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### The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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## Chapter 3 European spatial planning and power performances

### Introduction

Insofar its departure-point makes up this research's analytical stance, it revolves around spatial planning, a discursive context formed by more than merely ways of looking (e.g. theories, facts). The question then becomes: 'How does spatial planning as departure-point align with the analytical framework of governmentality?'. To sketch their linkage this chapter emphasises the difference between programmes and regimes of power practices (§3.1.1) and four of the former that appear in European spatial planning to study the latter (§3.1.2). These are *auctoritas*, *potestas*, *pecunia*, and *politique spirituelle*. Below each programme is treated separately before they are linked (§3.2). The conclusion then shows how this departure-point fits the analytical framework and how they result in the starting-point for this research (§3.3).

### 3.1 Forms of power performativity in two directions

#### 3.1.1 An analysis in the plural: programmes and regimes of power practices

Hacker&Pierson (2002: 313) pose 'that assessments of power need [to] consider multiple mechanisms of influence'. Nothing comes more as a matter of course in this research's analytical framework, as governmentality studies conduct an analysis in the plural. This because 'there is already a plurality of regimes of practices in a given territory, each composed from a multiplicity of in principle unlimited and heterogeneous elements bound together by a variety of relations and capable of polymorphous connections with one another' (Dean, 1999: 27). The question could then become which of all those mechanisms of power to study.

However, before we can answer this question, we need to take a small step back. In the governmentality framework, government is namely conceived as an activity that 'seeks to reconcile the failures and difficulties of governing' (Rose&Miller, 1992: 181). It does so by becoming programmatic (e.g. with official documents, committees) to transform practices through calculative and normalising forms of intervention (e.g. rules, norms, processes of authorities) (Raco&Imrie, 2000: 2190). These heterogeneous forms of rule thus (also) take place *via* discursive and material media (Barnett, 2001: 16; Murdoch, 2003: 51). The language used to express the ways in which power is exercised in the European Union might therefore not so much reflect the actual power practices but their programmes. Hence, the difference between programmes and practices becomes essential when you choose mechanisms of power to study.

In governmentality studies this difference comes forward clearly with the economico-juridical form of power. They see such a way of thinking about power (i.e. what is its origin and source, who holds and possesses it, when is it legitimate) as arising from changes in practices of government rather than the converse: as the reflection of a once dominant set of (monarchical) power relations (Gordon, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991: 4). That is to say, the economico-juridical form of power is a programme for how to govern some of the contemporary power practices. Governmentality studies on the other hand often emphasise the administrative rationalities in the workings of government (Foucault, 1978, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991). Yet, one does not become unimportant in favour of the other. It just means that one should not reduce the language to show the powers at issue to the language of the making and internal functioning of these governmental apparatus alone (Dean, 1999: 34). Hence, the generalisation to make here, is that a governmentality analytics does not so much study mechanisms of power, but related programmes and regimes of power practices.

### 3.1.2 Two-directional power performances in European spatial planning: *auctoritas*, *potestas*, *pecunia*, *politique spirituelle*

As the departure-point of this research's analytical stance, spatial planning points to related programmes and regimes of power practices to study. In a governmentality framework, spatial planning can namely be considered as a political technology – with goals systematised in programmes for thought of and actual practices (see §2.2.2). As such it has power effects, because '[a]ny planning decision is inherently discriminatory' (e.g. leading to simultaneous 'expansion' and 'exclusion') (Plotkin, 1987; Janin Rivolin, in Faludi, 2005a: 102). Yet, Massy (1992: 70, 84) has a similar argument with a twist: while spatial organisation might influence how society works and changes, it alters 'the future course of the histories that have produced it'. Spatial planning thus not only has power effects, but they also affect it.

This two-directional movement is of course a brute simplification of an agonistic reality where both movements might happen simultaneously in a "field of struggle", influence each other, or can be parts of a strategy or dominant set of power relations (e.g. as tactical means). No wonder, therefore, that Flyvbjerg&Richardson (in Allmendinger&Tewdwr-Jones, 2002: 20) stress that we should look at planning processes and events 'as the playing out of strategies and conflicts rather than debates or arguments'. The ways in which power effects by and on spatial planning play out is not a (rational) given; perhaps it is because of this that Allmendinger (2001: 130) emphasises institutional contexts as structural for planning in "postmodern times". We can nonetheless ask which leads this political technology gives to study the involved programmes and regimes of power practices.

As in particular European spatial planning is the departure-point of this research, we can start with the common definition Williams (1996: 7) gave for 'spatial policy': 'any policy which is spatially specific or is in effect spatial in practice, whether or not it is deliberately designed to be, and any policy which is designed to influence land-use decisions, to be integrated with local planning strategies or to be implemented by local and regional authorities as part of their spatial planning responsibilities.' At least insofar it concerns the European Union we can deduce three points from this. Firstly, spatial planning points to policy programmes, something in line with the emphasis of governmentality on administrative rationalities. Second, as governmentality studies do, spatial planning seems to presume a plurality of regimes of practices in a given territory. Thirdly, there seems to be no clear "official" demarcation of what spatial planning is. Also the latter is in line with a governmentality framework. Due to the absence of a legally legitimised and institutionalised European spatial planning power, Jensen&Richardson (2003: 127) spotlight the performativity of power in it.<sup>a</sup> The difference between programmes and the actual power practices is thus well-known in spatial planning too. Hence, when it concerns the forms of the exercise of power, the actual "power games" around programmes might be the issue for both governmentality and European spatial planning.

A governmentality framework has in itself no prefigured way of seeing power relations. Yet, four common ways (of thinking) in which power comes forward in European spatial planning (e.g. see Jensen&Richardson, 2003) can figure as types of programmes; as long at least one keeps in mind that 'established ways of thinking and doing are the products of time- and place-specific systems of power-relations, the products of fields of strategic interaction' (Fischler, 1998: 394). Here these types are labelled as: i) *auctoritas*, ii) *potestas*, iii) *pecunia*, and iv) *politique spirituelle*, and direct us to spheres of action where those transformations of regimes of power practices occur that this research studies. To characterise the main features of these programme types, also the exercise-possession and capacity-relation cross of power understandings helps (see Chapter 2), as shown in the table below.

<sup>a</sup> This spotlight on power in performance as a negative of legally legitimised and institutionalised power should be analytically distinguished from power relations "versus" power-capacity; even if only because power-capacities exist without legitimisation or institutionalisation too.

Programme type	Main features
<i>auctoritas</i>	juridical, power capacity, possession, governor
<i>potestas</i>	administrative, power capacity, exercised, policy
<i>pecunia</i>	financial, power capacity, possession, money
<i>politique spirituelle</i>	mental, relational, exercise, thought

*Auctoritas*<sup>a</sup> then exemplifies the possession of a power capacity, as it has much to do with juridical questions such as who “has” power or is the “governor” (e.g. which government level has the power to decide). *Potestas*<sup>b</sup> relates to this, as it stands for the administrative power of the bureaucracy (e.g. as expressed in policy<sup>c</sup>). No matter whether embodied as belonging to “the governor” or class of mandarins<sup>d</sup>, it shows the exercise of a power capacity. Another way in which conduct can be conducted is through money (e.g. the leverage of spending power) – a power capacity labelled *pecunia*<sup>e</sup> here to underscore the long-lasting office of this possession. Besides these three capacities, the guidance of the minds of those “playing the game” might also structure possible actions. One can understand this mental politics as exercised in relations, as systematic thought shapes the thinking in the game. Again, both *governmentality* studies and European spatial planning seem to emphasise such a *politique spirituelle* nowadays (see §3.2.4). The departure-point of European spatial planning thus points to these four spheres to study power in a Foucaultian way, that is, in the programmes of government and the regimes of actually performed power practices. Below they are treated separately in this order (§3.2.1 to §3.2.4) and linked thereafter (§3.2.5).

## 3.2 Power in European spatial planning per sphere of action

### 3.2.1 *Auctoritas*: “I got the power”

*Auctoritas* as juridical form of power depends on the law as a medium that stabilises behavioural expectations and constrains defection (e.g. due to sanctions for non-compliance) (Eriksen, in Joerges&Meny&Weiler, 2001). A government institution must thus act in accordance with the legal competencies it has to form a stable state for behaviour. As an economic construction, the European Union can be viewed thus (e.g. as the Single European Market). However, what if it does not have such a clear political identity? Then problems arise when further integration is no longer about perfecting uniform market rules, but about coping with the problems and constrains created in other policy areas due to economic integration (Scharpf, 2001; Biedenkopf&Geremek&Michalski, 2004; Camagni, in Faludi, 2007). For instance, economically wise, the weaker a state’s spatial policy control, the higher its advantage might be in intra-European competition (Ritter, 2003: 9). For the European Union to play a role in solving such issues (it causes), it might need some competency in the affected policy areas. As the European Union does not have a competency for spatial planning, the question becomes whether it will be one of these policy areas.

Besides that the European Commission’s believe in the moral superiority of supranationalism (Shore, 2000) might simply hold for spatial planning too, two other arguments are made in the discursive context of this research. Eser&Konstadakopoulos (2000: 783, 786) hold that we witnessed ‘an incremental extension of the European Union’s competence in the area of spatial planning’, and Jensen&Richardson (2003: 139) that ‘many of the basic elements of European spatial planning are already in place’. Obviously, a spatial planning from

<sup>a</sup> *Auctoritas* is the juridical power to authorize some other act, in and of itself it has no sense.

<sup>b</sup> *Potestas* signifies the power to enforce laws, exact obedience, command, determine, or judge; a public agency or corporation with administrative powers in a specified field.

<sup>c</sup> In French, ‘politics’ and ‘policy’ are translated with the same word, that is, ‘politique’.

<sup>d</sup> A Mandarin was a bureaucrat in imperial China. Note though that with *potestas* this research does not look at individual bureaucrats. An individual administrator assisting in the formulation of a policy, for instance, ‘cannot even comprehend one policy entirely’ (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 160).

<sup>e</sup> *Pecunia* is Latin for ‘money’, derived from ‘pecus’, meaning: ‘cattle as wealth’.

the European Union might conflict with the institutionalised (sub)national planning systems (e.g. concerning landownership, planning control, building regulations) (Williams, 1996). This also leads to a vital dimension of the competency issue: the question of subsidiarity<sup>a</sup> – or better: its infilling (Leitner, 1997: 126; Weiler, 1999; Jensen&Richardson, 2003). This is for instance shown by the European Commission's intervention rationale of Community Benefits (i.e. the added value of its actions) in discussions with Member States who want to hold sole competency for planning (e.g. in the case of national infrastructure projects that are components of Trans-European (Transport) Networks (TEN-(T))) (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 137). What thus clearly comes forward through *auctoritas* in European spatial planning, is a sphere of action "behind the throne", a power play performed to transform power relations in spatial planning practices. In a governmentality framework you then only analyse such juridical programmes of competencies in relation with these regimes of practices.

### 3.2.2 *Potestas*: power through policy

With *potestas* as administrative form of power one could think of policies for which the European Union has a competency. An example of this is Cohesion policy, which also contributed to the transformation, or even Europeanisation, of domestic policies (Bachtler&Polverari, in Faludi, 2007). However, Faludi&Waterhout (2002: xi) state that 'if planning is about strategy, then competency is a non-issue'. When in European spatial planning, *potestas* might thus be exercised without a competency, the question becomes how this happens.

Tewdwr-Jones&Williams (2001: 40) pose that informality and voluntary co-operation have circumscribed this lack of legal remit for spatial planning powers in the European Union. The informal and voluntary European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) is for instance a framework for co-ordination between Member States and the European Union. According to Jensen&Richardson (2003: 92) it already anticipates a broader European level of planning activity and a cascade of spatial policy making and implementation in the longer term. This shows an administrative rationality in which spatial policy will be implemented in accordance to the ESDP's shared vision of the European territory (CSD, 1998), one that Jensen (1997) argues is market- and competition-oriented. As such it fits the European Union as a market-oriented integration system. Or, as Giannakourou (1996) poses *vice versa*, the economic and institutional properties and dilemmas of this European integration process circumscribe the conceptual identity and normative value of European spatial policy. Hence, no matter whether it is an informal *potestas* that will become formal or not, as sphere of action European spatial policy might already transform the power relations in spatial planning practices. In a governmentality framework one then analyses the administrative programmes of European spatial policy that do this in relation with these regimes of practices.

For European spatial planning the *potestas* type of programmes do not end with European spatial policy though. As noted above, European spatial planning presumes a plurality of regimes of practices in the sense of policies that are in effect spatial in practice. Because the spatial impacts of many policies might have previously been overlooked in their implementation and evaluation (Davies, 1994), this opens a path to many administrative programmes and regimes of practices. The more so when you account for what the Member States' Ministers responsible for spatial development noted in 2005: 'EU policies have an impact on territorial developments in two ways', that is, directly (e.g. by providing information, subsidies, restrictions) and indirectly (e.g. by stimulating economic activity, introducing territorial concepts, creating administrative relationships, redrawing mental maps) (EU Council, 2005a: 5). This even shows more than that in a governmentality perspective one can analyse the administrative programmes of the various policies transforming power relations in spatial planning practices. It also brings us to *pecunia* (e.g. subsidies) and *politique spirituelle* (e.g. information) as spheres of action in which other programmes and regimes of practices might do the same.

<sup>a</sup> 'The principle of subsidiarity currently applied within the EU affirms that power and authority should be located at the national scale, and that the transfer to the supranational scale should only occur if it seems efficient and necessary' (Leitner, 1997: 126).

### 3.2.3 *Pecunia non olet: cash rules everything around me*

With *pecunia* as financial form of power one can think of a coordination without centralisation in itself: how the provision of grants with conditions can ensure that decisions accord with an agenda (e.g. as the European Union's regional policy does) (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). As 'spatial planning is linked to the allocation of structural funds' (Yeh, in Campbell, 2005: 412), it might go beyond (policy) discussion towards implementation (e.g. of urban projects) (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 37). Financial programmes of European (or other) funding thus direct us to another sphere of action in which transformations of power relations in spatial planning practices are performed.

The little European funding going through Interreg exemplifies the importance of this sphere of action for European spatial planning (Camagni, in Faludi, 2007).<sup>a</sup> Since 1988 Interreg would namely strengthen region-building by means of stronger institutionalised cross-border co-operation (Veggeland, 1996: 78). It thereby forms a framework for regional and urban spatial development in Europe (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 38). Power effects also flow *vice versa* though. The motives and rationales that drive local and regional authorities in their "bidding for European funds"<sup>b</sup> might namely be spatial planning flavoured (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 182). Especially since Interreg took on the ESDP, European funds can thus secure spatial programmes without the European Union having a competency for spatial planning or an own formulated spatial policy (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 137). Hence, power effects on and by spatial planning practices come forward in European (or other) funding. And in a governmentality framework you also analyse this type of programmes in relationship with the regimes of power practices performed in the sphere of action they point to.

### 3.2.4 *Politique spirituelle: guidance by mind games*

Also with *politique spirituelle* one can think of a coordination without centralisation: how discourses and ideas ensure that decisions accord with an agenda (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). It then does not matter whether this mental form of power comes forward through business lobbying (Hacker&Pierson, 2002: 280, 281), professional reputation (Faludi, 2004d: 163), the usage of results of scientific inquiry in policy (Clark&Majone, 1985: 16), or political ideas that direct and give meaning to certain capabilities and capacities in political organisations (Olsen, 2002: 926). What does matter is that mental programmes underline the strategic aspect of communication, both in the power over and in it (i.e. who may speak and how and the best argument) (Pellizzoni, 2001: 60-61, 62). Yet, why is this "soft" form of power important enough to direct us to a fourth sphere of action?

In the discursive context of this study as formed by European spatial planning, the strong arguments that appear for this inclusion are about the power effects through spatial planning practices. Spatial planning is according to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 396) for instance less about legislation, prescriptions, or money than the 'joint struggle for good ideas and better co-operation and communication' (e.g. to influence sectoral policies on various levels; e.g. see Böhme, 1999). Without cohesive government (i.e. *auctoritas, potestas*) and fiscal support (i.e. *pecunia*), there can according to Yeh (in Campbell, 2005: 412) be not much else for European spatial planning but this discussion and facilitation of greater understanding and information exchange. According to Faludi (2002b: 907), European spatial planning will even only become relevant if it is about strategy and new discourses concerning European space. This would make it less surprising if the ESDP indeed mostly worked indirectly by shaping the minds of the players involved in spatial development as Faludi&Waterhout (2002) pose. Hence, if also mental programmes transform power relations in spatial planning practices, one can analyse them and related regimes of practices in a governmentality framework too.

Note though, that from this discursive context already three basically different elements of this type of programmes come forward: frames, representation, and planning concepts. Frames would structure

<sup>a</sup> No matter whether Interreg was created to break down the barriers made by the nation states, to facilitate transnational planning, to offer Community help to the various centres losing their customs activities, or to deepen the European integration process (Veggeland, 1996; Niessler, in Jensen&Richardson, 2003; Camagni, in Faludi, 2007).

<sup>b</sup> What might be part of the trend in which many local and regional authorities make their own "foreign policy" (Williams, 1996), "bypass the capital" (Rometsch&Wessels, 1996), and work together to market agreed "storylines" (Healey, 1995).

representation, as they provide ‘guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting’ by selecting and organizing a complex reality (Rein&Schön, 1986: 4). What exemplifies this, are presupposed identities and actors, such as European Cities (e.g. Le Galès, 2002), City-Regions (e.g. Salet&Thornley&Kreukels, 2003), or Regions (e.g. Le Galès&Lesquesne, 1998) in international competition (e.g. Newman&Thornley, 1996; Sassen, 2000). The actual representations in spatial planning then often portray partial views of lived spaces in policy making (e.g. with infographics)<sup>a</sup> (Morely&Robins, 1995; Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 42-43, 216). This already points to what separates planning concepts from frames and representations: they explicitly claim reality by positing priorities and interests (Van Duinen, 2004: 23). That is to say, planning concepts are not only an interpretation of the actual spatial organisation of an area, but also an assessment of its desirability; Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2007) calls these the cognitive and intentional dimensions, amongst others, of planning concepts. Frames, representations, and policy concepts – to generalise beyond planning only – as elements of programmes thus direct us to the different though possibly related practices of framing, representing, and the usage of policy concepts (see Part III on this research’s methodology for more).

For now though, two things stand out: i) the importance of *politique spirituelle* in European spatial planning and ii) the double of it. That is, planning systems might not only be Europeanised subtly through the ways in which planning strategies at national, regional and local levels integrate ‘the ESDP’s language and framing of spatial relations and policy options’ (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 22). What is more, mental programmes are explicitly for government.<sup>b</sup> To analyse them in a governmentality framework, you should thus strictly distinguish aspects that appear to be similar: mental programmes and regimes of mental power practices.

### 3.2.5 Linkages between spheres of action

From the programme types of *auctoritas*, *potestas*, *pecunia*, and *politique spirituelle* we are directed to certain actions spheres. Especially the latter comes into view, as the mental type of programmes seem to be a focus of both governmentality and European spatial planning. For each of them holds though, that they seldom float loosely in power relations. Moreover, their programmes and regimes of power practices can interlink in many ways.

In old-fashioned state government *auctoritas* and *potestas* often do so as the authority to make policy and the capacity to administer it. A European Union competency for spatial planning might then, for instance, conflict with the balancing of various separate and potentially exclusive spatial objectives in policy-making at different levels (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). Also the link between *potestas* and *pecunia* is clear, because what can be at stake is the way in which policies backed by very large amounts of money will be targeted (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 6). *Politique spirituelle* and *potestas* then interlink when mind games steer a specific policy in a certain direction (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). This works *vice versa* too, as this mental politics can be ‘institutionalized only if it is reproduced by policy-makers’ who conform to or perceive it (Radaelli, 1999: 769). However, even in lieu of central control (e.g. *auctoritas*, *potestas*), *politique spirituelle* and *pecunia* incentives can also coordinate actions together (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). This interlinkage might be very common in European spatial planning, as Jensen&Richardson (2003: 182) say that regional authorities use its language to be seriously considered for Interreg funding. Note though, that in each instance it is not known beforehand which sphere of action’s power practices influence the ones of another (e.g. the making of policy can further the competency for it). The ways in which two, three, or all four spheres of action interlink to transform power practices thus depends on the case studied – *in casu* territorial cohesion.

Still, its separation between governing and rationality might persuade you that a governmentality framework puts up *politique spirituelle* as gluing the other three spheres of action together (e.g. thought interlinks

<sup>a</sup> Infographics “impressionistically” visualises a territory to guide the viewer and user to see a particular and informative idea about it clearly exposed, that is, the information of the territory goes through a “perspectival” mould for representation (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 216).

<sup>b</sup> The explicitness of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development when it concerns common issues in co-operative governance for building competitive regions for instance: ‘Whether in regard to relations between municipalities, relations between the public and private sectors or vertical relations between levels of government, enough time must be allowed to establish shared references, a common “language” and a minimum degree of trust in the undertakings for the different parties’ (OECD, 2005: 127).

competency, policy, funding). Although it does focus on thinking too with the pivotal role of expertise, this framework does not prefigure these interlinkages. Its distinction between programmes and practices moreover shows a sharp way to also analyse this argued for glue function of *politique spirituelle*.

Eising&Kohler-Koch (in Kohler-Koch&Eising, 1999: 275, 277) namely do reason that for convergence in the European community's 'heterogeneous composition and complex institutional set-up[, it] puts a premium on the ability to provide convincing policy concepts and their interpretation', either for the content of policy or its process. This because they facilitate a platform for or belief in solidarity, reciprocity, and consensus (Faludi, 2002b: 904; Schön, in Campbell, 2005: 396). Griggs&Howard (2002: 106) add the important role for frames to concepts, since problem solving in policy arenas would increasingly take place within 'policy frames'; these comprise 'a hierarchy of norms and codes for interpreting problems [and (contradictory) evidence and for] guiding behaviour within the policy process' (Murdoch, 2003: 50). However, due to their vagueness, normative relevance and prescriptive elements, such "bridging concepts" 'are often disputed and subject to divergent interpretation' (Eising&Kohler-Koch, in Kohler-Koch&Eising, 1999: 277; Faludi, 2002b: 904). For this reason they are criticised in academic literature (Krätke, 2001; Copus, 2001; Faludi, 2004e: 393). In a governmentality framework on the other hand, you study these policy concepts and frames as – not what actually happens or true knowledge, but as – elements in another type of programmes. And although mental programmes can be meant to govern practices by gluing spheres of action together (e.g. with multi-interpretable concepts), whether they are glued together thus depends on (the thinking in) the power practices of each sphere on a per case basis.

### 3.3 Conclusion

#### 3.3.1 The fit between spatial planning and governmentality

To answer the question of 'How does spatial planning as departure-point align with the analytical framework of governmentality?', this chapter expounded the analytical stance of this research on the concept of territorial cohesion insofar it is formed by its departure-point. In the analytical framework spatial planning can then be considered as a political technology, and especially European spatial planning fits this governmentality framework. Both namely start from the plurality of regimes of practices in a territory and thereby more emphasise the actual "power games" that are performed than the common ways in which power is expressed. Hereby four types of programmes come forward when you consider European spatial planning processes and events as the playing out of strategies and conflicts: i) *auctoritas* as in competencies, ii) *potestas* as in spatial and other policies, iii) *pecunia* as in funding, and iv) *politique spirituelle* as in frames, representations, and concepts. The European Union does not have the first form of power, European spatial planning centres around the in/formal second, can be implemented through the third, and the last was and is perhaps the most ajar for it. These expressed forms of power therefore direct us to four spheres of action in which transformations of power relations in spatial planning practices might, might already have, or already happened respectively. They thus help to carve out the research object from the departure-point of this study by organising the data-gathering and -analysis (see Appendix A), particularly when it concerns the usage of the concept of territorial cohesion (see Chapter 6).

#### 3.3.2 Resultant analytical stance as starting-point

While this research considers the concept of territorial cohesion from the departure-point of spatial planning, it always does so in the analytical framework of governmentality. Such an analytical stance entails an analysis in the plural: of juridical, administrative, financial, and mental programmes in relationship with regimes of power practices. Three things thereby make it more complex: i) these programmes point to spheres of action that can interlink in many ways, ii) the involved power practices can be effects on and by spatial planning, and iii) (expert) thought plays both a double role as practice and explicit programme to govern and a pivotal role as connection between government action and the governed entity. Hence, notwithstanding the governmentality

framework and direction from the four expressed forms of power, now new questions rise, methodological ones that is. Part III will therefore deal with the question of how to draw these divisions and relations when it concerns the government and rationality of the concept of territorial cohesion.