourse might be a composite of one or multiple discourses justifies its use. The question then becomes how to join the linking of the concept’s meanings and power relations and the territorial cohesion discourse with this operationalisation tool.

In the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective the expressions of reasoned thought tie meaning, power, and discourse together. It is namely only through the phenomena of discursive articulation that the meaning of ‘territorial’ and the meaning of ‘cohesion’ come firmly into being (Diez, 1999; Walker, 2000). Each discursive articulation of territorial cohesion is part of a discourse on territorial cohesion as well, because this discursive practice (Laclau&Mouffe, 1985: 105) stabilises meaning in discursive nodal points: it fills ‘territorial’ and ‘cohesion’ with meaning through the tying together of a number of discourses on other (e.g. more general) concepts (Diez, 2001: 16). When the territorial cohesion discourse thus draws on other discourses, each discursive articulation also brings in their power practices, which this research indexes with small-metanarratives (see Chapter 6). Every discursive articulation hereby simultaneously attempts to stabilise a field of discourses through the pinning down of specific meanings in the metanarratives and their relations with each other (Diez, 2001: 16). Discursive articulations thus form the territorial cohesion discourse as Discursive Nodal Point, as they tie territorial cohesion meanings to the concept’s usages in power practices in its combination of discourses.

In the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective ideas and interests are inherently intertwined – e.g. the approach does not address whether it are ideas or interests which shape policy (Diez, 2001: 25). In this intertwining of the territorial cohesion discourse meanings and usages affect each other (see Chapter 5 for how meanings and ideas relate and Chapter 6 for how usages and interests do). These links between territorial cohesion pro/positions therefore ensure certain power effects in knowledge and knowledge effects in power, as particular territorial cohesion meanings are with/out a corresponding usage and vice versa. The thinking which performs the linking follows, as suggested above, the discourse’s specific rules about what is considered to be a reasonable argument. It are these rules of the territorial cohesion discourse which determine the overall argumentative structure of discursive articulations of the concept as Discursive Nodal Point – e.g. by prescribing ‘the kind of relations that can reasonably be drawn between various metanarratives’ (Diez, 2001: 16). In doing so they justify ‘particular ways of exercising power’, delineate ‘notions of appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics’, and can thus be seen as ‘political rationalities’ that, for instance, imbue policy with (legitimising) “reason” (Rose&Millar, 1992: 175; Diez, 2001: 16). Hence, the rules of the territorial cohesion rationalities both demarcate the concept as discourse and form its structure as Discursive Nodal Point.
Chapter 7

7.2.3 Is the territorial cohesion discourse a kind of discursive nodal surface?
By using Diez’s Discursive Nodal Point-perspective this research carries out a discourse analysis and reflection on it to find out whether territorial cohesion is a central political concept around which knowledge and power are re-inscribed into the scientific and political debates (Diez, 2001: 18). Questions then become how the specific way in which territorial cohesion is conceptualised allows certain questions and not others, how this correlates with the organisation of governing, and which alternatives are available in the debate (Diez, 2001: 30). Such an analysis of discursive nodal points also enables us to see how territorial cohesion truth and knowledge claims are constructed, as it reconstructs: i) territorial cohesion conceptualisations in the various discourses present in the scientific and political debates, ii) the metanarratives on which these discourses draw, and iii) the rules according to which discursive practices tie these conceptualisations and metanarratives together (Diez, 2001: 17).

If discourses (inter)mediate between text an sich and its social context, between various practices, and between knowledge and power, then the treatment of a variety of tied-together conceptualisations and metanarratives as an interwoven Discursive Nodal Point highlights the inter-relatedness of such a network. With the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse this research thereby shows which of the rationalities that link power and knowledge are included by the concept. However, when the territorial cohesion pro/positions vary widely with many conceptualisations and metanarratives, we might wonder whether geometrically seen it is appropriate to talk about their network as a point. That is to say, when you widen a point through space, it starts to have length and breadth: it becomes a surface. The territorial cohesion discourse might therefore more resemble a discursive nodal surface than a Discursive Nodal Point. This surface can also function as a gateway where power and knowledge pass through and are selected and formed, just as a Discursive Nodal Point does. The possible structures for the concept's discursive nodal surface then conform to the three ways in which the territorial cohesion discourse might consist of multiple discourses (see section 7.1.2): i) various surfaces transform into one territorial cohesion discourse (i.e. the concept as a formation surface), ii) the territorial cohesion discourse is a larger surface for territorial cohesion policy discourses (i.e. the concept as an aggregation surface), or iii) the surface of the territorial cohesion discourse goes through other discourses (i.e. the concept as a thoroughfare surface). In a world of synreferential systems, the practices that draw different discursive interdependencies into a coherent whole therefore only make sense within the larger universe of discourse (Laclau&Mouffe, 1985; Diez, 2001: 18, 26). That this research demarcates the territorial cohesion discourse as a “discursive battle-arena” thus strongly presses the need to strategically reflect on the result of its discourse analysis due to the relativity of the tactical tautness of the discourse’s fabric.

7.3 Individualising the territorial cohesion discourse

7.3.1 Individualising a discourse
Although there is no clear or agreed upon usage or meaning of the concept, it would be off the mark to label every articulation as ‘territorial cohesion’. Certain borders therefore limit thought about the concept. What is more, even when considered as a wide discursive nodal surface, rules seem to govern the concept’s discursive interdependencies. Foucault (1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991) then understands the demarcation of a discourse as the problem of individualisation of discourses. He distinguishes three kinds of criteria for this: individualisation by linguistic system, the identity of the subject, or by less familiar but much more enigmatic criteria. *In this research we are not concerned with the linguistic system to which (also) the territorial cohesion discourse belongs though, nor with the identity of the subject which holds this discourse together, because neither constitutes it: the linguistic system might be necessary for this but not sufficient and the subject as a

* There exist criteria for individualising discourses which are known and reliable (or almighty): the linguistic system to which they belong, the identity of the subject which holds them together. But there are other criteria, no less familiar but much more enigmatic. When one speaks in the singular of (e.g.) economics, what is one speaking of? What are these various entities which one believes one can recognize at first glance, but whose limits one would have some difficulty defining?* (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 54).
Demarcating the Discursive Nodal Point

single unified body does not exist in this discoursal space of fundamental commonalities on which differentiated subject-positions often build (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: Diez, 2001: 13-14; Waever, in Hansen & Waever, 2002). This research is thus concerned with the discourse as entity in itself (see section 1.2.2 for how a play creates its stage and actors). However, each discourse undergoes constant change as new statements (énoncés) are added to it (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54). If discourses undergo constant change through discursive articulations and are not individualised by the linguistic system or subject, then the question is what does.

For Foucault (1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54) there are three criteria to individualise a discourse: criteria of i) formation, ii) transformation or threshold, and iii) correlation. The criteria of formation as a discourse’s fundament do not imply that a discourse has to have a unity of object, formal structure, coherence of conceptual architecture, and/or fundamental philosophical choices that characterise it. They do imply that what makes a discourse individual are the rules that count for all objects, operations, concepts and/or theoretical options in it – i.e. the rules that govern its discursively articulated statements, its logos, make the discourse an individual entity. When the rules governing these statements individualise a discourse as constant changing entity, it cannot be formed unconditionally from scratch. Before a discourse became what it is at a certain moment in time other discourses existed, or the same discourse did in another way. There were thus certain discursive conditions that must have been met as threshold to make external changes of and internal changes in the discourse possible as a transformation towards new rules of formation. The criteria of transformation or threshold therefore entail a definition of ‘the set of conditions which must have been possible for the discourse’s objects, operations, concepts and theoretical options to have been formed’ (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54). The criteria of correlation, finally, denote that an autonomous discursive formation does not exist independently, but stands in a discursive relation which defines and situates it among other discourses and in a non-discursive context in which it functions. Hence, to individualise a discourse three things should be put forward. That is to say in a geo-political way: i) the rules that govern the discourse’s discursive surface, ii) the conditions that made this territory’s formation, or change within in it, possible from other territories or as itself, and iii) the relations that situate and position it to other discursive and non-discursive territories.

7.3.2 Towards the criteria of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices

The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse involves an individualisation of the tactical productivity of its discursive interdependences by tracing the reciprocal effects of power and knowledge the concept ensures (Foucault, 1980b: 102; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 124). To individualise the concept’s system of knowledge and its associated practices, this research will therefore construct the discourse’s criteria of formation, threshold – for significant modifications inside the territorial cohesion discourse it is too new, in the making even –, and correlation. Or, to put in the vocabulary that operationalises this discourse analysis, this research will define: i) the structure of rules of formation that govern the territorial cohesion pro/positions, ii) the conditions for these rules, and iii) the relations of the territorial cohesion discourse to other discourses and its non-discursive

---

* Criteria of formation: What individualises a discourse such as political economy or general grammar is not the unity of its object, nor its formal structure, nor the coherence of its conceptual architecture, nor its fundamental philosophical choices; it is rather the existence of a set of rules of formation for all its objects (however scattered they may be), all its operations (which can often neither be superimposed nor serially connected), all its concepts (which may very well be incompatible), all its theoretical options (which are often mutually exclusive). There is an individual discourse formation whenever it is possible to define such a set of rules (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54).

* Criteria of transformation or threshold: I shall say natural history or psychopathology are units of discourse, if I can define the set of conditions which must have been possible for its objects, operations, concepts and theoretical options to have been formed; if I can define what internal modifications it was capable of; if I can define at what threshold of transformation new rules of formation came into effect (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54).

* Criteria of correlation: I will say that clinical medicine is an autonomous discursive formation if I can define the set of relations which define and situate it among other types of discourse (and in the non-discursive context in which it functions (institutions, social relations, economic and political contexts)) (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54).
context. Those rules about all objects, all operations, all concepts, and all theoretical options of the territorial cohesion discourse are the most important. The criteria of threshold namely concern the conditions for the formation of the discursive interdependencies governed by them and the criteria of correlation are concerned with situating their structure and conditions. The main outcome of this research’s discourse analysis of territorial cohesion is that the individualised structure of rules of formation of the concept as a discourse.

However, the rules governing the object-subject relation as the discourse’s criteria of formation are difficult to define for territorial cohesion, because the discourse is too young to (sharply) differentiate between trans/formations outside and inside it. To begin with, if a discourse differs from others in what of the world it includes (i.e. scale) (Fairclough, 2003: 125), this assumes that the stability hereof is a condition for rules of formation – i.e. geophysically put: the discourse’s structure of rules would be like a crystal grid (Diez, 2001: 31). The territorial cohesion discourse would not meet this criterion of threshold. Fortunately, a discourse also differs from others in stability over time and repetition (Fairclough, 2003: 125). It then would be about how stable the territorial cohesion discourse is relatively seen, as every discourse transforms through its constant reproduction (Diez, 2001: 26). To say that discourses are always in flux because they need to be constantly re-articulated misses the point though (Diez, 2001: 31). The rules of formation describe a regular pattern of a discourse, but more in the sense of a glacier than as a crystal grid (i.e. less fixed). A discourse’s structure of rules allows for a limited range of concrete articulations, with each of these articulations the rules are themselves transformed a bit, and after a longer timespan, the glacier/discourse is no longer what it used to be (Diez, 2001: 31). This allows one to take snapshots and to discern regularities, where they come from, and how they limit transformations. Then again, a discourse analysis of territorial cohesion has more to do with fluid discursive interdependencies like lava than a glacier: even though the territorial cohesion discourse appears on the surface, it is more erratic, pliable, amorphous, and easier to both spread and split. The molten lava of re/structuring rules then obscures how the discourse comes into existence, if it even freezes into a solid structure at all.

The difficulty of discursive interdependencies as lava for defining the rules of the formation of the territorial cohesion discourse leads to another related problem for its criteria of correlation. When a discourse has the structure of a Discursive Nodal Point, logically a specific criterion of threshold follows: the existence of other appropriable discourses becomes a condition for its rules of formation. The three ways in which the territorial cohesion discourse can consist of multiple discourses thereby structure these rules which then: i) mark (out) the discourse as a discursive formation surface (i.e. a fuzzy line around a yet indefinite entity), ii) circumscribe it as a discursive aggregation surface for territorial cohesion policy discourses (i.e. a bundling framework for policies), or iii) draw its structure as a discursive thoroughfare surface (i.e. how the territorial cohesion discourse combines discourses constitutes its essence). The criteria of formation and threshold are thus re/definable for a lava-like discursive nodal surface of discourses.

In so doing however, such rules and their conditions complicate the set of relations which define and situate the territorial cohesion discourse amongst other types of discourse. The problem is namely that criteria of correlation only individualise a discourse insofar they deal with its context, but that also the territorial cohesion discourse differs from others in the degree of what it has in common with them (i.e. commonality) (Fairclough, 2003: 125). That is, studying the territorial cohesion discourse as a discursive nodal surface might turn a part of its context into lava too, because you look for the degree in “lavaness” and how such a territorial cohesion characteristic structures other discourses. One therefore cannot simply situate the territorial cohesion discourse amongst other discourses, but, through all (molten) overlaps, one has to distinguish the others first. This both in discourses which function as discursive nodal point and those that do not and in discourses for which the territorial cohesion discourse functions as discursive nodal surface (i.e. the ones its criteria of formation include) and the ones for which it does not; these two differentiations already lead to a crossing to sort other
types of discourse. When the territorial cohesion discourse cannot be easily separated from others it makes its individualisation by situating it as a discursive nodal surface amongst other types of discourse the more complex. Hence, this discourse analysis stresses the need to reflect on its results.

7.3.3 Reflecting on a hypothetical discourse
As it is inherent to discourses that they in/exclude, the rules individualising territorial cohesion's tactical reciprocity will matter for those statements, rationalities, practices, and power relations of and around the concept. That the described rules deny/accept discursive articulations begs the question of how arbitrary expertise on the concept becomes when other rules for the involved argumentations to follow may logically be just as plausible. The more so as the discursive interdependencies follow a pattern which interweaves knowledge and power relations by accepting power as it is said to exist and "naturalising" a part of the world to govern (see §7.2.2 on political rationality). Take for instance the discrepancies between the territorial cohesion meanings with/out a corresponding usage and usages of the concept with/out a corresponding meaning. These discrepancies could play a role in governing. For specific meanings pinned down in the metanarratives of a Discursive Nodal Point often remain unquestioned or are taken for granted (Diez, 2001: 16). This discourse analysis merely sets up hypothetical rules though, because the molten lava of territorial cohesion meanings, usages, and discursive interdependencies clearly nor surely belongs to the concept and the concept only. Both the rules of formation governing the territorial cohesion discourse and that they are hypothetical therefore calls for a reflection on the status of the present expertise on this specific concept – e.g. how to claim expertise when what you say merely follows provisional rules?

Paradoxically, the hypotheticalness of the discourse's demarcation could also increase the significance of its rules of formation. That is to say, if this discourse analysis sets up accurate rules despite its lack of historical hindsight (see Appendix A; §A.1.6 on looking with a historical eye), the by them individualised statements, rationalities, practices, and power relations might actually extend beyond territorial cohesion and matter for other topics too (see possible future research, e.g. as proposed in §18.6). They are namely a part of the system which governs the texts which articulate the grounds from which we assert (contradicting) understandings about the social world: our regime of truth in which social science plays a key role (see §7.2.1 on the discourse's depth). The rules then not so much individualise the territorial cohesion discourse but wider shared features of the whole domain of expertise, or at least a part of it; the difficulty to form a distinct discourse could for instance belong to a multi- and interdisciplinary fashion in social (and spatial) science which blurs the boundaries between disciplines to the extent that it loses them altogether. The reflection on the status of the territorial cohesion discourse in the total system of relations which this research calls for then relies more on generalisation than specification (i.e. less on underlining the limits its rules of formation set and seeing the strategic value of this particular discourse). For the level of strategic integration this allows to reflect on what (lack of) conjunction and what force relations in the given episode of occurring confrontations need these – then common – characteristics the territorial cohesion discourse defines (Foucault, 1980b: 102; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 124). Such a placement in the wider power structures might point out how the territorial cohesion discourse helps to establish our regime of truth. Hence, this research tries to evoke reflections on the role of today's social (and spatial) science in the governing of our society, either by specifying the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices or by generalising this discourse's characteristics.

7.4 Concluding the discourse analysis
7.4.1 Overseeing the concept's hermeneutic horizon
This chapter operationalised this research's hypothetical demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse as the main outcome of its discourse analysis of the essentially contested concept. In its (inter)mediation between language, meaning, and power in political and scientific debates, the discourse constitutes a nodal point made up of territorial cohesion's system of knowledge and regulated practices by networking the concept's two sides into
Chapter 7

an individualisable group of pro/positions (i.e. what to trace). The discourse analysis therefore first reconstructs
the meaning/knowledge and power sides by mapping: i) the conceptualisation of knowledge validity (i.e.
meanings) and truth criteria as a gaze (partly) filled with delineated forms, objects, and limits of politics (i.e.
knowledges) and ii) the metanarratives of the field of interests in which the exercise of power uses the concept.
Yet, discursive practices establish the discursive interdependencies which actually form the discourse, as their
events link linguistic, meaning-making, and power practices and them to meaning/knowledge itself. Discursive
articulations then display the pattern of these interdependencies from which possibilities of articulation emerge
and alternatives are marginalised through the re/insertion of the discursive structure into the present debates.
When viewed with the Discursive Nodal Point operationalisation tool (i.e. how to trace) such phenomena show
how: i) the tying together of discourses stabilises the concept's meanings, ii) territorial cohesion metanarratives
bring in associated power practices, and iii) the pinning down of meanings in these metanarratives stabilises
a field of discourses. How these traces' regularity allows a setting up of the rules which structure together
the conceptualisations of territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge propositions and the concept's positions in
power practices and how definite this demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse as a Discursive Nodal
Point of interweaving political rationalities will be remains to be seen though, as that depends on the mapped
research object.

7.4.2 Recognising the pattern: the rules regulating the territorial cohesion discourse

This research might fail to define the criteria of formation, threshold, and correlation that individualise the
territorial cohesion discourse. However, after ordering the concept with its discourse analytical framework, such
a failure could point to the conclusion that there actually is no territorial cohesion discourse to individualise.
The use of the framework increases in credibility if this discourse analysis separates territorial cohesion from
everything else though, however vague its limits. Per criteria cumulative problems arise in such a tour de force
from three ways in which multiple territorial cohesion discourses can be at play. When the territorial cohesion
discourse emerges by combining existing ones, its demarcation has first to deal with indefinite trans/formations
of structures of rules governing the concept's pro/positions. Although for a Discursive Nodal Point the existence
of appropriable discourses is a condition for its rules of formation, due to the relation of territorial cohesion
with the emerging European spatial policy discourse these should be differentiated from policy discourses. Even
contesting territorial cohesion policy discourses might thereby make the concept’s system of knowledge and its
associated power practices turn into a larger but tightly knit web of discursive interdependencies. The relations
of this discourse to other ones and its non-discursive context will, finally, be complex to draw if the discourses
have “lavaness” in common. Even more if they are studied in the multi-discursive science of spatial policy with
a focus on how the “ownness” of the territorial cohesion discourse lays in the way it structures through other
discourses. As a consequence the discourse's rules define territorial cohesion as a discursive nodal surface of
formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare. The concept then functions as a gateway where knowledge, power,
and the rationalities that link them pass through to govern the object-subject relation and justify that and how
power is exercised.

To recognise the specific or general value of such discourse analytical outcomes this research in the end
calls to reflect them to the role of social (and spatial) science in the governing of our society. This by, one the
one hand, substantiating the arbitrariness of the concept's expertise when other argumentations are just as
plausible and the naturalisation of other powers leads to alternative conceptualisations. The exploration of the
depth of the territorial cohesion discourse's strategic integration in the total system of relations on the other
hand also has these two sides. On the one side it namely looks for how this discourse helps to establish our
regime of truth in which social science plays a key role by re-/inscribing its knowledge and power into scientific
and political debates or even re-/inscribing the rules governing texts into the domain of expertise in general.
On the other side this exploration places the discourse's tactical reciprocity in the wider power structures by
looking for the (lack of) conjunction and force relations which need it in occurring confrontations. However,
this research carefully conducts its discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion itself just to enable
such a reflection.
Chapter 8  Concluding what this research aims for

Introduction

Four steps have been devoted to answering the questions posed in Part III’s Introduction; five steps when you include Appendix A on methods. They explained the methodological stand of the research and how it uses discourse analysis to study the concept of territorial cohesion. This concluding chapter then does not summarise the previous chapters, but as final step consecutively describes what this research aims to achieve through such a methodological framework ($§8.1$), how it uses discourse analysis to be effective ($§8.2$), and what the upshots of the research results could be ($§8.3$). That is, how answering the three sub-questions leads to this research’s answer to the main question “What is the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union?”. It, therefore, has a double goal: spotlighting the research objective to illuminate what – not this chapter, but – the previous chapters clarified.

8.1 Aiming through the methodological framework

As this phronetic research does not battle on behalf of the truth but about the status of truth (Foucault, 1980a: 132; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125), its investigation of the (non-)existing ground for territorial cohesion primarily aims at social and spatial science – and politique merely indirectly (e.g. no scientific evidence, no evidence-based policy). With its Foucaultian fieldwork in philosophy it namely aims to contribute to the capacity for value-rational deliberation and action: it combines concrete analyses of and practical philosophical considerations about how a changing social and spatial reality makes sense and conflict (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 167).

This research answers the question “Where are we going?” by delivering a critical understanding which looks to the European Union with an historical eye instead of explaining this present (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60-61; Diez, 2001: 30). From what experts say when they talk as (contradicting) experts about official competencies, policy, funding, and shaping the debate, the distribution of the multiplicity of discursive elements in territorial cohesion’s knowledges, powers, practices, and rationalities is reconstructed in an interpretative search for meaning. In so doing the research deals with social science’s double hermeneutic and essential instability by analysing and interpreting the values and interests in society in an artisan manner: the discourse analysis is conducted in a framework of a constructionist epistemology and an ontological understanding of the world as meaningful. Consequentially, this research provides an answer to the question “Is this desirable?” by expanding on the answer to the previous question, as various desirabilities are displayed. Focussing on what makes the territorial cohesion problem intractable in order to understand how it arises and roots in an organisation of social life for instance suggests how some benefit from the problem being resolved or not (Fairclough, 2003: 209-210).

This research is neither everyday nor deep hermeneutics though, but a pragmatically governed interpretation of the dubious territorial cohesion practices and their semiotic aspect (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 140; Fairclough, 2003: 209-210). From an extra-scientific perspective the question “What should be done?” is dealt with in an attempt to – not to add to, but – creatively destruct the current form of science to use it differently (e.g. fröhlicher). This analytical project is not a search for universal theory or method, rather it is an attempt to problematise secure or totalising foundations so that practitioners (of science) no longer know what to do (Foucault, 1981, in Miller, 1993: 235; Diez, 2001: 23; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 140; 2002: 371). This discourse analysis therefore traces the whole of the territorial cohesion discourse by exploring the rules demarcating it, and maps the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices as its parts. This individualisable group of pro/positions is scrutinised and challenged by identifying what and how knowledge is promoted through

8.2 The discourse analysis to hit the target with

The methodology explained makes it possible, in this research’s interpretive search for meaning in political and scientific debates, to analytically separate what passes through the concept: knowledge, power, and the rationalities that link them. Because of this, the uncertainty, complexity, and conflict of the meanings and usages of territorial cohesion can be mapped by the process of discourse analytical operationalisation to trace the discourse they form. The definitions of the (proto-)concept from are mapped form linguistic and meaning-making practices through the triangle of signification as kinds of meanings and thereby taxonomises these intellectual propositions on the signifier ‘territorial cohesion’ in Sinn above Bedeutung. The garbage-can of power practices which holds the concept’s own history stands interested besides this common ground of meaning for territorial cohesion knowledge. From stories as the only index of strategic positions in these rational trails of grouped desires the discourse analysis then extends the use of Narrative Policy Analysis by basally mapping the concept’s bricolage usage as territorial cohesion metanarratives in four stages. Discursive articulations then indicate how discursive practices establish the discursive interdependencies which network these rhetorical organisations of territorial cohesion pos/positions together. The discourse analysis therefore uses the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective to structure how through thought the problematic knowledge of social and tangible reality (e.g. spatial policy analysis) reassesses the concept’s re-/mobilisation of bias in forms.

How can the patterns of competition in Realrationalität then be interpreted through the Hermeneutic circle? Appendix A answers that this research methodically deals with this question by following guidelines for dis- and reaggregation of data and iteration in its crisscrossing of discourse analytical steps and by having practices as leading interpretation and gatekeepers in copy-like documentation and falsification through analytic retroduction. The reciprocally interdependent timings of, on the one hand, when to stop gathering data from documents in (digital) archives and in-depth semi-structured interviews and, on the other hand, when to close the analysis with the concept’s hermeneutic horizon thereby rest on pragmatic judgement as the discourse analysis spirals through the intertextual territorial cohesion text to demarcate the discourse. That is why the rules which govern the concept’s interweaving political rationalities have been set up hypothetically. The regularity of their (inter)mediating traces might then point to three ways in which the individualisation of the territorial cohesion discourse plays with multiple discourses. For its i) criteria of formation indefinite trans/formations of appropriable structures of rules define a discursive formation surface, for its ii) criteria of threshold contesting territorial cohesion policy discourses define a tightly knit discursive aggregation surface, and for its iii) criteria of correlation the way it structures through other discourses define a discursive thoroughfare surface. The research’s re/construction of these discursive interdependencies that form the territorial cohesion discourse exemplifies how a realm of expertise helps to justify that and how power is exercised while its discursive structures marginalise alternative possibilities of articulation.

8.3 The upshots

Although this research involves much interpretation, it still claims that the quality of its results is higher than other similar research studies. This is due to the deep methodological module and insofar its analytical interpretations account for the detail in material, potential alternatives can be discounted, the overall account seems plausible, and it meshes with other studies (Potter&Wetherell, 1994: 63; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 165). The proof of this pudding is of course in the eating. Note though, that this research does not represent a single objective picture of reality, but observes the concept of territorial cohesion from a decentred viewpoint.
Concluding what this research aims for (Diez, 2001: 23-24; Foucault, 2003: 52). Without funding from the European Union and at home in spatial planning as a philosophical and critical thorn in its side, it actively distinguishes and names what happens from a relative outside (Luhmann, 1990: 73-75; Diez, 2001: 23-24).

The aim to contribute to value-rational deliberation and action through the problematisation of territorial cohesion truth influences the discourse analytical practice of classification: it does not give another interpretation of the concept but a meta-interpretation of territorial cohesion interpretations. Because the mapping of the taxonomy of territorial cohesion definitions and especially the interpretative schemes of coded problem statements constitute the largest part of the discourse analysis, the making of significant distinctions among groups of pro/positions hereby becomes the key factor. This significance follows from the critique of how these groupings link with the uneven incidence of forces (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 8): an attempt is made to look for the arbitrariness or inherent inconsistency of the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning and how the concept's systematic uncertainty also entails an indecision about the power practices producing territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. does the concept have own power practices and/or does it rule the games of its area of action?). The detailed maps might then present how the concept's rich problematic pictures an epistemic and strategic solidification of interconnections between expert language, thought of ideas, facts, and power relations. The usage of an explicit positive ground to question this interpretation of territorial cohesion would thus miss the point, as this research criticises all versions of the true interpretation.

For this research it neither matters that a multitude of classifications of the concept nor that multiple visions of the territorial cohesion discourse are feasible (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 8). Besides that this individualisation would only define hypothetical rules for the current (inter)mediating rationalities, the research tries to evoke reflections upon the status of its own discourse analytical outcomes. This research namely calls for comparisons of the territorial cohesion discourse to other theories and a placing of its tactical reciprocity of knowledge and power in wider structures. Such a reflection would strategically value the concept insofar it hinges on the integration of territorial cohesion expertise in how our regime of truth functions in our understanding and exercise of power. In so doing, this research cannot but problematise its own discourse analytical interpretations, as it promotes that these lead to a general questioning of why some interpretations are right or wrong, or if everything is mere interpretation and no interpretation may promise to be anything more than just that. Hence, this research's ultimate upshot attempts to stir up your own thinking about the role of science in the governing of our society with the question of what social science refers to if not studying stories with scientific methods.
Book II The Analysis

Wtewael (1600) The Battle between the Gods and the Titans
Book II The Analysis

Introduction

In myths such as the Titanomachy Wtewael (1600) portrays, one group of gods always opposes the dominant ones, sometimes the dominance shifts and sometimes the rebels loose and become outcasts or are incorporated into the dominant order of the pantheon. Here the pictured mythical battle thus echoes Rembrandt’s (1661) painting shown for Book I The Frameworks due to Claudius Civilis’ role in the Batavian rebellion against the Roman Empire and the outsiders’ view of this research it indicates. Moreover, both paintings can be interpreted as a fight over which causes guide human action. Yet, these struggles differ much too, also in that the Titanomachy was spiritual/mental (i.e. the Geist-world) and the Batavian rebellion was worldly. The idea underlying this research is that both sides can relate.

In this Book II The Analysis both sides and their relationship return during a discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion. Part I on territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge namely maps out the “ethereal substance” of the concept while Part II on its usage does so for the “earthly matter” involved. The crux then lays in Part III where these ether and earth are related to set up the concept’s hermeneutic horizon. This allows Part IV to conclude the analysis by unveiling the territorial cohesion struggles and critiquing their limitations.
Introduction

This Part of the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with the first sub-question of this research: what is the meaning of territorial cohesion? As came forward in the methodological framework, in a discourse analysis this does not only have to do with its definitions, but also with its knowledge (see §5.3.3).

Territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge then form the “ethereal substance” of the concept’s realm of expertise. Harnessed by reason such positions, intellectual as they are, claim durability beyond the arbitrariness observable in power practices. In contrast to the conceptual history there, it would therefore make no sense to take the time-dimension into account for the proto-concept of territorial cohesion here. Yet, as with Escher’s (1960) impossible figure, in the ivory tower, abstaining from “earthly matter”, meanings and knowledges seem to wander about in circles, continuously referring to each other, not knowing whether they climb (scandere) up or down. When you then set off to map territorial cohesion propositions on your journey towards the concept’s hermeneutic horizon there appears a “fata morgana” of explicit definitions. More often still, implicit definitions accompany the utterance of ‘territorial cohesion’. Despite this confusion the concept is nonetheless used for precise discriminations (e.g. as research topic).
To enable a critique of the expertise depending on the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, the first chapter of this Part I, Chapter 9 that is, first orders the marks of the involved linguistic and meaning-making practices. The involved expert language, abstract (scientific) objectifications of social reality, and (policy) action-oriented discursive simplifications go further than such signification events though, as they come up with territorial cohesion knowledge claims. Chapter 10 therefore maps these to critique them as well.
Chapter 9  The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

Introduction

To attribute a prima facie reading to the concept of territorial cohesion, one can combine what ‘territorial’ and ‘cohesion’ both signify. ‘Cohesion’ then has to do with how things relate to each other, and ‘territorial’ with the demarcation of space (see Chapter 1). Every territorial cohesion meaning would thus have to deal with the tension between relating and demarcating. Putting ‘territorial’ and ‘cohesion’ together could then amount to how things territorially relate to each other. Already such an abstract in-filling of the concept raises many questions essential for what it actually means (e.g. which things relate, when is something territorial). The concept thus leaves much room for interpretation. This chapter therefore gathers the meanings put under the label of ‘territorial cohesion’. It does so by first presenting them in taxonomy (§9.1) and then explaining how the triangle of signification groups territorial cohesion definitions in different kinds (§9.2) and helps to delineate the concept’s common ground of meaning (§9.3). The reason for this rather dry exercise is that it enables a critique of the system of territorial cohesion meaning insofar it harbours arbitrary significations and is inherently inconsistent (§9.4), what finally points towards the concept’s knowledge too (§9.5).

9.1 The taxonomy of territorial cohesion meaning

9.1.1 Taxonomising for clarity

To shed some light in the (conceptual) dark, this chapter’s taxonomic exercise unpacks territorial cohesion by decomposing the concept’s ‘mental components into orderly and manageable sets of component units’ (Sartori, 1970: 1038; Radaelli, 2000: 5). Seen through the triangle of signification this implies looking at how different territorial cohesion meanings group around specific Sinn (i.e. signified ideas). That is, you group statements of Bedeutung (i.e. referred to facts), which explicitly or through assumption or logical implication demarcate meaning in what experts say, under kinds of meaning. This research separates and maps out seven groups for the concept of territorial cohesion: i) descriptive, ii) normative, iii) policy objective, and iv) instrumental, and, less substantive and more technical, v) policy coherence, vi) spatial planning, and vii) territorial governmentality meanings. Table 1 and 2 below then display the mapped out taxonomy of territorial cohesion Sinn above Bedeutung by showing the concept’s more substantive and more technical meanings respectively.

---

1 Note that the European Union has no criteria for ‘cohesion’ (CoR, 2002a), nor is there a official definition of it (BBR, 2003: c. 118–119).
2 I thank Eric Warmerdam (well-known trainer and owner of Seconds Out Kick&Boxing Gym in Almere) for pointing this out to me.
### 9.1.2 The taxonomy of territorial cohesion Sinn above Bedeutung

#### Table 1 The territorial cohesion taxonomy: more substantive meanings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Sinn</th>
<th>Bedeutung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>descriptive</td>
<td>- ethical/political/economic/social/cultural cohesions in or between (people of) territories(^1)</td>
<td>- (territorial dimension of) disparities/sustainable development/(balanced) competitiveness(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- access to SGE(^3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial identity or worth of specific (geographical) territorial features (as endogenous potential)(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- complex web of spatial, social, economic, environmental structures in or between territories over several scales (and their potential, position, and integration through time)(^5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial effect of Cohesion/Community policies(^6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normative</td>
<td>- solidarity for the whole (European) territory or equality between territories (by helping geographically handicapped regions)(^7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- equality between citizens wherever they live/work (in the European Union) or a compensatory equity at certain levels and a certain diversity(^8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- equal SGE(^3) (in specific areas)(^9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- will to be together (in an ordered, resource-efficient, and/or environmental-friendly spatial distribution of human activities across the European Union)(^10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Rawls' concept of social justice (and equity with a spatial dimension)(^11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorialisation of European Social Model/there is more (for policies) than free economic competition(^12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>policy</td>
<td>- (territorial dimension of) regional policies/(economic and social) cohesion/planning for Europe(^13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- balanced (regional/social/economic) development or balanced/sustainable development (and competitiveness) in territorial/polycentric terms(^14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- improve Europe's/regions' (endogenous) territorial potentials (for competitiveness) or national ecological networks(^15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- access to SGE(^3) (for the European Union's inhabitants/in rural and peripheral areas)(^16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- mitigate effects of the (single) market/globalisation/liberalisation or balance people/human activities/competitiveness over (geographic-demographic divers) territories(^17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objective</td>
<td>- regional integration for economic and social cohesion/European integration(^18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- balanced development(^14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- competitiveness of a region/Europe(^19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- fit in foci of Cohesion policy/the ESDP, CEMAT(^b), Lisbon Strategy, and the Gothenburg European Council(^20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. ESDP: European Spatial Development Perspective.
2. CEMAT: European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning.
The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

Table 2 The territorial cohesion taxonomy: more technical meanings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Sinn</th>
<th>Bedeutung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>territorial policy</td>
<td>– bundle of (European) sector policies/actions</td>
<td>– horizontal coherence of (European Union) policies/interventions with a territorial impact (for efficiency) and/or regional policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coherence</td>
<td>– coordination of sector policies within one territory/through overlaps with territorial policy integration/the spatial dimension</td>
<td>– vertical (spatial) policy coherence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– horizontal and vertical coherence of European Union policies with a territorial impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spatial planning</td>
<td>– functioning as/replacing (European Union) spatial planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– spatial policy objective (to reorganise Community territory) or substantive spatial vision as framework for interventions (to overcome institutional differences)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– regional/national territorial development (to exploit territorial capital) or everything of spatial development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territorial</td>
<td>– new territorial way of thinking of the European Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governmentality</td>
<td>– fine-grained (territorial/biographical) oversight</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– basis for focusing individual/regional, national, and European (development) action or territorial governance issues (for effective European Structural Funds)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– territorial dimension/integration of (effective and efficient) European Union policy/regions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– combining spatial thinking and governance/assessment action or holistic, territorial, and dynamic approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.1 Focus on the system of territorial cohesion meaning

Tables 1 and 2 show how this research combines territorial cohesion definitions with similar ones to construct hues of Bedeutung in every Sinn. Because we are here more concerned with the system the kinds of territorial cohesion meanings form than the particular meanings defined, an oversimplification of the concept's propositions will suffice to present its semantic structure. The variety in meanings appearing in the intertextual territorial cohesion text is thus much larger than the ones presented in the territorial cohesion taxonomy. Although justified for clarity, it should be stressed that such an interpretation of the actual complexities of territorial cohesion propositions in the data implies choosing the most general definition, the largest common denominator, or the weakest proposition.³ It is important to keep this “violence done to reality” in the back of our minds, both for its consequences for understanding the territorial cohesion taxonomy and constructing the concept’s common ground of meaning from it.

9.2 The different kinds of territorial cohesion meaning

9.2.1 The essential differences of territorial cohesion Sinn

To complicate things further, in the interpretation of territorial cohesion definitions above the same wordings of territorial cohesion readings regularly return in different kinds of meaning (e.g. access to SG(E)I). Although this might seem artificial, it makes an essential difference whether the same (simplified) definition is proposed with a different idea behind it. Hence, the structuration of territorial cohesion meanings in seven Sinn to order how

³ To give a few examples of semantic simplification: i) the meanings of territorial cohesion as taking care of spatial effects or taking care of territorial effects differ, but the former is here put under the label of the latter; ii) territorial cohesion as cohesion ‘between cities and surrounding regions’ is more specific than territorial cohesion as cohesion between territories, but here only the latter is shown, and iii) although territorial cohesion as a balanced spatial distribution of human activities could entail spatial fragmentation, the statement that territorial cohesion goes against the latter can be put under the former as both return with the label ‘balance human activities over territories’. 

107
different but also similar territorial cohesion definitions differ in Bedeutung. To distinguish these Sinn, the kinds of territorial cohesion meaning are defined by how they fit in the act of governing, as the concept plays a role in European power practices, especially those of policy-making (see Chapter 2 on governmentality and power). The descriptive, normative, policy objective, and instrumental kinds of territorial cohesion meaning are thereby more concerned with (for) what there is governed (i.e. substance). The policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality kinds of territorial cohesion meaning differ from these other four in that they form a set which is more concerned with how there is governed (i.e. techniques). The next two sections consecutively explain these two spheres of meaning.

9.2.2 Distinguishing the more substantive kinds of territorial cohesion meaning

The descriptive kind of territorial cohesion meaning is concerned with what it is that is governed and therefore can be seen as combining reals and value statements (e.g. changing what is towards an ideal). Besides that policy objectives can be based on non-idealistic causes as well (e.g. Realpolitik), they also differ from ideals in that they exclude. Various territorial cohesion ideals can exist simultaneously in thought (e.g. contradict), but every policy objective implies the selection of a target. This also sets policy objective meanings of territorial cohesion apart from the concept's descriptive meanings, because territorial cohesion as a target cannot, arguably, be an elaborate description of the (future) state of affairs. The instrumental kind of territorial cohesion meaning is also concerned with realisable objectives of government, but other ones, and for this defines the concept to fit into another signification with more worth. While instrumental territorial cohesion meanings can resemble policy objective ones (e.g. as objective to reach other targets), definitions which cannot be pictured as an arrow are possible too. That is, the concept can put forward dimensional, bonding, or conditional meanings that still fit into for what territorial cohesion is instrumental – the signification of more worth might thereby even fashion the concept by transposing assumptions, conceptual choices, and ideals.

9.2.3 Distinguishing the more technical kinds of territorial cohesion meaning

As the policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality kinds of meaning are concerned with how to govern, each can include reals, value, and irrealis statements (e.g. territorial cohesion was, should, or will be spatial planning). The policy coherence kind of territorial cohesion meaning is then concerned with
how to govern effectively or efficiently and for this defines coordination through interrelations of policies and/or policy effects in a territory to reach coherence in implementation. The entities that (cohesively) relate to each other are then reduced to policies. As can be expected from a governing technique, coordination for effectiveness or efficiency serves the cause(s) that should be reached thus. The policy coherence kind of territorial cohesion meaning could therefore be seen as a specific instrumental meaning of the concept (especially in the dimensional, bonding, or conditional form), but then with a pure procedural instrumentality and without quaus meaning being defined by a policy objective.

Although the spatial planning kind of territorial cohesion meaning fits in the more technical sphere of meaning, it actually entails more. It is namely concerned with government techniques that are simultaneously concrete and more or less holistic \( ^6 \) and for this shapes (thinking) space with an own substance and rationality (see Chapter 2 on political technologies); \( ^7 \) note that this research does not attempt to answer the question ‘What is spatial planning?’ here, but only uses ‘spatial planning’ as the label appropriate for a group of territorial cohesion meanings (e.g. as they deal with this question). The policy coherence and spatial planning kinds of territorial cohesion meaning then have something in common. When a spatial area is planned, the same space can only be reshaped in one single way (e.g. open, multifunctional), this due to the nature of tangible space (i.e. there is only one). The plans can therefore only point to one direction, for which one (overarching) vision is needed, which implies coherence. However, this same nature of tangible space gives spatial planning meanings their own policy substance and rationality instead of merely (territorially) coordinating other policies.

This section ends by distinguishing the territorial governmentality kind of territorial cohesion meaning. This is the most general kind, as it is concerned with the practice and rationality of government and for this portrays a way of thinking about and doing in territorial governance that emphasises existing and/or desired territorial diversity and contextuality. Besides the different ways of seeing a territory, governing one namely entails that this is done with a way of thinking and doing things, with certain techniques and a mentality (e.g. a savoir-faire). In so doing the territorial governmentality kind of meaning expresses the notion of ‘governmentality’ (see Part II in Book I: the analytical framework of power and governmentality), this in a territorial way specific to territorial cohesion. Hence, the concept’s territorial governmentality meanings could function as a frame for all and each of the other kinds of territorial cohesion meaning distinguished above (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective, instrumental, policy coherence, and spatial planning).

9.3 Starting to draw the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

9.3.1 From arbitrary choices to characteristics and leftovers

This research’s methodological framework already noted that no arguments appear to be made for or against readings of territorial cohesion (e.g. see Chapter 5). Nonetheless, one can assume that a territorial cohesion definition is valid as long as it is proposed within the bounds set by the prima facie meaning presented in the introduction above (i.e. how things territorially relate to each other). Logically seen no proposition from the intertextual territorial cohesion text is thus invalid. On what grounds should one denounce a territorial cohesion meaning? Put otherwise, the taxonomy above shows that every choice for a particular territorial cohesion reading, whether Sinn or Bedeutung, is semantically arbitrary. Why should you prefer one idea or fact under the words ‘territorial cohesion’ over another? The range of these choices might not to be arbitrary though, as it can limit and structure the concept’s expertise (i.e. a bounded arbitrariness).

\( ^{6} \) The ‘more or less’ here signifies the tension between European spatial planning traditions (i.e. what is spatial planning?) Faludi (2003a) and Danneels (2005a: 415) for instance put the French regional-economic tradition against the German comprehensive one, thereby also arguing that only the latter is holistic. However, here the French tradition is seen as holistic too, even when it would be less so than other spatial planning traditions, because it is perhaps not holistic in the sense of ‘organic’, but surely in the sense of being concerned with the whole instead of being concerned with a part (e.g. regional-economics is not the same as economics).

\( ^{7} \) Explicitly stated to have such a meaning by Wall (2002: 83), Faludi (2003a: 115, 2004b: 166), Husar (2006: 44), and an Officer from DG Regio (personal interview in Brussels, 23rd of March 2006), and an Officer from the CPMR (personal interview by telephone, 13th of April 2006).
The order that the triangle of signification provides can be used here, as it goes beyond taxonomising the different kinds of territorial cohesion meaning. With it you can delineate the concept's common ground of meaning more precisely than a *prima facie* meaning does. Besides characterising each group of proposed definitions with their tensions, each territorial cohesion Sinn namely opens up a wider range of thinkable *Bedeutung* than the ones the territorial cohesion taxonomy represents. The questions which come up logically when filling-in a territorial cohesion Sinn thus point out with which types of issues the territorial cohesion propositions do and do not come to terms with. This enables section 9.3.9 to draw the line around the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning by joining those outlining the kinds of meanings as shown in sections 9.3.2 to 9.3.8 below.

9.3.2 Outlining the descriptive territorial cohesion meanings

When you look at the descriptive territorial cohesion definitions in Table 1, you can extract some features in which these meanings vary. Often they contain or relate a selection of social, economic, spatial, ecological, *et cetera* issues (e.g. socio-economic disparities) or denote another group of cohesion facts (e.g. its potential, position, situation), but they just once do not omit political issues; if the territorial always implies politics, then these definitions thus leave political issues rather untreated. This undertreatment seems to return when the definitions propose reality more as a harmony instead of a struggle (e.g. balanced competitiveness), even though most are quite neutral (e.g. a congregation of "cohesions"). Two other related features are the territorial and abstraction level. Understood roughly, these descriptive propositions mostly do not define a particular level (e.g. territorial identity) or include all (e.g. micro, meso, macro scales). However, even if the level to describe would be clear (e.g. cohesion between regions), the question still remains from which viewpoint to look at this territorial cohesion. As the Committee of the Regions (CoR, 2002a) put it: which level observes a lack of cohesion? Furthermore, to describe territorial cohesion in reality, a specific *Bedeutung* (e.g. access to Services of General Economic Interest) would give more focus than an abstract one (e.g. cohesion in a territory). Specific territorial cohesion definitions also decrease the clarity though. Proposing territorial capital as territorial cohesion meaning, represented in the taxonomy by ‘territorial (endogenous) potential’, for instance puts another black box (Zonneveld&Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a: 19) under territorial cohesion as matryoshka doll. It thus seems that the unresolved questions of for which territorial level the concept's descriptive meanings hold and how specifically they describe positively lines them out. The exclusion of politics and struggle and the question of how to deal with multiple levels, especially the viewpoint to describe territorial cohesion from, do so negatively (i.e. as holes in cheese).

9.3.3 Outlining the normative territorial cohesion meanings

The normative territorial cohesion definitions immediately show that they do not fully use the space for ideals as distinguished by their *Sinn*. They namely do not have the expected wider array of wished for states of affairs than those of the descriptive meanings (see §9.2.1 and Table 1). What also characterises these definitions is that they often entail a totalising choice by adding the territorial: going beyond a condition for members of a group towards an inclusion of everyone based on geographical grounds. The variation then lies, as with the descriptive territorial cohesion meanings, in what is totalised territorially: a social, economic, and/or ecological ideal for instance (e.g. the European Social Model, equal Services of General Economic Interest, and/or environmental friendliness respectively). Although not with a political ideal, the concept's normative *Bedeutung* does include politics between issues. This comes through clearly in contradictions between harmonic and agonistic ideals (e.g. maximally develop each territory or go beyond free economic competition). The exclusion the territorial per definition implies also shows such politics in the form of a tension between the total and specific (e.g. equality between all citizens of the European Union wherever they live or helping geographically handicapped regions). What is characteristic though, is that none of these normative propositions states how to deal with multiple territorial levels (e.g. with a compensatory equity at “certain” levels and a "certain" diversity). This might thus be something that – is not, but semantically wise – should be constructed by normative meanings.
of the concept; Rawls' social justice for instance 'does not take space into consideration' (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). Note thereby, that if procedures themselves are not territorial in nature, no territorial cohesion ideal can be proposed which is procedural instead of (statically) substantive as they are now. This also points to a tension the normative territorial cohesion definitions scarcely deal with: the one between tangibility and ideality to spatially ground normative meaning (e.g. an ordered spatial distribution of human activities). The narrowness of the variation in, the implicit totalising tendency of, and the political choice between harmonic or agonistic ideals thus seems to positively line out the concept's normative meanings, as does the tension between a total of territories or specific ones. Besides (again) the question of how to deal with multiple territorial levels, what also negatively lines out the normative meanings is the one of how to spatially ground ideals.

9.3.4 Outlining the policy objective territorial cohesion meanings

Mainly the Sinn of all the policy objective kind of territorial cohesion meanings structures the variety of definitions, since each proposes to change what is towards an ideal. Hence, although some add Bedeutung (e.g. balanced development in polycentric terms), most have the same features as the descriptive and normative ones in Table 1 (e.g. economic development, cohesion, balancing human activities, access to Services of General (Economic) Interest, improving territorial potential). The characteristics of the policy objective meanings then result from that they enter the policy sphere in the form of an aim. An also by the concept's descriptive and normative kinds of meaning unresolved question thereby becomes the more pressing: to what entities does territorial cohesion apply (e.g. first countries and regions second or all levels simultaneously) (CoR, 2002a; BBR, 2003a; Nordregio, 2003; Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007)? It also matters whether the policy objective is a self-assigned one (e.g. mitigate effects of the single market) or comes from a higher territorial level (e.g. regional policies for Europe). As the latter entails subjection, one can for instance wonder to which extent territorial cohesion is a question of European interest (e.g. with what support or financial intensity) (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). Adding these questions to the high variety of territorial cohesion meanings, the central tension becomes ‘with what objectives defined by whom’ territorial cohesion is to become a policy objective (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). How does it for instance differ from the established policy objectives of social and economic cohesion (Davoudi, 2005a: 435; Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007)? Moreover, as aims exclude, the tension between harmonic and agonistic meanings returns. Here, the territorial cohesion definitions often propose harmonic combinations of objectives (e.g. balanced and sustainable development in territorial terms), but one can ask whether this just points to an inherent conflict of goals with territorial cohesion (BBR, 2005a: 53-55).

Still, no matter which objective(s) territorial cohesion meanings aim for at what level, to be able to proof their feasibility, a feature of them is that they are more or less measurable (e.g. balancing development or improving national ecological networks). The question of when there is enough territorial cohesion is therefore yet another one these meanings leave open (e.g. what is the threshold or fine-grained gradually classified continuum); convergence for instance can mean a "levelling down" as well as a "levelling up" (Ulied&Turro, in Nordregio, 2003). However, something might make the policy objective meanings unable to elucidate this. That is, not only are these definitions often vague – as when they include polycentricity as a concept that is in itself not clear (Davoudi, 2003: 988; Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 109) –, but with territorial cohesion there might be no way to strive toward total homogeneity when taking territory into account (BBR, 2003a). When what is actually reached with the same policy objective definition of territorial cohesion might differ per territory, then the tension between abstract and specific meaning would be put inside the concept as inherent tension between clarification and opaqueness too. What thus seems to positively line out the policy objective meanings are the engraining of the issue of to what entities territorial cohesion applies to in the concept and both the tension between various objectives and their measurability. Again, the question of how to deal with multiple territorial levels does so negatively, here in the form of whether territorial cohesion is a self-assigned policy objective or implies subjection.
9.3.5 Outlining the instrumental territorial cohesion meanings

Although every policy objective could be posed to serve another (higher) goal, Table 1 shows that the instrumental territorial cohesion meanings vary the least of all kinds. This thus characterises the concept's meaning in general: it is hardly instrumental – not overtly at least. What further characterises every single Bedeutung with an instrumental Sinn is that each of course harmonises with its goal. These meanings are plagued by internal struggles however, if proposed in a definition harbouring several goals without grasping them together (e.g. fit in the foci of Cohesion Policy, the ESDP, CEMAT, the Lisbon Strategy, and the Gothenburg European Council). This tension between harmony and agonism could therefore relate to having a selective or all-encompassing meaning. The latter tension returns here in that the concept's instrumental meanings can be pointed, towards one objective for instance (e.g. competitiveness of a region), or more planed, such as a territorial expression for several objectives (e.g. regional integration for economic and social cohesion). The former territorial cohesion meanings are then more coloured by their narrower focus on a signification with more worth. Note though, that for instrumental meanings selective definitions do not have to be specific, because they could serve an abstract telos of government too (e.g. regional integration for European integration). Besides the unresolved tension of, yet again, for/on which territorial level the concept is instrumental, what thus positively lines out these few territorial cohesion meanings is the tension between pointed selectivity and planed harmony. Negatively seen the question of how to deal with multiple territorial levels does so for the instrumental meanings as it does for the policy objective ones.

9.3.6 Outlining the policy coherence territorial cohesion meanings

What characterises the policy coherence kind of territorial cohesion meanings in Table 2 is that most define the concept as coordination of policies on a single territorial level (i.e. horizontal policy coherence) instead of policies through territorial levels (i.e. vertical policy coherence). Either way, a tension hereby revolves around which policies to coordinate (e.g. only spatial ones or those with a territorial impact). Besides selectivity, how tangible this Bedeutung is forms another tension (e.g. coordination of interventions or effects). Although the Sinn of policy coherence does not distinguish substantive meanings as the four above, a question which also these technical territorial cohesion propositions leave open is on which territorial level this coherence is meant. Now, however, they barely treat it (e.g. the coherence of European policies on which level). The concept's policy coherence definitions neither specify how coordination comes about via the territorial (e.g. coherence of policies within one territory), nor whether the selected policies harmonise in the sense of unification (e.g. serving a most valued cause) or more loosely in non-contradiction (e.g. with/out a holistic perspective). The questions on the territorial level, the harmonic type of coordination, and their relation thus seem to line out the policy coherence meanings negatively, as does the tension of which policies to coordinate positively. What sets them apart as much as the dominating horizontal policy coherence does though, is that they centre on government proper instead of different organisational bodies as territorial total (e.g. hierarchies in multinational companies or the Roman Catholic Church).

9.3.7 Outlining the spatial planning territorial cohesion meanings

The same issues that characterise the concept's policy meanings (i.e. as objective, instrumental, or coherence) also apply to the spatial planning kind of territorial cohesion meanings, but then modified for this Sinn. Note thereby that Table 2 shows that a main issue seems to revolve around what a spatial planning substance and rationality actually entails (e.g. the French or German tradition). In addition, the propositions range in level of precision from policy to plan (e.g. everything of spatial development, a substantive spatial vision). Besides these tensions of specificity, the issue of which single or multiple levels are entailed returns too (e.g. replacement of European Union spatial planning, regional/national development to exploit territorial capital), as does the one of how selective these meanings are (e.g. planning-as-spatial-coordination encompasses more than a spatial policy objective). However, what none of these territorial cohesion definitions denote, is the hierarchy such
The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

territories as planning areas imply (i.e. through space indirectly influencing people). Nor does the Bedeutung deal with the tension of tangibility and ideality, even though spatial planning might bring territorial cohesion to the ground or concreteness into the concept's meaning. Hence, what appears to positively outline these meanings are the tensions of what spatial planning entails and how precise and selective territorial cohesion fills this meaning on which territorial level(s). But the negative outlining of them, through the non-treatment of both territorial politics (again) and a tangible spatial planning, does this more clearly.

9.3.8 Outlining the territorial governmentality territorial cohesion meanings

What seems to be a main characteristic of the territorial governmentality kind of territorial cohesion meanings is that none explicitly defines such a governmentality, but that together their features can form just that, even in various combinations. As might be expected for a Sinn that sets up a framing of the other territorial cohesion meanings, most of their tensions in Bedeutung return here too. That is to say, also these propositions vary in their selectivity (e.g. just a territorial dimension of European policy or even a new territorial way of thinking), abstraction (e.g. a spatial thinking or a holistic, territorial, and dynamic approach), specificity (e.g. fine-grained territorial or biographical oversight), and for which territorial level(s) these hold (e.g. territorial integration of regions or a basis for regional, national, and European action). Then again, what mostly characterises these territorial cohesion meanings is that they do not deal with questions which are central to any territorial governmentality: i) how is a territory demarcated (e.g. ownership of land established) and subdivided in parts and levels (e.g. defined via its cohesion or vice versa), ii) how are borders dealt with, and iii) how are all of them controlled. As no explicit territorial governmentality appears to provide a fundament for these, arguably, political issues (e.g. that the concept means combining spatial thinking and governance comes closest), a tension implicitly arises between knowing and administrating territorial specificities and flexibly governing the constant re-/demarcation of territories. The concept's territorial governmentality meanings thus always entail an existing and/or aimed for territorial diversity and contextuality, but that they do not define a basis to deal herewith mainly lines them out. As they neither resolve the tensions around how encompassing, tangible, precise, and for which territorial level their territorial governmentality features are, the positive outlining of these most general propositions scarcely frames the other territorial cohesion meanings.

9.3.9 THE common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

Territorial cohesion thus forms an obvious example of a concept that leads to confusion and elusive language because it is not well defined (Sartori 1970:1042; Radaelli, 2000: 1). Without negation it becomes a universal pointing to everything: a conception ‘without specified termination or boundaries’ (Sartori 1970: 1042; Radaelli, 2000: 1). Although the meanings stuffed under the concept are also regularly stated to be something else than territorial cohesion itself (e.g. as that relating to it), only Peyrony (in Faludi, 2007) explicitly negated territorial cohesion with ‘territorial fracture’ as its exact antonym. Other rare statements merely contradict proposed territorial cohesion definitions (i.e. ‘the concept does not mean X’ instead of ‘Y means the opposite of territorial cohesion’). No wonder then that the concept's propositions are under influence of degreeism, that is, ‘differences in kind are replaced by differences in degrees’ (Sartori, 1970; 1991; Radaelli, 2000: 5). To define territorial cohesion it would therefore seem more effective to ask ‘What is not territorial cohesion?’ instead of ‘What of all these proposed definitions is the most “territorial cohesion-like”? (Radaelli, 2005: 5). One can nevertheless outline a common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, even if only an unsteady one fabricated from the common threads of readings.

What is helpful for drawing this common ground from the lines defining the more substantive (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective, instrumental) and the more technical (i.e. policy coherence, spatial planning, territorial governmentality) kinds of territorial cohesion meanings, is that they have some features in common. To begin with, almost all harbour the same range of possibilities for filling the concept with meaning
(e.g. tensions of abstract/specific, all-encompassing/selective, single/multi level, harmony/agonism). However, only the unresolved issue of for which territorial entities this holds positively outlines all territorial cohesion meanings except for the policy coherence kind. What for instance characterises the descriptive and normative readings is that they substantively vary in whether the concept means an own cohesive collection of territorial objects or a territorial collection of cohesive social, spatial, and economic objects. The more technical set of territorial cohesion meanings similarly characterises the concept by not deciding on the territorial and cohesive total. With related territorial and abstraction levels this generates mistakes in the "ladder of abstraction": when the concept does not point down the level of analysis it obfuscates ‘the relations between genus and species’ (Sartori 1970:1042; Radaelli, 2000: 1) – e.g. between the European and regional will to be together.

The issue of territorial entities leads to another which territorial cohesion meanings could logically wise entail but characteristically do not. Only the not-treated issue of how to deal with multiple territorial levels namely negatively outlines all but the policy coherence and spatial planning kinds. That the absence of politics negatively outlines the descriptive and spatial planning readings conforms to the non-treatment of this multiple level issue insofar multiple territorial levels imply hierarchy and hierarchy in its turn politics. What comes closest to politics in territorial cohesion meanings is namely the narrow variation in ideals. The more striking then, that even the former issue on territorial entities negatively lines out the policy coherence readings, as it is they who could through coordination deal with multiple levels too. Yet, the horizontal instead of vertical policy coherence meanings dominate here, even though they leave open how to coordinate harmonically through the territorial. Neither the spatial planning readings seem to provide a rational ground, as they neither make these three centrally missing issues, nor the not-treated spatial grounding of territorial cohesion ideals, any more tangible. That the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning lacks such firmness makes it less surprising that the spatial planning and policy readings do not address how to relate multiple objectives. Moreover, it is probably save to say that the lack of a basis to deal with all these issues in the territorial governmentality Sinn thus rightily characterises the meaning of territorial cohesion.

To make this semantic characterising and outlining of the concept more concrete, you could for instance state that territorial cohesion means: a loose territorial governmentality, with a vague call for equity between peoples in regions, from a territorial description of the socio-economic diverse present, towards a totalising footloose ideality, by means of a regional policy with the hardly measurable objective of a nationally balanced spatial development, to prevent European Union sector policies with a territorial impact from contradicting. However, many other Bedeutung possibilities are just as valid. That the unsolved tensions and negative outlines mostly uncover the common threads of meaning increases this arbitrariness, as together they underline the many choices for a particular meaning within the concept’s common ground and the illogically leftover issues outside its demarcation. Semantically wise both a particular territorial cohesion meaning and the concept’s common ground of meaning thus seem to be pretty arbitrary. Perhaps the (vague) boundaries of this hermeneutic arbitrariness therefore solely come from somewhere else (see Part II on the concept’s usage and Part III on the territorial cohesion discourse).

9.4 An in/consistent system of territorial cohesion meaning

9.4.1 The system within the concept’s hermeneutic horizon: territorial cohesion meaning-networks

With an arbitrary common ground of meaning, it should come as no surprise that some consider territorial cohesion as nonsense – or, put diplomatically: as an ambiguous concept. Hence, notwithstanding official attempts, many note that the concept has no agreed upon definition yet – not even speaking of an operational

---

\[\text{Note that these tensions might of course hold for other -- perhaps not even territorial -- concepts too. This would however merely support the main point made here: the concept of territorial cohesion lacks an own identity.}\]

\[\text{See: Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 3; Husar, 2006: 1; Officer from DG Agriculture, personal interview in Brussels, 29th of March 2006. Also these references, just as the similar ones in this section, should be put in the main text itself properly speaking. However, they are here in the footnotes for the same reason as above (i.e. readability).}\]
The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

one. Although recognitions of multiple interpretations might help to penetrate such a "metaphysical substance," territorial cohesion's diffuse contours are said to have an appeal though, with its meaning lying in the eye of the beholder (e.g. to emphasise its richness, its primitive sense, to catch all, be flexible). What is more, one sees that territorial cohesion's multidimensionality allows to cumulate the varied manifestations within its hermeneutic horizon, or even to structure them into a federating or umbrella concept. Since also the choices for a particular Bedeutung within the concept's common ground are semantically arbitrary, the question then becomes how to systemise territorial cohesion meaning.

The taxonomy of Sinn above Bedeutung of course provides a foundation to systemise the concept's proposed meaning. With it one can argue that in a meaning-network the relations between territorial cohesion propositions should be between one Bedeutung per Sinn only. The concept namely cannot mean two descriptions of reality simultaneously, but could constellate a meaning-network of a descriptive and a policy objective meaning for example. Such small networks are easily formed. The BBR (2003b) holds for instance that territorial cohesion should consider the three sustainability dimensions (i.e. economy, society and environment) with a specifically territorial point of view and thereby pay attention to territorial potential, situation and integration. Hereby merely implying a policy objective, territorial governmentality, and descriptive kind of territorial cohesion meaning respectively. Another territorial cohesion meaning-network comes from Nordregio (2003) and focuses on the with the concept advocated territorial dimension while at the same time a suitable way is found to deal with the cohesion aspect within policy. As federating concept it then mainly aims to take account of the diversity of European territories when implementing policies, focuses in territorial governance at the territorial dimensions and relates to that new European policies and new ways of putting these policies into operation. This example of a territorial cohesion meaning-network refers to a descriptive structure, makes reference to the idea of territorial cohesion as policy coherence possible, and touches upon the territorial governmentality kind of meaning. But, again, it therefore does not pay tribute to, here, differences in the normative, policy objective, instrumental, and spatial planning kinds of meaning of the concept of territorial cohesion. The taxonomy of territorial cohesion meaning thus leaves room for many different interpretations and meaning-constellations. We are however not so much concerned with these proposed networks itself, but with their system, for which they thus depend on the relations between the kinds of meaning.

9.4.2 Contradictory kinds of territorial cohesion meanings
When the concept's meaning-networks or even its common ground of meaning depends upon the relations between the different territorial cohesion Sinn, it surely becomes problematic when the latter contradict. Based upon some logical assumptions it then almost seems as if not even two of the concept's kinds of meaning are compatible enough to simultaneously mean territorial cohesion (e.g. by together forming the concept's meaning). These logical assumptions are that: i) an ideal state of affairs cannot exist in actual fact, ii) an objective is a point, iii) an ideal harbours no instrumental meaning in itself (as then for what it is instrumental would be the ideal), iv) substance is not form, and v) a part is not the whole. Assumed, that is, that these assumptions can be applied to territorial cohesion meaning.

The first assumption leads straight to the logical contradiction between the descriptive and normative kinds of territorial cohesion meaning (e.g. the promotion of a community type that is said to already exist). Arguably, concepts which refer to a tangible reality, as territorial cohesion could do, suffer more from such a contradiction, if you see that intangible social realities differ less from ideals that is (as comes forth from...
this research’s methodological framework; e.g. see Chapter 3). Adding the second assumption brings us to 
the contradiction between the descriptive and policy objective kinds. That is, besides that it is hard to picture 
a wide-array of territorial cohesion facts as a point to aim for, something cannot simultaneously exist and 
be the target for what should be changed in what exists either. Moreover, since instrumental ideals appear 
 oxymoron, the third assumption indicates that a policy objective kind of territorial cohesion meaning can only 
be instrumental if it is not directed by a normative Bedeutung. The set of the more substantive kinds of territorial 
cohesion meaning thus appears ramshackle.

To start the more technical kinds of territorial cohesion meaning with the fourth assumption: the two 
sets logically contradict each other. Of course territorial cohesion could mean something which has form and 
substance. However, the concept cannot at the same time mean a government technique and to what this is 
related to. What is more, as already suggested above, as techniques, the policy coherence and spatial planning 
kinds of territorial cohesion meanings contradict. Even if spatial planning would need the coherence of policies 
and policy coherence could have a spatial planning goal for direction, this in itself already implies that territorial 
cohesion as spatial planning means more than policy coherence (i.e. no need to consider what this "more" 
actually entails here). The fifth logical assumption comes into play with the territorial governmentality kind. 
Even if it might (as base) entail policy coherence and/or spatial planning as governing techniques, as kind of 
territorial cohesion meaning it logically contradicts both as the whole to its parts. The categorical flaw would 
be that territorial coherence cannot solely mean one of the parts anymore (e.g. policy coherence) when it means 
the whole (i.e. territorial governmentality). The set of the more technical kinds of territorial cohesion meaning 
therefore appears ramshackle too.

The only kinds of meaning that do not logically contradict each other are when territorial cohesion is 
proposed as an ideal or instrumental policy objective (i.e. is in itself infeasible or amoral). All these contradictions 
between kinds of meaning do not solely appear with territorial cohesion of course. However, the point is that 
this concept brings these contradictions into its own confines, making the meaning-networks that depend upon 
these relations instable. That is to say, the system of territorial cohesion meaning which semantically forms 
the concept’s common ground is rather inconsistent and inherently so.

9.4.3 Synthesising tensions between kinds of territorial cohesion meaning: incomplete, back where we 
started
A less severe approach to the system of territorial cohesion meaning would be to show that its kinds of meaning 
do not contradict but that their relations are just tensions which can be decreased. Such a synthesising pulls 
kinds together and involves a bending of the strictness of logic and the making of consequential choices. To 
begin with the tension between the descriptive and policy objective kinds of territorial cohesion meaning. This 
one can be solved somewhat by focusing on a wide-range. Territorial cohesion would then as policy objective 
not so much portray a point but a vision of a certain state of affairs (e.g. a combination entailing many targets). 
However, a consequence hereof is that this makes it harder to keep the concept’s instrumental meanings, as 
these are not that self-directed. Still, such a policy objective meaning can also direct the coordination of policies 
for territorial cohesion as policy coherence, at least when it as wide-ranging policy objective matches the span 
of the concept in the coordination of policies. Hence, when instrumental meanings are not considered as a 
secondary objective, the substance/form-divide which contradicts them with policy coherence meanings can be 
brided with a perfect fit: territorial cohesion means being instrumental by substantively coordinating policies 
(e.g. with a vision). Yet, when synthesising the concept’s meanings thus, the question becomes what to do with 
the normative, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality kinds of territorial cohesion meanings.

With the concept’s spatial planning Sinn of governing technique with an own substance, crossing the 
substance/form-divide is easier. A spatial planning kind of territorial cohesion meaning could namely implicate 
both a spatial planning vision as a spatial planning way to get there for example (e.g. subsuming policy coherence 
under planning as coordination). When territorial cohesion for instance embodies a global ambition rooted in 
a concern for unity of a territorial level (e.g. governmental entity) as in the French spatial planning tradition of
The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

aménagement du territoire, this might be tied to the substantive linkage between the concept's policy coherence and spatial planning kinds of meaning and thereby to the involved strategy and spatial vision. However, all the territorial cohesion meanings synthesised as in this example should then fit in spatial planning or vice versa (to stay with French examples: un aménagement et développement durable et intégré du territoire). Besides that, the description of an in/tangible state of affairs is not spatial planning as in itself, this attempt to catch most territorial cohesion meanings thus also leads to the territorial governmentality kind.

The territorial governmentality Sinn could give a territorial cohesion way of thinking and/about doing as framework for all the other kinds of meanings. Then the parts would represent a part of instead of the whole territorial cohesion meaning. This would first of all still disallow the concept to solely have one kind of meaning. Hence, not all of the contradictions can be solved and a complete reconciliation thus seems to be one step too far: every attempt to synthesise some contradicting kinds of territorial cohesion meanings leaves the others the more on their own. Although synthesising makes a part of the system consistent, the whole remains systematically inconsistent nevertheless. Moreover, even if territorial cohesion means a territorial governmentality capturing each of the concept's meanings instead of solely one kind, caching all of them is more than just difficult (e.g. how to relate different meanings). You then namely still have to answer the question what the concept distinguishes and contains first. That is, we are back where we started: what does 'territorial cohesion' mean – or how does one want to read it (see Part II on the concept's usage and Part III on the territorial cohesion discourse).

9.5 Concluding towards territorial cohesion knowledge

9.5.1 The semantic order of territorial cohesion

This chapter ordered territorial cohesion propositions as marks of the concept's linguistic and meaning-making practices. An order it presented with two simplified Sinn above Bedeutung tables of the more substantive and more technical kinds of meanings. The territorial governmentality kind of territorial cohesion meanings could thereby frame the descriptive, normative, policy objective, instrumental, policy coherence, and spatial planning ones. Although the way in which the concept's definitions fit in the act of governing distinguishes them, what characterises all is that the hues of territorial cohesion meaning in every kind harbour the same tensions of abstraction, selectivity, territorial levels, and harmony. Compared to the concept's prima facie meaning (i.e. how things territorially relate to each other), four features further outline the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning: i) the unresolved issue of for which territorial entities it holds positively outlines all but the policy coherence kind of meanings; ii) the not-treated issue of how to deal with multiple territorial levels negatively outlines all but the policy coherence and spatial planning kinds of meanings; iii) the narrow variation in ideals comes closest to the meanings' inclusion of politics; and iv) neither does the spatial planning kind provide a rational ground, nor does the normative kind spatially ground ideals to tangibilise the concept. These indecisions show that the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning lacks semantic firmness. The main lesson to learn from this taxonomic exercise is thus that semantically seen every territorial cohesion reading proposed within the concept's hermeneutic horizon of "loose threads" is as valid as another.

9.5.2 Reinforcing critique: heading from the concept's meaning to knowledge with an eye on the territorial cohesion discourse

As the concept's common ground of meaning demarcates what can be proposed as territorial cohesion statement, it validates knowledge as being territorial cohesion knowledge. The most drastic conclusion deductible from the semantic order of territorial cohesion might be, however, to retreat from the search for a single true meaning or even a strict and clear meaning-network altogether: this proto-concept does not have such a meaning (yet). On the contrary, it is a universal under influence of degreism and mistakes in the "ladder of abstraction". Therefore, even though its Sinn and Bedeutung stay within the confines set by the prima facie meaning of the words 'territorial cohesion', the concept can be critiqued for the consequential arbitrariness of every choice for a
Chapter 9

particular meaning. The unsolved tensions and illogical leftovers uncovering the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning increase this arbitrariness, as they underline the diversity of choices and their arbitrary limitation. The many possibilities to constellate meaning-networks do even more than that by bringing the system of kinds of meaning inside the concept. That is, its semantic system is inherently inconsistent because the kinds of territorial cohesion meaning contradict and syntheses between some part others further. This will instabilise both the meaning-networks depending upon the system and, more fundamental, the common ground it forms. The variety of interlinking meanings might then be structured in the territorial cohesion discourse instead, a hermeneutic horizon which consists of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices. The instability of territorial cohesion meanings has consequences for the concept’s knowledge validity though, as it determines what counts as territorial cohesion knowledge. Hence, after ordering the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, the next chapter maps the concept’s epistemic system framed by its semantic arbitrariness and inconsistency.
The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning

28 Faludi, 2003a; Officer from the CPMR, personal interview by telephone, 11th of April 2006; Official from DG Employment and Social Affairs, personal interview in Brussels, 15th of March 2006.
29 Officer from the CPMR, undated; Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006.
33 André & Moreira, 2002; Faludi, 2003a; Waterhout & Zonneveld, 2003: 8; Dutch Presidency, 2004: 9; Luxembourg Presidency, 2004b; Camagni, Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007; Officer of the CEMR, personal interview in Brussels, 14th of March 2006.
Chapter 10  The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

Introduction

This chapter orders the claims on territorial cohesion knowledge in a system and critiques them insofar they contradict, are arbitrary, or their system suffers from inconsistency flaws similar to the concept's common ground of meaning. As the classifying system of territorial cohesion meaning frames the solidification of ideas and facts into the concept's epistemic strata, what would thus be at stake is how propositions (might) form a new body of knowledge (connaissance). Before mapping the existing claims, the ways in which meaning and knowledge relate to one another and what the concept's situation is are therefore quickly explicated (§10.1). The critique on the system of territorial cohesion knowledge will already be carried out during the mapping of it. This by per kind of territorial cohesion meaning showing the variety of biting claims, alternatives, and how they interrelate with the concept's system of meaning (§10.2). One should hereby keep in mind that territorial cohesion knowledge is in its creative phase, what leads conclusions on it towards the concept's discourse (§10.3), and this ordering thus points to the need to reflect on it (see Part IV).

10.1 Thinking and measuring territorial cohesion knowledge

10.1.1 Trading off intension and extension

In the previous chapter the triangle of signification taxonomised the relationships between the words 'territorial cohesion' and what they signify and refer to. As what can be seen and said knowledge, in its turn, forms perception by relating these signified ideas and referred to facts. To map the system of territorial cohesion knowledge, the concept's signifier is therefore left behind to focus on 'epistemological institutionalisation'. That is to say, we now want to see how the concept's ideas become more static and territorial cohesion facts are measured. This by identifying how the abstract (scientific) objectifications of social reality and (policy) action-oriented discursive simplifications of the intertextual territorial cohesion expertise represent a particular gaze in which some of the hues of Bedeutung express a Sinn. No matter the sophistication or whether it concerns, for instance, descriptions, norms, or policy coherence, territorial cohesion knowledge namely stratifies the relationships between ideas and facts of a particular part of the world with a particular perspective (Deleuze, 2000: 121; Fairclough, 2003: 129). The question of how to relate territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge then becomes how the latter relates the concept's signifieds and referents.

Here elementary logic comes in useful with 'intension' and 'extension' as two fundamental properties with which a concept can be described (Sartori, 1970; Radaelli, 2000: 4). 'Intension' thereby 'refers to the collection of properties covered by a concept' and 'extension' 'represents the class of entities to which the concept applies' (Radaelli, 2000: 4). Analogous to the signified and referent respectively, they add to the understanding of territorial cohesion knowledge. An intension then expresses the definitional conditions that specify the set of all possible facts and an extension the set of all actual facts. Radaelli (2000: 4) uses this distinction to reflect on studies on 'Europeanization'. Although most intellectual energy in this lively debate would be concentrated on empirical research (Radaelli, 2000: 4), it is less clear to what extent the researchers studying Europeanisation actually study the same phenomenon. The emergence of European identities, the effect of European Union policies on national policies, and the creation of European modes of governance (Radaelli, 2000: 2-3) are for instance all phenomena that can be studied as Europeanisation but differ in properties (i.e. intension) and entities (i.e. extension). The studies would therefore come up with both different specifications of Europeanisation (i.e. sets of possible facts) and measurements of it (i.e. sets of actual facts) respectively. In the case of the territorial cohesion sign, its extension thus groups data as territorial cohesion facts, while the sign's intension links the signifier (i.e. the words 'territorial cohesion') to the sign's extension from the signified's side (i.e. the territorial
cohesion ideas). The ways in which the concept's signified and referent relate to intension and extension are just the first step to explain how territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge relate though.

Another step needed to do this lies in matching ideas and facts by trading off intension and extension, as this forms knowledge. The more properties a concept thereby includes, the smaller its class of empirical instances will be (Radaelli, 2000: 4). Said differently, ‘a concept with high intension has high discriminatory power’ (Radaelli, 2000: 4). This can be explained by using Radaelli's (2000) example of Europeanisation again. Suppose the emergence of European identities due to the creation of European modes of governance is its intension. Empirical instances then have to meet each of the “criteria” (i.e. those emerging identities, and their causal relation) to be part of the extension of Europeanisation. The class of actual facts of it would in that case be much smaller than with an intension specified with merely one of the first two properties as criterion. However, what is more probable in the proto-conceptual case of territorial cohesion, is a privileging of extension (i.e. less properties and more entities). Just as with Europeanisation (in 2000), this could be the result of an early stage of research, as then ‘the analytic grid has to be broad enough to accommodate a wide range of empirical observations that may have something to do with it’; it is namely supposed to explain many phenomena (e.g. process of cultural change, new identities formation, policy change, administrative innovation with Europeanisation) (Radaelli, 2004: 4). We therefore expect territorial cohesion to have such a low discriminatory power too.

It thus is the intension-extension trade-off that relates territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge. Note though, that the concept of territorial cohesion has multiple signifieds (e.g. as ideal or spatial planning), which as broad ideas categorise even more referents, and that several intensions express the same idea (e.g. territorial cohesion as ideal) by differing in their properties. For territorial cohesion the trade-off between intension and extension therefore plays itself out for multiple idea-fact relationships, leading to a broad ensemble of intension grids that accommodate wide ranges of empirical observations. An intension of the concept is thereby often implied by a territorial cohesion definition (i.e. here: a Bedeutung), because in the formation of territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off goes back and forth between them. Hence, in order to map its system of knowledge, there is below per kind of territorial cohesion meaning looked for the intension-extension trade-offs between the concept's ideas and facts that form various knowledges.

10.1.2 Making territorial cohesion knowledge and defining the concept

In our case a problem rises when we look for intension-extension trade-offs, because we cannot look at how knowledge fixes this trade-off within stable territorial cohesion Sinn and Bedeutung. With the premise that one must know what one is looking for before one finds it, what becomes necessary to know before one collects territorial cohesion data, is what the concept means. That is, one should decide on what counts as a territorial cohesion fact before one measures them as being it. But at the moment there is not only no stable territorial cohesion meaning (see §9.4.2), the defining and knowledge creation occur simultaneously too. That is to say, the relationship between the concept's meanings and knowledges shows a dynamic interplay. Yet, it is this interplay between the concept's semantics and epistemics which can, notwithstanding the lack of stable territorial cohesion meaning, put us on the right track to look for intension-extension trade-offs.

The collection of data by the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) is an important example for this dynamic interplay, as it claims to both clarify a common definition of the concept and measure territorial cohesion (e.g. with indicators, databases, mapping techniques, evaluation models) (Tatzberger, 2003: 13; BBR, 2005a: 55-56; Husar, 2006: 46). However, ESPON did not achieve a common territorial cohesion definition yet, even though its approach might lay the groundwork, (quantitative) measurement requires such a commonly agreed definition, and territorial cohesion in-depth territorial observation (BBR, 2003a; Dutch Presidency, 2004: 15; BBR, 2005d; Husar, 2006: 46). This becomes the more striking when you consider that ‘a great deal of [ESPON’s] output has been created through analysing existing data’; this due to the difficulties with collecting ‘reliable primary data for all 29 participating states’ (Van Gestel&Faludi, in Faludi, 2005: 89). In general, the real issue might thus be as ESPON puts it for measuring territorial cohesion potential: combining...
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

all the already and soon available information in the territorial cohesion perspective (BBR, 2003a). Fragments of old data collections might thus be reordered in a new way and then (re)branded as ‘territorial cohesion’. Also, facts can be measured anew according to different meanings of the concept (e.g. those meanings for which most data exists or is easiest to find). Van Gestel & Faludi (in Faludi, 2005: 89) even hold that “[i]t is safe to say that the analytical gain lies in this combination of data collection and developing matching indicators, rather than the parallel efforts to theorise (new) concepts. Our question on the contrary becomes what then to map as territorial cohesion knowledge. Hence, without stable meaning in the concept’s semantic-epistemic interplay, we should ask ourselves the question of how we can look for intension-extension trade-offs while we avoid deciding on what counts as territorial cohesion knowledge.

One could argue that every definition in the territorial cohesion taxonomy has its own knowledge (e.g. knowledge on balanced development, Raumordnung; see Tables 1 and 2 in §9.1.2). Territorial cohesion knowledge would then include all the knowledge that implicitly through a meaning of the concept could be listed under this banner. The mapping below concerns itself solely with explicit claims on territorial cohesion knowledge though. For now we are namely interested in what is posed as territorial cohesion knowledge, those forms directly held as being part of the concept’s episteme that is (by others), instead of what could be posed thus (i.e. by us). It differs in this from the mapping of the concept’s meaning, in that implicit territorial cohesion definitions were taken into account (e.g. propositions through logical implication). However, compared with meaning propositions as points, this research considers accounting for the forms of implicit knowledge an interpretative step too far, as there are too many possibilities for lines to connect those semantic points to form epistemic forms. Then all knowledge which can be labelled as territorial cohesion knowledge would count, and to map territorial cohesion knowledge we would need to return to the question of what territorial cohesion means. We should thus sidestep the need to make arbitrary decisions on what real territorial cohesion knowledge is, and thus not follow the concept’s Sinn and Bedeutung to determine epistemic claims. Instead, to map the system in which the concept trades off intensions and extensions we should stick to the measured facts and thought of ideas that are explicitly posed as being territorial cohesion knowledge.

10.2 Territorial cohesion knowledges: mapping and critique

10.2.1 The epistemic territorial cohesion trade-offs: per kind of meaning

The mapping and critique of the concept’s system of knowledge revolves around territorial cohesion intensions, extensions, and their trade-offs. Since there could be many of these trade-offs (see §10.1.1), the question becomes how to systematise their mapping. As explained above, the concept’s semantic order should not be used to deduce intensions and extensions from. Only explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims set them up. However, this does not prohibit the use of the distinguished kinds of territorial cohesion meaning to merely systemise epistemic claims. Moreover, when you deal with the concept’s intension-extension trade-offs through these kinds, a fundamental difference between its semantic and epistemic systems comes forward clearly. This by setting these trade-offs against the background of the concept’s common ground of meaning outlined in §9.3.9 (i.e. ask which territorial entities, seldom include politics, neither tell how to deal with multiple levels nor tangibilise the concept). Both systems namely differ in in-filling in at least one other way besides, as argued in the previous section, that the epistemic system is not filled in with implicit propositions. As will be shown, the intensions and extensions filling-in the epistemic system are narrower than the mapped territorial cohesion Sinn and Bedeutung. The sections below therefore order the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims by treating them critically per kind.

The sections below are not only structured with the seven kinds of territorial cohesion meaning though (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective, instrumental, and policy coherence together, spatial planning, territorial governmentality). The intension-extension trade-offs structure them too: each section treats the intensions before the extensions, to conclude with the ways in which their trade-offs form territorial cohesion
knowledge. In a glance, it then seems that already quite some descriptive knowledge is produced (§10.2.2),
normative territorial cohesion knowledge is hardly thought through (§10.2.3), policy objective knowledge to
filter descriptive knowledge (§10.2.4), idem for instrumental knowledge, but with a totalising tendency, just as
with policy coherence knowledge (§10.2.5), an unexplained spatial planning to be more a system for than a
territorial cohesion knowledge (§10.2.6), and the fragmented claims relating territorial cohesion knowledge to
governing seem to suggest a narrow and not reflected upon territorial governmentality (§10.2.7). After ordering
these kinds of both ideas of territorial cohesion facts and facts of territorial cohesion ideas, we can finally
draw the map of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge from what was expressed (by others). This by
identifying the commonalities of the territorial cohesion gaze and distilling vague knowledge-dominances from
the groups of intension-extension trade-offs per kind (§10.2.8). It are, however, the problems with this map that
lead to the critical conclusions (§10.2.9).

10.2.2. Descriptive knowledge: ousting hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion,
and territorial capital intensions for descriptions
In descriptive territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off mostly revolves around different
ways to get a grip on the current state of affairs. This with four intensions: a hyper-cube, layer approach,
components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intension. The ways to get a grip on the current state
of affairs contaminate though, because separately seen every single intension seems sensible, but taken together
they make no sense, or at least far less. As firstly shown below, intensions oust each other for overlapping
extensions. One could also criticise these claims for their hard to find factuality. That is, many properties are
spoken of, but no facts are grouped, as demonstrated when the extensions are treated after the intensions. This
hard to find factuality could be explained by that in essence every territorial affair is contextual to a very high
degree (e.g. compared to juridical facts). For instance, when for territorial cohesion the European Commission’s
Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a) refers to assets and support constraints that cannot be fundamentally
modified by policies, it calls to take each territory into account. Descriptive territorial cohesion extensions then
always constitute knowledge of particular territories – and there are quite a few of those in the European Union.
Even before this though, it is unclear of what factual entities we are talking here (e.g. territories as inhabited by
peoples as wholes or by individuals). Thus before these (absent) extensions are treated, the already expressed
descriptive territorial cohesion intensions are.

An insightful and thorough entrance into the abovementioned ousting of intensions, is the hyper-cube
intension, which is in the territorial cohesion taxonomy implied by the Bedeutung of a complex web of structures
in or between territories (see Table 1 in §9.1.2). In ESPON, PhD Consultans&Grassland (in BBR, 2003a)
namely present a figure that covers such a complex web through a collection of properties. As their hyper-cube
figure shows below, it consists of four dimensions: territory, cohesion, scale, and time.

---

* The Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a) for instance comes up with polycentric development, urban and rural areas, regions submitted to geographical constraints and border regions as the assets and support constraints.
The hyper-cube further specifies its dimensions: territory is divided in space and society, scale corresponds to levels on which actions can be led by governing actors (e.g. through subsidiarity, vertical cooperation) and sub-territories as units of measurement, and time covers the dynamic prospect (e.g. through scenarios, the evolution of disparities) (BBR, 2003a). Conditions for cohesion complete the hyper-cube: potential, position, and integration enable the fitting of properties in it. Potential thereby points to all the factors that are not dependent on other territories and provide opportunities for a sustainable and possibly endogenous development; ‘position’ to the fusion of aspects of ‘geographical position’ and the economic and social cohesion approaches of dimensions not necessarily linked to space and distance and more in the range of “equity” or “homogeneity”; and integration is based on effective relations of im/material flows and exchanges with other areas (BBR, 2003a). Moreover, the three cohesion conditions interrelate and can be divided into conditions for spatial or social cohesion according to the territory dimension specified as space or society respectively (De Boe&Hanquet, 2004, in BBR, 2005c: 131). With its further specified four dimensions, this hyper-cube intension thus forms a complex order.

An example which fills in one of the territorial cohesion hyper-cube’s compartments can help to clarify its complex four-dimensional order. In which compartment would for instance the urban structure of the Dutch Randstad fit? Because it is qua territory concerned with space and qua cohesion a factor of the area itself, urban structure is an entity that is put up as a potential conditioning spatial cohesion (i.e. left and above in the figure). The scale on which this holds then determines which hyper-cube compartment it exemplifies – i.e. the State level –, and the Randstad’s possible development can account for the time dimension. ESPON hereby tries to delineate the components of such entities enough to be able to express them by different indicators and to build typologies on this basis; it could use advanced spatial analysis techniques (e.g. multi-scalar analysis) to measure them for instance (BBR, 2003a). The spatial integration of an area (e.g. as indicated by the traffic flows to and from other areas) might then present links with criteria such as geographical position, economic strength, and European Functional Urban Areas (EFUAs) (Nordregio, 2003). Furthermore, the hyper-cube's potential

---

1. These real things are factors – whether natural, generated and/or influenced by human activities or linked to the social fabric and structure – are ‘resources’ when positive or ‘constraints’ when negative (BBR, 2003a).
2. The ‘situation of the entity with regard to the other ones in matter of GDP, population, employment’ exemplifies of the latter (BBR, 2003a).
3. Note that these flows and exchange can enhance both potential and disparities through, for instance, pump and tunnel effects (BBR, 2003a).
spatial integration and social integration together form territorial integration (De Boe & Hanquet, 2004, in BBR, 2005c: 131). Territorial integration therefore seems to come from the hyper-cube as the necessary – though not sufficient – condition for territorial cohesion.

However, the territorial cohesion hyper-cube intension could result in instable knowledge. This goes beyond remarks such as ‘How can co-operation also be a spatial besides social condition for cohesion?’ (i.e. right and above in the figure). The territorial cohesion hyper-cube namely does not only collect properties – in which one can identify many, mostly descriptive, territorial cohesion Bedeutung –, but leaves the trade-off with extensions open to add more entities too. This hyper-cube might thus not so much discriminate entities as territorial cohesion facts, but give an order for them. As such, it is possible to think of more fundamental critiques of this intension.

To start the fundamental critique, a multitude of ways that combine elements categorised under potential may give an ‘equivalent’ outcome (BBR, 2003a). Different extensions would then describe the same territorial cohesion idea. Moreover, although ESPON aggregates different facets, it is not clear how these should link (e.g. geographical and in itself non-spatial issues). It is neither clear how for the potential of an area to take the potential of other areas into account when also their potentials come from their positions too (BBR, 2003a). That is, when position determines potential and vice versa, there is no starting point to measure the facts classified as the extension’s entities (e.g. should the same infrastructure that links areas have an intrinsic quality as spatial entity?). What adds to these three critiques is that territorial cohesion on one scale does not necessarily enhance territorial cohesion on another scale (BBR, 2003a). One could even question how to grasp territorial cohesion facts from different scales, as abstraction often accompanies increases in scale. But when this epistemological operation deals with the increasing amount of particular territorial cohesion facts associated with increases in scale, it goes beyond a similar ordering of (then) more facts. That is, it then goes towards the creation of another knowledge sphere: a more abstract one (e.g. regional culture is more concrete than transnational culture). This would especially be problematic for the hyper-cube intension, because its integration condition both includes relations outside and inside a territory. Then we are left with too many facts to fathom, extensions relating different abstraction spheres to express the same intension, or the need to come up with an external starting point. All in all, one can thus critique the fundamentals of the territorial cohesion hyper-cube, because with: i) equivalent potentials and multiple levels different extensions fit the same intension; ii) no way to relate facets the intension collects but does not connect properties; iii) circular properties the intension partly prohibits extension; and with iv) the choice of lowering discriminatory power, differing abstraction inside an extension, or depending on an external standard, you have to choose between a wide intension, moving extension, or predetermined measurement respectively. These still open intension-extension trade-offs therefore lead to instable knowledge. Which could leave us wonder how well the other three descriptive territorial cohesion intensions fare in this.

---

* Facets such as accessibility to other areas in terms of transport, telecommunications, etc; presence of borders and discontinuation between the area and the others; potential of neighbouring areas in matter of complementary resource, convergence/divergence in time of the evolution of the area with regard to other areas (this can be measured in “traditional” terms of GDP, population, employment but also in terms of spatial potential); proximity of other convergent/divergent areas (what indicates if the situation is more or less stable or if it could evolve toward a different balanced (BBR, 2001a).

* For instance, a way ESPON works with the relations between scales is Multiscale Territorial Analysis (MTA): To compute the relative deviation of a region at European, national or local level helps to measure the potential contradiction between levels of action (BBR, 2005a: Table 2). However, by basing the potential contradiction between levels on relative deviations of a territory, they presume a standard – i.e. to what is the region relatively deviant before you measure territorial cohesion on different levels?
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

Another intension implied by the same descriptive territorial cohesion Bedeutung (i.e. a complex web of structures in or between territories) weaves another collection of properties together. This is Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006) layer approach. The layer approach distinguishes three layers: the 1) geophysical, 2) infrastructural, and 3) occupational layer, and this on three levels: macro, meso, and micro (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006). It hereby seems to deal with some of the hyper-cube’s instabilities. This by focussing on spatial coherence as the ensemble of the layers’ elements in an area for instance (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006). The layer approach therefore per definition relates these elements instead of merely collecting properties as the hyper-cube does. The relations between clay as subsoil, canals as waterways, and strips of settlements on dykes could be an old-fashioned micro level example of such an ensemble from The Netherlands. Different extensions then never fit the same intension as equivalent potentials in the hyper-cube do (i.e. they are different ensembles). Moreover, because the layer approach sees such an ensemble as internal spatial coherence and the relations the area has with other areas as concerned with the spatial coherence on a higher scale, it saves itself from the hyper-cube’s instability of circular properties (i.e. potential and position mutually determining each other). It could also save itself from the hyper-cube’s choice between a wide intension, moving extension, or predetermined measurement due to the abstraction involved in accounting for several scales at once. Unless the layer approach simultaneously deals with different levels for one single territorial cohesion extension, it namely has just one level of abstraction. As intension the layer approach intension thus seems to be less likely to lead to epistemological instability than the hyper-cube.

Yet, Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006) layer approach has its own flaws as territorial cohesion intension. It can for instance be critiqued for putting the infrastructural before the occupational in the layer hierarchy. Infrastructure as connection between places could namely point out that not the former but the latter is more structural. More fundamental though, as territorial cohesion intension the focus of the layer approach on spatial coherence seems to wipe the social dimension brought forward in the hyper-cube out of view altogether. Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006) layer approach for instance deals with the land-use of activities instead of the activities themselves. The hyper-cube and layer approach intensions thus only out each other for extensions insofar it concerns spatial entities. This does not answer the question about instable knowledge for the other two descriptive territorial cohesion intensions though.

The territorial cohesion intension treated as third here is the one Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) comes up with: the components of territorial cohesion intension. As explained below, it is implied by territorial cohesion as territorial dimension of sustainability (see §10.2.4 and the territorial cohesion taxonomy in §9.1.2), which is another Bedeutung than the one of the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions. Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) thereby distinguishes the three territorial cohesion components of territorial quality, efficiency, and identity, and, as the figure displays below, each comes from the combination of two of the three systems (i.e. economic, socio-cultural, and natural and built environment).

1 That is, everything in the subsoil that determines differences between regions (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006).
2 That is, main roads, rail lines, waterways and other physical or telecommunication networks that turn networks into functional systems (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006).
3 The dynamic land-use of economic, caring and other activities, agriculture for instance (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006).
Although, this intension appears to focus more on society when compared to Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006) layer approach, it seems to differ from the hyper-cube too. Still, just as with the hyper-cube, one can identify many descriptive territorial cohesion Bedeutung in the properties of this intension: similar access of services of general interest as territorial quality; competitiveness of the economic fabric as territorial efficiency; and local specificities as territorial identity for example; the latter is even in itself a territorial cohesion definition. The components of territorial cohesion hereby heavily lean on the sustainability concept. As Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) wants to bear us in mind, this concept ‘refers and links the need for ecological equilibria to the needs of the entire society, and therefore addresses a correct integration or co-evolution of the natural, the economic and the social system’. As it would be here that ‘we can find the link with the term “cohesion”’ (Camagni, in Faludi, 2007), perhaps the middle of the figure above then is the real territorial cohesion knowledge. However, the components of territorial cohesion intension begs some critical questions, especially when compared to the order of the hyper-cube intension.

First of all, the hyper-cube’s scale and time dimensions are absent in the components of territorial cohesion intension and if it treats the cohesion conditions of potential, position, and integration then only implicitly so. More striking though, is that ‘space’ seems to be missing and ‘society’ to be split in two. When space and society would namely really constitute territory as the hyper-cube portrays, the natural and built environment of the components of territorial cohesion intension cannot solely contain the spatial. Then the identity formed by combining the socio-cultural and economic would not be territorial but merely “social”. To be more specific, while the hyper-cube includes both economic and social cohesion in society, here the economic and social both appear as own realms of sustainability. Yet, the components of territorial cohesion hereby colour many entities as economic properties in their trade-off with extension (e.g. social capital, competitive advantage, economic fabric). That the hyper-cube and layer approach intentions do not do this is thus another reason for why they hardly go together with the components of territorial cohesion intension. A final point of the critique of the components of territorial cohesion is the instability of knowledge it might lead to: the intension neither clarifies nor exemplifies what comes forth from the combination of – not two, but – each of the three systems. This gives this intension an open intension-extension trade-off. As such, precisely that what might form territorial

---

*The other properties Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) gives for territorial quality are: ‘the quality of the living and working environment; comparable living standards across territories; similar access to knowledge’.

*The other properties Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) gives for territorial efficiency are: ‘attractiveness of the local territory; internal and external accessibility’; and resource-efficiency with respect to energy, land, and natural resources.

*The other properties Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) gives for territorial identity are: ‘presence of “social capital”, capability of developing shared visions of the future; local know-how, productive vocations” and competitive advantage of each territory’.
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

cohesion knowledge instead of, for instance, territorial efficiency knowledge could be as instable as the hyper-cube intension.

The last territorial cohesion intension treated here, that is: territorial capital, is as spatial as the layer approach but even more economic than the components of territorial cohesion. That is to say, Zonneveld & Waterhout (in Faludi, 2005a: 19) suggest that the decidedly spatial characteristics featuring in territorial cohesion debates are aspects of territorial capital that play a decisive role in social and economic development. Following the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in that one can utilise territorial capital best at the regional and local level, they also relate it to other descriptive territorial cohesion intensions, that is, to endogenous potential and specific qualities of regions (Zonneveld & Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a: 19). The territorial capital intension itself is then made up of two kinds of characteristics: a region's structural ones (i.e. the 'givens') and those associated with its spatial position (i.e. in a broader context), such as geographical position (e.g. access to the outside world) (Zonneveld & Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a: 19). That some even call territorial capital 'something being in the air' (Dutch Presidency, 2004) thereby sums things up.

A lacking elaboration on properties could exempt a critique of the territorial capital intension – beyond stating that it is merely spatial and vague and trades extensions off as economic that is (e.g. as capital). Still, whatever its properties, they are circular. This because, just as with the hyper-cube intension, the potential of other regions determines a region's potential via spatial position. Thus from the get-go also the territorial capital intension can lead to instable territorial cohesion knowledge. Furthermore, due to its vagueness, this intension seems to take the low discriminatory power of territorial cohesion intensions to the extreme. As such it does not only out the other intensions for extensions but remains flexible in this trade-off as well.

What can we conclude after this overview of descriptive territorial cohesion intensions above? The hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intensions have their own flaws and share several. Besides the individual flaws, only the layer approach intension would not lead to instable knowledge and solely the hyper-cube intension, arguably, not to fractional knowledge (i.e. neither only spatial nor only economic). With the components of territorial cohesion and the hyper-cube intensions one could question the authenticity of their knowledge due to a dependence on intensions and extensions other than territorial cohesion (e.g. sustainability, accessibility); although for the latter this holds to a lesser degree. However, none clarifies how their properties that form a collection relate, not even the layer approach with its ensemble of spatial coherence does. Yet, even more fundamental for the production of territorial cohesion knowledge, is that the entities they classify seem to lack factuality. Without facts, the intension-extension trade-off does not form knowledge. Notwithstanding "the territorial cohesion perspective" (see §10.1.2), the relationships between ideas and facts then cannot be stratified. Some attempts to measure territorial cohesion facts have been made though.

As section 10.1.2 already suggested, you can easily critique a data-gathering of territorial cohesion facts when it has no stable meaning to group them. The same of course holds for the choice in which of the territorial cohesion intensions to fit facts of the concept's extensions. Insofar this happens in the ESPON process, Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) characterises it as favouring a widening of the analysis over a deepening of knowledge. Despite this widening, she for the outcomes holds that 'the limitation of techniques and data availability would condition, if not determine, the relevance and legitimacy of certain forms of knowledge over others'; and insofar territorial affairs indeed are essentially contextual, what amazes is that Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) quotes Innes (1990: 232) for that it is likely a set of data and relationships among selected variables or facts in isolation or abstracted from their social context that would count as legitimate knowledge. The question then becomes what typifies such "horse trading" between territorial cohesion ideas and facts from the extension's side.

When Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) and Husar (2006: 50) typify how ESPON measures territorial cohesion, they indicate that its set-up of indicators lacks social ones (i.e. four out of 103) (ESPON, 3.2, 2005: 524). ESPON would blame this on problems with data availability, that is, the difficulties of: having consistent data of the sustainability dimensions (i.e. economic, social, environmental) over time for a multidimensional and territorially based extension; the need to cover the national level; and that the current statistical situation
misses “clean” social indicators which are not mixed with other issues (i.e. indices can include economic competitiveness and sustainable development, but not social cohesion) (ESPON 3.2, 2005: 524-525; Husar, 2006: 50). Three things are important to note here for territorial cohesion extensions: i) the lack of social entities; ii) the quantification of facts, and iii) whether this only holds inside ESPON. To start with the latter, André&Moreira (2002) pose that the indicators often used to measure territorial cohesion do not only show a bias on market-economic views of development but are not the most adequate to concretise the conceptual framework of community policies in this field either (i.e. through a social and geographical distribution, which are the same economic indicators used for competitiveness). Whether their point is totally adequate or not, that lack of social entities thus seems to be a general characteristic. This also comes forward when the OECD (2001a; Zonneveld&Waterhout, in Fahudi, 2005a: 21) holds that territorial capital involves intangible factors not subject to quantification. That is to say, even if ESPON will not quantify all territorial cohesion facts, economic entities that are either statistic or intangible could dominate the extensions in general.

A further question then becomes whether these extensions classify territorial cohesion entities in a distributive or dispositional manner. Examples of such entities are economic activity, population, urban sprawl, GDP, unemployment, and services. An argument of Hamez (in Campbell, 2005) can then clarify the choice between distributive and dispositional extensions of them. For each his argument hereby runs as follows: if territorial cohesion concerns ‘relationships between for example a powerful metropolitan region and its hinterland’ instead of simply disparities between regions (e.g. economic relations or disparities), it must not merely be viewed ‘on maps of discontinuities between contiguous regions’ but in a wider geographical context (Hamez, in Campbell, 2005: 401). However, the alternative he puts forward is accounting for accessibility (ESPON 3.2, 2005; Hamez, in Campbell, 2005: 401). Although accessibility implies dispositions, as an entity it arguably is distributive (i.e. there is more or less of it). The choice for dispositional instead of distributive territorial cohesion extensions might come forward more clearly in André&Moreira (2002). They namely plea that territorial cohesion should include every geographical scale in a network perspective (André&Moreira, 2002). Nonetheless, what might thus typify most territorial cohesion extensions which trade-off with the concept’s intensions for descriptive knowledge, is that they quantitatively and economically classify distributive entities.

Hence, within the descriptive kind of meaning none of the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims relates the broad idea and facts on its own (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). Yet, they do systemise trade-offs: the hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intensions (partly) oust each other for – not solely, but – predominantly quantitative instead of qualitative, economic instead of social, and distributive instead of dispositional extensions. What then characterises these intensions is that they complexly collect properties and could lead to instable and/or fractional knowledge. Moreover, what justifies the question whether there actually exists descriptive territorial cohesion knowledge, is that these extensions themselves do not seem to classify territorial cohesion facts as entities of the current state of affairs.

10.2.3 Normative knowledge: Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intensions systematise territorial cohesion idealisations with two misunderstandings

In normative territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly revolve around the idealisation of different values or norms pleaded for as shared in and by the European Union. From what is already expressed about it three intensions come forward: a Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intension. Extensions seem to be absent though – which of course implies: no intension-extension trade-off. While the factual status of ideals could already be called problematic (e.g. thought of entities, hard to measure), this would mean that normative territorial cohesion knowledge does not even exists problematically at the moment. Still, as it might come into existence, the way in which the intension-side could systemise such trade-offs is treated below. What this shows, is that the normative territorial cohesion intensions do not oust each other as the descriptive ones do, but more overlap; something what could be expected with the concept’s Sinn: there is just one state of affairs, but ideals can co-exist (e.g. agonistically). In their overlap the three territorial
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

cohesion intensions further narrow down the already low variety in the concept's normative Bedeutung. On top of that, they seem to do so with two misunderstandings. The question namely is how the concept's normative intensions deal with territorial cohesion's place-bound and territorial aspects.

To lay out the overlaps of the three normative territorial cohesion intensions, we can perhaps start best with the Rawlsian intension, because it appears to be the most fundamental one. The American philosopher Rawls is the name dropped in the territorial cohesion taxonomy (see Table 1 in §9.1.2), and the intension implied by it shows an in-filling of his ideals. Faludi&Peyrony (2001) namely fill in Rawls' 'social justice' for territorial cohesion as communities living in territories engaging in collective projects of creating shared wealth.

Such an application of Rawls' social justice might thus for instance entail that individuals with basic liberties live in a community while agreeing on the objective of wealth creation towards Pareto efficiency (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). One could ask the question of how someone could disagree with such an intension.

Although it appears as basic as common sense, the problem of applying a philosopher's ideal in whatever way is that others beg to differ. Even when you ignore the ideas of "vanished" societies, contemporary Libertarians, Marxians, Communitarians, and Feminists will for example still have critical remarks on Rawls concerning what should be a 'community' or 'collective project' (e.g. Kymlica, 1990). A Rawlsian normative territorial cohesion intension alone might therefore be just as non-neutral, too narrow and presupposing social atomism (e.g. of individuals and/or communities) as Young (1990) argues that Rawls' principles of 'justice as fairness' are. However, if all western nation-states, or at least all liberal welfare ones, are based on Rawls principles, this normative intension might not be too narrow, but too broad for useful discriminations between idealisable 'social models' (e.g. American and Swedish ones) – models which are in themselves already 'ideal types' capturing 'the underlying similarities and differences of complex social phenomena' (Martin&Ross, 2004; Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007).

If the Rawlsian intension of territorial cohesion is not to be understood as a "hollow phrase" (e.g. how should a 'community' be), it might thus not so much be a neutral basis but follow a certain time- and place-bound consensus for its properties. It is here that a misunderstanding of this intension comes forward. Insofar a non-time- and non-place-bound subject bases the normative underpinning of Rawls' social justice, it for this intension results in instability to the degree that territorial cohesion is time- and place-bound in essence. In itself a Rawlsian territorial cohesion intension thus does not only seem to be one-sided, but not well thought through either.

The equal opportunities and quality of place intensions overlap with the Rawlsian one and each other. Both go further in place-boundness though. To start with the former: André&Moreira (2002) understand territorial cohesion as equal opportunities in the sense of the reinforcement of co-operation and spatial links of solidarity – as opposed to competition – in proximity – as opposed to long-distance – relations and network's integration; which as rather socialistic ideal both goes against and resonates some normative territorial cohesion Bedeutung (e.g. solidarity for the whole European Union, go beyond free competition; see Table 1 in §9.1.2). This equal opportunities intension starts to get to place-bound properties by idealising 'spatial links' and 'proximity'. Still, that this intension remains universalistic comes forward when you compare it to the one you can find in Davoudi (2005): a quality of place intension. She namely takes the normative Bedeutung that territorial cohesion is concerned with that people should not be disadvantaged by wherever they live or work

\footnote{In the simplistic abstract, Rawls' (1999) theory of justice as fairness hinges on the thought experiment of the 'original position': when we would decide on how society should look like from behind a veil of ignorance (i.e. not knowing our position in it), then each of us would agree on two principles. That is, each of us should have the same equal basic liberties (e.g. voting) and the first principle overtrumps the second principle that social and economic inequalities are allowed if they are the outcome of a fair equality of opportunity and to the benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. As such this society can hope for an 'overlapping consensus' to develop whereby citizens support the same basic laws for different reasons. Crudely put, Rawls is an American liberal.}

\footnote{Simply put, an allocation in society is called Pareto efficient/optimal when making it better for one would make it worse for someone else – here meaning the greatest equality (second principle) compatible with individual freedom (first principle).}

\footnote{In the footsteps of Max Weber, social models then conceptualize the ways in which societies construct social interdependence. In market democratic social models, a combination of public policies, market mechanisms and hierarchy relations are drawn upon to "coordinate obligations amongst interdependent members (who are) differently and unequally located in the division of labour and are economically related to each other primarily by market transactions regulated by politically constructed institutions" (Martin and Ross 2004, 11). Social models shape people's access to resources through income from work and welfare state provisions (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007).}
in the European Union (again, see Table 1 in §9.1.2). Building upon that, Davoudi (2005: 436) suggests that the quality of a place ‘can influence [people’s] access to economic and social opportunities and their quality of life’.

That is to say, ‘spatial links’ and ‘proximity’ are less place-bound properties than when you have the ‘quality of places’ as focus for a territorial cohesion intension. Even though Davoudi (2005) does not clarify how this quality of place is authentic to territorial cohesion, especially this intension is the most place-bound possibility for extensions to trade-off with. Leaving us wonder how such trade-offs would produce place-bound ideals.

As said above, the three intensions overlap. You can for instance think of collective projects of shared wealth (i.e. Rawlsian) as proximate solidarities (i.e. equal opportunities) influencing the economic opportunities of an area (i.e. quality of place). One could call this overlap a ‘social and/or liberal humanism’. Besides these intensions, there appear no normative territorial cohesion extensions yet though. Still, it already became clear that when you want to spatially ground ideals with such extensions for authentic normative territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. instead of territorially applying social ideals) you might try to square a circle. Thus even if these intensions would systemise territorial cohesion idealisations, they show that this goes with a misunderstanding of territorial cohesion’s place-boundedness.

The other misunderstanding is more striking though: none of the three intensions touches upon the territorial aspect of territorial cohesion. One could therefore already ask how an extension’s entities can stabilise the tension, connoted above by the intensions’ properties, that is, between the territorial nature of territorial cohesion and the universal nature asserted by most humanistic ideals (i.e. for all ‘humans’ on this planet). This goes deeper than the problematic outlined by the normative kinds of territorial cohesion meanings (i.e. a totalising tendency, harmonic or agonistic ideals, a total of or specific territories, multiple territorial levels; see §9.3.3). These normative extensions should namely not only draw the wished for order within the territorial confines – in itself already a challenge for the European Union if it wants to go beyond mimicking national ideals on the Community level –, but also the ideal geopolitical borders. That is, they should have an ideal territory as basis instead of the conquest that actually established territories through the history of the making of Europe (e.g. Bartlett, 1994). To put it simply with the normative territorial cohesion Bedeutung of a ‘will to be together in and ordered way’: the entities classified by normative territorial cohesion extensions should both clarify whom it are that want to be together – and thus whom ideally to exclude – and in what territory they want this – and thus demarcate “their turf”. We are thus not only left to wonder how the trade-off between normative territorial cohesion intensions and extensions would produce place-bound ideals, but territorial ones as well.

Hence, within the normative kind of meaning the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims do not relate the broad idea and facts on their own either (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). The three overlapping intensions (i.e. Rawlsian, equal opportunities, quality of place) merely systemise a trade-off with yet absent extensions in a one-sided and misunderstood way. Also here one could thus, as for the concept’s descriptive knowledge above, question whether there actually exists normative territorial cohesion knowledge. The instability rising from the intensions’ applications of social/liberal universalistic ideals reinforce this, as in their collections of properties they concentrate neither on place- nor territory-boundedness nor how the ideal is authentic to territorial cohesion.

10.2.4 Policy objective knowledge: filtering economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism through a policy hyper-cube intension into territorial cohesion objectives

In the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy objective knowledge the intension-extension trade-off mostly revolves around putting forward feasible changes in the concrete reality of territories. This with one intension: the policy hyper-cube intension, and three extensions: the economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism extension. That (public) policy objectives are irreals statements has two consequences thereby: i) when a target becomes (written) policy it already starts to be a fact and as such ii) – not so much knowledge, but – power practices are concerned with them (as Part II shows). Due to the former, the concept’s definitions forming its Bedeutung (see Table 1 in §9.1.2) are also the possible policy entities of territorial
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

cohesion extensions, or even the extensions themselves. Either way, these extensions consist of filtered territorial cohesion descriptions (and regularly ideals too), as all policy entities went through a filter to be useful for policy. Such a link to a role in power practices might for instance entail the consideration of territorial cohesion from ‘a sufficiently broad standpoint as to take into account links with other aspects/objectives’ (BBR, 2003b). But instead of focussing on the desires coming from power practices, the question here is what this filtering means for the concept’s policy objective knowledge that is expressed (by others).

On the knowledge side, an understanding of policy as, for instance, rational, ‘muddling through’ incrementality, or ‘mixed-scanning’ (e.g. Lindblom, 1992; Faludi, 1973; Anderson, 2000) shapes the selection process which is implied by the filtering of knowledge for policy (e.g. with short-term goals, detailed blueprints, as politique). As policy objective intensions do this filtering, they vary in two ways: i) the territorial cohesion descriptions (and values/norms) they filter and ii) the filter they use. These intensions would then not so much oust each other for extensions as the descriptive ones do, but more radiate from the broad policy objective idea outwards, mostly pointing to different territorial cohesion referents as extensions. A problem hereby is, that many properties are said to lead to or condition territorial cohesion (i.e. as such a targeted concrete reality) without that it is made explicit to what they then lead. Hence, such implicit territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. tacit intensions) cannot be dealt with below. The four ways in which the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy objective knowledge could vary will though, that is: i) extension (e.g. which Bedeutung), ii) what the intensions filter and with iii) what filter, and iv) how these two sides trade-off.

Yet, as mentioned above, there only appears one policy objective intension in what is already expressed and it sounds familiar: a hyper-cube (see §10.2.2). This one might be said to follow a more economic thinking though (Officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006). It thereby filters both the descriptive hyper-cube and components of territorial cohesion intensions by changing the space-society-division of the former with the more economic ‘triangle of sustainability’ of the latter, which puts the economic on par with the societal and the environmental. In ESPON De Boe&Hanquet (in BBR, 2005a: 53-55) present this intension with the following figure.

According to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 394; Husar, 2006: 47), here the hyper-cube approach summarises and visualises the various components of territorial policy with, amongst others, the introduction of different dimensions of policies. This could help to get a grip on the vagueness of the territorial cohesion concept by providing a ‘systematic framework through which possible conflicts in goals and strategies as well as areas of complementarity can be identified’ (Schön, in Campbell, 2005: 395; Husar, 2006: 47). Although this hyper-
cube stays elusively blank about the targeted changes, one could think of some examples to clarify it. The creation of jobs in a region could for instance be identified as a strategy where social and economic policies are complementary on the micro scale (i.e. the two compartments on the left above and three deep in the hypercube). An example of conflicting policy goals could be the preservation of the European ecological network and a country's economic policy for competitiveness (i.e. one compartment in the middle and two deep in the hypercube and the other one on the bottom right one deep). Although, as mentioned for descriptive knowledge, a descriptive Bedeutung implies this hyper-cube intension (see Table 1 in §9.1.2), filtered thus it therefore becomes a policy objective intension.

Also due to the blankness of this policy hyper-cube, the question suggested for descriptive knowledge returns the more full-force here: how for policy to blend the economy-society-environment part of this system with the society-space one of the descriptive hyper-cube? In ESPON De Boe&Hanquet (2004, in BBR, 2005c: 115) deal with this through the figure below, which notes the two different standpoints for territory.

Two standpoints over the "Thematic layers" of territory

ESPON then holds the same for the representation of the dimensions of territorial cohesion as those of territory (i.e. ‘through a hypercube where all components are identifiable and interlinked’) (BBR, 2005c: 122). Insofar this policy objective intension fits the picture of radiating ones towards targeted concrete realities, its properties thus more display a hyper-cube system in which radiation is possible than a directive arrow. But how this merging of the two hyper-cubical standpoints actually works for territorial cohesion as policy objective, no-one seems to know. The intension-side of this policy objective knowledge therefore filters territorial cohesion descriptions (and values/norms) more economically, but neither points towards extensions nor explicitly shows what understanding of policy shapes this filter.

When the concept's policy objective intension does not radiate towards a targeted concrete reality, giving direction becomes the top-priority for the extensions. An issue which comes up regularly in the concept's policy objective Bedeutung can illustrate this: development (e.g. regional or sustainable development). Besides that it leaves the issue of maintenance to the side, in a concrete reality of territories one encounters two problems. This is the tension between the inertness of territorial features (e.g. assets, handicaps) and the wish to progress to begin with, the more so if it concerns balanced development of different unique territories.8 The other problem

8 Although ESPON sees the hyper-cube’s three components of territory as useful here, in that the potential/actual interactions with other areas also counts for the potential of one area (BBR, 2005c: 121-122), their circularity (see section 2.2.2) does not solve things for the policy objective intension either.
is simply whether development can even be a policy objective in itself, as it always is the question of development whereto. For territorial cohesion you may for instance ask in what direction to unleash development forces (e.g. as implied by the Bedeutung of improving endogenous territorial potentials; see Table 1 in §9.1.2). Albeit that many policy objectives are put up as territorial cohesion definitions, what might then focus the concept's policy objective knowledge, is that only three come forward explicitly as extensions: economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism.

While various territorial cohesion referents imply the former two (e.g. as territorial dimension of cohesion), as extensions they hinge on their relation. That is to say, on the question of whether the entities of economic and social exclude or juxtapose each other or can be combined. On the one side territorial and social cohesion, on a par or the latter as facet of the former, are thereby put against economic cohesion (Faludi, 2003a; 2004a: 8; Husson, 2004c; BBR, 2005c: 131; Husar, 2006: 14). This with, respectively, the inseparability from the adhesion of citizens to a political body against the "level playing field" of a cohesive economic space due to similar rules or a comparable market demand over a territory (Faludi, 2003a; 2004a: 8; Husson, 2004c; Husar, 2006: 14). On the other side it is territorial cohesion that combines both. This as a regional aggregate and context of social cohesion, as against poverty and unemployment of individuals, and economic cohesion, as intermediate level of enterprises, unions, and tax systems (BBR, 2005a: 56-57). Hence, the entities of the economic cohesion and social cohesion extensions point to more than two policy objective directions. Perhaps the third policy objective extension is different in this.

Compared to economic and social cohesion, less territorial cohesion referents imply the policy objective extension of polycentrism (e.g. balanced development in polycentric terms). In ESPON it is hereby viewed as concrete operationalisation of 'territorial cohesion' when it goes against growing territorial disparities (BBR, 2003a). However, they also open up a chink between polycentrism as territorial cohesion extension and polycentric development itself. Instead of being the same, the latter would namely neither be a guarantee for the former, nor vice versa (BBR, 2003a). As a consequence, one can for instance squeeze entities in the polycentrism extension when they have to do with the infrastructural networks polycentric development implies. Then you can deal with rail policy (e.g. with little effect on territorial cohesion) or road investments (e.g. as pro-cohesion) and the problem of scale in dealing with such territorial cohesion issues (e.g. without good local networks the advantages of TENs as supranational east-west corridors do not penetrate into the local economy) (Fleischer, 2004: 9; BBR, 2005a: 59; Zonneveld, in Faludi, 2007). Still, notwithstanding its entities in the draught, the polycentrism extension does seem to give a direction (e.g. for development). This more in the sense of how to reach a target in concrete reality (i.e. in a polycentric form) than as a policy objective to target in itself though.

Besides that these policy objective intensions and extensions remain vague, two fundamental features of them come through clearly: they filter and are hierarchical. They filter, because they even exclude some territorial cohesion policy objectives. A main example of this is 'Services of General Economic Interest' (see §10.2.6 though). The intensions and extensions are also hierarchical, because the setting of such goals always entails a hierarchy, placing the one setting the goals (e.g. the sovereign, whomever that may be) above the one reaching them (e.g. administrators) and those subjected (e.g. citizens). As a consequence, the knowledge involved adopts the perspective of the head of the "administrative corpus" governing the "sovereign's subjects". That is to say, this trade-off between policy objective intensions and extensions always filters descriptive (and normative) knowledge in order to define territorial cohesion knowledge for subjection. Thus even if those services would not have been filtered out, they would not have been spoken of in less hierarchical ways, such as in marginal Marxian understandings. The question is however, whether this implicit filter and hierarchy of the expressed policy objective intensions and extensions is formed into territorial cohesion knowledge.

---

2. Jessop (2002) for instance says that accumulation strategies always decide between the needs of capital in general and particular capitals through an imagined 'general economic interest', a construction which always and necessarily marginalises some capitalist interests. He links this to particular economic trajectories and hegemonies and the relational nature of interests of actors and relative nature of those due to capital and temporal horizons: the imagined general economic interests define both the relational identities and the horizons within which their interests are calculated. This leads to quite-temporal flux, as every conception of general economic interests privileges some identities, interests, and businesses over others and thereby refers to what is needed to address wider problems of social cohesion.
As within the descriptive and normative kinds of meaning, the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims within the policy objective kind do not relate the broad idea and facts on their own either (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). However, insofar policy facts can constitute actual knowledge, they do, by contrast, set the stage for such a trade-off and the territorial cohesion knowledge in which it could result (but see Part II for the policy objective itself). Although no explicit understanding of policy shapes it, the knowledge claims namely do seem to filter out certain policy objectives put up as territorial cohesion definitions (e.g. services of general economic interest) and imply a hierarchy. Moreover, notwithstanding that the policy objective hyper-cube remains rather blank, is more economic, and does not radiate towards a targeted concrete reality, it opens up a possibility. This sole policy objective intension could with its properties (e.g. the triangle of sustainability) namely systemise the three extensions put up from the territorial cohesion Bedeutung. The polycentrism extension can then concretise the (network) form of how to reach social cohesion and economic cohesion when targeting through their mutually exclusive, juxtaposing, or combinatorial realities. Then again, without an intension-extension trade-off, such territorial cohesion knowledge does not exist yet.

10.2.5 Instrumental and policy coherence knowledge: a totalising tendency in a servile substantive plane and grand technical bundling

In instrumental territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly involve the different ways of fitting the concept in the realisation of more important government objectives (e.g. a substantive plane for European integration). Although this knowledge differs from the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy coherence knowledge, this section can treat both. In the latter the intension-extension trade-off would thereby mostly involve the different ways in which government can grab the interrelations between policies and/or policy effects in a territory in order for their coordination to increase its effectiveness and efficiency (i.e. a technical bundling). Even though the former is more substantive and the latter more technical, these two knowledges can be treated together here due to two reasons: they can overlap and for both no territorial cohesion knowledge claims seem to be expressed (by others). Due to the second reason, also these knowledges lack the intension-extension trade-offs that, by relating the broad ideas and facts, form the concept’s knowledge: there appear no instrumental nor policy coherence intensions and extensions. And also here this begs the question whether there actually exists something like instrumental or policy coherence territorial cohesion knowledge. Still, similar to the systematisation of the intension-side of the concept’s normative knowledge, we could nonetheless do something from what is already expressed. That is, we can ask what characterises both trade-off-sides for when the instrumental and policy coherence knowledges and their interrelations might come into existence.

Following the concept’s instrumental Sinn, it can be stated that territorial cohesion helps to bring about something else – as is done in the definitions which show a choice between pointed selectivity (e.g. balanced development) or planned harmony (e.g. regional integration) (see §9.3.5). However, knowledge in accordance with such definitions should arguably show how or why this is the case. This with intensions whose properties tell us what of territorial cohesion it is that is instrumental and how this works feasibly in the realisation of an objective. Here the smallest variety in meaning, shown by the instrumental territorial cohesion Bedeutung (see Table 1 of the territorial cohesion taxonomy in §9.1.2), is narrowed down the furthest though. ESPON namely hints at the sole instrumental intension, but thereby confines us more. This because it does not show how territorial cohesion’s instrumentality works. Instead, to fulfill ESPON’s obligation of fitting the concept in its context, territorial cohesion seems to depend on different foc to take its territorial dimension into account (i.e. Cohesion Policy, the ESDP, Lisbon Strategy, Gothenburg European Council, and European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning (CEMAT)) (BBR, 2003a). This would mean that the only

* These references show, respectively, a focus on “balanced and sustainable development of the territory of the EU” and its concern to “aim at a spatial balance designed to provide a more even geographical distribution of growth across the territory of the EU”, the aim of making the Union in 2010 “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”, which has implications in matters of territorial development; “a strategy for sustainable development which complements the Union’s political commitment to economic and social renewal, adds a third, environmental dimension to the Lisbon strategy.
instrumental intension expressed points away from territorial cohesion to borrow properties elsewhere. Furthermore, no facts in policy or concrete state of affairs are explicitly put forward as entities of an instrumental extension of the concept. The instrumental territorial cohesion meanings have therefore no epistemic support. Hence, it seems that the only thing one can say about the concept’s instrumental knowledge at this point, is that to come into existence it should describe and/or explain territorial cohesion’s instrumentality and give data hereon to show this.

As mentioned above and shown in the territorial cohesion taxonomy, the concept’s meanings also bring territorial cohesion forward as policy coherence (e.g. as a bundle of European sector policies) (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). It seems, however, that no claims of territorial cohesion knowledge back up these semantic propositions. This even notwithstanding that much know-how about this coordinative governing technique exists. Following the concept’s policy coherence Sinn, you could nonetheless think of ways in which this can be done. Obviously, the entities of policy coherence extensions would be policy facts, or more precise, those parts of policies that actually are coordinated (e.g. interventions). Policy coherence intensions would therefore not only need to show which policies can be coordinated as territorial cohesion. Their properties should also give us an insight into what possibly allows these (parts of) policies to be coordinated thus. The formation of policy coherence territorial cohesion knowledge could thereby begin with the questions pointed at by those which negatively outline the policy coherence kind of meaning (see §9.3.6). Following the concept’s policy coherence Bedeutung, one could for instance pose that the territorial leads to policy coherence because policies then have the same territorial entity as base for policy-making, their effects take place in the same realm, or by giving a fixed stage on which to relate them. However, such possibilities for territorial cohesion to coordinate policies merely provide conditions instead of actually being this territorial coordination in itself or effectuating it. You could then even argue that just as every other unified coordination, territorial coordination needs a single valuable cause to give a direction to guide it, even if it has the territory as base for this. What seems to hold for the concept’s instrumental territorial cohesion knowledge therefore seems to hold here as well for the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy coherence knowledge to come into existence, it should in any case describe and/or explain how territorial cohesion can coordinate policies and give actual examples of this. The concept’s instrumental and policy coherence knowledges are not only treated together here due to their absence though.

Something else that bonds these knowledges is that when they would come into existence they can overlap. Their formation can do this if both concern themselves with policy and/or are planed – e.g. with fit in foci of Cohesion policy, ESDP, CEMAT, Lisbon, and Gothenburg as instrumental Bedeutung and horizontal coherence of policies with territorial impacts as policy coherence Bedeutung (see Table 1 and 2 in §9.1.2). The simplest example of this is when territorial cohesion is instrumental for various policy objectives, and thus in policy substance horizontally planed. By doing so it cuts through various policies, and if territorial cohesion simultaneously bundles them, it could coordinate different policies horizontally. Moreover, you could even call this a – not substantive, but – technical instrumentality that lies in that territorial cohesion provides policy coherence to reach one or more objectives. Another example of how these knowledges can overlap is more complex. That is to say, what happens if territorial cohesion is in policy substance instrumental for a goal on a lower governmental level? This would namely imply a densification of instrumental relationships between the levels: tasks which are formally divided over governmental levels then merge through policy substance, but by constantly reaffirming the hierarchy between levels this institutional form is simultaneously strengthened. The densification of territorial cohesion’s instrumentality might then form the coordination between similar policies on different levels as a vertical plane, that is, vertical policy coherence; which is a territorial cohesion definition in itself (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). The most complex situation is of course seeing territorial cohesion as a combination of both these horizontal and vertical examples. Then one should have an interdisciplinary approach which does not only substantively and technically bind together various policies but government levels as well; this also is
a territorial cohesion definition in itself when it concerns policies with territorial impacts. What would make such a coordination even more complex, is if ESPON is right in saying that the higher we ascend the ladder of geographical levels, the clearer the focus on economic aspects and competitiveness becomes – which may be explained by the per level increasing substantive complexity (Nordregio, 2003). If this is the case, one should coordinate policies with different foci. Hence, whether horizontal, vertical, or both, the overlaps of instrumental and policy coherence knowledges increase their epistemic complexities, and therefore also the need to explain them thoroughly apart and/or together.

No matter that neither instrumental nor policy coherence territorial cohesion knowledge seems to exist at the moment and that their possible overlaps need thorough explanations of the consequential complexities, a common characteristic can already be glanced upon. Because this common characteristic would then be common for a substantive and technical kind of territorial cohesion knowledge, it might well be common for the concept’s knowledge in general. Hitherto the more substantive knowledges (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective) always seem to have an inclination towards some grandeur, albeit in undertakings to descriptively grasp a whole territorial world, wishes for an ideal that implies some totalisation, or assignments to territorially change all kinds of public affairs. If territorial cohesion is not described, idealised, and/or aimed for in itself but merely instrumental, the grandeur would be far less of course. Still, the instrumental knowledge might with territorial cohesion imply the same whole, totalising, and/or intruding epistemisation, but then in a servile manner. This through pointed selectivity and/or planed harmony. That is, by instrumentalising a territorial total of policy or state of affairs for a single objective (e.g. using everything a region controls for competitiveness) and/or by totalising the instrumentality of the territorial for various objectives (e.g. extending what a region controls for solidarity, sustainability, et cetera). The same totalising tendency of every substantive territorial cohesion knowledge could return in the concept’s policy coherence knowledge. When the coordination of policies should lead to their effective implementation, it namely assumes the grasping of all of them. This holds even more if this effectiveness should be efficient too: the tighter the grasp, the more efficient their implementation. The question of how to govern effectively and efficiently through coordination might therefore be reformulated as how to govern totalisingly. If this totalising feature truly characterises the concept’s substantive and policy coherence knowledges, we could already suggest that it is common for all territorial cohesion knowledge.

However, we cannot call this totalising tendency a feature of territorial cohesion knowledge (yet), because such a characterisation is based on mere speculation. Only a hint at an explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claim appears within the instrumental and policy coherence kinds of meaning, this in the form of a sole instrumental intension, and that even without authentic territorial cohesion properties. For now we can thus merely put forward that if instrumental or policy coherence intensions and extensions will relate their broad ideas and facts on their own by trading off, the knowledges they form should describe and/or explain territorial cohesion’s instrumentality or how it can coordinate policies respectively and give the classes of entities for both. What could thereby help to differentiate instrumental and policy coherence knowledge, is showing how the substantive plane of the servile former and the technical bundling of the grand latter overlap in the case of territorial cohesion.

10.2.6 Spatial planning knowledge: from the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space to a transposition of a system of knowledge

In the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of spatial planning knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly involve the various ways in which government can shape (thinking) space with a concrete and more or less holistic substance and rationality. However, also here such intensions, extensions, and their trade-off seem to be absent. This for two reasons: insofar it concerns territorial cohesion, spatial planning appears to be more entangled in power practices and to form something else than knowledge or know-how. To begin with the former reason, much might be "known" about the possibilities for territorial cohesion as a form of spatial planning and such claims simultaneously play a role in power practices as posed positions (see Part II). For the concept’s knowledge they point to lacking spatial planning entities though. That is to say, policy
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

objectives are *irrealis* statements, but that they are pro/posed makes them policy facts. The possibilities for territorial cohesion as spatial planning coming forward in the territorial cohesion taxonomy on the other hand do not become factual by being pro/posed as *Bedeutung*. Instead, for its extensions such knowledge needs actual practices in which territorial cohesion functions as the government technique of spatial planning (e.g. facts of power practices). Otherwise these territorial cohesion extensions would have merely spatial planning policy entities or none. It is at this point that the former reason for an absent trade-off, which has much to do with extensions (i.e. entanglement in power practices), leads to the latter one, which has more to do with intensions (i.e. neither knowledge nor know-how).

The extensions of the spatial planning part of territorial cohesion knowledge namely presuppose that we know what the *Sinn* of ‘spatial planning’ entails (as hinted at in §9.2.3). However, according to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 399n5), there is no uniform use of the terms ‘spatial’ and ‘planning’ in the European Union and there are also a few ‘philosophies of strategic planning’. Especially the latter is of importance for territorial cohesion knowledge, because it suggests that there is no shared way of thinking for spatial planning. This makes it the more striking that there seldom appear thoughts about what kind of spatial planning territorial cohesion is. That is to say, although one can deduce certain properties from the territorial cohesion definitions in the spatial planning kind of meaning (see Table 2 in §9.1.2), without thoughts about a combination of these properties there is no intension. For instance, albeit that territorial cohesion is put forward to mean the French or German planning tradition (i.e. *aménagement du territoire*, *Raumordnung*), questions such as how such a tradition then functions as territorial cohesion on the European level or how to combine these traditions in an intension of the concept remain unanswered. When you thus add the lack of intensions to the lack of extensions, you again end up without a stratification of relationships between ideas and facts, that is, without knowledge – or at least without a reason for it to be territorial cohesion knowledge. Spatial planning might nonetheless provide something else to territorial cohesion knowledge than such stratification though: a system.

Although one could argue both for and against whether spatial planning has endogenous/indigenous theory (Sorensen, 1982; Allmendinger, 2002: 78, 92), it at least assembles theories from elsewhere in a particular way. It can thus be understood as an own discipline (e.g. Flyvbjerg&Richardson, in Allmendinger&Tewdwr-Jones, 2002) with an accompanying system of knowledge; arguably, this is the case with every definition of ‘spatial planning’ one can think of. And when spatial planning knowledge (e.g. selected ideas, examples of practices, data) is transposed into the concept of territorial cohesion, spatial planning knowledge is transformed into territorial cohesion knowledge. This would more represent a mimicking of the system of spatial planning knowledge from the viewpoint of territorial cohesion than territorial cohesion's stratification of the relationships between spatial planning ideas and facts; especially so if the relevant knowledge claims open up and structure possibilities for territorial cohesion knowledge instead of actually delivering it (e.g. no extensions to back up propositions). To characterise this possible system, one can deduce features from the ways in which previously discussed substantive and technical territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. descriptive, policy objective) return with a spatial planning “twist”.

To start with a descriptive territorial cohesion intension which returns to let spatial planning deal with territorial cohesion: Vogelij (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006) claims that spatial planning should use the layer approach (see §10.2.2) for the concept. The essence of filling-in territorial cohesion for spatial planning with this rather spatial intension is that it is always about the ensemble of spatial physical elements and their surrounding, about what is called ‘spatial connectivity’, both concerning internal and external relations, while emphasising temporal connectivity (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006). Such a filling-in can with spatial visions be related to ideals, policy coherence, and policy objectives. *Leitlinien or Leitbilder* as informal instruments that (non-)verbally describe a desirable future of a region (i.e. guiding principles)
might namely be (part of) the German origin of territorial cohesion (Knieling, 2000; Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). Such ideals have to do with policy coherence when spatial planning is articulated by territorial cohesion as the packaging of ‘measures by different sectors and/or on different levels in such a way that they make sense in the spatial context’ (Faludi, 2003b: 135). And spatial visions do not only make sense in the spatial context, but can be put forward as a policy objective as well. Moreover, according to Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2007), ‘[i]n order to form images of territorial cohesion, in particular as regards services of general interest, it makes sense to identify certain categories of spatial planning concepts according to their content’. Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2007) then distinguishes planning concepts in accordance to scale: spatial arrangements and layout at lower scales (i.e. the exact location and nature of activities) and territorial structure at higher scales. The latter can be displayed in three ways: i) the form of spaces and areas as zonal structure (i.e. planes), ii) functions and activities concentrated at certain locations as nodal structure (i.e. dots), and iii) networks as communicative structure (i.e. lines) (Zonneveld, in Faludi, 2007). Although the distinction between lower and higher scales for planning concepts seems to overlap with the distinction between traditional land-use planning and strategic spatial planning respectively, the similarities between spatial arrangements and territorial structures are more important. That is to say, together all these claims – e.g. of the layer approach, spatial visions, planning concepts – namely tie descriptive, normative, policy objective, and policy coherence knowledge together in a way familiar to spatial planning. When all these claims lead towards a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge to territorial cohesion, however, the question remains what is particularly ‘territorial cohesion-like’ about them (e.g. when compared to spatial planning). Hence, something that holds for the (lacking) spatial planning knowledge part of territorial cohesion knowledge, holds for this system of knowledge as well: no reason appears for why it is territorial cohesion’s system of knowledge.

Insofar future territorial cohesion policies use the language of European spatial planning the concept could of course have a similar epistemological field as spatial planning too. However, this would bring us beyond knowledge (e.g. in the form of facts about what happens in power practices) and straight into the mutual relationships between the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated power practices (treated in Part III). For now though, it is enough to understand that an episteme implies a way that structures knowledge into a system. To transpose spatial planning’s system into territorial cohesion it would be extra difficult if such a shared way of thinking is even missing for spatial planning. Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) nevertheless opens up room for this, as she claims that territorial cohesion has re-conceptualised spatial planning by emphasising a new rationality for organising European space that adds a spatial justice dimension. This would turn things upside-down for us, as we look at how territorial cohesion could mimic a system of spatial planning knowledge instead of an influence vice versa. Moreover, it is neither clear what territorial cohesion’s rationality entails (see §10.2.7), nor is a transposition of every knowledge distinguished for the concept from a system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion explicitly claimed. The point is that the latter could have happened. That is to say, the new rationally Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) speaks of could also structure the system of territorial cohesion knowledge, but then originating from spatial planning instead of the other way around.

Also within the spatial planning kind of meaning, therefore, no explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims relate the broad idea and facts (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). Yet, although neither a territorial cohesion intension is put forward that combines spatial planning properties nor extensions are that gather hereto related territorial cohesion entities, the door is opened for more than just a trade-off between them. The system of spatial planning knowledge could namely be transposed, or even be transformed, into the one of territorial cohesion (e.g. with the layer approach and spatial visions). Territorial cohesion knowledge claims with a spatial planning in-filling namely come up for most of the concept’s kinds of meaning. However, also this mimicking remains far from stratified, as both European spatial planning and territorial cohesion seem to lack a rationality which structures their knowledge into a system.
10.2.7 Territorial governmentality knowledge: intensional fragments to link detailed spatial knowledge, territorial governing, and meta-knowledge

The final part of territorial cohesion knowledge treated here is the part that consists of territorial governmentality knowledge. In this knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly form the ways in which territorial governance and knowledge about it are linked through a rationality that emphasizes existing and/or desired territorial diversity and contextuality. That is to say, some territorial cohesion knowledge can represent the relationships between ideas about the links between territorial cohesion knowledge and governance on the one hand and the facts on these links on the other hand. One could for instance have thoughts about the use of certain territorial cohesion descriptions (e.g. maps) in governing a territory. As such descriptions form knowledge, knowing how to use this descriptive knowledge is knowledge about knowledge. The concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge would thus be reflexive, a meta-knowledge per definition. All this implies that the territorial cohesion intensions of territorial governmentality knowledge combine properties concerned with knowledge and governance and that its extension’s entities are combinable (e.g. with a knowledge entity if an entity only covers governance). Moreover, because epistemological reflexion entails thought, such knowledge consequentially has thoughts as both the more ideational and factual side of the intension-extension trade-off too. We thus go beyond the ways in which one Sinn of the concept’s meanings can frame others (i.e. the territorial governmentality kind of meaning; see §9.2.3) and look for the ways in which this territorial governmentality knowledge can frame other territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. of ideals or power practices).4

However, it should come as no surprise that, without an explicit territorial governmentality Bedeutung (see §9.3.8), there only appear fragments which could be combined into the territorial governmentality knowledge as described above. Although territorial cohesion knowledge claims point towards it, as shown below, no intension exist that harbours such a governmentality, at least not fully. Moreover, not even fragments of sets of all actual territorial governmentality facts appear (i.e. no fragments of extensions). What argues for this territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless, is that those “intensional fragments” (i.e. fragments of sets of all possible territorial governmentality facts) are already expressed and that they seem to frame other territorial cohesion knowledge. First though, those fragments that point towards a rationality that links them and them to territorial governance will be treated to demonstrate that we do have to do with territorial governmentality knowledge of the concept.

One of the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge claims which points towards a rationality that links governance and knowledge while emphasising diversity and contextuality can be seen in Niebuhr&Stiller (2003). They namely state that for territorial cohesion the diverse situation of spatial categories suggests a policy approach with differentiated instruments that meet the requirements of agglomerated, urbanised and rural regions (Niebuhr&Stiller, 2003). Detailed knowledge of such regional situations plays a critical role in government hereby, as it is according to Niebuhr&Stiller (2003) a necessary precondition for designing adequate policy measures to meet the individual needs of regional economies and spatial interdependencies. This knowledge claim still merely represents a fragment of a territorial governmentality intension, because it does not put forward a rationality that links detailed knowledge and policy measures.

Yet, the territorial governmentality Bedeutung defines territorial cohesion also as a new territorial way of thinking or as combining spatial thinking with governance (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). Here the epistemological question therefore becomes how to link this knowledge and governance. Another knowledge claim brings up the difference between the spatial and territorial for this.5 That is, according to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 391), space is more general and prompts concerns with information, analysis and future oriented strategic thinking, while territory is the most important reference frame for implementing spatial (and territorial) policies. It thus

---

4 Note though, that the territorial cohesion meta-knowledge should not be confused with this research’s demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse (see Part II) or reflections upon it (see possible future research, e.g. as proposed in §9.6). Here we are namely not concerned with tracing the discursive practices that link the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated power practices in the form of a discourse (i.e. a knowledge claim made by this research). Instead, we are concerned with what is already known about the links between such knowledge and practices (i.e. already expressed knowledge claims that are a part of the territorial cohesion discourse).

5 There are many more thoughts about the relation between the spatial and territorial of course, but only this claim relates to territorial cohesion when it concerns the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge.
seems to be policy that may tie the aspects of diversity, contextuality, knowledge, and governance together. The concept's territorial governmentality put forward does not have to be limited hereto though (e.g. strategic thinking, reference frame). What is more important, however, is that even though these territorial cohesion knowledge claims point towards the linkage between knowledge and governance, none links them with a rationality. They are therefore merely fragments of what could have been intensions.

Still, the choice to associate the spatial with knowledge and the territorial with governance – instead of *vice versa* or both with both – might unveil how such rationality would function. This division namely implicitly returns in territorial governmentality knowledge claims in line with a rationality that links knowledge and governance (i.e. another intensional fragment). ESPON thereby devises a complementary approach for viewing ‘all territorially relevant concepts within a common structure’ to clarify their contents, make their links explicit, and define coherent sets of indicators and typologies (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). This is done by bringing together different types of concepts, the links between them, and a territorial grid into a ‘tentative common framework for spatial concepts’ (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). De Boe&Hanquet’s (in BBR, 2005c: 126) figure on the classification of spatial concepts and links between the categories illustrates this. It namely divides concepts in three groups: i) basic notions (e.g. assessment, cohesion), ii) policy notions (e.g. spatial integration, urban-rural partnership), and iii) operational notions (e.g. low density area, barrier, territorial impact analysis). The basic notions are then said to be build upon by the other two, while the links between the latter need subdivisions: policy notions into policy objectives and means, both are linked through implementation, and operational notions into spatial objectives, aspects and tools, each of which links to policy notions through targeting, involvement, and reliance respectively. Together with a territorial grid various spatial concepts can be place in the framework shown below – e.g. multi-modality could be a spatial aspect involved in the policy objective of spatial integration implemented through the policy means of parity of access, and all this could refer to the basic notion of integration.
What is more, this framework does not only allow the identification of the specific role of a concept, but also to ‘apply a similar framework to the contents of each of them’ (BBR, 2005c: 125). As such this complementary approach almost forms the territorial cohesion intension we are looking for. This because three features return that would be characteristic of the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge: a global approach that directs the various standpoints (e.g. ‘social integration’ as a facet of ‘territorial cohesion’) (BBR, 2005c: 125), room to take territorial diversity and contextuality into account, and a conceptual framework that opens up the connections between knowledge and governance. Furthermore, all of this with the familiar policy focus and division between the spatial and territorial due to a reference to spatial knowledge (i.e. spatial objects, aspects, and tools) and an implied territorial governance (e.g. policy means within a territorial grid, only territorial tools under the heading of ‘spatial tools’). What is then the reason why this framework is not the concept’s territorial governmentality intension we are looking for?

We do not find a territorial cohesion intension here that links knowledge and governance with a rationality due to three reasons. A territorial approach is, firstly, at most a framework for a rationality. Certainly, without such a rationality itself the tentative framework may open up the connections between knowledge and governance, but it, secondly, does not link them. More important though, territorial cohesion is hereby seen as just another concept in the territorial approach instead of the approach itself as proposed in the territorial cohesion taxonomy (i.e. an holistic, territorial, and dynamic approach; see Table 2 in §1.1.2). Still, the part of this framework for concepts that holds for territorial cohesion might form a territorial governmentality intension for the concept. The more so when you take into account that the hyper-cube ESPON brings up to formalise the framework for the contents of each of the framework’s spatial concepts (BBR, 2005c: 125) is the same as the territorial cohesion hyper-cube (e.g. see §10.2.2) – and ESPON does claim that it is territorial cohesion that integrates scale and includes the diversity of sectors and topics that could be influential (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). It might thus be save to say that these knowledge claims – which show the need to link detailed knowledge and policy measures, the division between spatial knowledge and territorial governance, a tentative common framework for spatial concepts as territorial approach – point towards a territorial governmentality. They namely show possibilities for a rationality that links knowledge and territorial governance. Yet, because an unfragmented territorial cohesion intension is lacking, this is nothing more than what could have been claimed but was not claimed.

Even though no territorial governmentality intension or extension is explicitly put forward as territorial cohesion knowledge, such knowledge might frame other territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless. However, this is just demonstrated by ways related to territorial cohesion in which descriptive and policy objective knowledge is framed by certain thinking. For the former Peyrony (in Faludi, 2007) connects territorial capital, which is a descriptive territorial cohesion intension (see §10.2.2), to the European view that territories are ‘the basis for the existence of different political levels and territorially differentiated policies’. In doing so, certain descriptions are framed by the way of thinking that understands ‘territories (states, regions, cities) as factors of production (place of identity, of collective purpose) and of solidarity’ instead of as neutral (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). However, although clearly related to the concept, this knowledge claim on a rationality that frames descriptive knowledge as territorial capital does not explicitly name territorial cohesion. It therefore again merely represents what could have been claimed.

Another way of thinking likewise frames policy objective knowledge, this time a way proposed as territorial cohesion definition: “thinking spatial” (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). Waterhout&Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2005a: 21) namely contrast a policy-making which takes existing spatial structures into account to the common generic approach based on uniform principles and indicators (e.g. GDP). This thinking spatial frames policy objectives (e.g. through maps, visioning, frameworks of spatial development), because it prioritises places and space (Waterhout&Zonneveld, in Faludi, 2005a: 21, 23). The policy objective of territorial integration, for instance, could then not so much be about the distribution of GDP between regions, but more about ‘the
material elements that structure the area, territorial relations extending beyond the particular territory and
the ‘social agents behind particular functions that have an impact on the spatial structure’ (De Vries, 2002a;
Waterhout & Zonneveld, in Fahudi, 2005a: 21; Husar, 2006: 51). These concerns seem to resound spatial planning
—or at least those of many spatial planning traditions. As such this rationality would imply that spatial planning
does not only form the system of territorial cohesion knowledge (see §2.2.6), but also (a part of) the concept’s
territorial governmentality that links knowledge and governance with a rationality. Then again, this knowledge
claim does not explicitly mention territorial cohesion. It thus remains the case, that territorial cohesion
knowledge claims could have been made in which the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge frames
other territorial cohesion knowledge. Still, there is neither such territorial governmentality knowledge nor an
explicit framing of other territorial cohesion knowledge (yet).

It should come as no surprise that within the territorial governmentality kind of meaning no explicit
territorial cohesion knowledge claims relate the broad idea and facts (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off).
As territorial governmentality knowledge would be much encompassing, the criteria for territorial cohesion
claims to form it ask very much: not only a linkage between knowledge and territorial governance with an
explicated rationality (i.e. the treatment of three aspects), but also with an emphasis on territorial diversity
and contextuality (i.e. in a particular way). Therefore, no intensions or extensions appear here, just intensional
fragments pointing to such linking rationalities and to meta-knowledge which frames other territorial cohesion
knowledge. For such linking rationalities they show what could have been claimed for territorial cohesion: a
rationality that links detailed knowledge and policy measures, links spatial knowledge and territorial governance,
and fits in the territorial approach of a tentative common framework for spatial concepts. For meta-knowledge
they show the room for territorial cohesion knowledge claims on a way of thinking that has territories as basis
for understanding (e.g. territorial capital descriptions) and a thinking spatial (that resembles spatial planning).
Hence, although it seems obvious that the concept of territorial cohesion harbours an administration of diversity,
the territorial governmentality knowledge claims backing this up are weak. Moreover, not much in territorial
cohesion knowledge is about governance or a reflection upon the link between knowledge and power practices.
This fragmented picture where many topics are not covered thus at most displays the narrowness of the concept’s
territorial governmentality knowledge which ignorantly frames other territorial cohesion knowledge.

10.2.8 Towards a kaleidoscopic system: vague knowledge-dominances in a territorial cohesion gaze

After ordering the various territorial cohesion knowledge claims within each of the concept’s kinds of meaning
above (i.e. descriptive, normative, instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, territorial governmentality),
we can finally draw the map of the system they form. What this system of territorial cohesion knowledge entails
revolves around the question of what the concept’s ‘gaze’ is. This section therefore first characterises the concept’s
particular part of the world and perspective (Fairclough, 2003: 129) from the commonalities in the knowledge
claims. Inside this territorial cohesion gaze there appear vague dominances of certain knowledges over others,
these are treated next. As a third step one can from both (i.e. the gaze and dominances) deduce the system of
knowledge that we are concerned with.

Insofar the concept’s ‘gaze’ is determined by the part of the world it looks at, it is of course heavily influenced
by what the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning in- and excludes. That is to say, that to which the
words ‘territorial cohesion’ do not refer is not a part of the territorial cohesion world. Note though, that this
meaning of the concept is unsteady and has vague boundaries, arbitrary choices, and illogical leftovers (see
§9.3.9). Still, the territorial cohesion knowledge claims reinforce some of the semantic features of this common
ground. To recuperate them: a tendency to exclude politics, not solve issues concerned with territorial entities
and levels and the relation between objectives, and tensions of abstract/specific, all-encompassing/selective,
single/multi level, and harmony/agonism (again, see §9.3.9). Now, that the knowledge claims do not explicitly
demarcate a part of the world as being territorial cohesion’s part might leave the concept’s epistemic borders
just as vague as its framing semantic borders. Territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless does seem to exclude
political objects more strongly (i.e. save for a narrow variation of ideals) and to emphasise actual tangible things
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

"on the ground", as claims for the concept’s territorial governmentality exemplify (i.e. territorial governance needs detailed spatial knowledge). Insofar the concept’s part of the world characterises the territorial cohesion gaze, it thus is apolitical and tangible.

Three features could then positively characterise the perspective with which the territorial cohesion gaze looks at this world. It appears, for instance, to be not so much about the way in which forms are delineated (e.g. various descriptive ways even contaminate), but about the relationality in which objects are seen. This is even the case for the concept’s most “pointed” knowledge, as every policy objective extension (i.e. social cohesion, economic cohesion, polycentrism) can only trade off with one intension: an (economic) hyper-cube that relates components and dimensions (see §10.2.4). Another feature of the territorial cohesion perspective appears to be that it demarcates a total. Speculations for the concept’s instrumental and policy coherence knowledge bring this forward most clearly: both might entail a totalising tendency, either when the territorial serves a "larger goal", or due to the grandeur implied in coordinating many policies (see §10.2.4). That the territorial cohesion gaze appears to lack theoreticality and reflectiveness could relate to the here last-named feature of the concept’s perspective. Territorial cohesion knowledge namely appears to have a (state-)government and policy focus, a governing-centred perspective, which aligns with that the kinds of meaning are distinguished according to their role in ‘governing’*. The specification into government proper and policy in particular does, however, narrow down the scope of the territorial cohesion gaze. This is expressed most clearly in the claims on policy objective knowledge due to the filtering of descriptive (and normative) knowledge this implies. Hence, insofar the concept’s perspective characterises the territorial cohesion gaze, it is relational, totalising, and focussed on (state-)government and policy.

The question then becomes what it entails that the atheoretical and unreflective territorial cohesion gaze looks at an apotitical and tangible world through a relational, totalising, and (state-)government- and policy-centred perspective. It could for instance mean that this gaze is the mould in which available information should fit, or be fitted, to be included in what ESPON calls the "territorial cohesion perspective" (BBR, 2003). Territorial cohesion knowledge claims would thereby illustrate this fit or fitting, and the concept’s meanings without associated knowledge show the possibilities for such epistemic construction (e.g. creation, fabrication, colonisation). However, although this territorial cohesion gaze is more specific than the *prima facie* meaning of the concept (i.e. how things territorially relate to each other), it does not go much further to characterise territorial cohesion. From the intensions, extensions, and (lacking) trade-off per kind of meaning one can distil vague dominances of certain knowledges though. These go further in characterising territorial cohesion than the gaze’s common features, as they show the pieces of which most forms of the concept’s gaze are made of. As such they, with the implied weaker knowledges, bring forward groups of interrelatable elements within the concept’s hermeneutic horizon. However, a rationality that structures these elements into a firm whole seems to be missing. Perhaps the system of territorial cohesion knowledge is therefore better typified as a kaleidoscopic view that constantly rearranges a mixture of pieces instead of as a fixed gaze through set forms.

Note that the knowledge-dominances below are only of our interest insofar they are helpful to picture the whole system of territorial cohesion knowledge – i.e. to sketch the whole picture by starting with the parts which most catch the eye. To do this, we first need to list the dominances within each kind of territorial cohesion meaning. To begin with the concept’s descriptive knowledge, this is predominantly quantitative, economic, and distributive (e.g. GDP). In their turn social/liberal universal ideals dominate normative territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. Rawls), as economics, solutions for the tensions between economic, social, and ecological issues in territories, and the possibility for territorial cohesion policy on the level of the European Union simultaneously dominate policy objective knowledge (e.g. the policy hyper-cube). For the concept’s instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality knowledge, however, it is not really possible to talk about which knowledges dominate. This because the need to fit territorial cohesion instrumentally between cohesion, spatial, and regional policies and competition and sustainability strategies at the European, national, and regional levels is the only thing that dominates the first two. And because an absence and fragmentation

---

* ‘Governing’ understood here according to the analytical framework of governmentality (see Part II in Book I).
likewise dominate the latter two: the absence of reasons for why territorial cohesion would function as an equivalent of spatial planning in the European Union and the fragmentation of possibilities for territorial cohesion to combine knowledge and governance through an own rationality. Hence, the territorial cohesion knowledge-dominances which are mentioned above merely picture a part of the concept's epistemic system.

Together the concept's gaze and knowledge-dominances do give leads to map a kaleidoscopic system of territorial cohesion knowledge though. Descriptions then portray the apolitical and tangible territorial cohesion world by relating and totalising quantitative, economic, and distributive forms and centre them around (state-)government and policy. Similarly, idealisations of this world emphasise the ways in which social/liberal ideals relate and totalise people. Centring these ideals on (state-)government and policy in particular already points to the concept's policy objective knowledge. The latter namely colours the focus on policy, as here the apolitical world returns in – not choices, but – solutions for tensions (i.e. technocracy), the role of economics mirrors territorial cohesion descriptions, and the emphasis on (also) European policy fixes the European Union as government level. You can thereby speculate about possible knowledge-networks. After a turn of the concept's kaleidoscope, a way in which pieces of claimed territorial cohesion knowledge might for instance be arranged runs as follows: a region's score on economic competitiveness results from its use of its territorial capital (i.e. description) and indicates whether it should create a more shared wealth (i.e. ideal) to reach true economic cohesion (i.e. policy objective). However, this speculation on a territorial cohesion knowledge-network is not only just speculation – as it did not appear as the meaning-networks did for the semantic system (see (§9.4.1) –, but also a speculation based on a double partial picture. Both in the sense of only based on the dominant knowledge claims (i.e. not the weaker ones) and in the sense of not a whole kaleidoscopic view (i.e. not the instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality knowledges). Hence, we now only have an indicative map of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge.

10.2.9 Mapping the concept's epistemic system through its ruptures

What complicates this way of understanding the concept (i.e. with an indicative map of its system of knowledge), is that many ruptures appear within territorial cohesion knowledge. Perhaps the map is thus better drawn negatively, that is, by critiquing its faults. Then these faults do not form the reasons for why this system is hard to recognise, but the way in which it can be characterised – i.e. it is so full of ruptures that territorial cohesion knowledge is less a "ragged carpet" than an attempt to tie together loose threads (e.g. of meaning; see §9.5.1). These ruptures are as well general, between knowledges, as between knowledge claims of a certain knowledge. Only the fundamental ones will be treated below, and they in the end lead to a proposal to widen the concept's research agenda or a drastic epistemic conclusion.

A general rupture appears when the territorial and/or (state-)government and policy actually are political. Due to the latter, the territorial cohesion gaze would be inherently inconsistent, as then the (state-)government and policy part of its perspective contradicts with its world that excludes politics. And when you add to this that the territorial is always a political issue, it seems as if territorial cohesion knowledge does not so much exclude politics but presumes it – representing either the status quo or change by stealth. Another general rupture appears through the territorial too, but then due to its contextuality: if territories are always contextual, the territorial cohesion intensions should have been traded-off with particular territories. That is to say, when territorial cohesion is about things ‘on the ground’, the hard to find factuality in the concept's knowledge forms an inconsistency, as only the policy objective knowledge comes up with facts, and thus territorial cohesion knowledge only with policy facts. This contradiction therefore shows a fundamental rupture between the concept's intensions (i.e. tangibility) and extensions (i.e. only policy facts); this rupture thus aligns with what demarcates the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning (§9.3.9). The last general rupture treated here has to do with the tension between relating (i.e. cohesion) and demarcating (i.e. territory) already mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1. The perspective of the territorial cohesion gaze namely relates and totalises. The question for the concept’s knowledge then becomes whether you first determine this total by catching a given cohesive amalgam through the drawing of lines around it or do you start with determining the cohesiveness
within a given territory. As no claim decides on whether cohesiveness or the territory forms the ground for territorial cohesion knowledge, also this tension seems to rupture the concept’s epistemic system. Thus, to repeat, the general ruptures of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge seem to be inconsistencies in the concept’s gaze, epistemic trade-off, and perspective: looking politically at an apolitical world and having neither facts to show for the tangible world it emphasises, nor a firm relational or demarcated ground to base knowledge on respectively.

The concept’s epistemic system of course also suffers the same inconsistencies as the semantic system does due to contradicting kinds of meaning (see §9.4.2). The contradictions of the latter namely frame territorial cohesion knowledge, and they therefore rupture the system of it. These six ruptures are between: i) territorial cohesion descriptions and ideals (as an ideal state of affairs cannot exist in actual fact), ii) the former and the concept’s policy objective knowledge (as a territorial cohesion description pictures a wide-array and an objective is a point), iii) normative and instrumental territorial cohesion knowledge (as an ideal cannot be instrumental in itself), iv) the concept’s more substantive and more technical knowledges (as substance is not form), v) the concept’s policy coherence and spatial planning knowledge (now due to the system of knowledge the latter could add to territorial cohesion), and vi) all of these knowledges and the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge (as then the concept would grasp all instead of be represented by one). When you consider the knowledge claims inside every kind of meaning, however, new ruptures do appear besides the general ones.

First of all, the concept’s descriptive intensions (i.e. the hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital; see §10.2.2) partly contaminate and especially two of them could lead to instable knowledge. Although these intensions could be puzzled together notwithstanding their ousting for extensions, some issues remain. Insofar it concerns spatial entities the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions namely contradict, as the former accounts for several territorial levels and the latter for one. Another contradiction appears between the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions on the one side and the components of territorial cohesion intension on the other, because the latter colours many entities as economic properties, something which goes against the former two. Moreover, all these descriptive intensions have something in common what can lead to instable knowledge: they do not form an assemblage, but a loose collection of properties. The hyper-cube and territorial capital intensions add to this instability, as both seem to harbour circular properties in the sense that the potential of a territory is also determined by the potential of other territories. The hyper-cube intension instabilises knowledge further though, as with it different descriptions represent the same territorial cohesion and a single description can hover between levels of abstraction. Also the concept’s normative intensions (i.e. Rawls, equal opportunities, quality of place; see §10.2.3) bring forth epistemic ruptures, because the dominant intensions (i.e. social/liberal universal ideals) do not concentrate on place- or territory-boundedness, something territorial cohesion has, arguably, a lot to do with. The problem of how to apply a universal ideal territorially reflects this (and the general rupture between relating and demarcating). Finally the concept’s policy objective extensions (i.e. social cohesion, economic cohesion, polycentrism, see §10.2.4) might instabilise territorial cohesion knowledge too. This because when both social and economic cohesion represent territorial cohesion, they cannot be opposed to each other (as they regularly are). Such an opposition would be more consequential, as then a rupture appears when these territorial cohesion extensions would trade-off with the policy hyper-cube intension (which they do not), as this intension combines economy-society-environment. Probably more ruptures within certain territorial cohesion knowledge could have appeared if strong knowledge claims were not as scarce as they are. Without instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, or territorial governmentality intensions and extensions of the concept however, no more contradicting knowledge claims appear, and thus no more ruptures.

When one thus maps the system of territorial cohesion knowledge according to its ruptures, a system appears which is as instable as the concept’s inconsistent system of arbitrary meanings – if not more so. In general the issue of politics ruptures the territorial cohesion gaze, the one of tangibility the concept’s epistemic trade-off, and the tension of relating-demarcating its perspective. The ruptures between all and each of the territorial cohesion knowledges and the many between the concept’s descriptive, normative, and policy objective
knowledge claims add to this. It is thus not surprising when Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) says that in the case of the concept of territorial cohesion the ‘problems are complex and poorly structured’. Particularly for this reason she calls for a widening of the research agenda (i.e. more qualitative and in-depth inquiries by ESPON) and ‘that the technical analyses are complemented by discursive approaches’ (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). Perhaps this might even change the territorial cohesion gaze – e.g. into a more theoretical and reflective one. However, one can also take a step back to conclude what we have at the moment. There appears to be no rationality which harnesses territorial cohesion knowledge into a system (e.g. coming from spatial planning or the concept's territorial governmentality knowledge). Stronger put even, no territorial cohesion facts appear, save for policy “facts”. Even if they did, there seem to be no trade-offs between the concept's intensions and extensions either. That is, no territorial cohesion knowledge appears. This would have a drastic consequence. Without knowledge and system for it, there is no territorial cohesion discourse (yet) in the Foucaultian sense (i.e. a system of knowledge and its associated practices).

10.3 Conclusion towards the territorial cohesion discourse

10.3.1 The epistemic order of territorial cohesion

This chapter mapped territorial cohesion knowledge claims as marks of the concept's linguistic and knowledge-making practices. Framed by the concept's common ground of meaning these objectifications of social reality and action-oriented discursive simplifications construct the territorial cohesion gaze. Intensions and extensions would thereby trade-off to stratify relationships between thought of ideas and measured facts into a grid of knowledges. It then seems that the concept's forms and objects come through in seven ways: in i) hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intensions that oust each other to describe territorial cohesion, ii) Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intensions that systemise territorial cohesion idealisations, iii) a policy hyper-cube intension that filters economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism into territorial cohesion objectives, iv) speculations that identify a totalising tendency in the substantive plane of the concept's servile instrumental knowledge and v) technical bundling of its grand policy coherence knowledge, vi) claims with the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space that open the door for a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion, and vii) intensional fragments that give room for rationalities linking detailed spatial knowledge to territorial governing and for meta-knowledge with territories or thinking spatial as basis for understanding. As such, these seven ways have in common that the apolitical and tangible world is looked at through a relational and totalising perspective that focuses on (state-)government and policy. A kaleidoscope then appears with as dominant pieces quantitative, economic, and distributive descriptions, social/liberal ideals, and economic and technocratic conceivings of policy objectives for territories up to the European level. What is more important though, is that this map merely indicates the system of territorial cohesion knowledge, as it is based on a double partiality (i.e. on dominances in the three first-mentioned knowledges) and speculation. Above all it reveals the concept's lack of epistemic firmness.

10.3.2 The non-existence or creation of the territorial cohesion discourse

As the concept's epistemic system forms claims of territorial cohesion knowledge, it shows how the concept's gaze stratifies the forms, objects, and limits of politics which can be seen and said with territorial cohesion. One can easily critique this gaze for the lack of theory or reflection, as it is narrow and seems to be ignorant about the way it constructs knowledge. Or one can easily critique this system for the involved arbitrariness, as every choice for a particular relation between an idea and fact is as valid as another. Yet, the critique of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge goes further insofar it reveals a “ragged carpet” of epistemic ruptures. That is, the claims within the concept's descriptive, normative, and policy objective knowledges contradict each other and/or miss territorial cohesion's place- or territory-boundedness. The inherent inconsistency of the concept's kinds
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge of meaning in addition frames the ruptures between all and each of the territorial cohesion knowledges. Three kinds of general ruptures then appear: i) between the apolitical world and political perspective of the territorial cohesion gaze, ii) in the trade-off between the tangible intensions and extensions without classified facts beyond policy "facts", and iii) in the gaze's perspective between either relations or a demarcation as basis for territorial cohesion knowledge. In short, you could say that the territorial cohesion knowledge in the concept's epistemic system is instable.

However, there seems to be no territorial cohesion knowledge claim that relates a broad idea and facts. This means that there is no epistemic trade-off between territorial cohesion intensions and extensions – if these actually appear that is, what they seldom do. Moreover, only the policy objective extensions classify "facts" – arguably facts are something every knowledge needs. Hence, a legitimate question becomes whether something such as territorial cohesion knowledge exists at all. Even if it does, there appears no rationality – neither from spatial planning, nor a territorial governmentality – to structure the concept's knowledges into a system, merely a territorial approach of a tentative common framework for spatial concepts. And how to speak of a new body of knowledge (connaissance) when it is not organised? Territorial cohesion expertise therefore seems to depend mostly on the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, the more so if the crux in the concept's dynamic interplay of defining and knowledge creation lies in combining information as territorial cohesion knowledge. If this is the case, then the arbitrariness and inconsistency of the concept's knowledge validity and truth criteria pervade the system of territorial cohesion knowledge – a semantic and epistemic arbitrariness and inconsistency that could become more logical when seen in relation to the field of interests in which the exercise of power uses the concept. Hence, the most positive conclusion one can draw for now, is that no territorial cohesion discourse exists at the moment because it is in creation.
Introduction

This Part of the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with the second sub-question of this research: how is the concept used in the European Union? Its usage then forms the "earthly matter" of this neologism’s realm of expertise. To understand what the concept thereby means in practice, this "empirical" Part focusses on power practices by analysing how the concept’s usage plays out in concrete administrative, political, juridical, scientific, and theoretical behaviour. As such standpoints take place in government, a tracing of territorial cohesion’s conceptual history turns into a mapping of the topo-/geography/-metry of powers of the concept’s "battlefield".

Yet, this analysis thereby reconstructs the usage side of the concept’s multiplicity of discursive elements just as Picasso’s (1922) Glass of Absinthe structures the surface, contents and environment of a café table top congruent with the rectilinear picture field. Here the form of everyday reality is "shattered" by inserting its concrete signs ‘in the abstract armature of lines and textured planes’ (Kurlander, 1998). The chaotic usage of territorial cohesion is thus ordered as if it were through the lucid interpretation of an absent minded armchair scholar. What does this then imply for the reinterpretation of the territorial cohesion power practices when the following five chapters map out for what and how the concept is used?
The territorial cohesion battlefield comes forward through the power performances of the government that tries to re/organise institutional spaces, by re-mobilising bias for instance (see Chapter 2 and 6). Both the content of territorial cohesion and the basic institutional framework that forms its context are complex though. The concept could namely be ‘derived from the policy sphere’ (Hamez, in Campbell, 2005: 401) ‘to generate consensus’, for which ‘[r]azor-sharp criteria are not always helpful’ (Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 5). The debate on territorial cohesion could nonetheless ‘lay important groundwork for future decision-making and thus bring abundant choices, problems and uncertainties with it’ (Husar, 2006: 101-102).

Then again, although this debate ‘does not continuously include nor does it regularly update the stakeholders at the Community level’ (Husar, 2006: 98), different interests and motivations seem to stand behind the broad democratic and political consensus that backs the concept (Tatzberger, 2003). Note that these different interests can (partly) make up territorial cohesion through bricolage, that is, with the concept as a re/organisation of the tools and materials in its context (see Chapter 6). Much then forms the multiple openings for these different territorial cohesion and contextual interests: the multi-level structure where heterogeneous institutions cooperate closely, the constant questioning of who may officially do what, the rampant infranationalism and comitology, the shifting agendas, and the absence of a centre of power and imposed order (see Chapter 1). Of course also some interests run against the concept. Robert (in Faludi, 2007) even says that territorial cohesion became topical while ‘numerous obstacles were accumulating to counteract its implementation’. Material interests thus do matter, ‘but they matter all over the place and in many competing ways’ (Roe, 1994: 27). How does this research then map how a limited usage of territorial cohesion can institutionalise into a limiting usage?

You could employ the garbage-can model to represent this organised chaos of interests (i.e. rational trails of desires) with problematic preferences, unclear technology, fluid participation, and a usage of the concept for proximate goals through various windows of opportunity. However exact this might accord with reality, it will hardly order the interrelated complexities, uncertainties, and polarisations of territorial cohesion and its context in a simple and therefore instructive way. A reinterpretation of them at a higher level of abstraction thus sounds reasonable. With stories as the only indication of territorial cohesion power practices, this research then traces their patterns with an extended usage of Roe’s (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis (again, see Chapter 6).

Note that the texts which express narratives are, just as Roe (1994: 27) holds for budget texts, ‘contrary to received wisdom[,] multiple, intertextual, and constantly revised and altered’. The mapping of the limited and limiting usage in territorial cohesion’s conceptual history therefore revolves around Geschichte. Stories then point to issues, interests, positions, and the (necessary) conditional events for the concept’s usage. Even actors (e.g. authorities) are thus seen as included in stories that reveal, for instance, positions taken up. The ones often mentioned are three of the European Union’s standard formal institutions (see Chapter 1): two of the core, the European Commission, with the Directorate-General for Regional Policy, and the European Parliament, and one other, the Committee of the Regions. You can therefore compare the stories on the usage of territorial cohesion to a commentary of a game of chess as played in Carroll’s (1871/2010) Through the Looking Glass: no players, but just pieces and a board that together form the deployment. What begs the question on what field the reinterpretation of the texts on the territorial cohesion battle draws its abstract armature of lines and textured planes.

As also in this battle heterogonous forms of rule (i.e. programmes) transform regimes of power practices, multiple mechanisms of influence are assessed. From European spatial planning as the departure-point of this research’s analytical stance four programmes of power come forward for the analysis of the actual “power games” around them (see Chapter 3). The field of territorial cohesion then seems to consist out of four different “chessboards” for dispositions as well. We therefore are not attentive to one game (i.e. chess), but four different ones with their own rules, patterns, and playing field – e.g. football, American football, Australian football, and

---

* Geschichte in both the sense of story and history. Historical stories (e.g. about sovereignty) for example interwove both perspective for political usage (e.g. Foucault, 2003; Tzeltz.) (1868) for instance counterposes the stories of historical causal explanations of the war between Russia and Napoleon and argues “it was not Napoleon or the Russian state but the sum of all the individual decisions on the ground level that determined the outcome."
Florentine football, to stay with four different games which have the same label for what is used in it. The caveat though is that these four games do not perfectly overlap with these four programmes of power.

The four different spheres of action that the power programmes point to are concerned with: i) auctoritas (i.e. juridical programmes of competencies), ii) potestas (i.e. administrative programmes of policies), iii) pecunia (i.e. financial programmes of funding), and iv) politique spirituelle (i.e. mental programmes of thought). The four different areas in which territorial cohesion is used, however, are: i) Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), ii) the process that lead to the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) and continued thereafter, iii) Regional/Cohesion policy, and iv) the European funds. Still, each of these four usage areas do show a different ‘game of government’ with its own conflicts, actions upon actions, strategies, and goals.

Because the IGCs are clearly an official area, as their debates lead to Treaties that – might not really define competencies, but – ‘set out tasks’ or ‘purposes’ for European cooperation (Hooghe & Marks, 2001: 26; Faludi, 2003b: 129), this usage area matches auctoritas and how it forms politics proper. Also the European Funds usage area matches with an area of action, the pecunia one that is, because the European funds are clearly a financial area concerned with money-flows. Both the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas, however, match with potestas. Yet, while Regional/Cohesion policy is formal (i.e. supranational, backed by a Treaty), the ESDP process, and thereafter the Rotterdam process towards the Territorial Agenda and the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON), is informal (i.e. largely intergovernmental, not backed by a Treaty). These two administrative areas of action can therefore be separated according to in/formality. The four usage areas can then be arranged in the analytical quadrangle shown below.

The analytical quadrangle points to the connections between the usage areas. The IGCs usage area can then be placed on top because it plays a large role in what is a formal policy and what not. The European Funds usage area can be placed on the bottom because it plays a large and, arguably, the most concrete role in the implementation of European policies, at least when it concerns formal ones as Regional/Cohesion policy. Besides the Region/Cohesion policy usage area in-between, the (post-)ESDP process usage area can be placed more to the side, because it is informal and plays a much smaller role in directing where European funds go. The research thus maps out the usage of territorial cohesion according to this analytical quadrangle.

Still, this leaves us with politique spirituelle. However, since the label of ‘territorial cohesion’ is relatively new in European policy making, the focus on the concept’s usage often shows the ways in which conceptual innovation plays a role in (institutional) changes in politics, policy, funding, and knowledge production. This area of action is thereby concerned with representations and frames, and thus with the territorial cohesion

* Hereafter also Agenda 2007, as this Territorial Agenda was to be adopted in 2007.*
meaning/knowledge and discourse respectively (see Part I and III). Although politique spirituelle might thus glue the other three spheres of action, and therefore the four usage areas, together, here its concern with concepts is more important. That is to say, for now it is enough to understand that every usage of territorial cohesion in each usage area suggests a politique spirituelle.

The next five chapters then interpretatively describe the usage of the concept. This was only possible after reconstructing the practices, what this research did with an extended usage of Roe’s (1994) Narrative Policy Analysis (see Appendix C until F). The description in each of the first four chapters below is thus based on how this research ordered the many stories told. As this was done systematically, each time the focus was on opposing expert viewpoints to identify the concept’s systematic uncertainty. Also the same four kind of stories each time return in the same kind of order (see Appendix C): the stories were per usage area differentiated in i) general stories that frame it, ii) stories that structure territorial cohesion metanarratives (by being on the concept itself) or the narratives with an own dynamic without the mention of territorial cohesion, and iii) these metanarratives and iv) narratives themselves of course.

In these overviews you can see the aggregations of the concept’s strategic positions in the bundles of metanarratives. Because the four usage areas then reveal for what and how the concept is used, Chapter 15 can outline the whole territorial cohesion usage field according to all the metanarratives. This conclusion on the concept’s common ground for decision-making thereby further structures and/or partly readjusts the order of the analytical quadrangle shown above. We might thereby start to understand the arena and the rules of the ‘territorial cohesion game’.
Chapter 11  The Intergovernmental Conferences usage area

Introduction

In line of the analytical quadrangle made above, the Treaty debates are an important area to look for strategic positions that demarcate the usage of the concept of territorial cohesion. Treaties namely form the institutional fundamentals of the European Union politically bargained for during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). Many stories told in these conferences are therefore about for what competencies will (not) be given – in casu territorial cohesion. One can then deduce an order from them (§11.1) in which several aggregations of the concept's strategic positions appear (§11.2). Due to the departure-point of this research (i.e. European spatial planning; see Chapter 3), we are thereby mostly interested in how the concept is used for a competency for European spatial planning. From this order, aggregation, and usage two main conclusions can be drawn (§11.3).

11.1 Overviewing the straightforward IGCs usage area

The order of the many stories told in the IGCs usage area (see Appendix C) gives an overview of the developing strategic positions concerning territorial cohesion in the practices of the Treaty debates. Yet, the stories for/against competencies show little development and are straightforward though general, the positions seem to stay relatively the same and the borders of this area of action rather clear. They also point out that the whole territorial cohesion usage field is not independent but strongly related to other areas of action, as especially comes forward in the narratives of 'Power Allocation,' 'Regional/Cohesion Policy,' 'European spatial planning' and 'SG(E)I' (i.e. Services of General (Economic) Interest). The usage of the concept for a European Union competency for territorial cohesion might thus formally unlock existing areas of action for influences of "outside" forces; albeit by creating new relations between already existing areas, a new (conceptual) organisation within these areas, and/or a totally new (European) area of action.

11.2 The IGCs usage area's un/contested aggregations of the concept's strategic positions

While the structuring stories on territorial cohesion itself denote the disputed importance and development of the bundle of relations and/or areas made by the concept, the form this realignment could take is demarcated by six metanarratives. These metanarratives which relate the strategic positions show, with more or less resistance or success: i) a promotion of a new cohesion objective, ii) a spatial planning on the European level, iii) the provision of SG(E)I, iv) a focus on territorial specificities, v) the need for coordination, and/or vi) the importance of the territorial dimension. Hereby each of them brings forward that the Treaty debates might decide on territorial cohesion's official ground, but that they did not do this yet – safe for the metanarrative on SG(E)I that is, as it points to the only existing official ground for the concept's usage.

Besides that the official positions relate SG(E)I to territorial cohesion, those that relate Cohesion Policy to a competency for territorial cohesion are uncontested. Moreover, in the IGCs usage area there seem to be no positions against the promotion of coordination and territorial specificities with the concept either. However, when it concerns the possible unlocking of an area of action in European spatial planning, things are different. This is shown by the stories on territorial cohesion itself, stories of the European spatial planning narrative, and territorial cohesion stories of the 'spatial planning or territorial cohesion competency' metanarrative. That is to say, there appear both positions for and against, respectively, a Community competency for territorial cohesion, a formalisation of European spatial planning, and the relation/overlap of spatial planning and territorial cohesion – and the plethora of in-between positions adds to the complexity. A threefold contested usage of the concept...
of territorial cohesion might then nonetheless be possible. Hence, the promotion of the concept for European spatial planning with stories about territorial cohesion being (related to) spatial planning could formally open the relationship between European Union policies (e.g. regional and cohesion policies) and spatial planning.

11.3 The two main conclusions on the concept’s usage in the IGCs

The two main conclusions to draw from the usages of the concept in the IGCs usage area are therefore that the placement of territorial cohesion in Treaties gives the (official) room for possible usages of the concept (e.g. territorial cohesion and SG(E)I or territorial cohesion on a par with economic and social cohesion) and that there is a threefold contested usage of the concept that relates European Union policies and spatial planning.

However, as the IGCs only draw the official limits of the space in which the concept can be used, the reorganisation of areas of action with territorial cohesion cannot be described by the IGCs usage area alone. Whether these competencies for territorial cohesion (policy) and spatial planning are, for instance, used for the same areas of action or not – or, if there are overlaps in this, what the differences are – depends largely on what is practiced as European spatial planning and (territorial) cohesion policy; the more so when it is, especially for European spatial planning, more about informal areas of action. This brings the importance to the fore of focussing on the usage of the concept in stories of other usage areas (see the next chapters).
Chapter 12 The (post-)ESDP process usage area

Introduction

Besides the IGCs usage area, another area to look for strategic positions that demarcate the usage of the concept of territorial cohesion is, as the analytical quadrangle showed above, the (post-)ESDP process. A trait of this usage area is that it largely concerns informal (European) policy making and knowledge production as expressed in the process leading to the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) *par excellence*, but also thereafter – hence the label ‘(post-)ESDP process’. The relatively new though established area of European spatial planning action and the territorial cohesion (policy) one in creation then relate, as spotlighted in the fan of metanarratives and narratives of the IGCs usage area. Although these areas of action are similar, they differ too. The stories showing the concept’s usage in the (post-)ESDP process thereby go in-depth content wise. Still, also from them one can deduce an order (§12.1) in which this time a nitty-gritty of the concept’s aggregated strategic positions appears (§12.2). Due to (again) the departure-point of this research (i.e. European spatial planning; see Chapter 3), we are thereby mostly interested in how the concept substantively influences European spatial (planning) policy (§12.3). From this order, aggregation, and substantive influences two main conclusions can be drawn (§12.4).

12.1 Overviewing multiple and close-knitted promotions in the (post-)ESDP process usage area

The order of the myriad of specific stories told in the (post-)ESDP process usage area (see Appendix D) gives an overview of the developing strategic positions concerning territorial cohesion in the informal practices of European spatial planning. The multi-shaded patchwork of general stories thereby frames the firm bundle of territorial cohesion metanarratives and closely knitted package of narratives, and the intertwined stories on territorial cohesion and spatial planning themselves structure them. Surprisingly, although the concept’s usage for European spatial planning is threefoldly contested in the IGCs usage area, it is not problematic here. What is more, spatial planning and territorial cohesion themselves and their bond are in this usage area explicitly promoted. The usage of territorial cohesion for an implicit promotion of the whole area of European spatial planning might then informally lock areas of action by influencing verging forces; albeit by fitting substantive positions from one inert area into another, re/assembling (conceptual) corridors within these areas, and/or creating a totally new (European) area of action which overlaps and intersects with the previous ones.

12.2 The nitty-gritty of the aggregated positions for the concept in the (post-)ESDP process usage area

An implicit promotion of spatial planning interests through territorial cohesion would be multi-purposive. It would namely mostly be conducted *via* the six metanarratives, which all represent usages of the concept which are accepted here. The strategic positions represented by these metanarratives then substantively endorse: i) polycentrism, ii) the interrelated policy objectives of competitiveness, balance, and sustainability, iii) the accessibility of services or infrastructures, iv) observation of the territory, v) substantive and processual coordination of policies, and vi) the territorial dimension. No wonder, then, that in such a multi-purposive enforcement the stories are multi-shaded and specific, especially when it concerns territorial cohesion’s unifications of policy objectives, full territorial information agenda, and complex territorial governance – besides the relevance of details more in general that is.
Perhaps because this nitty-gritty is framed by detailed puzzles and calls for coordination (i.e. a want for overview), the threshold for positions to be accepted in it appears to be low. The way in which a represented concern forges with territorial cohesion is disputed in all the metanarratives though (e.g. territorial cohesion needs polycentrism or vice versa, territorial cohesion provides a policy framework or vice versa). In this competition between positions for prominence, only the concerns with accessibility are dimmed, especially if involved with services. Moreover, all these traits that demarcate the concept's usage are reinforced by the strong alliances between positions. These predominantly advocate spatial/territorial structures and coordination for policy objectives, coordination linked to the territorial impacts and dimension of policies as well, and a composite of foci to observe the territory. Then again, these alliances also add positions, entangle their particularities, and deviate structurally. They could therefore not only strengthen positions, but also disturb their interests. We could thus wonder how this low threshold for competitions and alliances between disputed and entangled ways of forging territorial cohesion positions affect the role the concept plays.

12.3 The asymmetric substantive influences between territorial cohesion and European spatial (planning) policy

In this intricate promotion of European spatial planning with territorial cohesion, the influence of the concept can radiate with every exposure. However, influences the other way around seem to be stronger, with the older and even more nuanced scene of multiple narratives (i.e. from the (post-)ESDP process) fitting its content into the concept. The territorial cohesion metanarratives namely mimic the self-directed dynamic of the narratives that promote spatial and territorial structures, the territorial dimension of policies, and competitiveness and sustainability, including the loose commitment to accessibility and augmentation of coordination interests in this. Furthermore, through their holistic links these narratives (and other ones; see Appendix D) give spatial and territorial development twists to territorial cohesion quarrels, thereby posing the ESDP as these quarrels’ major cause and concentrating on (economic) observation in general and territorial capital in particular. This would leave scarce turf for positions in the (post-)ESDP process usage area that only belong to territorial cohesion.

When territorial cohesion positions are obtained from European spatial planning, then the concept's usage is not problematic in these practices, arguably, the more so because its usage is ongoing in an uncontested promotion of both. Yet, insofar the concept's own ground differs, frictions might arise. This could become problematic when the concept would desert polycentrism, advance territorial instead of spatial concerns, and instrumentalise spatial development. Moreover, for accessibility both differing from and mimicking European spatial planning have risks: either the concept differs by dealing with services according to the official line (see Chapter 11), or it mimics by dealing with services in the familiar infrastructural ways and then deviates juridically. This besides that the specificity, complexity, and indecisiveness of territorial cohesion stories and the hazards they point to (e.g. the heated debate on the European Union's territory) could be problematic for European spatial planning by themselves. Notwithstanding that territorial cohesion positions seldom diverge from European spatial planning, the concept could therefore influence it nonetheless.

The substantive influence of territorial cohesion on European spatial (planning) policy might then commandeer the polycentrism campaign away (to research domains) and re/claim the processual structures of spatial planning for coordinative and framing usages within expansive territorial ways of doing. Moreover, if the concept reassembles passages within the narratives, then the outline of the territorial cohesion positions would simultaneously instrumentalise spatial development, fasten planning traditions even tighter to the structural quest to unify territorial governance, and institute the desire to plan – not European space, but – the territory of the European Union. The conclusion might be, however, that qua appearance the promotion of the concept for European spatial planning seems to be effective with these spatial planning stories on territorial cohesion. Yet, whether these utterances have any punching power remains to be seen.
12.4 The two main conclusions on the concept's usage in the (post-)ESDP process usage area

The two main conclusions to draw from these usages of the concept in the (post-)ESDP process usage area are therefore that the promotion of territorial cohesion in European spatial planning processes informally demarcates the substantive limits for possible usages of the concept (e.g. polycentrism or territorial capital, spatial development or territorial governance) and that there is no contested usage of the concept in this, only competitions and coalitions between usages.

The reorganisation of areas of action with the concept as described by the (post-)ESDP process usage area shows that if a new area of territorial cohesion action is created, it would largely overlap with practices of European spatial planning. European spatial planning practices extend beyond the part that forms a context for territorial cohesion though, and therefore consists of more than the substantive positions fitted into the concept. The sacrifices that the informally established area of European spatial planning action nevertheless might have to make to continue its support for creating a territorial cohesion area of action can indicate the indistinct border of both. That is to say, to merely safe its influence European spatial planning could need a queen sacrifice of polycentrism and to surrender spatial and territorial development concerns to coordination processes in a compromised pursuit for territorial governance.

However, it might not be territorial cohesion that influences these changes. Besides pervasive political agendas (e.g. on governance, Lisbon Strategy), other areas of action could affect European spatial planning via the concept too, especially when these areas of action are related to territorial cohesion. The European Union's Cohesion Policy is such an area, one that demarcates the official policy limits for possible usages of the concept (see the next chapter).
Chapter 13 The Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

Introduction

As the two previous chapters showed, the IGCs could be seen as drawing the official limits in which territorial cohesion may be used and the (post-)ESDP process as informally demarcating its substantive space. The strategic positions of Regional/Cohesion policy then demarcate the official policy limits for possible usages of the concept. Because formal European policy substances are more confined by official limits than those of informal practices, the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area could in the analytical quadrangle made above be placed somewhat between the IGCs and (post-)ESDP process ones. Moreover, Regional/Cohesion policy is within these confines only concerned with policy (making), thereby re/forming the substantial policy space with, among others, a focus on cohesion objectives and an attention to Services of General (Economic) Interest (SGEI) – two major issues in the IGCs that are not stressed in the (post-)ESDP process.

These traits make that the stories in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area treat territorial cohesion substantively, something the stories of the IGCs do not do, but less in-depth than the specific stories of the (post-)ESDP process. As shown by their order (§13.1), in which this time a clear-cut bundle of the concept’s aggregated strategic positions appears (§13.2). The departure-point of this research (i.e. European spatial planning; see Chapter 3) then only indirectly returns in our main interest. Ways in which the concept changes the direction of the future European Regional/Cohesion policy (§13.3), that is, a legitimate interest for every territorial cohesion research, could namely come from the (post-)ESDP process usage area. Also from this order, aggregation, and direction two main conclusions can be drawn (§13.4).

13.1 Overviewing clear-cut and interweaved promotions in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

The order of the stories told in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area (see Appendix E) gives an overview of the developing strategic positions concerning territorial cohesion in the formal practices of European policies. Hereby the general stories portray a frame of strives in which the clear-cut though consistent bundle of territorial cohesion metanarratives and the substantively alike interweaved narratives with an own dynamic dwell. The latter two are structured by the allied stories on territorial cohesion and regional/cohesion policy themselves respectively, in which promotions of them, apart and in their bond, uphold them both. This also via contested seizures of the concept, as the concept’s usage for an expansion of the Regional/Cohesion policy area of action simultaneously demonstrates the colonisation of informal practices and the opening of the door for forces outside the established policy area; albeit by the iteration of substantive positions, the formal addition of a new (European) area of action or arrangement of informal practices, or through (conceptual) remobilisations. Yet, the strategic positions of interest thereby manifest themselves within the framing trenches of the prevalent political, economic, and social struggles (e.g. concerning European integration, growth, welfare). What is more, through the years these positions are structured by combats against national control, for a wider geographical area of influence, and towards an alliance with the Lisbon Strategy. One could then ask in which battles territorial cohesion is involved.
13.2 The aggregated settlement of positions for the concept in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

While territorial cohesion and regional/cohesion policy themselves are mutually supportive in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area, the choice of whether the concept belongs or adds to regional/cohesion policy is contested. The settled amalgam of positions to fight over is then delineated by four metanarratives. These gather: i) challenging surges underway that push for territorial cohesion as cohesion objective or territorial dimension; ii) indecisive quarrels on whether to pursue balanced development objectives foremost or also economic or environmental ones (in combination); iii) a peculiarly placid putting forth of the idea of substantive and primarily processual coordination; and iv) a weakening union between the swelling cloud of specific territorial interests (i.e. from specific to all territories and also pointing to territorial realities, impacts, and capital) and accessibility concerns as the officially given ground for territorial cohesion to go beyond (i.e. services besides transport).

Territorial cohesion positions could thus be involved in each of the battles that structure them. That is, if the concept adds to Regional/Cohesion policy this, arguably, implies the policy's expansion, either as territorial dimension or cohesion objective. Moreover, while following the abovementioned order of metanarratives further, one could pose that economic objectives are more in line with the Lisbon Strategy; coordination of European Union policies strengthens supranational forces against national control, and the increasing promotion of specific territorial interests entails a widening of Regional/Cohesion policy's geographical area of influence.

The ways in which these strategic positions recently adhere to each other thereby reinforce the usage of the concept as territorial dimension, for economic and environmental interests, and for processual and mostly substantive coordination. However, these adherences also isolate the positions on specific territories and service provision (i.e. by leaving these concerns out of connections), what further weakens them. This development of adherence and isolation might rearrange the strategic positions of territorial cohesion, because then particularly the combined interest to provide enough services in all territories loses out and especially the blended concern to coordinate policies with territorial impacts grows. However, the question is what role all these territorial cohesion positions play in the re/direction of the concept's key formally established area of action, that is, the European Union's Regional/Cohesion policy.

13.3 Territorial cohesion's influence on the future direction of Regional/Cohesion policy

The European Union's Regional/Cohesion policy could expand its area of action by via the concept of territorial cohesion roaming the by the IGCs usage area drawn frontier of what is un/official and by (thereby) colonising positions of the (post-)ESDP process usage area. In the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area the official demarcation for territorial cohesion positions (i.e. SG(E)) is for instance transgressed by an on a par placement of territorial cohesion besides the economic and social cohesion objectives – an approach challenged later on – and a developing role for coordination concerns with the concept even infringes not (yet) established precincts. Moreover, the set objective of sustainable and balanced development is reused by claiming it for territorial cohesion and the concept's official base of providing services is partly followed by tying it to the formal task of reducing the backwardness of specific territories.

However, the strategic positions of territorial cohesion in Regional/Cohesion policy lean less on the IGCs than towards the (post-)ESDP process. This with the (post-)ESDP process' informal ways of doing and sources of information, the more so when these positions in Regional/Cohesion policy are associated. Hereby the concept's interest comes forward in three ways: i) the territorial dimension for economic and social cohesion (or even other objectives), ii) a balancing between economic, social, and environmental issues (which would substantively restructure the Regional/Cohesion policy), and iii) a pursuit of substantive coordination (which
The Regional/Cohesion policy usage area plays a major role for the concept by interlocking its strategic positions. As a consequence, these moves leave the confrontation of informal coordination with formal cooperation in the open (e.g. it is disputed who should coordinate for what). This challenge would increase in importance when the concept is used for the territorial dimension of policies in general or the coordination of all policies, as such an usage could increase the influence of European Regional/Cohesion policy on other (formal) areas of action. Nonetheless, if this arrangement of positions that roam the IGCs and cherry-pick the (post-)ESDP process usage area belongs to territorial cohesion, then the concept might reorder European Regional/Cohesion policy by expanding its area of action and/or area of influence.

Albeit that territorial cohesion could also influence its formal context in this usage area without expanding the Regional/Cohesion policy area of action (e.g. by substantive restructuration), this seldom seems to happen. Yet, in the surrounding narratives with an own dynamic the same strategic positions are taken without the usage of the concept too. Though differently ordered, the narratives thereby point more to territorial cohesion as a way to promote the older but also new regional/cohesion policy concerns than vice versa. That the concept was in the interest of regional/cohesion policy used to campaign for balanced development, specific territories, and the provision of services early on then leads to the consideration of the concept’s pointlessness. The rise and decline of the positions for sufficient services in all territories with territorial cohesion strengthens this possibility, as it points to a temporary usage of the concept for a standpoint sustained in its regional/cohesion policy context. However, strategic positions can also be fortified through a by territorial cohesion and Regional/Cohesion policy contested appropriation. The novel promotion of the territorial dimension and approach, coordination of (all) policies, the usage of ESPON information, and rare mention of polycentrism namely ensue both with and without the concept. There are home-grown interests of European Regional/Cohesion policy as well though, these lay in economic and social cohesion, cities, and coordination through the Lisbon Strategy. Territorial cohesion in contrast reigns where it involves the balancing between economic, social, and environmental issues – established cohesion objectives are not invaded by this assemblage – and annexed the care for coordinating policies with a territorial impact (or vice versa). Moreover, territorial cohesion’s advance in horizontal cooperation on the regional governmental level and governance as a strategic approach for the implementation of policies – which is prominent in the (post-)ESDP process usage area – offers practices to cope with the concept’s discrepancy between informal substantive coordination and formal cooperation. Still, as Regional/Cohesion policy roams its official limits, cherry-picks from European spatial planning, and expands its area of action in largely the same ways with and without the concept, territorial cohesion can even as merely a corridor between in/formal areas of action be cut down to size tremendously (i.e. to balancing objectivies, coordination of policies with a territorial impact, governance strategies).

13.4 The two main conclusions of the concept’s usage in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area

From these usages of the concept in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area two main conclusions can therefore be drawn. First of all that territorial cohesion in formal European Union policies promotes the expansion of Regional/Cohesion policy by combining a roaming of the official limits with a cherry-picking from the informal (post-)ESDP process. However, the difficulty to recognise innate territorial cohesion positions in this also thrusts towards the concept’s pointlessness.

The Regional/Cohesion policy usage area thus shows that for many of the strategic positions of territorial cohesion the concept is not needed to expand established areas of action. Nevertheless, this would be easier when the IGCs broaden the formal base for the usage of territorial cohesion, the more so for its inbuilt interests. Some of the spatial planning stories on territorial cohesion for the promotion of the concept for European spatial planning might then become formal positions by entering the Regional/Cohesion policy area of action.
However, besides the possible influences of these in/formal strategic positions on practices of policy-making, one could ask how these changes will bear any consequences. A main way in which the European Union implements policies is through the leverage of funding. Portraying the concept’s usage in the European funds would therefore wrap up the represented demarcation of territorial cohesion practices (see the next chapter).
Chapter 14 The European Funds usage area

Introduction

The analytical quadrangle made above shows that not only strategic positions in the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), the (post-)ESDP process, and Regional/Cohesion policy demarcate the practices of territorial cohesion, also those in the European funds do. While a treatment of the European Funds usage area also simply completes the presentation of how the concept's whole usage field is demarcated, the concerned practices thereby resonate the three other usage areas too. The concept's usage in these funding practices should namely concord with the official limits set for it by the IGCs, the Structural and Cohesion Funds are main ways to implement Regional/Cohesion policy as territorial cohesion's formal policy haven, and also the informal (post-)ESDP process, which promotes the concept, links to the funds. The European funds thus portray the practices in which territorial cohesion is used most concretely – i.e. if territorial cohesion has any real (financial) punching power, it should be on display here.

Yet, these funds should not only be seen as a main way to realise European Union policies, but also a major issue in itself – one that leads to fierce debates between the Member States and European Institutions on who gets how much money. This makes the political bargaining, administrative negotiations, and informal lobbying which result in the European Union's budget, the re/distribution of it, what is actually paid for, and under which conditions of interest for territorial cohesion. The European funds' area of action could for instance expand and various interest more or less benefit from that depending on what is additionally funded. Therefore, although this chapter again treats the concept substantively, whilst skimming the countless details it should be kept in mind that these matters are only superficially significant, that is will be able to make it, they are only noteworthy insofar they label where the money goes. In the European Funds usage area (at least) these two sides thus play a role: funding in itself (e.g. for whom?) and for in/formal policies (e.g. for what?).

When you overview the order of the stories of the European Funds usage area (§14.1), you can place the wide bundle of the concept's aggregated strategic positions on both of these sides (§14.2) with its in/formal usage in the European Funds (§14.3) and masses of positions (§14.4). Also here the departure-point of this research (i.e. European spatial planning; see Chapter 3) then only indirectly returns in our main interest. Ways in which territorial cohesion channels European funds (§14.5), again a legitimate interest for every territorial cohesion research, could namely come from and/or affect the (post-)ESDP process usage area. From this order, aggregation, and channeling three main conclusions can be drawn (§14.6).

14.1 Overviewing pax full and entangled squabbels in the European Funds usage area

The rough order of the wide-ranging masses of stories told in the European Funds usage area (see Appendix F) gives an overview of the emerging strategic positions concerning territorial cohesion in the in/formal practices of European funding. Hereby the general stories sketch the frame of promotions in which entangled discussions – not on major funding issues, but – about territorial cohesion and the European funds themselves structure the as ball of wool emerging metanarratives and the pax order and substance alike but even messier jungle of narratives. Yet, the events in the fierce disputes on the funding streams thereby fundamentally form this most concrete part of the whole territorial cohesion usage field though.

In the European Funds usage area neither the European funds nor territorial cohesion themselves are defied – what could characterise the usage area's status even more though, is that a major funding stream, agricultural funding that is, only has a marginal role. The structuring stories instead trace many squabbles on funding and the concept. These are on the one hand on how to decide on the European funds, the Structural Funds’ cause and reforms, and the allocation(s) for official policy directions and on the other hand on the...
un/definedness, existence/possibility, and in/formality of the concept's usage. More important though, they contest the relationship between these funds and the concept. How territorial cohesion fits in which funds for instance (e.g. the effects on both, the concept's location in the Community Strategic Guidelines). These squabbles are expressed within the painful frame of marches for European finances, economics, politics, and in/formal policies. The only hindrances that the general stories suggest are a friction between the official Cohesion policy and Lisbon Strategy and some resistance to the idea of the European Union as a business.

These squabbles and marches take place on a ground that is moulded by the financial events with three tracks: i) agricultural funding, ii) the Structural Funds, and iii) the Interreg (and URBAN) Community Initiative. Agricultural funding thereby relatively decreased in size but still predominates. The Structural Funds meanwhile increased in strength under pressure, changed directions, and also shows many details for their operationalisation (what is almost a separate track). The Interreg (and URBAN) Community Initiative in its turn progressed into the mainstream as territorial cooperation. Battles in the European Funds usage area therefore play themselves out at the fringes of the financial dealings. They thus do not so much influence the funding streams but *vice versa*. The relationship between the European funds and territorial cohesion themselves and the location of this usage area then already question whether territorial cohesion channels funding. That is to say, this relationship is contested and the concept can have no effect when it does not even participate in skirmishes on the fringes of the European funds.

14.2 The snarled labyrinth of aggregated positions for the concept's disputes in the European Funds usage area

What also points towards an ineffectual usage of territorial cohesion in the European funds is that the concept only just pops-up for (possible) formations in struggles all over the place (i.e. lacking stability and focus). It is thereby seldom opposed, but hardly develops either. A bundle of three wide metanarratives then groups these spots. Then again, these do not clarify: i) with which of the loosely grouped substantive objectives territorial cohesion affiliates, ii) for which of the myriad of territorial specificities the concept stands, or iii) which from the interrelated organisational interests it presses. The 'substantive objectives' metanarrative namely shows pairs of confronted balance and/or competitiveness, reluctantly posing infrastructure and services, economic and more often social cohesion, and the not-paired polycentrism and minor environmental objective of sustainability. The 'territorial specificities' metanarrative then even brings more to the fore: a clash between Member States, an erupting horde of region types, factions of urban and rural areas, multipurpose equipment in the passive territorial capital, territorial cohesion indicator, European Territorial Cohesion Index, and Territorial Impact Assessment, and an ignored lone war-trumpet which sounds allocation criteria. What the 'governal organisation of the territory' metanarrative in its turn shows ranges from the territorial to the processual: ordering the territory in un-State-like manners, instituting the territorial dimension in funding, undecidedly congregating the confused situation through a concern with vertical and mostly horizontal substantive coordination, sticking to (decentralised) State-like or other ways of governing, just listing processual coordination, and/or promoting their challenged crown of territorial cooperation. It thus would be an understatement to say that it is disputed in which concerns territorial cohesion is interested in the European funds.

A more thorough plot of this labyrinth does not come from the ways in which all these strategic positions interlink, as these connections merely expose unstable networks. The associated territorial cohesion positions thereby do leave territorial cooperation as a vanguard, give it an urban bias with the legacy of URBAN, and use State aid (for specific territories) as a well-known site against the march of the Single European Market. Also a contested push of the concept for a Cohesion policy for all regions appears, as it is gnawed at by specific territories (i.e. peripheral regions, urban areas, Central and Eastern European Countries), and that territorial cohesion might give heed to the war-trumpet nonetheless, as a contest opens over the concept's allocation of funds (e.g. by associating sustainability and the territorial dimension). Still, even despite the territorial
cohesion claims over substantive coordination of sectoral policies with spatial impacts, the concept's interests in coordination does not lead to an organisation of this chaos. Hence, the network of the strategic positions of territorial cohesion in the European Funds usage area increases the complexity by snarling the combats in lots of ways. The concept's lack of focus and stability thus also puts its channeling of European funding into doubt – i.e. even if the channels are delta-shaped, towards what do they channel?

14.3 The fuzzy line of in/formality through the European Funds usage area

Also the formality of territorial cohesion is contested in the European Funds. Yet, it thereby is not always clear whether a usage of the concept is either formal or informal. Although practices in the European funds should concord with official limits, they namely also seem to harbour informal practices and positions on possible usages of the concept which are not formal (yet). A way this returns in the European Funds usage area is how it resonates the (post-)ESDP process usage area. Moreover, the Structural Funds were for European spatial planning identified as the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow, DATAR was said to have heavily influenced Cohesion policy in the structure of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the political conclusions of the ESDP would have been encouraged to be applied in implementing action that is financed through the Structural Funds and noticed in the 2000-2006 funding guidelines later on. While European spatial planning is concerned with informal practices, here some of its positions thus appear formally too (also see Appendix F; §F.1.5). A fuzzy line of in/formality thus runs through the elusive European Union usage area, thereby creating a formal and informal side. This has particular consequences for territorial cohesion, as consecutively shown below with the uncertain status of positions, consequences of existing formal positions, ways in which the concept's context influences this, and ways in which European spatial planning and territorial cooperation might breach the line.

With substantive objectives the concept for instance mostly fiddles with this fuzzy line of in/formality by clinging on to economic and social cohesion for formalisation and marking an uncontested path towards formality with the minor issue of sustainability, a path which a connection with the territorial dimension could broaden. Some formal usages of territorial cohesion in this usage area appear to exist though. However, these risk an overstretching of the concept. Territorial cohesion namely disregards services, even though these are the official limits set by the IGCs, but engages in the margin of agricultural funding besides the more familiar Structural Funds. This extension towards the predominating funding stream for rural areas demonstrates the territorial cohesion interests of competitiveness and (territorial) balance inside formality, and relates this balance to interests of the environment and the territorial dimension. Yet, these strategic positions do not offer a solidifying formal usage. Besides that the concept's double edged place in agricultural funding (i.e. both on the edge of this usage area and this type of funding) restricts territorial cohesion to improving the environment and the countryside, the marginality of this funding stream for the European Funds usage area creates the threat for territorial cohesion of overextension, a threat which paradoxically increases the stronger the concept fits in both funds.

The dynamics of the narratives here show how territorial cohesion's context mostly decreases the chances for a solidifying formal usage of the concept. They namely only uphold the concept's narrow path towards formality via sustainability (in connection with the territorial dimension) and lay out a role for services, also if associated with specific territories – awkwardly enough territorial cohesion does not use this possibility. On the other hand, this context places economic and social cohesion largely outside the usage area and, insofar

---

* As mentioned in Appendix D on the (post-)ESDP process, the Délegation à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action Régionale (DATAR) is part of the French spatial planning way of doing that influences the European Union.

they are inside, challenges their relationships to the 2007-2013 Structural Funds objectives of convergence and (regional) competitiveness and employment.

What stands out though is that the narratives turn the risk of overstretching the concept into the risks of schisming and complexing instead. The danger of schisming approaches due to an isolated agricultural refuge for territorial cohesion to extend to in its context. That is, while the watershed between the (urban) Structural Funds and agricultural funding widens, agricultural funding does more than offer gateways for the concept, as it provides an own separate but fertile field where territorial cohesion can for instance mix with specificities of rural areas. The danger of complexing the concept in its turn results from that its context for agricultural funding stresses tense substantive horizontal coordination and leaves many choices open that have to be made on lower governmental levels (e.g. with territorial impacts, variance in (decentral) governance, the approach of the Leader Community Initiative). Besides, even when territorial cohesion is placed on the formal side of the European Funds usage area, this does not automatically grant the concept much influence.

Nevertheless, European spatial planning could be a remarkable example for a crossing of the fuzzy line of in/formality which can increase territorial cohesion's influence due to formalisation. Then again, European spatial planning hesitates to march from the informal side into the European Funds via territorial cohesion. Further advanced in this is a stationing of European spatial planning inside formality when the Structural Funds are concerned with processual coordination and at the European funds' margin when both European spatial planning and territorial cohesion are narrowed down to substantive integration. Less advanced positions are more characteristic though. Three instances of this are: i) a bad-established formal usage of territorial cohesion with polycentrism, ii) that the concept spotlights occasions for the territorial dimension to position territorial development and challenges inside the Structural Funds, and iii) that territorial cohesion's border-path towards an informal organisation of the territory could also be free for European spatial planning. The concept thus seems to place European spatial planning both inside and outside the Structural Funds.

An inference of this situation with more consequences could be that territorial cohesion forms a crossing on this border of in/formality. The links between the concept's organisational issues could thereby even dissolve the line. Governing as territorial cohesion interest namely handles the informal and formal conduct of the Structural Funds. Moreover, territorial cooperation breaches the fuzzy line with a disputed formal room to debate territorial cohesion and this could also open up ways to expand through the other two 2007-2013 Structural Funds objectives (i.e. convergence and (regional) competitiveness and employment). Note though, that this territorial cooperation merely gives a challenged room for European spatial planning, amongst others, and that this governing interest (also) appears without territorial cohesion. European spatial planning therefore is not the territorial cohesion crossing on the fuzzy line of in/formality in the European Funds usage area. Matters are more complex in this usage area instead.

Still, insofar it concerns territorial cohesion's channeling of funds due to a formal usage of the concept, clearly some passages and mostly obstacles thus appear. Besides a narrow path towards formality via sustainability (in connection with the territorial dimension), European spatial planning could namely cross the fuzzy line of in/formality with processual coordination and substantive integration and, related to this, territorial cooperation and governing could form a crossing on it. What certainly does not help a channeling though, is that the few existing formal usages of the concept in the Structural Funds and agricultural funding risk a schisming and complexing of it.

14.4 The guerrilla of territorial cohesion and expansion in the European Funds usage area

The complexity of this usage area also comes forward in drives to expand the European funds' area of action with and without territorial cohesion. This namely shows two ungathered masses of positions: those of the concept and its context. Because of this double, these masses order this usage area as a guerrilla-like situation instead of merely representing an ungathered mass of different positions. The ways in which the three metanarratives group
the mass of territorial cohesion positions thereby do not gather a network for combat though. Yet, struggles do appear, in the gap between policy and reality as framed by the marches for official policy directions for instance (e.g. problematic evidence-based targeting). The role of knowledge thereby increases, especially when it concerns territorial specificities (e.g. Territorial Impact Assessment), that is, the many different descriptions of territorial reality with territorial cohesion then clutter the policy-reality gap. Hence, as the whole battlefield for territorial cohesion is muddled, only in-battle positions might prospectively clarify the concept's mass.

The reign of territorial cohesion over these strategic positions is contested too, for they are also taken by the identical order of narratives with an own dynamic. These harbour a since longer fought over jungle of same (coupled) positions for other struggles (e.g. petty-fights) and too much to mention more. The asymmetry in the guerrilla-conflict then favours the prevailing funding streams over the cloud of territorial cohesion positions. Yet, besides obstructing, this intricate context of territorial cohesion also leaves some ways open for the concept for influence and buttresses them to follow others (e.g. sustainable development on lower governmental levels). The European Funds usage area thus hardly has any clear frontlines for large open confrontations about territorial cohesion, but does present camouflaged opportunities for countless small stealthy manoeuvres for the concept: many spots for hit-and-run tactics, endless issues for new recruits and to feed (conceptual) mobilisations, and the propaganda of slanted territorial cohesion promotions.

However, the overlap of strategic positions with/out territorial cohesion might less imply a drive for a territorial cohesion expansion of the European funds' area of action than an opportunistic and instrumental commandeering of the concept. To be precise, many positions thereby more fortify themselves within the already in/formally established European funds' area of action than expanding it (see Appendix F; §§5). Still, some positions distinguish territorial cohesion from its context. Besides the connection between sustainability and the territorial dimension, these thrust descriptions of territorial reality. They directly describe the geographical concentrations of deprivation or the territorial model of a region and especially emphasise territorial capital and polycentrism; territorial capital thereby fits the framing idea of the European Union as a business, as a clear-cut assumed reality that is, and polycentrism, also in the form of substantive objective, could be used as a corridor to get European spatial planning interests in the European funds. Distinctive territorial cohesion positions also further open up the debate on indirect descriptions of territorial reality, this with a territorial cohesion indicator and/or European Territorial Cohesion Index, which brings a focus in the (cluttered) gap between policy and reality and adds own marks as well (e.g. polycentrism). Such strategic positions would certainly annex an expansion of the European funds area of action, and might even have an effect when they are practical enough (e.g. easy to understand indicators which are selected for policy). Notwithstanding such in/direct descriptions of territorial reality, the guerrilla-like situation all in all does not favour a channeling of funds through territorial cohesion, not even if the concept's positions are merely used opportunistically and instrumentally.

14.5 Territorial cohesion's fivefold contested channeling of European funds up- and downstream

Although debated, much thus goes against a channeling of European funds through territorial cohesion: i) the contesting existent and/or wished for usages of the concept, ii) their in/formality, iii) their guerrilla-like situation, iv) the uncertainty of the concept's influence, and v) the European Funds usage area's non-participation in financial dealings. Sometimes the widespread mass of contesting usages comes close. Still, for instance neither the coordination of certain policies based on whether already spend funds had territorial impacts, nor a less uniform application of the European Union's provisions for State aid for some territories directly channels European funding. Hence, the concept's substantive, territorial, and organisational positions seem more to hinder than enable territorial cohesion channels for European funding.
A formal usage of the concept on the other hand could channel European funding more plainly. Yet, the formal usages of the concept for services and in agricultural funding do not endow explicitly. Moreover, its existing place in agricultural funding might even inhibit this by grounding a channelling on the watershed of the divergent currents of the agricultural funding and Structural Funds mainstreams. The Structural Funds could finance debate on the concept and its channelling though, for which much usable knowledge is available (e.g. ESPON). This debate would take place in a disputed and isolated formal room crowned by territorial cooperation. When the concept can be used officially (e.g. due to the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty), probably many more of such formal positions appear, as then the European funds' area of action would expand with territorial cohesion. Then again, if so, the concept's widespread mass still cannot give a clear direction for a channelling, and a (partly) in/formal incorporation of them would complex this even more.

Still, when territorial cohesion can be used officially, the balance in the guerrilla could turn around due to the concept's appropriation of the strategic positions in the European Funds usage area. Without this the concept's context still bolsters and blockades channellings of European funds through territorial cohesion though. Moreover, this channelling would chiefly depend on this context, as it electrifies nearby options for territorial criteria for funds and funnels them towards competitiveness and related substantive objectives. Important mobilisations for territorial cohesion could then be to go with the upsurge of the all-region approach (for competitiveness) on national and European levels and to overcome the vigorous struggle in which Territorial Impact Assessment is attacked on all sides. Yet, because such battles are undecided on the European level, they also transfer downstream. This is reinforced by that both territorial cohesion and its context have multifocal spotlights in horizontal substantive coordination. The multidirectedness of European funds that results makes their drainage area the more influential.

Territorial cohesion might mostly channel European funding downstream by rearranging practices. The concept could mainly do so with territorial cooperation. Although its organisational context presents some detailed difficulties for territorial cooperation, it also backs territorial cohesion's urban bias and expansion through the other two 2007-2013 Structural Funds objectives in this. Moreover, this organisational context even throws up a lifeline for the then enforced schmisming and complexing of the concept, this in the form of a managing of urban-rural relationships. Territorial cohesion and its context are not only concerned with the multi-level management structure for funding streams though.

They are also concerned with reorganisations of this multi-level management structure, even if these run counter to it (e.g. top-down supporting decentralisation). The hostilities between substantive and territorial in/formal ways of doing thereby leave many undemarcated in-between or hybrid options for territorial cohesion. Insofar they are territorially tainted, they suit the concept particularly well. Hereby (French) territorial ways of managing funds advance, whereby territorial cooperation could assist in improving territorial governance. Territorial ways of doing more downstream also rally to deal with the tension of vertical substantive coordination. Even the in/formal way of doing of European spatial planning can be used through (trans)national coordination for funds or transnational territorial cooperation.

However, processual concerns are more pronounced in the organisational context of territorial cohesion.

This does not form an unconquerable impediment for the concept, as it follows business-like ways as outlet too, just not totally. Still, its context mostly disregards the territorial or space-based approach on which territorial concepts would rely to be translated into the European funds (e.g. through information and dialogue). Because of this, the concept's role could vanish if it is locked in a territorial way of doing with which, for instance, "un-State-like" territorial divisions are made more downstream. What further diminishes its role is that the Member States seek flexibility for a general rather than territorial cohesion implementation approach and that the concept is not needed to support decentralisation. Hence, the concept's contextual mixing mash could both suit and hinder the practices in which territorial cohesion could channel funding streams more downstream. It thereby just depends on what the concept's and its context's ways of doing will be.

In the European Funds usage area the context of territorial cohesion therefore presents two conclusions: it tremendously cuts the concept down to size qua substantive objectives, territorial specificities, and share in
the governance organisation of the territory and/or portrays how territorial cohesion practices could develop as an amalgam of parts from its context. Either way, this guerrilla has not (yet) decided upon how territorial cohesion might channel European funds. Besides, the financial events are fundamental for this, as the concept's context does not re/direct European funds and therefore distances territorial cohesion even further from decision-making and major reshufflings. The widespread masses of nebulous and thorny in/formal conflicts left for territorial cohesion could nonetheless offer room for a (small) step towards evidence-based targeting.

14.6 The three main conclusions of the concept's usage in the European Funds usage area

From these usages of the concept in the European Funds usage area three main conclusions can therefore be drawn: the formal usage of territorial cohesion risks the concept's schisming and complexing, many positions can instrumentally use territorial cohesion opportunistically for the reinforcement in or drive to expand the European funds' area of action, and a channelling of European funds through territorial cohesion is contested in fivefold.

Insofar the complex and elusive European Funds usage area wraps up the whole territorial cohesion usage field by resonating the other three usage areas in financial concretisation, the concept's financial punching power thus appears questionable, even when the Intergovernmental Conferences will broaden and solidify the formal base for its usage. Much thus remains undecided (e.g. the role for European spatial planning) and the financial sphere might give no political way out for this. Hence, even the European funds area of action does not concretise territorial cohesion (yet), but points to the concept as a complex of castles in the sky.
Chapter 15 The whole territorial cohesion usage field

Introduction

This part on the usage of the concept of territorial cohesion showed the involved power practices mapped with Roe’s Narrative Policy Analysis (also see Appendix C until F). After the treatment of the IGCs, (post-) ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and European Funds usage areas in the previous chapters, the whole territorial cohesion usage field can be outlined here. This according to the concept’s collection of metanarratives insofar they make territorial cohesion stand out from its context. Below the four usage areas and their metanaratives are therefore compared to see how much they overlap (§15.1), form a topical order (§15.3), and reveal a battlefield (§15.4). We namely cannot know the ways in which their auctoritas, potestas, and pecunia spheres of action interlink beforehand. Note though, that this outlining is carried out to question the self-evidence of territorial cohesion power practices. This clearly comes forward in the comparison of the concept’s “ownness” and its alike context to see in what territorial cohesion stands out (§15.2). That is, does an outlining of the whole territorial cohesion usage field also demarcate power practices that belong to the concept? Before the conclusions point to Part III on the territorial cohesion discourse (§15.6), the self-evidence of territorial cohesion power practices is also questioned through the implications the concept’s usage has and could have for changes in government (§15.5).

15.1 The overlaps of metanarratives from different usage areas

15.1.1 The limited and limiting usage of territorial cohesion

The metanarratives in each usage area represent the limited usage of territorial cohesion. Because they mostly come from problem statements that do not have counter- or non-stories, they simply mobilise bias in their spheres of action due to assumptions where the concept is about. The metanaratives therefore form the common ground for decision-making on territorial cohesion. However, together those problem statements result in many circular argumentations, mostly of the shortest kind. One might argue that on both the level of stories and the level of them together there is therefore no “the” story to tell (Roe, 1994: 158), and thus no clarity to give on the arena and rules of the territorial cohesion game. This would be too quick though. The assumptions where the concept is about namely do take positions that set the stage, this agenda-setting does bring forward a limiting usage of territorial cohesion. When the collection of metanaratives outlines the whole territorial cohesion usage field, the question then becomes how different these metanaratives (§15.1.2) and their positions (§15.1.3) are in the different usage areas. That is, to what extent do they overlap?

15.1.2 Usage areas that overlap in metanaratives

As no metanarrative appears in each of the usage areas, there is no instance in which all four usage areas overlap. Still, their metanaratives do overlap, especially when it concerns the positions of balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension, as these positions return in the metanaratives of each usage area. Then those territorial cohesion positions are not ordered the same way in each usage area. Yet, these differently ordered positions are similarly ordered in several of the usage areas nonetheless.

Only the territorial cohesion positions with coordination come forward with the same metanarrative in three usage areas: the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, and Regional/Cohesion policy ones; note that the reason why the metanaratives of the European Funds usage area are not mentioned here is that they are very wide (see the differently appearing positions below). The usage areas overlap less with other territorial cohesion concerns though. Only in the IGCs and (post-)ESDP process usage areas the concerns with the territorial dimension are

* That is, not so much A → B → C → A or longer, but simply A → B → A, such as “territorial cohesion leads to polycentrism and polycentrism results in territorial cohesion.”
ordered in the same way, as are those with territorial specificities (although these latter two metanarratives vary
in their treatment of territorial impacts and/or specific territories). The case of services then is a particular one,
because concerns with this appear in three usage areas, but always a bit different. In the IGCs usage area it is
only about Services of General (Economic) Interest (SG(E)I), in the (post-)ESDP process usage area this is with
infrastructures combined into accessibility, and in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area a metanarrative
connects these accessibility concerns with the ones of territorial specificities (i.e. mostly in the form of services
in specific territories). Furthermore, one metanarrative is peculiar: only the (post-)ESDP process usage area
focuses on spatial/territorial structures (especially polycentrism).

Even though these same metanarratives appear in several usage areas, one should keep the different roles
of territorial cohesion in mind. That is to say, the same metanarrative (e.g. coordination) could in the IGCs
usage area display interests in adding a European Union competency, in the (post-)ESDP process usage area in
promoting European spatial planning, and in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area in a substantive expansion
of this European Union policy. Moreover, just as the same metanarrative might show different concerns in each
usage area according to the role the concept plays there, the same position could play a different role in different
usage areas, that is, a role following on its metanarrative (that accords to the role the concept plays in the usage
area).

15.1.3 Metanarratives that overlap in positions
Some territorial cohesion positions almost perfectly overlap in the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, and Regional/
Cohesion policy usage areas because they are part of the same metanarrative in each of them. However, the
metanarratives of the European Funds usage area are so wide, that they harbour large parts of – if not whole –
metanarratives of other usage areas. The European Funds usage area namely lacks a more specific organisation.
The coordination positions for instance appear largely the same in each usage area, in the (post-)ESDP process and
Regional/Cohesion policy ones even both in the substantive and processual form, but it is in the European
Funds usage area enclosed by the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative. The role of coordination
is in this usage area thus more instrumental (e.g. for territorial cooperation) than that it is a concern by itself as
in the other three usage areas (e.g. as another European Union competency).

Accessibility, the territorial dimension, and territorial specificities as territorial cohesion positions
demonstrate the same point more complexly. Accessibility is for instance enclosed in the European Funds
usage area, this time in the ‘substantive objectives’ metanarrative. Accessibility therefore shares the stage with
several substantive objectives to channel European funding. However, besides this, its role differs between the
other three usage areas as mentioned above too (e.g. the promotion of a competency for SG(E)I in the IGCs
usage area, the facilitation of mostly services for specific territories in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area).
The European Funds usage area ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative also encloses the
territorial dimension positions. The complexity here is, that in the IGCs and (post-)ESDP process usage areas
the territorial dimension (often of policies) is with territorial cohesion promoted in its own right, but in the
Regional/Cohesion policy usage area contested with territorial cohesion as cohesion objective. The only
territorial cohesion positions that are not enclosed by a metanarrative of the European Funds usage area are
concerned with territorial specificities, as this is a metanarrative there too. However, two complexities appear:
these positions include a lot (i.e. also specific territories, territorial impacts, and/or territorial capital), and often
differently so per usage area, and, as mentioned above, in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage it plays a different
role (i.e. it facilitates a connection with accessibility). Still, when territorial cohesion is concerned with the
positions of coordination, accessibility, the territorial dimension, and territorial specificities, the metanarratives
of the four usage areas show much overlap.

Some other territorial cohesion positions show less overlap between the metanarratives of the four usage
areas. These positions are concerned with a new cohesion objective, governance, polycentrism, and economic,
social, and environmental objectives (mostly competitiveness, balance, and sustainability respectively).
Territorial cohesion is in the (post-)ESDP process usage area namely not promoted as new cohesion objective.
Besides that as such it in the European Funds usage area fits amongst the substantive objectives to channel European funding, this cohesion objective just forms a metanarrative in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area by, as mentioned earlier, being contested with the territorial dimension (often of cohesion objectives). The governance positions, on the other hand, are in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area just once, and are in the European Funds usage area enclosed by the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative. Moreover, only if the framework topic (e.g. for coordination) can be considered as issuing the same, such positions return in the IGCs usage area too; this, just as in the (post-)ESDP process usage area, in the ‘coordination’ metanarrative. In the (post-)ESDP process usage area the interest for territorial cohesion as cohesion objective thus seems to be low, and in the Regional/Cohesion policy the interest for governance.

Both polycentrism and the economic, social, and environmental objectives do not appear in the IGCs usage area; that is, not as three objectives together, as balance alone is promoted in the IGCs usage area (e.g. against territorial disparities). However, their roles differ in the other three usage areas. While polycentrism plays a role as objective in the (post-)ESDP process usage area, it does so in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage as territorial specificity, and in the European Funds usage area in both ways. And while also economic, social, and environmental objectives fit in the European Funds usage area to channel European funding, they interrelate in the (post-)ESDP process (e.g. as in the ‘triangle of sustainability’; see below) and are quarrelled over in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area. Hence, these territorial cohesion positions with less overlap also seem to portray a wider variety in the roles they play in different usage areas.

15.2.1 Own territorial cohesion features

It is questionable whether the concept stands out substantively from its institutionally complex context. The aspects to consider hereby are: the concept’s own positions and own reorganisation of prior positions. The concept can namely be cut down in size per usage area with the narratives with an own dynamic (§15.2.2) and for the whole usage field be cut down further with narratives from other usage areas (§15.2.3). A first difficulty appears before this though. As shown above, the many territorial cohesion positions make it challenging to recognise the features of territorial cohesion. Because of this the three wide metanarratives in the European Funds usage area for instance do not clarify: i) with which of the loosely grouped substantive objectives territorial cohesion affiliates, ii) for which of the myriad of territorial specificities the concept stands, or iii) which from the interrelated organisational interests it presses. Moreover, the content of the IGCs usage area is not specific enough to see whether each feature of the concept’s usage there is authentic (also see §15.3). The ‘ownness’ of
territorial cohesion features that would make the concept stand out from its context is thus contested already by two extremes: there are too many positions or they are not specific enough.

Still, some features of territorial cohesion stand out in the whole usage field, and these appear in the (post-)ESDP process and European Funds usage areas. From the (post-)ESDP process usage area the connection between polycentrism and economic, social, and environmental policy objectives (e.g., within the ‘triangle of sustainability’) comes forward as territorial cohesion feature, just as the switch in importance from services to infrastructure does; note though that this switch does not appear in the IGCs and European Funds usage areas, because their metanarratives are, respectively, only concerned with SG(E)I or are too young. From the European Funds usage area comes the strong connection between sustainability and the territorial dimension, territorial cooperation with only an urban bias, and indirect descriptions of territorial reality with a territorial cohesion indicator and/or European Territorial Cohesion Index. Because with these positions territorial cohesion stands out from its context in the European funds, the concept could annex any expansion of this area of action with them. Of course, an allocation of European funding with territorial cohesion would do the same, but as this is contested it is not clear, neither substantively nor financially, how the concept differs from its context in this. Hence, even though the metanarratives of territorial cohesion overlap, the question is in which ways territorial cohesion shows that it lacks “ownness”.

15.2.2 Cutting down the size of concept per usage area
Territorial cohesion appears as a topic in itself and with many positions. The concept might merely be a bricolage though. Its linkage to and embeddedness in a variety of already ongoing debates (e.g., services, ESDP, cohesion, governance) suggest that the concept does not designate a new area of action, but merely represents prior ones. This comes forward differently per usage area.

The (post-)ESDP process usage area then shows that if an area of territorial cohesion action would be created, it would largely overlap with practices of European spatial planning. The metanarratives namely mimic the self-directed dynamic of the narratives. Both promote spatial and territorial structures, the territorial dimension of policies, and competitiveness and sustainability, and both loosely commit to accessibility positions and the augmentation of coordination interests in this. The concept’s context seems to infect territorial cohesion as well. The holistic links between these narratives give spatial and territorial development twists to territorial cohesion quarrels by posing the ESDP as their major cause and by concentrating on (economic) observation in general and territorial capital in particular. This would make the concept more alike its context. Then again, territorial cohesion does advance territorial concerns more than spatial concerns and later on the concept also stands out more in this usage area due to its restrain on spatial and territorial development issues. The ownness of the concept’s positions in the (post-)ESDP process usage area is nevertheless almost totally cut down by the narratives there.

In the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area such a cutting down of territorial cohesion could still imply a fortification of new positions. Here the concept and its context namely contest the appropriation of the novel promotion of the territorial dimension and approach, coordination of (all) policies, the usage of information from the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON), and rare mention of polycentrism. What is more, these novelties do not only ensue with and without the concept, early on territorial cohesion also campaigns for interests that appeared before its emergence. This is balanced development, specific territories, and the provision of services. Positions for sufficient services in all territories are even sustained in the concept’s context while they first rise and then decline with territorial cohesion. Territorial cohesion might on the other hand annex the care for coordinating policies with a territorial impact. Still, this contest over positions, the concept’s campaign for prior interests, and its temporary usage lead us to consider the literal pointlessness of territorial cohesion in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area.

In the European Funds usage area two ungathered masses form a guerrilla-like deployment: the positions of territorial cohesion and those in its context. As here the narratives are stronger than but their order identical to the metanarratives, the concept contests for its reign over these positions. Associated positions also exemplify
The whole territorial cohesion usage field

this, such as the well-known site of State aid for specific territories (against the Single European Market; see below) or a Cohesion policy for all regions (under threat by promotions for specific territories). Many positions can therefore instrumentally use territorial cohesion opportunistically in the drive to expand the European funds' area of action or, more often, their reinforcement insofar the lie in its already informally established part. Territorial cohesion is thus in the European Funds usage area tremendously cut down to size qua substantive objectives, territorial specificities, and share in the governal organisation of the territory. Hence, either in overlap, fortification, or guerrilla, in the usage areas most of the concept's positions are also held by its contexts.

15.2.3 Cutting down the size of the concept through other usage areas

The (small) remaining totality of positions belonging to territorial cohesion after the concept is cut down to size per usage area can be decreased even further by comparing these positions to those in the concept's context in other usage areas. That is, territorial cohesion stands out in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area and European Funds usage area with positions that appear with and without the concept in the (post-)ESDP process usage area too.

Territorial cohesion for instance reigns in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area where it involves the balancing between economic, social, and environmental objectives. Such a balancing instead of quarrelling would substantively restructure this area of action. However, the narratives in the (post-)ESDP process tell us that it is not an innate territorial cohesion position. Another way in which this could come to the fore in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area is the concept's pursuit of coordination, and thereby the interlocking of positions. The territorial cohesion positions on formal cooperation there namely do not match those on informal substantive coordination. Territorial cohesion's advance in horizontal cooperation on the regional level and governance as a strategic approach for the implementation of policies might then muster these positions. However, because these practices prominently come forward in the (post-)ESDP process usage area, this pursuit of coordination is not innate to territorial cohesion. The same holds for the territorial cohesion positions in the European Funds usage area on direct descriptions of territorial reality (e.g. territorial capital, polycentrism). In these instances the concept less appears with ownness than with a transposition of issues from one area of action into another. That is to say, territorial cohesion then functions as a corridor for Regional/Cohesion policy to cherry-pick topics from European spatial planning and to get the interests of the latter in the European funds (see §15.3).

15.2.4 From own territorial cohesion positions to bricolage

Even though the positions of balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension return in the metanarratives of each usage area, they are not innate territorial cohesion concerns. The concept's contexts namely cut away almost every ownness of territorial cohesion, making it profoundly contested. If the concept's own positions would constitute the whole territorial cohesion field, then only the switch from services to infrastructure and a territorial cohesion indicator and/or European Territorial Cohesion Index outline it, as do the connections between polycentrism and economic, social, and environmental objectives, between sustainability and the territorial dimension, and between territorial cooperation and urban areas. However, one could wonder whether this is not a too detailed and messy embodiment for the concept to stand out. Perhaps the ownness of territorial cohesion therefore lies less in its positions than in its particular re-formation of prior areas of action, that is, in its bricolage.

15.3 The topical order of usage areas for metanarratives

15.3.1 Redrawing the analytical quadrangle

Territorial cohesion might organise the various positions that appear in its context of areas of action in a different way. Per usage area the connections between metanarratives would point out such a re-formation. In the (post-)
ESDP process usage area the six metanarratives then form a firm bundle, the four clear-cut metanarratives of the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area a consistent bundle, and the three wide metanarratives of the European Funds usage area connect as a ball of wool. Yet, per usage area no particular territorial cohesion bricolage(s) of positions appears through the connections between metanarratives, the many stories that relate the metanarratives do not organise the concept in one or several clear ways – not to speak of the six metanarratives of the IGCs usage area, as these do not connect regularly. The metanarratives of the four usage areas also overlap, much when it concerns the positions of coordination, accessibility, the territorial dimension, and territorial specificities, less when it concerns the positions of a new cohesion objective, governance, polycentrism, and economic, social, and environmental objectives (see §15.2). Yet again, no particular bricolage(s) appear in this large amount of positions either.

Perhaps territorial cohesion is an order of four usage areas and thereby re/organises some of the power practices in the spheres of action of which they are a part. The concept can form such a bricolage, as auctoritas and potestas programmes for instance often link as the authority to make policy and the capacity to administer it and potestas and pecunia programmes with the way in which policies backed by very large amounts of money will be targeted (see Chapter 3). The territorial cohesion bricolage then would not re/organise the complete spheres of action these programmes direct us to, but solely the parts of the concept’s usage. This entails a re/adjustment and/or further structuring of the analytical quadrangle that was used to start the mapping of the usage of territorial cohesion (shown below on the left) to give an impression of how the concept’s usage organises them together according to their overlaps (shown below on the right).

The following paragraph therefore brings forward how the IGCs usage area functions as a filter, the (post-)ESDP process usage area delivers almost all the content, and the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area selects from this. As the European Funds usage area resonates these usage areas, the order of these three is treated (§15.3.3) before the order of the whole territorial cohesion usage field is (§15.3.4). Note though that this topical order is a possible one (i.e. the potential) which is arrived at by speculative reasoning based on the usage of the concept (i.e. the empirical).

15.3.2 Three usage areas in order
The IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, and Regional/Cohesion policy usage area each have their own place in territorial cohesion’s order for power practices. The usage of the concept in the IGCs usage area then unlocks the European Union’s Regional/Cohesion policy and European funding as established areas of action for the
The whole territorial cohesion usage field

influence of forces from outside. It does not so much do this by creating relations between already existing areas and/or new (conceptual) organisations within these areas, but by officially defining the (potential) formal space for territorial cohesion positions; the concept does not create a totally new (European) area of action due to its lack of ownness (see §15.2). As in the European Union a centre of power also lacks for an overall view of requirements in the case of a territorial cohesion competency, the concept’s policy picture could be patchy and ragged as well.

Still, the IGCs usage area does filter how territorial cohesion may appear in the other usage areas. It namely facilitates the concept’s realignment of areas of action with the six metanarratives of cohesion objective, spatial planning/territorial cohesion competence, SG(E)I, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension; note though, that during the researched period SG(E)I was the only official base for territorial cohesion. The question then is which more stringent restrictions for the concept’s bricolage come from the other usage areas.

The usage of territorial cohesion in the (post-)ESDP process usage area locks the European spatial planning area of action in the Regional/Cohesion policy and European funds areas of action. That Cohesion policy would at least partially draw on the ESDP is nothing new though (e.g. Healey, 2001a). Moreover, ESPON reasons that, because the European Union has no specific means in the domain of spatial planning, actions to achieve territorial objectives might go through Cohesion policy as European Union sectoral policy or through (related) national/regional policies on a voluntary basis and according to the subsidiarity principle (BRR, 2003b). Cohesion objectives can similarly go through (voluntary) European, national and/or regional spatial policies as well. However, in the case of territorial cohesion this relationship between areas of action might be hierarchical. General stories on regional/cohesion policy namely frame the (post-)ESDP process usage area and not vice versa.

Still, the (post-)ESDP process usage area influences such verging forces by accepting all the usages of concept in it and thereby informally demarcates most of territorial cohesion’s substantive limits. Such an implicit promotion of spatial planning interests is conducted multi-purposively via the six metanarratives of spatial/territorial structure, economy/society/environment, accessibility, spatial/territorial specificities, coordination, and the spatial/territorial dimension. The question then is how this lock-in and demarcation lead to positions that go from the (post-)ESDP process into the Regional/Cohesion policy and European funding areas of action and/or how this re/assemble (conceptual) corridors within them.

The concept’s usage in the Regional/Cohesion policy can be seen as a selection of its usages in the (post-) ESDP process usage area. Note hereby that Cohesion policy does not necessarily with territorial cohesion draw on the ESDP. Likewise, DG Regio does not take everything from the ESDP, as other DGs might deal with other ESDP issues. When ESPON for instance maps out the ESDP application and spatial orientation per Directorate-General in a table, territorial cohesion is, amongst many other issues, for DG Regio only categorised in the column of ‘Attention to spatial issues’; the other time territorial cohesion appears is for DG Environment in the column of ‘Cross-cutting concepts’ (Nordregio, 2006b: 88-89). The concept would thereby reassemble the corridor from the (post-)ESDP process towards the Regional/Cohesion policy areas of action: positions on spatial issues are then taken by territorial cohesion; note that the concept more advances territorial than spatial concerns in the (post-)ESDP process usage area (see §15.2.2), but that this leads to a similar conclusion (i.e. in the corridor between those areas of action, positions on territorial issues are then taken by territorial cohesion).

The question is of course what these positions on territorial issues are.

In the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area the territorial cohesion positions on territorial issues are delineated by the four metanarratives of cohesion objective/territorial dimension, balance/economy/environment, coordination, and territories and accessibility. These positions iterate many of those in the (post-) ESDP process usage area, as much of the metanarratives overlap (e.g. with coordination, accessibility; see §15.1.2 and 15.1.3). Because most of these positions appear in both usage areas’ contexts, only some fit from the (post-)ESDP process into the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area though. That is, only those that balance
economic, social, and environmental objectives or advance horizontal cooperation on the regional level are transposed thus (see §15.2.3).

When territorial cohesion merely remobilises prior positions from the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area (see §15.2.2), such cherry-picking of course plays no role. Instead, they are re/assigned, as the concept gathers balanced development, specific territories, and the provision of services (closer) together. Such re/assigned positions already were formal. Those that the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area selects from the positions in the (post-)ESDP process usage area, however, would become formal due to this. Territorial cohesion namely provides opportunities to formalise positions in the Regional/Cohesion policy area of action. As shown by much iteration, which could lead to the formalisation of the prior overlaps of the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas, and little transposition, which could lead to formally establishing positions in Regional/Cohesion policy that come from the (post-)ESDP process usage area.

15.3.3 The order of three usage areas in action
The order of the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas consists of a corridor with a filter in it. Before the descent of services and the ascent of coordination are treated as exemplary developments in this, below the order as a whole, instead of per usage area, will be laid down.

The territorial cohesion positions in these three usage areas then form a corridor for practices and interests between the informal (post-)ESDP process and formal Regional/Cohesion policy areas of action. The concept therefore opens a door for Regional/Cohesion policy to select positions from informal ways of doing and sources of information in the (post-)ESDP process and for European spatial planning to put forward positions for formalisation – if not as new area of action, then as new part – in Regional/Cohesion policy. The IGCs usage area could filter such selections and formalisations by broadening the official base of the concept’s usage (i.e. beyond SG(E)I, e.g. with coordination or a new cohesion objective). It is hereby important to keep in mind that even territorial cohesion’s functioning as corridor between formal and informal areas of action seldom stands out, as the same positions often appear in both the concept’s formal and informal contexts (see §15.2 and 15.4).

Still, territorial cohesion presents ways for the established Regional/Cohesion policy area of action to expand and for the European spatial planning area of action to (partly) formalise into a European Union policy. However, the latter would come at the cost of substantive transformation. That is to say, while the context of territorial cohesion in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area does not change substantively following the concept’s positions, this does happen in the (post-)ESDP process (e.g. less about polycentrism, instrumentalisation of spatial development). In the corridor between the two areas of action the direction of influence therefore goes one-way from the Regional/Cohesion policy towards the (post-)ESDP process usage area, but in two-ways vice versa. How can this be?

The territorial cohesion positions do not move, but the concept as corridor does. Its positions could therefore change from usage area. Cherry-picked positions which are via territorial cohesion transposed from the (post-)ESDP process usage area in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area (see §15.3.2) then formalise. For the former this would entail one of the two directions of influence (i.e. a formalisation of a part of European spatial planning), for the latter that single one (i.e. an expansion of Regional/Cohesion policy). Also with the iteration of positions between the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas (again, see §15.3.2) the concept could lead towards their formalisation, even if these positions do not stand out as territorial cohesion ownness (i.e. show prior overlaps between areas of action); especially when the IGCs usage area officially backs up such an usage of the concept. When such iterations change the context of territorial cohesion in the (post-)ESDP process usage area (e.g. use processual structures of spatial planning for coordination), this would entail its other direction of influence (i.e. a substantive transformation of European spatial planning). For the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area, however, this again entails the same single direction of influence (i.e. and expansion of Regional/Cohesion policy). Hence, due to territorial cohesion as moving corridor positions become part of the European Union’s Regional/Cohesion policy.
The descent of services and ascent of coordination in the usage of territorial cohesion could exemplify this. In the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area SG(E)I are partly followed as the concept’s official base from the IGCs usage area by tying the accessibility of services to the formal task of reducing the backwardness of specific territories. In the (post-)ESDP process usage area, however, the official line of services differs from the concept’s context, while accessibility through infrastructural ways is more familiar but deviates from territorial cohesion’s juridical base. In the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area territorial cohesion then leaves the provision of services in all territories in its context (i.e. it remains part of this policy) and more infringes coordination (e.g. of policies with territorial impacts). Although positions on this are thus also well-established in the (post-) ESDP process usage area, the IGCs usage area did not yet established precincts for such an usage of territorial cohesion. These developments thus show the concept as moving corridor in action. Yet, this merely orders three of the four usage areas.

15.3.4 The order of the whole territorial cohesion usage field

Just as the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, and Regional/Cohesion policy usages areas, the European Funds usage area has its own place in territorial cohesion’s order for power practices. It thereby resonates almost all positions of each of the other usage areas through financial concretisation. The moving corridor between the (post-) ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy (e.g. positions on coordination) and its filter from the IGCs usage area (e.g. positions on a new cohesion objective) therefore return here too. However, the picture of the ways in which territorial cohesion practices might develop as a bricolage of those in the concept’s context changes by accounting for the complex and elusive European Funds usage area. The question then is how these four usage areas order the concept’s whole usage field.

Also in the European Funds usage area the set down usages of territorial cohesion in the IGCs and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas define formality. The European Funds usage area deviates and adds to this though. Besides that the official limit of services is disregarded here, the concept engages in the margin of agricultural funding too. As the watershed between the Structural Funds and the agricultural funding widens (see §5.5) but this usage area mostly structures (in/formal) positions for the former while the latter has a marginal role, such existing formal usages risk a schisming andcomplexing of the concept.

The concept could then schism when it takes familiar positions (e.g. on competitiveness and balance), which are apart too, because they are for agricultural funding (e.g. with specificities of rural areas). Especially positions on sustainability (in connection with the territorial dimension) might lead to such schisming, because this is the only path towards formality that the European Funding context of territorial cohesion uphold. The concept could complex due to the stress its agricultural funding context lies on tense substantive horizontal coordination, as many positions interrelate in various ways, and the many choices this leaves for lower governmental levels (e.g. in the Leader approach). Due to this additional engagement of territorial cohesion in agricultural funding in the European Funds usage area, besides its resonation of the positions of the other three usage areas that is, the concept appears to order the four usage areas more as a three-way crossing than as a corridor. How so?

With territorial cohesion the IGCs usage area filters positions in the European Funds usage area through the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area – as Treaties set out this policy as task for European cooperation – and “negatively” so through the (post-)ESDP process usage area – as it is informal. Through the European Funds usage area there therefore runs a line of in/formality, as it resonates positions of both of these two usage areas.

Also the relationship between the Regional/Cohesion policy and European funding areas of action is rather straightforward: this policy targets were much of this funding goes. Regional/Cohesion policy could for example have been redefined in such a way that the European funds would also have gone to Member States (and their regions) from before the Enlargement in 2004 instead of only to the (regions of the) new Member States (e.g. with a territorial policy that also caters for “strong territories” in a globally competitive Europe). In the European Funds usage area territorial cohesion then clings with substantive objectives to positions on economic and social cohesion that resonate those in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area. As economic and
social cohesion are formal objectives but territorial cohesion is not, the concept thus fiddles with in/formality. Then again, the movement of the corridor as territorial cohesion order seems to return here. That is to say, the concept’s context in European funding places economic and social cohesion largely outside the usage area (while these objectives keep targeting European funding of course). Moreover, insofar these formal objectives are inside the usage area, their relationships to the 2007–2013 Structural Funds objectives of convergence and (regional) competitiveness and employment are challenged. When territorial cohesion orders the four usages areas as a three-way crossing, it then remains on the line of in/formality, also when this line moves.

The relationship between the European spatial planning and European funding areas of action is not straightforward. Still, one could say that the ESDP has influence with Interreg programmes (i.e. territorial cooperation), this directly or through Regional/Cohesion policy, but always informally or in the margin of formality. Also of importance for territorial cohesion is to note that in 2001 the Committee on Spatial Development (CSD), a “comitological think thank”, was substituted with a subcommittee to the ‘Committee of Development and Reconversion of the Regions’ (CDCR), that is, the Subcommittee on Spatial and Urban Development (SUD). The brief of this subcommittee namely ‘is to advise the [European] Commission in matters of ‘territorial cohesion’ (Faludi, 2003b:128). This CDCR then forms a linkage between the (post-)ESDP process and European Funds usage areas, as it was also called the “Structural Fund Committee”. This makes it less surprising that the usage of territorial cohesion in the European Funds usage area resonates many of the positions taken in the (post-)ESDP process.

Territorial cohesion therefore does not only function as a corridor between the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas, but also as one between the (post-)ESDP process and European Funds usage areas. The concept thereby for instance transposes direct descriptions of territorial reality (see §15.2.3) and re/assemble polycentricism as such a territorial specificity besides only as an objective. Moreover, these two corridors overlap for a large part, as positions often return in each of the three usage areas (e.g. on balance, territorial specificities, coordination; see §15.1.2 and 15.1.3). This makes the concept a three-way crossing.

The line of in/formality also returns here. Territorial cohesion namely does not only station European spatial planning outside the European funds’ formality, but also inside it, when the Structural Funds are concerned with processual coordination, and at the European funds’ margin when both are narrowed down to substantive integration that is. Less advanced positions for European spatial planning dwell between these sides (e.g. occasions for territorial development via the territorial dimension). Moreover, the organisational positions the concept takes could even dissolve the line of in/formality. To be exact, those on governing both handle the informal and formal conduct of the Structural Funds and those on territorial cooperation could breach the line with a formal room to debate territorial cohesion (as this room by itself does not limit territorial cohesion positions taken in it). The line of in/formality on which the three-way crossing of territorial cohesion lies is therefore a fuzzy one.

15.3.5 The topical order of territorial cohesion
The functioning of territorial cohesion as a moving three-way crossing on a fuzzy line of in/formality orders the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and European Funds usage areas together. However, the question is how this outlines the whole territorial cohesion usage field. When the way in which the metanarratives form a collection does so, then this order of the usage areas lays out how they can do so. That is, this bricolage is not of but for the metanarratives. Through the three-way crossing for instance similar metanarratives from different usage areas might connect (e.g. with positions on coordination), as can more different ones (e.g. with positions on a new cohesion objective). However, what obviously comes to the fore in the European Funds usage area, is that not even the interest territorial cohesion displays for coordination markedly organises the chaotic positions. The metanarratives thus form but do not clearly organise the common ground for decision-making on territorial cohesion. As a bricolage the concept thus does not so much create a new area of action, but more a topical order, that is, belonging to a particular location, arranged by or relating to particular topics, and contemporary.
15.4 The territorial cohesion battlefield

15.4.1 Locating territorial cohesion battles
An essential feature of territorial cohesion as topical order is that it is a contested bricolage. The concept namely forms a battlefield for power practices. Even though there are hardly any counterstories to show for it (by forming a metanarrative with the dominant story it opposes), battles appear over the concept's positions and order. These respectively come forward within and between metanarratives (§15.4.4) and between usage areas (§15.4.5). Before these battles are treated below, their place in larger struggles (§15.4.2) and the concept's contested nature (§15.4.3) will be treated to further unfold the territorial cohesion battlefield (§15.4.6).

15.4.2 Situating territorial cohesion battles
Battles over territorial cohesion positions do not stand on themselves, as they are framed and structured by larger struggles. The usages areas can thereby be divided into two sets of two usages areas that in a different way bring less and more struggle forward with their general stories. Although those of the IGCs usage area bicker about the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, they are mostly straightforward for the importance of competencies. Although the general stories of the (post-)ESDP process are not that general but specific, as multi-shaded patchwork they bring puzzling promotions forward (e.g. of coordination, economic causes) without much struggles too. The general stories of the Regional/Cohesion policy and European Funds usage areas contest this undisturbedness though.

The Regional/Cohesion policy usage area is framed by the struggles between political, economic, and social interests (e.g. balance or balance and growth). The more detailed European Funds usage area is on the other hand framed by struggles for European interests, whereby some of these struggles fit in the structure of the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area; as frames are more fundamental than structures, this suggests nestedness. The combats against national control and towards an alliance of regional/cohesion policy with the Lisbon Strategy which structure the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area namely also structure the paxful frame of marches in the European Funds usage area. These marches are for instance for European politics and informal policies (i.e. not for national control) and also show a friction between the official Cohesion policy and Lisbon Strategy (i.e. instead of only an alliance). In this usage area contest even pervades the specificities of how to decide on the European funds, the Structural Funds' cause and reforms, and the allocation(s) for official policy directions. Hence, not only the undisturbed frames for usages of territorial cohesion are contested, the concept's battles could also play a (minor) role in these larger struggles that frame and structure its usage.

15.4.3 Territorial cohesion's contested nature
While territorial cohesion might play a role in larger struggles, the concept is itself contested beyond its ownness (see §15.2). In the IGCs usage area the importance of territorial cohesion is for instance defied, and that the European Union should have a competency for it as well. Although the concept is not defied in the European Funds usage area and even promoted in the (post-)ESDP and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas, this does not change that it is contested. Moreover, in the European Funds usage area the un/definedness, existence/possibility, and in/formality of the concept's usage are contested, as is its precise relationship to these funds (e.g. which funds, what effects). Even the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area adds to this, as it is contested whether territorial cohesion belongs or adds to this policy, and the metanarratives thus show the settled amalgam of positions to fight this out. The concept seems to be contested in enough ways to call this its nature.

15.4.4 Battles in and between metanarratives
Since battles over territorial cohesion positions automatically pick a side in the contestedness of the concept (i.e. for it), the question becomes what role these play in larger struggles. We thus need to know what the battles in and between the metanarratives are, as the latter signify grouped territorial cohesion positions. In the IGCs usage area the metanarratives denote two battles with positions for and against: whether a European Union
competency for territorial cohesion entails one for spatial planning (also see §15.4.5) and whether territorial cohesion entails the territorial dimension. These battles thus take place in metanarratives.

An even clearer battle appears in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area, as a metanarrative is about whether territorial cohesion is an objective just as economic and social cohesion or their territorial dimension. These positions thus respectively reinforce or undermine positions in the IGCs usage area’s battle over whether territorial cohesion entails the territorial dimension, as do positions in this battle vice versa. What is more, such a relation between metanarratives exemplifies battles between them. Every time that in other usage areas positions are taken with territorial cohesion as territorial dimension (e.g. in the (post-)ESDP process) or cohesion objective (e.g. in the IGCs usage area), they are therefore contested. There are thus battles between metanarratives from different usage areas.

In the nitty-gritty of the (post-)ESDP process usage area do not appear such clear battles. Specificities define it instead, especially in territorial cohesion’s unification of policy objectives, full territorial information agenda, and complex territorial governance. Still, specificities of promotions also leave room for contests. That is to say, the way in which a represented concern forges with territorial cohesion is disputed in all the metanarratives in this usage area (e.g. territorial cohesion needs polycentrism or vice versa).

Due to its guerrilla-like deployment also the European Funds usage area has hardly a clear frontline. It namely presents camouflaged opportunities for countless small stealthy manoeuvres for or against the concept. However, battles between territorial cohesion positions also come forward in this. Examples of the most belligerent ones are the confrontation between balance and competitiveness as shown by the ‘substantive objectives’ metanarrative, the clash between Member States and the factions of urban and rural areas as shown by the ‘territorial specificities’ metanarrative, and the challenged crown of territorial cooperation (as formal room to debate territorial cohesion), as shown by the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative. Hence, although both the (post-)ESDP process and European Funds usage areas just appear to simply promote territorial cohesion in various specific ways, battles in their metanarratives are far from scarce.

Furthermore, in the myriad of the (post-)ESDP usage area, territorial cohesion positions do not only align but also compete for prominence (e.g. more for polycentrism than for coordination). Only accessibility concerns recede thereby, especially when involved with services; even though this is the official base for the concept’s usage. Such agenda-setting battles thus occur between positions in the same usage area and thereby between metanarratives too. While they are also fought out in the IGCs usage area, the contests over what territorial cohesion interests are comes forward most clearly in the mass of the concept’s positions in the European Funds usage area. This usage area namely resonates the other three (see §15.3.4), what makes the selection of territorial cohesion positions the least clear here. Due to the set-up of the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area, such battles point to an extra operation. The amalgam of positions to fight out whether the concept belongs or adds to this policy namely imposes that battles for prominence between territorial cohesion positions become contests between contextual positions to seize the concept (e.g. for an integrated approach, balanced development, peripheral regions). Either way, when you take battles for prominence into account, then each of the territorial cohesion positions becomes contested because of their multitude.

Notwithstanding these different battles in and between metanarratives, they do not seem to play a role in the larger struggles that frame and structure the concept’s usage. The promotion of coordination with territorial cohesion could for instance support the general cause of coordination (a struggle that frames all usage areas except for the IGCs one), and in the concept’s confrontation between balance and competitiveness siding with this policy namely imposes that battles for prominence between territorial cohesion positions become contests between contextual positions to seize the concept (e.g. for an integrated approach, balanced development, peripheral regions). Either way, when you take battles for prominence into account, then each of the territorial cohesion positions becomes contested because of their multitude.

The only larger struggle in which the battles of territorial cohesion appear to play a role is the one for European spatial planning. This struggle frames the European Funds usage area, which is also reflected in its line of in/formality, and the (post-)ESDP process usage area of course arrays for this struggle. The role the
The whole territorial cohesion usage field concept plays in this then depends on many outcomes: the battles for competencies in the IGCs usage area, those between positions in the (post-)ESDP process and European Funds usage areas for prominence, and the colonisation of which European spatial planning positions by Regional/Cohesion policy (see §15.4.5). Still, the territorial cohesion battlefield thus shows far more infighting than taking part in larger struggles.

15.4.5 Battles between usage areas
While each territorial cohesion position is contested due to infighting, there appear more structural battles than those in and also those between metanarratives. These more structural battles make the topical order of territorial cohesion contested, because they take place between usage areas. One might argue that this is a consequence of the different role the concept plays in each area of action. That is, to add a European Union competency, promote European spatial planning, expand Regional/Cohesion policy, or channel European funding when the European Union has a competency for it in the form of partly European spatial planning and a new part of Regional/Cohesion policy.

However, the usage areas’ positions that form territorial cohesion as moving three-way crossing on a fuzzy line of in/formality are contested too. The most obvious of the two ways in which this happens is the battle between the IGCs and (post-)ESDP process usage areas. In the (post-)ESDP process usage area territorial cohesion emerges as important concept for the promotion of European spatial planning. In the IGCs usage area on the other hand, the possible unlocking of this informal area of action with the concept is contested in threefold (i.e. a competency for territorial cohesion, a formalisation of European spatial planning, and the relation/overlap of both). The positions in the IGCs usage area against this unlocking therefore contest the whole (post-)ESDP process usage area: each of its positions promotes European spatial planning and territorial cohesion, and a competency for territorial cohesion would then imply a (partial) formalisation of European spatial planning. When there is no such unlocking, the concept is not a three-way crossing. Due to this battle between these two usage areas, this essential part of the territorial cohesion bricolage is therefore contested.

The other more structural battle is between the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas. Many territorial cohesion positions namely appear in both, what leads to a more substantive battle on which belong to European spatial planning (e.g. informal, the Ministers responsible for spatial development) and which to Regional/Cohesion policy (e.g. formal, the European Commission). The expansion of the Regional/Cohesion policy area of action with territorial cohesion as moving crossing namely entails that some positions from the European spatial planning area of action become Regional/Cohesion policy, that is, these positions are colonised with the concept.

This substantive battle over Regional/Cohesion policy’s colonisation of European spatial planning is exemplified by iterated and transposed positions (see §15.2.3). Regarding the iterated positions on coordination, what might for instance have to be fought out is which policies to coordinate: all spatial ones or those to bring in line with Regional/Cohesion policy. Probably this colonisation of coordination with territorial cohesion would namely move towards the latter; note that the Lisbon Strategy could reposition both this line of Regional/Cohesion policy and alignment of also other policies.

In their turn the transposed positions on economic, social, and environmental objectives for instance balance these objectives, what goes against the structure of Regional/Cohesion policy in which they often quarrel. Fights on this (i.e. balance versus quarrel) might then structure tentative outcomes, as shown when the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, 2004a) considered environmental standards as an integral part of economic, social, and territorial cohesion. According to the ‘triangle of sustainability’, which emerges in the (post-)ESDP process usage area, the environment fits besides economy and society. If so and if territorial cohesion harbours this triangle, then economic and social cohesion are a part of territorial cohesion just as the environment is (e.g. with environmental standards). Therefore the triangle of sustainability would not (yet) be used in Cohesion Policy (i.e. no placement of environmental issues and economic and social cohesion under territorial cohesion).
or incorrectly and instrumentally so (i.e. to get environmental standards besides economic and social issues without placing these three under territorial cohesion).

The positions on coordination and economic, social, and environmental objectives thus illustrate the structural battle between the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion policy usage areas. They therefore show another way in which territorial cohesion's topical order is contested (e.g. how particular topics are arranged). Yet, this does not show a way in which the concept's bricolage is contested, as this battle takes place within it. Moreover, when the concept functions as a moving crossing, then territorial cohesion would entail that more of such positions will follow. The battles between usage areas thus do not only portray that an essential part of territorial cohesion's bricolage is contested, but that the concept's bricolage organises a contest over its topical order too.

Hence, the re/organisation of power practices with territorial cohesion is directly contested, both the concept's influence and how it would do so. Structural battles in this are mostly concerned with European spatial planning, as the unlocking of this informal area of action with the concept is contested and it is colonised by Regional/Cohesion policy. Territorial cohesion thereby plays a role in larger struggles. The colonisation of the positions on coordination then of course formally supports the general cause of coordination and the colonisation of the positions on balancing economic, social, and environmental objectives sides with balance and competitiveness against only balance. Still, the territorial cohesion bricolage obviously plays a more essential role in the larger struggle for European spatial planning. Moreover, the contests which settle the concept's role in this, and are not territorial cohesion infighting (see §15.4.4), also form the concept's bricolage. The role of territorial cohesion in the struggle for European spatial planning therefore in a large part depends on the way in which the four usages areas are ordered.

15.4.6 The contests of the territorial cohesion battlefield
The contests of the topical order of territorial cohesion in sixfold reveal how the concept forms a battlefield. The concept is namely contested itself (i), and thus it being a battlefield is contested as well, and framed and structured by larger struggles (ii). Also every territorial cohesion position is contested somewhere in some way: if not in its officialness (iii) or ownness (iv), then due to infighting (v). Even the way in which the concept forms a bricolage is contested (vi). As everything appears to be contested, the uncertainty of territorial cohesion's re/organisation of power practices is systemic. This thus outlines the whole territorial cohesion field and the concept's minor role in larger struggles too (i.e. how to have influence without decisiveness). That is to say, the usage of the concept stands for systematic uncertainty.

15.5 Implications of the concept's usage in government
15.5.1 The twofold lack of the self-evidence of territorial cohesion power practices
When territorial cohesion stands for systematic uncertainty, the question becomes what implications the concept's usage has for changes in government. We can already restrict what these might be, as territorial cohesion has hardly a role to play in larger struggles besides the one for European spatial planning. The implications of the concept's usage then primarily hold for government in and through European spatial planning and just territorial cohesion.

The main point is though, that such power practices are not self-evident at all. This also in the straightforward sense that the concept could change the techniques that are employed to 'shape conduct [for] definite but shifting ends' (Dean, 1999: 209). When these ways change they cannot be taken for granted (idem for their ends). Yet, when it concerns territorial cohesion such power practices lack self-evidence in twofold.

* Note that this fits the departure-point of the analytical framework of this research (i.e. European spatial planning; see Chapter 3). You could then say that such conclusions are therefore more valid (i.e. findings within the analytical framework) or less so (i.e. this framework led to these interpretations). What again points to the need for reflection on the outcomes of this discourse analysis (see possible future research, e.g. as proposed in §18.6).
The whole territorial cohesion usage field

Although government always has ‘a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes’ (Dean, 1999: 209), the systemic uncertainty of the concept’s usage might affect such government itself. That is, also the ways it changes cannot be taken for granted. Below the consequences of this are shown for the concept’s conditional events (§15.5.2), reorganisation of institutional spaces on the European level (§15.5.3) and lower levels (§15.5.4).

15.5.2 Conditional non-/events for territorial cohesion’s systematic uncertainty

Territorial cohesion’s systematic uncertainty leaves much open. It is therefore difficult to point out the conditional events for the concept’s usage. That is, conditional for what? When this uncertainty comes from the contests of the territorial cohesion battlefield (see §15.4.6), one might ask why the agonism is seldom posed as such. An interpretation could be that the status quo of non-egalitarian relationships in power practices leads to different considerations of the situation. That is, for the dominating exercise of power there might be no agonism at all – at least not openly so – or a by all wished for picture of reconciliation is enacted, while for the dominated the agonism does exist – and is thus posed as such – or the enacted reconciliation for all does not exist or is not wished for. The systematic uncertainty of the concept’s usage might therefore exist because the dominating exercise of power does not consider the territorial cohesion battlefield (e.g. as such, or it is irrelevant). The non-events which fix this dominance then condition the non-decisions that lead to the lack of a clear territorial cohesion usage with its conditional events (see Chapter 17).

Then again, one could also say that there are many conditional events for territorial cohesion’s unclear appearance, that is, for its systematic uncertainty. For starters, the concept is not used in one but different usage areas, which show different examples of such events. From the IGCs usage area could come the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty since 2003, what then makes the official base to use territorial cohesion uncertain (e.g. on a par with economic and social cohesion or not). The publication of the ESDP in 1999 could be a conditional event from the (post-)ESDP process usage area. With this document as foot in the door, the continuation of the process that led to the ESDP can be seen as a driving force for territorial cohesion, but the informality of the process might have led to more (complexity and therefore) uncertainty of the concept’s positions (e.g. which are formal and which not). One could see an event from the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area as conditional for that this uncertainty lasts. The Second Cohesion Report namely formally mentioned territorial cohesion in 2001, but did not take a definite position on it. Another event might then have anchored both the concept’s formal usage and its uncertainty. The events in the fierce disputes on the funding streams fundamentally form the European Funds usage area through three tacks: agricultural funding, the Structural Funds, and the Interreg Community Initiative. The mainstreaming of the latter into Territorial Cooperation as the weakest of the three European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) objectives could then be a conditional event too. This objective namely puts forward a formal room for the guerrilla battles on territorial cohesion, making the concept’s usage not important but not lost either, and its positions still uncertain. However, many more events condition this usage. Besides the status quo, there appear too many to fathom though.

15.5.3 Re/organised uncertainty on the European level

The concept’s systematic uncertainty also entails an indecision about what are territorial cohesion power practices, both in the sense of which practices these are and whether the concept rules them. The question then becomes how the concept’s usage can re/organise institutional spaces. It is according to Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) in 2006 ‘even uncertain whether territorial cohesion policy will come about anyway’ – not to mention

Korpi (1985: 35) has a similar explanation in his power resources approach: ‘[S]ince manifest conflict requires that both actors use pressure resources, between actors with great power disparities conflicts of interest are relatively unlikely to turn into overt conflicts. In such situations, the weaker actor may not reveal his preferences and various forms of “non-decision-making” and exploitation are likely to occur’.
whether this policy will achieve it. Still, although no competency for or formal policy of territorial cohesion re/organises power practices in a certain way, the concept's usage could re/organise them into uncertainty.

European spatial planning might put forward ways in which territorial cohesion can re/organise uncertainty at the European level. The concept’s battles namely do not only influence this larger struggle, but the formal institutionalisation this area of action lacks seems to make its practices less certain as well. Giannakourou (1996: 603) then states that '[t]he emerging European spatial strategy is ‘concerted’ (its options resulting from consensus among member-states and through a ‘bottom-up’ approach), ‘selective’ (dealing only with territorial issues which have to be talked about at the European level), ‘flexible’ (designed for different contexts and depending on the voluntarism of the public or private sector for its implementation), and ‘consistent’ (promoting the symbiosis of the various Community policies instead of a strict discrimination).'

This concertedness, selectiveness, flexibility, and consistency might thus return in and due to the usage of territorial cohesion.

Insofar the concept's usage has implications for government, its systematic uncertainty could for instance level formal hierarchies (i.e. concertedness) and organise European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policy into a new indistinct symbiosis (i.e. consistency). This would not be the same uncertainty as organised in the institutional space of European spatial planning though. The selection of issues on the agenda of European spatial planning already differs from those on the territorial cohesion agenda. Moreover, the substantive influence of the concept on European spatial planning could even commander the polycentrism campaign out of its strategy and towards research domains. The usage of territorial cohesion thus reorganises the selectiveness of European spatial planning: the selection of issues is uncertain, but the concept does function as a three-way crossing on a fuzzy line of in/formality (see §15.1 to 15.3).

Still, territorial cohesion might less reorganise the institutional space of European spatial planning than subject it: when the concept organises a symbiosis between European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policy, it could claim the processual structures of spatial planning. With the subjection of this technology would come the instrumentalisation of its techniques (e.g. spatial development, coordination, framing) to shape conduct. Although, or because, the power practices of territorial cohesion are not clear, the concept's usage could thus make (a small part of) government on the European level more uncertain in particular ways: from distinct European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policies to an indistinct symbiosis in which the former is subjected, from a formal hierarchy and informal concertedness to an in/formal concertedness, and with a new selectiveness in the form of territorial cohesion's topical order.

15.5.4 Uncertain re/organisation on lower levels

Territorial cohesion might thus organise power practices on the European level in particular uncertainties. Yet, an organisation of uncertainty still entails an uncertain re/organisation of institutional spaces too. With territorial cohesion this especially appears to be the case on lower levels when it involves the European funds, that is, the most concrete practices in which the concept is used.

A channelling of European funds through territorial cohesion is thereby contested in fivefold due to: i) infighting between existent and/or wished for usages of the concept, ii) battles for and against the concept's in/formality and iii) over its influence, iv) the guerrilla-like deployment for territorial cohesion ownness, and v) that these battles less influence financial dealings than vice versa. This could have implications for government with the concept. The new selectiveness of territorial cohesion's topical order then namely comes with an uncertain targeting for funding (i.e. many positions), the concept's in/formal concertedness with an uncertain direction of funds (i.e. no strict prescriptions), and its indistinct symbiosis with an uncertainty about the channels through which the funding should stream (i.e. overlapping areas of action). This multidirectedness of funding would

Robert (in Faludi, 2007) for instance poses that '[t]he European society, economy and Europe's natural resources are subject to long-lasting factors of change that will make the achievement of territorial cohesion more difficult', and for this points to an ageing population, increasing energy prices, climate change, and that an acceleration of globalisation pressures employment in Europe.
therefore increase both the uncertainty on and the influence of lower levels, as the European level leaves much undecided.

With such an uncertainty it is not surprising when the financial punching power of territorial cohesion chiefly depends on the concept's context, which electricizes nearby options for territorial criteria for funds, funnels them towards competitiveness concerns, and backs its urban bias. Yet, territorial cohesion might mostly channel European funding downstream by rearranging the practices in the multi-level management structure for it.

One can follow Jørgensen & Nielsen (1997) for an illustration of how territorial cohesion's concerted, selective, and consistent uncertainty on the European level comes with a re/organisation of such institutional spaces on lower levels. Their analysis of the Interreg programme's application in the Baltic Sea Region namely reveals the establishment of a transnational space for spatial planning, one that leads to an institutional frame for the development of future regional and spatial planning policies, but this at a relatively technocratic level and with neither a superstructure of substantial political contents nor reflection of the principal players that are characteristic of national planning (Jørgensen & Nielsen, 1997: 6, 10; Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 143). In this government the indistinct symbiosis of European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policy returns (i.e. development of policies), as do the absence of hierarchy (i.e. technocracy) and the uncertain selection of contents (i.e. no superstructure). All might be features of institutional spaces on lower levels when the usage of territorial cohesion re/organises them.

Then again, the main point is that this re/organisation is uncertain. The concept's usage could namely come with various substantive and territorial ways of doing to manage European funding. Besides the informal one of European spatial planning, French territorial ways for instance advance while the more processual approaches, which are more pronounced in the concept's context, can be followed with business-like ways too. For lower levels territorial cohesion thus offers many options for a re/organisation of institutional spaces. This fits in the particular uncertainties that the usage of territorial cohesion re/organises on the European level, as flexibility that is. Government with such a range of ways of doing is then designed (as bricolage) to manage different contexts (e.g. to manage urban-rural relationships). Although you could see this as a limited uncertainty re/organised on the European level, the re/organisation of institutional spaces on lower levels then remains uncertain.

15.6 Conclusions on the concept's usage towards its discourse

15.6.1 Outlining the whole territorial cohesion usage field as castles in the sky

This chapter outlined the whole territorial cohesion usage field from the gathered positions taken with the concept. Those on balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension thereby set the agenda. How they set the stage then depends on whether such usages of the concept appear in the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and European Funds usage area. That is, whether the territorial cohesion positions play a role in, respectively, adding a European Union competency, promoting European spatial planning, substantively expanding Regional/Cohesion policy, or channelling European funding.

None of the positions are innate territorial cohesion concerns though. Merely some appear in the details. That is, only the switch from services to infrastructure, a territorial cohesion indicator, and/or European Territorial Cohesion Index belong to the concept, as do the connections between polycentrism and economic, social, and environmental objectives, sustainability and the territorial dimension, and territorial cooperation and urban areas. All the rest is bricolage.

Territorial cohesion only stands out in how it orders the four usage areas together for the ways in which the metanarratives can form a collection. The concept namely functions as a moving three-way crossing on a fuzzy line of in/formality: the IGCs usage area filters how the concept may appear, the (post-)ESDP process usage area delivers almost all the content, the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area cherry-picks from this, and
the European Funds usage area resonates all three in a guerrilla-like deployment. However, due to the many
interlaced metanarratives and narratives with a similar or even the same content, it is uncertain about what
there should be talked about when it concerns territorial cohesion. This bricolage of areas of action therefore
does not organise the common ground for decision-making on territorial cohesion clearly.

Moreover, the concept forms a topical order of a sixfold battlefield in which every territorial cohesion
position is contested. They namely reveal infighting (i), the concept itself is contested (ii), as is its built-in
bricolage (iii), officialness (iv), and ownness (v), while larger struggles frame and structure these battles (vi).
Territorial cohesion therefore stands for systematic uncertainty. That is, the concept might merely represent a
promise of castles in the sky, each complexly build on top and through others.

15.6.2 From the concept’s game of arbitrarinesses towards the rules of the territorial cohesion discourse

The systematic uncertainty of the concept’s usage has implications for the government in and through European
spatial planning and just territorial cohesion. It could imply that both the dominant status quo conditions the
non-decisions that lead to the lack of a clear territorial cohesion usage and that too many events to fathom
condition the particular appearances of the concept.

Another implication could be that the concept’s usage re/organises institutional spaces on the European
level in particular uncertainties. That is to say, from distinct European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion
policies to an indistinct symbiosis in which the former is subjected, from a formal hierarchy and informal
concertedness to an in/formal concertedness, with a new selectiveness in the form of territorial cohesion’s topical
order, and the flexibility to manage European funding with a range of ways of doing (e.g. European spatial
planning, French territorial ways, business-like). As this leads to a multidirectedness of European funding and
contextual selection of government techniques, it comes with an uncertain re/organisation of power practices
on lower levels too.

Territorial cohesion power practices are therefore far from self-evident. Not only could the concept’s usage
change the techniques employed in this government, but the ways it will do so cannot be taken for granted
either.

With this outline of the whole territorial cohesion field you can start to understand the “territorial
cohesion game”. That is, the concept’s usage is arbitrary in the sense of determined by “subjective” preference,
as it plays a role in power practices. Part I on territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge brought forward,
however, that statements on territorial cohesion appear arbitrary in the sense of intellectually random. The
concept’s propositions and positions therefore entail different arbitrarinesses. The relations between them then
lead us to the rules of this double game that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse as “battle arena”.

190
Part III  Territorial cohesion discourse

Introduction

This Part III of the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with the third sub-question of this research: how do the concept's meaning and usage relate? It thus in a discourse analytical way wants to understand what the meanings of territorial cohesion and usages of the concept mean. However, there neither appears a system of territorial cohesion knowledge (see Part I) nor a certainty about the concept's power practices (see Part II). As the territorial cohesion discourse consists of both, one might ask why then to even embark upon the tour de force of recognising the rules that regulate it.

Gestalt psychology answers that emergence is the process of complex pattern formation from simpler rules (Marr, 1982). You for instance do not recognise the Dalmatian pictured above by first identifying its parts (e.g. feet, ears), but by perceiving the dog as a whole, all at once, after which you can infer its component parts. Similarly, it is at the end of the interpretations of this research's discourse analysis that the descriptions, insights, and explanations of events come forward to reveal 'the system of interpretations and meaning, and the structuring and organizing processes' (Gioa&Pitre, 1990: 587). That is to say, the possible formation of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and the concept's power practices (of which much might still be blank, just as the pictured Dalmatian) could emerge when – not these two parts, but – the whole of the territorial cohesion discourse itself is demarcated by simpler rules.

Although you cannot grasp the concept's episteme and power practices from its intellectual and political positions themselves separately seen, these territorial cohesion pro/positions are nonetheless just as visible as the points of the picture above. On the one side the mapped meanings bring forward the conceptualisation...
of knowledge validity and a kaleidoscope of knowledge forms points towards truth criteria with a gaze of delineated objects and limits of politics. On the other side the field of interest is mapped out. The former thereby demonstrates intellectual randomness and the latter that "subjective" preference determines the concept's usage. The reconstruction of territorial cohesion's interwoven power-rationality therefore revolves around these two arbitrarinesses.

This "territorial cohesion creature" is demarcated by interpreting the limits that place meanings and powers in- and outside a discourse. By using the "3D glasses" of discourse analysis (with a "blue and red glass"; see §7.2.1) we can draw the "blue and red" lines that connect the concept's intellectual propositions on the one side and its political positions on the other. In doing so, not the whole of a two-dimensional image emerges (e.g. the Dalmatian above), but the whole of a three-dimensional "battle arena". Also the territorial cohesion discourse is namely a nodal point that mediates between text an sich and its social context. Politics and science share this discourse, and the link between them thus lies in their dependence on the same concept. Chapter 16 below therefore presents the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions out of which the concept's possibilities of articulation emerge.

Chapter 17 then presents the territorial cohesion discourse as a domain of statements governed by rules that point out the necessary and forbidden articulations. This is the main outcome of this research's discourse analysis: the individualised structure of rules of formation of the territorial cohesion discourse. These rules are hypothetical though, especially because the discourse is in the making and thus not yet crystallised. In this creative phase no territorial cohesion knowledge stratified yet and the concept's usage is essentially contested. Moreover, even though the concept might be central in the political debate, territorial cohesion could be a composite discourse (i.e. consisting of multiple discourses). By using the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective, the network of discursive interdependencies can be structured nonetheless. This allows us to grasp the commonalities in how (discursive) practices in various ways relate territorial cohesion pro/positions.

Still, it would come as no surprise if the Conclusion of this research's discourse analysis proposed in Part IV is vague (i.e. not specific at all), simplifying (i.e. it does not do justice to the contemporary chaotic truth of territorial cohesion) and not very structuring (i.e. there is not a single leading structure or finite multitude of leading structures found). Yet, this does not prohibit this research from reaching its objective: setting up the rules that demarcate the concept's hermeneutic horizon. What is more, the discourse analysis illuminates enough to be able to critique territorial cohesion for its internal tensions and its exclusion of certain issues and themes nonetheless (Jensen & Richardson, 2003).
Chapter 16 The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

Introduction

This chapter will present the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions out of which the concept's possibilities of articulation emerge. To do this with the analytical framework of this research in mind (§16.1.1), it first sketches the maps of these pro/positions in rough strokes (§16.1.2) and brings to the fore what points to such interdependencies (§16.1.3). The discursive interdependencies between the concept's pro/positions can be ordered by following perspectival relations (§16.2.1) or main political purposes or storylines (§16.2.2). However, as such interpretations prevent us from individualising the tactical productivity between the pro/positions, all of them are mapped out by crossing the kinds of territorial cohesion meanings and the concept's usage areas (§16.2.3). This leads us to the reciprocal effects of power and knowledge in general (§16.3.1) and those that the concept ensures (§16.3.2), the role spatial planning might play in this (§16.3.3), and the characteristics of territorial cohesion's tactical productivity (§16.3.4). Thereafter we can conclude how these findings set up a demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse (§16.4).

16.1 The framework, the maps, the pointers

16.1.1 The governmentality framework for territorial cohesion pro/positions

One might ask why the maps of territorial cohesion pro/positions and the pointers for discursive interdependencies between them are presented below. The reason for this comes from the research's analytical framework of governmentality. We namely look at the techniques and knowledges employed in government when it concerns territorial cohesion in order to understand the concept's relations between practices of government and the production of 'truth' (Dean, 1999: 18, 209). Hence, the emphasis on territorial cohesion expertise which mediates between actions and objects of \textit{politique} (Rose, 1993; in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 40, 50; Uitermark, 2005: 146) and on the explicit mental organisation of practices, that is, knowledge of the type of governor and governed entity.

Territorial cohesion knowledge then both arises from and informs the activity of government. We therefore want to understand how territorial cohesion expertise problematises objects of policy and renders them amendable to administration (Miller&Rose, 1990; Murdoch, 1997: 310). Common ways of analysing thereby construct particular forms of knowledge, what can legitimise particular strategies whilst marginalising other understandings of policy problems (Richardson&Jensen, 2003). With territorial cohesion these common ways of course fit the programmes of government that distinguish the regimes of power practices of the concept's usage areas. What is more, territorial cohesion knowledge depends on the positions in these spheres of action as well. We thus only have the concept's propositions on the one side (i.e. mental organisations of practices), its positions on the other side (i.e. in power practices), and discursive interdependencies that link them.

However, also \textit{politique spirituelle} and the sphere of action it points to could come into play here with mental programmes for government of mental power practices (see §3.2.4). This could make you wonder how these programmes and practices differ from discursive interdependencies and the discursive practices they indicate (see §7.1.1). The difference in the practices lies in that discursive practices deal with both propositions and positions and link them, while mental power practices prescribe (the thought of) the taking up of particular positions (e.g. by framing, representing, using policy concepts). And while the discursive interdependencies...
are interpreted, the mental programmes that govern mental power practices are explicit (else they cannot direct us to these practices). In the case of territorial cohesion one could for elements of such programmes think of frames or representation in policy – e.g. to direct the interpretation of problems and the behaviour in the policy process (Gregg & Howard, 2002: 106; Murdoch, 2003: 50) – or policy concepts or discourses – e.g. to ensure that decisions accord with an agenda (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). Put too simply: discursive practices link government and knowledge, mental programmes just govern.

Yet, discursive practices and mental programmes of government can relate. When mental practices become a way to govern, discursive practices (e.g. reasoning) are still needed to go from, for instance, frame to framing and/or from framing to taking a position. Also the discursive practices between mental programmes and power practices can thus be traced as discursive interdependencies of the territorial cohesion discourse. Then again, such programmes might intervene in the discursive practices of the territorial cohesion discourse as well (e.g. by gluing spheres of action together and/or by directing that some pro/positions are not linked), what then alters the discursive interdependencies which indicate these practices. One could therefore ask in how far mental programmes form these interdependencies out of which the possibilities of articulation for territorial cohesion emerge. That is, is territorial cohesion a discourse (i.e. a system of knowledge and associated practices) or merely politique spirituelle?

Even so, our main question is what of such, (again) for instance, frames and framing makes them territorial cohesion frames and framing. As the possibilities of territorial cohesion articulations emerge out of the discursive interdependencies between the concept’s pro/positions, we only touch upon politique spirituelle insofar explicit mental programmes help us to understand the relations between government and knowledge production in the case of territorial cohesion. In the case of the ESDP for example, they might have played a role. Concepts drawn from the ESDP were namely ‘incorporated in various policies or otherwise play a role in planning discourses through a process of diffusion’ (Faludi, 2004c: 405). Still, Faludi (2004c: 405) also mentions how the ESDP ‘shapes research agendas, both directly, i.e. through ESPON, and indirectly, i.e. by raising academic interest in the substance and the process of European spatial planning.’ Husar (2006: 103) might therefore be right in stating that with territorial cohesion agenda-setting means deciding on both the concept’s future meaning and its relevance on the European Union’s agenda. Put in a crude way: we are interested in the relations between the intellectual propositions on the research agenda and the positions on the political agenda, and politique spirituelle might play a major role in this.

### 16.1.2 The mapped territorial cohesion pro/positions

To interpret the discursive interdependencies between the territorial cohesion pro/positions, these pro/positions must be clear before our eyes. As they are mapped out in the concept’s semantic/epistemic order and topical order of its usage in power practices, the maps of both sides will be sketched in rough strokes below (i.e. as summaries of Parts I and II). Even though these intellectual and political sides differ, one can already wonder about how much these maps overlap (see §16.2.3).

The map of the propositions displays that territorial cohesion knowledge mostly depends on the concept’s common ground of meaning as structured by seven kinds. The semantics are thereby characterised by that the hues of territorial cohesion Bedeutung in every Sinn harbour the same tensions of abstraction (e.g. in how far to deal with the tangible world?), selectivity (e.g. which world parts to exclude?), territorial levels (e.g. cohesion on which level?), and harmony (e.g. which struggles to include?). The descriptive meanings then frame several intensions (i.e. hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital) that out each other to describe territorial cohesion. The normative meanings frame other intensions (i.e. Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place), as these systemise territorial cohesion idealisations. Two other more substantive kinds are the policy objective and instrumental meanings. The former frame just one intension, a policy hyper-cube that filters economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism into territorial cohesion objectives. The instrumental meanings do not so much frame intensions though – not to speak of extensions.
They rather frame a totalising tendency which can be identified in the substantive plane of the concept’s servile instrumental knowledge (e.g. interlinking contents for a higher goal).

Besides these four more substantive kinds of territorial cohesion meanings, three more technical ones appear. The policy coherence meanings thereby frame no intensions either. Just as with the concept’s instrumental knowledge, they more frame a totalising tendency, but here this can be identified in the technical bundling of grand policy coherence knowledge (e.g. horizontal coordination between many policies). Also the spatial planning meanings do not frame intensions. Instead, they frame claims that open the door for a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion (e.g. with the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space); this could be essential for the territorial cohesion discourse (see §16.3.3). Note then, that the concept’s territorial governmentality meanings can frame the other six kinds, just as this knowledge could frame the other six knowledge. As territorial cohesion meanings however, they (also) frame intensional fragments of territorial governmentality knowledge. These fragments of territorial cohesion knowledge thereby give room for rationalities that link detailed spatial knowledge to territorial governing and for meta-knowledge with territories or thinking spatial as basis for understanding. Together, these seven kinds of forms and objects construct the territorial cohesion gaze.

The map of the positions displays the whole territorial cohesion usage field. This field consists of four usages areas, that is: the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and European Funds usage area, and in each many to much more positions are taken in power practices. These play a role in, respectively, adding a European Union competency, promoting European spatial planning, substantively expanding Regional/Cohesion policy, or channelling European funding. Positions on balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension thereby set the agenda. Yet, as good as none of the positions are an innate territorial cohesion position, as almost all are a bricolage instead. Moreover, because these positions appear to be contested in everything, territorial cohesion stands for systematic uncertainty.

One might agree with the statement that ‘politics obeys different impact imperatives than the logic of cognisance in science’ (Murswieck, 1994: 10; Husar, 2006: 100n199). Then territorial cohesion’s semantic/epistemic order and whole usage field as sketched above stand separately: Although neither the concept’s intellectual propositions perfectly overlap with ‘science’, nor its political positions with politics proper, both sides do show different arbitrarinesses. That every choice for a territorial cohesion meaning or relation between an idea and facts appears as valid as another namely differs from that every usage of the concept in power practices seems to be determined by ‘subjective’ preference. Then again, these different arbitrarinesses have alike pro/positions (e.g. policy coherence and coordination; see §16.2.3). While Murswieck (1994: 10; Husar, 2006: 100n199) holds that the differences between politics and science keeps scientists from interacting with politicians, the governmentality perspective on the other hand suggests that the crux of both arbitrarinesses can be understood when they are seen in relation to each other.

6.1.3 The pointers towards discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions

If discursive interdependencies relate the concept’s arbitrarinesses, what guides us towards their interpretation is that many statements point towards such dependencies between, in order of their treatment below, its propositions, positions, and both. Hamez (in Campbell, 2005: 401) illustrates how the concept’s propositions depend on each other, as he holds that territorial cohesion ‘will not only be defined by definitions in policy documents,’ but also ‘through the methodologies, which are devised to measure its nature and extent.’ More pointers towards discursive interdependencies are concerned with positions and how pro/positions depend on each other though.³

³ Note that also such, perhaps, ‘non-scientific’ definitions are semantic propositions which this research understands as part of the territorial cohesion expertise (see Appendix A; §A.1.6). Moreover, as these definitions denote what territorial cohesion means instead of how it is or should be used, they form propositions instead of positions.

³ Note that we are not concerned with cause-effect relationships such as ‘positions influence propositions’ or vice versa due to the general scepticism of Foucaultian discourse analysis towards the existence of ‘real world knowledge’ outside discourse’ (Diaz, 2001: 12) (see §7.1.1).
Bachtler&Polverari (in Faludi, 2007) then point towards dependencies between positions in the case of territorial cohesion. They namely say that ‘in the context of the urban development and territorial cooperation agendas, the political and policy rhetoric of territorial cohesion is likely to be subject to major constraints’ (Bachtler&Polverari, in Faludi, 2007). Territorial cohesion positions are thus affected by other positions. Moreover, propositions might play no role here, as in the power practices of the European Union concepts might be used pragmatically instead of being questioned about their meaning. However, these pointers do not imply dependencies between territorial cohesion positions just yet.

That territorial cohesion can be understood as a political concept which shows a “coded consensus” of different interpretations does though. Moreover, such vagueness might even be useful in itself: Husar (2006: 105) on the contrary sees the transversal nature of territorial cohesion (i.e. complementing both economic and social cohesion) as reason for why political positions in this matter are not that pronounced (i.e. at least in the European Parliament). Pronounced positions would thus prove different. In light of the emphasis on cohesion in regional policy, the diversity of European territory, and the then upcoming enlargement that increased spatial-economic disparities, the Committee of the Regions (2003b) for instance states for territorial cohesion that no appraisal of cohesion should be restricted to the economic and social dimensions alone and that a clearer understanding of the reality of cohesion must include reference to substate territorial units; note that the concept might not be used in the regions themselves though. However, an officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006) thinks that how the Core Presidencies Group (of the (post-)ESDP process) uses territorial cohesion is most valuable: for an integrated approach. Not every territorial cohesion position thus has to be as politically valuable as the other. Either way, both as coded consensus or with pronounced positions, territorial cohesion positions clearly relate.

However, according to Tatzberger (2003), besides efforts of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions, no-one tried to elaborate a common territorial cohesion definition. This could remind us of the ESDP (CEC, 1999a), in which agreement on maps – not to mention plans – was almost non-existent (Faludi&Waterhout, 2002). Perhaps it therefore does not surprise that Bachtler&Polverari (in Faludi, 2007) state that in 2004 the Ministers responsible for spatial development did not reach a ‘general agreement on an operational definition of territorial cohesion’ either. Without pin-pointing “the” territorial cohesion position, only positions that consensually or agonistically depend on each other remain. What is more, the last statement of Bachtler&Polverari (in Faludi, 2007) already directs us towards dependencies between the positions (i.e. agreement) and propositions (i.e. a definition).

Much then points towards the dependence of territorial cohesion propositions on positions. As Tatzberger (2003) summarises: territorial cohesion more constitutes a political than theoretical debate. This also shows through time. Some 12 years after the emergence of ‘territorial cohesion’ in the ESDP process, five years after the official acquaintance with the concept in Article 16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (i.e. on SG(E)I (OJEC, 1997)), and one year after the first time in a European Policy context that it has been given some substance (i.e. in the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a)), the Committee of the Regions in 2002 asked to investigate what the concept of territorial cohesion could mean (Tatzberger, 2003). The concept could thus have been used without it having a meaning. You could therefore see territorial cohesion as a political concept without much scientific content. Put the other way around: territorial cohesion propositions that then do appear might for their content depend on already held positions.

---

1 An officer of the CEMR (Personal interview in Brussels, 14th of March 2006) for instance says that when you work in European Union policy you do not ask about the meaning of the concept you use, but use them pragmatically.
2 An official from DG Regio (Personal interview, 7th of February 2006) and officer from EUROSTATES (Personal interview in Brussels, 28th of February 2006) point in this direction for instance.
3 An officer from EUROSTATES (Personal interview in Brussels, 28th of February 2006) for instance proves that it is perhaps not totally without intention that the European Commission has a vague interpretation.
4 A representative of Nordrhein Westfalen (Personal interview, 16th of March 2006) for instance holds that regional actors do not use the concept.
5 A representative of the Permanent Dutch Representation in Brussels (Personal interview in Brussels, 27th of February 2006) for instance sees it thus.
However, a tension between the pro/positions could preclude such rash conclusions. For instance, what if the variation of propositions is larger than of the positions or vice versa? Pro/positions could thus depend on each other even though positions are not transferred to propositions in a completely unmodified way. ESPON’s clarification of territorial cohesion for instance does aim to operationalise the concept for European Union policies, and this clarification should thus fit the positions taken in these power practices. Propositions could thereby draw various positions together. As ESPON says: ‘there is not yet a clear definition for territorial cohesion nor a clear common understanding for its implementation on the basis of the new (draft) Constitution. But the basic elements [are] already visible’ (BBR, 2005a: 56). Although territorial cohesion propositions thus do not replicate the concept’s positions, Falidu (in Faludi, 2007) might be right by stating that much of the discussion will depend on the rapidly changing currents of European politics.

There also appear two pointers towards the dependence of territorial cohesion positions on propositions, both are concerned with ESPON. ESPON itself then says that its ‘difficulty [sometimes reluctance] to enclose territorial cohesion inside a definition probably results both from the complexity of the concept and from its potential implications for policies‘ (BBR, 2005c: 118). For instance, with a political concept that functions to generate consensus, ‘[r]azor-sharp criteria are not always helpful in achieving agreement’ (in Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 5; Husar, 2006: 28), as mentioned earlier. Both that and how propositions could affect positions thus seems to be problematic.

Hence, the pointers clearly show dependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions: between the concept’s definitions and methodologies for measuring territorial cohesion, in a coded consensus or as tensions between pronounced positions, with European politics affecting much of the discussion, and with problematic implications of clarification for policy. The pro/positions then do not only overlap, but also interlink; and what links them (daily) if not discursive practices? The point therefore is neither that the concept does not lead to anything due to its arbitrariness, nor that it is complex and unworkable for researchers if it is not (further) specified. Quite the contrary.

First of all, the concept might more lead to everywhere than nowhere. As Zonneveld & Waterhout (in Faludi, 2005a: 15) characterise the discussion on territorial cohesion: ‘over time its potential implications have become wider and wider’. However, perhaps another question is more important. That is, does it for territorial cohesion expertise matter that the concept’s arbitrarinesses are discursively interdependent (e.g. that arbitrary territorial cohesion knowledge depends on power practices)? If so, as this research argues, the discursive interdependencies should be tracked.

16.2 Territorial cohesion’s dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies

16.2.1 Ordering discursive interdependencies in perspectival relations

If discursive practices interlink territorial cohesion pro/positions, the question becomes how to order the discursive interdependencies involved. A commonsensical way to day this, is by checking which actor – in the institutional framework of the European Union (see Part I of Book I) – gives which meaning to territorial cohesion and for what it uses the concept. With a certain actor as starting-point, one could namely think of particular ways to relate meaning and usage, that is, from a perspective instead of in general. As the perspective would then set the discursive interdependencies, this orders them in perspectival relations. Below

---

1 As officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006) for instance holds that the variation of interpretations is larger in scientific circles than in political ones.

2 After reading Part I of this research’s discourse analysis (i.e. on the semantic/epistemic order of territorial cohesion), Prof.dr. Salet, in a personal conversation, told me that you could not say that the concept leads to nothing. Merely that it is complex and ‘territorial cohesion’ without specification impossible for researchers to work with.

3 Note though, that this way of checking does not fit this research’s analytical and methodological frameworks, as it is based on actors (e.g. see §2.2.2). However, just as the main political purposes and storylines below (see §16.2.2), this way of ordering discursive dependencies is just taken as an in-between step to make the comprehensiveness of the network of the concept’s discursive interdependencies more intelligible.
this is first done by presenting several star diagrams of actors, after which an opposite standpoint with a similar way of checking (i.e. of Husar (2006)) leads to the same conclusion.

In the star diagrams every radius stands for a different topic, of which there are 16, as shown around the circles.

If the surface around a radius is coloured with red lines the actor gives territorial cohesion that topic as meaning, if coloured with blue lines the actor uses the concept for that topic, and both can overlap; the yellow lines are not taken into account here (i.e. topics the actor relates territorial cohesion too). The significance thereby lies in that when these lines reach to the circumference the actor explicitly takes this pro/position, when they do not show (i.e. the centre of the star) the actor explicitly does not take this pro/position, and if they reach between these extremes then it does neither of both.

The four star diagrams below present the pro/positions of DG Employment and Social Affairs, the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), DG Regio, and EUROCITIES in 2006. These actors are chosen on purpose, as they show a diversity of pro/positions taken.

---

These topics are rather crude to map out the concept’s usages and even more so for territorial cohesion meanings. Besides that the star diagrams only display a part of one kind of the collected data (i.e. the extra bit, the interviews) in an early stage of this research (i.e. the analytic retroduction was not finished; see Appendix A, §A.2.4), it should again be noted that they are here only presented instrumentally, that is, to make the ordering of discursive interdependencies below more intelligible.

Based on a personal interview with an official from DG Employment and Social Affairs in Brussels on the 15th of March 2006.

Based on a personal interview by telephone with an officer from the CPMR on 13th of April 2006.

Based on personal interviews with an official from DG Regio on the 18th January, an official from DG Regio on the 7th of February, an officer from DG Regio on the 17th of February, an officer from DG Regio on the 2nd of March, and an officer from EUROCITIES in Brussels on the 28th of February 2006.
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

After a quick glance, one can already see that the actors give territorial cohesion different meanings (e.g. balanced development for the CPMR). More striking is that EUROCITIES takes no proposition, what supports that the concept is also only used pragmatically, and DG Regio several, even ones that contradict (as shown by the dotted lines, e.g. territorial cohesion both explicitly means and does not mean socio-economic policy). Actors also seem to take different positions, save for the usage of the concept in the Structural Funds (as all actors do so) and that the CPMR uses the concept for all of the topics (perhaps it holds that territorial cohesion always has to do with peripherality). The peculiarity is though, that per actor none of these explicit pro/positions overlap.

The discursive practices that link them thus differ per perspective (e.g. how DG Employment and Social Affairs "thinks" to use the concept in the Structural Funds if territorial cohesion means spatial policy). Still, this does offer a way to order the discursive interdependencies: how you relate territorial cohesion pro/positions just depends on your perspective (e.g. your place on the "territorial cohesion battlefield"; see §15.4).

Husar (2006: 92-93) only comes up with minor differences between country groupings and political groups in the European Parliament when it concerns territorial cohesion priorities; Husar (2006: 43) does not give a content to identify this group. Despite this vagueness, however, Husar (2006: 104) sees 'no significant disagreement on territorial cohesion between the institutions.' Besides that he excludes sceptics of the concept, the point here is that, contrary to the star diagrams above, he recognises no (major) perspectival differences in the taken propositions. Still, unless you pose that each of these institutions uses the concept in the same way (i.e. takes the same position), also Husar's (2006) take entails different discursive practices due the different relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions. Moreover, even if both the propositions and positions of actors only differ insignificantly, an intricate web of a bit differing pro/positions appears. That is to say, although the actors do not disagree, the agreement might seem vague. Hence, no matter whether you order the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions with perspectival relations of actors or by relating content to actors, a rather chaotic picture of discursive practices appears. Other ways to order the discursive interdependencies could thus prove useful.

16.2.2 Ordering discursive interdependencies in main political purposes or storylines

You could say that Tatzerberger (2003) and Waterhout (2003; in Faludi, 2007) do not make sense of the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions by ordering such relations per actor. They namely both do so in a broader and abstracter way with, respectively, main political purposes and storylines6 note that neither of them claims to order discursive interdependencies between pro/positions, this is thus an interpretation
of this research. Although they differ in approach and order, both Tatzberger’s (2003) and Waterhout’s (2003; in Faludi, 2007) ways are policy-oriented.

Tatzberger (2003) then distinguishes three main political purposes between which territorial cohesion mediates. These are: i) the weakening of liberalisation activities caused by the European Union and the ensuring of equal access to SGEI, ii) the strengthening of the territorial dimension of European Union policies to receive a balanced and sustainable development by taking into consideration the territorial effects of sector policies on different levels, and iii) steer the regional policy after 2006 (Tatzberger, 2003). Each of these purposes could not only clearly point out which position to take, but also delimit the possible propositions, and thus structure how the relationship between pro/positions is made. The first purpose for instance shows that territorial cohesion is not only used for this specific form of SGEI only as well, but also that the concept’s meaning then cannot contradict this usage (e.g. it could have exactly this meaning, or a type of balanced development which decreases due to liberalisation). As these main political purposes thus do not determine the discursive practices, Tatzberger’s (2003) approach does not pin-point the discursive interdependences down. Still, it does abstractly order the chaotic picture of many perspectival relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions in a clear way.

However useful the clarity provided by Tatzberger (2003) might be, the order is problematic – and not because an actor could support various main political purposes. Besides that its primacy with politics might not be that self-evident, the purposes seem both to be too broad and too specific. When you point out the main political purposes, you of course have to be broad; the purpose of steering regional policy after 2006 perhaps leaves too much open though. Yet, Tatzberger (2003) combines this with a specificity derived from the duality of them. Her order of main political purposes thereby precludes that territorial cohesion is, for instance, only used to strengthen the territorial dimension of European Union policies. Being both broad and specific then implies being too coarse. These issues are not that important here though.

More essential is that if there is another way to order the discursive interdependencies between the concept’s pro/positions, one could ask whether Tatzberger’s (2003) order is the right one. Both Waterhout (2003) and Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) distinguish four storylines that could tie policy discourse-coalitions together for example. As shown below, both orders differ, while Tatzberger’s (2003) three main political purposes do more or less return within them.

In Waterhout (2003) ‘the different storylines, which are trying to get a foothold at the European level through territorial cohesion, then are: i) SG(E)I, ii) Reducing regional disparities: making cohesion policy more effective, iii) Policy coherence: making European Union policies more efficient, and iv) Increasing Europe’s sustainable development and global competitiveness. Some notes come with the first two and last of these storylines. Waterhout (2003) namely thinks that the SG(E)I storyline is a discourse on its own – moreover, ‘SG(E)I’ would reflect a French discourse (Faludi&Waterhout, 2002). He calls the discourse that inhabits the three other storylines ‘Territorial Governance’, and says this originated in the process that led to the making of the ESDP (Waterhout, 2003) – moreover, this discourse would be a product of Northwest-European thinking about spatial planning (Waterhout&Zonneveld, 2003). Increasing Europe’s sustainable development and competitiveness would for instance come directly from the ESDP (Waterhout, 2003); Husar (2006) thinks likewise (see §16.2.1). The note for the second storyline is, that for Waterhout (2003) ‘reducing the disparities between regions’ seems to comprise two sub story lines, which are ‘polycentric development’ and ‘introducing territorial indicators’. Notwithstanding these notes, Waterhout (2003) says that these four storylines ‘are all part of the same discourse’.

If so, they order the discursive interdependencies of the territorial cohesion discourse. It then seems that a storyline does not only point down which position to take with the concept, but also which proposition, and thus to structure the discursive interdependencies. It namely does not only stand for some of the concept’s discursive practices in a given policy domain, but its generative statements would also create new meanings (for an explanation of Hajerian ‘storylines’, see Chapter 6.2.2). Compared to Tatzberger’s (2003) main political purposes, these storylines therefore appear to stronger structure discursive interdependencies while in first
instance they seem to be more abstract. The policy coherence storyline for instance does not only tell for what to use the concept (i.e. policy coherence), but also what sense to make of territorial cohesion (i.e. new policy coherence meanings).

However, when you compare Waterhout’s (2003) four storylines with Tatzberger’s (2003) three main political purposes, they do not only seem to be more abstract. The main political purposes of steering regional policy after 2006 cannot be found in his order and the storyline of ‘SG(E)I’ appears to match the main political purpose which includes equal access to SG(E)I. Yet, the ‘Territorial Governance’ storylines Waterhout (2003) distinguishes seem to consider the various aspects of the other main political purpose of Tatzberger (2003). That is, reducing regional disparities takes balanced development into account, policy coherence might do so for the consideration of the territorial effects of sector policies, and sustainable development directly so. Hence, Waterhout’s (2003) order also differs from Tatzberger’s (2003) by being more distinctive — and thus also stronger in structuring discursive interdependencies. As in Waterhout’s (2003) order the propositions as well as the positions are taken in policy, the territorial cohesion discourse he talks about could be categorised as a policy discourse. Moreover, one might read Faludi’s (2003a) position that territorial cohesion policy will eventually contain elements of the French and German spatial planning approaches as a convergence between, in Waterhout’s (2003) terms respectively, the ‘SG(E)I’ and ‘Territorial Governance’ discourses as different interpretations of territorial cohesion. What will be part of it depends following Waterhout (2003) also on the future position of the concept ‘in relation to well established policies like economic and social cohesion’. Territorial cohesion could for instance contribute bottom-up to economic and social cohesion by providing a new rationale to build policy on ([e.g.] a spatial economic structure vision of the EU’s territory that gives handholds for a more spatially selective allocation of structural funds) or could stand] on a par with economic and social cohesion policies and (become) another sector of the EU (e.g. with a dominance of SGI) (Waterhout, 2003). Either way, you can therefore not only order territorial cohesion pro/positions in different ways, but their order can change as well.

Although Waterhout’s (in Faludi, 2007) storylines structure discursive interdependencies just as Waterhout’s (2003) ones do, he comes up with another order. This might be the result of changes in his research object and/or interpretation of it. Now the four territorial cohesion storylines are: i) Europe in Balance, ii) Coherent European Policy, iii) Competitive Europe, and iv) Green and Clean Europe. Together they ‘give an indication of potential elements of territorial cohesion policy’ in the absence of easy to determine discourse-coalitions (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007).

Still, besides typifying each, Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) distinguishes these four storylines by suggesting their institutional origins. ‘Europe in Balance’ would then combine the thinking of the (post-)ESDP process and SGI and be about levelling out regional disparities and adding a territorial development rationale to the establishment of economic and social cohesion and the distribution of the Structural Funds (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). ‘Coherent European policy’ would come from the (post-)ESDP process and focus on horizontal policy coherence (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). ‘Competitive Europe’ then comes from Northwest European Member States while focussing on the competitiveness of Europe as a whole and of individual regions (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). ‘Green and Clean Europe’ in its turn would come from Nordic countries, Germany, and Ireland and is concerned with sustainable development and the sound management of the environment; this storyline ‘influenced the ESDP process and now looms in the background of territorial cohesion policy’ (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007).

This because the consideration of the territorial effects of various policies might lead towards more coherent policies by, for instance, strengthening the territorial dimension. Note though, that the storyline ‘Reducing regional disparities: making cohesion policy more effective’ could also account for the same main political purpose, as the consideration of territorial effects of cohesion policy could make it make effective. These nuances do not matter much here — only insular they lead to the thought that these orders do not fit each other that well either.

Hereby ‘the ball is on the court of the regions themselves’, that is, not only cities as ‘motors of the economy’ but the unique territorial capital of regions (including rural and peripheral areas) (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007).
Faludi, 2007). Although Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) brings each of these storylines to the fore as territorial cohesion storyline, they thus clearly differ.

Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) also sees a common understanding between the four storylines in the use of strategic territorial frameworks for operationalisation. Then again, they would focus on different levels: ‘Europe in Balance’ and ‘Coherent European Policy’ on the European Union level and the other two on lower administrative ones; whereby with the ‘Competitive Europe’ storyline regions have to compete for subsidies (Waterhout, Faludi, 2007). Another difference is that where ‘Europe in Balance’ is primarily concerned with existing cohesion policies, all other storylines potentially address all sector policies, with ‘Coherent European Policy’ as the prime example (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Again, these four storylines clearly differ. Just as Tatzberger (2003) and Waterhout (2003), also Waterhout (in Faludi) thus abstractly orders the chaotic picture of many relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions.

Just as above, however, the point here is that these orders of discursive interdependencies differ. Waterhout’s (in Faludi, 2007) storyline ‘Europe in Balance’ reflects Waterhout’s (2003) ‘SG(E)I’ storyline – and thus the alike main political purpose distinguished by Tatzberger (2003) – and the ‘Reducing regional disparities’ part of the so named other one; in hindsight you could say Waterhout (2003) partly foresaw this, as in this storyline a territorial development rationale is added to the well-established cohesion policies. His ‘Coherent European Policy’ storyline simply matches his previous ‘Policy Coherence’ one. Waterhout’s (in Faludi, 2007) storylines of ‘Competitive’ and ‘Green and Clean Europe’ separates his previous ‘Increasing Europe’s sustainable development and global competitiveness’ storyline though – what thus rearranges his previous rearrangement of one of Tatzberger’s (2003) main political purposes. However, according to Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007), more modifications are underway. The relative new storylines of a ‘Competitive’ and ‘Green and Clean Europe’ might overtake the most supported one of ‘Europe in Balance’, due to the critique on the latter’s methods of operation and lack of effectiveness, or it incorporates them to counter the trend (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Hence, Tatzberger (2003) and Waterhout (2003; in Faludi, 2007) seem to try to pin down a moving object, or at least the moving elements of which it consists.

We could therefore ask whether the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions are too dynamic (now) to set them in an order. Instead, the question might be what distinguishes the concept’s discursive practices from others (e.g. the ‘Competitive Europe’ storyline that appears with or without ‘territorial cohesion’). Especially because of the three foci on policy above we could mention Uitermark (2005: 141) here, in that ’most of the time policy shifts will occur within a particular regime’. That is to say, the dynamics of the discursive interdependencies then always take place within the same territorial cohesion discourse.

Moreover, each of the three orders presented above could exist in the concept’s discursive practices too, as long as the discourse includes them all. Do note that if such orderings explicitly prescribe instead of, as is the case here, describe, they would be elements of mental programmes. Now these orderings (as “the” order) might still get in the way of an interpretation that tries to demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse though. We therefore have to release all territorial cohesion pro/positions from such orders again to recognise their dynamic and possibly multi-ordered discursive interdependencies.

16.2.3 Opening territorial cohesion up again to show many discursive interdependencies

Releasing the territorial cohesion pro/positions from orderings of their discursive interdependencies still allows a schematisation of them. That is, when you picture these pro/positions and interdependencies as “molten lava” (see 7.3.2), “streams” might have different directions (e.g. contradicting meanings), but some overlaps come forward nevertheless (e.g. mutually dependent pro/positions). To come up with such tendencies, the tables of the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, which frames the concept’s knowledge (see Part I), were compared with the schemas on the concept’s usage (see Part II).

* One could picture this as a gymnasium floor with lines for multiple sports (e.g. basketball, volleyball, football): it is one floor, but with different orders. With the territorial cohesion discourse, the point is of course that the “game” played is unknown, it is not clear which rules hold. The patterns of it might simultaneously follow multiple orders through.
The cells of Table 1 below then present the results of this comparison per crossing of the concept's different kinds of meaning and usage areas. Note though, that it does not represent the strength of a proposition or position. Here we are namely more interested in the discursive interdependencies between them than in the mutual relations between either the propositions or between the positions separately seen (see Part I and II for this though). Simply put, the table below is concerned with the relationships between the concept's political and scientific realms.

The table brings the discursive interdependencies between the territorial cohesion pro/positions to the fore in two ways. All these propositions and positions are part of the discourse, however: either i) a meaning and usage correspond to each other (i.e. ‘pro/position’, the middle cell of each crossing) or ii) a meaning does not have a corresponding usage (i.e. ‘proposition’, the blue cells) or vice versa (i.e. ‘position’, the red cells). The correspondences and non-correspondences then together show the overlaps between pro/positions that point to the discursive interdependencies between them.

Table 1 Overlapping territorial cohesion pro/positions per crossing of kind of meaning and usage area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of meaning/usage area</th>
<th>IGCs</th>
<th>ipost-ESDP process</th>
<th>Regional/Cohesion Policy</th>
<th>European Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descriptive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial identity/value of specific territorial features</td>
<td>- territorial identity - complex web over several aspects and scales</td>
<td>- territorial identity - territorial effect of policies</td>
<td>- SG(E)I access - territorial identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial disparities/sustainable development/competitiveness</td>
<td>- cohesions in between territories - (territorial) disparities/sustainable development/competitiveness - SG(E)I access - value of specific territorial features - territorial impacts of policies</td>
<td>- cohesions in between territories - (territorial) disparities/sustainable development/competitiveness - SG(E)I access - value of specific territorial features - territorial impacts of policies</td>
<td>- territorial cohesion indicator - (territorial) disparities/sustainable development/competitiveness - value of specific territorial features - European Territorial Cohesion Index - (territorial) impacts policies/expenditure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific territories</td>
<td>- specific territories - infrastructure</td>
<td>- specific territories - infrastructure</td>
<td>- specific territories - impacts of State aid/GDP per capita measure - decentralisation index</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will to be together</td>
<td>- will to be together</td>
<td>- will to be together</td>
<td>- will to be together</td>
<td>- will to be together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social justice</td>
<td>- equality between territories - SG(E)I equality - European Social Model</td>
<td>- equality between territories</td>
<td>- social justice</td>
<td>- social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity against</td>
<td>- solidarity among European citizens - spatial justice</td>
<td>- solidarity amongst territories - equity wherever citizens live - SG(E)I equality - European Social Model</td>
<td>- equality over whole territory</td>
<td>- equal access to information - European Social Model/ Liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial discrimination</td>
<td>- political transparency/legibility</td>
<td>- political transparency/legibility</td>
<td>- unchangeable equity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity wherever citizens live</td>
<td>- SG(E)I equality - European Social Model</td>
<td>- political transparency/legibility</td>
<td>- unchangeable equity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kind of meaning/usage area</td>
<td>IGCs</td>
<td>(post-)ESDP process</td>
<td>Regional/Cohesion Policy</td>
<td>European Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy objective</td>
<td>- strengthen territorial potential</td>
<td>- territorial dimension of cohesion</td>
<td>- (territorial dimension of) cohesion</td>
<td>- (territorial dimension of) cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- balanced/sustainable/polycentric development</td>
<td>- (territorial) balanced/sustainable/polycentric development/competitiveness</td>
<td>- (territorial) balanced/sustainable/polycentric development/competitiveness</td>
<td>- (territorial) balanced/sustainable/polycentric development/competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SGEI provision</td>
<td>- strengthen territorial capital</td>
<td>- SGEI provision</td>
<td>- strengthen territorial capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- - balance distribution of activities over EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>- balance distribution of activities over EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental</td>
<td>- improve specific territories</td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td>- improve (services of) specific territories</td>
<td>- improve (access) specific territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td>- territorial cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- regional identity</td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy coherence</td>
<td>- regional/European integration</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
<td>- regional/European integration</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- competitiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>- competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- for Cohesion policy/CEMAT/ESDP/Lisbon Strategy/Gothenburg European Council</td>
<td></td>
<td>- for Cohesion policy/CEMAT/ESDP/Lisbon Strategy/Gothenburg European Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentric development</td>
<td>- economic and social cohesion</td>
<td>- whole EU territory</td>
<td>- European funds/cohesion policy for all regions/Europe's territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td>sustainable development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- bundle of sector policies</td>
<td>- vertical policy coherence</td>
<td>- coordination within one territory</td>
<td>- coordination within one territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- coordination within one territory</td>
<td></td>
<td>- horizontal and vertical coordination</td>
<td>- horizontal and vertical coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- coordination of policies with territorial impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- vertical policy coherence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (spatial) coordination of sector policies</td>
<td>- (territorial) coordination of sector policies (with territorial impact)</td>
<td>- (territorial) coordination of sector policies (with regional policy/territorial impact)</td>
<td>- (territorial) coordination of sector policies (with spatial impacts for cohesion policy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- horizontal and vertical coordination</td>
<td>- territorial policy integration</td>
<td>- territorial policy integration</td>
<td>- territorial policy integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- vertical (spatial) policy coherence</td>
<td>- horizontal and vertical coordination</td>
<td>- horizontal and vertical coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- coordination of policies (with territorial impact)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- coordination of economic/development policies</td>
<td>- coherent spatial development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of meaning/usage area</th>
<th>IGCs</th>
<th>Ipost-ESDP process</th>
<th>Regional/Cohesion Policy</th>
<th>European Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spatial planning</td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning</td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- as spatial planning</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning for European spaces and territories</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- European spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- from French/German spatial planning</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning tradition</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- Community territory</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-/EU levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial perspective</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The in-fillings of the table were drawn rather sketchy, as the significance of the table just lies in showing that overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions appear. They therefore do not show that, for instance, certain definitions are used within a particular usage area, a but direct us towards the third dimension of the territorial cohesion discourse (again, see section 7.2.1).

However, due to this sketchiness, only positions that in no way overlap with propositions (and vice versa) do not return in the table as 'pro/positions'. There might thus appear more overlaps than would be justifiable on the basis of a more precise mapping of pro/positions; the more so when you consider that there are more

---

a The labels in the table thus also do not directly refer to propositions and positions, but to groups of them and, more important, to groups of pro/positions with labels that suit both sides as much as possible (and these labels can thus differ from those used for propositions or positions or both).
and broader semantic than epistemic propositions, what leads to more overlapping pro/positions. Besides, as this table does not represent the strength of positions in power practices, neither contrapositions, which some have, come forward. Some overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions shown by the table therefore present a partisan picture (see §16.3 for how meanings/knowledges then choose sides). Hence, to prevent rash conclusions, it should be kept in mind that these overlaps point to (possible) discursive interdependences instead of representing them (e.g. as the only way).

Still, Table 1 is rich in content. The positions on which propositions could depend for instance do not appear in every usage area. We side-step the implications of this here (again, see §16.3), as we are now concerned with the total overlap between all the pro/positions. When you then look at the overlaps seen from the kinds of meaning, some remarkable exceptions come forward. The descriptive territorial cohesion meaning of territorial identity for instance does not return in the usage of the concept, while the meanings do not cover the common usage of the concept in matters of specific territories and infrastructure (only). The latter even holds for the policy objective definitions of territorial cohesion as well. The positions do cover all policy objective propositions though, just as they do for all instrumental ones, for which many exceptions appear the other way around (e.g. sustainable development). This holds less so when seen from the normative meanings, as here exceptions on both sides appear. Then again, besides that the will to be together does not return in the concept's positions, we could wonder why the propositions do not cover an ideal of political transparency. When you look at the usage areas seen from the policy coherence meanings, at first sight also many exceptions appear on both sides. However, together the positions in the four usage areas totally overlap with the propositions, save for some detailed positions (e.g. coordination of economic policies). Likewise for the spatial planning pro/positions – and that the propositions are not bothered by competencies and regulations as the positions are is not that remarkable, as both strongly relate to practices. While the positions cover all territorial governmentalitity propositions too, except for the essential combination of spatial thinking and governance, what is remarkable here is that there are so many positions which add to this (e.g. new territorial way of doing, (territorial) cooperation, territorial cohesion strategy). Yet, what comes forward from Table 1 as most remarkable is that almost all territorial cohesion meanings and usages overlap. This does not only hold for the concept's semantic propositions (which are shown in Table 1), but also for its epistemic propositions. The territorial cohesion knowledges only partly fill the frame set for them by the concept's common ground of meaning though (see Chapter 10). For instance, in the policy objective meanings SG(E)I appears, but it does not do so in the associated knowledges. Such meanings then show the possibilities for knowledge construction. Still, absolutely seen, the epistemic propositions thus correspond less with the positions. We can then list these overlaps as they come forward via the Bedeutung implied by the territorial cohesion knowledges (again, see Chapter 10), as these can be recognised in the labels for pro/positions in Table 1.

The epistemic territorial cohesion propositions correspond the most with the concept's positions when it concerns its descriptive, normative, and policy objective knowledges – which is not surprising, as far less claims appear for the other kinds. The descriptive hyper-cube and layer approach intensions thereby return in the pro/positions of a complex web over several aspects and scales, to which the components of territorial cohesion intension adds those of territorial sustainable development, while the territorial capital intensions returns in the value of specific territorial features. The normative Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intensions are in their turn covered by the pro/positions of, respectively, social/spatial justice, the European Social Model and those against territorial discrimination, and equity wherever citizens live. With the concept's policy objective knowledge the extensions return in the pro/positions, as economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism are almost identical to the ( territorial dimension of) cohesion and polycentrism pro/positions – this is not surprising either, as policy objective definitions are these policy facts. The only

---

*a* Although the same could be said vice versa, the groups of positions grouped per usage area overlap far more than the groups of propositions grouped by kind of meaning. As the latter are cleaner and more stable, they are taken as departure point.

*b* SG(E)I do appear in the spatial planning kind of territorial cohesion knowledges though.
epistemic proposition which is not covered by the positions is the hyper-cube intension, as policy objective intension that is (yet again, see §16.3).

Also in the epistemic propositions of the other territorial cohesion knowledges, just one appears that does not correspond to a position of the concept in power practices, and it reflects the not-covered semantic propositions. This is the for the territorial governmentality knowledge essential combination of spatial thinking and governance (this is the implied Bedeutung). Its other intensional fragments, such as a new territorial way of thinking and territorial approach, are covered by the concept’s positions. We further only have to take a pointer towards an instrumental intension into account, that is: different foci return in the pro/positions for Cohesion policy/CEMAT/ESDP/Lisbon Strategy/Gothenburg European Council. That is to say, neither the policy coherence nor spatial planning knowledges back up territorial cohesion – the system of spatial planning knowledge might be transposed though (see §16.3.3). Perhaps even more remarkable than the large overlap between territorial cohesion meanings and usages (i.e. almost all) is therefore the relatively seen even larger overlap between territorial cohesion knowledges and usages (i.e. all but two). Hence, generally speaking, it is an understatement to say that most territorial cohesion pro/positions overlap.

The corresponding pro/positions might then denote linkages between the concept’s meanings/knowledges and usages, that is, the network of discursive interdependencies that forms the territorial cohesion discourse – and because there are many pro/positions and thus even more linkages, this would be a complex network. The propositions without corresponding positions (e.g. territorial identity descriptions) and vice versa (e.g. specific territories) can also be seen as part of the territorial cohesion discourse. However, although these propositions and positions do not have to be weak in themselves, they obviously do show differences in the discourse between the territorial cohesion meanings/knowledges and the concept’s usages (i.e. between the “blue and red lines”) – which could have certain effects (see §16.3.2). For now it is enough to recognise that not-corresponding pro/positions at most suggest discursive interdependencies that do not tie the territorial cohesion discourse together but only to its side of meaning/knowledge or power practices. Still, most pro/positions instead seem to evidence that, simplistically put, politics and science do not only share the territorial cohesion discourse because both depend on the same concept, but also that discursive practices thereby link them.

Tewdwr-Jones & Morais Mourato (in Faludi, 2005a: 70) then see territorial cohesion as new economic concept. This does return in the kaleidoscopic system of territorial cohesion knowledge (see §10.2.8): quantitative, economic, and distributive descriptions and economic and technocratic conceivings of policy objectives appear as dominant pieces. However, here the point is not to bring forward weaker non-economic pro/positions (e.g. social indicators), neither that there seem to be non-economic dominant ones as well (e.g. social ideals), nor that those which are economic are not always dominant (e.g. coordination of economic policies). The point is that we are not interested in the dominance of pro/positions, but in which are in-/outside the territorial cohesion discourse.

To find out which pro/positions are territorial cohesion pro/positions and which are not is difficult enough in itself. The more so because they keep on changing: territorial cohesion knowledge is in construction and the concept’s usage also transforms. While we left the orderings of discursive interdependencies between these pro/positions behind us, discursive practices would network them together. What is more, the overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions more point to an explosion of possibilities for discursive interdependencies than their non-existence. With changing pro/positions, the network of discursive interdependencies would therefore not only be complex but dynamic too. In this interplay between meaning/knowledge and power practices, the territorial cohesion discourse could then for instance produce a common vocabulary (e.g. in spatial analysis) and embed institutional forms (e.g. in policy implementation), which in their turn reproduce the discourse. What leads us to the question how discursive interdependencies ensure power effects of knowledge and vice versa in the case of territorial cohesion.
16.3 The power and knowledge effects of territorial cohesion

16.3.1 Power-knowledge effects in general

The territorial cohesion pro/positions overlap so much that there is only slim chance this is due to coincidence. We then look at their interplay in a Foucaultian discourse analytical fashion: as a tactical reciprocity between knowledge and power (see §2.2.2). This section therefore first treats ways in which knowledge can have effects in and on power practices (i.e. power effects of knowledge) and power practices in and on knowledge (i.e. knowledge effects of power). The next section then places the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions within them (see §16.3.2).

Power effects of knowledge (e.g. through administering, analysing policy problems, proposing intervention techniques) are so well-known, that studies even focus on it. Researching an ‘epistemic community’ is an approach for this, that is, ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’ within that domain (Haas 1992: 3; Radaelli, 1999: 761). Although we do not follow this approach, the three characteristics of the policy process Radaelli (1999: 761) says it introduces might be interesting for us nevertheless: uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalisation of ideas. In power practices territorial cohesion for instance stands for systematic uncertainty. Haas (1992) then argues that with such radical uncertainty ‘there is no clear perception of what the interest of the actor is: accordingly, an epistemic community can generate a definition of interests by illuminating certain dimensions of an issue, from which an actor can deduce her/his interests. Interests therefore become a dynamic dependent variable, framed by knowledge’ (Radaelli, 1999: 761). Besides “normal” ways in which territorial cohesion knowledge can have power effects (see below), it could therefore also illuminate which positions can be taken with the concept. Moreover, Radaelli (1999: 762) holds that ‘the production of meaning is the key to the definition of interests and to the institutionalization of policy ideas.’ Territorial cohesion definitions could play this role by proposing on what to take positions with the concept. As such, they would be a clear case of politique spirituelle. Hence, even if we do not research the epistemic community of territorial cohesion, what becomes clear is that territorial cohesion knowledge can have power effects in uncertain practices by clarifying positions and/or proposing clarifications.

That power effects of knowledge are mediated by power could be taken for granted. In’t Veld&de Wit (2000: 154) for instance note that ‘[l]arge quantities of knowledge produced for the benefit of policy are never used in that policy-making.’ Due to power practices some knowledges have power effects and others do not. However, power might not only affect the usage of knowledge through selection, it can have more sinister effects as well.

In general, knowledge reassesses established forces by crystallising power relations in forms (e.g. structures of the social world; see §3.5.2). Yet, more particular ways in which power has knowledge effects appear too. Owens&Rayner&Bina (2004: 1945-1946) even pose that ‘[i]n many cases[,] rather than being ignored, the output of particular assessments is invoked – perhaps even deliberately manipulated – in order to rationalise decisions that have been reached on other grounds.’ That is to say, power then does not only have effects on the usage of knowledge – what could make some knowledges more dominant in both science and politics than others –, but also on the production of it: power calls forth certain knowledge. Also in the case of territorial cohesion, power can therefore have knowledge effects by being crystallised or even by invoking certain epistemic formations.

Again, when it concerns power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power, a Foucaultian discourse analysis is not interested in causal relationships. Even when you put its general scepticism towards the existence of ‘real world knowledge’ to the side (i.e. without real world knowledge, no knowledge of the real cause; see §7.1.1), power that in a certain way has knowledge effects could already be affected by knowledge. That is, instead of answering the question of where the beginning lies, we just note that territorial cohesion pro/positions reinforce each other.
This is similar to research on epistemic communities in their interplay with wider coalitions (e.g. Sabatier 1998), in that then the theoretical rationale 'is that often knowledge and interests are in a symbiotic relation' (Radaelli, 1999: 762). Owens&Rayner&Bina (2004) for instance point out that despite the extensive critique on the technical-rational model, it has had significant leverage in legislation, policy rhetoric, and evaluation techniques (also see §16.3.2). This model namely provides policy with rationality and legitimisation and it shelters science from political debate (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007), as it for instance allows for the provision of disinterested knowledge to power. Territorial cohesion pro/positions could likewise ensure a reciprocal productivity. However, even without such a model, these pro/positions reinforce each other when discursive interdependencies network them together in various ways (i.e. the above-mentioned and more). Before we can answer the question what tactical reciprocity this entails (e.g. which power practices need these knowledges and which knowledges need these power practices), we therefore have to show how the dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions can be placed in this reciprocal productivity of knowledge and power.

16.3.2 Territorial cohesion pro/positions in the reciprocal productivity of knowledge and power

To go beyond the general power-knowledge effects to their reciprocal productivity which is specific for territorial cohesion, we can start by cross-referring to other territorial cohesion studies. Hamez (in Campbell, 2005: 401) for instance puts forward that 'territorial cohesion is a concept derived from the policy sphere', and Tatzberger (2003) that it is the outcome of a political rather than a theoretical and/or scientific debate. However, thus only beginnings are dealt with (i.e. policy, politics), power-knowledge effects at most one-sidedly (i.e. power with effects; although they do not mention knowledge), but reciprocal productivity is not. Evidence for both the concept's power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power therefore becomes the more important.

Yet, such reciprocal productivity might merely be in creation, as there is no stratified territorial cohesion knowledge (yet) (see Chapter 10) – what makes power effects of knowledge for instance difficult to picture. Then again, for the concept much does point to power-knowledge effects such as those mentioned above, as territorial cohesion meanings, intensions, and extensions overlap with its positions in power practices. Territorial cohesion definitions could therefore indeed have defined interests. Moreover, a debate only about meaning that clarifies the concept is hard to find and always appears entwined with power issues. Even one of the two epistemic propositions which are not covered by positions could point to power-knowledge effects. The policy objective hyper-cube intension namely does not only filter the descriptive hyper-cube and components of territorial cohesion intensions for policy (see §10.2.4), but a hyper-cube that more gives a system for various directions than direction might also be too complex to be used in power practices. As the door stands wide open, territorial cohesion examples are therefore needed of power-knowledge effects ensured by discursive interdependencies. As the concept's overlaps between pro/positions differ per usage area, territorial cohesion knowledge could have effects in different power practices and vice versa. The positions that in this respect stand out in the European Funds usage area are those on combining policy making and research. Although many power-knowledge effects could result from such a combination, an important example comes forward which is related to the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area. Faludi (2003b: 135) namely states that 'the Commission is searching for indicators on which it can base territorial cohesion policy' (i.e. power with knowledge effects), and Husar (2006: 97) that the definition of territorial indicators 'could potentially reform the distribution of the financial resources going to areas in need as part of EU Cohesion Policy' (i.e. knowledge with power effects). Discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion propositions on indicators and positions in the

\[\text{Note that the policy objective hyper-cube intension lacks a meaning that directly validates it for territorial cohesion knowledge, but this validation can happen indirectly via the descriptive hyper-cube and components of territorial cohesion intensions. That is to say, even though all other territorial cohesion knowledges stay within the limits set by the territorial cohesion definitions of the same kind of meaning, when one does not, it does not necessarily mean that this is not territorial cohesion knowledge – for that it would need a lacking definition in all kinds of meaning.}\]
Regional/Cohesion policy and European Funds usage areas on the distribution of funds might thus ensure power-knowledge effects.

A less obvious example of power-knowledge effects relates to this. That is, in the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, 2004a) the relations between the various scales with territorial cohesion are not treated explicitly as such (e.g. which scale’s cohesion and/or growth to favour?). However, in the measurement of territories (with indicators) hierarchy does appear: politico-administrative actors seem only to measure their sub-territories (see §10.2.2); these actors are also presupposed identities, but this is more a general mental programme than one of territorial cohesion. For measurement by ESPON (also see §16.3.3) always a higher level, with its own preferences, then seems to be needed. Also discursive interdependencies between propositions on measurement (i.e. knowledge asked for and thus affected by power) and such positions on government levels (i.e. hierarchical knowledge has power effects) might thus ensure power-knowledge effects.

Another example comes forward due to the absence of certain territorial cohesion knowledge. In the usage areas positions are namely taken on specific territories. However, territorial cohesion knowledge always appears to treat all territories or the territorial in the general sense instead. That is, in the measurement of territories (with indicators) hierarchy does appear: politico-administrative actors seem only to measure their sub-territories (see §10.2.2); these actors are also presupposed identities, but this is more a general mental programme than one of territorial cohesion. For measurement by ESPON (also see §16.3.3) always a higher level, with its own preferences, then seems to be needed. Also discursive interdependencies between propositions on measurement (i.e. knowledge asked for and thus affected by power) and such positions on government levels (i.e. hierarchical knowledge has power effects) might thus ensure power-knowledge effects.

Yet, more come forward with certain discursive interdependencies, that is, those concerned with spatial planning – enough of them for an own section (see §16.3.3). Moreover, there might not be many specific territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects due to a general feature of the concept, that is, its openness.

Faludi (2003b: 135) for instance holds that ‘in the bands of the Commission territorial cohesion might become as abstract a concept as the celebrated, but spatially empty concept of a level playing field.’ While we are not interested in the European Commission or other particular institutions in the European Union, the concept indeed seems, to follow Husar (2006: 4), to be reinforced politically, but its contents, indicators, and targets to be left open. This could relate to power-knowledge effects too, as Husar (2006: 4) notes that ‘[t]his openness is an advantage considering the diverse interests and institutional settings which need to be combined to come to an agreement between Member States’. However, as Polverari&Bachtler (in Faludi, 2005a: 40) say: ‘The fact that territorial cohesion is ‘an undefined policy objective’ [is] likely to have evident implications for policy design and implementation with respect to the explicit targeting of territorial cohesion through future Structural Fund support’ (e.g. through indicators; see above). When it concerns the actual implementation of the concept the same openness might therefore be a disadvantage, according to Husar (2006: 4) because this ‘requires a common ground that can be communicated to all stakeholders.’ These power-knowledge effects due the concept’s openness thus lead to three deductions: i) the absence of certain territorial cohesion knowledge could be an effect of power, ii) knowledge of this openness could have power effects, and iii) these power-knowledge effects could change (e.g. for implementation). Territorial cohesion knowledge could then play an essential role in power practices by clarifying positions and/or proposing clarifications.

We thus lack territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects, as merely four relationships come forward: i) between indicators and positions on the distribution of funds, ii) measurement and positions on scales, iii) knowledge of all territories and positions for a Cohesion policy for all regions, and iv) between openness and political agreement. That discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions lead to a tactical reciprocity between knowledge and power would then mostly be speculation. Then again, if there is so much smoke (i.e. overlap between pro/positions) and some finds of fire (i.e. the few examples above), the question could be why no-one is looking.

Perhaps the answer lies in that it might not so much be that this tactical reciprocity is not known, but that it is considered as unproblematic. In 2004, Robert for instance posed that ‘[a]fter 10 years of lobbying and

Note that Husar (2006) is not speaking of a common ground of meaning (as distinguished in Part I), but a mere limited amount of territorial cohesion pro/positions (i.e. less open).

Husar (2006: 37) prevents us from following this last deduction too quickly though, as he notes that territorial cohesion can also be understood as a political label ‘that would have been replaced by other concepts [during] its implementation according to given institutional needs.’

The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

political debate, it is time to know what territorial cohesion really is and how it can be achieved. Such a more thorough debate will according to Husar (2006: 97) have to clarify how the concept directs policies ‘without imposing a rigid corset that fails to allow for adequate adaptation to specific territorial potentials and needs’; note that this might be the first time that an element of a mental programme shines through (i.e. clarifications about which positions can be taken). Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) even explicitly brings forward that the real problem for territorial cohesion is ‘not that the policymakers intervene in the discussion, but that they do not do so sufficiently and in a more inclusive, transparent and explicit manner’. No arguments for such a symbiotic relation appear though. Hence, the tactical productivity between territorial cohesion knowledge and power might not be researched because it is taken for granted (i.e. as beneficial).

16.3.3 A transposition of spatial planning’s tactical productivity into territorial cohesion with pivotal help from ESPON

In Part I came forward that a (part of) the system of spatial planning knowledge could be transposed into territorial cohesion. Although no reasons appear for why this is territorial cohesion’s system of knowledge instead of another, claims of for instance the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space do tie territorial cohesion knowledge together in a way familiar to spatial planning (see §10.2.6); the concept’s intensional fragments of territorial governmentality knowledge give room for a thinking spatial that resembles spatial planning too (see §10.2.7). Just as this system could fill-in the undefined structure of territorial cohesion’s common ground, the concept’s power practices might partly come from European spatial planning, as the (post-)ESDP process is one of its four usage areas (see Chapter 11). Therefore not only the system of spatial planning knowledge might be transposed into the concept, but also the involved discursive interdependencies into the territorial cohesion discourse. Before it is shown that the resulting tactical productivity would then revolve around ESPON, below some of the involved power-knowledge effects in spatial planning are treated first.

If a shared discourse is as important for spatial planning as Faludi (2004d: 156) says it is, power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power might be easy to detect. The more so when a traditional symbiotic relation between knowledge and interests returns in European spatial planning. Its research would, according to Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007), namely largely be grounded in the technical-rational model Owens&Rayner&Bina (2004) point out, thereby helped by the technocratic nature of European Union policies (e.g. when it concerns easy to measure indicators). As in this model objective assessments directly lead to better decisions (also see §16.3.1), it clearly suggests power effects of knowledge. Befittingly, ESPON was to become a “survey before plan” observatory (Van Gestel&Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 89) and many of the experts involved act as expert advisors in their Member States (Husar, 2006: 91). That is to say, although no specific spatial planning examples of knowledge with power effects come forward here, the research tradition and institutions seem to be set up for such usage of it.

With a technical-rational model, the same would hold vice versa. As Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 396) states plainly: ‘strategic spatial planning also needs detailed knowledge about the development of territories and spatial relationships’. The creation of ESPON played a central role in the production of this knowledge on the European level. Interreg, through which it was financed, thereby drew thousands of (university) experts ‘within the orbit of the ESDP’, creating a European spatial planning community (Zetter, 2002; Faludi, 2003b: 126, 135) with few planners standing outside it (Officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006). Again, although this is not a spatial planning example of a knowledge effect of power, the research institutions are set for the production of knowledge that the exercise of power needs on the level of the European Union.

Besides that power brings forward the production of certain knowledge, it might have more particular effects in spatial planning too. With Territorial Impact Assessment, knowledge tools would for instance be pushed by the requirements to build big new infrastructure rather than the need for effective spatial planning (Williams&Connoly&Healey, 2000; Schindegger, 2001; Jensen&Richardson, 2003). For the European level Husar
(2006: 42n73) then mentions the influence of the Member States and the European Commission in the selection of indicators. Such particulars are important, because ESPON (2004: 113) tries to create scientific coherence through its programme, and thus to select which knowledges are part of this. Yet, the ESPON documents themselves state that they do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ESPON Monitoring Committee; this on top of the short time for reaching conclusions which could endanger scientific quality (Husar, 2006: 42n73). What leaves us wondering whether the ESPON’s knowledge or coherence is scientific or accords with which opinions (which are always specific).

This difference between science and opinion is fundamental. When the coherence is a scientific one, it namely leads to knowledge (i.e. descriptive, e.g. useful for policy). When the coherence is based on opinions instead, it shows politique spirituelle in the form of a policy frame that orders the interpretation of behaviour. That is to say, this coherence then is part of a mental programme that prescribes which territorial cohesion positions can be taken up (e.g. a balance between or contraposition of economic and social cohesion). In that case we do not directly speak of power-knowledge effects (i.e. our focus), but a policy frame that can affect both knowledge and other power practices.

Jensen&Richardson (2003) then direct our attention to knowledge effects of power in European spatial planning more in general. They namely want to carefully scrutinise the development of the system of spatial analysis within the ESDP framework. Hereby policy ideas (e.g. spatial integration, peripherality) would ‘become embedded in new frameworks for compartmentalising our understanding of the world’ (Jensen&Richardson, 2003), as they become criteria in analyses. One could ask which indicators will be used in this for instance; note that if these policy ideas would affect power practices instead of knowledge they would be part of a mental programme. However, while Jensen&Richardson (2003) see the development of such a system as a crucial step between rhetoric and institutionalisation, they also note it is difficult to track.

The lack of spatial planning examples attests for this – save for those studies on Territorial Impact Assessment and pointers to knowledge effects of power on the European level in the case of indicators. Because the research tradition and institutions seem to be set up for tactical productivity (i.e. a technical-rational kind), it might therefore in the case of European spatial planning be taken as much for granted as with territorial cohesion. This would suggest the transposition of spatial planning’s discursive interdependencies into the territorial cohesion discourse too, or at least that it would be a good fit.

Yet, some reflect on these power-knowledge effects in European spatial planning. Bengs (2004: 2) wants to follow the dualism of science and politics associated with the technical-rational approach (e.g. there should be no power-knowledge effects), Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) believes that in ESPON the assumptions of this approach will be unravelled (e.g. no false assumption of disinterested knowledge), and Van Gestel&Faludi (in Faludi, 2005a: 89) even pose that ESPON became a dynamic research network instead of a "survey before plan" institution that fits this approach. However, an unravelling of the technical-rational model and plea that science and politics should be separate do not matter much. Power and knowledge in European spatial planning can namely still have their interplay, also in a dynamic network fashion.

As Van Gestel&Faludi (in Faludi, 2005a: 82) for instance tell us: indicators from ESPON might always have a political element instead of being truly objective. Moreover, the tendencies in European spatial policy research could remain the same. That is to say, it could generally speaking remain overly-reliant on quantitative data (e.g. indicators) (Zonnveld&Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a) and focus on describing European policy-making and spatial development trends (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007) instead of understanding the emerging new spatial focus in the European Union (Böhme&Richardson&Dabinett&Jensen, 2004: 1178). Also without a technical-rational approach, the tactical productivity of European spatial planning then delivers knowledge affected by and for the exercise of power.

The involved discursive interdependencies of spatial planning can then (partially) be transposed into the territorial cohesion discourse, especially with the former’s research tradition (i.e. mostly technical-rational) and institutions (i.e. ESPON). Note though, that notwithstanding that European spatial planning might exist tangibly now (Janin Rivolin, 2005a: 22-23), such influences would be informal, as both lack an institutional
definition. That is to say, when Janin Rivolin (2005a: 23) is right in that such a definition of European spatial planning ‘would also contribute to making territorial cohesion a truly accountable and effective policy’, the influences remain between both with an unaccountable and ineffective territorial cohesion policy. Mental programmes could then support the transposition, such as territorial cohesion policies that use the language of European spatial planning (e.g. ESDP concepts). Then again, not so much mental programmes but expertise seems to play a pivotal role here, this in the form of ESPON.

As ESPON (2004: 7) notes itself: “Observation of the European territory and its evolution is an important prerequisite to formulating territorial cohesion policies and for the application of the [ESDP] in Community, national and regional policies.” Following Husar (2006: 42), the latter appears to have been followed up, as ‘ESPON findings contribute to a large extent to the elaboration of the document “Territorial State and Perspectives of the EU” (i.e. a part of the post-ESDP process).’ The question then is which power-knowledge effects come forward from this spatial planning observation of the territory for territorial cohesion. However, these effects might not so much come with observation, but with the aforementioned creation of ESPON’s scientific coherence; note that we for now follow the path that this coherence is scientific, else the expertise only lies in politique spirituelle (e.g. policy frames).

ESPON (2004) explicitly mentions power-knowledge effects in this creation of scientific coherence. Besides power effects of knowledge because this coherence is deemed especially important for the elaboration of policy recommendations, the committed support for a common terminology and methodology fixes knowledge effects of power (ESPON, 2004: 97). Spatial development goals, political goals that is, are namely interpreted and operationalised for a data-based statistical and empirical judgement of the coincidences and discrepancies of development trends compared with development goals’ (ESPON, 2004: 97). This of course merely showcases the (technical-rational) tendencies in European spatial policy research (e.g. indicators for criteria). Yet, an area of innovation is ‘the topics and issues analysed’, territorial cohesion amongst others (ESPON, 2004: 98). This opens up a transposition of spatial planning’s discursive interdependencies and associated power-knowledge effects in territorial cohesion.

It should then come as no surprise when Husar (2006: 46) says that with ‘guidance from constant strategic exchanges between the CEC and the Member States in the ESPON Monitoring committee and the analytical tools developed so far, ESPON stays close to the development of the territorial cohesion discourse.’ Moreover, according to an officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006), the “ESPON research community’s” interpretation of territorial cohesion slowly sides to the one of ESPON’s Monitoring Committee. The territorial cohesion discourse might thus be formed, at least partially, according to the knowledge effects of power ESPON fixes.

Some more specific and related examples then hint at tactical productivity, including power effects of knowledge that is. ESPON for instance holds that a more dynamic perception of territorial cohesion ‘is far from being accepted right now, what could explain that its implications have not yet been explored in the ESPON research’ (BBR, 2005c: 121-122). Whatever this dynamic perception entails, it seems to exemplify that only what is accepted in power practices will be researched.

As mentioned above, openness of the concept and political agreement on territorial cohesion relate (i.e. not everything, but much is accepted). ESPON itself then spells out the power-knowledge effects involved in ESPON: ‘given the sensitiveness of the issue [of territorial cohesion], it seems more sensible in the ESPON context to focus on what is (seen) inside the concept (bottom-up) rather than to try to delineate it abstractly in a normative way (top-down) which would hardly fit with the current standpoints’ (BBR, 2005c: 119). These current standpoints in power practices thus affect the focus of ESPON, which in its turn has power effects. Namely, although ESPON’s approach ‘should be sufficiently broad in order to encompass the different visions (there is no a priori reason to eliminate some and keep others); it also gives ‘as much coherence as possible to the whole’ (BBR, 2005c: 119).’ That is to say, although the knowledge coming from ESPON then would not

---

Note that ESPON’s approach ‘should be sufficiently broad in order to encompass the different visions (there is no a priori reason to eliminate some and keep others); it also gives ‘as much coherence as possible to the whole’ (BBR, 2005c: 119).’ That is to say, although the knowledge coming from ESPON then would not
choose between the standpoints it takes up from power practices,\(^a\) it does clarify them in a descriptive order which is useful for these practices. Hence, the tactical productivity coming forward through ESPON is that the variety of standpoints in power practices limits the territorial cohesion knowledge to be produced, and when it is produced this knowledge is serviceable in power practices because it orders this variety.

Power-knowledge effects that such a tactical productivity entail for instance appear in ESPON project 3.2 which intended to develop a European Territorial Cohesion Index. As Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) says: ‘This multi-faceted nature of the concept and the problems of developing an index which can effectively capture complexity have confronted ESPON with not just a technical challenge but also a highly political one’ (e.g. which criteria, weighting, thresholds). Hereby power effects of knowledge come forward in two ways: i) the index allows for European spatial planning knowledge, or at least ESPON, to enter debates in the European Union (see §14.2.3) and ii) insofar the index is used its content matters.

Consequential for the latter is that ESPON project 3.2 made some changes due to the substantial obstacles it faced; thereby staying well within the tendencies of spatial policy research (i.e. quantitative data and a focus on describing spatial development trends). It namely decided to postpone the research on statistical and cartographic tools and to focus more on the availability of data which could be used for the development of a composite index taking into account the three dimensions of the ESDP and the definition of territorial cohesion (ESPON 3.2, 2005: 32; Husar, 2006: 50). That this research starts with policy ideas shows the knowledge effects of power. And do note the mention of ‘the definition of territorial cohesion’ besides the arbitrariness of a definition (see §9.3.1) and ESPON’s notice of this (see above), the dominance of economic indicators (e.g. over social ones; see §10.2.2) has a role to play here as well. According to Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007), ‘the institutional setting and the economic policy discourse within the European spatial development research perpetuate [the] policy emphasis on the economic dimension of territorial cohesion’. Because we might add that the same holds vice versa, also with ESPON’s European Territorial Cohesion Index a tactical productivity is thus shown by reciprocal power-knowledge effects.

When the discursive interdependencies are concerned with spatial planning, more territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects thus come forward. This suggests a (partial) transposition of spatial planning’s tactical productivity into the territorial cohesion discourse. The technical-rational research tradition and research institutions of European spatial planning thereby seem to be set up for the usage of knowledge in power practices (e.g. descriptions for policy) and for the production of that knowledge which the exercise of power needs (e.g. quantitative indicators). Insofar Territorial Impact Assessment is pushed for big infrastructure and politics influences the selection of indicators, they illustrate the knowledge effects of power this entails. The discursive interdependencies involved then form a taken for granted tactical productivity which also works in a dynamic network instead of the “survey before plan” observatory ESPON was meant to be.

The associated experts, which are often advisors too, might hereby form a planning community with few outsiders; and if ESPON’s coherence merely accords to opinions instead of science, the involved expertise lays in mental programmes (see Part IV). Expertise then plays a pivotal role in the transposition of tactical productivity mentioned above, the more so because the concept belongs to the new topics and issues ESPON analyses and the creation of scientific coherence would be important for policy recommendations too. Examples of this are that: i) ESPON does not research a dynamic perception of the concept when it is not accepted, iia) the current variety of standpoints limits ESPON’s focus, and iib) ESPON’s order of those standpoints could be serviceable in power practices. ESPON’s European Territorial Cohesion Index for instance brings European spatial planning into debates of the European Union and its content reinforces power practices as it starts with policy ideas and economic indicators dominate. However, no coherence of knowledge appears – as could be expected after Part I showed the lack of a system of territorial cohesion knowledge. Instead, spatial planning’s reciprocal effects between power and knowledge might structure the territorial cohesion discourse, at least partly. What begs the question of how to characterise the resulting tactical productivity.

\(^a\) Taking up certain standpoints (and not others) can have power effects too of course (e.g. see §16.3.2: knowledge on all territories or the territorial in general do not reinforce territorial cohesion positions on specific territories but those on a Cohesion policy for all regions).
16.3.4 Characterising territorial cohesion's tactical productivity

The dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between the overlapping territorial cohesion pro/positions seems to point to reciprocal power-knowledge effects. This tactical productivity can then be characterised in an oversimplified fashion by following Weis (1977), especially when it concerns ESPON. Whether technical-rational or not, it namely appears to emphasise 'research for policy's sake,' with the danger that this 'leads to a selective construction of knowledge, leaving behind areas perceived as not having immediate policy relevance' (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). Knowledge effects of power clearly come forward in – if not 'research for policy's sake,' then – policy-centred research.

Policy-centred research even clearer implies power effects of the produced knowledge of course (i.e. if used), also by reinforcing the status quo. The latter might work through education, especially insofar territorial cohesion follows its roots of aménagement du territoire (i.e. the French spatial planning tradition; see §12.1.3 for how stories on this structure the concept's usage). French education namely endorses 'the harmony of the French territoire, with its "natural borders" shaping a regular hexagon, mixing diversity into a unity guaranteed by the nation state' (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). You can expect that if knowledge (e.g. education) and power (e.g. the nation state) limited each other so strongly, this could make the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse much easier.

However, the point is that territorial cohesion's tactical productivity builds forth upon links between semantic and epistemic arbitrariness and inconsistency on the one hand and a contested topical order that bares the systematic uncertainty of the concept's usage on the other. When Husar (2006: 103) desires that 'the interplay of power and knowledge in influencing outcomes be acknowledged and serve the outcome', our question thus becomes: what outcome?

Vogelij (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006) then sees the in-filling of territorial cohesion as important task for the field of spatial development and planning. This would underline a (partial) transposition of spatial planning's tactical productivity into territorial cohesion. For Vogelij (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006), territorial cohesion can namely reinforce urban and regional territorial capital, and spatial planners could play an essential strategic role by identifying and reinterpreting it for future developments. Moreover, he does not only bring forward such power effects of knowledge, but also vice versa, by letting (this time) Dutch education follow policy. That is to say, Dutch planning education should also prepare for the importance of the policy objective of territorial cohesion due to its consequences on planning practices (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006). In the case of territorial cohesion even the acknowledgment of the in spatial planning taken for granted tactical productivity might thus reproduce policy-centred research.

A transposition of spatial planning’s tactical productivity would not form the whole territorial cohesion discourse though, because a significant part of both the territorial cohesion propositions (e.g. applied social justice intensions) and the concept's positions (e.g. most in the Region/Cohesion policy usage area) lies elsewhere. When economic pro/positions dominate territorial cohesion, for example, one could ask in how far spatial planning is actually transposed, whether it changed thereby, and which pro/positions are simply economics instead of spatial planning.

Jensen&Richardson (2003) for instance hold for European spatial planning that economic evaluation elevated to hegemonic status. 'Economic criteria will be used to justify EU intervention in projects, while environmental knowledge will support decisions rather than carry any binding power' (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). Then again, also such critique on this dominance belongs to the territorial cohesion discourse, as shown by for instance Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) and André&Moreira (2002) when it concerns indicators (see §10.2.2). Moreover, as Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) rather sees critical research conducted that brings the European Social Model forward and general stories on this model frame the concept's power practices in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area (see Part II), also pro/positions running against the dominance of economics are part of the territorial cohesion discourse. The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse should therefore include both its various parts (e.g. spatial planning, economics) and debates around its dominances (e.g. economics).
Chapter 16

Note though that there is no critique on policy-centred research in itself, but only on its particular infilling (i.e. too economic, not enough social). Yet, even if territorial cohesion knowledge, power, and thus its discourse would be limited by this tactical productivity, the question is by what more it is too (see Chapter 17).

16.4 Conclusions on the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions

16.4.1 Evidencing the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions
This chapter evidences that the crux of the intellectual and political arbitrarinesses of the territorial cohesion pro/positions lies in the ways discursive interdependencies relate them. On the one side territorial cohesion knowledge thereby depends on the concept's common ground of arbitrary meanings which are inconsistently structured by seven kinds, and together the seven kinds of epistemic forms and objects then construct the territorial cohesion gaze. On the other side the territorial cohesion positions in the four usage areas appear to be contested in everything, due to which the concept stands for systematic uncertainty. That European politics would affect much of the territorial cohesion discussion and research on it might have policy implications then points to relations between these sides.

However, a chaotic picture of discursive practices appears when you see either the relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions through perspectives of actors in the European Union or the various institutional origins of a vague common content. Abstracter orderings with main political purposes of territorial cohesion (e.g. steer the regional policy after 2006) or its storylines (e.g. Green and Clean Europe) underline this due to their marked differences. Hence, the suggestion to conclude that the concept is too dynamic to descriptively order thus and/or that the discursive interdependencies which mark its discursive practices are multi-ordered.

Yet, when one crosses the concept's different kinds of meaning/knowledge and usage areas, this schematisation does remarkably show that almost all pro/positions correspond; relatively seen the smaller amount of epistemic propositions even more correspond with positions in power practices than the larger amount of semantic propositions do. Although some exceptions on this large overlap exist – such as the descriptive meaning of territorial identity that does not return in the concept's usages and positions on specific territories vice versa –, at least many possibilities for linkages therefore appear. The questions then are how possibilities of articulation emerge out of such a dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion knowledge under construction and the concept's transforming usage and what this means for territorial cohesion expertise.

16.4.2 From territorial cohesion's tactical reciprocity towards the demarcation of its discourse
In the case of territorial cohesion, pro/positions might not reinforce each other merely by overlapping, as the discursive interdependencies between them also seem to ensure reciprocal power-knowledge effects. Knowledge can thereby inform the activity of government due to the concept's uncertain practices, for which it can clarify positions (e.g. define interests) and/or propose clarifications (e.g. order positions to take). Besides that government can then select the knowledge to use, it can also affect knowledge by being mentally crystallised as a programme (e.g. potestas) or by invoking certain epistemic formations. For territorial cohesion such power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power come forward in relations between: i) indicators and positions on the distribution of funds, ii) measurement and positions on government levels, iii) knowledge of all territories and positions for a Cohesion policy for all regions, and iv) between openness and political agreement. These power-knowledge effects then form a tactical productivity.

Territorial cohesion's tactical productivity can be characterised as policy-centred (e.g. research for policy's sake), whereby knowledge reinforces the status quo (e.g. through education). Another feature is that economics dominates the associated critique and pro/positions running counter to it (e.g. more social). Moreover, spatial
planning's tactical productivity might (partially) be transposed into territorial cohesion as well, for which expertise and ESPON in particular seems to play a pivotal role. In general this could entail a research tradition and institutions set up for the symbiotic relation between knowledge and power of either the technical-rational approach or a more dynamic network interplay, as shown by descriptions of European policy-making and spatial development trends that are useful for policy and how quantitative indicators cater to policy needs.

Four more specific examples of this transposition appear as well. For instance, ESPON will not research a dynamic perception of territorial cohesion when it is not accepted. That ESPON’s research on a European Territorial Cohesion Index starts with policy ideas then reminds us that those of the ESDP would be embedded in spatial analysis. Besides such knowledge effects of power, power effects of knowledge appear here too. That is to say, while European politics would influence the selection of indicators in the case of spatial planning, the same index could allow spatial planning to enter debates in the European Union and perpetuate the dominance of the economic dimension of territorial cohesion with its indicators. It is thus not surprising that ESPON deems its creation of scientific coherence as important for policy recommendations. This is shown by ESPON’s descriptive clarification of territorial cohesion standpoints in an order, which is both useful for power practices and limits ESPON’s epistemic focus. All of this suggests that territorial cohesion expertise does not only mediate between actions and objects of *politique*, but that its knowledge would depend on power practices too.

This tactical productivity of territorial cohesion might not be considered as problematic though, because it is overlooked, taken for granted, or seen as beneficial – just as in spatial planning. Nevertheless, our problem with this tactical productivity of territorial cohesion knowledge and the concept's power practices is that it limits which articulations are considered to be reasonable in the case of territorial cohesion. The question then becomes how it does so, that is, what demarcates the territorial cohesion discourse (see Chapter 17).
Chapter 17  The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

Introduction

This chapter will set up the rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse and thereby indicate the necessary and forbidden articulations of concept's expertise. Yet, it appears to be characterised by having to do with multiple discourses. Before an overview of them is presented (§17.1.2 until 17.1.7), territorial cohesion is therefore considered as Discursive Nodal Point, as through this perspective three ways come forward in which it can include these discourses (§17.1.1). We are namely concerned with how also such inclusions establish the lines that structure and demarcate territorial cohesion expertise (§17.2.1). This is caught in the hypothetical rules that individualise the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices, that is, the discourse (§17.2.2), and their conditions (§17.2.3) and the relations to its context (§17.2.4). The conclusion then suggests how this discourse can be understood as a territorial governmentality in creation (§17.3).

17.1 Territorial cohesion as Discursive Nodal Point of many discourses

17.1.1 The ways in which territorial cohesion functions as a Discursive Nodal Point

The discourse analysis carried out thus far shows that territorial cohesion can be considered as a Discursive Nodal Point, because the concept accords to most if not all of their four features (see §7.2.2). It surely is essentially contested (i), as its creative phase, semantic and epistemic arbitrariness (see Part I), and systematic uncertainty (see Part II) attest. It could also be a central political concept around which knowledge and power are re-inscribed into the scientific and political debates (ii). Territorial cohesion's tactical productivity would ensure this re-inscription (see Chapter 16).

However, the concept's centrality is questionable, as it is used in rather marginal areas of European Union action (e.g. European spatial planning, a small if any role in European funds). When ESPON for instance conducted interviews in the European Union's administration, territorial cohesion, as most of the crosscutting concepts with a specific spatial dimension, was 'not considered very important by many interviewees' (Nordregio, 2006a: 78). The concept might for example less be about growth, cohesion, or balance between both, but more about a way in which such issues can be dealt with (e.g. analysed, structured, deliberated). Although territorial cohesion knowledge and power might then be re-inscribed without much ado, it can still be treated as a central concept, for the involved marginal areas of action that is (iii). Moreover, when the concept is indeed crosscutting and about a way to deal with various issues, this points to another feature of discursive nodal points: in it discourses (e.g. on more general concepts) tie together (iv). The question then becomes how discourses tie together in the case of territorial cohesion.

They could do so in three particular ways (see §7.1.2). As territorial cohesion knowledge did not stratify (yet) and the concept's power practices are uncertain, its discourse did not develop into a definite stage, which might therefore emerge through the combination of existing ones. Another way in which discourses could tie together in the concept comes forward in Waterhout's (2003; in Faludi, 2007) storylines that indicate the potential elements of future territorial cohesion policy (e.g. Europe in Balance, SG(E)I, Policy Coherence). For his two orders of discursive interdependencies (see §16.2.2) he namely follows Hajer (2000: 140; Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007) in that storylines bridge different policy discourses (e.g. 'SG(E)I' and 'Territorial Governance'), which would then tie together in territorial cohesion. When territorial cohesion is a crosscutting concept, this of course also brings forward a way in which territorial cohesion combines discourses. The possible (partial) transposition of spatial planning's tactical productivity into territorial cohesion for instance reminds us of the multidisciplinarity of the former. Planning would namely have no endogenous body of theory (Sorensen, 1982), but 'draws upon a wide range of theories and practices from different disciplines' (Allmendinger, 2002: 78). We
can therefore treat territorial cohesion as a Discursive Nodal Point which is essentially contested in several ways, re-inscribes knowledge and power into marginal debates, and in which multiple discourses tie together in a new combination, as policy discourses, and/or in the concept’s particular form.

Most steps in the analysis of territorial cohesion through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective (see §7.2.3) are already taken, except for the role discourses play in this. Although territorial cohesion conceptualisations are reconstructed (see Part I), they are not represented as coming from various discourses. In a similar way the concept’s metanarratives are reconstructed (see Part II), but not as on what these various discourses draw. Besides that these two roles of discourses should be explored, the final step of reconstructing the rules according to which discursive practices tie territorial cohesion conceptualisations and metanarratives together should be taken too of course. Which brings us to the question how then to bring discourses to the fore.

Below this is first done by cross-referring to discourses which might be combined in territorial cohesion. Discursive articulations could namely stabilise a field of them through the pinning down of both territorial cohesion meanings in metanarratives and their mutual relations (see §7.2.2). The large overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions (see §16.2.3) give many possibilities for this. When the concept functions as Discursive Nodal Point, it could for example pin down both social cohesion as policy objective meaning and competitiveness as instrumental meaning of the concept (see §9.3.4 and 9.3.5) in the ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area (see §12.2.2). The two roles of discourses then come forward: when ‘social cohesion’ and ‘competitiveness’ come from different discourses (see §17.1.4), these thus provide different territorial cohesion conceptualisations while being supported by the same territorial cohesion metanarrative; note that not only the metanarrative does so, as also shown by the narratives with an own dynamic. The conceptualisation of territorial cohesion as social cohesion for instance does not emerge out of nothing, and when territorial cohesion is used thus it does not only strengthen the concept but also the discourse social cohesion comes from, because a discourse that is not used in practices would disappear. However, as the large amount of overlapping territorial cohesion pro/positions testifies, the concept might pin down so many meanings in power practices, and therefore try to stabilise so many discourses, that it could perhaps better by called a discursive nodal surface than a discursive nodal point.

If so, the three ways in which discourses tie together in the concept become more particular (see §7.2.3). When discourses tie together in a new combination, territorial cohesion can thereby be seen as formation surface, when they do so as policy discourses, then as an aggregation surface, and when in its particular form, as thoroughfare surface. For the formation surface, a partial transposition of spatial planning’s discourse – and not only its tactical productivity – in territorial cohesion would for example indicate that also more discourses can transform into one territorial cohesion discourse. For the aggregation surface, the concept’s multi-ordered discursive interdependencies indicate a tightly knit web for, for instance, cohesion and spatial policy discourses, this as their battle arena or convergence towards territorial cohesion policy. As thoroughfare surface territorial cohesion might go through an unfixed number of discourses just as spatial planning would do according to Graham&Healey (1999). That is, because ‘the discourse community which clusters around planning practice has such a confused and limited conceptual vocabulary with which to describe what they are adjusting to, planners readily slip back into earlier conceptions, or slide away into the specifications thrust on them by the dominant circuits of power’ (Graham&Healey, 1999: 641). An example they give of such specifications is important here: these would largely be aspatial conceptions of which relationships to consider. Spatial planning then has to relate, if not spatialise, varying aspatial conceptions to make them its own. Hence, territorial cohesion as formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare surface perhaps more resembles a concourse than a discourse. Either way, the question remains which discourses territorial cohesion thereby includes (see §17.1.2 until 17.1.6) and how so (see §17.1.7).
17.1.2 Through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective towards an overview of discourses that form territorial cohesion

When you see territorial cohesion through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective, many discourses can be referred to that the concept appears to include in combination. An extensive list of those that appear in the intertextual territorial cohesion text and its context and/or this research's departure-point of spatial planning is presented below while noting their two roles regarding the concept (i.e. providing territorial cohesion conceptualisations shown in Part I and drawing on metanarratives shown in Part II). Even though this list might not be all-embracing, the overview it gives already exposes the main problematic.

The concept is of course part of Community discourse, as Faludi & Waterhout (2002) note. All territorial cohesion metanarratives are concerned with the European Union, and some conceptualisations even explicitly name it (e.g. territorial effects of Community policies). Radaelli (2000: 13) then thinks ‘it is useful to distinguish the specific discourse on public policy, the specific discourse on public policy and the specific discourse on public policy’ (many) Policy discourse namely ‘provides a rationale and justifies change at the policy level’ (Radaelli, 2000: 13, 24). Yet, these three discourses do not (directly) provide territorial cohesion conceptualisation. For territorial cohesion their distinction does underline the specificity of its policy-centred tactical productivity though, especially the research done for policy’s sake and the way the metanarratives of the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion Policy usages areas differ from those of the IGCs and European Funds usage areas (i.e. directly policy-related or not respectively).

Different discourses entail different policy priorities though. As shown for the fundamental discourse of economic chance and social cohesion (§17.1.3), specified in competitiveness, Social European Model, Europe of the Regions, and Europe of flows discourses (§17.1.4), which the discourse of monotopia iterates (§17.1.5). All these discourses return in the spatial policy discourse, while even more, such as the discourse of justice, seem to return in the spatial policy discourse. While more, such as the discourse of justice, seem to do so in territorial cohesion (§17.1.6). Because of this the conclusions on territorial cohesion seen through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective direct us to the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse (§17.1.7).

17.1.3 The fundamental neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses

Fairclough (2003: 128) makes a fundamental distinction between two discourses: ‘the neo-liberal discourse of economic change which represents globalization as a fact which demands adjustments and reforms to enhance “efficiency and adaptability” in order to compete; and [a] political discourse which represents societies in terms of the goal of “social cohesion” and threats to “social cohesion”.’ While the latter represents the feelings of people (e.g. sense of belonging to a community), social cohesion is also ‘constructed in economic terms as “source” or “human quality”’ (Fairclough, 2003: 128). This would reduce “people to forces of production which rank along with others, such as information technology”, what shows a legitimisation of “the discourse of social cohesion in terms of the neo-liberal discourse” (Fairclough, 2003: 128). Yet, despite their contrasts, Fairclough (2003: 133) notes that both discourses abstract from “events in mainly policy-formation contexts.” The neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, this relation between them, and what they have in common return in territorial cohesion.

The concept's policy coherence meaning of coordination of policies for efficiency might for instance come from this neo-liberal discourse, which then also draws upon the ‘coordination’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area, its territorial governance stories to be more specific. The above-noted ‘social cohesion’ (see §17.1.1) could simply come from the so named discourse, just as it is this discourse which also draws on the ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative noted above. You could see the concept's territorial capital intension as coming from the neo-liberal discourse's legitimisation of the social cohesion discourse, but in an altered form: not so much reducing people but territories as forces of production (which include people too). This legitimisation then also draws on the ‘territories and accessibility’ metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area, in particular its territorial capital stories. The abstraction from events in policy-formation
contexts of both discourses also clearly returns in the concept with the lack of territorial cohesion facts and that most positions are about policy while none correspond to propositions which do not do so (e.g. those on territorial identity). Moreover, that territorial cohesion propositions nonetheless point towards concreteness (see §9.2.2) even seems to exemplify what Fairclough (2003: 132) says about these discourses: although they are ultimately referencing to concrete events, they exclude the people, objects, and places involved. Other discourses which could combine in territorial cohesion show this fundamental distinction of neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, their relation, and policy-centred abstraction more specifically though.

17.1.4 The neo-liberal and social cohesion discourse specified

Discourses in the vein of the neoliberal discourse which territorial cohesion includes might be a rationale of economic competitiveness which ‘remains a central driver in the EU discourse’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003), the Lisbon Strategy as the dominant discourse in European Union politics (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007), and a hegemonic economic discourse (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). The policy objective of competitiveness as territorial cohesion meaning might for instance derive from the first, the concept’s instrumental meaning of fitting in, amongst others, the Lisbon Strategy from the second, and the dominance of economic indicators to measure territorial cohesion from the third. These discourses could then also be supported by the (post-)ESDP’s usage area’s ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative, especially by the many economic stories on competitiveness, and how stories on the Lisbon Strategy structure all the metanarratives of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area. However, that the hegemonic economic discourse could also draw upon the ‘territorial specificities’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area points to more specific discourses that combine in territorial cohesion, because in its discussions on indicators the “old” economic indicator of GDP is mostly confronted. That is to say, the discourses that territorial cohesion includes are not only in the vein of the neo-liberal discourse, but also in the vein of the social cohesion discourse.

The initial concerns of territorial cohesion have namely been with, following Faludi (2003a), ‘equity, with maintaining services and life styles under the onslaught of privatisation and de-regulation’. This fits according to Waterhout (2003) into a discourse of the ‘Social European Model’. SG(E)I for instance feature prominently as a descriptive, normative, and policy objective meaning of territorial cohesion and as a metanarrative, as in the IGCs usage area, or as a part of a metanarrative, as in the other usage areas. Then again, voices are raised that the cohesion policy pursued in the European Union detached from its redistributive origins and became incorporated by a discourse of competitiveness and growth (Rumford, 2000; Ó Cuiv, in DCRGA, 2004: 36). Such incorporation specifies the legitimisation Fairclough (2003: 128) mentioned: of the discourse of social cohesion in terms of the neo-liberal one. The descriptive territorial cohesion meaning of balanced competitiveness might then come from this combination of discourses, while this combination could also draw on the (post-)ESDP usage area’s ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative, especially when it promotes balance for competitiveness. The combination of the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses and their relation in territorial cohesion can therefore be specified in, respectively, competitiveness and Social European Model discourses, for instance, and then an incorporation of the latter discourse by the former.

Interestingly enough, Rumford (2002) says that due to this incorporation cohesion policy is less about a redistributive agenda than the ‘creation of a harmonized European economic space’. His mention of ‘space’ directs us to other discourses that can combine in territorial cohesion: those on (partially) spatial entities and relations. A basic example of the former comes from Le Galès (2002). He says that the development of cohesion policy, the Structural Funds, and the related principles ‘contributed to establishing a discourse on the making of the Europe of the Regions, and a little later, on the Europe of Cities’ (Le Galès, 2002: 100). The former discourse might have provided territorial cohesion with its territorial governmentality meaning of integration of regions and draw on the ‘territories and accessibility’ metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area where many specific territories come to the fore; while no territorial cohesion conceptualisations appear from the discourse on the making of the Europe of the Cities, the same metanarrative does include urban areas. The points here are that discourses on spatial entities can also combine in territorial cohesion and both with the
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

neo-liberal and/or social cohesion discourses (e.g. competition or balance between regions, balanced regions for a competitive European Union).

Hajer (2000) then seems to give us an example of a discourse on spatial relations that relates the neo-liberal economic and political discourse of social cohesion in a specific way. The economic and political discourse of European integration would namely create specific demands on mobility, such as an increasing demand for personal mobility and the development of new technologies that enable a more footloose approach to economic development (e.g. Just in Time logistics), which necessitate a discourse of an Europe of flows (Hajer, 2000).

He mentions many features to characterise it as a policy discourse: more general ones, such as market integration, global competition, and the European Union as both an ‘enabling state’ and ‘welfare state’; a vocabulary of ‘modernist commitments’ (i.e. a belief in integration, distribution, management and control), ‘ecological modernization’ in particular; and infrastructure as the primary policy instrument, this with an enhancement of mobility and connectivity, the identification of ‘missing links’ of infrastructure, and an anticipation of more international transport demands (Hajer, 2000). The general features appear to iterate the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses and how these return in territorial cohesion more or less specifically as shown above (e.g. globalization and competitiveness, the redistribution of the welfare state and services). Also the other features of the Europe of flows discourse appear to combine in territorial cohesion in one way or another.

The vocabulary of modernist commitments thereby seems to reiterate two other discourses as well: the one of governance and ecological modernisation. The specialist discourse of governance would then involve governing being represented as ‘managing’ (Fairclough, 2003: 199); probably related to the managerial discourse in which you have goals and plans instead of intentions and judgment and means instead of ends (Clarke & Newman, 1997: 16; Stenson & Watt, 1999: 194). The conceptualisation of territorial cohesion in its territorial governmentality meaning of combining spatial thinking and governance might then (partly) come from this discourse, while the discourse could then also draw on the ‘coordination’ metanarrative of the IGCs usage area due to its calls for an institutional framework for good territorial governance. Other examples of how the vocabulary of modernist commitments of the Europe of flows discourse appears to return in territorial cohesion are easy to find (e.g. positions for territorial policy integration, the dominance of distributive knowledge in descriptions).

The discourse of ecological modernisation can then be considered as being about a particular form of this "modernism". According to Hajer (1996: 249), it namely holds that ‘the ecological crisis can be overcome by technical and procedural innovation’, such as the calculation and management of risks. Gouldson & Murphy (1996) argue that the European Union progressed towards this modernisation by adopting the belief that the environment and the economy can achieve synergy for further economic growth, by integrating environmental policy into other sectors, by exploring innovative policy measures, and by promoting new clean technologies. This might have provided the components of territorial cohesion, a descriptive intension of the concept, with its territorial efficiency component (i.e. the combination of the systems of the economy and the natural and built environment). The discourse could also draw upon the ‘substantive objects’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area insofar it links territorial cohesion to the sustainable development part of the Structural Funds objective of (regional) competitiveness and employment. The Europe of flows discourse thus seems to have a large role to play in territorial cohesion.

However, what then surprises is the role of the primary policy instrument of the Europe of flows discourse (i.e. infrastructure) in territorial cohesion. Following Jensen & Richardson (2003: 19), the challenge for infrastructure networks would thereby namely be ‘to enable such frictionless mobility, a challenge which has featured prominently in the EU policy agenda. Yet, although this discourse could for instance draw on the ‘accessibility’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area when it is concerned with TENs, it hardly gives rise to territorial cohesion conceptualisations. Infrastructure does appear as one of the three layers in the layer approach, a descriptive intension of territorial cohesion, but this without referring to features of the

Castells (1996) distinguishes the space of place and the space of flows, the physical real world time to which people are accustomed and the dynamic human interaction at a distance (e.g. with information and communication technology).
Europe of flows discourse such as the enhancement of mobility or missing links. Likewise, polycentrism as policy objective extension of territorial cohesion merely implies infrastructural networks. As spatial form polycentrism does give us a direction though. According to Jensen & Richardson (2003: 19), the challenge for infrastructure from the Europe of the flows discourse namely reflects ‘political struggles over the framing of future mobility and spatial organisation’. Moreover, they argue that a remaking of European space as a Europe of flows is a necessary precondition for the creation of a monotypic Europe (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 214).

Because the discourse of monotypia does clearly return in territorial cohesion, discourses on spatial relations perhaps do not so much combine in territorial cohesion directly with infrastructure and mobility, but with spatial organisation.

17.1.5 The discourse of monotypia

All of the discourses listed above seem to take part in the discourse of monotypia, which might therefore structure them. Spatial organisation then has a central role to play in it, as Jensen & Richardson (2003: 3) also characterise its vision as ‘an organised, ordered and totalised space of zero-friction and seamless logistic flows.’ More specifically, this discourse would envision cities as urban nodes in global networks of flows of capital and information, a reorientation of the urban towards a polycentric form, and a reconciliation of Europe as a space of urban competition and balanced spatial development, such as a balance between the interests of core cities (e.g. knowledge-intensive entrepreneurial ones) and peripheral regions (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 4). While the feature of flows iterates Hajer’s (2000) Europe of flows discourse, the one of spatial organisation, and polycentricity in particular, do not. The policy objective extension of polycentrism as territorial cohesion conceptualisation might thus come from the discourse of monotypia, a discourse which could thereby also draw on the ‘spatial/territorial structure’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area which is mostly about this particular spatial organisation. More of the discourse of monotypia than polycentrism returns in territorial cohesion though.

What thereby reminds us of the relationship between Fairclough’s (2003) neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, is Jensen & Richardson’s (2003: 99) argument that the ‘twin mirrors of European policy, of growth and cohesion, of competition and balance, together require and reproduce monotypia.’ A counter-discourse which combines spatial entities with features of the social cohesion discourse would for instance also form it: the regions against market integration discourse (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 77). Moreover, they detect ‘a hierarchical ordering which places the environment as subsidiary to the logics of material growth and market expansion’ and an ‘accomodationist’ vocabulary of ecological modernisation in the discourse of monotypia (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 4). This thus iterates the ecological modernisation of Hajer’s (2000) Europe of flows discourse. Examples of ways in which these twin mirrors and ecological modernisation seem to return in territorial cohesion are mentioned above. However, the discourse of monotypia would more underline the spatial.

When Jensen & Richardson (2003: 226) for instance pose that ‘the imagined community of monotypic Europe needs cohesion as its vehicle for the idea of a level and coherent playing field in order to carry forward the message of ‘one Europe’, it only reminds us of Rumford’s (2002) note about a harmonised European economic space. Yet, for Jensen & Richardson (2003: 226) this does not only amount ‘to thinking about cohesion in terms of sharing growth, environment[, but also] space.’ Sharing space thereby does not only have to do with the discourse’s reorientation of the urban towards a polycentric form, but also its reconciliation between core cities and peripheral regions. Territorial cohesion’s policy objective meaning of balancing human activities and competitiveness over territories might therefore come from the discourse of monotypia, which could also draw on the ‘territories and accessibility’ metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area that at least seems to exclude no specific territory. The spatial way in which the discourse of monotypia relates the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses (i.e. polycentricly reconcile territorial interests to share space) then also returns in territorial cohesion.
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

Yet, one might ask whether accounting for territories underlines the spatial (e.g. or the territorial). Jensen & Richardson (2003) see this as a part of the next phase of the discourse of monotopia though. This phase is namely marked by new linguistic wrappings (the change from ‘spatial policy’ to ‘territorial dimension/territorial development’), new institutional settings and practices (the SUD and the aim to include the common document in the Third Cohesion Report), but still with the rationale of offering an arena for policy articulation outside formal EU competency, founded on voluntary interaction and a view of the European Union’s territory as based on the seamless flows of goods, services, and citizens’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 151).

The significance of this would go beyond that the territorial dimension, territorial development, services, and citizens return in territorial cohesion (e.g. its territorial governmentality meaning of the territorial dimension of European Union policy and ‘territorial dimension’ metanarrative of the IGCs usage area, its normative meaning of equality between citizens wherever they live and ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area with similar articulations). That is to say, if monoptic Europe would indeed need cohesion as a vehicle and “territorial wrappings” mark the next phase of the discourse of monotopia, ‘territorial cohesion’ itself could become the spatial, or better, territorial expression of the monoptic community imagined in this discourse.

If so, territorial cohesion expresses the discourse of monotopia territorially. The way in which this discourse structures all of the discourses that take part in it then becomes the more important, as this structure might return in territorial cohesion. However, there does not seem appear such a structure, only an emphasis on the spatial/territorial does. Moreover, although services and citizens return in territorial cohesion, seamless flows of them, as would be the case in the discourse of monotopia, do not, quite the contrary. A policy objective extension of the concept for instance puts territorial cohesion against the “level playing field”, as adhesion of citizens to a political body that is, and the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area mentions State aid. Discourses that go against (features of) the discourse of monotopia could thus return in territorial cohesion too.6

17.1.6 The spatial policy and justice discourse

Then again, the discourse of monotopia can return in territorial cohesion more fully (i.e. including flows). Its next phase, or better: the institutional settings Jensen & Richardson (2003: 151) mention thereby (e.g. the SUD, an informal arena), directs us to a way for this: the European Union’s spatial policy discourse. All of the discourses which take part in the discourse of monotopia namely seem to do so in the European Union’s spatial policy discourse as well. For Richardson & Jensen (2003: 7) this discourse is for instance ‘based on the language and ideas of polycentricity and hypermobility’, which are both mentioned in the discourse of monotopia (‘hypermobility’ not as such, but the implied ‘seamless flows’ are), and it would be wrapped in a new language of ‘territorial’ and ‘development’ instead of ‘spatial’ and ‘planning’ too (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 150). It also harbours a balance between growth–ecology–equity, even an emphasis on economic development (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 98).7 Many of these features return in territorial cohesion, as shown above, but not all them.

That is to say, just as the spatial relations in the above-mentioned forms of improvement of infrastructure and seamless flows, (hyper)mobility lacks territorial cohesion conceptualisations. However, Jensen & Richardson’s (2003) reasoning for the European Union’s spatial policy discourse points to an indirect way in which the concept could be concerned with spatial relations nonetheless. They namely hold that this discourse frames mobility as accessibility (i.e. what can be approached instead of the movement) (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 80), which does return in territorial cohesion. This in an intensional fragment of its territorial governmentality

6 These discourses do not appear on the list presented here though, what perhaps has to do with the departure-point of this research (i.e. European spatial planning in particular).

7 This would be far from surprising if you follow Faludi’s (2003a) argument that the French spatial planning tradition affects territorial cohesion a lot, as aménagement du territoire, would ever have been limited to an economic discourse, but now also includes notions of sustainability and cultural, social, and institutional dimensions. Faludi (2003a) could partly be right in this, because aménagement du territoire does return in territorial cohesion, but not fully, although the French spatial planning tradition is a spatial planning meaning of the concept, it does not appear in any metanarrative, only in their context (e.g. the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area).
knowledge that links knowledge and governance, as the tentative common framework for spatial concepts puts forward 'parity of access' as policy means (what entails the improvement of physical accessibility and access to information and knowledge). Do note though, that this framework is not a territorial cohesion intension but merely a fragment, because territorial cohesion is just one of the concepts in it instead of the framework itself for instance (see §10.2.7). Still, the weak territorial cohesion conceptualisation of mobility framed as accessibility, or at least the latter, might thus come from the European Union's spatial policy discourse, and this discourse could then also draw on, as mentioned above, the 'accessibility' metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area. Via this "accessibility route" territorial cohesion would not only include spatial relations in the form of spatial organisation, but (partly) in the form of flows as well, and therefore include the discourse of monotopia more fully.

However, Jensen&Richardson (2003: 80) also hold that the European Union's spatial policy discourse frames accessibility 'in economic rather than social or environmental terms'. Although changing spatial relations would lead to new patterns of socio-economic exclusion, according to them the policy debate (e.g. TEN-T, ESDP) merely notes accessibility in economic analysis (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 220). This showcases the policy dilemma of balancing growth-ecology-equity with accessibility in economic terms while this leads to socio-economic exclusion. According to Jensen&Richardson (2003: 98), this 'suggests that the EU's spatial strategy will be played out in competition between cities and regions, between urban and rural, between core and periphery, and along growth corridors'. With accessibility from the European Union's spatial policy discourse territorial cohesion would thus include a tension.

This tension comes forward with the above-mentioned counter-discourse which represents the regions against market integration, as it would also run throughout the European Union's spatial policy discourse (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 77). The ESDP is for instance concerned about 'pump' and 'tunnel' effects where new high-speed infrastructure removes resources from structurally weaker and peripheral regions or such areas are crossed without being connected (CSD, 1999: 26). Yet, 'all of the policy options identified pursue the general aim of improving accessibility as an unproblematic generic response' (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 77). According to Richardson (1995; Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 77-79), the European Union's spatial policy discourse avoids this tension by relying on a series of unproven assumptions for and about infrastructure development: regional competitiveness and regional balance are the same, the outcome is even development of regional economies, there is a causal link between infrastructure provision and economic development, and regions are the correct units of measurement. Avoiding a tension is not the same as resolving it of course. Still, when territorial cohesion indirectly (and partially) includes the Europe of flows discourse in its primary policy instrument (i.e. infrastructure) and the discourse of monotopia in its seamless flows, the question for territorial cohesion becomes how the tension of balancing growth-ecology-equity with accessibility returns.

A few stories that relate metanarratives in the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area come closest to balancing growth-ecology-equity with accessibility, but merely close; whereby one could argue that ecology plays no role thereby. As could have been expected with the absent territorial cohesion conceptualisations when it concerns infrastructure and flows, also here none appears. Although territorial cohesion includes accessibility (hesitantly), the concept thus neither avoids nor resolves the tension of how accessibility can provide such a balance. Therefore not all the features of the European Union's spatial policy, Europe of flows, and monotopia discourses return in territorial cohesion. Hence, the partiality of the transposition of spatial planning into territorial cohesion, both qua the former's system of knowledge, discursive interdependencies, and the European Union's spatial policy discourse. In a sense, you could then say that territorial cohesion is less than spatial planning: it lacks a role for infrastructure or accessibility in the balancing of growth-ecology-equity.

---

\* Vickerman&Spiekermann&Wegener (1993) for instance identify the uneven distribution of accessibility within regions (e.g. due to concentration, shadow effects).
\* The story for instance tells us: a key challenge for territorial cohesion in view of promoting sustainable economic growth is to strengthen, amongst others, connectivity because the development of the European Union territory needs stronger balance and competitiveness. If sustainability here means having an economic growth which maintains itself instead of anything ecological, even this story does not come close.
In another sense, however, you could say that territorial cohesion is more than spatial planning. Discourses against monotopia (e.g. featuring political bodies) could namely return in territorial cohesion while they do not take part in the European Union's spatial policy discourse described above – merely those discourse that show its "twin-mirrors" of growth and cohesion do. Moreover, Davoudi (2005a: 437) says that the discourse of territorial cohesion has added a spatial justice dimension to European spatial policy. Logically seen, this perspective then was not part of the European Union's spatial policy discourse. Following Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007), this perspective even challenges the technical rational approach that dominates the European Union's spatial policy research (e.g. ESPON). The spatial justice dimension would thereby extend and apply 'John Rawls' theory of justice[,] with its emphasis on equity, to territorial development' (Davoudi, 2005a: 437). You could then also say that we therefore have yet another discourse that territorial cohesion includes, one on justice that is.

Then again, Giannakourou (1996) already brings a discourse of justice forward that might be a part of the European Union's spatial policy discourse. That is, '[t]he central idea underpinning the new European planning rhetoric is that of a more general reorientation of the traditional spatial fairness concept in the new context provided by the competition principles of a spatial integration process that is market-oriented' (Giannakourou, 1996: 603). This would lead to a 'transition from a unitary and substantive rationale of fairness towards a pluralist and procedural one' (Giannakourou, 1996: 605). As Rawls' (1999) justice as fairness is both unitary in its decision on how society should look and substantive in the benefit it should have to the least advantaged (see §10.2.3), there might thus be different discourses of justice at work.

Jensen & Richardson (2003: 29) then note three driving conceptions of the pluralist and procedural discourse of justice which Giannakourou (1996) distinguishes: i) 'competitive spatial justice' (i.e. promising the levelling of spatial imbalances through the redistribution of competitiveness among European areas), ii) 'diversified spatial justice' (i.e. tolerating discrimination of goals, instruments and actors for the handling of divergent problems), and iii) 'pluralist spatial justice' (i.e. appealing both to public and private stakeholders to contribute to the redistribution of spatial prosperity). Together these would express 'a specific notion of 'spatial fairness' that involves the paradox of invoking a welfare principle in order to ensure global competitiveness' (Giannakourou, 1996: 604). This of course brings us back (full circle) to the legitimisation of the social cohesion discourse by the neo-liberal discourse and how the discourse of monotopia iterates it with its twin-mirrors. Besides that this returns in territorial cohesion with competitive and pluralist spatial justices (e.g. balanced competitiveness, governance), the diversified spatial justice does so too. It for instance might provide the concept with its variety of policy objective and instrumental meanings and could also draw on the rather broad 'substantive objectives' metanarrative of the European Funds usage area. Territorial cohesion thus includes the discourse of pluralist and procedural justice.

Yet, as hinted at above, another discourse of justice appears to return in territorial cohesion as well, one which was not mentioned as part of the monotopic or European Union's spatial policy discourse. This discourse would namely, to follow Davoudi (2005: 437), provide the Rawlsian normative meaning of territorial cohesion and could also draw on the 'territories and accessibility' metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy metanarrative, especially when it promotes the assistance of (naturally) disadvantaged areas (i.e. emphasises equity in territorial development). This underlines that, even though all the other discourses listed above take part in the monotopic and European Union's spatial policy discourses, territorial cohesion could include more than these "two".

17.1.7 Territorial cohesion as seen through the Discourse Nodal Point-perspective
That territorial cohesion includes all of the particular discourses listed above, or at least parts of them, characterises the concept as a Discourse Nodal Point. Note thereby that we are not interested in their causal relationships, such as what discourse was first and therefore gives territorial cohesion this feature. For us the main problematic brought forward with this overview is namely the way in which these discourses tie together. That is to say, listing so many discourses pictures them as sticking together like grains of sand. We therefore
want to know the ways in which territorial cohesion combines which discourses. Does the concept for instance stabilise them as a Discursive Nodal Point would or does it as discursive nodal surface more resemble 'imperial overstretch'?

With the dynamic and complexity of discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion knowledge and the concept's usage (see §16.4.2), it is not surprising that is hard to come up with the structure in which territorial cohesion ties discourses together, no matter whether you consider the concept as discursive formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare surface. When you see it as a discursive formation surface, many discourses could combine to transform into one territorial cohesion discourse, as listed above: the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, their specification in economic and Social European Model discourses, and the discourses of Europe of the Regions, ecological modernisation, governance, monotopia, regions against market integration, and unitary and substantive justice and pluralist and procedural justice. However, it is unclear how these discourses would do so; and because the list above is not all-embracing, there might be even more. One might wonder why the Europe of flows and European Union’s spatial policy discourses presented in the list above are not mentioned for such a formation surface.

They are not mentioned because territorial cohesion could combine policy discourses as discursive aggregation surface. Waterhout (2003) mentions two policy discourses when it concerns territorial cohesion: SG(E)I and territorial governance. However, the storylines which tie them together change (e.g. see Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007) and the involved stories are also told without the concept. Still, the territorial governance policy discourse seems at least to overlap with the European Union’s spatial policy discourse, because it would originate in the ESDP process. What is more, SG(E)I can be added to territorial cohesion as policy discourse, just as cohesion policy and economic policy discourses probably could. Yet, even though this aggregation surface reminds us of the topical order of the concept’s usage in power practices (i.e. a battlefield; also see §17.2.3), it is unclear how such policy discourses would convergence to a territorial cohesion policy discourse or combine in the concept as battle arena.

A partial transposition of spatial planning into territorial cohesion then suggests that territorial cohesion forms other discourses (e.g. those listed above) as discursive thoroughfare surface (e.g. by spatialising a wide range of theories; see §17.1.1). Then again, how the concept would do so is unclear as well (e.g. different from spatial planning in which way?). Moreover, if these three discursive surfaces mutually exclude each other, it is unclear which one territorial cohesion actually is, and if the concept can be more than one at once, the relations between its parts are unclear. When we look at territorial cohesion, the only clarity the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective thus brings is that we cannot see how the concept’s functioning is its own.

Whether territorial cohesion stabilises discourses is then a moot question. It could pin down many meanings in power practices, but it is unclear which and how. This presses us to the question of what makes a statement a territorial cohesion statement. Below this research answers with the ways in which the rules followed by the concept’s discursive practices demarcate them before its structure is revisited.

17.2 Demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse

17.2.1 Following Foucault to draw the boundaries of territorial cohesion expertise

Even though the many discursive ‘streams’ running through territorial cohesion are unpetrified (see §16.2.3), we can speculate about the demarcation of its discourse. Besides that such a demarcation would clarify what the concept is about, it might be essential for four technocratic reasons: i) the European Union’s informal bureaucratic ways without a centre of power (see §1.1.2), ii) the large role for potestas programmes in the concept's usage (see §15.3.1), iii) territorial cohesion's policy-centred tactical productivity (see §17.1.2), and iv) the possible transposition of spatial planning's technical-rational approach in the concept (see §16.4.2). According to Pellizzoni (2001: 64), the power wielded by technocratic elites namely hinges on the creation of
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

boundaries', such as 'the distinction between expertise and layman'. This could exactly be what the territorial cohesion discourse does, that is, demarcating territorial cohesion expertise. Moreover, Pellizzoni (2001: 64-65) suggests that discourses (e.g. through elite peer review) circumscribe 'the area within which the best argument can be sought' by drawing lines in two ways: by 'establishing the boundaries with the outside' and 'structuring the inner space of the debate on the basis of specific conceptual frames'. For territorial cohesion the latter might not only involve how the concept links the conceptualisations in the system of territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge on the one hand and the concept's power practices which come forward through metanarratives on the other hand, but also the concept's functioning as Discursive Nodal Point, that is, the ways in which these two sides tie discourses together. The objective of this research then is to descriptively interpret the rules regulating territorial cohesion statements through discursive practices. This because only these practices form the territorial cohesion discourse by linking its system of meaning/knowledge and power practices and the rules thereby demarcate what reasonable arguments are in the case of territorial cohesion. Yet, the rules followed by these discursive practices are necessary instead of sufficient "causes", as they do not determine statements, at least not totally.

Also note that the rules demarcating all territorial cohesion statements (i.e. the boundaries) do not themselves form the linkages between the meaning/knowledge and power practices sides (i.e. the structure) – although the latter of course have to abide by the former. These would only be the same when either territorial cohesion's functioning as Discursive Nodal Point demarcates it as a discourse, then the rules form the overall argumentative structure of discursive articulations (see §7.2.2), or there is no clear structure for linking the two sides, then arguments merely have to accord to the rules for all statements. That is to say, respectively, the rules point out which territorial cohesion articulations are considered to be reasonable due to the way they relate metanarratives or all these articulations are considered to be so as long as the rules include them as being about territorial cohesion. Yet, Pellizzoni (2001: 72) warns us for situations in which 'the force of the best argument is only a myth.' Our question would then become whether territorial cohesion is such a situation.

Insofar territorial cohesion articulations are 'entangled in the web of strategy, technocracy or rhetoric.' (Pellizzoni, 2001: 72), argumentation about it could be a myth. In such situations, following Pellizzoni (2001: 72), intractable problems 'cast doubt on the solidity of the cognitive basis of deliberation', as 'dialogue becomes more problematic, conflict grows fiercer[, and reason] seemingly shatters into fragments impossible to reassemble.' The concept might then be too fluid to stabilise discourses or fill 'territorial' and 'cohesion' with meanings to pin down in metanarratives, that is, to function as Discursive Nodal Point. In any case, the discursive interdependencies of the territorial cohesion discourse would cognitively be too unstable for argumentation.

Yet, even with a solid cognitive basis for deliberation, territorial cohesion is entangled in power relations as long as the concept's discursive interdependencies accept power as it is said to exist and "naturalise" a part of the world to govern (see §7.2.3). The pattern discursive practices follow while thus interweaving knowledge and power relations might further circumscribe the territorial cohesion articulations that are considered to be reasonable. Paradoxically enough, this consideration is thus not lead by the absence or presence of argumentation, nor by that statements cannot mutually exclude each other. Instead, when the concept's discursive practices continue to follow a same pattern, we can speak of its discursive structures – i.e. the 'trunk' which is re/inserted into the debate (see §7.2.1). It is this structuring of discursive interdependencies (i.e. the branches) which can marginalise alternative statements even if warrants could be put forward for their claim. Territorial cohesion pro/positions which are weakly linked in the concept's power-knowledge network – e.g. its descriptive meaning of territorial identity without a usage or its usage for infrastructure without a meaning (see §16.2.3) – might be such alternatives. Although not every statement belongs to the territorial cohesion discourse, it thus is a changing entity nonetheless. We can then not only demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse, but also specify which changes are more likely to occur in it than others.

The stability of the territorial cohesion discourse therefore depends on the depth of the concept's discursive structures as well. This depth and stability are relative of course (see §7.2.1); compared to other discourses the territorial cohesion discourse could for instance have no trunk but merely branches. Yet, the
deeper this structure, the stronger it defines what makes statements territorial cohesion statements, and the
clearer the rules would be that demarcate the discourse. This research then follows Foucault to demarcate the
territorial cohesion discourse, that is, by individualising it with criteria of formation, threshold, and correlation
(see §7.3.1). To recuperate them, these entail, respectively, the rules that count for all objects, operations,
concepts and/or theoretical options in the discourse, the set of discursive conditions which must have been possible for its objects, operations, concepts and theoretical options to have been formed, and the relations of the
discourse to other discourses and its non-discursive context. The concept's discursive structures then take part in this individualisation insofar they for instance define all territorial cohesion objects, conditions for their appearance, or the discourse's relations to power practices. In any case the criteria of threshold and correlation thus derive from the criteria of formation. Hence, it are the rules involved that demarcate territorial cohesion
erpertise.

17.2.2 The rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse
This research's whole discourse analysis carried out thus far led to this point: the rules that regulate the territorial
cohesion discourse. To be able to put such rules forward while setting them up in this case is a tour de force, they
will be hypothetical. First the structure of rules that governs the territorial cohesion propositions is formulated
and explained (§17.2.2). After these criteria of formation follow the conditions for them (§17.2.3) and the
relations of the territorial cohesion discourse to other discourses and its non-discursive context (§17.2.4). The
ways in which the concept could function as a Discursive Nodal Point complexes these criteria though. They are therefore treated in combination with the threshold criteria. Together with the three criteria they individualise what are considered to be reasonable territorial cohesion articulations.
However, the semantic/epistemic and political variation of territorial cohesion articulations is large. The rules
that regulate them thus need to leave much open. Nevertheless, the following rules could individualise the
territorial cohesion discourse:

– all objects can neither be political nor tangible;
– all operations must be policy-centred in specific ways and lack reflective argumentation;
– all concepts must be open to relate their content to that of others;
– all theoretical options must be adopted.

Although these rules are broad and unspecific, as also shown by their often negative formulation, they do
exclude articulations, as explained below per rule.

Notwithstanding the large variety in territorial cohesion articulations, the objects involved are never
political or tangible. Sometimes the concept might imply the inclusion of politics about an issue (e.g. balance
versus competitiveness, which competencies), but its propositions always exclude politics in itself (e.g.
territorial demarcation, competency). What exemplifies this is a way in which the concept's narrow variation
in ideals outlines the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning: some of its normative propositions
contradict politically (e.g. for or beyond competitiveness), but they never propose a political ideal (e.g. of the
State). Territorial cohesion also sometimes includes facts, however, if so, these are policy objective extensions
e.g. polycentrism), and these are not, arguably, tangible. Another feature that outlines the concept's common
ground of meaning can be mentioned here, as not even its spatial planning meaning provides a rational ground
to tangibilise objects. Hence, with the rule that none of its objects may be political or tangible, the territorial
cohesion discourse would make an apolitical and not-tangible world "natural".

Moreover, this 'naturalisation' could be for a specific government, as all the operations of the territorial
cohesion discourse are centred on, or at least around, policy. The specificity of this comes forward in a
commonality of the concept's knowledge claims and in its tactical productivity. Epistemically the apolitical and
tangible world of territorial cohesion is namely looked at with a (state-)government and policy focus. However,
not any policy will do, as the concept's reciprocal productivity further specifies this policy-centredness, that is,
only the policies in, or related to, the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion Policy, and European
Funds usage areas will do. Many argumentations then appear in these policy-centred operations, such as how or
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

why to reach territorial cohesion, what (in policy) lead to a particular interpretation of it, what its consequences could be, or to what the concept relates. Yet, there are no arguments about the why. There for instance only appear premises that certain articulations belong to territorial cohesion, the ‘Grounds’ that is. Yet, no argument comes forward for why this is actually the case (e.g. one instead of another meaning, as there are many), as no ‘Warrants’ justify the inference to this ‘Claim’ (see §4.5.3). Perhaps for territorial cohesion the force of the best argument is therefore not so much a myth, but they more appear to be based upon unreasoned for pro/positions, that is, upon premises without argumentation. If so, then apolitical and not-tangible objects operate in the territorial cohesion discourse unreflectively and in the specified policy-centred ways.

That all concepts must thereby be open to relate their content to that of others does not oblige them to relate everything they include (at once) with what lies “beyond them”. Another commonality of the concept’s knowledge claims is their relational perspective though. Its hyper-cube intension is an extreme example of this, because it is a complex web of properties to describe territorial cohesion and even leaves its trade-off with extensions open to add more entities (see §10.2.2). Yet, also when concepts do not do so, they should have the possibility for this. The descriptive territorial cohesion meaning of access to SG(E)I shows this: it appears to be the most unrelated conceptualisation, but in the components of territorial cohesion intension also combines with other properties of territorial quality to describe territorial cohesion (again, see §10.2.2).

Territorial cohesion conceptualisations therefore cannot be limited to only economics for instance, at least not definitively. What can therefore be added to the structure of rules of the territorial cohesion discourse, is that conceptualisations of apolitical and not-tangible objects are open to relate their content unreflectively while centring on or around specific policies.

The concept’s theoretical options must of course follow the other rules just as the territorial cohesion conceptualisations have to. As territorial cohesion would more constitute a political than theoretical debate (Tatzberger, 2003), its theoretical options are for instance policy-centred as well. Yet, sometimes a theory does appear in the territorial cohesion discourse. In those instances, however, it does not seem indigenous to the concept. Rawls’ theory of justice is for instance such a theoretical option for ideals, but the concept’s normative intension merely applies this theory to territorial cohesion, by filling it in as communities living in territories engaging in collective projects of creating shared wealth that is (see §10.2.3). Rawls’ theory of justice thus is not a territorial cohesion theory but an adopted option. Besides such options of theories in the discourse, it has options which are theoretically possible. The ARL (2003) then holds that the theoretical possibilities of some form of European Union territorial cohesion policy heavily relies on what is meant by the concept and what (spatially-relevant) “means” it should use as public policy. Then again, no territorial cohesion Bedeutung seems to come with a previously unknown meaning (e.g. but one from another discourse; see §17.1.1). They at most appropriate meanings and combine them in an own way (e.g. the descriptive definition of economic and social cohesion in territories). What is more, also the crux in the dynamic interplay of defining and knowledge creation might lie in combining information as territorial cohesion knowledge. Likewise for the “means” of this territorial cohesion policy, as the ordinal topic formed by the concept’s usage appears as a bricoleage of areas of action (see below). Hence, the territorial cohesion discourse can only adopt theoretical options whose unreflective conceptualisations of apolitical and not-tangible objects relationally centre on or around specific policies.

The hypothetical rules demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse thus seem to be neither definitive nor highly informative. Yet, they do point out the concept’s forbidden articulations: each which does not accord with the criteria of formation (e.g. by being about a political object). They also point out that the concept has no necessary articulations, as much is left open – what also characterises the discourse. Together the rules then govern territorial cohesion pro/positions, as the irrelevance of a rule for an articulation is the sole reason for that it does not have to abide that rule (e.g. a proposition of an object which does not articulate a theoretical option of course does not have to abide to the rule for the concept’s theoretical options). As a structure the rules

* Note that there are two different interpretations of what ‘theoretical options’ means. Although they differ, and Foucault (1968, in Burchell&Biscoe&Miller, 1991: 54) probably means options of theories – these can namely mutually exclude each other, which he says they often do, while theoretical possibilities cannot –, here both are accounted for, just to be sure.
therefore regulate how the discourse links the involved meanings/knowledges and power practices. These links are namely formed by all the articulations which abide to these rules in their various connections. However, as shown below, more structures the territorial cohesion discourse.

17.2.3 The conditions for the rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse

The indefinitiveness and unspecificity of the rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse result in a vagueness. This also makes the formulation of its criteria of threshold and correlation trickier, as they have to point out the conditions and relations of a discourse which cannot be pin-pointed down. This might have three reasons: i) the discourse is in its phase of creation (i.e. its limits are not yet really drawn); ii) holisticness is one of its key features (i.e. these limits will never be drawn); or iii) the territorial view is the focus* (i.e. its demarcation is not meant to be limiting). These reasons return when you consider territorial cohesion as a discursive nodal surface.

However, the criteria of threshold of the territorial cohesion discourse also bring ways forward in which the concept could function as Discursive Nodal Point, what would further structure the discourse. The discursive conditions for the formation of all its objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options are therefore first formulated (in random order). These are that:

- the concept of 'cohesion' grows in importance (Hooghe\&Marks, 2001);
- 'territorial' emerges as a new linguistic wrapping;
- in general territorial cohesion can have many meanings and contradicting ones in particular;
- scientific data exist to put into a territorial cohesion perspective;
- in general territorial cohesion can be used as an undefined concept and as undefined policy objective in particular;
- the non-decisions of the dominant status quo accommodate a future territorial cohesion policy;
- territorial cohesion can be interpreted beyond its official base;
- the common ground for decision-making on territorial cohesion is systematically uncertain;
- every territorial cohesion position is contested due to infighting, the contested nature of the concept itself, its built-in bricolage, officialness, and ownness, and due to its place in larger struggles;
- the concept's functions as a moving three-way crossing on a fuzzy line of in/formality;
- at least the neo-liberal, social cohesion, economic, Social European Model, Europe of the Regions, ecological modernisation, governance, monotopia, regions against market integration, unitary and substantive justice, pluralist and procedural justice discourses appear as appropriable;
- at least the following policy discourses appear as appropriable too: the Europe of flows, European Union's spatial policy, territorial governance, SG(E)I, cohesion, and economic ones.

Probably, there are more discursive conditions of the territorial cohesion discourse – not to mention the countless events that condition the concept's particular appearances –, what makes these mentioned above non-exhaustive. Moreover, they of course picture the conditioning of indefinitiveness and unspecificity. That is to say, they show what is needed for territorial cohesion's discursive interdependencies to appear as fluid as lava (see §7.3.2). Yet, also these criteria of threshold individualise the territorial cohesion discourse.

The criteria of threshold at least do so with a paradoxical double: the discourse seems to accept power as it is said to exist (i.e. the status quo) while the stability of what of the world the discourse includes is not a condition for its rules of formation. This tension between stability and constant flux can be solved by considering the selection of territorial cohesion objects. Political ones, such as power relations, are excluded, while the ones included operate for power in the form of (state-)government and the specified policies. That is to say, power relations might be taken for granted while the included objects do not have to be fixed. Discursive interdependencies as firm as a glacier thus stand outside the discourse, and a reason for this could be that its gaze appears to be directed from power instead of on power.

* This territorial view might come out of nowhere, but is mentioned in the discussion of ways in which the discourse of monotopia could return in territorial cohesion (see §17.1.5).
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

What is more, three of these discursive conditions point towards the concept’s functioning as *Discursive Nodal Point*, what would further individualise the territorial cohesion discourse due to the entailed discursive structure. These three are the many territorial cohesion meanings, the concept as a three-way crossing, and the many (policy) discourses. When territorial cohesion functions as *Discursive Nodal Point* every discursive articulation would namely simultaneously attempt to stabilise a field of discourses through the pinning down of specific meanings in the metanarratives and their relations with each other (see §7.2.2). With the large overlap between territorial cohesion pro/positions, the concept can thus pin down many meanings in metanarratives. It can also relate these metanarratives in particular ways and stabilise the many discourses providing those meanings, so many that we can speak of a discursive nodal surface (see §17.1.1). Yet, no structure appears in which the concept’s dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between these many meanings and metanarratives tie these many discourses together (see §17.1.7).

Then again, the territorial cohesion meanings/knowledges are structured in their inherently inconsistent system of contradicting kinds of meaning. Also the concept’s power practices, of which the metanarratives are an index, are structured, in their bricolage of in/formal areas of action that is. When the concept moves through power practices as three-way crossing, its usage in the IGCs namely filters how territorial cohesion may appear, the concept’s usage in the (post-)ESDP process delivers almost all the content, its usage in Regional/Cohesion policy cherry-picks from this, and its usage in the European Funds usage area resonates the three others in a guerrilla-like deployment. Although the involved topical order bares the systematic uncertainty of the concept’s usage, it does form the ways in which the metanarratives can relate. Hence, even if this systemic and topical order did not structure the ways in which the concept’s ties discourses together as discursive nodal surface, both could therefore structure how it might do so. As possibilities of territorial cohesion articulations would be specified thus, this could individualise its discourse as well.

Together the concept’s semantic system and topical order could structure the possible territorial cohesion articulations in three ways: as a discursive formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare structure (see §17.1.7). As discursive formation surface the first mentioned reason for why the discourse cannot be pin-pointed down returns. It would namely mark (out) a surface on which at least the listed discourses combine. However, if the territorial cohesion discourse is in its phase of creation, this would merely entail a fuzzy line around a yet indefinite entity and no structure whatsoever. Its criteria of formation therefore allow for indefinite trans/formations of the structure of rules of other discourses, structures territorial cohesion could appropriate. One of the four criteria exemplifies this: if the rule is that all concepts should be able to relate their content to that of others, it does not specify the contents. Territorial cohesion can then pin down any meaning in any corresponding metanarrative which can relate to any other metanarrative. This does not structure the tying together of discourses any further. Hence, when territorial cohesion would function as such a discursive formation surface, possible articulations do not appear to be specified any further than the rules which demarcate the discourse already do.

As discursive aggregation surface the second reason for why the discourse cannot be pin-pointed down returns. It would namely circumscribe a surface for the listed policy discourses. However, if holisticness is a key feature of the territorial cohesion discourse, this could entail that the bundling framework remains ajar for policies. The concept’s functioning as three-way crossing shows this with is movement. The meanings pinned down in the metanarratives, such as the contradicting ones of territorial cohesion as either SG(E)I or policy coherence, are then played out in the contested positions. In that case policy discourses are aggregated according to the topical order where they encounter each other in the (mental) power practices which are in line with the ways metanarratives can relate. To follow the same pro/positions, the IGCs can for instance give official backing to the policy discourse of SG(E)I, while the (post-)ESDP process can equip the one of territorial governance with policy coherence, and they meet in battle. Territorial cohesion can then only appropriate these policy discourses together with a surface tightly knit for contests between them. Still, when territorial cohesion would function as such a discursive aggregation surface, just the topical order specifies possible articulations beyond the rules which demarcate the discourse.
As discursive thoroughfare surface the (indeed) third reason for why the discourse cannot be pin-pointed down returns. It would namely draw a structure in which discourses can constantly combine. If the territorial view itself is the focus of the territorial cohesion discourse, this view would structure how other discourses can combine in the discourse while a constant transformation remains possible within the boundaries set by its broad rules of formation and their criteria of threshold. This way in which territorial cohesion relates to other discourses individualises it more as a discourse (as mentioned with its criteria of correlation; see §17.2.4). What is more, because the territorial view would constitute its essence, all the meanings and metanarratives of the discourse should then operate accordingly. Yet, again any meaning can be pinned down in any corresponding metanarrative which can relate to any other metanarrative, as long as they abide by this rule. Hence, when territorial cohesion would function as such a discursive thoroughfare surface, possible articulations only appear to be specified further by the rule that all the operations of the discourse must express a territorial view.

Probably neither a functioning of territorial cohesion as discursive formation, aggregation, nor thoroughfare surface will structure all of its possibilities of articulation. Still, as three discursive prospects they together do individualise the territorial cohesion discourse further. What is more, these surfaces could (partly) be the same. The structure of thoroughfare namely might not be fixed yet and also be formed by the discourses that combine in territorial cohesion as formation and aggregation surface (e.g. the discourse of monotopia and the European Union’s spatial policy discourse). Either way, to be considered reasonable, territorial cohesion articulations might have to fit in (at least) one of these three prospects. They could therefore show the ways in which the concept’s branches (i.e. discursive interdependencies) might grow into a trunk (i.e. discursive structure) due to their re/insertion into the debate.

One can then speculate about the kind of changes in the territorial cohesion discourse that are more or less likely, this within the rules that demarcate it of course. When articulations follow the discursive formation surface, only the same broad rules apply, what makes many transformations possible. Yet, because this does not imply major changes in the discourse and its criteria of threshold – which, arguably, do not change all of a sudden – picture the conditioning of indefinitiveness and unspecificity, this is a very likely prospect.

When articulations follow the discursive aggregation surface instead, those broad rules would be made narrower by the topical order which forms the battlefield of the concept’s usage, what turns territorial cohesion in a battle arena of both the concept’s meanings and usages. In this battle arena positions of for instance spatial/territorial development objectives (polycentrism in particular) and services (specifically for all territories) appear to weaken, while those of balanced development, coordination (of policies), and the territorial dimension to gain strength (see Chapters 11 until 14). Although each of these changes is likely, they are in general less so than the prospect above, because in themselves fragile (i.e. those which weaken might strengthen later on and vice versa).

When the articulations conversely follow the discursive thoroughfare surface, those rules that demarcate the discourse would be less broad, because all of the operations of the territorial cohesion discourse have to express a territorial view. This implies a fundamental change in the discourse, one that also needs a major overhaul of the (political) agenda by favouring explicit territorial positions over others (i.e. territorial specificities and the territorial dimension over balance, services, and coordination; see §16.1.2). This change therefore seems the least likely. Hence, in the territorial cohesion discourse no marginalisation of statements seems the most likely, the definite marginalisation of particular ones less likely and the marginalisation of non-territorial ones unlikely. This unlikeliness of major marginalisations (i.e. almost everything goes) again brings the indefinitiveness and unspecificity forward that individualises the discourse.

17.2.4 The contextual relations of the territorial cohesion discourse
What lastly individualises the territorial cohesion discourse are its criteria of correlation, in which what is said above about the concept’s functioning as a discursive nodal surface comes back. Some criteria of the discourse’s correlation are its relations to other discourses, which are (in random order):
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

- the discourses of its criteria of threshold;
- the policy discourses of its criteria of threshold;
- the general discourse on Europe, the Community discourse, the European Union’s public policy discourse;
- the managerial discourse;
- probably the Member States’ national spatial planning discourses.

The three prospects in the territorial cohesion discourse, that is, the concept’s functioning as a discursive formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare surface, then structure the relations of territorial cohesion to the (policy) discourses of its criteria of threshold. Then again, just as with the criteria of threshold, probably even more discourses can be mentioned here, also because as a discursive nodal surface the concept could relate to every discourse it can tie together with others while it follows the rules that demarcate territorial cohesion as a discourse. Moreover, when you consider that each of the discourses that territorial cohesion could tie together has relations with other discourses, many more could be mentioned, as then these relate to the territorial cohesion discourse as well. For when these discourses would tie together in territorial cohesion, each also remains a discourse in itself, which thus relates to the territorial cohesion discourse in a specific way.

Other criteria of correlation of the territorial cohesion discourse are the relations it has to its non-discursive context. This context is formed by (in random order):

- the many positions in power practices as indexed by the narratives with an own dynamic;
- the larger struggles in four spheres of action to add a European Union competency (i.e. in the IGCs), promote European spatial planning (i.e. in the (post-)ESDP process), substantively expand Regional/Cohesion policy (i.e. in this policy), and to channel European funding (i.e. in the European funds);
- the European Union’s shifting agendas and the absence of an imposed order.

The relations involved are straightforward. Almost all the territorial cohesion positions are namely the same as their older contextual positions which remain to show other dynamics. The discourse can thus mis/appropriate them for its power practices. The indecision about these practices could then re/organise institutional spaces into uncertainties: on the European level towards an indistinct symbiosis in which European spatial planning is subjected to Regional/Cohesion policy, solely informal concertedness, selection of content within the new topical order of the concept, and a flexibility in ways to manage European funding and nebulosity on lower levels (see §15.5.3 and 15.5.4). Then again, the larger struggles frame and structure territorial cohesion battles while the concept’s usage merely stirs them vice versa. These asymmetrical power relations could therefore entail a minor role for the discourse in general (i.e. marginal and/or subordinate). The concept’s transforming usage also fits its institutional framework in which “everything flows” and agendas therefore shift and order lacks. The discourse is thus well-adapted to its setting. Still, probably also more non-discursive contexts can be mentioned where it relates to. Hence, in a nutshell: the power practices of the territorial cohesion discourse relate to more power practices than those of European spatial planning.

All in all, three ways therefore individualise the territorial cohesion discourse beyond the rules that demarcate it: i) the conditions for these rules, ii) how they point towards three prospective structures of the discourse (i.e. as discursive formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare surface), and iii) its relations to other discourses and its non-discursive context. Each thereby comes with a defining characteristic. The conditions bring forward that the discourse’s lavaness could be due to its gaze from power. It could then be structured to tie other discourses together by being in creation, a holistic battle arena for policy discourses, and/or a territorial view. And the territorial cohesion discourse could be called marginal and/or subordinate to its context. Hence, territorial cohesion does not so much appear to be a basic concept that alters the deepest discursive structures, but a concept that is easily modified by them.
17.3 Conclusion on the demarcation and structure of the territorial cohesion discourse

17.3.1 The hypotheses that individualise the territorial cohesion discourse

This chapter speculated about the ways in which the demarcation and structure of the territorial cohesion discourse individualise its creation. To thereby take the large semantic/epistemic and political variation into account, its structure of rules of formation is indefinite and unspecific in demarcating the statements which can be articulated (e.g. there are no necessary articulations). Still, the construction of territorial cohesion knowledge and contested transformation of the concept's usage appear to follow these four rules: i) all objects can neither be political nor tangible, ii) all operations must be policy-centred in specific ways and lack reflective argumentation, iii) all concepts must be open to relate their content to that of others, and iv) all theoretical options must be adopted.

The many conditions for these rules further individualise the territorial cohesion discourse. Especially that the dominant status quo which accommodates territorial cohesion policy would be fixed outside the discourse's gaze from (state-)government and the specified policies does, because this might condition that everything within this gaze can appear in a constant flux. Moreover, that many territorial cohesion meanings can be pinned down in metanarratives, these can be related in the concept whilst it moves as a three-way crossing in power practices, and many (policy) discourses can be tied together thus, would condition its functioning as Discursive Nodal Point. Because these multitudes seem to hinder stability, the concept might merely harbour prospects for functioning as such a nodal point though.

Nonetheless, because the dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between its largely overlapping pro/positions can be structured as discursive formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare surface, possibilities of articulation emerge that individualise the territorial cohesion discourse too. That is, when it, respectively, ties discourses together by being in creation articulations merely have to follow the rules of formation, when it appropriates policy discourses with a holistic battle arena the individualisation by these rules is specified by the concept's topical order, and when it structures related discourses with a territorial view the rules become more specific. The first entails no fundamental changes to the discourse and the conditions for its indefinitiveness and unspecificity and the second only contested particular ones. The obligation of having a territorial view on the other hand does imply a fundamental change. The re/insertions of these discursive structures in the debate are therefore of a decreasing likeliness, what probably results in a continuing vagueness of the territorial cohesion discourse.

17.3.1 Towards a new territorial governmentality

The territorial cohesion discourse hypothesised above could play a pivotal role in technocratic government, because it circumscribes the boundaries and structure of the concept's expertise. These namely limit which territorial cohesion articulations are considered to be reasonable and can therefore mediate between, in the concept's case, several marginal and/or subordinate areas of action and many naturalised objects of its politique. Because they thereby delineate objects and limits of politics and justify 'particular ways of exercising power', the discourse can be seen as a political rationality, or a composite of interweaving rationalities, that imbues policy with (legitimising) 'reason' (Rose&Millar, 1992: 175; Diez, 2001: 16).

The involved re-inscription of some instead of other knowledges and powers into debates then allows particular questions to be asked and not others. However, as the territorial cohesion discourse might not be pinpointed down, many questions can come up in it. To mention just a few meta-questions:

- cohesion and growth or cohesion or growth?
- is the answer to the question 'What is territorial cohesion?' the answer to the question 'What is European spatial planning'?
- is territorial cohesion a structure for other discourses (e.g. a federating concept, coordination) or a discourse on its own (e.g. a single policy objective, an own rationality)?
- should these choices be decided on or not?
What is more, the unity of the territorial cohesion discourse could also lie in the emerging array of questions which are never known beforehand. How do the discourse's broad limits to questioning then correlate with an organisation of governing?

As the concept stands for systematic uncertainty, its usage can re/organise institutional spaces around European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policy into indistinct symbioses, solely in/ formal concertednesses, flexibility in management, and/or nebulosity on lower levels, each and all of course accompanied by the selectivity of territorial cohesion's topical order. Hence, even if the discourse can only play a major role in these margins of the European Union, it surely correlates with an organisation of governing: its institutional context in which "everything streams" (see §1.3.2). As the territorial cohesion discourse might thus have much in common with, moreover, combines parts of its non-/discursive contexts, it might be part of a new territorial governmentality, one which does not oblige a territorial view.
Part IV  Conclusion: research output

Introduction

This research undertook a Foucaultian fieldwork in philosophy to answer a broad and fundamental question: what is the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union? Concrete analyses of the neologism 'territorial cohesion' were carried out and lead to practical philosophical considerations about the ways its conflicting meanings and usages make sense. The output of this discourse analytical endeavour is then meant to entice value-rational deliberation and action in social and spatial science.

The research frameworks, its object, the below presented discourse analytical output, and the reflective questions these lead to can be illustrated by Escher’s (1940) Metamorphosis II. The relation between concrete practices and (strategic) thought made by the analytical framework of governmentality can be seen in the relationship between a village and the game of chess; the ethereal order of territorial cohesion meanings and knowledges in the chess-board, the earthly chaos of the concept’s practices in the rocky soil on which the buildings stand, and its discourse in the white castle with a bridge between this order and chaos; the substantive framework of a world in flux in the streamlet between these sides; the transforming stream of territorial cohesion rationality that meets them in the title ‘Metamorphosis’; the snap shot of it all with the methodological framework of discourse analysis in the woodcutting of the image itself; and, finally, the title of this thesis (i.e. the place where streams seek ground) in the question why that white castle, or rather: ivory tower, is positioned thus. That is to say, with Chapter 18 Part IV concludes the questions of where is territorial cohesion going and who wins from this by creating more freedom for thinking (differently).
Chapter 18  Concluding the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion

Introduction

This conclusion of the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion will show where the concept is going and who wins from this. Its meta-interpretation of territorial cohesion interpretations arrived here in three steps. These are followed below as well, as each answers a sub-question of this research, that is, what is the meaning of territorial cohesion, how is the concept used in the European Union, and how do these two relate? The first step mapped territorial cohesion meanings and knowledges, what brings an ethereal order forward that just shows where the concept is going (§18.1). The second step mapped its power practices, what brings an organised chaos of earthly matter forward that shows that at least the dominant status quo wins with this direction (§18.2). The third step pointed out that their relations between this "ether" and "earth" form the concept’s hermeneutic horizon (§18.3), what enabled a demarcation of the discourse’s vagueness (§18.4). Each of these steps thereby provided ways to critique the ivory tower of territorial cohesion expertise (§18.5) and thus opened up room for reflective questioning (§18.6).

18.1 The ethereal order of territorial cohesion meanings and knowledges

A taxonomy of Sinn above Bedeutung seems to structure the concept’s ethereal order of propositions. Its more substantive descriptive, normative, policy objective, and instrumental kinds of meaning and its more technical policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality ones thereby group too many territorial cohesion definitions to mention here. The common ground of territorial cohesion meaning can then be outlined by that all these meanings harbour certain same tensions (e.g. cohesion on which territorial level), share one feature (i.e. no ground for tangibilisation), and several features are shared by almost all of them (e.g. no dealings with multiple territorial levels). These semantics frame territorial cohesion knowledge.

In the concept’s epistemic appear descriptive, normative, and policy objective intensions, such as a layer approach, equal opportunities, and a policy hyper-cube respectively. Intensional fragments of territorial governmentality do so as well, which could for instance become rationalities that link detailed spatial knowledge and territorial governing, just as claims do that open the door for a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion. The territorial cohesion gaze then comes forward as a kaleidoscope with certain dominant pieces (e.g. quantitative descriptions, social/liberal ideals, economic conceivings of policy objectives). Moreover, the commonalities of its pieces indicate where territorial cohesion might be going: a system of knowledge of the apolitical and tangible world seen through a relational and totalising perspective and with a (state-)government and policy focus.

18.2 The earthly chaos of the concept’s power practices

A topical order of the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and European Funds seems to form the whole field for the earthly chaos of the concept’s usage in power practices. In these four usage areas many positions are taken, but those on balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension set the agenda. Yet, each position re-/mobilises bias with a metanarrative for where territorial cohesion is about, either in the addition of an European Union competency, the promotion of European spatial planning, the substantive expansion of Regional/Cohesion policy, and/or a channelling of European funding.
Chapter 18

The IGCs thereby filter how the concept may appear, the (post-)ESDP process delivers almost all its content, Regional/Cohesion policy cherry-picks from this, and the European funds resonate all three with a guerrilla-like deployment for territorial cohesion. The concept then stands out by moving as a three-way crossing over all these marginal power practices with their fuzzy line of informality.

The usage of territorial cohesion might then be going towards an indistinct symbiosis which subjects European spatial planning to Regional/Cohesion policy, this accompanied by, on the European level, in/formal concertedness, a flexibility in management, and/or, on lower levels, nebulosity. That is to say, territorial cohesion appears to selectively re/organise institutional spaces in an institutional context where “everything streams”. This could for instance mean more influence for European spatial planning if it becomes more economic, but mostly implicates more non-decision. Therefore, besides wins in minor scuffles, the status quo dominates thus – i.e. divide et impera.

18.3 The concept’s hermeneutic horizon

European politics would affect much of the territorial cohesion discussion and research on it might have policy implications. This points to discursive practices that form the concept’s hermeneutic horizon by relating its ethereal order and organised earthly chaos. As almost all territorial cohesion pro/positions overlap, many possibilities appear on this horizon to forge reciprocal relationships of tactical productivity (e.g. with territorial cohesion indicators and the distribution of funds). Due to the involved power-knowledge effects, territorial cohesion knowledge then reassess the concept’s re-/mobilisation of bias in forms (e.g. by descriptively ordering standpoints on it) and informs government (e.g. by devising a European Territorial Cohesion Index). Thus the dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies could be weaved between its knowledge under construction and transforming usage.

The resulting territorial cohesion weave can be characterised as policy-centred with a critiqued dominance of economics and much fibre, or even fabric, from spatial planning. This might entail a research tradition and institutions (e.g. ESPON) set up for a symbiotic relationship between knowledge and power (e.g. describing European policy-making for government). Hence, when ESPON solely researches accepted territorial cohesion perceptions it at once exemplifies where territorial cohesion is above said to be going and who wins from this.

18.4 The territorial cohesion discourse as ivory tower

The territorial cohesion discourse can be seen as an ivory tower from which the reasonableness of articulations is circumscribed. Only these qualify for territorial cohesion expertise and thereby mediate between the concept’s earth of marginal and/or subordinate areas of action and its ether of many naturalised objects. Four rules then demarcate the statements within this horizon full of discursive interdependencies: i) all objects can neither be political nor tangible, ii) all operations must be policy-centred in specific ways and lack reflective argumentation, iii) all concepts must be open to relate their content to that of others, and iv) all theoretical options must be adopted. Much conditions these broad rules of formation, but especially a fixing of the dominant status quo outside the discourse’s gaze would individualise it further, as thus, arguably, everything within it can appear in a constant flux.

Individualised in this way, the discourse could function as a Discursive Nodal Point. This by pinning the many territorial cohesion meanings down in metanarratives, relating them according to the concept’s three-way crossing, and thus tying together many (policy) discourses (again, too many to mention here). Three prospects for such a structuring of its discursive interdependencies appear: a discursive formation, aggregation, and thoroughfare surface. When the territorial cohesion discourse would tie other discourses together in its phase of creation, a discursive formation surface is formed. Then the discourse would not change fundamentally, as its articulations just have to follow the rules of formation mentioned above. When it would become a
Concluding the discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion
discursive aggregation surface, this merely implies contested particular changes. The discourse then namely appropriates policy discourses with a holistic battle arena in which statements should also follow the topical order of the concept's usage. When it would become a discursive thoroughfare surface, however, this does imply a fundamental change. Because the discourse then structures other discourses with a territorial view, this view supplements the rule to which all of its operations should oblige. Then again, since many conditions thwart such a change, the territorial cohesion discourse most likely remains rather vague.

18.5 Critiquing territorial cohesion expertise to create more freedom for thinking (differently)

How the discourse limits which territorial cohesion articulations are considered to be reasonable can be critiqued in many ways; seen from a decentred viewpoint, here the upshots of this research begin. First of all, the many territorial cohesion meanings make it semantically arbitrary to choose one over another. The unsolved tensions (e.g. which territorial entities) and illogical leftovers (e.g. dealing with multiple territorial levels) that uncover their common ground then underline the arbitrary limitation of the first mentioned arbitrariness. Less obvious than arbitrary territorial cohesion meanings is the inconsistency of the concept's semantic system due to the contradictions between its kinds of meaning (e.g. description or ideal, policy coherence or objective). Still, what could baffle you more is that this arbitrary and instable common ground of meaning nevertheless appears to frame territorial cohesion knowledge.

If so, the concept's lack of epistemic firmness is not surprising. The critique of territorial cohesion knowledge thereby goes beyond its lack of theory or reflection and the arbitrary choices for specific relations between an idea and fact. A "ragged carpet" of epistemic ruptures namely appears. Here particular claims within the concept's descriptive, normative, and policy objective knowledges contradict (e.g. the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions on spatial entities). In itself such contradictions between them are not inexplicable, but the absence of argumentation on them is, just as, in the case of territorial cohesion, their lack of place- or territory-boundedness. Above such particulars three general ruptures appear: i) between the apolitical world and political perspective of the territorial cohesion gaze, ii) in the trade-off between the tangible intensions and extensions without classified facts beyond policy "facts", and iii) in the gaze's perspective between either relations or a demarcation as basis for territorial cohesion knowledge. Yet, most astonishing might be that none of the involved claims stratified into knowledge, as there is no intension-extension trade-off. Instead, the crux in the creation of this knowledge seems to lie in its interplay with meaning, that is, in combining information as territorial cohesion knowledge. Moreover, even if territorial cohesion knowledge does come about, no rationality appears to structure it into a system. Hence, if you, as this research does, define a discourse as a system of knowledge and its associated practices, then no territorial cohesion discourse would exist.

You could also arrive at this conclusion by considering the indecision about the concept's power practices. These namely do not merely change in uncertain ways (e.g. in the employed techniques), but the many territorial cohesion positions in it appear to be contested in everything. Taking one thereby does not merely involve an arbitrariness of "subjective" preference, because as good as none of them are innate to the concept and almost all a bricolage instead. Moreover, when you regard territorial cohesion as bricolage of areas of action, the concept does not clearly organise a common ground for decision-making either (e.g. where to talk about). In its place systematic uncertainty stands in the shape of a battlefield and castles in the sky.

But not territorial cohesion's semantic and epistemic arbitrariness and instability, neither the systematic uncertainty of the concept's arbitrary usage, nor their correlation is the most problematic aspect of territorial cohesion expertise. Its dubiousness namely lies in their discursive interdependencies which ensure power-knowledge effects (e.g. epistemic ruptures signal contrapositions). Put simply, with territorial cohesion every intellectual choice always implies a political choice. And with the concept this sinister linkage at least seems to justify that power is exercised technocratically.
Paradoxically, the territorial cohesion discourse would do so with a structure of rules of formation that indefinitely and unspecificly delineates objects and limits of politics. That is to say, how can a (composite) political rationality imbue policy with "reason" when its boundaries and structure are vague? This does enable two ways of critique though. That these rules deny/accept articulations first begs the question of how arbitrary territorial cohesion expertise becomes when other rules for its "argumentations" could logically wise be just as plausible. Yet, because they include such a multitude of meanings, metanarratives, and (policy) discourses, the alternative critique is that this makes the ones included the more arbitrary (i.e. where to draw the line) and the discourse too instable to function (even as Discursive Nodal Point).

The drastic conclusion might then be that the difficulty to pinpoint a territorial cohesion discourse down (i.e. in its (system of) knowledge, power practices, and rules of formation) suggests that it does not exist. Also the discourse constructed above would then be mere appearance – i.e. *unisono quas una fantasia*. What thereby does not help either, is that only premises come forward that certain articulations belong to territorial cohesion, but arguments for why this is actually the case do not appear. When Faludi (in Faludi, 2005a: 115) for instance proposes for many interpretations of territorial cohesion to rub off on another in a polycentric process, perhaps this could at least be done more clearly when the (contra)dictions and (contra)positions are argued over. One could then say that the concept lacks knowledge and argumentation and therefore merely prescribes (the thought of) the taking up of positions. That is, territorial cohesion is neither a discourse, nor one with major mental power practices, but a *politique spirituelle* in itself.

All in all, one can understand territorial cohesion as the place where streams seek ground. For instance, Harvey (1996: 260-261) believes that ‘cogredience’ is important in urban life, that is, ‘the way in which multiple processes flow together to construct a single consistent, coherent, though multi-faceted time–space system’; and Graham & Healey (1999) add that cogredience is crucial for notions of urban planning and the city. The territorial cohesion discourse can then be characterised as both representing and being a place for such a flowing together due to, respectively, the many objects and processes it includes and the various meanings/knowledges, powers, and rationalities that form it. However, while these streams meet, they do not appear to construct a consistent and coherent system, and there seems to be no ground for this either, not in facts or tangible objects, neither in decisions, nor in thinking. Yet, the ideas involved are oriented toward tangibility, the positions are put on the agenda for decision-making, and the proposed premises need argumentation, that is, they seek a ground. Hence, the obscurity of the territorial cohesion discourse might therefore simply point out that if you want to describe, understand, explain, and/or order the world, other concepts are more worthwhile. This problematisation of the foundations of the concept of territorial cohesion thus anticipates that practitioners (of science) no longer know what to do, what calls for reflection.

### 18.6 A reflective questioning of territorial cohesion

After the critique of territorial cohesion expertise above especially academic research could try to illuminate why the concept's ivory tower is positioned as it is and so circumscribes as it does. Besides that such a querying entails a different thinking about territorial cohesion, the involved questions also probe to what is outside the discourse. That is, to reflect on what the territorial cohesion discourse means you need a certain generalisation *moderatum*. Academic research could firstly do so by replacing the question of ‘What is a territorial cohesion interpretation?’ for the one of ‘Why these territorial cohesion interpretations?’. Although the broad rules which demarcate the discourse suggest that they less individualise territorial cohesion than features which extend beyond it, some of its features appear to be specific nonetheless. Cognate theories can spotlight them by differing in fundamental aspects. Formulated in a question: which alternatives to the current territorial cohesion interpretations are available in theoretical debates?
Academic research could also do so by feeling free to replace the question of 'What is a territorial cohesion interpretation?' for the one of 'Why territorial cohesion interpretations?'. As the territorial cohesion discourse might be part of a new territorial governmentality and appears to be easily modified by deeper discursive structures, one could explore the ways in which it fits in reflections on the total system of relations. These could enlighten what (lack of) conjunction and force relations in general confrontations want a territorial cohesion gaze which apparently accepts the status quo, justifies technocratic government, and does not oblige a territorial view. These could also enlighten how a discourse without a tangible or thought-out ground supports our regime of truth and the key role social science plays in it. Formulated in a question: what strategic value of the territorial cohesion discourse prevents that the vague and minor concept has not been discarded already?


– Biernacki, R. 'The Action Turn? Comparative Historical Inquiry beyond the Classical Modes of Conduct'.


– Ansell, C.K. 'Restructuring Authority and Territoriality'.

– Bartolini, S. 'Old and New Peripheries in the Processes of European Territorial Integration'
References

- Caporaso, J.A. and Jupille J.: 'Sovereignty and Territory in the European Union, Transforming the UK Institutional Order.'
- Stone Sweet, A.: 'Islands of Transnational Governance.'
- Asnini, C.K.: 'Territoriality, Authority, and Democracy.'

- Burchell, G.: 'Liberal governmentalities and technologies of the self'
- Rose, N.: Governing 'advanced liberal democracies'
References


BBR – Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung. (2001b) Spatial Development and Spatial Planning in Germany, Bonn: BBR.


– Astmann, R. ‘State Formation and Supranationalism in Europe, The Case of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation’.
– Díez-Medrano, J. ‘Ways of Seeing European Integration, Germany, Great Britain, Spain’.
– Calhoun, C. ‘The Democratic Integration of Europe, Interests, Identity, and the Public Sphere’.


249
References


- Ritchie, J. and Spencer, L., 'Qualitative data analysis for applied policy research', p. 173-194.
- Schön, P. 'Territorial Cohesion in Europe?', p. 389-400
- Hames, G. 'Territorial Cohesion How to Operationalise and Measure the Concept?', p. 400-402.
- Yeh, A.G.O. 'Territorial Cohesion: An International Comparison from the Perspective of Greater Pearl River Delta, South China', P. 409-413.


CDCR – Committee on the Development and Conversion of the Regions (2001) Decision – Laying down the creation of a working group 'Spatial and urban development', CDDR/01/0013/06.


CEC – Commission of the European Communities (1999a) *European Spatial Development Perspective: Towards Balanced and Sustainable Development of the Territory of the EU*, Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities.

CEC – Commission of the European Communities (1999b) *The Structural Funds and their Coordination with the Cohesion Fund*, Guidelines for Programmes in the Period 2000-2006, Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities.

References


CEC – Commission of the European Communities (2003d) Report from the Commission on European Governance, Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities.


252
References


CEM – European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning of the Member States of the Council of Europe (2000) 'Guiding Principles for sustainable development of the European continent. Adopted by resolution No. 1 on a ten-point programme for greater cohesion among the regions of Europe at the 12th Session of the European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning on 7-8 September, Hanover, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.


CoR – Committee of the Regions (1999a), Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 11 March 1999 on the Communication from the Commission the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, INTERMODALITY AND INTERMODAL FREIGHT TRANSPORT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION A Systems approach to freight transport. Strategies and actions to enhance efficiency, services and sustainability (COM/97) 243 final, COM-3/018, Brussels
References


CoR – Committee of the Regions (2003c) De regional en lokale dimensies by de totstandkoming van nieuwe normen van governance in Europa, Luxemburg: Bureau van officiele publicaties der Europese Gemeenschappen.


– Checkel, J.T., ‘The Europeanization of Citizenship?’
– Risse, T., ‘An European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities’


CPMR – Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (2001), Memorandum: The role of the regions in the new European Governance, For the attention of the Belgian Presidency of the European Union, Member States and European institutions in view of the Laeken Summit in December, July 2001.

CPMR – Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (2002a) Tasks, policies and competencies of the European Union: what peripheral maritime regions expect from Europe, CPMR’s contribution to the first stage of the work led by the Convention on the Future of Europe (March 2002 July 2002); Summary of a survey conducted among 146 member regions of the CPMR, adopted by the CPMR Political Bureau (Schwerin, 14 May 2002), May 2002.


References

CSD – Committee on Spatial Development (1997a) European Spatial Development Perspective: First Official Draft, Noordwijk, CSD.
CSD – Committee on Spatial Development (1997b) ‘Concept on the establishment of the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON)’ Draft for the CSD Meeting, November, Brussels.
– Ø Cinnéide, M.: ‘Executive Summary: Meeting the Challenges of Territorial Cohesion in an Enlarged European Union’
– Bennett, J.: ‘Introduction’
– Leygues, J-C: ‘Territorial Cohesion’.
– Tosics, I.: ‘Sustainable Development and Economic Competitiveness in Metropolitan Regions’.
– Tenreiro, C.: ‘Some Considerations about State Aid as a Possible Factor of Territorial Cohesion’.
– Cristodorescu, G.: ‘Regional Innovation: A Driver for Territorial Cohesion in Romania’.


255
References


DTI, HTM and ODPM – Department of Trade and Industry, Her Majesty’s Treasury and The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (2003), A Modern Regional Policy for the United Kingdom, London, DTI.


EECSC – European Economic and Social Comité (1996) Zesde periodiek verslag over de social-economische situatie en de ontwikkeling van de regio’s van de Europese Unie, Brussel.


References


References


ESPON – European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (2005b) In search of territorial potentials, Midterm results by spring 2005, Luxembourg.


EURADA (undated) Contribution to Future Discussions on Modernising the EU Budget, Memo to the Secretariat.


- Faludi, A. 'Territorial Cohesion: An unidentified political objective, Introduction to the special issue', p. 1-14
- Polverari, L. and Bachtler, J.: 'The contribution of European Structural Funds to territorial cohesion', p. 29-42.
- Schäfer, N.: 'Coordination in European spatial development, Whose responsibility?', p. 43-56.
- Mercier, G.: 'Which territorial cohesion policy for the new EU members? The example of Slovakia', p. 57-68.
- Janin Rivolin, U.: 'Cohesion and subsidiarity, Towards good territorial governance in Europe', p. 93-106


Faludi, A. (2005) Foreword
- Robert, J.: 'The origins of territorial cohesion and the vagaries of its trajectory'
- Waterhout, B.: 'Territorial Cohesion: Discourses Underlying'
- Darvudi, S.: 'Territorial cohesion, European social model and spatial policy research'
- Camagni, R.: 'The rationale for territorial cohesion and the place of territorial development policies in the European Model of Society'
- Drevet, J-F.: 'Chasing a Moving Target: Territorial Cohesion Policy in a Europe with Uncertain Borders'
- Zonneveld, W.: 'Unraveling Europe's spatial structure through spatial visioning: Is there a European territorial model of society?'


Faludi, A. ‘Strategic Spatial Planning in Europe: institutional aspects’.

Hajer, M., ‘Transnational networks as transnational policy discourse: some observations on the politics of spatial development in Europe’.


Fischer, F. ‘Policy discourse and the politics of Washington think tanks’.

Hoppe, R. ‘Political judgement and the policy cycle: the case of ethnicity policy arguments in the Netherlands’.

Hajer, A.M. ‘Discourse coalitions and the institutionalisation of practice: the case of acid rain in Great Britain’.


Fleischer, T. (2004) Comments on services of general interest and territorial and social cohesion; Contribution to the international conference on ‘Services of General Interest in an Enlarged European Union’, organised by the TEPSA members Study Group for European Policies (Belgium), Institute for World Economics (Hungary) and the Initiative pour des services d'utilité publique en Europe (Belgium) with the support of the European Commission on 21-22 October, 2004.


– Foucault, M. (1977): ‘Le jeu de Michel Foucault’ in Ornicar? 10 July. The journal is published by members of the Department of Psychoanalysis at the University of Vincennes. A few preliminary remarks are omitted from this translation.

Maurice Florence, "Foucault".
References


262
References


References


– E.O. Eriksen: 'Governance or Democracy?' The White paper on European Governance'.


– P. Magnette: 'European Governance and Civic Participation: Can the European Union be politicised?'.

– K.A. Armstrong: 'Civil Society and the White paper – Bridging or Jumping the Gaps'.


– Ph.C. Schmidt: 'What is there to legitimise in the European Union ... and how might this be accomplished?'.


– C. Mollers: 'Policy, Politics or Political Theory'.


References


References

- Foucault, M., ‘Space, knowledge, power’
Hall, P.A.: ‘Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Research’


Mermaid Group discussion document of 2002 called 'ESDP: Managing the territorial dimension of the EU policies after enlargement - Outline for a common document'.


London: Routledge.


References


Nordestro (2006a) ESPON Project 2.3.1, Application and Effects of the ESDP in the Member States, Second Interim Report.

Nordestro (2006b) ESPON Project 2.3.1, Application and Effects of the ESDP in the Member States, Final Report.


References


Peyrony, J. (2002) 'Le schema de développement de l’espace communautaire, Territoires en mouvement, Paris: La Documentation Francaise, DATAR.


References


Ravensteijn, N., van, and Evers, D. (2004) 'What happened to European spatial planning?', Ruimte in Debat, No. 4, p. 4-10.


270
References


SUD – Subcommittee on Spatial and Urban Development (2003b) 'Annual Activity report from the Sub-Committee of Spatial and Urban Development to the Committee on the Development and Conversion of the Regions.


References


Tolstoj, L.N. (1868) Oorlog en vrede Deel 2, Rainbow Russische Bibliotheek pocket nr. 456, Muntinga, 1999


Walloon Presidency (1993) ‘For a significant step towards a co-ordinated spatial organisation of Europe. Note of the Presidency concerning the spatial planning discussion of 13 November’, informal meeting of ministers responsible for regional policy and spatial planning, Liège, 12-13 November.


References


Working Group 4c (2001) 'Multi-level Governance: Linking and Networking the Various Regional and Local Levels (Group 4c) (http://europa.eu.int/governance/areas/group10/index_en.htm).


Summary

Introduction
The discourse analysis of territorial cohesion
A phronetic path in three directions
a. The ethereal order of territorial cohesion meanings and knowledges
b. The earthly chaos of the concept's power practices
c. The concept's hermeneutic horizon
Critique of territorial cohesion expertise
Concluding the philosophical fieldwork about the concept of territorial cohesion

Introduction
The summary of this PhD-thesis in spatial planning presents philosophical fieldwork on the concept of territorial cohesion. Territorial cohesion has a simple meaning at first glance, along the lines of ‘forming a united whole related to the ownership of an area’. However, such a broad definition leaves considerable room for manoeuvring, thereby providing the starting point for this research.

The confusion surrounding territorial cohesion is also formed by its complex and uncertain, although promoted, usage within the European Union organisation. This organisation is a context in which “everything flows” and can be described as a multi-level structure without a centre of power in which heterogeneous institutions cooperate closely using many informal methods. The concept then informally emerged on the stage of European spatial planning – note that the European Union has no competency in this matter – and later in the official context of the European Treaties, another stage, one which assigns competencies to the European Union, and in the context of Cohesion Policy, yet another stage, one of formal European Union policy (these stages will be explicated below). The main question in this thesis is therefore broad and fundamental, and formulated as: What is the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union? This question has remained unanswered.

This research answered the question based on the Foucaultian stance that the meanings and usage of territorial cohesion mutually affect one another. Furthermore, the power practices in which the concept is used are also regarded as dependant on the knowledge arising from and informing the act of governing. In abstract terms, one can only govern if you know what you govern, hence government’s need for knowledge. Moreover, one can only know a ‘specific something’, and one can therefore only know with a focus, hence, knowledge’s need for direction.

Instead of researching what we are programmed to see (e.g. sovereignty), this research allows such programmes to merely direct us to spheres of action in which power relations are transformed. In the context of territorial cohesion, what actually happens when it concerns competencies (auctoritas), policy (potestas), funding (pecunia), and framing (politique spirituelle) is queried. Given that expert thought arguably plays a pivotal role in the relations between meaning and knowledge on the one hand and power on the other hand, by connecting government action and the governed entity, the territorial cohesion discourse as therefore the research object.
The discourse analysis of territorial cohesion

A phronetic path in three directions

The discourse analysis in this research follows a phronetic path with European spatial planning as a point of departure by studying the status of values and interests in relation to the concept of territorial cohesion. It thereby defines ‘discourse’ as a system of knowledge and its associated practices that operates as a tactical element in a field of force relations. The analysis of the territorial cohesion discourse as such entails a concrete study of rationality and power construction through an interpretative search for meaning in three ways: i) what are the concept's meanings and knowledges (i.e. connaissances), ii) what are its usages, iii) and how do these sides relate? These ways map the “ethereal order”, “earthly chaos”, and “hermeneutic horizon” of territorial cohesion as shown below. In due course this threefold path leads to a questioning of the intertwinement of the concept’s scientific and political agendas.

a The ethereal order of territorial cohesion meanings and knowledges

There appears to be plenty of meanings for territorial cohesion, perhaps even too many. Random definitions include: economic cohesion between territories, the territorial dimension of sustainable development, equal access to Services of General (Economic) Interest (SG(E)I), balanced regional development, horizontal coherence of European Union policies, national territorial development, and a new territorial way of thinking.

To structure the concept’s “ethereal order”, the multitude of such definitions can be categorised by using seven kinds of meaning, of which four are substantive (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective, instrumental) and three are technical ones (i.e. policy coherence, spatial planning, territorial ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1980, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991)). This leads to a taxonomy of territorial cohesion semantics in which different kinds of meaning group different definitions (i.e. in philosophy of language terms, Sinn above Bedeutung).

Moreover, all these meanings have common four features: i) the question which territorial entities are concerned, ii) that relations between territorial levels are seldom treated, and iii) the exclusion of both politics and iv) tangibility. To put it simply, when talking about territorial cohesion, one is talking about cities, regions, Member States, or the European Union? This question does not need to be answered (in the same way) though. On the other hand, when talking about how territorial levels relate, one has almost passed the fuzzy limit at after which one is not talking about territorial cohesion any more. The last two features give clearer limits though. One cannot simultaneously talk about politics and territorial cohesion (i.e. one can talk about the balance or even tension between policy objectives, but neither about the organisation which sets these objectives, nor about the form of State for instance). One can likewise not simultaneously talk about territorial cohesion and tangible matters. Hence, just as the seven kinds of meaning structure the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, these four features outline it.

The semantics of this common ground of meaning validates knowledge as being territorial cohesion knowledge and frames it. In the structure of the seven kinds of knowledge (i.e. the same kinds as the seven Sinn), epistemic claims can thereby either express the set of all properties that something must have to be called territorial cohesion (i.e. its intension) or a set of all the facts which are actually territorial cohesion (i.e. its extension). However, there only appear to be descriptive, normative, and policy objective intensions, such as a layer approach, equal opportunities, and a policy hyper-cube respectively. Intensional fragments of territorial governmentality are also apparent and these could, for instance, become rationalities that link detailed spatial knowledge and territorial governing. Other claims open the door to the transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge unto territorial cohesion. However, both these fragments and “open door” are not in themselves knowledge claims, which are uncommon.

Nevertheless, the knowledge claims generate a specific ‘gaze’ (Fairclough, 2003: 129), through which one sees a particular part of the world with a particular perspective. In the case of territorial cohesion, this is not so much a clear and fixed gaze though but a kaleidoscope with a number of dominant pieces (e.g. quantitative descriptions, social/liberal ideals, and economic conceptions of policy objectives). The commonalities of the
pieces might thereby even provide a broader indication. In alignment with the concept's four semantic features, indicating the direction of the gaze: a system of knowledge of the apolitical and tangible world that is seen through a relational and totalising perspective and with a (state-)government and policy focus (see below). Both the definitions and knowledge claims are the concept's propositions, and together they form its "ethereal order.

This order can now be displayed with an outlined and structured map of territorial cohesion meaning and indicative map of the concept's knowledge, which together display the ways in which the concept's forms, objects, and limits of politics are stratified.

b  The earthly chaos of the concept's power practices

Similarly to its meaning, the concept is (over)used for many issues. Many positions that are taken under the flag of territorial cohesion can namely be reconstructed from the stories told in and about power practices. Some concentrations are however apparent because its agenda seems to be mostly set by positions on balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension. The question, therefore, is how they set the agenda.

One is, in fact, directed to the spheres of action in which these positions are taken by the programmes mentioned above (i.e. juridical programmes of competencies, administrative programmes of policies, financial programmes of funding, and mental programmes of thought). These then lead to four usage areas which structure the whole territorial cohesion usage field: i) the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) (auctoritas), ii) the (post-)ESDP process (informal potestas, as the European Union has no competency for spatial planning), iii) Regional/Cohesion policy (formal potestas), and iv) the European funds (pecunia); mental programmes thus do not have a corresponding usage area – politique spirituelle features more in meaning, knowledge, and discourse. Territorial cohesion, and with that the positions which most definitively set its agenda, therefore plays a role in adding to European Union competency, promoting European spatial planning, the substantive expansion of Regional/Cohesion policy, and/or the channelling of European funding. Each position taken under the flag of the concept can thereby 'mobilise bias' (Schattschneider, 1960: 71; Lukes, 1975: 16) in these transformations of power relations, especially when it features in a metanarrative that marks where and what territorial cohesion deals with.

In these usage areas many minor conflicts appear, which are too numerous to mention here. The focus is therefore only on the main conclusions per usage area, which are drawn from the perspective of European spatial planning. These conclusions are then linked, and thus the usage areas. As far as the IGCs usage area is concerned a threefold contested usage of the concept then appears: i) for or against a European Union competency for territorial cohesion policy, ii) for or against a European Union competency for spatial planning, and iii) for or against their overlap or relationship. These disputes in the IGCs therefore act as a filter for how the concept may manifest itself (i.e. the in/formality of its usage).

In contrast, the (post-)ESDP usage area has no contested usage of the concept, but merely promotions of it. Here, territorial cohesion is only used to place a large number of European spatial planning issues on the agenda. You could therefore say that the concept is simply used to promote European spatial planning. This is in stark contrast to the contests in the IGCs usage area. Yet, the (post-)ESDP process does deliver almost all the territorial cohesion content, and therefore informally demarcates the substantive limits for possible usages of said concept (e.g. polycentrism or territorial capital, spatial development or territorial governance).

The Regional/Cohesion policy usage area obviously demarcates the formal usage of territorial cohesion in European policies. By doing so, it promotes the expansion of the Regional/Cohesion policy area of action by combining roaming along the official limits of the concept's usage with cherry-picking from the informal (post-)ESDP process. This revolves around the questions of what exactly territorial cohesion gives a competency to (see the IGCs; e.g. services or even policy coordination) and which territorial cohesion content from European spatial planning can be used for Regional/Cohesion policy (see the (post-)ESDP process; e.g. a balancing of economy-society-environment, informal cooperation)?
The European Funds usage area seems to resonate with the three other usage areas in financial concretisation with a guerrilla-like deployment for territorial cohesion. The European funds might be involved in a messy asymmetrical battle because: i) the concept’s usage appears to be opportunistic, ii) to risk a “schisming” of itself, iii) to risk to become too complex, and this while iv) a channelling of European funds via the concept is contested in fivefold. These features will be briefly clarified below, starting with the opportunism of the usage of the concept. This is indicated by the multiplicity of interests (e.g. peripheral regions, territorial cooperation) that sometimes return under the concept’s flag, which are or are not counterposed, and which were always also promoted without the usage of territorial cohesion. The usage of the concept for these interests may have been nothing more than one of many opportunities to acquire (more) funding, either through an expansion of this area of action, or through a fortification of certain interests within it. The risk of “schisming” then comes from the sole formal way in which the concept is used here (until the beginning of 2006), namely in the Rural Development Fund. The resources from this fund are mostly made available for other areas than those for which resources are made available from the more urban Structural Funds, such as the Cohesion and European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), in which territorial cohesion is also used, as, for example, referred to in the European Union’s Regional/Cohesion policy. From the financial point of view the concept then has to endure such a wide split between funding streams that it could schism. The risk of becoming too complex does not come from the increasing variation in interests for which the concept is used, but from the frequently stressed substantive coordination between them, between agricultural and other policies for instance. This makes it more and perhaps too complex. This opportunism, “schisming”, and “complexing” also feature in the fivefold contested channelling of European funds via territorial cohesion. Although this channelling is debated, much namely goes against it: i) the contests between existing and/or wished for usages of the concept, ii) the in/formality of the positions involved, iii) their guerrilla-like situation, iv) the uncertainty of the concept’s influence, and v) that the European Funds usage area seems to play no role in financial affairs. The concept’s financial punching power therefore appears to be questionable, even if the IGCs were to broaden and solidify the formal base for its usage.

Nevertheless, these four maps help us to draw conclusions about territorial cohesion’s “earthly chaos”, because they display the concept’s usage. We are also able to link the four maps together to indicate the whole territorial cohesion usage field and consider what its topical order implies. Although all kinds of links can be drawn between the four usage areas, it is hard to create an orderly overview without adopting a perspectival viewpoint to start from (e.g. of a partial actor such as a national government).

Adopting a bird’s eye view helps to create a more abstract order. Territorial cohesion then stands for a battlefield forming a corridor between the different areas of action. The concept therefore stands out as a three-way crossing between European spatial planning, Regional/Cohesion policy, and the European Funds and their fuzzy line of in/formality from the IGCs. Then again, two features of the concept make this image more complex: i) the concept is not only placed between these areas, but also within them and ii) the concept does not only have a location, it also relocates due to the changing territorial cohesion positions. Hence, the concept is a three-way crossing that moves over various power practices.

In a context where “everything streams”, territorial cohesion’s topical order might then selectively re/organise institutional spaces. Its usage could namely steer towards an indistinct symbiosis of European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policy due to the usage of the same concept, and thus an overlap of positions. This would subject the former to the latter due to the difference in their in/formal status and the cherry-picking involved.

The usage of territorial cohesion could on the European level be accompanied by in/formal “concertedness”, as it is unclear who gets a competency for what, and a flexibility in management, as various ways of doing from the different areas of action can be taken up. On the lower levels this could all lead to nebulosity due to the little-known haze that comes from the European Union (e.g. with funding).
The usage of territorial cohesion thus reveals implicit but major battles at the margin of the European Union (e.g. on European spatial planning). It demonstrates the decision to make no decisions, that is, non-decisions with which the status quo persists and thus dominates.

**c The concept’s hermeneutic horizon**

Consequently territorial cohesion has, on the one hand, a common ground of many meanings on which forms, objects, and limits of politics are stratified and, on the other hand, numerous usages of the concept in power practices. The point then is that almost all the propositions of the concept’s “etheral order” correspond to positions in the topical order of its “earthly chaos”. These overlapping propositions and positions (i.e. pro/positions) suggest that thinking in daily discursive practices can easily form the hermeneutic horizon of territorial cohesion by linking the concept’s “ether” and “earth”. In other words, possibilities appear on this horizon for reciprocal relationships in which European politics affect the discussion of the concept, while territorial cohesion research has policy implications. Obvious examples of this tactical productivity between pro/positions would be territorial cohesion indicators, which have to be defined, and the distribution of funds, including on the basis of those indicators. Two additional examples are: i) if the concept is used to coordinate European Union policies territorially, territorial cohesion research cannot then focus any longer on balanced development without contradicting that usage, but must at least have a more technical meaning, and ii) if a territorial cohesion knowledge presents the competitiveness of all regions, this could have a detrimental effect on the promotion of specific regions with the concept (e.g. peripheral or mountainous regions), given that the territorial cohesion then applies to competitiveness in general rather than that of specific regions.

Due to these power-knowledge effects, knowledge on the concept can corroborate its mobilisation of bias in forms (e.g. by descriptively ordering viewpoints on it) and inform government (e.g. by devising a European Territorial Cohesion Index). Given that the knowledge is being constructed while the many usages are still changing, a complex and dynamic network of discursive interdependencies’ (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 58; Wæver, 1998: 116; Diez, 2001: 12) could then be woven between them. Although this weave is a work in progress, its characteristics can still be defined. It focuses on policy with an emphasis on economic thinking and the criticism thereof. Moreover, many of the threads, or even the fabric, of territorial cohesion seems to come from spatial planning. This may mean that the research tradition and institutions of European spatial planning are being mimicked (e.g. with the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON)). These institutions were set up on behalf of a symbiotic relationship between knowledge and power (e.g. to describe European policy-making for government). The question is then which possibilities of articulation (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 58; Wæver, 1998: 116; Diez, 2001: 12) emerge out of the discursive interdependencies of the concept’s hermeneutic horizon. In other words, in which way do they limit what is considered to be reasonable in the case of territorial cohesion?

The answer provided by this research is an interpretative demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse. Hypothetically speaking, there are four rules which demarcate the statements within this discourse, that is, the territorial cohesion pro/positions described in this research’s philosophical fieldwork seems to obey four prescriptions. These regularities are then: i) all objects can neither be political nor tangible, ii) all operations must be policy-centred in specific ways and lack reflective argumentation, iii) all concepts must be open to relate their content to that of others, and iv) all theoretical options must be adopted. The first rule regarding what territorial cohesion can be about follows from the concept’s “ether” as shown above. The second rule has more to do with the ways in which territorial cohesion can be about these apolitical and intangible objects. The part of the rule that the operations have to be policy-centred comes from the discursive interdependencies outlined above that are woven into the concept’s hermeneutic horizon, whereby its ‘specific ways’ points to the battlefield that the concept forms in and between the usage areas of the IGCs, the (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and the European Funds. The third rule concerns the variety of issues territorial cohesion deals with, instead of mere economic examples, that are treated and frequently
shown as interwoven. The part of the second rule on reflective argumentation and the fourth rule simply state
that neither reflections nor theories appear with the concept, except for theories from elsewhere (e.g. Rawls' theory of justice). These regularities together constitute the discourse's 'rules of formation' (Foucault, 1988, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 54) that demarcate what are considered to be reasonable articulations of the concept.

These boundaries of territorial cohesion discourse define it as an individual entity. However, its rules of formation leave plenty of opportunities to make statements about this. After all, they have to take account of the multitude of existing territorial cohesion pro/positions. These pro/positions do not appear out of thin air, but each of them is conditioned. The general rules of formation therefore have many conditions. However, these conditions individualise some of its pro/positions instead of the entire discourse. The discourse would be further individualised by the setting up of the dominant status quo outside the concept's gate, as indicated by its "earth". Such a viewpoint enables everything within its perspective to appear in a constant state of flux.

The openness of the territorial cohesion discourse leaves room for tying many other discourses together (i.e. as a Discursive Nodal Point (Diez, 2001)). Although specific discourses can be tied together in this way (e.g. the social cohesion discourse, an economic policy discourse), there are too many to mention here. Nevertheless, there are three ways in which the territorial cohesion discourse can do this, which may therefore further individualise it, as they structure the concept's discursive interdependencies. The three expectations here are territorial cohesion as a discursive formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare surface, and these prospects are briefly treated in the same order below.

If the territorial cohesion discourse were to tie other discourses together in its creation, a discursive formation surface would be formed. It would both consist of various discourses and exist as tied together discourses. The territorial cohesion discourse would not have to change fundamentally, because its articulations simply have to comply with the above rules of formation.

If the discourse were to become a discursive aggregation surface, this would carry with it certain changes. That is because a holistic arena then indicates which policy discourses are appropriated (e.g. the cohesion policy discourse, European Union's spatial policy discourse), and in this battle arena statements should also follow the topical order of the concept's usage. However, given that the resulting changes would relate to particular cases and these changes could be contested as well, the territorial cohesion discourse is not fundamentally changed.

However, the discourse would fundamentally change if its essence is formed by a territorial view. It would then become a discursive thoroughfare surface which structures other discourses and by doing so adds a feature to them. This view supplements the above stated rule with which all of its operations have to comply, given that all the discourse's statements have a territorial perspective.

Although territorial cohesion did not develop in one of these three discursive surfaces, the discourse is still open to them. However, since many conditions hamper changes, the territorial cohesion discourse will most likely remain rather vague with regards to this.

Consequently, the concept's meanings and knowledges and its usages together form an indefinite entity, in their reciprocal productivity they form a system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices as a discourse. Although its rules offer room for a large variety of articulations and discursive structures, not all statements are reasoned as territorial cohesion statements. Here, the discourse re/inserts an openness into debates on territorial cohesion, a limited openness that is.

Critique of territorial cohesion expertise
This openness of this discourse leaves it open to much criticism on the involved expertise. This research has strangely enough found the boundaries of discourse or rather the ways in which it is limited to be more problematic.

This research, therefore, does not make a point on the randomness of choosing a particular territorial cohesion meaning over many others, or that they contain some unresolved tensions (e.g. on territorial entities), nor that its kinds of meaning mutually contradict (e.g. either territorial cohesion is an existing state of affairs
or an ideal, or either policy coherence or a policy objective, but it is impossible for it to be both). The resulting instability of the concept's common ground of meaning or the fact that this common ground frames territorial cohesion knowledge are not criticised here. Criticism is also not directed at the fact this knowledge is often created by referring to combinations of existing information as being territorial cohesion knowledge, or that it is arbitrary to prefer one knowledge claim over another, or that they contradict each other. Similarly, this research also does not criticise the indecisiveness of the concept's power practices due to uncertain changes in its usage and that territorial cohesion stands for systematic uncertainty due to how almost every position taken with the concept is contestable. This research does not even criticise the bricolage of areas of action, where territorial cohesion does not form common ground for decision-making (e.g. what subject to discuss, on what to decide?). All the above points criticise is the openness of the territorial cohesion discourse.

This research instead regards the boundaries of the territorial cohesion discourse as being far more problematic. Of course, the discourse's rules of formation exclude political and tangible objects as well as operations that are not policy-centred. They also exclude aspects that remain (illogically) untreated in the concept's meaning (e.g. dealing with multiple territorial levels). The same applies to knowledge, as it lacks facts beyond policy "facts", argumentation in the case of contradicting claims, theory (e.g. on place- or territory-boundedness, relations or demarcation as basis), and reflection (e.g. on the tension between the apolitical world and political perspective of the territorial cohesion gaze). Yet, the main criticism of this research is not directed at these discourse boundaries, but the fact that they are adhered to.

This research criticises territorial cohesion expertise primarily for the dubiousness of the involved discursive interdependencies that ensure power-knowledge effects. With territorial cohesion, every intellectual choice always implies a political choice. This sinister link seems to justify that power is being exercised in a technocratic way, because the territorial cohesion discourse, which ensures these reciprocal relationships, separates its experts from the general public.

The discourse paradoxically does this in a vague way that is both indefinite and unspecific. The difficulty in pinning down the discourse suggests that it perhaps does not exist, neither as a system of knowledge, nor as power practices, nor as rules of formation. One can assert that the concept merely prescribes (the thinking about) the taking of positions in power practices because territorial cohesion lacks factual knowledge and argumentation. Consequentially, territorial cohesion is not a discourse, but a politique spirituelle, which therefore distinguishes experts from laymen but this without any actual expertise being involved – save the expertise of mental power practices.

Concluding the philosophical fieldwork about the concept of territorial cohesion

The philosophical fieldwork of this research began with the question on what the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion is within the European Union. While travelling along its threefold phronetical path, it passed by many meanings, knowledges, powers, and reasonings that flow together and form the territorial cohesion discourse. If these semantic, epistemic, agonistic, and rational streams together represent a part of the world at all, it is a place where numerous objects and processes flow together. In both cases, territorial cohesion can be interpreted as *The Place where Streams seek Ground.*

Although these streams flow together, they do not appear to form a consistent and coherent system. There seems to be no basis for such a conjugation, neither in facts nor tangible objects, nor in decisions or in thought. Nevertheless, the ideas involved are oriented toward tangibility, the positions have been placed on the decision-making agenda, and the discourse needs argumentation. Given the problematic status of the concept of territorial cohesion, this research therefore concludes by asking the practitioners (of science) who still know what to do in this context ‘Why these territorial cohesion interpretations?’ or indeed, ‘Why territorial cohesion interpretations at all?’

283
Samenvatting

Introductie

De discoursanalyse van territoriale cohesie
Een fronetisch pad langs drie wegen
a. De etherische orde van territoriale cohesie betekenissen en kennislenen
b. De aardse chaos van de machtspraktijken van het concept
c. De hermeneutische horizon van het concept

Critiek op territoriale cohesie expertise

Conclusie van het filosofische veldwerk over het concept territoriale cohesie

Introductie

De samenvatting van dit planologieproefschrift presenteert filosofisch veldwerk over het concept territoriale cohesie. Op het eerste gezicht heeft territoriale cohesie een simpele betekenis, zoiets als ‘een geheel vormen in relatie met het eigendom van een gebied’. Echter, zulk een brede betekenis laat veel open, en dat is waar dit onderzoek begint.

De verwarring over territoriale cohesie komt hierbij ook van zijn complexe en onzekere maar desondanks gepromote gebruik in de Europese Unie, een context waar ‘alles stroomt’, aangezien de organisatie beschreven kan worden als een structuur met meerdere niveaus, zonder machtscentrum, waar heterogene instituties nauw samenwerken, en ook met vele informele werkwijzen. Het concept kwam hierbij op het toneel van Europese ruimtelijke planning op – laat wel, de Europese Unie heeft hiervoor geen bevoegdheid – en verscheen daarna officieel op het toneel van de Europese Verdragen, dat de Europese Unie haar bevoegdheden geeft, en op het formele toneel van het Europese Cohesiebeleid (deze tonelen worden hieronder uitgelegd). De hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift is dan breed maar fundamenteel en voor lang onbeantwoord: wat is de betekenis en het gebruik van het concept territoriale cohesie in de Europese Unie?

Om deze vraag te beantwoorden is dit onderzoek uitgevoerd met een Foucaultiaanse houding die stelt dat territoriale cohesie betekenissen en gebruik elkaar wederzijds beïnvloeden. Abstract gezegd: je kunt enkel besturen als je weet wat je bestuurt, vandaar de behoefte van bestuur aan kennis, en je kunt enkel een “bepaald iets” kennen en daarom enkel kennen met een focus, vandaar de behoefte van kennis aan directie.

Daarom onderzocht dit onderzoek niet wat we geprogrammeerd zijn te zien (bijv. soevereiniteit), maar wijzen deze programma’s ons enkel op de handelingsvelden waarin machtrecht kan veranderen. Dat wil zeggen, we vragen ons ook af wat daadwerkelijk gebeurt als het bevoegdheden (auctoritas), beleid (potestas), fondsen (pecunia), en framing (politique spirituelle) betreft in het geval van territoriale cohesie. Aangezien gesteld kan worden dat het denken (van experts) een hoofddrol speelt in de relaties tussen betekenissen en kennis aan de ene kant en macht aan de andere kant, door bestuur en het bestuurde te verbinden, richt dit onderzoek zich op het territoriale cohesie discours als zijn onderzoekssubject.

De discoursanalyse van territoriale cohesie

Een fronetisch pad langs drie wegen

Vanaf het vertrekpunt van Europese ruimtelijke planning neemt de discoursanalyse van dit onderzoek een fronetisch pad door de status van waarden en belangen te bestuderen in het geval van territoriale cohesie. Daarbij wordt ‘discours’ gedefinieerd als een kennisysteem en daaraan verbonden praktijken, een geheel dat functioneert als een tactisch element in een veld van krachtrelaties. Zodoende houdt de analyse van
het territoriale cohesie discours een concrete studie van rationaliteit en macht constructie in, dit door een interpretatieve zoektocht naar betekenis, en wel op drie manieren: i) wat zijn territoriale cohesie betekenis en kennissen, ii) hoe wordt het concept gebruikt, en iii) hoe relateren deze kanten? Deze wegen brengen dan de “etherische orde”, de “aardse chaos”, en de “hermeneutisch horizon” van territoriale cohesie in kaart. Dit drievoudige pad leidt naar een ondervragen van, simpel gesteld, de vervlechting van de wetenschappelijke en politieke agenda’s van het concept.

a. De etherische orde van territoriale cohesie betekenis en kennissen

Territoriale cohesie lijkt niet zoveer een gebrek te hebben aan betekenis, want er zijn vele definities van het concept – misschien zelfs te veel. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn: economische cohesie tussen territoria, de territoriale dimensie van duurzame ontwikkeling, horizontale coördinatie van Europese beleid, nationale territoriale ontwikkeling, en een nieuwe territoriale denkwijze. Om de “etherische orde” van territoriale cohesie te structureren kan het grote aantal van zulke definities gecategoriseerd worden met behulp van zeven kennissoorten, vier meer inhoudelijke (i.e. beschrijvende, normatieve, beleidsdoelen, instrumentele) en drie meer technische (i.e. beleidscoherentie, ruimtelijke planning, territoriale ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1980, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991)). Dit leidt tot een taxonomie van territoriale cohesie semantiek met verschillende soorten betekenis Deze wegen brengen dan de dan gegroepeerde verschillende definities (i.e. Beschreibung).

Bovendien hebben al deze betekenis kenmerken: i) de vraag welke territoriale eenheden het betreft, ii) de zeldzame behandeling van relaties tussen territoriale niveaus, en zowel de uitsluiting van ii) politiek als iv) tastbaarheid. Het eerste kenmerk wil simpelweg zeggen dat als we het over territoriale cohesie hebben het de vraag is of het over steden, regio’s, lidstaten, of de Europese Unie gaat. Deze vraag hoeft trouwens niet (hetzelfde) beantwoord te worden. Als we het daarentegen over territoriale niveaus hebben dan zijn we al bij de grens aanbeland, we hebben het dan bijna niet meer over territoriale cohesie. In vergelijking met deze twee kenmerken geven de andere twee duidelijke grenzen aan: we kunnen het niet tegelijkertijd over politiek en territoriale cohesie hebben (i.e. we kunnen het over het evenwicht of zelfs de spanning tussen beleidsdoelen hebben, maar niet over de organisatie die deze doelen stelt en ook niet over staatsvormen bijvoorbeeld). Ook kunnen we het niet tegelijkertijd hebben over territoriale cohesie en dingen waartegen we (letterlijk) ons hoofd kunnen stoten. Oftewel, net zoals de zeven soorten van betekenis de common ground van territoriale cohesie betekenis structureren, zo omlijken deze vier kenmerken het.

De semantiek van de common ground van betekenis verklaart niet alleen bepaalde kennis als zijnde geldige territoriale cohesie kennis, maar kadert deze kennis ook in. In de structuur van zeven kennissoorten (i.e. dezelfde soorten als de zeven Sinn) kunnen kennisclaims vervolgens het totaal van alle eigenschappen uitdrukken dat iets moet hebben om territoriale cohesie genoemd te worden (i.e. zijn intensie) ofwel de verzameling van dingen die feitelijk territoriale cohesie zijn (i.e. zijn extensie). Echter, er verschijnen enkel beschrijvende, normatieve, en beleidsdoelintensies, zoals, respectievelijk, die over de lagenbenadering, gelijke kansen, en een beleidshyper-cube. Intensive fragmenten van territoriale governmentalities verschijnen ook, deze kunnen bijvoorbeeld denkwijzen worden die gedetailleerde ruimtelijke kennis verbinden met territoriaal besturen. Daarnaast komen kennisclaims naar voren die de deur openen voor het kennisysteem van ruimtelijke planning dat dan in territoriale cohesie overgezet kan worden. Let wel, deze fragmenten en “opengezette deur” zijn zelf geen kennisclaims – zulke claims komen zelden voor.

Desondanks komt uit de claims op territoriale cohesie kennis een specifieke ‘gaze’ (Fairclough, 2003: 129) naar voren, een blik die op een specifieke manier waar een bepaalde deel van de wereld kijkt. Dit is geen heldere en onbeweeglijke blik, maar meer een kaleidoscoop met bepaalde overheersende stukjes (bijv. kwantitatieve beschrijvingen, sociale/liberale idealen, economisch bedachte beleidsdoelen). De overeenkomsten tussen deze stukjes kunnen zelfs meer aangeven. In de lijn van de vier semantische kenmerken van het concept kunnen ze namelijk aangeven wat de territoriale cohesie blik kan worden: een systeem van kennis over de apolitieke en
Zowel territoriale cohesie definities als kennisclaims zijn proposities van het concept, en samen vormen ze zijn “etherische orde”. Deze orde kunnen we nu dus weergeven met een omlijnde en gestructureerde kaart van territoriale cohesie betekenis en een indicatieve kaart van de territoriale cohesie kennis. Samen geven ze dan de lagen aan waarin de territoriale cohesievormen, -objecten, en -grenzen van politiek gevormd worden.

b De aardse chaos van de machtspraktijken van het concept
Net zoals bij de betekenis van territoriale cohesie lijkt er geen gebrek te zijn aan een manier waarop het concept wordt gebruikt, want dat wordt het voor vele zaken – en weer zo veel dat het te veel zou kunnen zijn. Uit de verhalen in en over machtspraktijken kunnen namelijk vele stellingnames van het concept gereconstrueerd worden. Echter, de posities van deze stellingnames lijken daarbij wel enigszins geconcentreerd te zijn, want die aangaande evenwicht, diensten, territoriale specificiteiten, coördinatie, en de territoriale dimensie bepalen het meest de agenda. De vraag is dan hoe ze dat doen.

De hierboven genoemde programma’s (i.e. juridische over bevoegdheden, administratieve over beleid, financiële over fondsen, en geestelijke over gedachten) richten ons namelijk op de handelingsvelden waarin deze posities worden ingenomen. Deze leiden ons vervolgens tot vier gebieden die het hele veld van territoriale cohesie gebruik structureren: i) de Intergouvernementele Conferenties (IGCs) (auctoritas), ii) het proces van en na het Europese Ruimtelijke Ontwikkelingsperspectief (EROP) (informele potestas, want de Europese Unie heeft geen bevoegdheid voor ruimtelijke planning), iii) Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid (formele potestas), en iv) de Europese Fondsen (pecunia); politieke spirituele discours. Territoriale cohesie, en dus ook de posities die het meest haar agenda bepalen, spelen daardoor een rol in, respectievelijk, het toevoegen van Europese bevoegdheden, de promotie van Europese ruimtelijke planning, de inhoudelijke uitbreiding van het Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid, en/of het kanaliseren van Europese fondsen. In deze veranderende machtsrelaties kan dan elke positie die met het concept wordt ingenomen neigingen mobiliseren (bijv. vooroordelen), dit met een metanarrative voor waarover territoriale cohesie gaat en dus waarover besloten moet worden.

Er verschijnen te veel kleine gevechten in deze gebruiksgebieden om hier op te noemen. Daarom volgen hieronder per gebruiksgebied enkel de hoofdconclusies, gezien vanuit het vertrekpunt van dit onderzoek (i.e. Europese ruimtelijke planning), voordat deze conclusies, en dus de gebieden, verbonden worden. Uit het IGCs gebruiksgebied komt dan een drievoudig betwist gebruik van het concept naar voren: i) voor of tegen een Europese bevoegdheid voor territoriale cohesie beleid, ii) voor of tegen een Europese bevoegdheid voor ruimtelijke planning, en iii) voor of tegen een overlap van of relatie tussen beide. Deze geschillen in de IGCs filteren aldaar hoe het concept mag verschijnen (i.e. informeel of formeel gebruik).

In het gebruiksgebied van het proces van en na het EROP is er daarentegen geen betwist gebruik van het concept, enkel promotie van territoriale cohesie. Dat wil zeggen, territoriale cohesie wordt enkel gebruikt om kwesties van Europese ruimtelijke planning op de agenda te zetten. Je zou daarom kunnen zeggen dat het concept simpelweg gebruikt wordt om Europese ruimtelijke planning op vele manieren te promoten. Dit staat natuurlijk op gespannen voet met de hierboven genoemde twisten in het IGCs gebruiksgebied. Desondanks levert het proces van en na het EROP zodoende bijna alle territoriale cohesie inhoud, en dus bakent dit gebied informeel de inhoudelijke grenzen af voor het mogelijke gebruik van het concept (bijv. polcentrisme of territoriaal kapitaal, territoriale ontwikkeling of territoriale governance).

Het gebruiksgebied van het Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid bakent het formele gebruik van territoriale cohesie in Europees beleid af. Wat minder voor de hand liggend is, dat het hierbij de uitbreiding van het handelingsgebied van Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid promoot, dit door een combinatie van een zwervtocht langs de officiële grenzen getrokken voor het gebruik van het concept en cherry-picking uit het informele proces van en na het EROP. Dit gaat dus om de vraag waarvoor territoriale cohesie nu precies een bevoegdheid geeft (kijk naar de IGCs, bijv. diensten of zelfs beleidscoördinatie) en welke inhoud uit Europese ruimtelijke planning bruikbaar
Samenvatting

is voor Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid (kijk naar het proces van en na het EROP; bijv. een balanceren van economie-
samenleving-milieu, informele samenwerking)?

Het gebruiksgebied van de Europese Fondsen rezoneert de andere drie gebruiksgebieden met zijn 
financiële concretisering. Dit gebeurd met een guerrilla-achtige opstelling voor territoriale cohesie. Dat wil 
zeggen, in de Europese fondsen zou het concept verwikkeld kunnen zijn in een rommelig asymmetrische 
strijd. Het gebruik ervan lijkt immers opportunistisch, ook lijkt het zowel een scheuren als overcompliceren te 
riskeren, en dit terwijl een kanaliseren van Europese fondsen vis-à-vis het concept in vijfvoud betwist wordt. Deze 
kenmerken worden hieronder kort uiteengezet, beginnend bij het opportunisme in het gebruik van het concept.

Dit opportunisme wordt aangegeven door de vele verschillende belangen (bijv. van perifere regio's, territoriale 
samenwerking) die soms terugkomen onder het vaandel van het concept, weerstand krijgen of niet, en altijd 
ook gepromoot worden zonder het gebruik van territoriale cohesie. Voor deze belangen zou het gebruik van 
het concept dus niets meer kunnen zijn dan een van de vele mogelijkheden om meer financiering te krijgen 
door bepaalde belangen in de Europese fondsen te versterken of dit handelingsgebied met ze uit te breiden. Het 
scheuringsrisico komt vervolgens van de enige plek van het formele gebruik van het concept in de Europese 
Fondsen (tot en met het begin van 2006): het Plattendontwikkelingsfonds. De geldstromen hieruit gaan vooral 
naar andere gebieden dan die waar de geldstromen naar toe gaan uit de meer stedelijke Structuurfondsen, zoals 
het Cohesiefonds en het Europese Fonds voor Regionale Ontwikkeling (EFRO), waarvoor territoriale cohesie 
ook gebruikt wordt (zoals bijvoorbeeld vermeld in het Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid). Het gebruik van territoriale 
cohesie in beide zou het concept wel eens financieel kunnen scheuren doordat deze fondsen hun geld zo ver 
uit elkaar laten stromen. Het risico van overcomplicering komt, op zijn beurt, dan niet zozeer door de steeds 
grote variatie in belangen waarvoor het concept gebruikt wordt, maar doordat vaak nadruk wordt gelegd op de 
inhoudbare coördinatie tussen deze belangen, zelfs tussen landbouw en ander beleid, waardoor de complexiteit 
dus toeneemt. Deze problemen van het opportunisme, het scheuren en overcompliceren spelen ook een rol in 
het vijfvoudig betwiste kanaliseren van Europese financiering via territoriale cohesie. Hierover wordt namelijk 
wel gedebatteerd, maar veel werkt effectueren tegen: i) de strijd tussen zowel bestaand als wenselijk gebruik van 
het concept, ii) de in/formaliteit ervan, iii) hun guerrilla-achtige situatie, iv) de onzekerheid of het concept wel 
invloed heeft, en iv) dat het gebruiksgebied van de Europese Fondsen geen rol speelt in financiële transacties.

De financiële slagkracht van het concept lijkt dus twijfelachtig, zelfs indien de IGCs de formele grondslag voor 
sein gebruik zouden verbreden en verstevigen.

Toch kunnen we uit deze vier kaarten de "aardse chaos" van territoriale cohesie opmaken, ze tonen 
immers het gebruik van het concept. Dit maakt het ook mogelijk de vier kaarten samen te voegen om een 
indicatie te geven van het hele gebruiksveld van territoriale cohesie en te overdenken wat zijn topclal orde 
inhoudt. Tussen de gebruiksgebieden kunnen dan vele verbindingen gelegd worden. Echter, zonder een bepaald 
gericht punt om hiermee te beginnen (bijv. van een partijdige actor zoals een nationale overheids) is het lastig 
on een overzicht te geven.

Gelukkig kan één een birds-eye view een abstracter overzicht geven. Territoriale cohesie staat dan voor een 
strijdscorridor tussen verschillende handelingsgebieden. Het concept onderscheidt zich als 
een driesprong van zijn context, een driesprong tussen de Europese ruimtelijke planning, het Regionaal-/- 
Cohesiebeleid, en de Europese Fondsen en hun wazige streep uit de IGCs voor wat informeel en formeel is. 
Twee kenmerken van het concept maken dit beeld echter complexer: i) het concept is niet alleen als een of meer 
diesprong tussen deze gebieden, maar is er ook in te plaatsen en ii) het concept is niet alleen als een of meer 
plaatje, maar verplaatst zich ook door de veranderingen in territoriale cohesie. Het concept is dus een driesprong die zich over 
verschillende machtspraktijken beweegt.

In een context waarin "alles stroomt" zou de topclal orde van territoriale cohesie hierdoor wel eens selectief 
institutionele ruimtes kunnen gaan reorganiseren. Het gebruik van het concept zou namelijk een onduidelijke 
symbiose van Europese ruimtelijke planning en Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid te weeg kunnen brengen, omdat 
hun posities immers in het gebruik van territoriale cohesie overlappen. Dit onderwerpt Europese ruimtelijke 
planning wel aan Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid door hun verschil in status en stelt het bloot aan cherry-picking.
Samenvatting

Het gebruik van territoriale cohesie zou op het Europese niveau ook gepaard kunnen gaan met zowel informeel als formeel gecoördineerde arrangementen aangezien het niet duidelijk is wie voor wat een bevoegdheid krijgt, en met flexibiliteit in management aangezien verscheidene werkwijzen uit de verschillende handelingsgebieden opgenomen kunnen worden. Op lagere niveaus zou dit allemaal tot vaagheid kunnen leiden door de onbekende waas die van de Europese Unie vandaan komt (bijv. met fondsen). Als het gebruik van territoriale cohesie dus al iets onthult, dan zijn dit enkel impliciete veldslagen in de marge van de Europese Unie (bijv. over Europese ruimtelijke planning). In zoverre dit het geval is toont het de beslistheid om geen beslissingen te nemen, waarmee de status quo voortduurt en dus domineert.

De hermeneutische horizon van het concept

Aldus heeft territoriale cohesie twee kanten: aan de ene kant een common ground van vele betekenissen waarop vormen en objecten neergezet worden en grenzen van politiek ervoor worden gesteld (i.e. proposities) en aan de ander kant veel gebruik van het concept in machtspraktijken (i.e. posities). Het punt is dat bijna alle proposities van de "etherische orde" van het concept overeenkomen met posities in de topical orde van zijn "aardse chaos". Deze overlappende proposities en posities (i.e. pro/posities) brengen ons ertoe om te stellen dat nadenken, in de alledaagse praktijk van beredeneren, gemakkelijk de "ether" en "aarde" van het concept kan verbinden en zo de hermeneutische horizon van territoriale cohesie kan vormen.

Dat wil zeggen, er verschijnen aan deze horizon vele mogelijkheden voor wederkerige relaties waarin Europese politiek de discussie over het concept beïnvloedt en territoriale cohesie onderzoek gevolgen heeft voor beleid. Voor de hand liggende voorbeeld van deze tactische productiviteit tussen pro/posities zijn, die gedefinieerd moeten worden, zoals ook de verdeling van fondsen, eveneens volgens deze indicatoren. Twee andere voorbeeld zijn dat: i) als het concept gebruikt wordt om Europees beleid territoriaal te coördineren, territoriale cohesie onderzoek dan niet meer als belangrijke ontwikkeling kan gaan zonder dat gebruik tegen te spreken (i.e. op zijn minst is een technischere betekenis nodig), of ii) als territoriale cohesie kennis het concurrentievermogen van alle regio's weergeeft, dan de territoriale cohesie dan over concurrentiekracht in het algemeen gaat in plaats van die van specifieke regio's.

regelmatrijden zijn: i) alle objecten kunnen politiek noch tastbaar zijn, ii) alle bewerkingen moeten op
specifieke wijze beleidsgericht zijn en reflectie moet ontbreken, iii) alle concepten moeten open staan om hun
inhoud aan de inhoud van andere concepten te verbinden, en iv) alle theoretische keuzes moeten overgenomen
worden.

De eerste regel voor waar territoriale cohesie over kan gaan volgt simpelweg direct uit de hierboven
weergegeven “ether” van het concept. De tweede regel gaat meer over de manier waarop territoriale cohesie
over deze objecten kan gaan. Het beleidsgerichte deel van de regel komt van de net gekenschetste beredeneerde
onderlinge afhankelijkheden die in de hermeneutische horizon van het concept geweven zijn, waarbij de
specifieke wijze natuurlijk verwijst naar het strijdtonenke dat het concept vormt in en tussen de gebruiksgebieden
van de IGCs, het proces van en na het EROP, het Regionaal-/Cohesiebeleid, en de Europese Fondsen. De derde
regel vat de verschillendheid van zaken die territoriale cohesie behandelt, in plaats van enkel economische zaken
bijvoorbeeld, en geeft ook aan dat ze vaak met elkaar verstrengeld zijn. Het deel van de tweede regel over reflectie
en de vierde regel stellen simpelweg dat met het concept noch reflectie noch territoriale cohesie theorieën
voorkomen, enkel theorieën van elders (bijv. Rawls’ theory of justice). Samen vormen deze regelmatigheden de
formatieregels van het discours (i.e. ‘rules of formation’; Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 54)
die demarcaten wat als redelijke territoriale cohesie uitspraken beschouwd worden.

Deze grenzen van het territoriale cohesie discours individualiseren het als een geheel. Echter, de
formatieregels laten natuurlijk vele mogelijkheden voor uitspraken hierover open. Ze moeten immers
rekening houden met de verschillendheid van al bestaande territoriale cohesie pro/posities. Omdat geen van
deze pro/posities uit het niets komt maar alle geconditioneerd zijn, zijn er ook vele condities voor deze brede
formatieregels. Alleen individualiseren zulke condities niet het discours, maar enkel bepaalde pro/posities
ervan. Wat het discours wel verder individualiseert is, zoals de "aarde" van het concept al aangeeft, een opstellen
van de overheersende status quo buiten de territoriale cohesie blik. Een gezichtspunt dat zo is opgesteld maakt
het mogelijk dat alles binnen zijn perspectief in een voortdurend stroomen kan verschijnen.

Door deze openheid heeft het territoriale cohesie discours de ruimte om vele discoursen samen te binden
(als een Discursive Nodal Point (Diaz, 2001)). Ook al kunnen specifieke discoursen zo samengebonden worden
(bijv. het sociale cohesie discours met een economisch beleidsdiscours), het zijn er te veel om hier te noemen.
Toch kunnen drie manieren waarop territoriale cohesie dit kan doen het discours verder individualiseren, want
ze structureren de beredeneerde onderlinge afhankelijkheden van het concept. De drie verwachtingen hiervoor:

Als het territoriale cohesie discours in zijn schepping andere discoursen samen zou binden, dan vormt
zich een formatievak van redenatie. Dat wil zeggen, het zou zowel bestaan uit meerdere discoursen als als
samengebonden discoursen. Het territoriale cohesie discours hoeft dan niet fundamenteel te veranderen, want
in dit geval hoeven zijn uitspraken enkel de hierboven opgestelde formatieregels te volgen.

Als het discours een verzamelfvak van redenatie wordt brengt dit veranderingen met zich mee. Een
holistisch strijdperk wijst dan namelijk beleidsdiscoursen aan (bijv. het cohesiebeleidsdiscours, het Europese
ruimtelijke planningsdiscours), en dit is een strijdperk waarin uitspraken ook de topical orde van het gebruik
van het concept moeten volgen. Echter, aangezien de veranderingen die dit meebrengt zowel specifieke gevallen
betreft als betwist zijn, veranderen ze het territoriale cohesie discours niet fundamenteel.

Het territoriale cohesie discours zou daarentegen fundamenteel veranderen als een territoriale zienswijze
zijn essentie vormt. Zo wordt het namelijk een doorgangsvak van redenatie dat andere discoursen structureert
met die zienswijze en daardoor een kenmerk aan ze toevoegt. Aangezien uit alle uitspraken van het discours
dan een territoriale zienswijze moet blijken, vult deze zienswijze de hierboven gestelde regel aan waaraan alle
bewerkingen moeten voldoen.

Let wel, territoriale cohesie heeft zich nog niet tot een van deze drie vlakken van redenatie ontwikkeld,
het discours staat echter wel voor ze open. Maar aangezien vele condities veranderingen dwarsbomen zal het
territoriale cohesie discours waarschijnlijk ook wat dit betreft nogal vaag blijven.
In wederkerige productiviteit vormen de territoriale cohesie betekenissen en kennissen en het gebruik van het concept dus samen een onbepaald geheel, een systeem van territoriale cohesie kennis en daaraan verbonden praktijken: een discours. Ondanks dat de regels veel ruimte open laten voor uitspraken en structuren van redenatie, worden toch niet alle uitspraken beschouwd als redelijke territoriale cohesie uitspraken. Vandaar dat het territoriale cohesie discourse weliswaar een openheid in debatten voegt, maar dan wel een begrenste openheid.

**Kritiek op territoriale cohesie expertise**

Door de openheid van het territoriale cohesie discours is het mogelijk veel kritiek te hebben op de betrokken expertise. Gek genoeg vindt dit onderzoek echter de grenzen, de manier waarop ze worden getrokken om precies te zijn, problematischer.

Dit onderzoek maakt er dus niet zozeer een punt van dat het arbitrair is om de ene territoriale cohesie betekenis te verkiezen boven een van de vele andere, ook niet dat ze enkele onopgeloste spanningen bevatten (bijv. welke territoriale eenheden), noch dat de soorten betekenissen van het concept elkaar tegenspreken (bijv. of territoriale cohesie is een bestaande stand van zaken of een ideaal, of beleidscoherentie of een beleidsoordeel, maar het kan niet beide zijn). Zelfs de hieruit volgende instabiliteit van de *common ground* van territoriale cohesie betekenis is niet zozeer het punt van kritiek, ook niet dat deze *common ground* territoriale cohesie kennis vormgeeft (bijv. met *framing*). Dit onderzoek bekritiseert dus ook niet zozeer dat deze kennis vaak gemaakt wordt door combinaties van al bestaande informatie zo te noemen, het arbitrair is en de ene kennisclaim boven een andere te verkiezen, of dat deze claims elkaar tegenspreken. Hetzelfde geldt voor de besluiteloosheid over de machtspraktijken van het concept door de wisselvallige veranderingen in zijn gebruik en dat territoriale cohesie staat voor systematische onzekerheid door de betwistbaarheid van bijna elke positie die met het concept wordt ingenomen. Beide zijn niet zozeer de punten die dit onderzoek bekritiseert. Het bekritiseert niet eens dat zelfs als *bricolage* van handelingsgebieden territoriale cohesie geen *common ground* vormt voor besluitvorming (bijv. waar gaat het dan over, waarover te besluiten?). Al deze punten bekritiseren namelijk de openheid van het territoriale cohesie discours.

Dit onderzoek vindt daarentegen de grenzen van het discours veel problematischer. De formatieregels sluiten politieke en tastbare objecten buiten, net als beweringen die niet beleidsgericht zijn. Ook laten de zaken in de betekenissen van het concept die onbehandeld blijven, terwijl dit niet logisch is, de grenzen van het discours zien (bijv. omgaan met meerdere territoriale niveaus). De gebreken in territoriale cohesie kennis doen dat ook doordat het, naast "feit" van beleid, feiten mist, net als argumentatie bij elkaar tegensprekende claims, theorie (bijv. over plaats- of territoriumgebondenheid, relaties of afbakening als basis), en reflectie (bijv. op de spanning tussen de apolitieke wereld en het politieke perspectief van de territoriale cohesie blik). De hoofdkritiek van dit onderzoek betreft echter niet deze grenzen die het territoriale cohesie discours afbakenen, maar dat ze gevolgd worden.

Dat wil zeggen, dit onderzoek bekritiseert territoriale cohesie expertise vooral omdat de onderlinge afhankelijkheden van redenering, die effecten tussen macht en kennis verzekeren, dubieus zijn. Bij territoriale cohesie houdt, simpel gesteld, elke intellectuele keuze een politieke keuze in. Bij het concept lijkt deze griezelige verbinding dan te rechthouden dat macht technocratisch uitgeoefend wordt, omdat het territoriale cohesie discours, dat deze wederkerige relaties verzekert, zijn experts onderscheidt van leken.

Wat dan paradoxaal is, is dat het territoriale cohesie discours dit doet op een vage wijze die zowel onzeker als onduidelijk is. Dat het discours lastig is vast te stellen betekent misschien wel dat het niet bestaat, niet als kennisysteem, ook niet als machtspraktijken, noch in de zin van formatieregels. Je zou dan kunnen stellen dat het concept enkel (het denken over) het innemen van posities voorschrijft, omdat territoriale cohesie feitelijke kennis en argumentatie mist. Het gevolg hiervan zou zijn dat territoriale cohesie geen discours is, maar in zichzelf een *politique spirituelle*, en dus experts van leken onderscheidt maar dit zonder dat daadwerkelijke expertise een rol speelt – behalve de expertise van geestelijke machtspraktijken.
Conclusie van het filosofische veldwerk over het concept territoriale cohesie

Het filosofische veldwerk van dit onderzoek begon met de vraag wat de betekenis en het gebruik van het concept territoriale cohesie is in de Europese Unie. Op zijn drievoudige fronetisch pad kwam het vervolgens langs vele betekenissen, kennis, machten, en redeneringen die samenstromend het territoriale cohesie discours vormgeven. Daarbij komt dat als deze semantische, epistemische, agonistische, en rationale stromen samen al een deel van de wereld weergeven, dit dan ook een plaats zou zijn waar vele objecten en processen samenstromen. In beide gevallen is territoriale cohesie dus te begrijpen als de plaats waar stromen grond zoeken (The Place where Streams seek Ground).

Deze stromen komen namelijk samen, maar ze lijken geen consistent en coherent systeem te vormen. Daarbij komt dat er geen basis verschijnt om de stromen op te grondvesten, niet in feiten of tastbare objecten, ook niet in besluiten, noch in het denken. Desondanks zijn de betrokken ideeën gericht op tastbaarheid, staan de posities op de agenda voor besluitvorming, en heeft het discours argumentatie nodig. Dat wil zeggen, de territoriale cohesie posities, de posities van het concept, en het discours proberen zich te grondvesten. Met deze geproblematiseerde status van het concept territoriale cohesie eindigt dit onderzoek daarom met een vraag aan de (wetenschaps)praktijk, als die in dit geval nog wel weet wat zij moet doen: ‘Waarom deze territoriale cohesie interpretaties?’, of sterker, ‘Waarom territoriale cohesie interpretaties?’.
Appendices

See www.hissinkmuller.nl/bmhissinkmuller/AppendicesPhDThesis.pdf