The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

Hissink Muller, B.M.

Citation for published version (APA):

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
Chapter 10  The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

Introduction

This chapter orders the claims on territorial cohesion knowledge in a system and critiques them insofar they contradict, are arbitrary, or their system suffers from inconsistency flaws similar to the concept's common ground of meaning. As the classifying system of territorial cohesion meaning frames the solidification of ideas and facts into the concept's epistemic strata, what would thus be at stake is how propositions (might) form a new body of knowledge (connaissance). Before mapping the existing claims, the ways in which meaning and knowledge relate here and what the concept's situation is are therefore quickly explicated (§10.1). The critique on the system of territorial cohesion knowledge will already be carried out during the mapping of it. This by per kind of territorial cohesion meaning showing the variety of biting claims, alternatives, and how they interrelate with the concept's system of meaning (§10.2). One should hereby keep in mind that territorial cohesion knowledge is in its creative phase, what leads conclusions on it towards the concept's discourse (§10.3), and this ordering thus points to the need to reflect on it (see Part IV).

10.1 Thinking and measuring territorial cohesion knowledge

10.1.1 Trading off intension and extension

In the previous chapter the triangle of signification taxonomised the relationships between the words 'territorial cohesion' and what they signify and refer to. As what can be seen and said knowledge, in its turn, forms perception by relating these signified ideas and referred to facts. To map the system of territorial cohesion knowledge, the concept's signifier is therefore left behind to focus on 'epistemological institutionalisation'. That is to say, we now want to see how the concept's ideas become more static and territorial cohesion facts are measured. This by identifying how the abstract (scientific) objectifications of social reality and (policy) action-oriented discursive simplifications of the intertextual territorial cohesion expertise represent a particular gaze in which some of the hues of Bedeutung express a Sinn. No matter the sophistication or whether it concerns, for instance, descriptions, norms, or policy coherence, territorial cohesion knowledge namely stratifies the relationships between ideas and facts of a particular part of the world with a particular perspective (Deleuze, 2000: 121; Fairclough, 2003: 129). The question of how to relate territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge then becomes how the latter relates the concept's signifieds and referents.

Here elementary logic comes in useful with 'intension' and 'extension' as two fundamental properties with which a concept can be described (Sartori, 1970; Radaelli, 2000: 4). 'Intension' thereby 'refers to the collection of properties covered by a concept' and 'extension' 'represents the class of entities to which the concept applies' (Radaelli, 2000: 4). Analogous to the signified and referent respectively, they add to the understanding of territorial cohesion knowledge. An intension then expresses the definitional conditions that specify the set of all possible facts and an extension the set of all actual facts. Radaelli (2000: 4) uses this distinction to reflect on studies on 'Europeanization'. Although most intellectual energy in this lively debate would be concentrated on empirical research (Radaelli, 2000: 4), it is less clear to what extent the researchers studying Europeanisation actually study the same phenomenon. The emergence of European identities, the effect of European Union policies on national policies, and the creation of European modes of governance (Radaelli, 2000: 2-3) are for instance all phenomena that can be studied as Europeanisation but differ in properties (i.e. intension) and entities (i.e. extension). The studies would therefore come up with both different specifications of Europeanisation (i.e. sets of possible facts) and measurements of it (i.e. sets of actual facts) respectively. In the case of the territorial cohesion sign, its extension thus groups data as territorial cohesion facts, while the sign's intension links the signifier (i.e. the words 'territorial cohesion') to the sign's extension from the signified's side (i.e. the territorial
cohesion ideas). The ways in which the concept's signified and referent relate to intension and extension are just the first step to explain how territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge relate though.

Another step needed to do this lies in matching ideas and facts by trading off intension and extension, as this forms knowledge. The more properties a concept thereby includes, the smaller its class of empirical instances will be (Radaelli, 2000: 4). Said differently, ‘a concept with high intension has high discriminatory power’ (Radaelli, 2000: 4). This can be explained by using Radaelli’s (2000) example of Europeanisation again. Suppose the emergence of European identities due to the creation of European modes of governance is its intension. Empirical instances then have to meet each of the “criteria” (i.e. those emerging identities, and their causal relation) to be part of the extension of Europeanisation. The class of actual facts of it would in that case be much smaller than with an intension specified with merely one of the first two properties as criterion. However, what is more probable in the proto-conceptual case of territorial cohesion, is a privileging of extension (i.e. less properties and more entities). Just as with Europeanisation (in 2000), this could be the result of an early stage of research, as then ‘the analytic grid has to be broad enough to accommodate a wide range of empirical observations that may have something to do with it; it is namely supposed to explain many phenomena (e.g. process of cultural change, new identities formation, policy change, administrative innovation with Europeanisation) (Radaelli, 2004: 4). We therefore expect territorial cohesion to have such a low discriminatory power too.

It thus is the intension-extension trade-off that relates territorial cohesion meaning and knowledge. Note though, that the concept of territorial cohesion has multiple signifieds (e.g. as ideal or spatial planning), which as broad ideas categorise even more referents, and that several intensions express the same idea (e.g. territorial cohesion as ideal) by differing in their properties. For territorial cohesion the trade-off between intension and extension therefore plays itself out for multiple idea-fact relationships, leading to a broad ensemble of intension grids that accommodate wide ranges of empirical observations. An intension of the concept is thereby often implied by a territorial cohesion definition (i.e. here: a \textit{Bedeutung}), because in the formation of territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off goes back and forth between them. Hence, in order to map its system of knowledge, there is below per kind of territorial cohesion meaning looked for the intension-extension trade-offs between the concept's ideas and facts that form various knowledges.

10.1.2 Making territorial cohesion knowledge and defining the concept

In our case a problem rises when we look for intension-extension trade-offs, because we cannot look at how knowledge fixes this trade-off within stable territorial cohesion \textit{Sinn} and \textit{Bedeutung}. With the premise that one must know what one is looking for before one finds it, what becomes necessary to know before one collects territorial cohesion data, is what the concept means. That is, one should decide on what counts as a territorial cohesion fact before one measures them as being it. But at the moment there is not only no stable territorial cohesion meaning (see §9.4.2), the defining and knowledge creation occur simultaneously too. That is to say, the relationship between the concept's meanings and knowledges shows a dynamic interplay. Yet, it is this interplay between the concept's semantics and epistemics which can, notwithstanding the lack of stable territorial cohesion meaning, put us on the right track to look for intension-extension trade-offs.

The collection of data by the European Spatial Planning Observatory Network (ESPON) is an important example for this dynamic interplay, as it claims to both clarify a common definition of the concept and measure territorial cohesion (e.g. with indicators, databases, mapping techniques, evaluation models) (Tatzberger, 2003: 13; BBR, 2005a: 55-56; Husar, 2006: 46). However, ESPON did not achieve a common territorial cohesion definition yet, even though its approach might lay the groundwork, (quantitative) measurement requires such a commonly agreed definition, and territorial cohesion in-depth territorial observation (BBR, 2003a; Dutch Presidency, 2004: 15; BBR, 2005d; Husar, 2006: 46). This becomes the more striking when you consider that ‘a great deal of [ESPON’s] output has been created through analysing existing data; this due to the difficulties with collecting reliable primary data for all 29 participating states’ (Van Gestel & Faludi, in Faludi, 2005: 89). In general, the real issue might thus be as ESPON puts it for measuring territorial cohesion potential: combining...
all the already and soon available information in the territorial cohesion perspective (BBR, 2003a). Fragments of old data collections might thus be reordered in a new way and then (re)branded as ‘territorial cohesion’. Also, facts can be measured anew according to different meanings of the concept (e.g. those meanings for which most data exists or is easiest to find). Van Gestel & Faludi (in Faludi, 2005: 89) even hold that ‘[i]t is safe to say that the analytical gain lies in this combination of data collection and developing matching indicators, rather than the parallel efforts to theorise (new) concepts’. Our question on the contrary becomes what then to map as territorial cohesion knowledge. Hence, without stable meaning in the concept’s semantic-epistemic interplay, we should ask ourselves the question of how we can look for intension-extension trade-offs while we avoid deciding on what counts as territorial cohesion knowledge.

One could argue that every definition in the territorial cohesion taxonomy has its own knowledge (e.g. knowledge on balanced development, Raumordnung; see Tables 1 and 2 in §9.1.2). Territorial cohesion knowledge would then include all the knowledge that implicitly through a meaning of the concept could be listed under this banner. The mapping below concerns itself solely with explicit claims on territorial cohesion knowledge though. For now we are namely interested in what is posed as territorial cohesion knowledge, those forms directly held as being part of the concept’s episteme that is (by others), instead of what could be posed thus (i.e. by us). It differs in this from the mapping of the concept’s meaning, in that implicit territorial cohesion definitions were taking into account (e.g. propositions through logical implication). However, compared with meaning propositions as points, this research considers accounting for the forms of implicit knowledge an interpretative step too far, as there are too many possibilities for lines to connect those semantic points to form epistemic forms. Then all knowledge which can be labelled as territorial cohesion knowledge would count, and to map territorial cohesion knowledge we would need to return to the question of what territorial cohesion means. We should thus sidestep the need to make arbitrary decisions on what real territorial cohesion knowledge is, and thus not follow the concept’s Sinn and Bedeutung to determine epistemic claims. Instead, to map the system in which the concept trades off intensions and extensions we should stick to the measured facts and thought of ideas that are explicitly posed as being territorial cohesion knowledge.

10.2 Territorial cohesion knowledges: mapping and critique

10.2.1 The epistemic territorial cohesion trade-offs: per kind of meaning

The mapping and critique of the concept’s system of knowledge revolves around territorial cohesion intensions, extensions, and their trade-offs. Since there could be many of these trade-offs (see §10.1.1), the question becomes how to systematise their mapping. As explained above, the concept’s semantic order should not be used to deduce intensions and extensions from. Only explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims set them up. However, this does not prohibit the use of the distinguished kinds of territorial cohesion meaning to merely systemise epistemic claims. Moreover, when you deal with the concept’s intension-extension trade-offs through these kinds, a fundamental difference between its semantic and epistemic systems comes forward clearly. This by setting these trade-offs against the background of the concept’s common ground of meaning outlined in §9.3.9 (i.e. ask which territorial entities, seldom include politics, neither tell how to deal with multiple levels nor tangibilise the concept). Both systems namely differ in in-filling in at least one other way besides, as argued in de previous section, that the epistemic system is not filled in with implicit propositions. As will be shown, the intensions and extensions filling-in the epistemic system are narrower than the mapped territorial cohesion Sinn and Bedeutung. The sections below therefore order the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims by treating them critically per kind.

The sections below are not only structured with the seven kinds of territorial cohesion meaning though (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective, instrumental, and policy coherence together, spatial planning, territorial governmentality). The intension-extension trade-offs structure them too: each section treats the intensions before the extensions, to conclude with the ways in which their trade-offs form territorial cohesion.
knowledge. In a glance, it then seems that already quite some descriptive knowledge is produced (§10.2.2), normative territorial cohesion knowledge is hardly thought through (§10.2.3), policy objective knowledge to filter descriptive knowledge (§10.2.4), idem for instrumental knowledge, but with a totalising tendency, just as with policy coherence knowledge (§10.2.5), an unexplained spatial planning to be more a system for than a territorial cohesion knowledge (§10.2.6), and the fragmented claims relating territorial cohesion knowledge to governing seem to suggest a narrow and not reflected upon territorial governmentality (§10.2.7). After ordering these kinds of both ideas of territorial cohesion facts and facts of territorial cohesion ideas, we can finally draw the map of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge from what was expressed (by others). This by identifying the commonalities of the territorial cohesion gaze and distilling vague knowledge-dominances from the groups of intension-extension trade-offs per kind (§10.2.8). It are, however, the problems with this map that lead to the critical conclusions (§10.2.9).

10.2.2. Descriptive knowledge: ousting hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intensions for descriptions

In descriptive territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off mostly revolves around different ways to get a grip on the current state of affairs. This with four intensions: a hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intension. The ways to get a grip on the current state of affairs contaminate though, because separately seen every single intension seems sensible, but taken together they make no sense, or at least far less. As firstly shown below, intensions oust each other for overlapping extensions. One could also criticise these claims for their hard to find factuality. That is, many properties are spoken of, but no facts are grouped, as demonstrated when the extensions are treated after the intensions. This hard to find factuality could be explained by that in essence every territorial affair is contextual to a very high degree (e.g. compared to juridical facts). For instance, when for territorial cohesion the European Commission's Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a) refers to assets and support constraints that cannot be fundamentally modified by policies, it calls to take each territory into account. Descriptive territorial cohesion extensions then always constitute knowledge of particular territories – and there are quite a few of those in the European Union. Even before this though, it is unclear of what factual entities we are talking here (e.g. territories as inhabited by peoples as wholes or by individuals). Thus before these (absent) extensions are treated, the already expressed descriptive territorial cohesion intensions are.

An insightful and thorough entrance into the abovementioned ousting of intensions, is the hyper-cube intension, which is in the territorial cohesion taxonomy implied by the Bedeutung of a complex web of structures in or between territories (see Table 1 in §9.1.2). In ESPON, PhD Consultans&Grassland (in BBR, 2003a) namely present a figure that covers such a complex web through a collection of properties. As their hyper-cube figure shows below, it consists of four dimensions: territory, cohesion, scale, and time.

---

* The Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a) for instance comes up with polycentric development, urban and rural areas, regions submitted to geographical constraints and border regions as the assets and support constraints.
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge


The hyper-cube further specifies its dimensions: territory is divided in space and society, scale corresponds to levels on which actions can be led by governing actors (e.g. through subsidiarity, vertical cooperation) and sub-territories as units of measurement, and time covers the dynamic prospect (e.g. through scenarios, the evolution of disparities) (BBR, 2003a). Conditions for cohesion complete the hyper-cube: potential, position, and integration enable the fitting of properties in it. Potential thereby points to all the factors that are not dependent on other territories and provide opportunities for a sustainable and possibly endogenous development: ‘position’ to the fusion of aspects of ‘geographical position’ and the economic and social cohesion approaches of dimensions not necessarily linked to space and distance and more in the range of “equity” or “homogeneity”; and integration is based on effective relations of im/material flows and exchanges with other areas (BBR, 2003a). Moreover, the three cohesion conditions interrelate and can be divided into conditions for spatial or social cohesion according to the territory dimension specified as space or society respectively (De Boe&Hanquet, 2004, in BBR, 2005c: 131). With its further specified four dimensions, this hyper-cube intension thus forms a complex order.

An example which fills in one of the territorial cohesion hyper-cube’s compartments can help to clarify its complex four-dimensional order. In which compartment would for instance the urban structure of the Dutch Randstad fit? Because it is qua territory concerned with space and qua cohesion a factor of the area itself, urban structure is an entity that is put up as a potential conditioning spatial cohesion (i.e. left and above in the figure). The scale on which this holds then determines which hyper-cube compartment it exemplifies – i.e. the State level –, and the Randstad’s possible development can account for the time dimension. ESPON hereby tries to delineate the components of such entities enough to be able to express them by different indicators and to build typologies on this basis; it could use advanced spatial analysis techniques (e.g. multi-scalar analysis) to measure them for instance (BBR, 2003a). The spatial integration of an area (e.g. as indicated by the traffic flows to and from other areas) might then present links with criteria such as geographical position, economic strength, and European Functional Urban Areas (EFUAs) (Nordregio, 2003). Furthermore, the hyper-cube’s

---

1. These real things as factors – whether natural, generated and/or influenced by human activities or linked to the social fabric and structure – are ‘resources’ when positive or ‘constraints’ when negative (BBR, 2003a).

2. The situation of the entity with regard to the other ones in matter of GDP, population, employment exemplifies of the latter (BBR, 2003a).

3. Note that these flows and exchange can enhance both potential and disparities through, for instance, pump and tunnel effects (BBR, 2003a).
spatial integration and social integration together form territorial integration (De Boe&Hanquet, 2004, in BBR, 2005c: 131). Territorial integration therefore seems to come from the hyper-cube as the necessary – though not sufficient – condition for territorial cohesion.

However, the territorial cohesion hyper-cube intension could result in unstable knowledge. This goes beyond remarks such as 'How can co-operation also be a spatial besides social condition for cohesion?' (i.e. right and above in the figure). The territorial cohesion hyper-cube namely does not only collect properties – in which one can identify many, mostly descriptive, territorial cohesion Bedeutung –, but leaves the trade-off with extensions open to add more entities too. This hyper-cube might thus not so much discriminate entities as territorial cohesion facts, but give an order for them. As such, it is possible to think of more fundamental critiques of this intension.

To start the fundamental critique, a multitude of ways that combine elements categorised under potential may give an "equivalent" outcome (BBR, 2003a). Different extensions would then describe the same territorial cohesion idea. Moreover, although ESPON aggregates different facets, it is not clear how these should link (e.g. geographical and in itself non-spatial issues). It is neither clear how for the potential of an area to take the potential of other areas into account when also their potentials come from their positions too (BBR, 2003a). That is, when position determines potential and vice versa, there is no starting point to measure the facts classified as the extension’s entities (e.g. should the same infrastructure that links areas have an intrinsic quality as spatial entity?). What adds to these three critiques is that territorial cohesion on one scale does not necessarily enhance territorial cohesion on another scale (BBR, 2003a). One could even question how to grasp territorial cohesion facts from different scales, as abstraction often accompanies increases in scale. But when this epistemological operation deals with the increasing amount of particular territorial cohesion facts associated with increases in scale, it goes beyond a similar ordering of (then) more facts. That is, it then goes towards the creation of another knowledge sphere: a more abstract one (e.g. regional culture is more concrete than transnational culture). This would especially be problematic for the hyper-cube intension, because its integration condition both includes relations outside and inside a territory. Then we are left with too many facts to fathom, extensions relating different abstraction spheres to express the same intension, or the need to come up with an external starting point. All in all, one can thus critique the fundamentals of the territorial cohesion hyper-cube, because with: i) equivalent potentials and multiple levels different extensions fit the same intension; ii) no way to relate facets the intension collects but does not connect properties; iii) circular properties the intension partly prohibits extension; and with iv) the choice of lowering discriminatory power, differing abstraction inside an extension, or depending on an external standard, you have to choose between a wide intension, moving extension, or predetermined measurement respectively. These still open intension-extension trade-offs therefore lead to unstable knowledge. Which could leave us wonder how well the other three descriptive territorial cohesion intensions fare in this.

---

* Facets such as accessibility to other areas in terms of transport, telecommunications, etc; presence of borders and discontinuities between the area and the others; potential of neighbouring areas in matter of complementary resources; convergence/divergence in time of the evolution of the area with regard to other areas (this can be measured in “traditional” terms of GDP, population, employment but also in terms of spatial potential); proximity of other convergent/divergent areas (what indicates if the situation is more or less stable or if it could evolve toward a different balanced) (BBR, 2003a).

* For instance, a way ESPON works with the relations between scales is Multiscalar Territorial Analysis (MTA): To compute the relative deviation of a region at European, national or local level helps to measure the potential contradiction between levels of action (BBR, 2005a: Table 2). However, by basing the potential contradiction between levels on relative deviations of a territory, they presume a standard – i.e. to what is the region relatively deviant before you measure territorial cohesion on different levels?
Another intension implied by the same descriptive territorial cohesion *Bedeutung* (i.e. a complex web of structures in or between territories) weaves another collection of properties together. This is Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006) layer approach. The layer approach distinguishes three layers: 1) geophysical, 2) infrastructural, and 3) occupational layer, and this on three levels: macro, meso, and micro (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006). It hereby seems to deal with some of the hyper-cube’s instabilities. This by focusing on spatial coherence as the ensemble of the layers’ elements in an area for instance (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006). The layer approach therefore per definition relates these elements instead of merely collecting properties as the hyper-cube does. The relations between clay as subsoil, canals as waterways, and strips of settlements on dykes could be an old-fashioned micro level example of such an ensemble from The Netherlands. Different extensions then never fit the same intension as equivalent potentials in the hyper-cube do (i.e. they are different ensembles). Moreover, because the layer approach sees such an ensemble as internal spatial coherence and the relations the area has with other areas as concerned with the spatial coherence on a higher scale, it saves itself from the hyper-cube's instability of circular properties (i.e. potential and position mutually determining each other). It could also save itself from the hyper-cube’s choice between a wide intension, moving extension, or predetermined measurement due to the abstraction involved in accounting for several scales at once. Unless the layer approach simultaneously deals with different levels for one single territorial cohesion extension, it namely has just one level of abstraction. As intension the layer approach intension thus seems to be less likely to lead to epistemological instability than the hyper-cube.

Yet, Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006) layer approach has its own flaws as territorial cohesion intension. It can for instance be critiqued for putting the infrastructural before the occupational in the layer hierarchy. Infrastructure as connection between places could namely point out that not the former but the latter is more structural. More fundamental though, as territorial cohesion intension the focus of the layer approach on spatial coherence seems to wipe the social dimension brought forward in the hyper-cube out of view altogether. Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006) layer approach for instance deals with the land-use of activities instead of the activities themselves. The hyper-cube and layer approach intensions thus only outline each other for extensions insofar it concerns spatial entities. This does not answer the question about stable knowledge for the other two descriptive territorial cohesion intensions though.

The territorial cohesion intension treated as third here is the one Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) comes up with: the components of territorial cohesion intension. As explained below, it is implied by territorial cohesion as territorial dimension of sustainability (see §10.2.4 and the territorial cohesion taxonomy in §9.1.2), which is another *Bedeutung* than the one of the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions. Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) thereby distinguishes the three territorial cohesion components of territorial quality, efficiency, and identity, and, as the figure displays below, each comes from the combination of two of the three systems (i.e. economic, socio-cultural, and natural and built environment).

---

1. That is, everything in the subsoil that determines differences between regions (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006).
2. That is, main roads, rail lines, waterways and other physical or telecommunication networks that turn networks into functional systems (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006).
3. The dynamic land-use of economic, caring and other activities, agriculture for instance (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006).
Although, this intension appears to focus more on society when compared to Vogelij’s (in Janssen-Jansen & Waterhout, 2006) layer approach, it seems to differ from the hyper-cube too. Still, just as with the hyper-cube, one can identify many descriptive territorial cohesion definitions in the properties of this intension: similar access of services of general interest as territorial quality;\(^a\) competitiveness of the economic fabric as territorial efficiency;\(^b\) and local specificities as territorial identity\(^c\) for example; the latter is even in itself a territorial cohesion definition. The components of territorial cohesion hereby lean on the sustainability concept. As Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) wants to bear us in mind, this concept ‘refers and links the need for ecological equilibria to the needs of the entire society, and therefore addresses a correct integration or co-evolution of the natural, the economic and the social system.’ As it would be here that ‘we can find the link with the term “cohesion”’ (Camagni, in Faludi, 2007), perhaps the middle of the figure above then is the real territorial cohesion knowledge. However, the components of territorial cohesion intension begs some critical questions, especially when compared to the order of the hyper-cube intension.

First of all, the hyper-cube’s scale and time dimensions are absent in the components of territorial cohesion intension and if it treats the cohesion conditions of potential, position, and integration then only implicitly so. More striking though, is that ‘space’ seems to be missing and ‘society’ to be split in two. When space and society would namely really constitute territory as the hyper-cube portrays, the natural and built environment of the components of territorial cohesion intension cannot solely contain the spatial. Then the identity formed by combining the socio-cultural and economic would not be territorial but merely “social”. To be more specific, while the hyper-cube includes both economic and social cohesion in society, here the economic and social both appear as own realms of sustainability. Yet, the components of territorial cohesion hereby colour many entities as economic properties in their trade-off with extension (e.g. social capital, competitive advantage, economic fabric). That the hyper-cube and layer approach intentions do not do this is thus another reason for why they hardly go together with the components of territorial cohesion intension. A final point of the critique of the components of territorial cohesion is the instability of knowledge it might lead to: the intension neither clarifies nor exemplifies what comes forth from the combination of – not two, but – each of the three systems. This gives this intension an open intension-extension trade-off. As such, precisely that what might form territorial

---

\(^a\) The other properties Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) gives for territorial quality are: ‘the quality of the living and working environment; comparable living standards across territories; similar access to knowledge.’

\(^b\) The other properties Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) gives for territorial efficiency are: ‘attractiveness of the local territory; internal and external accessibility; and resource-efficiency with respect to energy, land, and natural resources.’

\(^c\) The other properties Camagni (in Faludi, 2007) gives for territorial identity are: ‘presence of “social capital”; capability of developing shared visions of the future; local know-how; productive “vocations” and competitive advantage of each territory.’
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge instead of, for instance, territorial efficiency knowledge could be as instable as the hyper-cube intension.

The last territorial cohesion intension treated here, that is: territorial capital, is as spatial as the layer approach but even more economic than the components of territorial cohesion. That is to say, Zonneveld & Waterhout (in Faludi, 2005a: 19) suggest that the decidedly spatial characteristics featuring in territorial cohesion debates are aspects of territorial capital that play a decisive role in social and economic development. Following the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in that one can utilise territorial capital best at the regional and local level, they also relate it to other descriptive territorial cohesion intensions, that is, to endogenous potential and specific qualities of regions (Zonneveld & Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a: 19). The territorial capital intension itself is then made up of two kinds of characteristics: a region’s structural ones (i.e. the ‘givens’) and those associated with its spatial position (i.e. in a broader context), such as geographical position (e.g. access to the outside world) (Zonneveld & Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a: 19). That some even call territorial capital ‘something being in the air’ (Dutch Presidency, 2004) thereby sums things up.

A lacking elaboration on properties could exempt a critique of the territorial capital intension – beyond stating that it is merely spatial and vague and trades extensions off as economic that is (e.g. as capital). Still, whatever its properties, they are circular. This because, just as with the hyper-cube intension, the potential of other regions determines a region’s potential via spatial position. Thus from the get-go also the territorial capital intension can lead to instable territorial cohesion knowledge. Furthermore, due to its vagueness, this intension seems to take the low discriminatory power of territorial cohesion intensions to the extreme. As such it does not only out the other intensions for extensions but remains flexible in this trade-off as well.

What can we conclude after this overview of descriptive territorial cohesion intensions above? The hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intensions have their own flaws and share several. Besides the individual flaws, only the layer approach intension would not lead to instable knowledge and solely the hyper-cube intension, arguably, not to fractional knowledge (i.e. neither only spatial nor only economic). With the components of territorial cohesion and the hyper-cube intensions one could question the authenticity of their knowledge due to a dependence on intensions and extensions other than territorial cohesion (e.g. sustainability, accessibility); although for the latter this holds to a lesser degree. However, none clarifies how their properties that form a collection relate, not even the layer approach with its ensemble of spatial coherence does. Yet, even more fundamental for the production of territorial cohesion knowledge, is that the entities they classify seem to lack factuality. Without facts, the intension-extension trade-off does not form knowledge. Notwithstanding “the territorial cohesion perspective” (see §10.1.2), the relationships between ideas and facts then cannot be stratified. Some attempts to measure territorial cohesion facts have been made though.

As section 10.1.2 already suggested, you can easily critique a data-gathering of territorial cohesion facts when it has no stable meaning to group them. The same of course holds for the choice in which of the territorial cohesion intensions to fit facts of the concept's extensions. Insofar this happens in the ESPON process, Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) characterises it as favouring a widening of the analysis over a deepening of knowledge. Despite this widening, she for the outcomes holds that ‘the limitation of techniques and data availability would condition, if not determine, the relevance and legitimacy of certain forms of knowledge over others’; and insofar territorial affairs indeed are essentially contextual, what amazes is that Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) quotes Innes (1990: 232) for that it is likely a set of data and ‘relationships among selected variables or facts in isolation or abstracted from their social context’ that would count as legitimate knowledge. The question then becomes what typifies such “horse trading” between territorial cohesion ideas and facts from the extension's side.

When Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) and Husar (2006: 50) typify how ESPON measures territorial cohesion, they indicate that its set-up of indicators lacks social ones (i.e. four out of 103) (ESPON, 3.2, 2005: 524). ESPON would blame this on problems with data availability, that is, the difficulties of: having consistent data of the sustainability dimensions (i.e. economic, social, environmental) over time for a multidimensional and territorially based extension; the need to cover the national level; and that the current statistical situation...
misses “clean” social indicators which are not mixed with other issues (i.e. indices can include economic competitiveness and sustainable development, but not social cohesion) (ESPON 3.2, 2005: 524-525; Husar, 2006: 50). Three things are important to note here for territorial cohesion extensions: i) the lack of social entities; ii) the quantification of facts, and iii) whether this only holds inside ESPON. To start with the latter, André & Moreira (2002) pose that the indicators often used to measure territorial cohesion do not only show a bias on market-economic views of development but are not the most adequate to concretise the conceptual framework of community policies in this field either (i.e. through a social and geographical distribution, which are the same economic indicators used for competitiveness). Whether their point is totally adequate or not, that lack of social entities thus seems to be a general characteristic. This also comes forward when the OECD (2001a; Zonneveld & Waterhout, in Fahudi, 2005a: 21) holds that territorial capital involves intangible factors not subject to quantification. That is to say, even if ESPON will not quantify all territorial cohesion facts, economic entities that are either statistic or intangible could dominate the extensions in general.

A further question then becomes whether these extensions classify territorial cohesion entities in a distributive or dispositional manner. Examples of such entities are economic activity, population, urban sprawl, GDP, unemployment, and services. An argument of Hamez (in Campbell, 2005) can then clarify the choice between distributive and dispositional extensions of them. For each his argument hereby runs as follows: if territorial cohesion concerns ‘relationships between for example a powerful metropolitan region and its hinterland’ instead of simply disparities between regions (e.g. economic relations or disparities), it must not merely be viewed ‘on maps of discontinuities between contiguous regions’ but in a wider geographical context (Hamez, in Campbell, 2005: 401). However, the alternative he puts forward is accounting for accessibility (ESPON 3.2, 2005; Hamez, in Campbell, 2005: 401). Although accessibility implies dispositions, as an entity it arguably is distributive (i.e. there is more or less of it). The choice for dispositional instead of distributive territorial cohesion extensions might come forward more clearly in André & Moreira (2002). They namely plea that territorial cohesion should include every geographical scale in a network perspective (André & Moreira, 2002). Nonetheless, what might thus typify most territorial cohesion extensions which trade-off with the concept’s intensions for descriptive knowledge, is that they quantitatively and economically classify distributive entities.

Hence, within the descriptive kind of meaning none of the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims relates the broad idea and facts on its own (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). Yet, they do systemise trade-offs: the hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intensions (partly) oust each other for – not solely, but – predominantly quantitative instead of qualitative, economic instead of social, and distributive instead of dispositional extensions. What then characterises these intensions is that they complexly collect properties and could lead to instable and/or fractional knowledge. Moreover, what justifies the question whether there actually exists descriptive territorial cohesion knowledge, is that these extensions themselves do not seem to classify territorial cohesion facts as entities of the current state of affairs.

10.2.3 Normative knowledge: Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intensions systematise territorial cohesion idealisations with two misunderstandings

In normative territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly revolve around the idealisation of different values or norms pleaded for as shared in and by the European Union. From what is already expressed about it three intensions come forward: a Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intension. Extensions seem to be absent though – which of course implies: no intension-extension trade-off. While the factual status of ideals could already be called problematic (e.g. thought of entities, hard to measure), this would mean that normative territorial cohesion knowledge does not even exists problematically at the moment. Still, as it might come into existence, the way in which the intension-side could systematise such trade-offs is treated below. What this shows, is that the normative territorial cohesion intensions do not oust each other as the descriptive ones do, but more overlap; something what could be expected with the concept’s Sinn: there is just one state of affairs, but ideals can co-exist (e.g. agonistically). In their overlap the three territorial
cohesion intensions further narrow down the already low variety in the concept's normative Bedeutung. On top of that, they seem to do so with two misunderstandings. The question namely is how the concept's normative intensions deal with territorial cohesion's place-bound and territorial aspects.

To lay out the overlaps of the three normative territorial cohesion intensions, we can perhaps start best with the Rawlsian intension, because it appears to be the most fundamental one. The American philosopher Rawls is the name dropped in the territorial cohesion taxonomy (see Table 1 in §9.1.2), and the intension implied by it shows an in-filling of his ideals. Faludi&Peyrony (2001) namely fill in Rawls' 'social justice' for territorial cohesion as communities living in territories engaging in collective projects of creating shared wealth. Such an application of Rawls' social justice might thus for instance entail that individuals with basic liberties live in a community while agreeing on the objective of wealth creation towards Pareto efficiency\(^4\) (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). One could ask the question of how someone could disagree with such an intension.

Although it appears as basic as common sense, the problem of applying a philosopher's ideal in whatever way is that others beg to differ. Even when you ignore the ideals of "vanished" societies, contemporary Libertarians, Marxians, Communitarians, and Feminists will for example still have critical remarks on Rawls concerning what should be a 'community' or 'collective project' (e.g. Kymlica, 1990). A Rawlsian normative territorial cohesion intension alone might therefore be just as non-neutral, too narrow and presupposing social atomism (e.g. of individuals and/or communities) – Young (1990) argues that Rawls' principles of 'justice as fairness' are. However, if all western nation-states, or at least all liberal welfare ones, are based on Rawls' principles, this normative intension might not be too narrow, but too broad for useful discriminations between idealisable 'social models' (e.g. American and Swedish ones) – models which are in themselves already 'ideal types' capturing 'the underlying similarities and differences of complex social phenomena' (Martin&Ross, 2004; Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007).\(^5\) If the Rawlsian intension of territorial cohesion is not to be understood as a "hollow phrase" (e.g. how should a 'community' be), it might thus not so much be a neutral basis but follow a certain time- and place-bound consensus for its properties. It is here that a misunderstanding of this intension comes forward. Insofar a non-time- and non-place-bound subject bases the normative underpinning of Rawls' social justice, it for this intension results in instability to the degree that territorial cohesion is time- and place-bound in essence. In itself a Rawlsian territorial cohesion intension thus does not only seem to be one-sided, but not well thought through either.

The equal opportunities and quality of place intensions overlap with the Rawlsian one and each other. Both go further in place-boundedness though. To start with the former: André&Moreira (2002) understand territorial cohesion as equal opportunities in the sense of the reinforcement of co-operation and spatial links of solidarity – as opposed to competition – in proximity – as opposed to long-distance – relations and network's integration; which as rather socialistic ideal both goes against and resonates some normative territorial cohesion Bedeutung (e.g. of individuals and/or communities) – models which are in themselves already 'ideal types' capturing 'the underlying similarities and differences of complex social phenomena' (Martin&Ross, 2004; Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007).\(^5\) If the Rawlsian intension of territorial cohesion is not to be understood as a "hollow phrase" (e.g. how should a 'community' be), it might thus not so much be a neutral basis but follow a certain time- and place-bound consensus for its properties. It is here that a misunderstanding of this intension comes forward. Insofar a non-time- and non-place-bound subject bases the normative underpinning of Rawls' social justice, it for this intension results in instability to the degree that territorial cohesion is time- and place-bound in essence. In itself a Rawlsian territorial cohesion intension thus does not only seem to be one-sided, but not well thought through either.

The equal opportunities and quality of place intensions overlap with the Rawlsian one and each other. Both go further in place-boundedness though. To start with the former: André&Moreira (2002) understand territorial cohesion as equal opportunities in the sense of the reinforcement of co-operation and spatial links of solidarity – as opposed to competition – in proximity – as opposed to long-distance – relations and network's integration; which as rather socialistic ideal both goes against and resonates some normative territorial cohesion Bedeutung (e.g. of individuals and/or communities) – models which are in themselves already 'ideal types' capturing 'the underlying similarities and differences of complex social phenomena' (Martin&Ross, 2004; Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007).\(^5\) If the Rawlsian intension of territorial cohesion is not to be understood as a "hollow phrase" (e.g. how should a 'community' be), it might thus not so much be a neutral basis but follow a certain time- and place-bound consensus for its properties. It is here that a misunderstanding of this intension comes forward. Insofar a non-time- and non-place-bound subject bases the normative underpinning of Rawls' social justice, it for this intension results in instability to the degree that territorial cohesion is time- and place-bound in essence. In itself a Rawlsian territorial cohesion intension thus does not only seem to be one-sided, but not well thought through either.

\(^4\) In the simplistic abstract, Rawls' (1999) theory of justice as fairness hinges on the thought experiment of the 'original position.' when we would decide on how society should look like from behind a veil of ignorance (i.e. not knowing our position in it), then each of us would agree on two principles. That is, each of us should have the same equal basic liberties (e.g. voting) and the first principle overtrumps the second principle that social and economic inequalities are allowed if they are the outcome of a fair equality of opportunity and to the benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. As such this society can hope for an 'overlapping consensus' to develop whereby citizens support the same basic laws for different reasons. Crudely put, Rawls is an American liberal.

\(^5\) Simply put, an allocation of society is called Pareto efficient/optional when making it better for one would make it worse for someone else – here receiving the greatest equality (second principle) compatible with individual freedom (first principle).
in the European Union (again, see Table 1 in §9.1.2). Building upon that, Davoudi (2005: 436) suggests that the quality of a place ‘can influence [people’s] access to economic and social opportunities and their quality of life’. That is to say, ‘spatial links’ and ‘proximity’ are less place-bound properties than when you have the ‘quality of places’ as focus for a territorial cohesion intension. Even though Davoudi (2005) does not clarify how this quality of place is authentic to territorial cohesion, especially this intension is the most place-bound possibility for extensions to trade-off with. Leaving us wonder how such trade-offs would produce place-bound ideals.

As said above, the three intensions overlap. You can for instance think of collective projects of shared wealth (i.e. Rawlsian) as proximate solidarities (i.e. equal opportunities) influencing the economic opportunities of an area (i.e. quality of place). One could call this overlap a ‘social and/or liberal humanism’. Besides these intensions, there appear no normative territorial cohesion extensions yet though. Still, it already became clear that when you want to spatially ground ideals with such extensions for authentic normative territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. instead of territorially applying social ideals) you might try to square a circle. Thus even if these intensions would systemise territorial cohesion idealisations, they show that this goes with a misunderstanding of territorial cohesion’s place-boundedness.

The other misunderstanding is more striking though: none of the three intensions touches upon the territorial aspect of territorial cohesion. One could therefore already ask how an extension’s entities can stabilise the tension, connoted above by the intensions’ properties, that is, between the territorial nature of territorial cohesion and the universal nature asserted by most humanistic ideals (i.e. for all ‘humans’ on this planet). This goes deeper than the problematic outlined by the normative kinds of territorial cohesion meanings (i.e. a totalising tendency, harmonic or agonistic ideals, a total of or specific territories, multiple territorial levels; see §9.3.3). These normative extensions should namely not only draw the wished for order within the territorial confines – in itself already a challenge for the European Union if it wants to go beyond mimicking national ideals on the Community level –, but also the ideal geopolitical borders. That is, they should have an ideal territory as basis instead of the conquest that actually established territories through the history of the making of Europe (e.g. Bartlett, 1994). To put it simply with the normative territorial cohesion Bedeutung of a ‘will to be together in and ordered way’; the entities classified by normative territorial cohesion extensions should both clarify whom it are that want to be together – and thus whom ideally to exclude – and in what territory they want this – and thus demarcate “their turf”. We are thus not only left to wonder how the trade-off between normative territorial cohesion intensions and extensions would produce place-bound ideals, but territorial ones as well.

Hence, within the normative kind of meaning the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims do not relate the broad idea and facts on their own either (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). The three overlapping intensions (i.e. Rawlsian, equal opportunities, quality of place) merely systemise a trade-off with yet absent extensions in a one-sided and misunderstood way. Also here one could thus, as for the concept’s descriptive knowledge above, question whether there actually exists normative territorial cohesion knowledge. The instability rising from the intensions’ applications of social/liberal universalistic ideals reinforce this, as in their collections of properties they concentrate neither on place- nor territory-boundedness nor how the ideal is authentic to territorial cohesion.

10.2.4 Policy objective knowledge: filtering economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism through a policy hyper-cube intension into territorial cohesion objectives

In the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy objective knowledge the intension-extension trade-off mostly revolves around putting forward feasible changes in the concrete reality of territories. This with one intension: the policy hyper-cube intension, and three extensions: the economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism extension. That (public) policy objectives are irreleit statements has two consequences thereby: i) when a target becomes (written) policy it already starts to be a fact and as such ii) – not so much knowledge, but – power practices are concerned with them (as Part II shows). Due to the former, the concept’s definitions forming its Bedeutung (see Table 1 in §9.1.2) are also the possible policy entities of territorial
cohesion extensions, or even the extensions themselves. Either way, these extensions consist of filtered territorial cohesion descriptions (and regularly ideals too), as all policy entities went through a filter to be useful for policy. Such a link to a role in power practices might for instance entail the consideration of territorial cohesion from ‘a sufficiently broad standpoint as to take into account links with other aspects/objectives’ (BBR, 2003b). But instead of focussing on the desires coming from power practices, the question here is what this filtering means for the concept’s policy objective knowledge that is expressed (by others).

On the knowledge side, an understanding of policy as, for instance, rational, ‘muddling through’ incrementalism, or ‘mixed-scanning’ (e.g. Lindblom, 1992; Faludi, 1973; Anderson, 2000) shapes the selection process which is implied by the filtering of knowledge for policy (e.g. with short-term goals, detailed blueprints, as politique). As policy objective intensions do this filtering, they vary in two ways: in i) the territorial cohesion descriptions (and values/norms) they filter and ii) the filter they use. These intensions would then not so much oust each other for extensions as the descriptive ones do, but more radiate from the broad policy objective idea outwards, mostly pointing to different territorial cohesion referents as extensions. A problem hereby is, that many properties are said to lead to or condition territorial cohesion (i.e. as such a targeted concrete reality) without that it is made explicit to what they then lead. Hence, such implicit territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. tacit intensions) cannot be dealt with below. The four ways in which the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy objective knowledge could vary will though, that is: in i) extension (e.g. which Bedeutung), ii) what the intensions filter and with iii) what filter, and iv) how these two sides trade-off.

Yet, as mentioned above, there only appears one policy objective intension in what is already expressed and it sounds familiar: a hyper-cube (see §10.2.2). This one might be said to follow a more economic thinking though (Officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006). It thereby filters both the descriptive hyper-cube and components of territorial cohesion intensions by changing the space-society-division of the former with the more economic ‘triangle of sustainability’ of the latter, which puts the economic on par with the societal and the environmental. In ESPON De Boe&Hanquet (in BBR, 2005a: 53-55) present this intension with the following figure.

According to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 394; Husar, 2006: 47), here the hyper-cube approach summarises and visualises the various components of territorial policy with, amongst others, the introduction of different dimensions of policies. This could help to get a grip on the vagueness of the territorial cohesion concept by providing a ‘systematic framework through which possible conflicts in goals and strategies as well as areas of complementarity can be identified’ (Schön, in Campbell, 2005: 395; Husar, 2006: 47). Although this hyper-
cube stays elusively blank about the targeted changes, one could think of some examples to clarify it. The creation of jobs in a region could for instance be identified as a strategy where social and economic policies are complementary on the micro scale (i.e. the two compartments on the left above and three deep in the hypercube). An example of conflicting policy goals could be the preservation of the European ecological network and a country’s economic policy for competitiveness (i.e. one compartment in the middle and two deep in the hypercube and the other one on the bottom right one deep). Although, as mentioned for descriptive knowledge, a descriptive Bedeutung implies this hyper-cube intension (see Table 1 in §9.1.2), filtered thus it therefore becomes a policy objective intension.

Also due to the blankness of this policy hyper-cube, the question suggested for descriptive knowledge returns the more full-force here: how for policy to blend the economy-society-environment part of this system with the society-space one of the descriptive hyper-cube? In ESPON De Boe&Hamquet (2004, in BBR, 2005c: 115) deal with this trough the figure below, which notes the two different standpoints for territory.

![Two standpoints over the “Thematic layers” of territory](image)

ESPON then holds the same for the representation of the dimensions of territorial cohesion as those of territory (i.e. through a hypercube where all components are identifiable and interlinked) (BBR, 2005c: 122). Insofar this policy objective intension fits the picture of radiating ones towards targeted concrete realities, its properties thus more display a hyper-cube system in which radiation is possible than a directive arrow. But how this merging of the two hyper-cubical standpoints actually works for territorial cohesion as policy objective, no one seems to know. The intension-side of this policy objective knowledge therefore filters territorial cohesion descriptions (and values/norms) more economically, but neither points towards extensions nor explicitly shows what understanding of policy shapes this filter.

When the concept’s policy objective intension does not radiate towards a targeted concrete reality, giving direction becomes the top-priority for the extensions. An issue which comes up regularly in the concept’s policy objective Bedeutung can illustrate this: development (e.g. regional or sustainable development). Besides that it leaves the issue of maintenance to the side, in a concrete reality of territories one encounters two problems. This is the tension between the inertness of territorial features (e.g. assets, handicaps) and the wish to progress to begin with, the more so if it concerns balanced development of different unique territories.6 The other problem

---

6 Although ESPON sees the hyper-cube’s three components of territory as useful here, in that the potential/actual interactions with other areas also counts for the potential of one area (BBR, 2005c: 121-122), their circularity (see section 2.2.2) does not solve things for the policy objective intension either.
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

is simply whether development can even be a policy objective in itself, as it always is the question of development
where to. For territorial cohesion you may for instance ask in what direction to unleash development forces
(e.g. as implied by the Bedeutung of improving endogenous territorial potentials; see Table 1 in §9.1.2). Albeit
that many policy objectives are put up as territorial cohesion definitions, what might then focus the concept’s
policy objective knowledge, is that only three come forward explicitly as extensions: economic cohesion, social
cohesion, and polycentrism.

While various territorial cohesion referents imply the former two (e.g. as territorial dimension of cohesion),
as extensions they hinge on their relation. That is to say, on the question of whether the entities of economic
and social exclude or juxtapose each other or can be combined. On the one side territorial and social cohesion,
on a par or the latter as facet of the former, are thereby put against economic cohesion (Faludi, 2003a; 2004a: 8;
Husson, 2004a; BBR, 2005c: 131; Husar, 2006: 14). This with, respectively, the inseparability from the adhesion
of citizens to a political body against the “level playing field” of a cohesive economic space due to similar rules
or a comparable market demand over a territory (Faludi, 2003a; 2004a: 8; Husson, 2004; Husar, 2006: 14). On
the other side it is territorial cohesion that combines both. This as a regional aggregate and context of social
cohesion, as against poverty and unemployment of individuals, and economic cohesion, as intermediate level
of enterprises, unions, and tax systems (BBR, 2005a: 56-57). Hence, the entities of the economic cohesion and
social cohesion extensions point to more than two policy objective directions. Perhaps the third policy objective
extension is different in this.

Compared to economic and social cohesion, less territorial cohesion referents imply the policy objective
extension of polycentrism (e.g. balanced development in polycentric terms). In ESPON it is hereby viewed
as concrete operationalisation of ‘territorial cohesion’ when it goes against growing territorial disparities
(BBR, 2003a). However, they also open up a chink between polycentrism as territorial cohesion extension and
polycentric development itself. Instead of being the same, the latter would namely neither be a guarantee for the
former, nor vice versa (BBR, 2003a). As a consequence, one can for instance squeeze entities in the polycentrism
extension when they have to do with the infrastructural networks polycentric development implies. Then you
can deal with rail policy (e.g. with little effect on territorial cohesion) or road investments (e.g. as pro-cohesion)
and the problem of scale in dealing with such territorial cohesion issues (e.g. without good local networks the
advantages of TENs as supranational east-west corridors do not penetrate into the local economy) (Fleischer,
2004: 9; BBR, 2005a: 59; Zonneveld, in Faludi, 2007). Still, notwithstanding its entities in the draught, the
polycentrism extension does seem to give a direction (e.g. for development). This more in the sense of how to
reach a target in concrete reality (i.e. in a polycentric form) than as a policy objective to target in itself though.

Besides that these policy objective intensions and extensions remain vague, two fundamental features
of them come through clearly: they filter and are hierarchical. They filter, because they even exclude some
territorial cohesion policy objectives. A main example of this is ‘Services of General Economic Interest’ (see
§10.2.6 though). The intensions and extensions are also hierarchical, because the setting of such goals always
entails a hierarchy, placing the one setting the goals (e.g. the sovereign, whomever that may be) above the
one reaching them (e.g. administrators) and those subjected (e.g. citizens). As a consequence, the knowledge
involved adopts the perspective of the head of the “administrative corpus” governing the “sovereign’s subjects”.
That is to say, this trade-off between policy objective intensions and extensions always filters descriptive (and
normative) knowledge in order to define territorial cohesion knowledge for subjection. Thus even if those
services would not have been filtered out, they would not have been spoken of in less hierarchical ways, such as
in marginal Marxian understandings.4 The question is however, whether this implicit filter and hierarchy of the
expressed policy objective intensions and extensions is formed into territorial cohesion knowledge.

---

4 Jessop (2002) for instance says that accumulation strategies also decide between the needs of capital in general and particular capitals through an imagined ‘general economic interest’, a construction which always and necessarily marginalises some capitalist interests. He links this to particular economic trajectories and hegemonies and the relational nature of interests of actors and relative nature of those due to capital and temporal horizons: the imagined general economic interests define both the relational identities and the horizons within which their interests are calculated. This leads to quote-temporal flux, as every conception of general economic interests privileges some identities, interests, and horizons over others and thereby refers to what is needed to address wider problems of social cohesion.

---

135
Chapter 10

As within the descriptive and normative kinds of meaning, the explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims within the policy objective kind do not relate the broad idea and facts on their own either (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). However, insofar policy facts can constitute actual knowledge, they do, by contrast, set the stage for such a trade-off and the territorial cohesion knowledge in which it could result (but see Part II for the policy objective itself). Although no explicit understanding of policy shapes it, the knowledge claims namely do seem to filter out certain policy objectives put up as territorial cohesion definitions (e.g. services of general economic interest) and imply a hierarchy. Moreover, notwithstanding that the policy objective hyper-cube remains rather blank, is more economic, and does not radiate towards a targeted concrete reality, it opens up a possibility. This sole policy objective intension could with its properties (e.g. the triangle of sustainability) namely systemise the three extensions put up from the territorial cohesion Bedeutung. The polycentrism extension can then concretise the (network) form of how to reach social cohesion and economic cohesion while targeting through their mutually exclusive, juxtaposing, or combinatorial intensions. Then again, without an intension-extension trade-off, such territorial cohesion knowledge does not exist yet.

10.2.5 Instrumental and policy coherence knowledge: a totalising tendency in a servile substantive plane and grand technical bundling

In instrumental territorial cohesion knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly involve the different ways of fitting the concept in the realisation of more important government objectives (e.g. a substantive plane for European integration). Although this knowledge differs from the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy coherence knowledge, this section can treat both. In the latter the intension-extension trade-off would thereby mostly involve the different ways in which government can grab the interrelations between policies and/or policy effects in a territory in order for their coordination to increase its effectiveness and efficiency (i.e. a technical bundling). Even though the former is more substantive and the latter more technical, these two knowledges can be treated together here due to two reasons: they can overlap and for both no territorial cohesion knowledge claims seem to be expressed (by others). Due to the second reason, also these knowledges lack the intension-extension trade-offs that, by relating the broad ideas and facts, form the concept’s knowledge; there appear no instrumental nor policy coherence intensions and extensions. And also here this begs the question whether there actually exists something like instrumental or policy coherence territorial cohesion knowledge. Still, similar to the systematisation of the intension-side of the concept’s normative knowledge, we could nonetheless do something from what is already expressed. That is, we can ask what characterises both trade-off-sides for when the instrumental and policy coherence knowledges and their interrelations might come into existence.

Following the concept’s instrumental Sinn, it can be stated that territorial cohesion helps to bring about something else – as is done in the definitions which show a choice between pointed selectivity (e.g. balanced development) or planed harmony (e.g. regional integration) (see §9.3.5). However, knowledge in accordance with such definitions should arguably show how or why this is the case. This with intensions whose properties tell us what of territorial cohesion it is that is instrumental and how this works feasibly in the realisation of an objective. Here the smallest variety in meaning, shown by the instrumental territorial cohesion Bedeutung (see Table 1 of the territorial cohesion taxonomy in §9.1.2), is narrowed down the furthest though. ESPON namely hints at the sole instrumental intension, but thereby confines us more. This because it does not show how territorial cohesion’s instrumentality works. Instead, to fulfil ESPON’s obligation of fitting the concept in its context, territorial cohesion seems to depend on different foc to take its territorial dimension into account (i.e. Cohesion Policy, the ESDP, Lisbon Strategy, Gothenburg European Council, and European Conference of Ministers responsible for Regional Planning (CEMAT)) (BBR, 2003a).¹ This would mean that the only

¹ These references show, respectively, a focus on “balanced and sustainable development of the territory of the EU” and its concern to “aim at a spatial balance designed to provide a more even geographical distribution of growth across the territory of the EU”, the aim of making the Union in 2010 “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”, which has implications in matters of territorial developments; a strategy for sustainable development which completes the Union’s political commitment to economic and social renewal, adds a third, environmental dimension to the Lisbon strategy.
instrumental intension expressed points away from territorial cohesion to borrow properties elsewhere. Furthermore, no facts in policy or concrete state of affairs are explicitly put forward as entities of an instrumental extension of the concept. The instrumental territorial cohesion meanings have therefore no epistemic support. Hence, it seems that the only thing one can say about the concept's instrumental knowledge at this point, is that to come into existence it should describe and/or explain territorial cohesion's instrumentality and give data hereon to show this.

As mentioned above and shown in the territorial cohesion taxonomy, the concept's meanings also bring territorial cohesion forward as policy coherence (e.g. as a bundle of European sector policies) (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). It seems, however, that no claims of territorial cohesion knowledge back up these semantic propositions. This even notwithstanding that much know-how about this coordinative governing technique exists. Following the concept's policy coherence Sinn, you could nonetheless think of ways in which this can be done. Obviously, the entities of policy coherence extensions would be policy facts, or more precise, those parts of policies that actually are coordinated (e.g. interventions). Policy coherence intensions would therefore not only need to show which policies can be coordinated as territorial cohesion. Their properties should also give us an insight into what possibly allows these (parts of) policies to be coordinated thus. The formation of policy coherence territorial cohesion knowledge could thereby begin with the questions pointed at by those which negatively outline the policy coherence kind of meaning (see §9.3.6). Following the concept's policy coherence Bedeutung, one could for instance pose that the territorial leads to policy coherence because policies then have the same territorial entity as base for policy-making, their effects take place in the same realm, or by giving a fixed stage on which to relate them. However, such possibilities for territorial cohesion to coordinate policies merely provide conditions instead of actually being this territorial coordination in itself or effectuating it. You could then even argue that just as every other unified coordination, territorial coordination needs a single valuable cause to guide it, even if it has the territory as base for this. What seems to hold for the concept's instrumental territorial cohesion knowledge therefore seems to hold here as well for the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of policy coherence knowledge to come into existence, it should in any case describe and/or explain how territorial cohesion can coordinate policies and give actual examples of this. The concept's instrumental and policy coherence knowledges are not only treated together here due to their absence though.

Something else that bonds these knowledges is that when they would come into existence they can overlap. Their formation can do this if both concern themselves with policy and/or are planed – e.g. with fit in foci of Cohesion policy, ESDP, CEMAT, Lisbon, and Gothenburg as instrumental Bedeutung and horizontal coherence of policies with territorial impacts as policy coherence Bedeutung (see Table 1 and 2 in §9.1.2). The simplest example of this is when territorial cohesion is instrumental for various policy objectives, and thus in policy substance horizontally planed. By doing so it cuts through various policies, and if territorial cohesion simultaneously bundles them, it could coordinate different policies horizontally. Moreover, you could even call this a – not substantive, but – technical instrumentality that lies in that territorial cohesion provides policy coherence to reach one or more objectives. Another example of how these knowledges can overlap is more complex. That is to say, what happens if territorial cohesion is in policy substance instrumental for a goal on a lower governmental level? This would namely imply a densification of instrumental relationships between the levels: tasks which are formally divided over governmental levels then merge through policy substance, but by constantly reaffirming the hierarchy between levels this institutional form is simultaneously strengthened. The densification of territorial cohesion's instrumentality might then form the coordination between similar policies on different levels as a vertical plane, that is, vertical policy coherence; which is a territorial cohesion definition in itself (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). The most complex situation is of course seeing territorial cohesion as a combination of both these horizontal and vertical examples. Then one should have an interdisciplinary approach which does not only substantively and technically bind together various policies but government levels as well; this also is and established a new approach to policy making”, and guiding principles also “promoting territorial cohesion through a more balanced social and economic development of regions and improved competitiveness.”
a territorial cohesion definition in itself when it concerns policies with territorial impacts. What would make such a coordination even more complex, is if ESPON is right in saying that the higher we ascend the ladder of geographical levels, the clearer the focus on economic aspects and competitiveness becomes – which may be explained by the per level increasing substantive complexity (Nordregio, 2003). If this is the case, one should coordinate policies with different foci. Hence, whether horizontal, vertical, or both, the overlaps of instrumental and policy coherence knowledges increase their epistemic complexities, and therefore also the need to explain them thoroughly apart and/or together.

No matter that neither instrumental nor policy coherence territorial cohesion knowledge seems to exist at the moment and that their possible overlaps need thorough explanations of the consequential complexities, a common characteristic can already be glanced upon. Because this common characteristic would then be common for a substantive and technical kind of territorial cohesion knowledge, it might well be common for the concept's knowledge in general. Hitherto the more substantive knowledges (i.e. descriptive, normative, policy objective) always seem to have an inclination towards some grandeur; albeit in undertakings to descriptively grasp a whole territorial world, wishes for an ideal that implies some totalisation, or assignments to territorially change all kinds of public affairs. If territorial cohesion is not described, idealised, and/or aimed for in itself but merely instrumental, the grandeur would be far less of course. Still, the instrumental knowledge might with territorial cohesion imply the same whole, totalising, and/or intruding epistemisation, but then in a servile manner. This through pointed selectivity and/or planed harmony. That is, by instrumentalising a territorial total of policy or state of affairs for a single objective (e.g. using everything a region controls for competitiveness) and/or by totalising the instrumentality of the territorial for various objectives (e.g. extending what a region controls for solidarity, sustainability, et cetera). The same totalising tendency of every substantive territorial cohesion knowledge could return in the concept's policy coherence knowledge. When the coordination of policies should lead to their effective implementation, it namely assumes the grasping of all of them. This holds even more if this effectiveness should be efficient too: the tighter the grasp, the more efficient their implementation. The question of how to govern effectively and efficiently through coordination might therefore be reformulated as how to govern totalisingly. If this totalising feature truly characterises the concept's substantive and policy coherence knowledges, we could already suggest that it is common for all territorial cohesion knowledge.

However, we cannot call this totalising tendency a feature of territorial cohesion knowledge (yet), because such a characterisation is based on mere speculation. Only a hint at an explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claim appears within the instrumental and policy coherence kinds of meaning, this in the form of a sole instrumental intension, and that even without authentic territorial cohesion properties. For now we can thus merely put forward that if instrumental or policy coherence intensions and extensions will relate their broad ideas and facts on their own by trading off, the knowledges they form should describe and/or explain territorial cohesion's instrumentality or how it can coordinate policies respectively and give the classes of entities for both. What could thereby help to differentiate instrumental and policy coherence knowledge, is showing how the substantive plane of the servile former and the technical bundling of the grand latter overlap in the case of territorial cohesion.

10.2.6 Spatial planning knowledge: from the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space to a transposition of a system of knowledge

In the part of territorial cohesion knowledge that consists of spatial planning knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly involve the various ways in which government can shape (thinking) space with a concrete and more or less holistic substance and rationality. However, also here such intensions, extensions, and their trade-off seem to be absent. This for two reasons: insofar it concerns territorial cohesion, spatial planning appears to be more entangled in power practices and to form something else than knowledge or know-how. To begin with the former reason, much might be “known” about the possibilities for territorial cohesion as a form of spatial planning and such claims simultaneously play a role in power practices as posed positions (see Part II). For the concept's knowledge they point to lacking spatial planning entities though. That is to say, policy
objectives are *irrealis* statements, but that they are pro/posed makes them policy facts. The possibilities for territorial cohesion as spatial planning coming forward in the territorial cohesion taxonomy on the other hand do not become factual by being pro/posed as *Bedeutung*. Instead, for its extensions such knowledge needs actual practices in which territorial cohesion functions as the government technique of spatial planning (e.g. facts of power practices). Otherwise these territorial cohesion extensions would have merely spatial planning policy entities or none. It is at this point that the former reason for an absent trade-off, which has much to do with extensions (i.e. entanglement in power practices), leads to the latter one, which has more to do with intensions (i.e. neither knowledge nor know-how).

The extensions of the spatial planning part of territorial cohesion knowledge namely presuppose that we know what the Sinn of ‘spatial planning’ entails (as hinted at in §9.2.3). However, according to Schon (in Campbell, 2005: 393n5), there is no uniform use of the terms ‘spatial’ and ‘planning’ in the European Union and there are also different ‘philosophies of strategic planning’. Especially the latter is of importance for territorial cohesion knowledge, because it suggests that there is no shared way of thinking for spatial planning. This makes it the more striking that there seldom appear thoughts about what kind of spatial planning territorial cohesion is. That is to say, although one can deduce certain properties from the territorial cohesion definitions in the spatial planning kind of meaning (see Table 2 in §9.1.2), without thoughts about a combination of these properties there is no intension. For instance, albeit that territorial cohesion is put forward to mean the French or German planning tradition (i.e. aménagement du territoire, Raumordnung), questions such as how such a tradition then functions as territorial cohesion on the European level or how to combine these traditions in an intension of the concept remain unanswered. When you thus add the lack of intensions to the lack of extensions, you again end up without a stratification of relationships between ideas and facts, that is, without knowledge – or at least without a reason for it to be territorial cohesion knowledge. Spatial planning might nonetheless provide something else to territorial cohesion knowledge than such stratification though: a system.

Although one could argue both for and against whether spatial planning has endogenous/indigenous theory (Sorensen, 1982; Allmendinger, 2002: 78, 92), it at least assembles theories from elsewhere in a particular way. It can thus be understood as an own discipline (e.g. Flyvbjerg&Richardson, in Allmendinger&Tewdwr-Jones, 2002) with an accompanying system of knowledge; arguably, this is the case with every definition of ‘spatial planning’ one can think of.\(^1\) And when spatial planning knowledge (e.g. selected ideas, examples of practices, data) is transposed into the concept of territorial cohesion, spatial planning knowledge is transformed into territorial cohesion knowledge. This would more represent a mimicking of the system of spatial planning knowledge from the viewpoint of territorial cohesion than territorial cohesion’s stratification of the relationships between spatial planning ideas and facts; especially so if the relevant knowledge claims open up and structure possibilities for territorial cohesion knowledge instead of actually delivering it (i.e. no extensions to back up propositions). To characterise this possible system, one can deduce features from the ways in which previously discussed substantive and technical territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. descriptive, policy objective) return with a spatial planning “twist”.

To start with a descriptive territorial cohesion intension which returns to let spatial planning deal with territorial cohesion: Vogelij (in Janssen-Jansen&Watthour, 2006) claims that spatial planning should use the layer approach (see §10.2.2) for the concept. The essence of filling-in territorial cohesion for spatial planning with this rather spatial intension is that it is always about the ensemble of spatial physical elements and their surrounding, about what is called ‘spatial connectivity’, both concerning internal and external relations, while emphasising temporal connectivity (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006). Such a filling-in can with spatial visions be related to ideals, policy coherence, and policy objectives. *Leitlinien* or *Leitbilder* as informal instruments that (non-)verbally describe a desirable future of a region (i.e. guiding principles)

---

\(^1\) As returned in the beginning of this section, section 9.2.3 distinguished ‘spatial planning’ in a very broad way: the government techniques that are simultaneously concrete and more or less holistic and for this shapes (thinking) space with an own substance and internality. Again, we are here not concerned with the question ‘What is spatial planning?’ To look for the concept’s spatial planning knowledge one can remain vague and not define ‘spatial planning’ precisely, moreover, one needs to, because it is about the ‘spatial planning’ that comes forward as territorial cohesion knowledge compared to, for instance ‘policy coherence’ or ‘descriptions’ (i.e. a grouping from which a definition might emerge).
might namely be (part of) the German origin of territorial cohesion (Knieling, 2000; Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). Such ideals have to do with policy coherence when spatial planning is articulated by territorial cohesion as the packaging of ‘measures by different sectors and/or on different levels in such a way that they make sense in the spatial context’ (Faludi, 2003b: 135). And spatial visions do not only make sense in the spatial context, but can be put forward as a policy objective as well. Moreover, according to Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2007), ‘[i]n order to form images of territorial cohesion, in particular as regards services of general interest, it makes sense to identify certain categories of spatial planning concepts according to their content’. Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2007) then distinguishes planning concepts in accordance to scale: spatial arrangements and layout at lower scales (i.e. the exact location and nature of activities) and territorial structure at higher scales. The latter can be displayed in three ways: i) the form of spaces and areas as zonal structure (i.e. planes), ii) functions and activities concentrated at certain locations as nodal structure (i.e. dots), and iii) networks as communicative structure (i.e. lines) (Zonneveld, in Faludi, 2007). Although the distinction between lower and higher scales for planning concepts seems to overlap with the distinction between traditional land-use planning and strategic spatial planning respectively, the similarities between spatial arrangements and territorial structures are more important. That is to say, together all these claims – e.g. of the layer approach, spatial visions, planning concepts – namely tie descriptive, normative, policy objective, and policy coherence knowledge together in a way familiar to spatial planning. When all these claims lead towards a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge to territorial cohesion, however, the question remains what is particularly “territorial cohesion-like” about them (e.g. when compared to spatial planning). Hence, something that holds for the (lacking) spatial planning knowledge part of territorial cohesion knowledge, holds for this system of knowledge as well: no reason appears for why it is territorial cohesion's system of knowledge.

Insofar future territorial cohesion policies use the language of European spatial planning the concept could of course have a similar epistemological field as spatial planning too. However, this would bring us beyond knowledge (e.g. in the form of facts about what happens in power practices) and straight into the mutual relationships between the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated power practices (treated in Part III). For now though, it is enough to understand that an episteme implies a way that structures knowledge into a system. To transpose spatial planning’s system into territorial cohesion it would be extra difficult if such a shared way of thinking is even missing for spatial planning. Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) nevertheless opens up room for this, as she claims that territorial cohesion has re-conceptualised spatial planning by emphasising a new rationality for organising European space that adds a spatial justice dimension. This would turn things upside-down for us, as we look at how territorial cohesion could mimic a system of spatial planning knowledge instead of an influence vice versa. Moreover, it is neither clear what territorial cohesion's rationality entails (see §10.2.7), nor is a transposition of every knowledge distinguished for the concept from a system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion explicitly claimed. The point is that the latter could have happened. That is to say, the new rationally Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) speaks of could also structure the system of territorial cohesion knowledge, but then originating from spatial planning instead of the other way around.

Also within the spatial planning kind of meaning, therefore, no explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims relate the broad idea and facts (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). Yet, although neither a territorial cohesion intension is put forward that combines spatial planning properties nor extensions are that gather hereto related territorial cohesion entities, the door is opened for more than just a trade-off between them. The system of spatial planning knowledge could namely be transposed, or even be transformed, into the one of territorial cohesion (e.g. with the layer approach and spatial visions). Territorial cohesion knowledge claims with a spatial planning in-filling namely come up for most of the concept’s kinds of meaning. However, also this mimicking remains far from stratified, as both European spatial planning and territorial cohesion seem to lack a rationality which structures their knowledge into a system.
10.2.7 Territorial governmentality knowledge: intensional fragments to link detailed spatial knowledge, territorial governing, and meta-knowledge

The final part of territorial cohesion knowledge treated here is the part that consists of territorial governmentality knowledge. In this knowledge the intension-extension trade-off would mostly form the ways in which territorial governance and knowledge about it are linked through a rationality that emphasises existing and/or desired territorial diversity and contextuality. That is to say, some territorial cohesion knowledge can represent the relationships between ideas about the links between territorial cohesion knowledge and governance on the one hand and the facts on these links on the other hand. One could for instance have thoughts about the use of certain territorial cohesion descriptions (e.g. maps) in governing a territory. As such descriptions form knowledge, knowing how to use this descriptive knowledge is knowledge about knowledge. The concept's territorial governmentality knowledge would thus be reflexive, a meta-knowledge per definition. All this implies that the territorial cohesion intensions of territorial governmentality knowledge combine properties concerned with knowledge and governance and that its extension's entities are combinable (e.g. with a knowledge entity if an entity only covers governance). Moreover, because epistemological reflexion entails thought, such knowledge consequentially has thoughts as both the more ideational and factual side of the intension-extension trade-off too. We thus go beyond the ways in which one Sinn of the concept's meanings can frame others (i.e. the territorial governmentality kind of meaning; see §9.2.3) and look for the ways in which this territorial governmentality knowledge can frame other territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. of ideals or power practices).¹

However, it should come as no surprise that, without an explicit territorial governmentality Bedeutung (see §9.3.8), there only appear fragments which could be combined into the territorial governmentality knowledge as described above. Although territorial cohesion knowledge claims point towards it, as shown below, no intension exist that harbours such a governmentality, at least not fully. Moreover, not even fragments of sets of all actual territorial governmentality facts appear (i.e. no fragments of extensions). What argues for this territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless, is that those "intensional fragments" (i.e. fragments of sets of all possible territorial governmentality facts) are already expressed and that they seem to frame other territorial cohesion knowledge. First though, those fragments that point towards a rationality that links them and them to territorial governance will be treated to demonstrate that we do have to do with territorial governmentality knowledge of the concept.

One of the concept's territorial governmentality knowledge claims which points towards a rationality that links governance and knowledge while emphasising diversity and contextuality can be seen in Niebuhr&Stiller (2003). They namely state that for territorial cohesion the diverse situation of spatial categories suggests a policy approach with differentiated instruments that meet the requirements of agglomerated, urbanised and rural regions (Niebuhr&Stiller, 2003). Detailed knowledge of such regional situations plays a critical role in governance hereby, as it is according to Niebuhr&Stiller (2003) a necessary precondition for designing adequate policy measures to meet the individual needs of regional economies and spatial interdependencies. This knowledge claim still merely represents a fragment of a territorial governmentality intension, because it does not put forward a rationality that links detailed knowledge and policy measures.

Yet, the territorial governmentality Bedeutung defines territorial cohesion also as a new territorial way of thinking or as combining spatial thinking with governance (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). Here the epistemological question therefore becomes how to link this knowledge and governance. Another knowledge claim brings up thoughts about the relationship between the spatial and territorial for this.² That is, according to Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 391), space is more general and prompts concerns with information, analysis and future oriented strategic thinking, while territory is the most important reference frame for implementing spatial (and territorial) policies.³ It thus

¹ Note though, that the territorial cohesion meta-knowledge should not be confused with this research's demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse (see Part III) or reflections upon it (see possible future research, e.g. as proposed in §18.6). Here we are namely not concerned with tracing the discursive practices that link the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated power practices in the form of a discourse (i.e. a knowledge claim made by this research). Instead, we are concerned with what is already known about the links between such knowledge and practice (i.e. already expressed knowledge claims that are a part of the territorial cohesion discourse).

² There are many more thoughts about the relation between the spatial and territorial of course, but only this claim relates to territorial cohesion when it concerns the concept's territorial governmentality knowledge.
seems to be policy that may tie the aspects of diversity, contextuality, knowledge, and governance together. The concept’s territorial governmentality put forward does not have to be limited hereto though (e.g. strategic thinking, reference frame). What is more important, however, is that even though these territorial cohesion knowledge claims point towards the linkage between knowledge and governance, none links them with a rationality. They are therefore merely fragments of what could have been intensions.

Still, the choice to associate the spatial with knowledge and the territorial with governance – instead of vice versa or both with both – might unveil how such rationality would function. This division namely implicitly returns in territorial governmentality knowledge claims in line with a rationality that links knowledge and governance (i.e. another intensional fragment). ESPON thereby devises a complementary approach for viewing ‘all territorially relevant concepts within a common structure’ to clarify their contents, make their links explicit, and define coherent sets of indicators and typologies (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). This is done by bringing together different types of concepts, the links between them, and a territorial grid into a ‘tentative common framework for spatial concepts’ (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). De Boe&Hanquet’s (in BBR, 2005c: 126) figure on the classification of spatial concepts and links between the categories illustrates this. It namely divides concepts in three groups: i) basic notions (e.g. assessment, cohesion), ii) policy notions (e.g. spatial integration, urban-rural partnership), and iii) operational notions (e.g. low density area, barrier, territorial impact analysis). The basic notions are then said to be build upon by the other two, while the links between the latter need subdivisions: policy notions into policy objectives and means, both are linked through implementation, and operational notions into spatial objectives, aspects and tools, each of which links to policy notions through targeting, involvement, and reliance respectively. Together with a territorial grid various spatial concepts can be place in the framework shown below – e.g. multi-modality could be a spatial aspect involved in the policy objective of spatial integration implemented through the policy means of parity of access, and all this could refer to the basic notion of integration.
What is more, this framework does not only allow the identification of the specific role of a concept, but also to ‘apply a similar framework [to] the contents of each of them’ (BBR, 2005c: 125). As such this complementary approach almost forms the territorial cohesion intension we are looking for. This because three features return that would be characteristic of the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge: a global approach that directs the various standpoints (e.g. ‘social integration’ as a facet of ‘territorial cohesion’) (BBR, 2005c: 125), room to take territorial diversity and contextuality into account, and a conceptual framework that opens up the connections between knowledge and governance. Furthermore, all of this with the familiar policy focus and division between the spatial and territorial due to a reference to spatial knowledge (i.e. spatial objects, aspects, and tools) and an implied territorial governance (e.g. policy means within a territorial grid, only territorial tools under the heading of ‘spatial tools’). What is then the reason why this framework is not the concept’s territorial governmentality intension we are looking for?

We do not find a territorial cohesion intension here that links knowledge and governance with a rationality due to three reasons. A territorial approach is, firstly, at most a framework for a rationality. Certainly, without such a rationality itself the tentative framework may open up the connections between knowledge and governance, but it, secondly, does not link them. More important though, territorial cohesion is hereby seen as just another concept in the territorial approach instead of the approach itself as proposed in the territorial cohesion taxonomy (i.e. an holistic, territorial, and dynamic approach; see Table 2 in §1.1.2). Still, the part of this framework for concepts that holds for territorial cohesion might form a territorial governmentality intension for the concept. The more so when you take into account that the hyper-cube ESPON brings up to formalise the framework for the contents of each of the framework’s spatial concepts (BBR, 2005c: 125) is the same as the territorial cohesion hyper-cube (e.g. see §10.2.2) – and ESPON does claim that it is territorial cohesion that integrates scale and includes the diversity of sectors and topics that could be influential (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). It might thus be save to say that these knowledge claims – which show the need to link detailed knowledge and policy measures, the division between spatial knowledge and territorial governance, a tentative common framework for spatial concepts as territorial approach – point towards a territorial governmentality. They namely show possibilities for a rationality that links knowledge and territorial governance. Yet, because an unfragmented territorial cohesion intension is lacking, this is nothing more than what could have been claimed but was not claimed.

Even though no territorial governmentality intension or extension is explicitly put forward as territorial cohesion knowledge, such knowledge might frame other territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless. However, this is just demonstrated by ways related to territorial cohesion in which descriptive and policy objective knowledge is framed by certain thinking. For the former Peyrony (in Faludi, 2007) connects territorial capital (see §10.2.2) to the European view that territories are ‘the basis for the existence of different political levels and territorially differentiated policies’. In doing so, certain descriptions are framed by the way of thinking that underestimates ‘territories (states, regions, cities) as [a] factors of production (place of identity, of collective purpose) and of solidarity’ instead of as neutral (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). However, although clearly related to the concept, this knowledge claim on a rationality that frames descriptive knowledge as territorial capital does not explicitly name territorial cohesion. It therefore again merely represents what could have been claimed.

Another way of thinking likewise frames policy objective knowledge, this time a way proposed as territorial cohesion definition: “thinking spatial” (see Table 2 in §9.1.2). Waterhout&Zonneveld (in Faludi, 2005a: 21) namely contrast a policy making which takes existing spatial structures into account to the common generic approach based on uniform principles and indicators (e.g. GDP). This thinking spatial frames policy objectives (e.g. through maps, visioning, frameworks of spatial development), because it prioritises places and space (Waterhout&Zonneveld, in Faludi, 2005a: 21, 23). The policy objective of territorial integration, for instance, could then not so much be about the distribution of GDP between regions, but more about ‘the

---

143

The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

What is more, this framework does not only allow the identification of the specific role of a concept, but also to ‘apply a similar framework [to] the contents of each of them’ (BBR, 2005c: 125). As such this complementary approach almost forms the territorial cohesion intension we are looking for. This because three features return that would be characteristic of the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge: a global approach that directs the various standpoints (e.g. ‘social integration’ as a facet of ‘territorial cohesion’) (BBR, 2005c: 125), room to take territorial diversity and contextuality into account, and a conceptual framework that opens up the connections between knowledge and governance. Furthermore, all of this with the familiar policy focus and division between the spatial and territorial due to a reference to spatial knowledge (i.e. spatial objects, aspects, and tools) and an implied territorial governance (e.g. policy means within a territorial grid, only territorial tools under the heading of ‘spatial tools’). What is then the reason why this framework is not the concept’s territorial governmentality intension we are looking for?

We do not find a territorial cohesion intension here that links knowledge and governance with a rationality due to three reasons. A territorial approach is, firstly, at most a framework for a rationality. Certainly, without such a rationality itself the tentative framework may open up the connections between knowledge and governance, but it, secondly, does not link them. More important though, territorial cohesion is hereby seen as just another concept in the territorial approach instead of the approach itself as proposed in the territorial cohesion taxonomy (i.e. an holistic, territorial, and dynamic approach; see Table 2 in §1.1.2). Still, the part of this framework for concepts that holds for territorial cohesion might form a territorial governmentality intension for the concept. The more so when you take into account that the hyper-cube ESPON brings up to formalise the framework for the contents of each of the framework’s spatial concepts (BBR, 2005c: 125) is the same as the territorial cohesion hyper-cube (e.g. see §10.2.2) – and ESPON does claim that it is territorial cohesion that integrates scale and includes the diversity of sectors and topics that could be influential (BBR, 2005c: 8-11). It might thus be save to say that these knowledge claims – which show the need to link detailed knowledge and policy measures, the division between spatial knowledge and territorial governance, a tentative common framework for spatial concepts as territorial approach – point towards a territorial governmentality. They namely show possibilities for a rationality that links knowledge and territorial governance. Yet, because an unfragmented territorial cohesion intension is lacking, this is nothing more than what could have been claimed but was not claimed.

Even though no territorial governmentality intension or extension is explicitly put forward as territorial cohesion knowledge, such knowledge might frame other territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless. However, this is just demonstrated by ways related to territorial cohesion in which descriptive and policy objective knowledge is framed by certain thinking. For the former Peyrony (in Faludi, 2007) connects territorial capital, as the contribution of places to efficiency, based on local (natural or human) assets, but also on accessibility to networks provided by ‘public service’, contributing to the territorial structure (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007).
material elements that structure the area, territorial relations extending beyond the particular territory and the ‘social agents behind particular functions that have an impact on the spatial structure’ (De Vries, 2002a; Waterhout & Zonneveld, in Fahudi, 2005a: 21; Husar, 2006: 51). These concerns seem to resound spatial planning – or at least those of many spatial planning traditions. As such this rationality would imply that spatial planning does not only form the system of territorial cohesion knowledge (see §2.2.6), but also (a part of) the concept’s territorial governmentality that links knowledge and governance with a rationality. Then again, this knowledge claim does not explicitly mention territorial cohesion. It thus remains the case, that territorial cohesion knowledge claims could have been made in which the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge frames other territorial cohesion knowledge. Still, there is neither such territorial governmentality knowledge nor an explicit framing of other territorial cohesion knowledge (yet).

It should come as no surprise that within the territorial governmentality kind of meaning no explicit territorial cohesion knowledge claims relate the broad idea and facts (i.e. no intension-extension trade-off). As territorial governmentality knowledge would be much encompassing, the criteria for territorial cohesion claims to form it ask very much: not only a linkage between knowledge and territorial governance with an explicated rationality (i.e. the treatment of three aspects), but also with an emphasis on territorial diversity and contextuality (i.e. in a particular way). Therefore, no intensions or extensions appear here, just intensional fragments pointing to such linking rationalities and to meta-knowledge which frames other territorial cohesion knowledge. For such linking rationalities they show what could have been claimed for territorial cohesion: a rationality that links detailed knowledge and policy measures, links spatial knowledge and territorial governance, and fits in the territorial approach of a tentative common framework for spatial concepts. For meta-knowledge they show the room for territorial cohesion knowledge claims on a way of thinking that has territories as basis for understanding (e.g. territorial capital descriptions) and a thinking spatial (that resembles spatial planning). Hence, although it seems obvious that the concept of territorial cohesion harbours an administration of diversity, the territorial governmentality knowledge claims backing this up are weak. Moreover, not much in territorial cohesion knowledge is about governance or a reflection upon the link between knowledge and power practices. This fragmented picture where many topics are not covered thus at most displays the narrowness of the concept’s territorial governmentality knowledge which ignorantly frames other territorial cohesion knowledge.

10.2.8 Towards a kaleidoscopic system: vague knowledge-dominances in a territorial cohesion gaze

After ordering the various territorial cohesion knowledge claims within each of the concept’s kinds of meaning above (i.e. descriptive, normative, instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, territorial governmentality), we can finally draw the map of the system they form. What this system of territorial cohesion knowledge entails revolves around the question of what the concept’s ‘gaze’ is. This section therefore first characterises the concept’s particular part of the world and perspective (Fairclough, 2003: 129) from the commonalities in the knowledge claims. Inside this territorial cohesion gaze there appear vague dominances of certain knowledges over others, these are treated next. As a third step one can from both (i.e. the gaze and dominances) deduce the system of knowledge that we are concerned with.

Insofar the concept’s gaze is determined by the part of the world it looks at, it is of course heavily influenced by what the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning in- and excludes. That is to say, that to which the words ‘territorial cohesion’ do not refer is not a part of the territorial cohesion world. Note though, that this meaning of the concept is unsteady and has vague boundaries, arbitrary choices, and illogical leftovers (see §9.3.9). Still, the territorial cohesion knowledge claims reinforce some of the semantic features of this common ground. To recuperate them: a tendency to exclude politics, not solve issues concerned with territorial entities and levels and the relation between objectives, and tensions of abstract/specific, all-encompassing/selective, single/multi level, and harmony/agonism (again, see §9.3.9). Now, that the knowledge claims do not explicitly demarcate a part of the world as being territorial cohesion’s part might leave the concept’s epistemic borders just as vague as its framing semantic borders. Territorial cohesion knowledge nonetheless does seem to exclude political objects more strongly (i.e. save for a narrow variation of ideals) and to emphasise actual tangible things...
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

"on the ground", as claims for the concept's territorial governmentality exemplify (i.e. territorial governance needs detailed spatial knowledge). Insofar the concept's part of the world characterises the territorial cohesion gaze, it thus is apolitical and tangible.

Three features could then positively characterise the perspective with which the territorial cohesion gaze looks at this world. It appears, for instance, to be not so much about the way in which forms are delineated (e.g. various descriptive ways even contaminate), but about the relationality in which objects are seen. This is even the case for the concept's most "pointed" knowledge, as every policy objective extension (i.e. social cohesion, economic cohesion, polycentrism) can only trade off with one intension: an (economic) hyper-cube that relates components and dimensions (see §10.2.4). Another feature of the territorial cohesion perspective appears to be that it demarcates a total. Speculations for the concept's instrumental and policy coherence knowledge bring this forward most clearly: both might entail a totalising tendency, either when the territorial serves a "larger goal", or due to the grandeur implied in coordinating many policies (see §10.2.4). That the territorial cohesion gaze appears to lack theoreticality and reflectiveness could relate to the here last-named feature of the concept's perspective. Territorial cohesion knowledge namely appears to have a (state-)government and policy focus, a governing-centred perspective, which aligns with that the kinds of meaning are distinguished according to their role in 'governing'*. The specification into government proper and policy in particular does, however, narrow down the scope of the territorial cohesion gaze. This is expressed most clearly in the claims on policy objective knowledge due to the filtering of descriptive (and normative) knowledge this implies. Hence, insofar the concept's perspective characterises the territorial cohesion gaze, it is relational, totalising, and focussed on (state-)government and policy.

The question then becomes what it entails that the atheoretical and unreflective territorial cohesion gaze looks at an apolitical and tangible world through a relational, totalising, and (state-)government- and policy-centred perspective. It could for instance mean that this gaze is the mould in which available information should fit, or be fitted, to be included in what ESPON calls the "territorial cohesion perspective" (BBR, 2003). Territorial cohesion knowledge claims would thereby illustrate this fit or fitting, and the concept's meanings without associated knowledge show the possibilities for such epistemic construction (e.g. creation, fabrication, colonisation). However, although this territorial cohesion gaze is more specific than the *prima facie* meaning of the concept (i.e. how things territorially relate to each other), it does not go much further to characterise territorial cohesion. From the intensions, extensions, and (lacking) trade-off per kind of meaning one can distil vague dominances of certain knowledges though. These go further in characterising territorial cohesion than the gaze's common features, as they show the pieces of which most forms of the concept's gaze are made of. As such they, with the implied weaker knowledges, bring forward groups of interrelatable elements within the concept's hermeneutic horizon. However, a rationality that structures these elements into a firm whole seems to be missing. Perhaps the system of territorial cohesion knowledge is therefore better typified as a kaleidoscopic view that constantly rearranges a mixture of pieces instead of as a fixed gaze through set forms.

Note that the knowledge-dominances below are only of our interest insofar they are helpful to picture the whole system of territorial cohesion knowledge – i.e. to sketch the whole picture by starting with the parts which most catch the eye. To do this, we first need to list the dominances within each kind of territorial cohesion meaning. To begin with the concept's descriptive knowledge, this is predominantly quantitative, economic, and distributive (e.g. GDP). In their turn social/liberal universal ideals dominate normative territorial cohesion knowledge (e.g. Rawls), as economics, solutions for the tensions between economic, social, and ecological issues in territories, and the possibility for territorial cohesion policy on the level of the European Union simultaneously dominate policy objective knowledge (e.g. the policy hyper-cube). For the concept's instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality knowledge, however, it is not really possible to talk about which knowledges dominate. This because the need to fit territorial cohesion instrumentally betwixt cohesion, spatial, and regional policies and competition and sustainability strategies at the European, national, and regional levels is the only thing that dominates the first two. And because an absence and fragmentation

* Governing* understood here according to the analytical framework of governmentality (see Part II in Book I).
likewise dominate the latter two: the absence of reasons for why territorial cohesion would function as an equivalent of spatial planning in the European Union and the fragmentation of possibilities for territorial cohesion to combine knowledge and governance through an own rationality. Hence, the territorial cohesion knowledge-dominances which are mentioned above merely picture a part of the concept's epistemic system.

Together the concept's gaze and knowledge-dominances do give leads to map a kaleidoscopic system of territorial cohesion knowledge though. Descriptions then portray the apolitical and tangible territorial cohesion world by relating and totalising quantitative, economic, and distributive forms and centre them around (state-)government and policy. Similarly, idealisations of this world emphasise the ways in which social/liberal ideals relate and totalise people. Centring these ideals on (state-)government and policy in particular already points to the concept's policy objective knowledge. The latter namely colours the focus on policy, as here the apolitical world returns in – not choices, but – solutions for tensions (i.e. technocracy), the role of economics mirrors territorial cohesion descriptions, and the emphasis on (also) European policy fixes the European Union as government level. You can thereby speculate about possible knowledge-networks. After a turn of the concept's kaleidoscope, a way in which pieces of claimed territorial cohesion knowledge might for instance be arranged runs as follows: a region's score on economic competitiveness results from its use of its territorial capital (i.e. description) and indicates whether it should create a more shared wealth (i.e. ideal) to reach true economic cohesion (i.e. policy objective). However, this speculation on a territorial cohesion knowledge-network is not only just speculation – as it did not appear as the meaning-networks did for the semantic system (see §9.4.1) –, but also a speculation based on a double partial picture. Both in the sense of only based on the dominant knowledge claims (i.e. not the weaker ones) and in the sense of not a whole kaleidoscopic view (i.e. not the instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, and territorial governmentality knowledges). Hence, we now only have an indicative map of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge.

10.2.9 Mapping the concept's epistemic system through its ruptures

What complicates this way of understanding the concept (i.e. with an indicative map of its system of knowledge), is that many ruptures appear within territorial cohesion knowledge. Perhaps the map is thus better drawn negatively; that is, by critiquing its faults. Then these faults do not form the reasons for why this system is hard to recognise, but the way in which it can be characterised – i.e. it is so full of ruptures that territorial cohesion knowledge is less a "ragged carpet" than an attempt to tie together loose threads (e.g. of meaning; see §9.5.1). These ruptures are as well general, between knowledges, as between knowledge claims of a certain knowledge. Only the fundamental ones will be treated below, and they in the end lead to a proposal to widen the concept's research agenda or a drastic epistemic conclusion.

A general rupture appears when the territorial and/or (state-)government and policy actually are political. Due to the latter, the territorial cohesion gaze would be inherently inconsistent, as then the (state-)government and policy part of its perspective contradicts with its world that excludes politics. And when you add to this that the territorial is always a political issue, it seems as if territorial cohesion knowledge does not so much exclude politics but presume it – representing either the status quo or change by stealth. Another general rupture appears through the territorial too, but then due to its contextuality: if territories are always contextual, the territorial cohesion intensions should have been traded-off with particular territories. That is to say, when territorial cohesion is about things "on the ground", the hard to find factuality in the concept's knowledge forms an inconsistency, as only the policy objective knowledge comes up with facts, and thus territorial cohesion knowledge only with policy facts. This contradiction therefore shows a fundamental rupture between the concept's intensions (i.e. tangibility) and extensions (i.e. only policy facts); this rupture thus aligns with what demarcates the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning (§9.3.9). The last general rupture treated here has to do with the tension between relating (i.e. cohesion) and demarcating (i.e. territory) already mentioned in the introduction of Chapter 1. The perspective of the territorial cohesion gaze namely relates and totalises. The question for the concept's knowledge then becomes whether you first determine this total by catching a given cohesive amalgam through the drawing of lines around it or do you start with determining the cohesiveness
The system of territorial cohesion knowledge

within a given territory. As no claim decides on whether cohesiveness or the territory forms the ground for territorial cohesion knowledge, also this tension seems to rupture the concept's epistemic system. Thus, to repeat, the general ruptures of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge seem to be inconsistencies in the concept's gaze, epistemic trade-off, and perspective: looking politically at an apolitical world and having neither facts to show for the tangible world it emphasizes, nor a firm relational or demarcated ground to base knowledge on respectively.

The concept's epistemic system of course also suffers the same inconsistencies as the semantic system does due to contradicting kinds of meaning (see §9.4.2). The contradictions of the latter namely frame territorial cohesion knowledge, and they therefore rupture the system of it. These six ruptures are between: i) territorial cohesion descriptions and ideals (as an ideal state of affairs cannot exist in actual fact), ii) the former and the concept's policy objective knowledge (as a territorial cohesion description pictures a wide array and an objective is a point), iii) normative and instrumental territorial cohesion knowledge (as an ideal cannot be instrumental in itself), iv) the concept's more substantive and more technical knowledges (as substance is not form), v) the concept's policy coherence and spatial planning knowledge (now due to the system of knowledge the latter could add to territorial cohesion), and vi) all of these knowledges and the concept's territorial governmentality knowledge (as then the concept would grasp all instead of be represented by one). When you consider the knowledge claims inside every kind of meaning, however, new ruptures do appear besides the general ones.

First of all, the concept's descriptive intensions (i.e. the hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital; see §10.2.2) partly contaminate and especially two of them could lead to instable knowledge. Although these intensions could be puzzled together notwithstanding their outing for extensions, some issues remain. Insofar it concerns spatial entities the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions namely contradict, as the former accounts for several territorial levels and the latter for one. Another contradiction appears between the hyper-cube and layer approach intensions on the one side and the components of territorial cohesion intension on the other, because the latter colours many entities as economic properties, something which goes against the former two. Moreover, all these descriptive intensions have something in common what can lead to instable knowledge: they do not form an assemblage, but a loose collection of properties. The hyper-cube intension instabilises knowledge further though, as with it different descriptions represent the same territorial cohesion and a single description can hover between levels of abstraction. Also the concept's normative intensions (i.e. Rawls, equal opportunities, quality of place; see §10.2.3) bring forth epistemic ruptures, because the dominant intensions (i.e. social/liberal universal ideals) do not concentrate on place- or territory-boundedness, something territorial cohesion has, arguably, a lot to do with. The problem of how to apply a universal ideal territorially reflects this (and the general rupture between relating and demarcating). Finally the concept's policy objective extensions (i.e. social cohesion, economic cohesion, polycentrism, see §10.2.4) might instabilise territorial cohesion knowledge too. This because when both social and economic cohesion represent territorial cohesion, they cannot be opposed to each other (as they regularly are). Such an opposition would be more consequential, as then a rupture appears when these territorial cohesion extensions would trade-off with the policy hyper-cube intension (which they do not), as this intension combines economy-society-environment. Probably more ruptures within certain territorial cohesion knowledge could have appeared if strong knowledge claims were not as scarce as they are. Without instrumental, policy coherence, spatial planning, or territorial governmentality intensions and extensions of the concept however, no more contradicting knowledge claims appear, and thus no more ruptures.

When one thus maps the system of territorial cohesion knowledge according to its ruptures, a system appears which is as instable as the concept's inconsistent system of arbitrary meanings – if not more so. In general the issue of politics ruptures the territorial cohesion gaze, the one of tangibility the concept's epistemic trade-off, and the tension of relating-demarcating its perspective. The ruptures between all and each of the territorial cohesion knowledges and the many between the concept's descriptive, normative, and policy objective
knowledge claims add to this. It is thus not surprising when Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) says that in the case of the concept of territorial cohesion the 'problems are complex and poorly structured'. Particularly for this reason she calls for a widening of the research agenda (i.e. more qualitative and in-depth inquiries by ESPON) and 'that the technical analyses are complemented by discursive approaches' (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). Perhaps this might even change the territorial cohesion gaze – e.g. into a more theoretical and reflective one. However, one can also take a step back to conclude what we have at the moment. There appears to be no rationality which harnesses territorial cohesion knowledge into a system (e.g. coming from spatial planning or the concept's territorial governmentality knowledge). Stronger put even, no territorial cohesion facts appear, save for policy "facts". Even if they did, there seem to be no trade-offs between the concept's intentions and extensions either. That is, no territorial cohesion knowledge appears. This would have a drastic consequence. Without knowledge and system for it, there is no territorial cohesion discourse (yet) in the Foucaultian sense (i.e. a system of knowledge and its associated practices).

10.3 Conclusion towards the territorial cohesion discourse

10.3.1 The epistemic order of territorial cohesion
This chapter mapped territorial cohesion knowledge claims as marks of the concept's linguistic and knowledge-making practices. Framed by the concept's common ground of meaning these objectifications of social reality and action-oriented discursive simplifications construct the territorial cohesion gaze. Intentions and extensions would thereby trade-off to stratify relationships between thought of ideas and measured facts into a grid of knowledges. It then seems that the concept's forms and objects come through in seven ways: in i) hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital intentions that out each other to describe territorial cohesion, ii) Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intentions that systemise territorial cohesion idealisations, iii) a policy hyper-cube intention that filters economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism into territorial cohesion objectives, iv) speculations that identify a totalising tendency in the substantive plane of the concept's servile instrumental knowledge and v) technical bundling of its grand policy coherence knowledge, vi) claims with the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space that open the door for a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion, and vii) intensional fragments that give room for rationalities linking detailed spatial knowledge to territorial governing and for meta-knowledge with territories or thinking spatial as basis for understanding. As such, these seven ways have in common that the apolitical and tangible world is looked at through a relational and totalising perspective that focuses on (state-)government and policy. A kaleidoscope then appears with as dominant pieces quantitative, economic, and distributive descriptions, social/liberal ideals, and economic and technocratic conceivings of policy objectives for territories up to the European level. What is more important though, is that this map merely indicates the system of territorial cohesion knowledge, as it is based on a double partiality (i.e. on dominances in the three first-mentioned knowledges) and speculation. Above all it reveals the concept's lack of epistemic firmness.

10.3.2 The non-existence or creation of the territorial cohesion discourse
As the concept's epistemic system forms claims of territorial cohesion knowledge, it shows how the concept's gaze stratifies the forms, objects, and limits of politics which can be seen and said with territorial cohesion. One can easily critique this gaze for the lack of theory or reflection, as it is narrow and seems to be ignorant about the way it constructs knowledge. Or one can easily critique this system for the involved arbitrariness, as every choice for a particular relation between an idea and fact is as valid as another. Yet, the critique of the system of territorial cohesion knowledge goes further insofar it reveals a "ragged carpet" of epistemic ruptures. That is, the claims within the concept's descriptive, normative, and policy objective knowledges contradict each other and/or miss territorial cohesion's place- or territory-boundedness. The inherent inconsistency of the concept's kinds
of meaning in addition frames the ruptures between all and each of the territorial cohesion knowledges. Three kinds of general ruptures then appear: i) between the apolitical world and political perspective of the territorial cohesion gaze, ii) in the trade-off between the tangible intensions and extensions without classified facts beyond policy "facts", and iii) in the gaze's perspective between either relations or a demarcation as basis for territorial cohesion knowledge. In short, you could say that the territorial cohesion knowledge in the concept's epistemic system is instable.

However, there seems to be no territorial cohesion knowledge claim that relates a broad idea and facts. This means that there is no epistemic trade-off between territorial cohesion intensions and extensions – if these actually appear that is, what they seldom do. Moreover, only the policy objective extensions classify "facts" – arguably facts are something every knowledge needs. Hence, a legitimate question becomes whether something such as territorial cohesion knowledge exists at all. Even if it does, there appears no rationality – neither from spatial planning, nor a territorial governmentality – to structure the concept's knowledges into a system, merely a territorial approach of a tentative common framework for spatial concepts. And how to speak of a new body of knowledge (connaissance) when it is not organised? Territorial cohesion expertise therefore seems to depend mostly on the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, the more so if the crux in the concept's dynamic interplay of defining and knowledge creation lies in combining information as territorial cohesion knowledge. If this is the case, then the arbitrariness and inconsistency of the concept's knowledge validity and truth criteria pervade the system of territorial cohesion knowledge – a semantic and epistemic arbitrariness and inconsistency that could become more logical when seen in relation to the field of interests in which the exercise of power uses the concept. Hence, the most positive conclusion one can draw for now, is that no territorial cohesion discourse exists at the moment because it is in creation.