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The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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Chapter 6 Mapping usage

Introduction

As the second sub-question of this research is ‘How is the concept used in the European Union?’, we also have to know how to operationalise this step of this research’s discourse analysis. This time the operationalisation revolves around mapping territorial cohesion positions, what has to deal with how the concept’s usage plays out in concrete behaviour.

To arrive at the vocabulary with which Book II can write down the map of territorial cohesion’s conceptual history, this chapter takes three steps. Just as the previous chapter they successively treat what to operationalise, how to, and the actual operationalisation. Here the primary step to take to reconstruct the usage side of the concept’s multiplicity of discursive elements also elaborates on what this research maps, this time when mapping territorial cohesion positions and by questioning the nature of power practices and reinterpreting them (§6.1). *Narrative Policy Analysis* then enables this research to order the traces of the patterns in territorial cohesion power practices (§6.2). The selection and processing of expert stories shows how the extended use of this tool gives an overview of the whole territorial cohesion usage field (§6.3). The conclusion of this chapter clarifies the role the thus created overview plays in this research by pointing to the next chapter on demarcating territorial cohesion as *Discursive Nodal Point* (§6.4).

6.1 Reinterpreting (policy) power practices

6.1.1 Analyse what actually happens

What helps to sketch the territorial cohesion power practices of which to map the concept’s usages is the distinction between the ‘actual’ (i.e. what happens), ‘potential’ (i.e. what is possible), and ‘empirical’ (i.e. what we know about reality) (Fairclough, 2003: 14). This research namely also concerns itself with knowing what actually happens to be able to think how social structures and practices allow and constrain what can happen (Fairclough, 2003: 14). However, tracing what actually happens in power practices out of the ordered text involves a reinterpretation of what is already said and hidden about concrete behaviour. This because what is mostly said about power practices – like policy, but definitively with territorial cohesion – has some distracting flaws which prohibit it from forming a reliable leading interpretation (see Appendix A; §A.2.4 on distinguishing interpretations). This section argues that the taking of causal agency lies at the heart of the problem, as then the outcome of the looking becomes arbitrary, there is no check on it, and interpretation runs wild (Dewey, in Boydston, 1984: 243, 248; Roe, 1994: 188). Before the next section tells how to start from the acts which are performed and to consider their consequences (Dewey, in Boydston, 1984: 243; Roe, 1994: 188), this section therefore explains how causes and agency conceal what actually happens by treating the form and order of final goals, intentions and incontextual preferences, and actors

Pursued goals can be seen as the causes which drive what happens. However, to know what actually happens, one should not “backtrack” too far into such origins. That is, when you ‘have information about the proximate goal specific to an act that explains the form of the act, why hypothesize that a more general goal or value is the independent “ultimate motive” and the proximate goal is only the expression of this motive in the circumstances of action’ (Biernacki, in Adams&Clemens&Shola Orloff, 2005: 88)? In the policy sphere, and thus possibly in a major part of the (potential) power practices of territorial cohesion, such abstract ends (e.g. salvation, peace, welfare, profit maximisation; see §2.2.2) can merely be analysed incompletely at most, because they ‘are often only distantly and loosely operative in the specific analysis of policy problems’ (e.g. beset by internal contradictions) (Lindblom, 1979: 519). Moreover, even more mundane policy objectives can be used as means in another policy, and although agreement is then easily reached, such ‘objectives themselves have

no ultimate validity other than they are agreed upon' (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 157, 160). Instead of explaining what happens with an extrinsic frame of terminal functionality, it is thus simpler and more direct to start from the evidence immanent in the action's unfolding: it are 'the publicly accessible schemas that are immediately implicated in the organization of the action itself' which define the pragmatics' orienting puzzles, anomalies, and problems (Biernacki, in Adams&Clemens&Shola Orloff, 2005: 87). When mapping the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion, this research is therefore not teleologically oriented, but concerned with the vectors of what happens in power practices, that is, with courses of direction (e.g. puzzle-solving behaviour towards proximate goals).

However, if you map vectors as courses of direction, you should not presume that intentions bring about congruent outcomes. Accidental correspondence between preferences and outcomes and an inverse causality are other possibilities. That is to say, at least 'public policies have complex and interactive effects', therefore 'policy outcomes do not always reflect intentions' and enacted policies 'reshape political processes, preferences, and strategies', due to which 'major public policies are not just effects but also causes' (e.g. policy feedback) (Hacker&Pierson, 2002: 285-286). Even in those cases that intentions would produce an outcome, preferences hardly grasp them due to the adjustments at a margin: 'That one value is preferred in one decision situation does not mean that it will be preferred in another decision situation in which it can be had only at great sacrifice of another value' (Lindblom, 1959, in Faludi, 1973: 157). A general ranking of values which do not shift from decision to decision thus ignores the relevant marginal preferences (Lindblom, 1959). Only studies of particular policies can order the proximate objectives and marginal values, that is, as what actually happens. What actually happens thus comes about as little due to intentions or on the basis of incontextual preferences as for abstract final goals. The question then becomes what to make of the ones to whom these intentions and preferences are usually ascribed to.

As with a flying flock of birds (e.g. van Ginneken, 2009: 52-53), it is difficult to actually point down who the actors are in power practices (i.e. the whole flock or individual birds). Is in the case of the concept of territorial cohesion for instance the European Union an actor, or the European Commission, the European Commission's DG Regio perhaps, or a unit of DG Regio? 'Indeed, "government" is frequently just a rubric for loosely coupled officials contributing at different times and in complexly unpredictable ways to an outcome or decision' (Roe, 1994: 129). No wonder then, that governmental organisations 'are *internally* divided in horizontal and vertical patterns' (Salet, 1982: 190) and 'governments do not always know their intentions' (Roe, 1994: 129). Even if 'it is also essential that in a social context the presence of other rationalizing and (more or less) controlling parties should be acknowledged' besides governments (Salet, 1982: 190), these other parties arguably suffer from the same "un-actor-like" existence. What is more, one could also move beyond methodological individualism and ask whether individuals are actors: do the parts of him which function in, for instance, his work as official constitute the actor, are it the forces acting on the sub-individual level which matter in themselves (Foucault, 1977, in Foucault 1980a: 208) or do they need to form a 'plural subject' or 'we-intentionality' (e.g. Gilbert, 1989; Roe, 1994: 189)?^a Although strange at first sight, leaving the actor and its intentions and (incontextual) preferences behind altogether could thus be the reasonable thing to do.^b

A phronetic research of what actually happens analyses and interprets interests in power practices. But what to study then if not actors and intentions? If 'we never desire against our interest, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it' (Deleuze&Foucault, 1972, in Bouchard, 1977: 214), the answer becomes simple: you study desires (i.e. impulsive drives) which create interests (i.e. perceived benefits) (Smith, 2007: 69). Although desires can thereby be considered as scattered over (the unconscious of) one or more individuals, because desires are a part of a society's infrastructure, individuals do not own them (Smith, 2007: 74). It therefore is not an actor who intends its course of action, but desires which group interests, and interests

^a Actor-Network Theory for instance emphasises interaction between non-/human 'actants' (i.e. forces) to understand change, whereby actors can even be seen as network-effects (e.g. Law, 1992; Latour, in Law&Hassard, 1999).

^b Instead of for instance endlessly discussing the level of aggregation on which to place "actorhood" (e.g. network-groupings) (Elster, 2000: 693, 694; Bates&Greif&Levi&Rosenthal&Weingast, 2000: 698).

can be pursued in a rational way (Smith, 2007: 74). Discourse analysis then studies text for these rational trails of desires in their vectors or standstill of power practices (e.g. maintaining the *status quo* through non-decision). However, researching interests as rationalised desires begs the question of how to study territorial cohesion interests in power practices and deal with the perplexity of proximate goals and – possibly marginal, but surely – contextual values.

6.1.2 Streams happen: the garbage-can model and bricolage

Understanding rationalised desires as an “organised anarchy” in the form of a garbage-can, streams, and bricolage helps to map the usages of the concept. You then do not begin by presupposing the organisation of territorial cohesion power practices as a coherent structure. Instead, you pose that they more look like a garbage-can with problematic preferences (i.e. action forms preferences), unclear technology (i.e. practices operate by trial and error, learning by experience, and pragmatic invention), and fluid participation (i.e. the boundaries of the decision structures are flexible) (Cohen&March&Olsen, 1972; Kingdon, 1995; Husar, 2006: 103). The acts performed in power practices can thereby be pictured as streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities which run through such an organisation, each having ‘a life on its own’ (Kingdon, 1995; Husar, 2006: 103). In a sense these streams even are the organisation of interests (i.e. rationalised desires): ‘a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work’ (Cohen&March&Olsen, 1972; Husar, 2006: 103). However, streams do follow describable patterns. The outcomes are a function of the mix of the garbage in the can and how it is processed (Kingdon, 1995). When you know these patterns, you can interpret the structures and then think about the potential consequences (e.g. possible power practices). Hence, this research does not ask for which abstract goals territorial cohesion aims, what intentions and incontextual preferences lay behind it, nor who make the concept as it is – not even in the sense of participants as in Kingdon’s garbage-can model. Instead, this research maps what is in the territorial cohesion garbage-can and how the streams move inside it (and into and out of it). That is, it researches the interests and (marginal) contextual values at play in the problems, solutions, and boundaries of decision structures of territorial cohesion power practices and the development of such usages of the concept towards proximate goals through various windows of opportunity.

However, the territorial cohesion power practices are not without history – i.e. no *tabula rasa* here. For policy Kingdon (1984) for example imagines that in the streams of the garbage-can ‘proposals are floated, revised, combined and floated again’ (Husar, 2006: 103). Policy-making could then borrow and copy bits and pieces of ideas from elsewhere, draw upon and amend locally tried and tested approaches, and cannibalise theories, research, and trends in a complex process of influence, text production, and dissemination (Ball, 1998: 126; Nixon&Walker&Baron, 2002: 238; Davoudi, 2006: 18). Insofar the concept’s usage involves policy, territorial cohesion might therefore take on board some features which Ball (1998: 126) ascribes to most policies: they are ramshackle, compromise hit- and miss affairs, reworked, tinkered with, nuanced, and re-created in contexts of practice (Nixon&Walker&Baron, 2002: 238; Davoudi, 2006: 18). The usage of such techniques extends beyond policy though. The anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1966) coined the term ‘bricolage’ for new forms and order created from tools and materials at hand to address new tasks and challenges (Ferney&Bell, 2006: 232-233).^a For this research bricolage is then not so much a statement on how reality always works or how power practices actually happen (e.g. in policy), but more a way to think of the “garbage” in the “territorial cohesion can”. Just as genealogy studies how every individual evolved from bits of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of many ancestors and an occasional mutation, this research analyses the concept’s usage as a bricolage of many problems, solutions, and boundaries of decision structures and, perhaps, some (pragmatic) inventions indigenous to territorial cohesion itself. As answer to the question of ‘What to operationalise?’ an almost indescribable chaos then appears: the nature of territorial cohesion power practices to map is understood as a garbage-can of mixing streams and you look at the usage of the concept in this as bricolage. To order things more clearly one therefore

^a A term later adopted by improvisational theorists (e.g. Innes&Booher, 1999; Weick, 1993).

is in a dire need of a tool with which to interpret the “territorial cohesion genotype” rather violently from the concept’s “textual phenotype”.

6.2 Not Hajer but Roe

6.2.1 Mapping particular power practices

This research maps the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion that appear in power practices in a particular way. It does not map resources of agent and institutional practices, nor which agents are in and who’s out, but the patterns of (in/formal) power practices with a focus on their conflicts while contextualising and eventualising them (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). Its discourse analysis thereby emphasises how power relations are most effective ‘when they are embodied in what we take as the unquestioned givenness of the world, in our commonsense understanding of reality’ (Roe, 1994: 14). What is more, just as Jensen&Richardson (2003) argue concerning the institutionalisation of European spatial planning as a “rational, science-based policy field”: the boundaries between invalid and valid knowledge are vital and result from the construction of forms and fields of knowledge. Hence, the need to go beyond merely opinion (i.e. *para-doxa*) by reinterpreting power practices (see §6.1) in order to interpret how they affect the construction of truth and knowledge claims (e.g. on reasonable territorial cohesion practices) (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). While this research’s way of seeing power practices thus clearly relates to mapping the concept’s system of meaning/knowledge (see Chapter 5) and demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse (see Chapter 7), the consequences for analysing how an emerging discourse becomes institutionalised in (new) power practices should still be explained. The sections below will do this by first caricaturing the path which is not followed (i.e. “Hajerian” discourse analysis) to thereafter with more contrast clarify the tool used to interpret the concept’s usage (i.e. Roe’s *Narrative Policy Analysis*).

6.2.2 More common: Foucaultian discourse analysis *a la* Hajer

To make Foucault’s abstracter work (see Chapter 4) more applicable to study concrete political events, Hajer introduces the “middle range” concepts of ‘storylines’ and ‘discourse coalitions’ (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Storylines as central concept is thereby defined as the ‘generative statements that bring together previously unrelated elements of discourse and thus allow for new understandings and create new meanings’ (Hajer, in Salet&Faludi, 2000: 140). These help to constitute discourse coalitions, because Hajer (in Salet&Faludi, 2000: 139) defines this central concept as a ‘variety of actors [that] through their utterances reinforce a particular way of talking that is reproduced via an identifiable set of storylines and discursive practices in a given policy domain’. Storylines do this due to ‘their essentially figurative or metaphorical nature which allows for a diversity of interpretations’, and it would be such multi-interpretable storylines, instead of shared belief systems for instance, that ‘hold together the coalitions behind transnational policy discourses’ (Hajer, in Salet&Faludi, 2000: 140). Although this compressed characterisation of Hajerian discourse analysis uses a thick brush, some elements common to many discourse analyses, especially policy discourse analyses, come forward from which this research’s discourse analysis of the concept of territorial cohesion fundamentally deviates.

With ‘discourse coalitions’ Hajer re-introduces the role of agency into discourse analysis, which is according to Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) necessary to understand how particular discourses emerge, develop and change. However, as argued above, such a reintroduction of agency would prevent understanding (e.g. how actors are socially constructed through discourse). Also the presumed ‘given policy domain’ is problematic if one studies change. While Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) takes territorial cohesion as a given policy domain where discursive production takes place, this research on the other hand poses that with the emerging concept of territorial cohesion its (policy) domain is not a “given” either. That is, the creation of it should be researched. What also sets this research on the concept of territorial cohesion apart is that it is not concerned with ways of talking. Where Hajer stresses utterances and their figurative or metaphorical nature, this research focuses on the meaning of what is said in the sense of knowledge and power; its operationalisation to map territorial cohesion

power practices does share the focus on stories though. One could thus by and large characterise this research as on a level of abstraction higher than Hajer's more common brand of (policy) discourse analysis. This because it understands actors solely as part of common understandings of social reality, studies the creation of a policy domain, and abstracts statements from talk. Simply put for the sake of clarity: this research's discourse analysis stands "closer to Foucault".

6.2.3 Roe's *Narrative Policy Analysis*

This research studies territorial cohesion power practices by using Roe's *Narrative Policy Analysis*.^a '*Narrative Policy Analysis* applies contemporary literary theory to extremely difficult public policy issues' (Roe, 1994: 1). Territorial cohesion is such an issue, because it is uncertain, complex, and polarised (see Chapter 1 and 5 and Book II). That is, the uncertainty of the concept's usage derives from its emergence without a solid ground, the complexity arises from its internal intricacy and interdependence with other policy issues, and the polarisation 'crystallizes as the concentration of groups around extremes in the issue' (Roe, 1994: 2-3). The interrelation of territorial cohesion's uncertainties, complexities, and polarisations make the analysis especially difficult (e.g. complexity and polarisation lead to uncertainty and the reduction of uncertainty and/or polarisation increase complexity) (Roe, 1994: 2-3). Territorial cohesion therefore unmistakably exemplifies a policy issue so complex and uncertain that it is impossible to identify objectively weaker/stronger arguments (Roe, 1994: 72-73). As a consequence, the asymmetrical narratives in the concept's usage are 'the only index we have that unequal power relations are working themselves out through these policy narratives' (Roe, 1994: 72-73). Hence, when this research cannot study the power practices themselves, it can only study stories as indication of what actually happens. However, such a turn to stories does not entail a lapse from realism into relativism, nor does it imply, as in Hajerian discourse analysis, 'that what is "behind" the narratives are the power relations that form them' (Roe, 1994: 10, 72-73). On the contrary, for *Narrative Policy Analysis* 'what is "in front of" us is power in form of winning and losing narratives' (Roe, 1994: 72-73). When all else in the territorial cohesion controversy remains uncertain, 'our knowledge of asymmetrical narratives is our knowledge of power' (Roe, 1994: 72-73).

Just as the territorial cohesion power practices are not without history, the usage of the concept does not take place in a void. The social context of the usages even partly forms the concept's role. Although there might solely be linguistic, meaning-making, and discursive territorial cohesion practices – i.e. a possible conclusion of this research's discourse analysis –, when it concerns the established social context in which the concept emerges (e.g. policy domains), the actual existence of power practices is, arguably, more probable. With the concept's usage as bricolage, a central question then becomes whether territorial cohesion has own power practices at all or merely shows a struggle over the re-formation of "old" power practices.

This research hereby applies *Narrative Policy Analysis* to both the concept's usage and its social context. In general, European policy can namely be 'understood as part of a discursive formation on European governance that is linked to a set of metanarratives on basic questions of 'what the world is about' (Diez, 2001: 6) – e.g. the Metanarratives of the Free Market, State, Civil Society, Science. *Narrative Policy Analysis* however, is about small-*m* metanarratives. These are the policy narratives 'that do not seek to homogenize or stifle conflict', but 'embrace, however temporarily, the major oppositions in a controversy, without in the process slighting any of that opposition' (Roe, 1994: 52). Also such policy articulations enable and reproduce the larger discursive structure of "large-*M*" metanarratives, and are thus 'part, and not merely a consequence, of the latter' (Diez, 2001: 6-7). *Narrative Policy Analysis* then allows one to both reinterpret the power practices that exist in the more fixed social context of the concept's usage and to index territorial cohesion's uncertain, complex, and polarised power practices with metanarratives.

6.2.4 The three steps of *Narrative Policy Analysis*

With *Narrative Policy Analysis* as the proper operationalisation tool to map the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion, the question becomes how to use it as such. There are three steps. Following Roe (1994:

^a I thank Michael Neumann for recommending this book to me at the PhD workshop of the Association of European Schools of Planning (AESOP) in Bristol 2006.

155) you start with the conventional definitions of the stories told with territorial cohesion and identify the policy narratives that conform to this definition: 'If they are stories, they have beginnings, middles, and ends, as in scenarios; if arguments, they have premises and conclusions.' You thereby look for those scenarios/arguments in the textual data that dominate the issue of territorial cohesion, that is, those policy narratives that 'underwrite and stabilize the assumptions for policymaking in situations of many unknowns, high intricacy, and little, if any agreement' (Roe, 1994: 155). Note that these identified stories are linguistic events when told, but themselves merely the only phenomena we have to know what actually happens in the chaotic events of territorial cohesion power practices. The next step of *Narrative Policy Analysis* also identifies, but this time those narratives that do not conform to the definition of policy narratives above (i.e. nonstories) or 'run counter to the controversy's dominant policy narratives' (i.e. counterstories) (Roe, 1994: 155). The last step is essential though: you compare the two sets of narratives (i.e. stories and nonstories/counterstories) 'in order to generate a metanarrative "told" by the comparison' (Roe, 1994: 155). The generation of a metanarrative thus heavily leans on interpretation. A precept coming from semiotics and gestalt psychology hereby governs the interpreting: 'a thing is defined by what it is not' (Roe, 1994: 155). The stories and nonstories or counterstories which are not the metanarrative then together construct the metanarrative which embraces the controversy's major opposed assumptions (Roe, 1994: 52, 161). Where policy narratives seek to ensure the assumptions for decision making in territorial cohesion's uncertain and complex power practices, this research then approximates objectivity with *Narrative Policy Analysis* by identifying the concept's systematic uncertainty 'apparent only at the aggregate level as the certainties of expert, but opposing, viewpoints' (Roe, 1994: 161).

6.2.5 The unknown rules of the territorial cohesion game

This research's discourse analysis thus maps the usages of the concept of territorial cohesion as patterns of (in/formal) power practices. It thereby contextualises and eventualises the conflicts in a more abstract way than the Hajerian discourse analyses which presume actors and a policy domain as givens and focus on language to show how storylines form discourse coalitions. Instead, this research uses Roe's *Narrative Policy Analysis* because of territorial cohesion's interrelated uncertainty, complexity, and polarisation. These namely make our knowledge of asymmetrical narratives the only available index of the power relations in what actually happens with the concept's usage – besides the reinterpreted power practices of the more fixed social context in which the concept plays or might play a role that is. To identify the systematic uncertainty (i.e. the opposing expert viewpoints) in the conventional definitions of the stories told, one would with *Narrative Policy Analysis* interpret the metanarrative which embraces the major opposed assumptions of the dominant scenarios/arguments and the nonstories or counterstories in the territorial cohesion controversy. In the concept's case these assumptions are mostly concerned with one step of a conventional policy analysis: 'defining the policy problem of interest' (Roe, 1994: 156). A *Narrative Policy Analysis* of territorial cohesion thus mostly maps problem statements. A conclusion thereof could then resonate with what Roe says about the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: 'By being always preoccupied with determining which story "was" correct, we evade the more urgent exercise of having to deal with there still being no "story" to tell' (Roe, 1994: 157-158). The consequence would be similar too: we may wonder whether the arena and the rules of the territorial cohesion game are known (Roe, 1994: 158).

6.3 Extending the use of Roe

6.3.1 From digression to extending

As stories are the only index of the unequal power relations at play in the mixing streams of the territorial cohesion garbage-can, this research uses *Narrative Policy Analysis* to map the major opposed assumptions of the uncertain, complex, and polarised usage of the concept. For Roe (1994: 156) the goal of *Narrative Policy Analysis* always is to generate a metanarrative that makes it possible 'for opponents to act on an issue over which they still disagree'. That is, although Roe (1994: 156) stresses that this metanarrative does not end the uncertainty,

complexity, or polarisation, the metanarrative does underwrite and stabilise a set of common assumptions due to which it can function as a policy narrative for decision-making. However, instead of coming up with a metanarrative as new agenda, this research uses *Narrative Policy Analysis* for other aims – even opposed ones (see Chapter 8). Another way in which this research digresses from Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis*, is that it extends the application of this tool beyond the policy sphere to other forms of *politique* which perform power practices. While this is necessary simply because the concept appears in other spheres too, the research's methodology also allows for such an extension due to its ontological understanding of the meaningful world outside text as "text-like". Territorial cohesion controversies outside policy can therefore also be studied through their stories. Using Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis* for other goals and spheres of application thus extends its usage.

Besides extending the use of Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis*, this research also merely uses this tool to answer a mundane question: 'What are the territorial cohesion power practices?', or in other words: 'For what is the concept used and how?'. To know the concept's game, how assumptions of territorial cohesion problems form its common ground for decision-making, one needs to describe these inertnesses through interpretive analysis instead of (simultaneously) being solution-oriented to further decision-making. This mapping of strategic positions reveals the systematic uncertainty of the concept's bricolage by outlining the – not one, but – multiple metanarratives which embrace the major opposed assumptions in territorial cohesion controversies. The actual operationalisation in which *Narrative Policy Analysis* fits to map the usages of the concept below will further explain this extended and mundane use in four consecutive stages and one in-between alert: i) drawing the agendas, ii) recognising the topics, iii) structuring the order, and iv) outlining the field, and a battlefield generalisation for positions instead of actors.

6.3.2 Stage one: drawing the agendas

Every political organisation exploits some kinds of conflict and suppresses others, organises some into and some out of politics, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias (Schattschneider, 1960: 71; Lukes, 1975: 16). To hereby understand how the contested definition of a single policy concept plays a part in the emergence of a new policy field, Böhme&Richardson&Dabinett&Jensen (2004: 1181) would look at how a particular concept enters a policy arena and 'reaches the status of an agreed aim or need, and thus becomes established as a hegemonic concept'. However, as mentioned above, the concept of territorial cohesion seems to create a new policy arena, mostly out of various old ones (i.e. bricolage), and to appear in other arenas than policy too (e.g. politics proper, science). For the political organisation of territorial cohesion the question therefore becomes which topics are included in the concept's mobilisation of bias and therefore mark out its usage – and this research separates usage before it is related to territorial cohesion definitions (see Chapter 5 and 7). The first stage in mapping the usage of the concept then revolves around agenda-setting.

For any political system agenda-setting is a crucial stage in the policy process, as an issue needs first to be placed onto the active agenda of a governmental institution before policy can be made for it (Peters, 1996: 61; Husar, 2006: 103). Also for territorial cohesion this could be a difficult task which requires substantial political mobilisation and luck (Peters, 1996: 61; Husar, 2006: 103), but what remains a question is how far it forms a new issue or a bricolage of old ones already on the active agenda. Either way, an important distinction hereby is the one between placing an issue on an agenda and doing this in a particular form (Peters, 1996: 63; Husar, 2006: 95). In European policy different (administrative and legislative) organisations often have different conceptualisations of the same issue, and 'having a favourite item placed on the agenda, but in a form that is not acceptable, must be counted as a defeat' (Peters, 1996: 63; Husar, 2006: 95). The concept of territorial cohesion could thus also be used to put an issue which is already on an active policy agenda on the same or another agenda in a different form.

For the use of Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis* beyond policy, Kingdon's (1984) garbage-can model helps to extend what you can draw of territorial cohesion's agenda-setting; note that the refinements below are here merely meant to demonstrate that you can look at different spheres in the same way (i.e. agenda-

setting). Kingdon's model considers agenda-setting as consisting of three elements: problems, policies, and politics, whereby each constitutes a largely independent process stream (Kingdon, 1984; Richardson, 1996: 16; Husar, 2006: 103). This opens up the possibility to draw what happens on the territorial cohesion agendas of policy and politics proper, and its scientific agenda too when science concerns itself with the re/cognition of territorial cohesion problems. What is more, besides that these process streams do follow patterns in the territorial cohesion garbage-can (e.g. with structure couplings, system constraints), the proposals that survive also conform to criteria of technical feasibility, budgetary workability, dominant values, and current national moods (Kingdon, 1984: 21; Richardson, 1996: 17; Husar, 2006: 103). Hence, this adds the possibility to draw territorial cohesion's financial and more general agendas (i.e. budgets, values, moods), or how these as criteria frame the concept's agenda-setting process, and opens up yet another way to draw the concept's scientific agenda when science researches territorial cohesion's technical feasibility.

Especially that with Kingdon's (1984) garbage-can model the problem stream of agenda-setting and the criteria of technical feasibility make it possible to (indirectly) draw the scientific agenda-setting is essential, because this research on the concept of territorial cohesion focuses on the relation between, simply put, politics and science. While also in science itself the choice of research topics has an important influence on the current state of scientific knowledge, such choices become enormously complex in the case of science in policy contexts (Clark&Majone, 1985: 13-14). As Clark&Majone (1985: 13) pose for instance: then 'scientists choose what studies to perform, institutions choose what work will be on their agenda, program managers choose what research to fund, and policymakers what problems to tackle (and in what order)'. However, this research does not aim for the sophisticated level of detail which untangles such a complex agenda-setting process into the agendas of preconceived policy, political, financial, and scientific spheres. Nor does it order this agenda-setting according to streams of problems, policy, and politics and the various criteria met by the proposals which survive them. Instead, this part of the research's discourse analysis simply interprets the territorial cohesion agenda, whereby it does not matter much whether the issues on it derive from policy, politics, finances, and/or science; other discourse analytical parts are more concerned with science (see §5.3) and its relationship with politics (see Chapter 7). This actual operationalisation is thus about the basal ordering of the different usages of the concept which re-/mobilise bias in the power practices of the European Union – what nonetheless leads to some refinement according to the concept's stories and the different ways in which territorial cohesion power practices are performed.

6.3.3 ALERT: not actors but positions

A major way in which the actual operationalisation of this research deviates from Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis*, is that it considers the concept of territorial cohesion as a disputed battle ground in itself. That is, the contest in the territorial cohesion game is not only about what the concept's area of action is (i.e. "the where" of positions), but also about what its (chief) actors are (i.e. "the who" of positions).^a The strategic positions shown in territorial cohesion stories on various topics thus do not belong to certain actors (e.g. as with storylines in a Hajerian discourse analysis). Of course, one can think of actors moving from position to position and therefore of strategic positions as for actors to take or keep. Metaphorically speaking, an armed group can, within its constraints and on the ground of their goals, strengths, coalitions, *et cetera*, choose its strategic place on a battlefield (e.g. hiding in a cave, over-viewing from a mountain top, in the midst of an open plain, along a well-travelled road, moving constantly). Different groups could use these same positions for different goals, also when the battle is not fought very intensely and the struggle continues in colder forms (e.g. placing a castle near a river-crossing, fortifying a place of residence, become nomadic). Nevertheless, these strategic positions should not be identified with the acting groups.

Quite the contrary, because stories are this research's only index of power relations, the "actors" are understood as part of the stories themselves. What is more, taking the strategic position to recognise one and

^a As Elster (2000: 692-693) for instance holds for historic explanations on high levels of aggregation: 'Some of the actors that enter into the explanations are huge collectives – clans, the elite, North, South, and so on. When these are endowed with beliefs and goals are assumed to engage in complex strategic calculations, credibility breaks down.'

not another as an actor when it concerns territorial cohesion could be self-fulfilling (e.g. the same actor in the concept's area of action as in other "games"). The territorial cohesion stories then also show the construction of actors, as the forces in power practices constitute both positions and actors (i.e. grouped forces); note that every strategic position is an interpretation of stories instead of their cause. Also without actors who tell stories territorial cohesion can be viewed tactically: as a new conceptual instrument in older and larger struggles which are partly refashioned by its usage (e.g. by the creation of new positions through reshaping the landscape with walls, fortifications, bridges). Contradicting stories for instance hint at the battles fought, often heard stories at inertness in usages, and marginal stories at explorations of new possibilities when it concerns (the expansion of) the territorial cohesion domain. This part on the usage of the concept then does not describe how certain actors use it in power practices, but maps the domain, landscape, and topography of the territorial cohesion battlefield by interpreting the strategic positions from the stories as "sonic echoes" of the battles fought.

6.3.4 Stage two: recognising the topics

If you map the order of the territorial cohesion battlefield in which the concept's usages show strategic positions that mobilise bias in power practices, the question becomes how to know what the territorial cohesion topics (on the agenda) are. Here Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis* comes in, as you take all stories as they are told with territorial cohesion and interpret on what they dis/agree, that is, the dominant stories and their counterstories. Besides often being problem statements, territorial cohesion counter/stories thereby seldom give more than premises. When you would follow Roe's (1994) *Narrative Policy Analysis* strictly, most of the territorial cohesion stories would then be nonstories, as they do not conform to his definition of 'policy narrative' (i.e. stories with beginnings, middles, and ends or arguments with premises and conclusions). However, instead of immediately running to the conclusion that with the concept there is no "story" to tell, this research wants to know about what the concept does (and might) tell. To do this the territorial cohesion stories need to be interpreted nonetheless, even if this results in basic metanarratives which only distillate the topics for which the concept is (assumed to be) used. Said differently, if territorial cohesion's area of action is a battlefield full with strategic positions, then *Narrative Policy Analysis* comes in handy, as the metanarratives reveal the points in the concept's usage field around which positions aggregate, grouping together as oppositions in an arena (i.e. counter/stories) or straying away (i.e. nonstories) – something schemes of coded problem statements of territorial cohesion put on view by setting metanarratives against time.

Insofar the territorial cohesion discourse establishes our regime of truth, the concept's metanarratives together indicate ruptures of this regime in text (see Appendix A; §A.1.6 on expertise). Thus mapped, the articulation of the text 'territorial cohesion' does not offer a definite safe haven, but breaks open a large volatile field of power practices associated with the concept's system of meaning/knowledge (see Chapter 5). The territorial cohesion counter/stories themselves thereby manifest the strategic positions of such ruptures. However, you can also identify implicit territorial cohesion positions by contextualising the usage of the concept, as its context gives away the hidden territorial cohesion mission statements: texts which in themselves seem to be without consequence might turn out to be essential when the concept's context gives them their weight (also see §6.3.5 on narratives with an own dynamic). The concept's context also discloses possibilities for territorial cohesion power practices if they do not exist yet themselves. Agenda-setting then becomes a strategic action in the concept's usage which settles where the battle on which topics can be fought (later on) and, consequently, how territorial cohesion might be discussed with more argumentation; in this strategic light you can consider the territorial cohesion nonstories, which seem rather unsuccessful because they barely inhabit an arena, as exploration points. This mapping of the concept's usage with *Narrative Policy Analysis* then leads to the question of how the collection of metanarratives changes or might change through time – a question though, which presupposes that it is due to these metanarratives that we can know the territorial cohesion topics.

6.3.5 Stage three: structuring the order

When you will know the territorial cohesion topics through the concept's metanarratives, the question becomes how to structure the ordering of all the stories involved; due to the hermeneutic circle involved in archival work the structure below comes forth out of the processing of the research's data as demonstrated in Book II. You start with analytically separating different usage areas. Hereby Wittgenstein's (1968) idea of family resemblance helps to re/group relevant similarities: as long as stories have enough similar characteristics they form a "family" (Goertz&Mahoney, 2005: 504). There are no necessary conditions that put a story in one usage area instead of another, because 'no single trait is shared by all members of the family' (Goertz&Mahoney, 2005: 504). What makes it especially decisive which similarities of the stories you take as ir/relevant for ordering them, is that these usage areas do not only relate but also overlap. Through analytic retroduction (see Appendix A; A.2.4) this research then comes up with the relevant similarities according to the contextual appearance of a story in a sphere where power practices are performed in a certain way (e.g. *autoritas, potestas*; see Chapter 3). Note though, that this analytical separation of usage areas is an abstraction: although usage areas are characterised as containing stories with certain traits, the way they were distinguished was due to these traits, and the usage areas therefore did not first exist as an entity in itself to which these stories were ascribed to later. In addition, after sorting texts into usages areas, you still have to construct different information out of the same sets of data "within" them.

Besides the territorial cohesion stories embraced by the metanarratives, there also appear four other types of stories in the usage areas. To start with those on the highest abstraction level: each usage area is characterised by the general stories which frame all stories within it – these framing stories come very close to the "large-*M*" metanarratives from §6.2.3 above (e.g. "the European Union has competencies" comes close to "the State"). One level of abstraction lower you can distinguish those that structure all the territorial cohesion stories embraced by the metanarratives. These structuring stories are on the concept of territorial cohesion itself and show the strategic meta-positions on the usage of the concept in an usage area (e.g. territorial cohesion is un/important). However, in every usage area there also appear stories on similar or even the same topics as the territorial cohesion stories without mentioning the concept. These help to understand the role of the concept's practices, as they show the immediate social context of the (inherently contextual) territorial cohesion positions – thereby, for instance, indicating a leeway for an area of action to extend. For this reason the dynamics of the narratives of which these contextual stories are a part need to be ordered; from here on the term 'narrative' is only meant in this – compared to Roe (1994) more – specific way. The usage area's narratives with an own dynamic are the counterparts of its territorial cohesion metanarratives in that they have their own structuring stories while embracing the usage area's dominant stories and counter-/nonstories which do not mention the concept. These narratives can then indicate which forces led or might lead to the strategic positions interpreted from the territorial cohesion stories, because their dynamics existed (long) before and during the concept's usage for similar topics. Important struggles might then be about which part of a usage area should be within the domain of territorial cohesion, as shown by discussions on whether a (part of a) narrative should be "colonised" as a territorial cohesion metanarrative (e.g. a re-formation of "old" power practices). To end this refinement of the stories in the usage areas, those stories on territorial cohesion or its immediate context can be noted that link topics. In the struggles as mentioned above, these connecting stories can indicate a joining of forces and/or the specification of a position depending on their role and development. However, the four layers of abstraction which mainly structure the ordering of all the stories are: i) usage areas in which ii) general stories frame all stories within it, iii) others structure the territorial cohesion stories and those in the concept's immediate context, and iv) territorial cohesion metanarratives and narratives with an own dynamic.

6.3.6 Stage four: outlining the field

After constructing ordered usage areas from stories on territorial cohesion and its immediate context, the question becomes how to come up with the whole territorial cohesion usage field. It are the territorial cohesion metanarratives as parts of the usage areas that together do this, because the schemas of metanarratives reveal for

which topics the concept is used. However, to outline the concept's whole usage field out of its context in which often the same topics appear (i.e. in the narratives with an own dynamic), one should also describe the ways in which the concept's usage stands out.

How the concept is used depends on the contextual role it plays in time. This research interprets the patterns of this after mapping the strategic positions from all the stories through the years, both those on territorial cohesion and its immediate context. Eventualisation is important hereby, because although together the metanarratives and narratives point out where the territorial cohesion positions aggregate, they do not show which are strong/weak. One should thus place stories in their social context of events (e.g. the agreement on the European Spatial Development Perspective, the concept's appearance in the draft Constitutional Treaty, the publication of a new Cohesion Report) to see how what are assumed to be territorial cohesion problems give the concept an own ground for decision-making. The changing stories in such an overview indicate how the usage of the concept develops on certain topics. One should then focus on the developments in territorial cohesion's conceptual history of which the pattern stands out from the contextual dynamics of the concept, especially those that (in usage areas) alter the borders of the whole territorial cohesion usage field. The latter namely both show the range of territorial cohesion power practices and suggest the possibilities for them later on. When you interpret the patterns of the collection of metanarratives thus, you can outline the whole territorial cohesion usage field according to the "ownness" of the concept's usage.

The actual operationalisation of the basic mapping of the usages of the concept thus allows the construction of different information from the same sets of data (i.e. documents) interpreted and analysed to map the concept's meanings in territorial cohesion propositions (see Chapter 5). The concept's whole usage field namely marks out the (possible) territorial cohesion power practices from the intertextual territorial cohesion text as an area of action full of territorial cohesion positions on which argumentations can be built indirectly (see Chapter 7). The following elaborate vocabulary thereby presents the significant data (i.e. text), social events (i.e. power practices) and indexive phenomena (i.e. stories): the territorial cohesion area of action, the concept's whole usage field, usages areas, general/framing stories, structuring stories, territorial cohesion metanarratives, narratives with an own dynamic, and the (connecting) territorial cohesion stories and (connecting) stories in the concept's immediate context.

6.4 Concluding towards discourse

6.4.1 Creating an overview

This chapter operationalised this research's violently basal mapping of the territorial cohesion garbage-can and bricolage usage of the concept that is needed to come up with its whole usage field from the mixing streams of problems, solutions, and boundaries of decision structures (i.e. what to map). To know for what and how the concept is used in its policy, political, financial, and/or scientific spheres, *Narrative Policy Analysis* functions as a central tool in the unfolding of territorial cohesion's uncertainty, complexity, and polarisation in four stages (i.e. how to map). The first stage draws the extensive territorial cohesion agenda on which the agenda-setting of the European Union re/places many issues in various forms. From the conventional definitions of all the stories involved the second stage then recognises the territorial cohesion topics by interpreting the metanarratives. They embrace the major opposed assumptions of the dominant arguments (i.e. premises) and their counter- and nonstories in the concept's controversies. To structure the order of these opposing expert viewpoints on territorial cohesion the third stage distinguishes four layers of abstraction. Family resemblance thereby analytically separates usage areas (i) also characterised by general stories which frame all the stories within it (ii). The metanarratives and their counterparts that do not mention territorial cohesion (i.e. narratives with an own dynamic) fit herein (iv) and are structured by stories on the concept and its immediate context themselves (iii). Schemes of coded problems statements which put these three types of stories (and those connecting topics) against time then present this layered order. They also allow the final mapping stage to interpretively outline

the whole usage field formed by the collection of territorial cohesion metanarratives. However, to separate this territorial cohesion field out of a context of similar topics, the patterns of the concept's usage should with eventualisation be identified from the streams moving in the collection of metanarratives towards proximate goals through windows of opportunity. Whether territorial cohesion's conceptual history developed "ownness" in the courses of direction of what happens in power practices remains to be seen though, as (also) that depends on the research object.

6.4.2 What's the use of mapping usages?

This research's (also) studies the intertextual territorial cohesion data to discourse analytically trace the rational trails of grouped desires (i.e. interests) and (marginal) contextual values displayed by the concept's battlefield. Besides the reinterpreted social context in which the concept plays or might play a role, stories appear as the only available phenomena to index the power relations in what actually happens. In the social events of the European Union's vectors and standstill of power practices the contextualised landscape of the concept's usage then depicts the usage areas in which different kinds of battles wage over territorial cohesion topics. To topographically mark out the (possible) domain of the concept, this research maps the whole territorial cohesion usage field, whereby the metanarratives indicate the points around which oppositions group (i.e. counter/stories) and positions fade or are explored (i.e. nonstories).

However, while agenda-setting settles the topics to battle (later on), their strategic positions cover the concept's area of action, and the relevant power practices are therefore mapped, the question of what are territorial cohesion power practices still remains. A major struggle is namely not merely about what the limits of the territorial cohesion arena are, but whether the concept rules the games played in it. Hence, the usage of mapping territorial cohesion positions is that it opens up a critique of the concept: the concept's systematic uncertainty also entails an indecision about which power practices constitute the territorial cohesion discourse by being associated to its system of knowledge. The operationalisation question then becomes how to link the mapped power and knowledge (e.g. how the ways in which the concept's usages re-/mobilise bias in the European Union's power practices produce territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge and *vice versa* and territorial cohesion argumentations build on a contested ground of positions). The next chapter therefore deals with how Book II can answer to this.