The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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Chapter 4 Situating discourse analysis

Introduction

An understanding of how this research applies the discourse analytical approach to the developing formation of the concept of territorial cohesion needs a general explanation of its methodology. The chapter below presents such an explanation by first placing discourse analysis in science through the methodology’s onto- and epistemological traces which show the way to an alternative analytical route for what is called ‘social science’ (§4.1). Secondly, what discourse analysis analyses, that is: discourse, will be delineated more precisely by defining it and outlining the interpretative kind of analysis involved (§4.2). Thereafter, however, two peculiarities for how this research uses discourse analysis come up and point to the possibilities and limitations of the methodology. Both have to do with two interrelated problems sketched in the Introduction of this Part III on the methodological framework: the relations between text, the social world, and tangible reality are treated in a section on discourse of – not social, but – spatial reality (§4.3), both in general and for planning, and a section on the similarities of and differences between discourse analysis and policy analysis touches upon the uncertainties around territorial cohesion practices (§4.4). To end this description which situates the discourse analytical approach, the fifth section shows how discourse analysis links practices and language (§4.5) and the sixth rounds up this general explanation with a characterisation of the methodology by using biological and historical metaphors (§4.6).

4.1 Placing discourse analysis onto- and epistemologically

4.1.1 Facts, phenomena, knowledge: science or discourse?

Science may today well be the dominant way to know the existing world, objectively state how the world actually is, and arrive at facts by following certain methodologies. Directly discussing methodology without paying attention to ontology would be inept though, as the appropriateness of a particular set of scientific methods for a research object turns on assumptions about the nature of the ‘reality’ they are meant to discover (e.g. its causal relations). A neglect of ontology might therefore lead to a research field which badly matches its methodology for doing research and its assumptions about the researched object – e.g. the development of one can outrun the other (Hall, in Mahoney&Rueschemeyer, 2003: 373-374, 398). Before the discourse analytical methodology is presented, its ontological assumptions should therefore be brought forward. This is done below by placing discourse analysis in the discussions which go from the assumptions of empiricism/positivism, phenomenology, via the linguistic turn, towards a philosophy of social science.

Empiricist/positivist assumptions can lead to problems because they see the nature of the researched reality basically as an ‘objective one that is “out there” awaiting impartial exploration and discovery’ (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 586-587), and after this folding of onto- and epistemology the step to methodology quickly follows. Such tendencies can have perverse effects in and with social science, the more so if social science models drive the study of organisations (Behling, 1980; Audet&Landry&Déry, 1986). That is to say, if these empiricist/positivist assumptions conceal subjective views or become problematic by acknowledging change. Indeed, with some doubt about the existence of social facts and stability, the study of ‘phenomena such as sensemaking, meaning construction, power, and conflicts becomes very awkward to handle using any immutable objectivist framework’ (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 586-587). Hence, the need for a (constant) revaluation of what reality exists, what knowledge is, and how to link them through research – i.e. properly ground ontology, epistemology, and methodology for research.

* For the field of comparative politics Hall states that the important theories build on ontological views that point to distant events, sequencing, and complex interaction to explain political outcomes while the important methodologies are still based on views which see political phenomena caused by ‘a few powerful factors operating independently of context’ (Hall, in Mahoney&Rueschemeyer, 2003: 398).
When you seek to ground methodology, doubting the existence of facts is something else than doubting their appearance – after all, when you do research you have to have something as research object. Yet, looking at "facts" as (mere) phenomena indicates a phenomenological turn away from (objectivistic) ontologies. The premise of phenomenology is, namely, that reality exists (only) as it is perceived in human consciousness: when we bracket off the actual world and 'try to arrive at something which cannot be so bracketed off,' we shall see that consciousness itself is the one absolute (Hamlyn, 1987: 321). Phenomenology thus bases the knowledge of phenomena on the subject, something of which Husserl speaks of as the constitution of objectivity through subjective activity: 'It is true that the world transcends and thus is not reducible to the consciousness we have of it, but that is precisely the meaning consciousness bestows on it' (Carr, in Popkin, 1998: 677). For science, which claims objectivism, this would of course be highly problematic, in particular the problem of the subject for the social sciences (see below). And it is phenomenology which is concerned with how the subjective bestowal of meaning occurs.

Phenomenology "mystically" looks away from objects for an epistemological ground and perplexes itself when it stands for the subject, speechless about the appearance of this base as meaning-giver. A way to circumvent this problem is by turning to intersubjectivity. This is what the sociology of knowledge (e.g. of Dewey, Mannheim) seems to do under the guise of materialism. Knowledge is here 'no longer exclusively a resultant of the thinking individual, [but] both reflective moments (thought and knowledge) are associated with a worldly context which in different theories are elaborated into different concepts of "existential determination" (Seinsverbundenheit)' (Salet, 1982: 185). Hence, various opposing/overlapping knowledges would hereby be determined by the materiality of social reality. However, although this turns epistemological groundings (partly) away from the subject, does this not strangle even science in intersubjectivity – e.g. not a subjective but partialist perspectivism? Namely, if knowledge 'originates and develops in relation to certain collective experiences, social situations and the specific Weltanschauungen (philosophies of life) which accompany it' (Salet, 1982: 186), does that not entail that all knowledge goes as long as it is intersubjectively constituted? What is more, the sociology of knowledge does not fold onto- and epistemology as empiricist/positivist approaches do, but hands over the problem of differentiating between the thought and knowledge of the social world and the social world itself. How then, to prevent that every sociology of knowledge runs in circles: grounding knowledge on the social and understanding how it knows the social through the sociology of knowledge again? The sociology of knowledge thus seems to trap knowledge and social science in a self-referentiality for reflection.

After from ontology passing through phenomenology into the sociology of knowledge in the search for an epistemological ground, Hoggart&Lees&Davies (2002: 163-164) notice a linguistic turn as way out of the sociology of knowledge's self-referentiality: it would be a system of language which socialises us. The usage of (technical) jargon, for instance, makes one part of a profession, and such a system of language determines which words to utter, when, and how. Particularly interesting herein is that Hoggart&Lees&Davies (2002: 163-164) see academic discourse as authorising and professionalising. The academia is of course no unity and, just as the sociology of knowledge teaches us, the fields herein are made. 'They acquire coherence and integrity in time because scholars devote themselves in different ways to what seems to be a commonly agreed-upon subject matter. Yet it goes without saying that a field of study is rarely as simply defined as even its most committed partisans – usually scholars, professors, experts, and the like – claim it is' (Said, 2003: 50). When neither the research object nor the ones who study the field define the subject matter, does a linguistic turn therefore imply that a language system does – i.e. what matter who is speaking (Foucault, 1969, in Bouchard, 1977: 130)? An additional problem to define an academic field of study is that they can change entirely 'as to make an all-purpose definition of subject matter almost impossible' (Said, 2003: 50). It thus seems that a linguistic turn would make the sociology of knowledge's self-referential epistemological ground into a hall of mirrors by adding systems of that which signifies and refers, that is: language (see Chapter 5 on mapping meanings), to the social world and knowledge about it, thereby constantly reflecting research objects and subject-matters of transforming fields of study. However, an awkward point about seeing language as a socialising system herein is, that an analysis of these systems cannot base itself solely on language, as it needs an understanding of the
social as well (how else to know that and how language socialises?). In such a complexly intertwined context Hoggart&Lees&Davies (2002: 163-164) point to discourse analysis as methodology ‘used to investigate how scientific knowledge is socially constructed’ (Latour&Woolgar, 1979; Demeritt, 1996). Discourse analysis can thus not so much be placed on bedrock onto- and epistemological grounds, but in traces through our thinking that accept the shaky position offered to us by the interrelatedness of social facts, phenomena, and knowledge through language.

Then again, for scientific research such a methodological placing of discourse analysis in the linguistic interrelation of facts, phenomena, and knowledge might be unsatisfactory and especially go too hasty when traced through the sociology of knowledge. Namely, as Sayer (2000: 32) insinuates, one should not substitute ‘the sociology of science for the philosophy of science, and to treat knowledge as a function of power’. The philosophy of science comes up with the names of Popper and Kuhn for the archetypal images of change in science. While Popper (1959/1992) prescribes scientists to seek for falsification instead of verification of their theories to advance through discoveries (i.e. while induction leads to theories through generalisation, one counterexample through deduction is logically decisive), Kuhn’s (1962/1970) scientific revolutions describe how through time scientists merely replace exemplars: one paradigm for another (i.e. incommensurable frameworks follow each other wherein normal science develops towards anomalies). To offer a middle ground between the tensions of pre-/description and scientific advance/paradigms, Lakatos came up with a model which combines Popper and Kuhn by distinguishing hard-core postulates from the auxiliary hypotheses which protect the former against falsification (Lossee, 1993: 202-206). However, this would even make natural science a normative enterprise whereby the canons of particular research programmes judge this differentiation and the success of any explanation (Lakatos, in Hacking, 1981: 117; Emigh, 1997: 659). Moreover, although such research may well entail both inductive as deductive reasoning, ‘induction alone cannot be used in developing explanations because facts do not exist outside of the framework for analyzing them’ (Emigh, 1997: 660). That is to say, also hard-core postulates are theoretical explanations of facts and thus arrived at with an a priori framework instead of solely having an a posteriori base. Philosophically seen this is not enough for science, especially for the empirical natural sciences – or rather: too much to handle, as this would make science’s epistemological base unscientific (e.g. philosophic).

For the social sciences the problematic of explaining reality becomes even more tricky than for the natural sciences due to their – not single (i.e. humans understanding nature), but – ‘double hermeneutic’ (Giddens, 1987; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 210): both the researchers’ interpretations and the interpretations of the people whom the researchers study determine ‘what are to be counted as “relevant” facts within a given discipline’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 33). Flyvbjerg shows through Foucault how this double hermeneutic has to do with social science’s research object: subjects. That is to say, humankind herein has the double role of meaning giver (e.g. by deciding on what counts as an object) and objects which are to be given meaning, a double role which ‘drives the study of human activity into an “essential instability”’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 36). All human sciences thus treat as their object (i.e. what is given to representation) that which forms these objects (i.e. what renders representation possible, but is still representation). The human sciences, therefore, do not so much seek to ‘generalize themselves or make themselves more precise as to be constantly demystifying themselves’ (Foucault, 1973: 344, 364) – e.g. representing ever-more mechanisms instead of ever-better theories (Elster, 1989: 173; Hedström&Swedberg, 1996: 283). Although social science could differ from natural science in that it can be

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Anomaly: when a type of phenomena resists our best attempts to apply our principles of intelligibility (Lossee, 1993).

Deduction: ‘approach to science that proceeds from theory formulation to testing empirically’ (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308).

Falsification: proving a scientific theory is wrong (Lossee, 1993).

Incommensurability: scientific theories are incommensurable if they cannot be compared for knowing which one is more accurate (Lossee, 1993).

Induction: ‘process of research that proceeds from research investigations to theory’ (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 310).

Verification: proving a scientific theory is right (Lossee, 1993).

A priori (from what comes before): independent of experience (Lossee, 1993).

A posteriori (from what comes after): dependent on experience (Lossee, 1993).

Read Kant (1781/1998) for starters.
implicated in the construction of practices besides discovering and naming already existing ones, this is thus not, as Sayer (2000: 44) holds, the ‘difference between natural and social science which makes the relativism (rightly or wrongly) associated with Kuhn (1970) different from that associated with Foucault’. The difference between Kuhn’s and Foucault’s relativism is based on the onto- and epistemological difference of the natural and social sciences’ research object, making social science an instable activity – reminding us of the sociology of knowledge’s self-referentiality. Moreover, associated herewith is that change in social science does not evolve through scientific revolutions but intellectual waves: researchers follow and abandon fashions, but there are no paradigm shifts because no collective accumulation of knowledge took place within the dominant wave (Dreyfus, 1982; Flyvbjerg, 2001: 30). While you could call this situation preparadigmatic (Kuhn, 1962), if the instability of social science is essential, its development will never be paradigmatic. Hence, in line with Popper (1959) who holds that theories are not scientific if they are not falsifiable, Foucault’s question for social science is whether it is reasonable at all to use the label “science” for this kind of activity. Even the expression “body of knowledge” is too pretentious for Foucault’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 30): ‘let us say, to be more neutral still…body of discourse’ (Foucault, 1973: 344).

The reduction of social science to a body of discourse would clearly be crucial for the methodology of discourse analysis and extend its range of application. With such an epistemological grounding it would namely provide a suiting methodology for showing what is purported to be science is not scientific at all and/or based on non-scientific grounds. Discourse analysis would also be useful for analysing activities whose un/scientific and knowledge status is not set (yet), because if social science is just a body of discourse too, you can always apply this methodology, no matter the (eventual) status of the activity. As a consequence of these traces through the philosophy of social science, we can swap the question for discourse analysis which came to us through the sociology of knowledge after the linguistic turn, that is: ‘how is scientific knowledge socially constructed?’, for the one of ‘how is a discourse constructed as “social-scientific”?’. Due to the difference of objects and subjects as research object and a focus on words as signs of what is said some mirrors are taken out of the hall of social science: no facts, no body of knowledge (connaissance), just discourse. Leaving us with the all important question ‘what is discourse?’, treated in section 4.2.1 on its definition, and, in this perspective, the question of ‘what is knowledge?’, touched upon in the section below. Save to say though, the traces of discourse analysis through science still lay bare our shaky research position, whereby the methodology sees discourse as holding social facts, phenomena, and knowledge and the analysis places them between parentheses. What is thus much needed is an analytical route to follow for analysing the later to be defined ‘discourse’.

4.1.2 Alternative analytical route for what is called ‘social science’

To give an analytical route to follow for applying discourse analysis after destabilising the common way of doing research this methodology can first be placed in another path arrived at through juxtaposition. As we saw above, Popper (1959/1992) stands for the importance of the falsification of scientific theory, which puts social science in a difficult position, as philosophically seen it cannot arrive at scientific theories. Nonetheless, the activity of social science often still concerns itself with abstractions, basic principles, theories, and general criteria for the evaluation of existing conditions in society’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125). It is this unreflected ‘will to knowledge’ that Foucault criticises, as it ‘distracts us from the concrete operations of power’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125). To understand power, Foucault sets the task ‘to break with this mode of questioning [and] instead inquire how power actually functions’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 125) (see Part II on the analytical framework above for a discussion on governmentality and power). The old term of phronesis can be dug up for this task, leading to a phronetic approach to social science which carries out ‘analyses and interpretations of the status of values and interests in society’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60; also see Owens & Rayner & Bina, 2004; Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). Hereby phronetic researchers ‘see no neutral ground, no “view from nowhere,” for their work. There is therefore no unified

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*Phronesis can be characterised as ’Ethics. Deliberation about values with reference to praxis. Pragmatic, variable, context-dependent. Oriented toward action. Based on practical value-rationality. The original concept has no analogous contemporary term’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 57). Phronesis goes beyond both analytical, scientific knowledge (episteme) and technical knowledge or know-how (technê) and involves judgments and decisions made in the manner of a virtuous social and political actor’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 357).
"we" when asking and answering the value-rational questions phronesis entails: 'Where are we going?', 'Is this desirable?', and 'What should be done?' (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 60-61). Even in the attempt to answer the primary and descriptive question, phrenetic research always focuses on the actual practical activities and knowledges in everyday situations which constitute a given field of interests (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134). A social science which is carried out phrenetically thus offers a methodological path for discourse analysis if it will inquire the values and interests shown in practical activities and knowledges to know how power actually functions.

One of those things that can happen in everyday life is policy making (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). However, the ethical analysis of policy making involved in phrenetic research requires an abandoning of many central tenets of positivism, something which could undermine 'the carefully tended technocratic image of the analyst and its comfortable role in the policymaking system (Amy, 1984: 582). Moreover, when the moral underpinnings of policy issues are the focus, these are often linked with larger ideological controversies [which] politicians are even more hesitant to address' (Amy, 1984: 585). A policy analysis which freely addresses normative issues in an open and systematic way is therefore easier to do for relatively independent policy analysts not subjected to the career and institutional pressures that exist in the field of interests (Amy, 1984: 588).

Although academics/scientists might seem well-suited for this job, relatively independent as they are supposed to be from the government, in situations whereby government and scientific research join hands it becomes more complicated to find someone outside the field of interests with enough expertise to carry out such an analysis – not to mention the general problem Foucault raises for doing social science from an outside position. When you leave the positivistic role of technocratic analyst, the status of knowledges and their relationship with moral underpinnings in such an associated field of interests becomes a central problem (e.g. mixing Sein und Sollen). A policy analyst on the phrenetic path can use discourse analysis, because with the daily activities and knowledges (of policy making) leading the way this methodology does not need to (beforehand) decide on the status of the knowledge involved (e.g. un/scientific) – although this might form a key outcome (see §4.4 on policy analysis).

Within the phrenetic approach discourse analysis seeks to know practices of power and knowledges and thus does not throw away knowledge. Quite the contrary if such research follows Foucault. According to Deleuze (2000: 109), the conversion of phenomenology into epistemology is even his major achievement. After the traces of discourse analysis through social science turned social facts into phenomena, a conversion to knowledge therefore easily follows. Hereby the difference comes forward between connaissance as the body of knowledge of a particular discipline and savoir as underlying all knowledge at any time. Although even the activity called social science can be understood as a body of discourse instead of connaissance, more in general seeing and speaking always mean savoir. Everything is knowledge, [and] there is nothing beneath or prior to knowledge' (Deleuze, 2000: 109) – there is therefore no need for a priori a posteriori discussions or a phenomena-constraining subject. That said, we should know that knowledge is irreducibly double 'since it involves speaking and seeing, language and light[;, but] we do not see what we speak about, nor do we speak about what we see' (Deleuze, 2000: 109); as a result signs are broken in two: words are signs of what is said and images are signs of what is shown. At first sight this Foucaultian conversion leads to another folding of onto-and epistemology, this time in favour of knowledge over facts, away from empiricist/positivist assumptions. However, Foucault did convert phenomenology and not ontology into epistemology. This research can thus easily pose that it does not question the existence of facts, merely the tangibility of social facts.

But what status does the social world have then? To answer this question discourse analysis can take the cultural turn along with hermeneutics and interpretative human geography fuelled by an ontological understanding of the world as meaningful and therefore textlike, in the sense that its meanings must always be interpreted (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 22). It are, then, the sections below which downplay the risk of being accused of with the discourse analytical hammer seeing everything as a discursive nail, as they deal with how this methodology differentiates knowledges, comprehends spatial reality, and links language and practices.

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*By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this enunciation to be formulated (Foucault, 1972: 156); Blacker, 1998: 139).
Yet, the methodology already seems to be appropriate for a research on the concept of territorial cohesion (by a phronetic policy analyst), because discourse analysis can study how the territorial cohesion field gets coherence and integrity and its knowledges and their status are constructed. Hereby it comes up with the framework in which ‘territorial cohesion facts’ exist by, with the recognition of social science’s double hermeneutic, not only acknowledging but also laying bare the essentially instable research position involved. As a phronetic inquiry of the values and interests shown in the practical territorial cohesion activities and knowledges befits (see Chapter 2 on the analytical framework inside which power practices exist), no view from nowhere but a decentered outsider’s perspective on the field of interests is taken to know how power actually functions. In spite of this apparent match between the concept of territorial cohesion as research object and discourse analysis as methodology, a central problem remains: how to define the territorial cohesion field of interests, what are territorial cohesion (policy making) practices? Before treating this problem though (see §4.4 on policy analysis and 4.5 on linking practices and language), it should be clear what a ‘discourse’ is and how to analyse it – perhaps this even gives a perspective for identifying territorial cohesion practices.

4.2 Delineate discourse

4.2.1 Definition of ‘discourse’

If discourse ‘delimits what can be said and what not’ (Wæver, 1997: 5; Diez, 2001: 11), what is it? It is necessary to give a definition which more precisely delineates ‘discourse’ before there can be put forward an interpretative kind of analysis of such a delimiting entity. In the style of the Foucaultian tradition followed in this research discourses refer to systems of knowledge (connaissance) and their associated practices (Barker, 1998: 139-140; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308). These practices are the ensemble ‘through which the world is made meaningful and intelligible to oneself and others’ (Johnston&Gregory&Smith, 1994: 136; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308) – e.g. not the practices to which ‘territorial cohesion’ would refer, but those that give the concept meaning. Meaning-making practices can thus be distinguished from power practices, a separation which opens up the possibility to see how they relate (see section 1.5 on linking practice and language).

However, to be more precise, ‘discourse’ can be used in two ways: ‘as an abstract noun, meaning language and other types of semiosis as elements of social life’ and, as mostly meant in this research, more concretely as a count noun, meaning particular ways of representing some part of the physical, social, psychological world (Fairclough, 2003: 17, 26). Discourses as systems of knowledge are, namely, ‘frameworks that embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action’ (Johnston&Gregory&Smith, 1994: 136; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308). Moreover, discourses do not only differ in the part of the world they represent, there are also alternative and often competing ones differing in how the same events are represented: how they represent processes and relations, actors, time and place of events, what they ex-/include with which level of abstraction/concreteness (Fairclough, 2003: 17). Discourses are therefore embedded in practices, situated between other discourses, heterogeneous, as they consist of different parts, regulated, as they are a frame, and performative, as they are (partly) a practice themselves (Johnston&Gregory&Smith, 1994; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 308).

A common feature of discourse analytical research has been its textual orientation (Richardson&Jensen, 2003). Thereby, for instance, seeking to provide critical scrutiny of texts and utterances of policy makers and other key actors, like much of the discourse-based research in urban policy which draws on Fairclough or Foucault (Jacobs, 2006: 39). Nevertheless, social scientists working in the influential tradition of Foucault generally pay little close attention to the linguistic features of texts (Foucault, 1972; Fairclough, 1992: 2). But what to look for in texts when you are not that interested in language? Discourse? Also, what to do...
when we can find many different representations of the world in any text, but 'would not call each separate representation a separate discourse' (Fairclough, 2003: 124). Discourses as systems of knowledges and their associated practices namely transcend such 'concrete and local' representations, and a particular discourse can generate many specific representations (Fairclough, 2003: 124). Hence, to delineate what a 'discourse' is beyond the abovementioned definition, the kind of interpretative analysis involved needs to be considered, especially because such an analysis presents the discourse as its outcome (see the section below).

Still, what follows from above is that discourses can be outlined according to their own features. That is, what makes a discourse coherent is that it forms the ground whereon disagreement can arise (discursively) due to common observations, concepts, theoretical backgrounds, and/or beliefs (Nelson, 1990: 241; Saarikoski, 2002: 8). A discourse's own features are also pointed at by how it differs from others in degree of repetition, commonality, stability over time, and 'scale' (i.e. how much of the world is included) (Fairclough, 2003: 125). Discourses are therefore – not only limited in, but also – different in 'the range of representations they can generate' (Fairclough, 2003: 125). Of course, for this research the question discourse analysis tries to answer is what these limiting and differentiating features are for territorial cohesion – i.e. what are the concept's system of knowledge and its associated practices?

4.2.2 Re/Construct: interpretative analysis

The interpretative kind of analysis involved in analysing a system of knowledge and its associated practices (i.e. a discourse) can be characterised as a methodology in the epistemological challenge of social constructionism to positivism. Social constructionism namely challenges the positivistic assumptions that the relationship between 'knowledge of the nature of the world and its actual nature' is straightforward and thus unproblematic and that objective, unbiased understanding is possible, as the categories which 'divided up, describe, and give meaning to the world are socially, culturally and historically contingent' (Burr, 1995; Hastings, 1996: 193). With a 'critical stance toward seemingly natural or common sense 'knowledge' of the world' (Hastings, 1996: 192; e.g. see Manning, 1985; Kemeny, 1992) constructionist approaches therefore hold that practices and symbols construct and sustain "social reality" and its issues, problems, and organisations as ostensible pre-existing givens (Berger&Luckmann, 1966; Morgan&Smircich, 1980; Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588). How, then, to reconstruct this construction with research?

With the use of a hermeneutic methodology it is the researcher who can interpret how "social reality" was constructed by recovering the practices and categories which constructed it (Berger&Luckmann, 1967; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 28). However, that hermeneutical approaches can be caught in words might become problematic. That is, when hermeneutics researches how problems are identified and constructed, it does so by accounting 'for the emergence, organization, and maintenance of claims making activity', that is, the linguistic categories and rhetorical practices (Burningham&Cooper, 1999: 304; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 29). What is more, when such research follows Geertz's approach to textual analysis, it digs through layers of meaning to get (to) the underlying message: the system of rules that structure the construction of the text' (Geertz, 1973/1975; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 156). Such an interpretative search for meaning seems both to go too far and not far enough, as its recognition that people are 'suspended in webs of signification' might on the one hand lead to interpretation without end, while, on the other hand, how it does this, that is: by 'sorting out the structures of signification, could limit interpretative research to linguistic research (Geertz, 1973/1975: 5, 9; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 156). The possible consequences for hermeneutics increase when the research does not start with activities but the claims making activity instead. Yet, if the goal of interpretative approaches is the generation of descriptions, insights, and explanations of events to reveal the system of interpretations and meaning and the structuring and organising processes (Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588), why should interpretation be limited to language?

Discourse analysis is not limited to language, nor does it (beforehand) see language as the determining factor. As method discourse analysis can even be considered a reaction to an overemphasis on language: although also its focus is on talk and texts, they are seen as part of practices (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 28).
163). While it sees language – not as reflecting, but – as constructing and organising social reality just as hermeneutics does, it approaches the use of language and strategies of argument as ‘forms of discourse that help create and reproduce social meaning’ (Tonkiss, 1998b: 246; Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 163). Hence, discourse analysts view language – not as the only, but – as one domain in which knowledge of the social world is shaped’ (Hoggart&Lees&Davies, 2002: 163). Moreover, if they are ‘Foucaultian constructionists,’ they analyse discourses as level on which language, knowledge, and power are fundamentally interconnected (Foucault, 1997b; Burr, 1995; Hastings, 1996: 192). By differentiating language and knowledge you can distinguish between ‘construction’ and ‘construal’, something social constructionists not always do (Fairclough, 2003: 8-9). Although texts construe (e.g. represent, imagine) the social world in ways, these construals neither automatically, regularly, nor single-effectually change its construction, as this depends upon contextual factors (e.g. how the social world already is, different interpretations of the text) (Fairclough&Jessop&Sayer, 2002; Fairclough, 2003: 8-9). Because the discourse analysis of this research is in the style of the Foucaultian tradition, it places language besides knowledge and power (e.g. as helpful) instead of in the centre of attention. However, how to research the relationship between language and the social world if not through straightforward constructionism?

How the discourse analysis used in this research para-doxa-cly differs from more common ways of seeing the social world affects how this methodology analyses it. Perhaps following commons sense, most see social structures and social agents as causal “powers” of events and texts, whereby social agents texture texts by setting up relations between elements of texts (Archer, 1995; Sayer, 2000; Fairclough, 2003: 22). Politics, in fact, can then be considered as ‘an arena in which different interest groups seek to establish a particular narrative or version of events as a means to pursue political objectives’ (Jacobs, 2006: 39). However, such a prior objectification of the social world does not suit a Foucaultian methodology, because, as explained above (see §4.1.1 on social science), this approach reduces the most scientific activity to know these “social facts” (i.e. social science) to a body of discourse due to the essential instability of studying humans and the related absence of a collective accumulation of knowledge. This research cannot, therefore, base events and texts on social structures or social agents as facts, because the common categories in use (e.g. government, civil society, capitalist, individual) would thereby obscure an understanding of how power actually functions. On the contrary, subjects, whether categorised as structures or agents, should be seen as a part of the discursive field: ‘Discourse is not a place into which subjectivity irrupts; it is a space of differentiated subject-positions and subject-functions’ (Foucault, 1968, in Burchell&Gordon&Miller, 1991). Hence, just as a play creates its stage and actors instead of that a stage and actors create their play, structure and agency are a part of the discourse (e.g. its performance) and do not stand outside of it (e.g. as its origin). This discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion therefore does not research how social structures and social agents affect texts on territorial cohesion and related events and vice versa, but how the territorial cohesion discourse interconnects language, knowledge, and power.

Although language, knowledge, and power fundamentally interconnect at the level of discourse, a Foucaultian discourse analysis does not pose that everything solely exists as discourse. On the contrary, it looks at discourses as tactical elements operating in the field of force relations (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 124) (see Chapter 7 on tactical reciprocity). Tactical elements, however, which must be viewed as a series of interrupted segments and whose function in force relations is neither uniform nor stable (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123). The fit of a discourse in a strategy is, namely, neither one-to-one nor fixed beforehand: the same discursive elements can be put into operation in various strategies, [different and even opposing discourses may coexist within the same strategy], so one cannot expect that discourses disclose by themselves what strategy they are part of’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123, 124). A research of discourses should thus not divide discourses up according to their strength, acceptance/exclusion, or validity, because, respectively, the same discourse can dominate or be dominated, it is about how discourses operate and seeing them in a tactical and strategic way (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123-124). One should deal with them otherwise: as a multiplicity of discursive elements whose distribution must be reconstructed in a concrete study of rationality and power (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123). For territorial cohesion such
a discourse analysis may involve a re/construction of structures as outcomes of rule-based processes that lead to particular interpretations of the concept (Agar, 1986; Gioia&Pitre, 1990: 588). What it definitely entails though, is a mapping of the words ‘territorial cohesion’ as a tactical element in particular force relations.

And so this section delineated discourse analysis by defining discourses as systems of knowledge and their associated practices, which should be analysed as tactical elements in force relations framing particular representations of the (social) world. To identify territorial cohesion’s ground for (discursive) disagreement this research should therefore interpret how language, knowledge, and power – not in themselves or separately, but through interconnection construct the concept by reconstructing the distribution of its discursive elements in a concrete study. Such a methodological approach to discourse leads, then, to a particular way of mapping the field of interests when it concerns the concept of territorial coherence: territorial cohesion practices can be distinguished in meaning-making and power practices, knowledge shows traces of the former, and with the latter they form a tactical element embedded in particular force relations. However, before this chapter explains the viewpoint taken to see the particular ways in which territorial cohesion knowledges and practices connect (see §4.5 on linking practices and language), it first needs to deal with two distinctive features of the concept: knowledges of territorial cohesion at least partly represent spatial reality instead of or besides social reality (see §4.3 on spatial reality below) and the concept may mostly be embedded in policy-making practices (see §4.4 on discourse and policy analysis).

4.3 No discourse analysis of spatial reality

4.3.1 Physical objects as research object of non-natural sciences

Insofar territorial cohesion has to do with social reality the methodology of discourse analysis suits a research on the concept which reconstructs how interconnections of language, knowledge, and power construct it as a tactical element in force relations. What, however, if territorial cohesion (also) has to do with spatial reality? Neither the double hermeneutic nor the essential instability involved in studying humans complicates research of spatial reality, because it has a fundamentally different status: while the research object of social science is a subject, the one of “spatial science” is an object. For instance, while discourse constructs the social world, the construction of actual physical conditions needs more; just as the creation of money is less tangible than the creation of gold bars (e.g. Zarlenga, 2002). However, the tangible reality of the natural sciences differs from the spatial reality of, for instance, geography – e.g. studying the molecular composition of bricks or stones requires another approach than studying streets or mountains. What this entails for how discourse analysis can study the links between text, the social world, and tangible reality in general and for planning in particular points for this research towards the analysis of policies.

4.3.2 In general: representing and/or mapping spatial reality?

Massey (1992) puts forward the problem of representing spatial reality with Jameson’s view that the spatial is unrepresentable and should be mapped and Laclau’s view that the spatial is unmappable and spatial discourses attempt to represent it. Either way, a limitation for discourse analysis is therefore that it cannot analyse spatial reality but at most merely the knowledge of it. Arguably, knowledge of spatial reality primarily falls on the seeing side of the irreducible double of knowledge (i.e. light, not language). Not only words but also images can thus be included in the conceptualisation of discourse (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). The problem that spatial reality cannot be represented or mapped gets particular importance in politics, as herein a range of discourses are simultaneously at work ‘in which the meaning and identity of political actors are referred to a particular place, a portion of a real space, whether it be a neighbourhood, a city, region, or national territory, and where as a result

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Note though, that the words ‘spatial science’ are not uttered here to in one sweep characterise all sciences which are also concerned with space, as urban planning and geography are concerned with both the social and the spatial for example. ‘Spatial science’ is meant literally here: merely the science(s) concerned with space. “Spatial science” could thus, just as “social science”, be a part of a “spatio-social science” which, for instance, researches how people re/order space.
a certain degree of political closure is effected or at least reinforced’ (Low, 1997: 255; Richardson & Jensen, 2003: 13). What discourse analysis thus can do is to reconstruct how systems of linguistic and pictorial knowledge of spatial reality function as tactical elements in force relations while the meaning-making practices involved are thoroughly problematic. Hence, although discourse analysis cannot study tangible reality, it can show how text/images, the social world, and knowledge of the tangible world link; something which tallies a research which looks at how people try to reshape spatial reality itself through, for instance, planning – leaving the question on the status of the kind of knowledge involved (e.g. compared to the natural and social sciences) in the open.

4.3.3 Planning: reshaping spatial reality

This spatial planning research on the concept of territorial cohesion sees planning as strategic discourse (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). The government issue this leads to is that of the “knowledge policy” in operation shown by epistemologies (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). That is to say, planning can be seen as world making in the sense that the used ‘words, signs and symbols become the frame of mind for social agents as well as being the outcome of the historical and contextual conditions under which they are articulated’ (Fischler, 1995; Richardson & Jensen, 2003). In spatial planning spatial metaphors as hybrid of words and images come up here as way to enforce certain spatial qualities and exclude others – e.g. ‘blue bananas’, ‘bunches of grapes’, ‘the pentagon’, ‘golden triangles’ for European space (Williams, 1993; 1996; Jensen & Richardson, 2003). The images these spatial metaphors speak of ‘work by providing principles of spatial organisation that stick in planners’ minds, enticing them to act and assisting public dialogue’ (Faludi, 1996). Moreover, of this type of ‘framing with images’ many metropolitan examples are known in which these Leitbilder are important as tool and goal of strategic spatial planning (Faludi, 1996; Salet & Thornby & Kreukels, 2003). To study the concept of territorial cohesion in the acknowledgement of all these words, signs, and symbols this research follows Jensen & Richardson (2003) in their turn to discourse analysis to deal with the interconnections of space, discourse, and power-rationalities (see Chapter 2 on the analytical framework of governmentality). Such a turn might well be a necessity to not only analyse the knowledge of spatial reality but also the reshaping of it: ‘If discourse is necessary for attaching meaning to things in everyday life, then analysis of discourse is inseparable from the analysis of space. In fact, analysis of space requires analysis of discourse if we are to understand how spaces come to be as they are, how people exist and act within them, and how our ideas and ways of thinking are affected by what happens in spaces’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Discourse thus produces lived spaces while actions within lived spaces shape discourse.

4.3.4 Towards policy analysis

When the social world takes place in the tangible reality it reshapes partly through discourse, what role does text/image have herein? According to Zukin (1998; Jensen & Richardson, 2003), ‘sets of meanings of the social imaginary are conceptualized in symbolic languages [and] these meanings are materialized and become real in all sorts of spatial and social practices, from urban design to housing policy’. Then again, not only are not all practices policy, policies are not only practices. As part of their integrated multi-level analysis of governance of European space, Böhme & Richardson & Dabinett & Jensen (2004: 1180) therefore ask: ‘How is space captured in policy ideas and reproduced in policy language and practice?’ In itself spatial policy is therefore not more spatial than any other kind of policy, but a language and practice which deals with space. Hence, before treating the way the Foucaultian kind of methodology links practices and language, it should be made clear how the used discourse analysis differs from and relates to policy analysis.
4.4 Is this discourse analysis only policy analysis?

4.4.1 Why compare discourse analysis and policy analysis?
Possibilities and limitations for the discourse analysis in this research come from this methodology in general and how this research uses it. While a general limitation is that no discourse analysis can analyse tangible reality, this research could reduce discourse analysis to merely a kind of policy analysis if territorial cohesion language and practices are only policy making and the kinds of analysis become isomorphic. Critical methodological issues for this research on the concept of territorial cohesion are, therefore, the differences between discourse analysis and policy analysis and how their similarities offer a common ground to relate them, in particular for spatial policy.

4.4.2 A major difference between discourse analysis and policy analysis
A major difference comes up between policy analysis and the Foucaultian discourse analytical approach shown above when you see the former as comprising ‘those activities aimed at developing knowledge relevant to the formulation and implementation of public policy’ (Torgerson, 1986: 33). Instead of helping the formulation and implementation of policy, a discourse analysis on the alternative analytical route of *phronesis* namely (also) aims to study the ethics involved in making and using knowledge. And not only the professional and political interests of policymakers (e.g. the administrator, legislator, bureaucracy), but even those of the policy analyst itself resist the potential challenges of moral evaluation, threatened as they are by ethical inquiry (Amy, 1984: 573). However, you could argue that these understandings of policy analysis are outdated and a feature of the dominance of positivism in approaches to policy analysis which saw it as an area of social science (Amy, 1984: 575). The more so since the policy analysis ‘enshrouded in a neo-positivist conception of knowledge and the technocratic [concept] of policy making long associated with it’ (Fischer, in Fischer & Forester, 1993: 37) was challenged later on by a constructionist understanding of policy ‘issues’ or ‘problems’ as historical and cultural specific instead of pre-existing givens to be discovered by policy makers (Edelman, 1988; Rochefort & Cobb, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 193, 194). Such a constructionist turn remembers us of a trait of discourse analysis. The difference remains though, that when discourse analysis analyses the field of interests insofar they are concerned with policy, this does not only include the interests of policy making, but also those of policy analysis, even if the latter uses constructionist approaches and/or does not help policy making.

4.4.3 The constructionist and argumentative turn to policy discourse and *Reallralationalität*: a common ground to relate discourse analysis and policy analysis
Building upon social constructionism, the argumentative turn in policy analysis argued ‘that the policy process should be understood as a process of argumentation’ (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 194). Both the constructionism involved and seeing language from the viewpoint of arguments can as similarities of discourse analysis and policy analysis form a common ground to relate them. That is, because the argumentative turn ‘suggests that successful policy making depends on constructing shared or accepted understandings of the ‘real’’, it implies an examination of how particular versions of reality are promoted in the process and language advances and legitimises these selective and contingent accounts (Hoppe, in Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 194). Although discourse analysis and policy analysis are essentially different activities, the argumentative turn aligns policy analysis partly to discourse analysis. This in the sense of how the latter approaches the use of language and strategies of argument as ‘forms of discourse that help create and reproduce social meaning’ (Tonkiss, 1999b: 246; Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 163). Moreover, the argumentative turn in policy analysis can exemplify how constructions of problems have political functions, because it goes beyond general constructionist observations and ‘demands the analysis of the ways in which particular constructions of social problems are used for particular (political) purposes’ (Hajer, in Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hastings, 1996: 194). Discourse analysis can also perform such an analysis, thereby analysing language and practices as ‘complementary ways of revealing these struggles for control over meaning in policy-making and implementation’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003).
Vice versa the argumentative turn also links policy analysis to the broader language and practices studied with discourse analysis, because it ‘highlight[s] the instrumentality of the process of problem construction [to] sustaining systems of belief about the nature of social reality’ (Hastings, 1996: 194). For instance, the existence of (certain) actors appears to be such a believe sustained by the policy sciences – e.g. leading to a study of territorial cohesion as a discourse brought forth by (a coalition of) actors (see Chapter 6 on the mapping of the usages of the concept). A discourse analytical methodology can thus be used for policy analysis, and policy analysis can in its turn point to the more general systems of knowledge also scrutinised by discourse analysis. However, how should this common ground of discourse analysis and policy analysis be understood?

Although discourse analysis and policy analysis differ, policy can be seen as a (everyday) place where systems of knowledge and their associated practices come together. The common ground for discourse analysis and policy analysis becomes, then, ‘policy discourse’. Policy discourses complexly hold values, thoughts, and practices and by forming bundles of exchanges between these elements (e.g. scientific and lay knowledge, unspoken actions, power relations) give shape to particular policy-making processes or debates (Sharp & Richardson, 2001; Jensen & Richardson, 2003; Richardson & Jensen, 2003). The analysis of policy discourse thus concretely studies rationality and power through an inquiry into the rationalities at work in policy making; thereby understanding policy making as an exposure and focus of conflict on a field of power struggles between different interests where knowledge and truth are contested (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). This, what Flyvbjerg (1998) has called Realrationalität, points to contingent power relations which create space for particular assertions to operate as absolute truths (Pavlich, 1995), thereby accepting and marginalising rationalities, knowledges and practices (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Hence, a policy discourse analysis should reconstruct the distribution of the multiplicity of tactical discursive elements in particular force relations of policy making.

Yet, even if a part of the territorial cohesion discourse is policy discourse, the mapping of the words ‘territorial cohesion’ hereby does not need to beforehand decide on how large and/or influential this part is. On the contrary, also the performativity of the territorial cohesion discourse can, namely, be explored by focusing on how discourse creates conditions for thought, communication, and action and how different configurations of power and rationality shape and are shaped by policy processes (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). That is to say, the role played by policy and policy analysis in the territorial cohesion discourse can thus be presented as an outcome of this research’s discourse analysis. Important to note hereby is, that to not only study policy but also the ways in which policy is analysed or even made into a scientific research object, one should look at the above discussed common ground of discourse analysis and policy analysis from a viewpoint outside the “policy sciences” – e.g. not study policy and the actors who make it but how a discourse constructs both policy and actors as such.

4.4.4 Spatial policy discourse analysis

Entities of spatial policy discourse can be analysed through the three spheres of language, practices, and power-rationality too (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). However, spatial policy is a particular kind of policy, as it deals with spatial reality (see §4.3 on spatial reality). An important issue for research is, then, ‘how spatialities, or framings of space and spatial relations, are ‘constructed’ in spatial policy discourses’ (Böhme, Richardson, & Dabinett & Jensen, 2004: 1180). Besides looking for how power-rationality configurations shape and are shaped by policy processes, the exploration of the performativity of a spatial policy discourse should therefore focus on how words and actions frame and represent spaces on the basis of certain relations between power and rationality (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). The capture of representations of space in language and images placed within policy processes hereby reveals power relations by showing, for instance, how different spatial visions are contested and different interests compete over the shape of policy. The methodological framework must, however, also be able to probe ‘the ways in which spaces and places are re-presented in policy discourses in order to bring about certain changes of socio-spatial relations and prevent others‘ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). New changes may need new discourses, since the old re-presentations of spatial reality were to bring about past changes. Besides
looking for how policy languages and practices manifest and reproduce a spatial policy discourse, a spatial policy discourse analysis should therefore also analyse ‘the relations between power and rationality as a new discourse emerges in a contested policy space and possibly attains hegemonic status’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003). Also to understand the (possible) spatial implications of policy making the Foucaultian approach appears, then, as a well-travelled path for crossing the gap between practices and language that link space with the operation of discourses and power – with Bentham's panopticon as archetypal example (Foucault, 1979a; 1990; Philo, 1987; Flyn, 1993; Lyon, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Marks, 1995; Sibley; 1995; Casey, 1996; Jensen, 1997; Jensen & Richardson, 2003) (see §4.5 on linking practices and language).

This research on the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with the European government level. For this level the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) (CEC, 1999a) can give a glimpse of a spatial policy discourse, as it shows an European spatial policy framework which would work indirectly by shaping the minds of the players involved in spatial development: the new terms leave room for interpretation and maps were up until the very last moment an issue of controversy in the process of making the ESDP and policy maps eliminated altogether (Faludi, in Faludi & Salet, 2000; Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). In spite of the common usage of Leitbilder in spatial planning on lower government levels, spatial reality appears on the EU level thus mostly to be represented by ambiguous (policy) language; if spatial reality is first represented by images, this would entail an extra translation from what we see to what we speak about. Hence, limitations for how this research uses discourse analysis might not so much come from policy analytical methodology, but follow insofar territorial cohesion is only concerned with the making of vague (spatial) policy (see the next Chapters). Moreover, methodologically seen it is possible for discourse analysis to analyse (spatial) policy.

4.5 Linking practices and language

4.5.1 Different practices: discourse and power

To come to the end of the general account of the methodological approach used in this research on the concept of territorial cohesion, the way in which this Foucaultian discourse analysis links practices and language should be discussed; thereby giving the general structure in which the discussions above on spatial reality and policy (analysis) fall. First of all, it is important not to conflate discourse and practices, but to separate them without denying that discourse itself is a practice: 'discursive practices are a subset of social practices [and discourses] invariably have conditions and effects (both ideational/textual and material) that differ from those that they acknowledge and intend' (Fairclough, 1992; Sayer, 2000: 45). As phronetic research attempts to know how power actually functions (see §4.1.2 on an alternative analytical route), other social practices of interest in this research are power practices, and therefore the relationship between discursive and power practices as ways of acting and thinking at once. By in their articulation and institutionalisation analysing language as a practice and power practices associated to a system of knowledge, the core ideas at stake in, for instance, shaping places (e.g. making European space) can be identified (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Hence, a crucial question for researching the actual functioning of power in a discourse analytical study of territorial cohesion is: what are the actual practical activities and knowledges which constitute the concept's field of interests? Methodologically seen the identification of the territorial cohesion field of interests in a discourse analytical study can be divided in two parts. On the one hand how the discourse analytical methodology used in this research which identifies the practices and knowledges constituting a field of interests moves towards the abstract notion of power-rationality explained in Chapter 2 on the analytical framework – e.g. the rationalities at work in policy making (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). On the other hand how this study of the concept of territorial cohesion revolves around statements. Below both are discussed consecutively.
4.5.2 Not political economic but Foucaultian discourse analysis

Since a discourse expresses a conceptualisation of reality and knowledge that may try to gain hegemony, it can be seen as a “will to knowledge” that attempts to embed and naturalise particular values and ways of seeing and understanding the world [through the] institutionalisation and fusion of articulation processes and practice forms [and thereby] generates new forms of knowledge and rationality, and frames what are considered to be legitimate social actions’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Two strands of discourse analysis can then be distinguished which differ essentially in how they structure these interconnections of practice, power, rationality, knowledge, and language: political economic informed analysis and Foucaultian-inspired research (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). Before presenting the Foucaultian approach chosen for this research, it can first be described by what it is not

The political economic informed analysis includes ‘critical discourse analysis’ associated with Fairclough and studies of ‘discourse coalitions’ advanced by others (e.g. Dryzek; Hafter, in Fischer & Forester, 1993; Davoudi & Healey, 1995; Newman, 1996; Rydin, 1998). Both emanate from Marxian writings ‘that extolled the significance of ideology and political economy in enabling powerful vested interests groups to impose hegemony’ (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). It follows that this political economic strand of discourse analysis emphasises ‘the material and economic factors that shape policy discourses [and] the linguistic strategies that are deployed by key actors to shape policy agendas’ (Harrison & Munton & Collins, 2004; Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41, 45). Such discourse analyses differ from a Foucaultian approach in that they imply a prior abstract and theoretical objectification of social reality distracting us from the concrete operations of power. That is, they say how their research object looks like (e.g. through theory) before they study it (see §4.1.2 on an alternative analytical route and 4.2.2 on interpretative analysis). Why, for instance, study the material and economic factors instead of political technologies and/or label some and not others as actors?

Obviously, the Foucault-inspired strand of discourse analysis draws on Foucault (e.g. Foucault, 1972; 1978, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991; 1980a). It differs from the political economic strand in two major ways. Firstly, power is not reduced to individual agency, but the exercise of power is seen as ‘contingent on the relationships formed between individuals within and beyond organizations’ (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41) – i.e. the Foucaultian approach does not fill in how power works with an abstract or theoretical objectification before it starts its analysis of practices (see Part II on the analytical framework). Secondly, language is not seen as a reflection of power relations, but their relationship is seen as recursive (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). Language practices thus both shape and are shaped by the power relations in power practices (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41). Then again, for analysis the Foucaultian approach puts language secondary to knowledge.

To be precise, power relations are a disposition of force-points and the lines between them and can change through time. When the forms in which these clouds of force-points appear are drawn though, such a chaotic reality of power can be grasped inside knowledge’s tranquility. ‘The informal outside is a battle, a turbulent, stormy zone where particular points and the relations of forces between these points are tossed about’ (Deleuze, 2000: 121). Knowledge (i.e. what can be seen and said) is then more stable and stratifies light and language: ‘Strata merely collected and solidified the visual dust and the sonic echo of the battle raging above them’ (Deleuze, 2000: 121). Hence, power produces knowledge which crystallises and fixes parts of the power relations in forms, as knowledge’s relationship to the informal outside of power relations ‘has the task of reassessing the forces established, and the strata of knowledge have the task of constantly producing levels that force something new to be seen or said’ (Deleuze, 2000: 120). So, language, as ‘sonic echo’, merely helps to create and reproduce meaning, as it plays ‘an instrumental role in establishing “regimes of truth”’ (Foucault, 1980a) by which social problems are formulated and addressed (Lees, 2004; Jacobs, 2006: 41) – e.g. the regime of truth formed by social science as a body of discourse (see §4.1.1 on science and discourse, 5.3.3 on meaning and knowledge, and Appendix A; §A.1.6 on regimes of truth). The system of knowledge and its associated practices (i.e. a discourse) takes centre stage herein, but not simply as surface projection of power mechanisms, as ‘via discourse and interpretation, rationality and power become interwoven’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 123). A Foucaultian discourse analysis thus identifies a field of interests by looking for the interconnected
linguistic, meaning-making, discursive, and power practices in their association with a system of knowledge, that is: by reconstructing the discourse which forms the interwoven power-rationality. However, although this methodology to identify a field of interests gives us a framework to identify the discourse of territorial cohesion, it does not tell us why these are territorial cohesion practices and knowledges – i.e. what are the arguments that something has to do with territorial cohesion or even belongs to the concept?

4.5.3 From argumentation to territorial cohesion pro/positions

When this discourse analytical research reconstructs the distribution of the discursive elements of territorial cohesion it would involve a mapping of territorial cohesion arguments as tactical elements in the force relations of the concept's field of interests. The research's methodology namely takes a look at the practical use of language and strategies of argument; the more so after the argumentative turn in policy analysis if policy making is an important part of territorial cohesion. In general, the generic structure of an argument primarily combines 'Grounds' as the argument's premise, the 'Claim', and 'Warrants' as 'what justifies the inference from the Grounds to the Claim' (Toulmin, 1958; Van Eemeren&Grootendorst&Jackson&Jacons, 1997; Gieve, 2000; Fairclough, 2003: 81). What could identify territorial cohesion arguments, then, is that Warrants are often discourse-specific, even though they are often implicit too (Gieve 2000; Fairclough, 2003: 82). The territorial cohesion discourse, that is: its system of knowledge and associated practices, could in that case be recognised as entity by its warrants, and therefore the territorial cohesion field of interests thereby as well (via the practices and knowledges which constitute it). However, as will be shown below (see Book II), with territorial cohesion there are hardly any argumentations made for something to belong to the concept or having to do with it (e.g. no implicit Warrants). This is a major limitation for this discourse analytical research, as this has the consequence that it might not only analyse the making of vague (spatial) policy, but also not (complete) argumentations. Hence, this research may merely reconstruct the positions in the territorial cohesion field of interests around which argumentations could be made (i.e. their ground).

From Greek, θέσις (thesis) means 'position'. Mostly, this is used to refer to intellectual propositions (e.g. giving meaning, forming knowledge) instead of strategic positions taken in struggles (e.g. stages, battle, cooperation). However, the emphasis could also lay on the latter – which are also rational, since strategic and thus goal-led. Furthermore, the focus could be on both in their relationship. This discourse analytical research on territorial cohesion may then relate the stratifying intellectual positions in meaning-making practices and strategic ones in power practices taken with, on, in, and/or under the concept. When studied for how the concept of territorial cohesion solidifies force relations and knowledges, these pro/positions will together form the entity of territorial cohesion statements: a "creature" which cannot only be defined as a field of interests but as a discourse as well – as there is thought in practices and thinking is a practice too (e.g. a perilous act (Foucault, in Bouchard, 1997: 5)). However, are the daily practices in which 'territorial cohesion' is uttered and thought of, used and defined an already existing field of interests, is it a concept in creation and thus an entity in the making, or is it an undecided upon and/or footloose concept without any significant power practices? Besides that these questions point to the appropriateness of a constructionist stance for territorial cohesion research, they also lead to another one: how to interpret the "line" demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse, showing the possible ground, and perhaps even value, of the concept of territorial cohesion? After this chapter situated the methodological framework by explaining what a discourse is and what the involved interpretative analysis entails, the next chapters will therefore display the essentially instable position of this research in answering the questions above with a treatment of the operationalisation for the fishing out of the meanings and usages of the concept and the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse; and Appendix A goes beyond explaining what to do by showing how to do it, that is, the methods used for doing the interpretative analysis involved.
4.6 Round-up: from biological to historical metaphors

4.6.1 Discourse analysis situated

This methodological chapter situated discourse analysis in an ontological understanding of the world as meaningful and the constructionist epistemology of a "social science" which researches how a changing social reality makes sense and conflict – traditions which suit a research on the usages and meanings of territorial cohesion with all their uncertainties, complexities, and conflicts. To deal with the double hermeneutic and essential instability involved in as a subject studying subjects, discourse analysis thereby passed both phenomenology and the sociology of knowledge to find itself on the phronetic path which analyses and interprets the status of values and interests in society with a focus on actual practices and knowledges. A discourse can namely be defined as a system of knowledge (i.e. a framework of linguistic and pictorial representations of the world) and its associated practices (i.e. interconnections of linguistic, discursive, meaning-making, and power practices) which operates as a tactical element in a field of force relations. An analysis hereof entails an interpretative search for meaning by reconstructing the distribution of the multiplicity of discursive elements in a concrete study of rationality and power, in casu a mapping of 'territorial cohesion.' Insofar the concept has to do with spatial reality though, this methodology thus shows a limitation, as it cannot analyse spatial reality itself, merely the thoroughly problematic knowledge of and policy for it. Yet, this does make it possible for discourse analysis to not only analyse policy but also policy analysis as a part of the territorial cohesion field of interests, especially when both kinds of analysis have a common ground in the emphasis on arguments and Realrationalität to construct (policy) problems. Hereby the limitations for this discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion might more come from the research object (see the next Chapters and Book II) when it is concerned with the making of vague (spatial) policy without any (complete) argumentation.

4.6.2 Main methodological problem characterised biologically and historically

How to study the interconnections of language, rationality, knowledge, power, and practices forms the most intricate part of the discourse analytical methodology used in this research and directs us to the next chapters. The Foucaultian approach used namely does not beforehand state how these interconnections should be seen in every particular case: i) the relationship between language and power is recursive, ii) the exercise of power is contingent on the relationships formed between individuals within and beyond organisations, iii) knowledge reassesses the established forces in forms (i.e. what can be seen and said), and iv) discourse and interpretation interweave rationality and power. A picture of territorial cohesion statements which solidify these interconnections with the concept could thus result as an outcome of this research. The question then becomes: what is the pictured "territorial cohesion creature"? A question which asks for a genealogy of morphing "genes": re-usage of old bits, dominant and recessive treats, mutations. A research of the evolution of territorial cohesion's "DNA helix" though, which interprets the genotype through analysing the phenotype; or such research could borrow from the biological school of behaviourism (e.g. van Ginneken, 2009: 52-53). However, a description of human processes (e.g. as supraorganism) should, at least in social science as a body of discourse, not be biological but historical. That is, just as discourse is not life (Foucault, 1969: 210-211), territorial cohesion is not a living being, but nonetheless appears to make its own Geschichte. Hence, the importance of perspectivism and interpretation to analyse present movements and relative inertnesses and tracing the whole and its parts. The analysis of this entity of repeatable (and repeated) linguistic articulations, existing and/or possible practices, and power-rationality configurations can be operationalised around, respectively, the mapping of the analytically separated territorial cohesion meanings, usages of the concept, and the discourse they form. The next three chapters therefore operationalise this discourse analytical methodology for the concept of territorial cohesion; note that during the research each of these steps shown here uses the methods which are explained in Appendix A. These three chapters thus elaborate on how the maps and picture of the concept of territorial cohesion will look like.