The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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Chapter 5 Mapping meaning

Introduction

As the first sub-question of this research is 'What is the meaning of territorial cohesion?', we have to know how to answer this question, that is, how to operationalise this step of this research's discourse analysis. As shown below, it revolves around mapping territorial cohesion propositions, what has to deal with how the concept's meaning is worded in language. This calls to mind the situation caught by the almost untranslatable Greek term λόγος (logos) that defined a large field of meanings connecting speech and reason, name and object (Heidegger, 1957: 32; Heidegger, 2000). What may be overobvious in this "post-Tower of Babel era", especially with the 'Euro-English' spoken in the EU (Williams, 1996), is Nietzsche's (1969: 191) idea that 'there is a philosophical mythology concealed in language' due to which we are continually tempted to think of things as being simpler than they are (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134).

To arrive at the vocabulary with which Book II can write down the map of territorial cohesion's complication of meaning nonetheless, this chapter takes three steps. They successively treat what to operationalise, how to, and the actual operationalisation. The primary step to reconstruct the meaning side of the concept's multiplicity of discursive elements thereby elaborates on what this research maps when mapping territorial cohesion propositions (§5.1). The triangle of signification details how to outline the concerned traces of meaning-making practices (§5.2). The selection of expert language and territorial cohesion definitions shows then how far the concept can be destined to a system of knowledge (connaissance) (§5.3). A conclusion ends this operationalisation by cutting out the mapping of territorial cohesion meaning with the next chapter on mapping usages of the concept (§5.4).

5.1 Language and thought

5.1.1 Meanings as statements in thought

When doing a Foucaultian discourse analysis, emphasis should not merely be on the texts themselves (i.e. traces of linguistic practices), but on the "substance(s)" of their words – that what comes closer to the thought 'territorial cohesion' than to the words 'territorial cohesion'. That is to say, we are after the concept's meaning as a category of thought, we follow Foucault and seek statements instead of utterances (Deleuze, 2000) (see §4.5.3 on territorial cohesion pro/positions). Although this might be plain by now, the catch is that '[w]ritten texts often consist in themselves of nothing but Statements' (Fairclough, 2003: 109). So we need to select utterances to interpret in order to analyse relevant statements (see §5.3.1 on definitions). No matter whether meaning comes as trace about through meaning-making practices of difference, contextual influences (Nellhaus, 1998; Sayer, 2000: 37), and/or the interplay of the production of the text, the text itself, and the reception of it, it are 'meanings that have social effects rather than texts as such' (Fairclough, 2003: 10–11). Hence, this research focuses on meaning, and thereby understands language and strategies of argument as forms of discourse that help to create and reproduce it (see §4.2.2 on language and interpretive analysis). The question is then what the status of these meanings is when it concerns the statements of territorial cohesion propositions.

5.1.2 Mapping territorial cohesion's proto-/conceptual area

When 'the social effects of texts are mediated by meaning-making' (Fairclough, 2003: 11), then the territorial cohesion texts forming the data of this research solely have an effect on power practices through the practices which make and uphold the concept's meaning. What does it mean hereby; that territorial cohesion is without an established "single meaning" which changed through time (see Appendix A; §4.2.3 on documenting changes in meaning)? That is, what area of meaning to map? Of course, territorial cohesion is something which goes
beyond merely words. What actually lies beyond this is not clear though. While it is sometimes defined and used in inquiries into seemingly diverse phenomena (see Book II), the question is whether territorial cohesion is defined clearly and guides inquiry effectively enough as concepts do, and, moreover, whether it actually is a general idea at all (Merton, in Powell & Robbins, 1984: 267; Hedström & Swedberg, 1996: 299-300). Perhaps territorial cohesion is partly (stuck) in its development before reaching a full-blown conceptual phase, as a proto-concept that is, with the characteristics of being ‘an early, rudimentary, particularized, and largely unexplicated idea’ which is occasionally used in empirical research instead of guiding it (Merton, in Powell & Robbins, 1984: 267; Hedström & Swedberg, 1996: 299-300). Territorial cohesion might thus fall in between the development phases of proto-concept (i.e. setting up meaning) and concept (i.e. upholding meaning), while its meaning-making practices have features of both. Hence, at least insofar formed by propositions, the territorial cohesion grounded on which argumentations can be built is not yet solid but solidifying at most. When mapping what is said with territorial cohesion (again see Appendix A; §A.2.2 on what to look for), it is this inerting distribution of the concept’s multiplicity of discursive elements which this research attempts to reconstruct.

5.2 The triangle of problematic signification

5.2.1 Triangle of signification: words, ideas, facts

The question of how exactly to map (traces of) territorial cohesion meaning-making practices is here answered by giving an operationalisation tool: the triangle of signification. When looking for the meaning of the (proto-)concept of territorial cohesion you can namely distinguish the Sinn and Bedeutung of the words ‘territorial cohesion’: that what is denoted in thought (i.e. ideas) and what is denoted in actual reality (i.e. facts) (Frege, 1892; Geach & Black, 1988; Stokhof, 2000: 64). Besides words as signifiers, these two meanings of the word ‘meaning’ return in the signification process as signified and referent respectively, as the signification process takes place through networks of triangles of signification (i.e. signifier-signified-referent) (Neillhaus, 1998; Sayer, 2000: 37). To make it more complex, ‘what is a signifier or signified in one triangle may become the referent in another’ (Neillhaus, 1998; Sayer, 2000: 37); this could be an essential characteristic of social science due to its object (i.e. a subject; see §4.1.1 on science or discourse). An example where a referent becomes a signifier is that, although it may well be a fundamentally different enterprise ‘to analyze and discuss what democracy is than to discuss what should be the indicators of democracy’ (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005: 522), no indicator of democracy is purely a tangible object and therefore itself both a referent of ‘democracy’ and a signified of something else. Despite these difficulties, the triangle of signification as operationalisation tool thus distinguishes ‘territorial cohesion’ as signifier, what it signifies, and what it refers to as the elements of meaning to map. The question about their three relations in this triangle of signification begs then.

The relation between words and facts: language and reality are not isomorphic because language is ‘about the sense the world makes to us [and sense] is not tightly correlated with physical characteristics’ (Sayer, 2000: 38). This sense leads us to meaning (i.e. signifieds and referents). Or better, words and many meanings, because while ‘meanings are typically “worded” in various ways’ and different wordings thereby also change meanings, with territorial cohesion we are of course more interested in how ‘words typically have various meanings’ (Fairclough, 1992: 185; Sayer, 2000: 36). Instead of futilely looking for which pre-existing presence the meaning of territorial cohesion has in certain words and expressions, we therefore look for how ‘the relations that are set up between them’ have such meanings as an effect (Merleau-Ponty 1964; Fairclough, 2003: 23). Yet, the focus of this research lies on the relation between Sinn and Bedeutung, between meaning as the signified idea and referred to fact. Although it is important not to incline to ‘a simple correspondence notion of discourse and reality’ (Richardson & Jensen, 2003), the turn away from materialism towards discourse should namely neither eliminate the object in favour of a preoccupation with the ‘horizontal’ relation between signifiers (equivalent to words or images) and signifieds (equivalent to concept), together forming signs, in abstraction from any relation

* Obviously, this separation between thought and actual reality is an analytical construction, as thought itself is actually real as well.
to referents’ (Sayer, 2000: 36). The triangle of signification thus operationalises this (part of the) research in a mapping of the construction of the concept’s variable ideas and facts, with the words ‘territorial cohesion’ as constant. The next task is to find out how variable these ideas and facts are.

### 5.2.2 Problematic signification: a case for un/arbitrariness

Constructionist epistemologies owe considerable debt to the “de Saussurian” insight ‘that there is an arbitrary relation between the linguistic categories humans use to divide up the world, and the real nature of the world itself’ (Belsey, 1980; Eagleton, 1984; Burr, 1995; Hastings, 1996: 194-195). The concept of territorial cohesion would therefore have no necessary or intrinsic link with the objects it purports to explain (Hastings, 1996: 194-195). This insight leads to a constructionist turn towards *episteme* via an empirical route: ‘the world outside of human consciousness is not reflected in language, instead linguistic categories actually construct or constitute how reality is perceived’ (Hastings, 1996: 194-195). However, language is not knowledge – it are thus linguistic and epistemic categories which do the constructing – and that (also) language constructs our perception of reality does not make that mere randomness rules the relation between words and facts. To be precise, even though there is no necessity in the relationship between signifier and referent, no total, perfect, and automatic correspondence between the utterance and meaning, nor meaning in single signs in isolation, it does not follow that there are no relatively stable meanings and that their relation to the world is arbitrary (Sayer, 2000: 38). Something else follows from these premises.

A problem for determining whether the relations between the signifier, signified, and referent are always un/arbitrary is that the relation between language and the world ‘can only be thought about from within discourse’ (Sayer, 2000: 36). Logically this argument arguably entails that we cannot perceive language and/or the world *an sich*, so neither their relation to one another without the intervention of knowledge – not when discourses are understood as systems of knowledge and their associated practices at least (see §4.2.1 on the Foucaultian delineation of ‘discourse’). Hereby knowledge stands on its own as the stratified pattern of forms (see §4.5.2 on knowledge). Conversely, inherent to meaning is that it is represented through signification (e.g. as signified or referent). Meaning is relational – opening up the possibility that it is knowledge which is represented as meaning. As a consequence, our position inside discourse allows us to look at our knowledge of language, ideas, the world, and their relations and at how meaning is made thereby ($5.3.3$ elaborates on meaning, knowledge, and discourse). Space and time demonstrate this point. They are central to our understanding of the world – especially in a spatial planning research on territorial cohesion – and differently constructed in different texts and “text-like” worlds of societies and physical environments; contested constructions of space and time (e.g. class struggles in workplaces) interconnect in different space-times which co-exist in any social order (Harvey, 1996; Fairclough, 2003: 151). When space and time are constructed in texts and social and spatial worlds, what is definitively constructed is their meaning. Discourse analysis thus does not deny the existence of every idea, logic, and rationality, it merely poses that seen through the triangle of signification words denote a by power relations structured aggregation of signifieds and referents as particular collection of meaning. Hence, what follows from the premises that words, ideas, and facts do not correspond out of necessity and that language and knowledge construct our perception of reality, is that in the abstract the triangular relations between signifiers, signifieds, and referents are problematic. Whether it are un/arbitrary relations should be explored on a per case basis, as this research does with the concept of territorial cohesion.

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* Note that de Saussure can be put against Bourdieu (e.g. 1999: 53) when it concerns the arbitrariness of the language we use. This research as a whole then stands closer to Bourdieu than de Saussure – i.e. one should go beyond “scholarly relativism” and investigate the tensions between semantic, logical, and political arbitrariness (see the conclusion of this chapter). The argument to use de Saussure to map territorial cohesion propositions nevertheless, is that although this particular discourse analytical step goes beyond language, it stays within semantics.
5.3 Mapping definitions: from meaning to knowledge

5.3.1 Making a common ground of expertise

When this research maps the concept of territorial cohesion with the triangle of signification, what language does it map? Not the genres and styles of linguistic and expressive conventions or visual forms thereof (e.g. maps, infographics), and it goes beyond intertextuality and the concept as neologism (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). Besides key words and territorial cohesion's recent conceptual history (see Chapter 6 on usages), it namely maps the different things said in a particular language style: expertise (Jensen & Richardson, 2003). It is essential to note that just as all forms of fellowship, expertise depends 'upon meanings which are shared and can be taken as given': an implicit and assumed 'common ground' (Fairclough, 2003: 55). With the (proto-)concept of territorial cohesion, its definitions demarcate this common ground of developing meaning by drawing the conceptual borders to be filled and discriminating between meanings. The question then becomes what can define territorial cohesion's common ground of meaning.

There are several ways in which a common ground of meaning can be defined. Social science is a prime example of this. It is concerned with knowledge and has concept definition as a common operationalisation problem. Although in social science 'conceptual definitions can have major implications for how a variable is measured or human behaviour interpreted[,] even core concepts lack agreed understanding' (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 58). This problem arises because concepts are abstractions instead of artefacts and they thus have to be constructed with a particular theoretical framework (Hoggart & Lees & Davies, 2002: 58) - with a framework which objectifies reality before researching it that is (see section 1.2.2 on interpretative analysis). In social science different abstract objectifications of social reality differently define a concept. Within a realm of expertise the construction of a concept's common ground of meaning formed by definitions can go beyond social science though (see Appendix A; §A.1.6 on expert texts). Any action oriented towards social reality namely also requires expertise. The ever so complex social relations need some discursive simplification which constitutes specific subsets as its 'social, material and spatio-temporal horizon of action' (Jessop, 2002). When such discursive simplifications (e.g. economic or political imaginaries) solidify they can confine, for instance, policy making in limits of knowledge. To make the most out of available knowledge, policy making might focus on small variations from present policy (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 162). Together the scientific problem of concept definition and the discursive simplification of an instrumental spatio-temporal horizon of action open up a competition between definitions over the common ground of meaning. Language is hereby not a conduit for concepts (e.g. territorial cohesion), but a political activity in its own right, as it helps to institutionalise structures of meaning that channel political thought or action in certain directions (Connelly, 1983: 1; Jacobs, 2006: 40). This research on territorial cohesion therefore maps how in the concept's realm of expertise the expert language, abstract (scientific) objectifications of social reality, and the horizon of (policy) action construct territorial cohesion meaning. Building on Fairclough (2003: 55), the research question would then be on how experts with definitions significantly shape the nature and content of the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning.

5.3.2 Different kinds of statements: building-stones for definitions

With territorial cohesion definitions in a central role in mapping the concept's common ground of meaning, it is worth asking what they are made of. A definition is a typical statement, as it demarcates a piece of meaning. Furthermore, Fairclough (2003: 109) distinguishes three other types of statements: those about what is and/or was the case (i.e. realis statements), predictions and hypotheses (i.e. irrealis statements), and evaluations (e.g. value statements). However, as clear as these types may be, to actually distinguish them in text constitutes a difficult task in the view of contemporary culture as a promotional and consumer culture where the distinctions blur between realis statements on the one hand and irrealis and value statements on the other (Featherstone, 1991; Wernick, 1991; Fairclough, 2003: 115). As far as the concept of territorial cohesion is concerned with policy this becomes the more tricky for mapping its propositions, because especially contemporary policy texts...
would blur facts and predictions, hypothesis, and evaluations with their commands ‘often implied in, disguised as, or buried under piles of ostensibly value-free, objective, pseudo-scientific facts’ (Graham, 2001; Fairclough, 2003: 115). Still, these two typifications can be crossed to further operationalise this research: definitions consist of realis, irrealis, or value statements which demarcate meaning.

You can also typify definitions by distinguishing explicit from implicit ones. Filtering explicit definitions out of texts is a straightforward affair. Just document what, for instance, follows the wording of ‘territorial cohesion means’ or ‘the meaning of territorial cohesion is’. With implicit definitions this is more problematic though. You have to find out how other wordings demarcate territorial cohesion meaning without them saying so. Verschueren (1999) can be useful herein, in that he differentiates four types of implicitness: assumptions, logical implications, and non-/standard conversational implicatures (Fairclough, 2003: 59-60); note that just the first two are of interest to us, as we are not interested in conversations in general or linguistic customs in a particular case, not even when this case is territorial cohesion. What is very suited here, is that the types of assumptions match the three types of statements as building stones for definitions: about what exists (i.e. existential assumptions), is or can be or will be the case (i.e. propositional assumptions), and about what is good or desirable (i.e. value assumptions) (Fairclough, 2003: 56). But how to recognise these assumptions which demarcate the concept’s meaning in the intertextual territorial cohesion text and how to trace what is logically implied by words? When ordering the territorial cohesion definitions into the concept’s taxonomy of meaning, they should not be filled-in through logical speculation but by interpretively describing the data (see Appendix A: §4.2.3 on using the methodical guidelines for interpreting territorial cohesion pro/positions). Even if the data might fog their differences, the building stones with which interpretatively to map territorial cohesion definitions can thus be typified in threefold: fundamentally they always demarcate meaning, which is possible with, qua substance, realis, irrealis, or value statements proposed, qua form, explicitly or via assumption or logical implication.

5.3.3 The lingo: from territorial cohesion definitions towards a system of knowledge?

When mapping the meanings included and excluded by the territorial cohesion definitions (e.g. through hyponymy and antonymy); the question becomes which territorial cohesion meanings are identifiable as the same or similar (e.g. through synonymy)² (Fairclough, 2003: 130). The triangle of signification comes into play here as operationalisation tool. With the words ‘territorial cohesion’ as constant, one can distinguish the included meanings according to the variables of meaning, the Sinn the signifier ‘territorial cohesion’ signifies and the Bedeutung to which the territorial cohesion sign refers. As Book II demonstrates, this leads to a nested taxonomy of, respectively, different kinds of territorial cohesion meaning and different territorial cohesion meanings inside a kind of territorial cohesion meaning. Although the kinds of meaning are not bogged through speculation but through description, they can nonetheless together be understood hierarchically: as a grid to put different meanings in. The operationalisation of one third of this research on the concept of territorial cohesion then gives a simple vocabulary to present its discourse analysis of the linguistic data (i.e. text), signification events (i.e. linguistic and meaning-making practices), and the defining phenomena (i.e. definitions), in short: kinds of meanings.

So the territorial cohesion discourse can be differentiated by how semantic relations classify a part of the world – e.g. the types of assumptions can be discourse-relative (Fairclough, 2003: 132-133). We should thereby ‘look particularly closely at how things are being classified, because it are the classificatory schemes or systems of classification which function as instruments of construction while being ignored as such: they are drawn upon to impose a preconstructed and taken for granted ‘di-visions’ (on the social) through which particular ‘visions’ of the world are continuously generated’ (Bourdieu&Wacquant 1992; Fairclough, 2003: 130, 138). This research therefore maps the concept’s kinds of meanings as a system with which the words ‘territorial cohesion’

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1. Hyponymy: a text whose semantic range totally falls inside the semantic range of another word (e.g. red, blue, yellow are hyponyms of colour).
2. Antonymy: a text whose semantic range entails it totally lies outside the semantic range of another (opposite) word (e.g. long, heavy, male are antonyms of short, light, female).
3. Synonymy: a text whose semantic range is (nearly) the same with the semantic range of another word (e.g. plain, easy, elementary are synonyms of simple).
classify ideas and facts: it uses the triangle of signification to order the explicit and assumed or logically implied \textit{reals}, \textit{irreals}, and value statements which demarcate territorial cohesion meaning into the concept's taxonomy of \textit{Sinn} and \textit{Bedeutung}. It is Fairclough (2003: 130) who holds that what is contested when different discourses come into conflict is this (performative) power of preconstructed semantic systems to generate visions which may sustain or remake the world in their image. The operationalisation needed to map territorial cohesion propositions would then end here. However, this research is not concerned with contesting discourses but interested in the contests over and in the single discourse of territorial cohesion. As mentioned above and more importantly, it is interested in the concept's \textit{episteme} instead of being a semantic study of its meaning in language.

Although this operationalisation thus maps the concept's kinds of meanings as a system, the system of territorial cohesion meaning does not constitute a system of knowledge by itself. Whether this is the case depends on the research object of territorial cohesion as (proto-)concept mapped in Book II (e.g. does it guide or is it occasionally used in empirical research?). Still, this mapping of territorial cohesion meaning is necessary, because with text as data (see Appendix A; §A.3.1 on collecting data) the only way to arrive at the system of territorial cohesion knowledge runs through the ordering of the concept's meaning. Why so? Because when you leave behind the signifying words "territorial cohesion" as the by language structured "sonic echoes" (see §4.5.2 on knowledge), the concept's signified ideas and referred to facts then remain as its common ground of meaning which can enclose and/or be filled with knowledge. It is thus the signification process implied by meaning which allows this research to go from intertextual text to system of knowledge (also see §10.1).

While the system in the concept's common ground of meaning classifies how the words 'territorial cohesion', its \textit{Sinn}, and its \textit{Bedeutung} relate, it is the order in which territorial cohesion ideas and facts are solidified into epistemic strata which is the concept's system of knowledge; due to this research's iterative methodical process (see Appendix A; §A.2.4 on analytic retroduction) these two systems have the same structure (e.g. the analysis of some knowledge can result in a correction of the interpreted system of meaning). This research therefore tracks down how the propositions of territorial cohesion definitions (might) stratify into a new body of knowledge: the particular territorial cohesion discipline (\textit{connaissance}). A possible conclusion of this research could then be that there is no real territorial cohesion knowledge or system thereof (yet), and thus no real territorial cohesion discourse in the Foucaultian sense.

5.3.4 Criticising territorial cohesion knowledge

It is important to note that in this research the rule-governed subject-object relationship which is knowledge arises as to be the criticised research object (see §4.1.2 on \textit{connaissance} and Chapter 7 on demarcating a discourse). We can thereby build upon how our social scientific regime of truth unfolds contradictions or ruptures in the discourses which help to establish it (see Appendix A; §A.1.6 on expertise). Social science's "\textit{epistemicization}" of subjects is namely problematic. It makes knowledge about the subject as research object without bringing the knowing subject himself into play (see §4.1.1 on social science's essential instability). Book II displays how the textual evidence of such contradictions or ruptures appear in the "ideaification" of territorial cohesion, its objectification, and their relationship. The concept's definitions can be contradictory for instance, or its system of territorial cohesion knowledge can harbour disagreements over single knowledge claims. The latter is also possible in a positivist conception whereby all real knowledge is scientific: 'restricted to the observation of facts, to logical inference, and to the determination of regular relationships among facts' (Torgerson, 1986: 36). However, the discriminating point made here is, that a framework selects evidence and provides it with meaning and interpretation – i.e. the frame determines 'what counts as a fact and what interpretations are taken to be relevant' (Rein&Schön, 1994: 41; Hajer, 1995; Saarikoski, 2002: 3, 7). Knowledge thus forms perception because knowledge relates ideas and facts. Solidified epistemic strata therefore do not only force that something new will be seen and said (see §4.5.2 on knowledge), but also frame how these ideas and facts will be seen or said. Hence, if not only single knowledge claims about territorial cohesion contradict but even the framework wherein such
knowledge claims are made is inconsistent in itself (e.g. leading to incompatible facts or interpretations), then the critique on the territorial cohesion discourse becomes even more fundamental.

5.4 Concluding towards usages

5.4.1 Systematic mapping: mapping systems
This chapter operationalised this research’s fundamental critique of the territorial cohesion discourse as an inherently inconsistent framework of, or even merely for, contradicting knowledge claims. Meaning implies a signification process, it thereby allows us to go from the linguistic data of the intertextual territorial cohesion text to the concept’s system of knowledge. That is, to the order in which its ideas and facts thought about (i.e. what to map) are solidified into epistemic strata. The operationalisation tool used for this is the triangle of signification (i.e. how to map) which distinguishes elements of meaning: words as signifiers, ideas as signifieds, and facts as referents. When the wording of ‘territorial cohesion’ is the constant, the common ground of meaning where expertise depends on can then be formed as a nested system of kinds of meanings which places variable territorial cohesion ideas above the concept’s variable facts. Such taxonomy of Sinn and Bedeutung results from the mapping of the signification events in the linguistic and meaning-making practices of expert language, abstract (scientific) objectification of social reality, and (policy) action-oriented discursive simplification inside the concept’s realm of expertise. Territorial cohesion definitions are the marks of these practices, as these phenomena explicitly and through assumption or logical implication demarcate meaning with realis, irrealis, or value statements. Whether the (proto-)concept solidified into a system of meaning, and if so, with arbitrary or unarbitrary relations between words, ideas, and facts, or even stratified into a system of territorial cohesion knowledge (connaissance) remains to be seen though, as that depends on the research object.

5.4.2 Meaning on itself is nothing?
The hermeneutic horizon of meaning of the concept’s realm of expertise cannot be distinguished by solely mapping the “ethereal substance” of territorial cohesion meaning. As with every horizon, the “earthly matter” needs to be mapped too, that is: the concept’s practical usage. Moreover, in Flyvbjerg’s phronetic approach practice even is the fundamental: to get beyond the problem of language, the analysis of practices must discipline discourse analysis (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134). However, despite that this phronetic research on the concept of territorial cohesion agrees with the maxim that there is something outside discourse (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 134), it poses that practices associated with a system of knowledge are actually a constitutive part of a discourse’s existence (see §4.2.1 on the delineation of discourse’). What makes discourses performative besides descriptive, is that they are embedded in ‘social practices, codes of behaviour, institutions and constructed environments’ (Sayer, 2000: 44). This research thus does not so much discipline its discourse analysis with the analysis of practices, but analyses (policy) power practices as an essential part of the territorial cohesion discourse. The questions which remain are then, whether the concept has power practices or merely linguistic, meaning-making, and discursive practices, and if so, how these practices relate mutually and to territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge. The next chapters therefore deal with how Book II can give an answer to this.