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The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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Chapter 2 Governmentality analytics

Introduction

Insofar its analytical framework makes up this research's analytical stance, it revolves around power. This is one of the most controversial concepts (Lukes, 1974: 26; Korpi, 1985: 31) and one of the most difficult to define and impossible to measure terms (Schmitter, in Joerges&Meny&Weiler, 2001). Yet, according to Flyvbjerg (2002: 354), the intellectual tradition strong on issues of power runs from Aristotle *via* Machiavelli and Nietzsche to Foucault. We follow this path to answer the question of 'What is the analytical framework of this research?'. This starting with a sketch of theories of power with two axes (§2.1.1) to distinguish the clarity and sharpness of Foucault's look (§2.1.2). The understanding of government (§2.2.1) and organisation of governmentality analytics (§2.2.2) this entails follows thereafter. At the end we conclude with how this analytical framework (§2.3.1) suits a research on the concept of territorial cohesion (§2.3.2).

2.1 Power


2.1.1 Power theories in an exercise-possession and capacity-relation cross

Foucault's power look does not exist in a vacuum. Quite the contrary, there are many other understandings of power. Yet, Foucault's thinking differs in essential ways. Because his account could be called "alternative", we will first treat more common theories of power as a contrast to let Foucault stand out more clearly.

Most understandings of power can be categorised roughly with two axes. One axis comes forward in Lukes (1974: 12), who separates these understandings in those that treat the exercise or possession of power. Korpi's (1985: 31, 33) identification of two schools then hints at the other axis, because according to him you either follow the behavioural tradition which looks at the exercise of power or take the alternative path by studying resources or dispositions of power. Instead of leading us to the study of the possession of power, the splitting in two of this "alternative path" directs us to that other axis. Fairclough (2003: 41) namely distinguishes understandings of power in the sense of on what power depends (e.g. resources) or secures outcomes (e.g. dispositions). He thereby implicitly shows the nowadays common division between understandings of power as capacity or relation respectively (e.g. Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 217).^a The question then becomes to what these exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes lead when it concerns understandings of power.

When both axes are crossed and some theories of power placed within the four compartments, a landscape of understandings of power appears, as shown in the figure below.


^a 'As far as this power is concerned, it is first necessary to distinguish that which is exerted over things and gives the ability to modify, use, consume, or destroy them – a power which stems from aptitudes directly inherent in the body or relayed by external instruments. Let us say that here it is the question of "capacity." On the other hand, what characterizes the power we are analyzing is that it brings into play relations between individuals (or groups).[.] The term "power" [then] designates relationships between partners (and by that I am not thinking of a zero-sum game, but simply, and for the moment staying in the most general terms, of an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another)' (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 217).



Understanding power as social hierarchy is for instance clearly relational (e.g. Brown&Gilman, 1960; Fairclough, 2003: 75). When these (hierarchical) relationships are built to influence change as a collective, it can be placed in the relation-possession compartment. Booher&Innes' (2002; Innes, 2004: 13) 'network power' is an example of this (i.e. the glue for collaboration over time). Power understood as capacity on the other hand, comes according to Korpi (1985: 34) from economists, because they often see property (e.g. human capital) as power resource. Co-operation thereby becomes, for instance, an emerging resource for parties to enhance their power over others (Heiskala, 2001: 243). This looks similar as Booher&Innes' (2002) 'network power', but then within the capacity-possession compartment. As with every categorisation, especially rough ones, sometimes it is ambiguous in which compartment a theory fits. One could for instance place Gramsci's (1971) 'hegemony', in which power depends upon achieving acceptance (e.g. through ideology) (Fairclough, 2003: 45), anywhere on the capacity-relation axis. You could namely think of this acceptance as a base of power created by relations. Moreover, some theories do not only "hover" on a single but on both axes. Weber's (1922/1978: 53) well-known approach to power can for instance exemplify each category. He namely talks about the probability that one actor within a social relationship can carry out his will (even) despite resistance (Korpi, 1985: 31-32, 41n2). But because Weber's approach is zero-sum (i.e. more power for me is less for you), and therefore distributive, it shows power as capacity to possess as well (Heiskala, 2001: 242-243). What is then the use of this landscape of understandings of power that is categorised by crossing the exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes?

For starters, it gives us an overview from which we can identify the current dominant theories of power, that is, those that adhere to a capacity way of thinking. Power is thereby identified and centralised with a body – mostly the State – in a juridico-economical and theoretical a-historic or non-historicist manner (Foucault, 2003: 265).^a This form of power often implies that a body claims power – and related means – that inheres in and lies behind a legal system; when this body is a state: a monopoly of independent territorial power and the means of violence (Dean, 1999: 9). That is, often this capacity is possessed. Another way this domination of capacity-possession understandings of power comes to the fore, is in political economic studies that concentrate on capital (i.e. something owned, wealth, normally summed in units of money). These often point to the capitalist class, such as Olsen&O'Connor (in O'Connor&Olsen, 1998: 6, 22) do, as 'the most powerful actor in society by virtue of its control over economic resources' (i.e. the means of production), what relates to 'the growing asymmetry in power between capital and labour'. The cross of the exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes then allows us to question the dominance of theories of power in the capacity-possession compartment.

^a The juridical model of sovereignty 'in effect presupposes that the individual is a subject with natural rights or primitive powers; it sets itself the task of accounting for the ideal genesis of the State; and finally, it makes the law the basic manifestation of power' (Foucault, 2003: 265).




For instance, what if that juridical system ‘is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power [that are employed] on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus’ (Foucault, 1980b: 89; Flyvbjerg&Richardson, in Allmendinger&Tewdwr-Jones, 2002)? And what if capital neither is the simple principle with which we can understand our recent history nor has the privilege of materiality, but is theoretically unsatisfactory because it cannot explain realities (e.g. of limitation) (Pasquino, 1978, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 106-107)?^a Notwithstanding their dominance, the capacity-possession theories would then prevent us to understand today’s power due to what they make us see. They could for example presuppose and obscure institutional contexts, overextend the concept of distribution, and reduce justice to distributive justice, just as the distributive paradigm does that Young (1990) tries – not to replace, but – to displace. Obviously, the cross of the exercise-possession and capacity-relation axes also shows alternatives to this dominance, as there are three other compartments. Lukes (1974: 31) for instance holds that studies of power as capacity focus on the ‘power to’, and therefore ignore the ‘power over’, that is, ‘the fact that it is exercised *over* people’. One could thus also, opposite from power as possessed capacity, theorise about power exercised in relations.

2.1.2 Foucault’s power *θεαυ*: relational action

It can be said that Foucault takes an alternative path to the dominant power capacity-possession understandings, this on multiple counts. What he does not do, however, is offering a context-free, ahistorical, objective description of power, that is, a theory (Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 184). What he does do, is taking a path that combines the two axes opposite to the dominant understandings. Foucault clearly studies how power is exercised in relations.^b

^a ‘It is true that for quite some time our understanding of recent history has been made to turn on the axis of capital and of its correlate, the bourgeoisie, and that the history of knowledges and institutions has begun to be made to revolve around these concepts. People thought they had found a simple, and hence all the more seductive, principle to make sense of and give an explanation for all those great figures of oppression and revolt which have perturbed the surface of our social history for about the past two centuries. A strange paradox: capital, a metaphysical substance, had in addition what was or came to be the privilege of materiality. Everything else was mere shadow-play. For] twenty years now this schema has begun to be called in question, as being theoretically unsatisfactory and politically untenable. Theoretically unsatisfactory, in that as soon as it was sought to apply this schema in a detailed analysis, it revealed itself to be false, that is, incapable of accounting for problems that formed the crux of these analyses: consider the realities of the prison or of confinement in general. Politically untenable, because it failed to account for a great number of struggles which, since the sixties at least, have traversed our Western societies. It could only do so at the cost of imposing an interpretation on them which gradually become intolerable to the very people who were engaged in struggle[. Behind] the monotonous, uninterrupted and omnipresent genealogy of capital, there appeared the polymorphous universe of what we have since begun to call technologies of power’ (Pasquino, 1978, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 106-107).

^b ‘In order to make a concrete analysis of power relations, we must abandon the juridical model of sovereignty. [Instead, we] should be trying to study power not on the basis of the primitive terms of the relationship, but on the basis of the relationship itself, to the extent that it is the relationship itself that determines the elements on which it bears: rather than asking ideal subjects what part of themselves or their powers they have surrendered in order to let themselves become subjects, we have to look at how relations of subjugation can manufacture subjects. Similarly, rather than looking for the single form or the central point from which all forms of power derive, either by way of consequence or development, we must begin by letting them operate in their multiplicity, their difference, their specificity, and their reversibility; we must therefore study them as relations of force that intersect, refer to one another, converge, or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another. And, finally, rather than privileging the law as manifestation of power, we would do better to try to identify the different techniques of constraint that it implements’ (Foucault, 2003: 265).



This follows from a rather sharp marking. For Foucault (in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 219-220) power does not only exclusively exist when it is put into action, but ‘action is the exercise of power’ too (Flyvbjerg&Richardson, in Allmendinger&Tewdwr-Jones, 2002). Yet, as such power is ‘integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures’ (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 219-220). ‘For let us not deceive ourselves; if we speak of the structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons exercise power over others’ (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 217). The exercise of power thus relates people – reminiscent of Lukes (1974). This in a certain way though: it is ‘not simply a relationship between partners, [but] a way in which certain actions modify others’ (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 219-220). That is to say, power does not directly act upon others, because what defines a relationship of power is that it is an action upon an action, ‘a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions’ (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 220). This simultaneous focus on action and relations comes forward in the example so often used to typify Foucault’s work: the Panopticon. This is a design for institutional buildings Foucault (1977) used as a metaphor for the (internalised) disciplining in our societies through observation and normalisation. From the middle of this circular building one could namely oversee the others without them seeing this surveyor, making everyone act (normal) as if they are under constant surveillance. Important from Foucault’s work for now though, is that in it he also shows himself through a looking for such relational action.

When you adopt this Foucaultian look, you do not see how power relations are ‘reconstituted “above” society’ (e.g. as locatable entities), as you understand action in relations, and thus also power, as ‘rooted deep in the social nexus’ (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 222). Note though, that power itself is thereby neither necessarily a (manifest) conflict, negative sanction (Korpi, 1985: 31), nor a hierarchy, because actions upon actions occur positively in equal and harmonious relationships too (e.g. those of the market place)^a. Yet, insofar (equal) social relations are power relations, they are in that aspect mobile though “nonegalitarian”. Such relations are namely integrated in power mechanisms. They thus involve ‘the operation of the political technologies throughout the social body’, and these are the rituals that set up asymmetries in relations (Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 185). Hence, to understand power in its day to day materiality, one should isolate, identify, and analyse the web of nonegalitarian relationships set up by political technologies (Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 185).

The contrast between common theories of power and Foucault’s thinking then comes forward most clearly when you oppose the dominant understandings and Foucault’s power look, as shown in the Table below.

^a Korpi (1985: 35) argues likewise for power resources: ‘Conflict, exchange, and exploitation are thus different types of interaction involving the use of power resources[.] Since exchange forms the very base of economic life in the free-market of capitalistic democracies, it is a crucial area for the understanding of the role of power in and thus the nature of these societies.’

Dominance	Foucault
– theories of power	– contextual and historical power look
– power as capacity	– power as relation
– power to be possessed	– power in action
– power to/over	– power as action upon an action
– power “above” society	– power “in” society
– State/capital	– Panopticon

To grasp these contrasts in a nutshell: with a Foucaultian look you for instance should not carry out a political analysis of economics (i.e. political economy), but an analysis of the economy of power relations (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 208). The question then becomes what to think of political technologies, or more in general: the organisation of this clearly relational and sharply active look.

2.2 Governmentality

2.2.1 Power-rationality: redefining ‘gouvernement’ as rational activity

As explained above, the Foucaultian look sees power as relational action in society. Yet, although alternative to the dominant theories of power, this alone does not form an analytical framework. We still do not know how to isolate, identify, and analyse the web of nonegalitarian relationships set up by political technologies. Some separations in this framework need to be organised as well. Foucault (in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 220) initiates this by coining the term ‘conduct’ (e.g. for behaviour, handling) to understand power relations.^a As they form actions upon actions, we are concerned with ‘the conduct of conduct’ – this is how he broadly understands *gouvernement* of self, others, or all (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 220-1; Burchell, in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 19; Dean, 1999: 10; Lemke, 2000: 2-3; MacKinnon, 2000: 295). Here Foucault’s look can be separated from contemporary restricted senses of government as the state or political action proper. Instead, to follow Dean’s (1999: 209) definition, government is: ‘[a]ny more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.’ An analysis of ‘government’ then concerns itself with many facets, such as the quantitative and qualitative means of calculation, the type of governor and knowledge, the techniques of government,^b the governed entity and how it is conceived, the ends sought and what all of this leads to. After thus separating many facets of government in the broad sense, the question becomes how to organise them into an analytical framework.

The organisation of government facets in Foucault’s look of power hinges on a power-rationality relationship, the relationship between ‘gouverner’ and ‘*mentalité*’ that is – something he denotes with the neologism ‘*gouvernementalité*’ (Gordon, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 7). With this term you can distinguish particular mentalities, arts, and regimes of government and administration (Dean, 1999: 2). Every mentality of government, or governmental rationality, namely involves a ‘calculating pre-occupation with activities directed at shaping, channelling, and guiding the conduct of others’ (Hunt&Wickham, 1994: 26; Raco&Imrie, 2000: 2189). Such ‘rational activities’ therefore include every form of thinking that strives to be relatively clear and systematic about how things are or how they ought to be. That is, how we think about governing, the different mentalities of government, the representations of bodies of knowledge, and the belief

^a Note that having the form in which people behave as base to understand power relations entails that, as Lukes (1974: 39) already posed, it does not matter whether the exercise of power is conscious or not.

^b This focus on techniques and know-how can also be found in the problem-solving model of human action as explained by Biernacki (in Adams&Clemens&Shola Orloff, 2005: 86).

and opinion in which we are immersed (Dean, 1999: 16). This emphasis of governmentality on thinking thus fundamentally organises the Foucaultian analytical framework.

However, this thoughtful look should not lead to theoretical exercises. On the contrary, the idea of mentalities of government emphasises the way in which thought is involved, linked to, and embedded in institutions and practices of government; more precisely: where this thought is collective and relatively taken for granted (Dean, 1999: 16). Yet, you should not forget that one needs to grasp what one governs. Governmentality studies therefore view ‘practices of government in their complex and variable relations to the different ways in which ‘truth’ is produced in social, cultural and political practices’ (Dean, 1999: 18). This becomes the more important when ‘the activity of governing comes to be called into question, the moments and the situations in which government becomes a problem’ (Dean, 1999: 27). Such situations and moments are, according to Dean (1999: 27), the key starting point for an analytics of government that, instead of ‘starting from a global theory of the state or of power relations [,] directs us to examine the different and particular contexts in which governing is called into question, in which actors and agents of all sorts must pose the question of how to govern’. Hence, because governmentality forms an analytical instead of theoretical framework, it allows the researcher to study power practices without a prefigured way of seeing.

2.2.2 Foucaultian analytics of government

Although the governmentality framework does not prefigure power relations, it does analyse them in a particular way: through the antagonism of strategies, that is, the goal-oriented rationalities that can be defined by the choice of winning solutions (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 1982: 208, 224-225).^a Because of this, it organises the government facets mentioned above (i.e. calculation, governor, knowledge, techniques, governed entity, ends, consequences) into an analytical framework in a particular way too – one based upon the governing-mentality duo of course. Their relationship namely returns in both of the two main components of government: ‘the various rationalities that give rise to goals or objectives of governing’ and ‘the mechanisms or technologies that allow these goals to be put into practice’ (Rose&Miller, 1992; Rose, in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 42, 43; Murdoch, 2000: 505; Uitermark, 2005: 146). The explanation of the role of technologies, programmes, and knowledge in this strategic action of power relations below further places those facets in the Foucaultian analytics of government.

In this analytical framework the facets of techniques and ends come forward in the technological component of government. The reason behind this is that here ‘to govern’ entails more than simply “to exercise authority”. ‘It is to believe that government is not only necessary but possible’ (Dean, 1999: 33). And if ‘government is to achieve ends, or seeks to realize values, it must use technical means. Those technical means are a condition of governing and often impose limits over what it is possible to do’ (Dean, 1999: 31). Technologies are not merely techniques to achieve ends though. They entail the ways of thinking about (the usage of) such techniques (i.e. *techne-logos*). Modern city planning (e.g. with zoning) can be seen as an example of them, the sociological normalisation of the population (e.g. with standard needs) as another (Fischler, 1998: 393, 400, 402). Because such techniques set up nonegalitarian relationships in society (e.g. standard above marginal needs), they are inherently political. Hence, government uses political technologies.

Such a technical treatment of government can therefore also question technologies: to what end? ‘As far as governing is concerned with “making things better”, it is irreducibly utopian. A means, then, by which regimes of government might be made intelligible is to isolate their ultimate ends and their utopian goals. This is, if one likes, the *telos* of government. Every theory or programme of government presupposes an end of this kind’ (Dean, 1999). Besides ways of thinking about techniques to reach goals, goal giving rationalities thus

^a ‘The word strategy is currently employed in three ways. First, to designate the means employed to attain a certain end; it is a question of rationality functioning to arrive at an objective. Second, to designate the manner in which a partner in a certain game acts with regard to what he thinks should be the action of the others and what he considers the others think to be doing. Third, to designate the procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive the opponent of his means of combat and to reduce him to giving up the struggle; it is a question therefore of the means destined to obtain victory. These three meanings come together in situations of confrontation – war or games – where the objective is to act upon an adversary in such a manner as to render the struggle impossible for him. So strategy is defined by the choice of winning solutions. But it must be borne in mind that this is a very special type of situation and that there are others in which the distinctions between the different sense of the word strategy must be maintained’ (Foucault, in Dreyfus&Rabinow, 19982: 224-225).

return here (i.e. the other component of government). That is to say, according to Lemke (2000: 2) it is not even possible to study technologies of power ‘without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them’.

In the governmentality framework, thought is not only involved in giving goals and using techniques to achieve them, as there are also programmes. Programmes are the deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought that endeavour to transform practices (Gordon, 1980; Foucault, 1980, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999: 22). It is here that the government facets of calculation and governed entity come to the fore. The ways in which programmes systematically grasp together the technical achievement of goals (e.g. winning solutions) entails this calculation. These are ‘all the attempts to regulate, reform, organize and improve what occurs within regimes of practices in the name of a specific set of ends articulated with different degrees of explicitness and cogency’ (Dean, 1999: 32). Regimes of practices thus entail the government facet of governed entity. Following Murdoch (1997: 309), we therefore have to turn to government practices if we want to know how government is thought to be possible.

Note though, that an analytics of government is not concerned with ‘causality’ as it is mostly understood in human, social, political sciences (e.g. Kurki, 2003). It is concerned with ‘conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed’ (Dean, 1999: 21). And insofar the term ‘institutional practices’ denotes the routinised and ritualised ways we do things in certain places and times, regimes of practices are institutional practices – although never identical with a particular institution or system. When government has an intrinsically programmatic character, an analysis of it should therefore attend to ‘all the more or less explicit, purposive attempts to organize and reorganize institutional spaces, their routines, rituals and procedures, and the conduct of actors in specific ways’ (Dean, 1999: 32; Raco&Imrie, 2000: 2190). The consequences of such programmes on regimes of practices are then another facet the analytics of government can study. With the governmentality framework you namely analyse those programmes that strategically mould practices in which techniques meet goals.^a

Regimes of practices cannot only be associated with and become the object of programmes, but depend on forms of knowledge as well (Gordon, 1980; Foucault, 1980, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991; Dean, 1999: 22). That is to say, forms of knowledge that arise from and inform the activity of government are an explicit mental organisation of practices as governed entity; when knowledge changes due to such activities it falls under the government facet of consequences too of course. We then for instance have to understand ‘how the objects of policy are problematized and rendered amendable to administration via particular forms of expertise and knowledge practices’ (Miller&Rose, 1990; Murdoch, 1997: 310). Examples of this are the ‘forms of individual and collective identity through which governing operates and which specific practices and programmes of government try to form’ (Dean, 1999: 32). An analytics of government therefore sharply separates knowledge of reality as governed entity from the reality a programme wants us to see.

Expertise thus plays a pivotal role in the governmentality framework with its emphasis on rationality. Simply put: ‘experts mediate between the actions of political authorities and the objects – jurisdictions, persons, groups, etc. – that fall under their responsibility’ (Rose, 1993; in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 40, 50; Uitermark, 2005: 146). While the programmes of the reform of conduct are a penetrating feature of the existence of regimes of practices, forms of knowledge define the field of operation and codify what can be known (see Chapter 4 on discourse). They do not only play this role for the constitution of domains as governable and administrable though (Dean, 1999: 29). Knowledge does the same for another government facet: the type of governor. An analytics of government namely also wants to understand ‘how different agents are assembled with specific powers’, or more in general, ‘how different locales are constituted authoritative and powerful’ (Dean, 1999: 29). The analytical distinction between the actual government and the one a programme wants us to see returns here too of course (e.g. as a distinguished identity). Hence, with this Foucaultian analytical framework you can study


^a This is partly similar as when researchers from the behavioural tradition in studies on power ‘explicitly try to take account of the capacity of human beings for strategic action in the pursuit of goals’; dissimilar insofar it concerns the need for overt actions and supplementing the causal mode of explanation (e.g. ‘concrete decision-making involving key issues’) with intentional explanations (e.g. actors choose to act in ways which they believe will be the means to their goal) (Korpi, 1985: 32).

strategies through the programmes that systematise technologies and goals in both the thought of and actual regimes of practices – in one word: governmentalities.

2.3 Conclusion

2.3.1 The analytical framework: governmentality analytics

To answer the question of ‘What is the analytical framework of this research?’, this chapter expounded this part of the analytical stance of this research on the concept of territorial cohesion. Hereby Foucault’s look of power was adopted as a clear alternative to the dominant capacity-possession theories of power. Yet, instead of offering a theory of the exercise of power in relations, it sharply marks power as an analysable structure of actions upon possible actions. A governmentality analytics then organises the many facets of such webs of nonegalitarian relationships, as shown in the rough organisation of the governmentality framework below.



This mainly entails understanding government broadly and emphasising the relationship between governing and rationality. When you thus leave prefigured ways of seeing power behind, the pivotal role expertise plays in the antagonism of strategies comes forward. This in the systematic thought of government: the political rationalities that give rise to goals and the technologies to reach them. What is more, programmes systematise how these techniques and goals meet to transform regimes of practices that depend on the knowledge arising from and informing government. The knowledge organising government and the governed entity therefore fits in the analytical framework of governmentality as the difference between what actually happens and how we are programmed.

2.3.2 Governmentality, the European Union, and territorial cohesion

Studies of governmentality are characterised by their concreteness (Dean, 1999: 3). They are not theory-based, but problem-centred and present-oriented. Therefore there is not one governmentality paradigm. Besides that such an analytical framework sounds suiting in today’s “theoretical un-/multi-paradigmatic times”, one could argue for its particular usefulness in research on the European Union. Here the activity of (unofficial) government is in flux and problematised most of the time (see §1.3.2 on *παντα ρει*). This due to, amongst others, the “newness” of the European Union, its changing policy “patchwork” in integration (Héritier, 1999), and reorientations for an analysis of it as almost permanent process of institutionalisation (Stone Sweet&Sandholtz&Fligstein, 2001), transformation (Cowles&Caporaso&Risse, 2001), or Europeanisation (Featherstone&Radaelli, 2003). And if Faludi (in Faludi, 2007) is right in that much of the discussion on territorial cohesion ‘will depend on the rapidly changing currents of European politics’, this reasoning for a governmentality framework even goes more for research on this concept.