The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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Citation for published version (APA):

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Chapter 16 The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

Introduction

This chapter will present the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions out of which the concept’s possibilities of articulation emerge. To do this with the analytical framework of this research in mind (§16.1.1), it first sketches the maps of these pro/positions in rough strokes (§16.1.2) and brings to the fore what points to such interdependencies (§16.1.3). The discursive interdependencies between the concept’s pro/positions can be ordered by following perspectival relations (§16.2.1) or main political purposes or storylines (§16.2.2). However, as such interpretations prevent us from individualising the tactical productivity between the pro/positions, all of them are mapped out by crossing the kinds of territorial cohesion meanings and the concept’s usage areas (§16.2.3). This leads us to the reciprocal effects of power and knowledge in general (§16.3.1) and those that the concept ensures (§16.3.2), the role spatial planning might play in this (§16.3.3), and the characteristics of territorial cohesion’s tactical productivity (§16.3.4). Thereafter we can conclude how these findings set up a demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse (§16.4).

16.1 The framework, the maps, the pointers

16.1.1 The governmentality framework for territorial cohesion pro/positions

One might ask why the maps of territorial cohesion pro/positions and the pointers for discursive interdependencies between them are presented below. The reason for this comes from the research’s analytical framework of governmentality. We namely look at the techniques and knowledges employed in government when it concerns territorial cohesion in order to understand the concept’s relations between practices of government and the production of ‘truth’ (Dean, 1999: 18, 209). Hence, the emphasis on territorial cohesion expertise which mediates between actions and objects of politike (Rose, 1993; in Barry&Osborne&Rose, 1996: 40, 50; Uitermark, 2005: 146) and on the explicit mental organisation of practices, that is, knowledge of the type of governor and governed entity.

Territorial cohesion knowledge then both arises from and informs the activity of government. We therefore want to understand how territorial cohesion expertise problematises objects of policy and renders them amendable to administration (Miller&Rose, 1990; Murdoch, 1997: 310). Common ways of analysing thereby construct particular forms of knowledge, what can legitimise particular strategies whilst marginalising other understandings of policy problems (Richardson&Jensen, 2003). With territorial cohesion these common ways of course fit the programmes of government that distinguish the regimes of power practices of the concept’s usage areas. What is more, territorial cohesion knowledge depends on the positions in these spheres of action as well. We thus only have the concept’s propositions on the one side (i.e. mental organisations of practices), its positions on the other side (i.e. in power practices), and discursive interdependencies that link them.

However, also politique spirituelle and the sphere of action it points to could come into play here with mental programmes for government of mental power practices (see §3.2.4). This could make you wonder how these programmes and practices differ from discursive interdependencies and the discursive practices they indicate (see §7.1.1). The difference in the practices lies in that discursive practices deal with both propositions and positions and link them, while mental power practices prescribe (the thought of) the taking up of particular positions (e.g. by framing, representing, using policy concepts). And while the discursive interdependencies...
are interpreted, the mental programmes that govern mental power practices are explicit (else they cannot directly
to these practices). In the case of territorial cohesion one could for elements of such programmes think of frames or representation in policy – e.g. to direct the interpretation of problems and the behaviour in the policy process (Griggs & Howard, 2002: 106; Murdoch, 2003: 50) or policy concepts or discourses – e.g. to ensure that decisions accord with an agenda (Benz, 2000; Faludi, 2000b: 905). Put too simply: discursive practices link
government and knowledge, mental programmes just govern.

Yet, discursive practices and mental programmes of government can relate. When mental practices
become a way to govern, discursive practices (e.g. reasoning) are still needed to go from, for instance, frame to
framing and/or from framing to taking a position. Also the discursive practices between mental programmes
and power practices can thus be traced as discursive interdependencies of the territorial cohesion discourse.
Then again, such programmes might intervene in the discursive practices of the territorial cohesion discourse as
well (e.g. by gluing spheres of action together and/or by directing that some pro/positions are not linked), what
then alters the discursive interdependencies which indicate these practices. One could therefore ask in how far
mental programmes form these interdependencies out of which the possibilities of articulation for territorial
cohesion emerge. That is, is territorial cohesion a discourse (i.e. a system of knowledge and associated practices)
or merely politique spirituelle?

Even so, our main question is what of such, (again) for instance, frames and framing makes them
territorial cohesion frames and framing. As the possibilities of territorial cohesion articulations emerge out of
the discursive interdependencies between the concept’s pro/positions, we only touch upon politique spirituelle
insular explicit mental programmes help us to understand the relations between government and knowledge
production in the case of territorial cohesion. In the case of the ESDP for example, they might have played a
role. Concepts drawn from the ESDP were namely ‘incorporated in various policies or otherwise play a role in
planning discourses through a process of diffusion’ (Faludi, 2004e: 405). Still, Faludi (2004e: 405) also mentions
how the ESDP ‘shapes research agendas, both directly, i.e. through ESPON, and indirectly, i.e. by raising
academic interest in the substance and the process of European spatial planning.’ Husar (2006: 103) might
therefore be right in stating that with territorial cohesion agenda-setting means deciding on both the concept’s
future meaning and its relevance on the European Union’s agenda. Put in a crude way: we are interested in the
relations between the intellectual propositions on the research agenda and the positions on the political agenda,
and politique spirituelle might play a major role in this.

16.1.2 The mapped territorial cohesion pro/positions
To interpret the discursive interdependencies between the territorial cohesion pro/positions, these pro/positions
must be clear before our eyes. As they are mapped out in the concept’s semantic/epistemic order and topical
order of its usage in power practices, the maps of both sides will be sketched in rough strokes below (i.e. as
summaries of Parts I and II). Even though these intellectual and political sides differ, one can already wonder
about how much these maps overlap (see §16.2.3).

The map of the propositions displays that territorial cohesion knowledge mostly depends on the concept’s
common ground of meaning as structured by seven kinds. The semantics are thereby characterised by that the
hues of territorial cohesion Bedeutung in every Sinn harbour the same tensions of abstraction (e.g. in how far
to deal with the tangible world?), selectivity (e.g. which world parts to exclude?), territorial levels (e.g. cohesion
on which level?), and harmony (e.g. which struggles to include?). The descriptive meanings then frame several
intensions (i.e. hyper-cube, layer approach, components of territorial cohesion, and territorial capital) that
oust each other to describe territorial cohesion. The normative meanings frame other intensions (i.e. Rawlsian,
equal opportunities, and quality of place), as these systemise territorial cohesion idealisations. Two other more
substantive kinds are the policy objective and instrumental meanings. The former frame just one intension, a
policy hyper-cube that filters economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism into territorial cohesion
objectives. The instrumental meanings do not so much frame intensions though – not to speak of extensions.

194
Chapter 16
They rather frame a totalising tendency which can be identified in the substantive plane of the concept's servile instrumental knowledge (e.g. interlinking contents for a higher goal).

Besides these four more substantive kinds of territorial cohesion meanings, three more technical ones appear. The policy coherence meanings thereby frame no intensions either. Just as with the concept's instrumental knowledge, they more frame a totalising tendency, but here this can be identified in the technical bundling of grand policy coherence knowledge (e.g. horizontal coordination between many policies). Also the spatial planning meanings do not frame intensions. Instead, they frame claims that open the door for a transposition of the system of spatial planning knowledge into territorial cohesion (e.g. with the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space); this could be essential for the territorial cohesion discourse (see §16.3.3). Note then, that the concept's territorial governmentality meanings can frame the other six kinds, just as this knowledge could frame the other six knowledges. As territorial cohesion meanings however, they (also) frame intensional fragments of territorial governmentality knowledge. These fragments of territorial cohesion knowledge thereby give room for rationalities that link detailed spatial knowledge to territorial governing and for meta-knowledge with territories or thinking spatial as basis for understanding. Together, these seven kinds of forms and objects construct the territorial cohesion gaze.

The map of the positions displays the whole territorial cohesion usage field. This field consists of four usages areas, that is: the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion policy, and European Funds usage area, and in each many to much more positions are taken in power practices. These play a role in, respectively, adding a European Union competency, promoting European spatial planning, substantively expanding Regional/Cohesion policy, or channelling European funding. Positions on balance, services, territorial specificities, coordination, and the territorial dimension thereby set the agenda. Yet, as good as none of the positions are an innate territorial cohesion position, as almost all are a bricolage instead. Moreover, because these positions appear to be contested in everything, territorial cohesion stands for systematic uncertainty.

One might agree with the statement that ‘politics obeys different impact imperatives than the logic of cognisance in science’ (Murswieck, 1994: 10; Husar, 2006: 108n199). Then territorial cohesion’s semantic/epistemic order and whole usage field as sketched above stand separately: Although neither the concept’s intellectual propositions perfectly overlap with ‘science’, nor its political positions with politics proper, both sides do show different arbitrarinesses. That every choice for a territorial cohesion meaning or relation between an idea and facts appears as valid as another namely differs from that every usage of the concept in power practices seems to be determined by ‘subjective’ preference. Then again, these different arbitrarinesses have alike pro/positions (e.g. policy coherence and coordination; see §16.2.3). While Murswieck (1994: 10; Husar, 2006: 108n199) holds that the differences between politics and science keeps scientists from interacting with politicians, the governmentality perspective on the other hand suggests that the crux of both arbitrarinesses can be understood when they are seen in relation to each other.

6.1.3 The pointers towards discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions

If discursive interdependencies relate the concept’s arbitrarinesses, what guides us towards their interpretation is that many statements point towards such dependencies between, in order of their treatment below, its propositions, positions, and both. Hamez (in Campbell, 2005: 401) illustrates how the concept’s propositions depend on each other, as he holds that territorial cohesion will not only be defined by definitions in policy documents, but also ‘through the methodologies, which are devised to measure its nature and extent.’ More pointers towards discursive interdependencies are concerned with positions and how pro/positions depend on each other through.

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*Note that also such, perhaps, “non-scientific” definitions are semantic propositions which this research understands as part of the territorial cohesion expertise (see Appendix A, §A.1.6). Moreover, as these definitions denote what territorial cohesion means instead of how it is or should be used, they form propositions instead of positions.

*Note that we are not concerned with cause-effect relationships such as ‘positions influence propositions’ or vice versa due to the general scepticism of Foucaultian discourse analysis towards the existence of ‘real world knowledge’ outside discourse’ (Dauz, 2001: 32) (see §7.1.1).
Bachtler & Polverari (in Faludi, 2007) then point towards dependencies between positions in the case of territorial cohesion. They namely say that ‘in the context of the urban development and territorial cooperation agendas, the political and policy rhetoric of territorial cohesion is likely to be subject to major constraints’ (Bachtler & Polverari, in Faludi, 2007). Territorial cohesion positions are thus affected by other positions. Moreover, propositions might play no role here, as in the power practices of the European Union concepts might be used pragmatically instead of being questioned about their meaning. However, these pointers do not imply dependencies between territorial cohesion positions just yet.

That territorial cohesion can be understood as a political concept which shows a “coded consensus” of different interpretations does though. Moreover, such vagueness might even be useful in itself. Husar (2006: 105) on the contrary sees the transversal nature of territorial cohesion (i.e. complementing both economic and social cohesion) as reason for why political positions in this matter are not that pronounced (i.e. at least in the European Parliament). Pronounced positions would thus prove different. In light of the emphasis on cohesion in regional policy, the diversity of European territory, and the then upcoming enlargement that increased spatial-economic disparities, the Committee of the Regions (2003b) for instance states for territorial cohesion that no appraisal of cohesion should be restricted to the economic and social dimensions alone and that a clearer understanding of the reality of cohesion must include reference to substate territorial units; note that the concept might not be used in the regions themselves though. However, an officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006) thinks that how the Core Presidencies Group (of the (post-)ESDP process) uses territorial cohesion is most valuable: for an integrated approach. Not every territorial cohesion position thus has to be as politically valuable as the other. Either way, both as coded consensus or with pronounced positions, territorial cohesion positions clearly relate. However, according to Tatzberger (2003), besides efforts of the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions, no-one tried to elaborate a common territorial cohesion definition. This could remind us of the ESDP (CEC, 1999a), in which agreement on maps – not to mention plans – was almost non-existent (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). Perhaps it therefore does not surprise that Bachtler & Polverari (in Faludi, 2007) state that in 2004 the Ministers responsible for spatial development did not reach a ‘general agreement on an operational definition of territorial cohesion’ either. Without pin-pointing “the” territorial cohesion position, only positions that consensually or agonistically depend on each other remain. What is more, the last statement of Bachtler & Polverari (in Faludi, 2007) already directs us towards dependencies between the positions (i.e. agreement) and propositions (i.e. a definition).

Much then points towards the dependence of territorial cohesion propositions on positions. As Tatzberger (2003) summarises: territorial cohesion more constitutes a political than theoretical debate. This also shows through time. Some 12 years after the emergence of ‘territorial cohesion’ in the ESDP process, five years after the official acquaintance with the concept in Article 16 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (i.e. on SG(E)I (OJEC, 1997)), and one year after the first time in a European Policy context that it has been given some substance (i.e. in the Second Cohesion Report (CEC, 2001a)), the Committee of the Regions in 2002 asked to investigate what the concept of territorial cohesion could mean (Tatzberger, 2003). The concept could thus have been used without it having a meaning. You could therefore see territorial cohesion as a political concept without much scientific content. Put the other way around: territorial cohesion propositions that then do appear might for their content depend on already held positions.

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1. An officer of the CEMR (Personal interview in Brussels, 14th of March 2006) for instance says that when you work in European Union policy you do not ask about the meaning of the concepts you use, but use them pragmatically.
2. An officer from DG Regio (Personal interview, 7th of February 2006) and officer from EUROSTES (Personal interview in Brussels, 26th of February 2006) point in this direction for instance.
3. An officer from EUROSTES (Personal interview in Brussels, 28th of February 2006) for instance posits that it is perhaps not totally without intention that the European Commission has a vague interpretation.
4. A representative of Northern WestFalen (Personal interview, 16th of March 2006) for instance holds that regional actors do not use the concept.
5. A representative of the Permanent Dutch Representation in Brussels (Personal interview in Brussels, 27th of February 2006) for instance says it thus.
However, a tension between the pro/positions could preclude such rash conclusions. For instance, what if the variation of propositions is larger than of the positions or vice versa? Pro/positions could thus depend on each other even though positions are not transferred to propositions in a completely unmodified way. ESPON’s clarification of territorial cohesion for instance does aim to operationalise the concept for European Union policies, and this clarification should thus fit the positions taken in these power practices. Propositions could thereby draw various positions together. As ESPON says: ‘there is not yet a clear definition for territorial cohesion nor a clear common understanding for its implementation on the basis of the new (draft) Constitution. But the basic elements [are] already visible’ (BBR, 2005a: 56). Although territorial cohesion propositions thus do not replicate the concept’s positions, Falidu (in Faludi, 2007) might be right by stating that much of the discussion will depend on the rapidly changing currents of European politics.

There also appear two pointers towards the dependence of territorial cohesion positions on propositions, both are concerned with ESPON. ESPON itself then says that its ‘difficulty (sometimes reluctance) to enclose territorial cohesion inside a definition probably results both from the complexity of the concept and from its potential implications for policies’ (BBR, 2005c: 118). For instance, with a political concept that functions to generate consensus, ‘[r]azor-sharp criteria are not always helpful in achieving agreement’ (in Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 5; Husar, 2006: 28), as mentioned earlier. Both that and how propositions could affect positions thus seems to be problematic.

Hence, the pointers clearly show dependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions: between the concept’s definitions and methodologies for measuring territorial cohesion, in a coded consensus or as tensions between pronounced positions, with European politics affecting much of the discussion, and with problematic implications of clarification for policy. The pro/positions then do not only overlap, but also interlink; and what links them (daily) if not discursive practices? The point therefore is neither that the concept does not lead to anything due to its arbitrarinesses, nor that it is complex and unworkable for researchers if it is not (further) specified. Quite the contrary.

First of all, the concept might more lead to everywhere than nowhere. As Zonneveld & Waterhout (in Faludi, 2005a: 15) characterise the discussion on territorial cohesion: ‘over time its potential implications have become wider and wider.’ However, perhaps another question is more important. That is, does it for territorial cohesion expertise matter that the concept’s arbitrarinesses are discursively interdependent (e.g. that arbitrary territorial cohesion knowledge depends on power practices)? If so, as this research argues, the discursive interdependencies should be tracked.

16.2 Territorial cohesion’s dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies

16.2.1 Ordering discursive interdependencies in perspectival relations

If discursive practices interlink territorial cohesion pro/positions, the question becomes how to order the discursive interdependencies involved. A commonsensical way to day this, is by checking which actor – in the institutional framework of the European Union (see Part I of Book I) – gives which meaning to territorial cohesion and for what it uses the concept. With a certain actor as starting-point, one could namely think of particular ways to relate meaning and usage, that is, from a perspective instead of in general. As the perspective would then set the discursive interdependencies, this orders them in perspectival relations. Below
this is first done by presenting several star diagrams of actors, after which an opposite standpoint with a similar way of checking (i.e. of Husar (2006)) leads to the same conclusion.

In the star diagrams every radius stands for a different topic, of which there are 16, as shown around the circles. If the surface around a radius is coloured with red lines the actor gives territorial cohesion that topic as meaning, if coloured with blue lines the actor uses the concept for that topic, and both can overlap: the yellow lines are not taken into account here (i.e. topics the actor relates territorial cohesion too). The significance thereby lies in that when these lines reach to the circumference the actor explicitly takes this pro/position, when they do not show (i.e. the centre of the star) the actor explicitly does not take this pro/position, and if they reach between these extremes then it does neither of both.

The four star diagrams below present the pro/positions of DG Employment and Social Affairs, the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), DG Regio, and EUROCITIES in 2006. These actors are chosen on purpose, as they show a diversity of pro/positions taken.

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These topics are rather crude to map out the concept’s usages and even more so for territorial cohesion meanings. Besides that the star diagrams only display a part of one kind of the collected data (i.e. the extra bit, the interviews) in an early stage of this research (i.e. the analytic introduction was not finished, see Appendix A, §4.2.4), it should again be noted that they are here only presented instrumentally, that is, to make the ordering of discursive interdependencies below more intelligible.

Based on a personal interview with an official from DG Employment and Social Affairs in Brussels on the 15th of March 2006.

Based on a personal interview by telephone with an official from the CPMR on the 13th of April 2006.

Based on personal interviews with an official from DG Regio on the 18th January, an official from DG Regio on the 7th of February, an officer from DG Regio on the 17th of February, an officer from DG Regio on the 2nd of March, and an officer from DG Regio on the 23rd of March, and a personal e-mail of an officer from DG Regio on the 2nd of February, all in Brussels 2006.

Based on a personal interview with an officer from EUROCITIES in Brussels on the 28th of February 2006.
After a quick glance, one can already see that the actors give territorial cohesion different meanings (e.g. balanced development for the CPMR). More striking is that EUROCITIES takes no proposition, what supports that the concept is also only used pragmatically, and DG Regio several, even ones that contradict (as shown by the dotted lines, e.g. territorial cohesion both explicitly means and does not mean socio-economic policy). Actors also seem to take different positions, save for the usage of the concept in the Structural Funds (as all actors do so) and that the CPMR uses the concept for all of the topics (perhaps it holds that territorial cohesion always has to do with peripherality). The peculiarity is though, that per actor none of these explicit pro/positions overlap. The discursive practices that link them thus differ per perspective (e.g. how DG Employment and Social Affairs "thinks" to use the concept in the Structural Funds if territorial cohesion means spatial policy). Still, this does offer a way to order the discursive interdependencies: how you relate territorial cohesion pro/positions just depends on your perspective (e.g. your place on the "territorial cohesion battlefield"; see §15.4).

Then again, Husar (2006) seems to go against such perspectival differences. He recognises the institutional origins of the various territorial cohesion definitions in policy documents: the Member States’ Ministers responsible for spatial development, the European Council/Member States (e.g. Constitutional Treaty), and the European Commission (e.g. Cohesion Reports, Community Strategic Guidelines) (Husar, 2006: 42). 4 In terms of content, however, Husar (2006: 104) sees 'no significant disagreement on territorial cohesion between the institutions.' Besides that he excludes sceptics of the concept, the point here is that, contrary to the star diagrams above, he recognises no (major) perspectival differences in the taken propositions.

Still, unless you pose that each of these institutions uses the concept in the same way (i.e. takes the same position), also Husar’s (2006) take entails different discursive practices due the different relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions. Moreover, even if both the propositions and positions of actors only differ insignificantly, an intricate web of a bit differing pro/positions appears. That is to say, although the actors do not disagree, the agreement might seem vague. Hence, no matter whether you order the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions with perspectival relations of actors or by relating content to actors, a rather chaotic picture of discursive practices appears. Other ways to order the discursive interdependencies could thus prove useful.

16.2.2 Ordering discursive interdependencies in main political purposes or storylines
You could say that Tatzberger (2003) and Waterhout (2003; in Faludi, 2007) do not make sense of the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions by ordering such relations per actor. They namely both do so in a broader and abstracter way with, respectively, main political purposes and storylines6 note that neither of them claims to order discursive interdependencies between pro/positions, this is thus an interpretation

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1 What is probably caused by that the star diagram of DG Regio represents many interviews instead of one – or that this sequence is intended (see above).
2 Besides that he excludes sceptics of the concept, also Husar's (2006) take entails different discursive practices due the different relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions. Moreover, even if both the propositions and positions of actors only differ insignificantly, an intricate web of a bit differing pro/positions appears. That is to say, although the actors do not disagree, the agreement might seem vague. Hence, no matter whether you order the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions with perspectival relations of actors or by relating content to actors, a rather chaotic picture of discursive practices appears. Other ways to order the discursive interdependencies could thus prove useful.
3 The reports for territorial cohesion analyse: the concentration of economic activity and population in the Pentagon, economic disparities at national level, disparities on a regional level other than GDP or unemployment, disparities within regions, and cities, regional specificity, geographical, natural or demographic handicaps, SGI and SSD access and liberalisation, research, innovation and access to transport, ICT and energy networks (regional competitiveness), and effects caused by Community instruments (Structural funds, sectoral policies).
4 Husar (2006: 46) does not give a content to identify this group.
5 Husar (2006: 104) only covers up with minor differences between country groupings and political groups in the European Parliament when it concerns territorial cohesion priorities; although the social-democrats there believe most in the term 'territorial cohesion', but he is sceptical about its meaning in regard to the European Union.
6 As officer from TEAM (Alliance of EU-Critical Movements) in a personal e-mail in Brussels on the 27th of January 2006 for instance says to have no familiarity with the term 'territorial cohesion', but he is sceptical about its meaning in regard to the European Union.

199
of this research. Although they differ in approach and order, both Tatzberger’s (2003) and Waterhout’s (2003; in Faludi, 2007) ways are policy-oriented.

Tatzberger (2003) then distinguishes three main political purposes between which territorial cohesion mediates. These are: i) the weakening of liberalisation activities caused by the European Union and the ensurement of equal access to SGEI, ii) the strengthening of the territorial dimension of European Union policies to receive a balanced and sustainable development by taking into consideration the territorial effects of sector policies on different levels, and iii) steer the regional policy after 2006 (Tatzberger, 2003). Each of these purposes could not only clearly point out which position to take, but also delimit the possible propositions, and thus structure how the relationship between pro/positions is made. The first purpose for instance shows that territorial cohesion is not only used for this specific form of SGEI only as well, but also that the concept’s meaning then cannot contradict this usage (e.g. it could have exactly this meaning, or a type of balanced development which decreases due to liberalisation). As these main political purposes thus do not determine the discursive practices, Tatzberger’s (2003) approach does not pin-point the discursive interdependences down. Still, it does abstractly order the chaotic picture of many perspectival relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions in a clear way.

However useful the clarity provided by Tatzberger (2003) might be, the order is problematic – and not because an actor could support various main political purposes. Besides that its primacy with politics might not be that self-evident, the purposes seem both to be too broad and too specific. When you point out the main political purposes, you of course have to be broad; the purpose of steering regional policy after 2006 perhaps leaves too much open though. Yet, Tatzberger (2003) combines this with a specificity derived from the duality of them. Her order of main political purposes thereby precludes that territorial cohesion is, for instance, only used to strengthen the territorial dimension of European Union policies. Being both broad and specific then implies being too coarse. These issues are not that important here though.

More essential is that if there is another way to order the discursive interdependencies between the concept’s pro/positions, one could ask whether Tatzberger’s (2003) order is the right one. Both Waterhout (2003) and Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) distinguish four storylines that could tie policy discourse-coalitions together for example. As shown below, both orders differ, while Tatzberger’s (2003) three main political purposes do more or less return within them.

In Waterhout (2003) ‘the different story lines, which are trying to get a foothold at the European level through territorial cohesion, then are: i) SG(E)I, ii) Reducing regional disparities: making cohesion policy more effective, iii) Policy coherence: making European Union policies more efficient, and iv) Increasing Europe’s sustainable development and global competitiveness. Some notes come with the first two and last of these storylines. Waterhout (2003) namely thinks that the SG(E)I storyline is a discourse on its own – moreover, ‘SG(E)I’ would reflect a French discourse (Faludi & Waterhout, 2002). He calls the discourse that inhabits the three other storylines ‘Territorial Governance’, and says this originated in the process that led to the making of the ESDP (Waterhout, 2003) – moreover, this discourse would be a product of Northwest-European thinking about spatial planning (Waterhout & Zonneveld, 2003). Increasing Europe’s sustainable development and competitiveness would for instance come directly from the ESDP (Waterhout, 2003); Husar (2006) thinks likewise (see §16.2.1). The note for the second storyline is, that for Waterhout (2003) ‘reducing the disparities between regions’ seems to comprise two sub story lines, which are ‘polycentric development’ and ‘introducing territorial indicators’. Notwithstanding these notes, Waterhout (2003) says that these four storylines ‘are all part of the same discourse’.

If so, they order the discursive interdependencies of the territorial cohesion discourse. It then seems that a storyline does not only point down which position to take with the concept, but also which proposition, and thus to structure the discursive interdependencies. It namely does not only stand for some of the concept’s discursive practices in a given policy domain, but its generative statements would also create new meanings (for an explanation of Hajerian ‘storylines’, see Chapter 6.2.2). Compared to Tatzberger’s (2003) main political purposes, these storylines therefore appear to stronger structure discursive interdependencies while in first
instance they seem to be more abstract. The policy coherence storyline for instance does not only tell for what to use the concept (i.e. policy coherence), but also what sense to make of territorial cohesion (i.e. new policy coherence meanings).

However, when you compare Waterhout's (2003) four storylines with Tatzberger's (2003) three main political purposes, they do not only seem to be more abstract. The main political purposes of steering regional policy after 2006 cannot be found in his order and the storyline of 'SG(E)I' appears to match the main political purpose which includes equal access to SG(E)I. Yet, the 'Territorial Governance' storylines Waterhout (2003) distinguishes seem to consider the various aspects of the other main political purpose of Tatzberger (2003). That is, reducing regional disparities takes balanced development into account, policy coherence might do so for the consideration of the territorial effects of sector policies, and sustainable development directly so. Hence, Waterhout's (2003) order also differs from Tatzberger's (2003) by being more distinctive – and thus also stronger in structuring discursive interdependencies.

As in Waterhout's (2003) order the propositions as well as the positions are taken in policy, the territorial cohesion discourse he talks about could be categorised as a policy discourse. Moreover, one might read Faludi's (2003a) position that territorial cohesion policy will eventually contain elements of the French and German spatial planning approaches as a convergence between, in Waterhout's (2003) terms respectively, the 'SG(E)I' and 'Territorial Governance' discourses as different interpretations of territorial cohesion. What will be part of it depends following Waterhout (2003) also on the future position of the concept 'in relation to well established policies like economic and social cohesion.' Territorial cohesion could for instance 'contribute bottom-up to economic and social cohesion by providing a new rationale to build policy on (e.g. a spatial economic structure vision of the EU's territory that gives handholds for a more spatially selective allocation of structural funds) or could stand' on a par with economic and social cohesion policies and (become) another sector of the EU (e.g. with a dominance of SGI) (Waterhout, 2003). Either way, you can therefore not only order territorial cohesion pro/positions in different ways, but their order can change as well.

Although Waterhout's (in Faludi, 2007) storylines structure discursive interdependencies just as Waterhout's (2003) ones do, he comes up with another order. This might be the result of changes in his research object and/or interpretation of it. Now the four territorial cohesion storylines are: i) Europe in Balance, ii) Coherent European Policy, iii) Competitive Europe, and iv) Green and Clean Europe. Together they 'give an indication of potential elements of territorial cohesion policy' in the absence of easy to determine discourse-coalitions (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007).

Still, besides typifying each, Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) distinguishes these four storylines by suggesting their institutional origins. Europe in Balance would then combine the thinking of the (post-)ESDP process and SGI and be about levelling out regional disparities and adding a territorial development rationale to the establishment of economic and social cohesion and the distribution of the Structural Funds (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Coherent European policy would come from the (post-)ESDP process and focus on horizontal policy coherence (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Competitive Europe then comes from Northwest European Member States while focussing on the competitiveness of Europe as a whole and of individual regions (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Green and Clean Europe in its turn would come from Nordic countries, Germany, and Ireland and is concerned with sustainable development and the sound management of the environment; this storyline 'influenced the ESDP process and now looms in the background of territorial cohesion policy' (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007).
Faludi, 2007). Although Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) brings each of these storylines to the fore as territorial cohesion storyline, they thus clearly differ.

Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007) also sees a common understanding between the four storylines in the use of strategic territorial frameworks for operationalisation. Then again, they would focus on different levels: 'Europe in Balance' and 'Coherent European Policy' on the European Union level and the other two on lower administrative ones; whereby with the 'Competitive Europe' storyline regions have to compete for subsidies (Waterhout, Faludi, 2007). Another difference is that where 'Europe in Balance' is primarily concerned with existing cohesion policies, all other storylines potentially address all sector policies, with 'Coherent European Policy' as the prime example (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Again, these four storylines clearly differ. Just as Tatzberger (2003) and Waterhout (2003), also Waterhout (in Faludi) thus abstractly orders the chaotic picture of many relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions.

Just as above, however, the point here is that these orders of discursive interdependencies differ. Waterhout's (in Faludi, 2007) storyline 'Europe in Balance' reflects Waterhout's (2003) 'SG(E)I' storyline – and thus the alike main political purpose distinguished by Tatzberger (2003) – and the 'Reducing regional disparities' part of the so named other one; in hindsight you could say Waterhout (2003) partly foresaw this, as in this storyline a territorial development rationale is added to the well-established cohesion policies. His 'Coherent European Policy' storyline simply matches his previous 'Policy Coherence' one. Waterhout's (in Faludi, 2007) storylines of 'Competitive' and 'Green and Clean Europe' separates his previous 'Increasing Europe's sustainable development and global competitiveness' storyline through – what thus rearranges his previous rearrangement of one of Tatzberger's (2003) main political purposes. However, according to Waterhout (in Faludi, 2007), more modifications are underway. The relative new storylines of a 'Competitive' and 'Green and Clean Europe' might overtake the most supported one of 'Europe in Balance', due to the critique on the latter's methods of operation and lack of effectiveness, or it incorporates them to counter the trend (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007). Hence, Tatzberger (2003) and Waterhout (2003; in Faludi, 2007) seem to try to pin down a moving object, or at least the moving elements of which it consists.

We could therefore ask whether the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions are too dynamic (now) to set them in an order. Instead, the question might be what distinguishes the concept's discursive practices from others (e.g. the 'Competitive Europe' storyline that appears with or without 'territorial cohesion'). Especially because of the three foci on policy above we could mention Uitermark (2005: 141) here, in that 'most of the time policy shifts will occur within a particular regime'. That is to say, the dynamics of the discursive interdependencies then always take place within the same territorial cohesion discourse.

Moreover, each of the three orders presented above could exist in the concept's discursive practices too, as long as the discourse includes them all. Do note that if such orderings explicitly prescribe instead of, as is the case here, describe, they would be elements of mental programmes. Now these orderings (as "the" order) might still get in the way of an interpretation that tries to demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse though. We therefore have to release all territorial cohesion pro/positions from such orders again to recognise their dynamic and possibly multi-ordered discursive interdependencies.

16.2.3 Opening territorial cohesion up again to show many discursive interdependencies

Releasing the territorial cohesion pro/positions from orderings of their discursive interdependencies still allows a schematisation of them. That is, when you picture these pro/positions and interdependencies as "molten lava" (see 7.3.2), "streams" might have different directions (e.g. contradicting meanings), but some overlaps come forward nevertheless (e.g. mutually dependent pro/positions). To come up with such tendencies, the tables of the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning, which frames the concept's knowledge (see Part I), were compared with the schemas on the concept's usage (see Part II).

* One could picture this as a gymnasium floor with lines for multiple sports (e.g. basketball, volleyball, football): it is one floor, but with different orders. With the territorial cohesion discourse, the point is of course that the "game" played is unknown, it is not clear which rules hold. The patterns of it might simultaneously follow multiple orders though.
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

The cells of Table 1 below then present the results of this comparison per crossing of the concept's different kinds of meaning and usage areas. Note though, that it does not represent the strength of a proposition or position. Here we are namely more interested in the discursive interdependencies between them than in the mutual relations between either the propositions or between the positions separately seen (see Part I and II for this though). Simply put, the table below is concerned with the relationships between the concept's political and scientific realms.

The table brings the discursive interdependencies between the territorial cohesion pro/positions to the fore in two ways. All these propositions and positions are part of the discourse, however: either i) a meaning and usage correspond to each other (i.e. ‘pro/position’, the middle cell of each crossing) or ii) a meaning does not have a corresponding usage (i.e. ‘proposition’, the blue cells) or vice versa (i.e. ‘position’, the red cells). The correspondences and non-correspondences then together show the overlaps between pro/positions that point to the discursive interdependencies between them.

Table 1 Overlapping territorial cohesion pro/positions per crossing of kind of meaning and usage area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of meaning/usage area</th>
<th>IGCs</th>
<th>ipost-ESDP process</th>
<th>Regional/Cohesion Policy</th>
<th>European Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Descriptive</strong></td>
<td>- territorial identity/value of specific territorial features - complex web over several aspects and scales</td>
<td>- territorial identity - complex web over several aspects and scales</td>
<td>- territorial identity territorial effect of policies - territorial cohesion indicator - territorial disparities/sustainability/competitiveness - European Territorial Cohesion Index - (territorial) impacts policies/expenditure</td>
<td>- territorial cohesion indicator - territorial disparities/sustainability/competitiveness - value of specific territorial features - European Territorial Cohesion Index - (territorial) impacts policies/expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (territorial) impacts of policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- specific territories</td>
<td>- specific territories infrastructure</td>
<td>- specific territories infrastructure</td>
<td>- specific territories - impacts of State aid/GDP per capita measure - decentralisation index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative</strong></td>
<td>- will to be together - social justice</td>
<td>- will to be together - equality between territories - SG(E)I equality - European Social Model</td>
<td>- will to be together - social justice</td>
<td>- will to be together - social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- solidarity against territorial discrimination - equity wherever citizens live - SG(E)I equality - European Social Model</td>
<td>- solidarity among European citizens - spatial justice</td>
<td>- solidarity amongst territories - equity wherever citizens live - SG(E)I equality - European Social Model</td>
<td>- equality over whole territory - equality of opportunities - equal access to information - European Social Model/ liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- political transparency/legibility - unchangeable equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kind of meaning/usage area</td>
<td>IGCs</td>
<td>(post-)ESDP process</td>
<td>Regional/Cohesion Policy</td>
<td>European Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy objective</strong></td>
<td>- strengthen territorial potential</td>
<td>- territorial dimension of cohesion</td>
<td>- (territorial dimension of) cohesion</td>
<td>- (territorial dimension of) cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial dimension of cohesion</td>
<td>- (territorial) balanced/ sustainable/polycentric development/ competiveness</td>
<td>- (territorial) balanced/ sustainable/polycentric development/ competiveness</td>
<td>- (territorial) balanced/ sustainable/polycentric development/ competiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- balanced/sustainable/polycentric development</td>
<td>- SG(E)I provision</td>
<td>- SG(E)I provision</td>
<td>- SG(E)I provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- market mitigation</td>
<td>- strengthen territorial potential</td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- (territorial) market mitigation</td>
<td>- balance distribution of activities over EU</td>
<td>- balance distribution of activities over EU</td>
<td>- balance distribution of activities over EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental</strong></td>
<td>- improve specific territories</td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td>- improve (services of) specific territories</td>
<td>- improve (access) specific territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td>- regional/European integration</td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td>- regional/European integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- regional/European integration</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- regional/European integration</td>
<td>- competiveness</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
<td>- balanced development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- for ESDP/Lisbon Strategy/Gothenburg European Council</td>
<td>- economic and social cohesion</td>
<td>- economic and social cohesion</td>
<td>- European funds/cohesion policy for all regions/Europe's territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- polycentric development sustainability</td>
<td>- regional development</td>
<td>- regional development</td>
<td>- regional development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- infrastructure</td>
<td>whole EU territory</td>
<td>whole EU territory</td>
<td>whole EU territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- regional development</td>
<td>sustainable development</td>
<td>sustainable development</td>
<td>sustainable development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- European funds/cohesion policy for all regions/Europe's territory</td>
<td>- coordination of economic/development policies</td>
<td>- coherent spatial development</td>
<td>- additionality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- SG(E)I
- horizontal and vertical coordination
- vertical (spatial) policy coherence
- coordination of policies (with spatial impacts for cohesion policy)
- territorial policy integration
- regional policy/territorial policy integration
- coordination of sector policies (with spatial impacts)
- (spatial) coordination of sector policies
- coordination of sector policies with territorial impact
- coordination of sector policies (with regional policy/territorial impact)
- bundling of sector policies
- horizontal and vertical coordination
- vertical policy coherence
- coordination within one territory
- horizontal and vertical coordination
- coordination of economic/development policies
- coherent spatial development
- additionality
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kind of meaning/usage area</th>
<th>IGCs</th>
<th>Spatial planning</th>
<th>Regional/Cohesion Policy</th>
<th>European Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- as spatial planning</td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning</td>
<td>- French/German spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>- European spatial vision</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
<td>- form of spatial planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial development on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- from French/German spatial planning</td>
<td>- polycentrically reorganising Community territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU spatial planning competency</td>
<td></td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives/ spatial vision</td>
<td>- territorial/spatial development/planning on sub-EU levels</td>
<td>- spatial policy objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial governmentality</td>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial thinking</td>
<td>- combination of spatial thinking and governance</td>
<td>- combination of spatial thinking and governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- fine-grained territorial oversight</td>
<td>- rationale for organising European space</td>
<td>- new way of thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- combination of spatial thinking and governance</td>
<td>- territorial governance/ framework</td>
<td>- fine-grained (territorial) oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial dimension of policies</td>
<td>- territorial governance</td>
<td>- basis to promote sustainable economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- territorial governance/ framework</td>
<td>- territorial dimension</td>
<td>- territorial governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legal basis</td>
<td></td>
<td>- cooperation</td>
<td>- holistic approach</td>
<td>- territorial (dimension of) actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td>- decision on European geographical area</td>
<td>- new territorial way of doing</td>
<td>- holistic/spatial approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cooperation</td>
<td>- cooperation</td>
<td>- new territorial way of doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- European territorial strategy</td>
<td>- cooperation</td>
<td>- EU territorial cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- centralisation/republican model</td>
<td>- decentralisation</td>
<td>- combination of policy making and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- new territorial way of doing</td>
<td>- territorial cohesion strategy</td>
<td>- territorial/cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cooperation</td>
<td>- subsidiarity/capacity building</td>
<td>- subsidiarity/capacity strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- European territorial strategy</td>
<td>- competencies</td>
<td>- competencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- centralisation/republican model</td>
<td>- territorial cohesion strategy</td>
<td>- territorial cohesion strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- new territorial way of doing</td>
<td>- traditional European Funds approach</td>
<td>- traditional European Funds approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- cooperation</td>
<td>- not Member States’ territories but overlapping fields of action</td>
<td>- not Member States’ territories but overlapping fields of action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The in-fillings of the table were drawn rather sketchy, as the significance of the table just lies in showing that overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions appear. They therefore do not show that, for instance, certain definitions are used within a particular usage area, but direct us towards the third dimension of the territorial cohesion discourse (again, see section 7.2.1).

However, due to this sketchiness, only positions that in no way overlap with propositions (and vice versa) do not return in the table as ‘pro/positions’. There might thus appear more overlaps than would be justifiable on the basis of a more precise mapping of pro/positions; the more so when you consider that there are more

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* The labels in the table thus also do not directly refer to propositions and positions, but to groups of them and, more important, to groups of pro/positions with labels that suit both sides as much as possible (and these labels can thus differ from those used for propositions or positions on both).
and broader semantic than epistemic propositions, what leads to more overlapping pro/positions. Besides, as this table does not represent the strength of positions in power practices, neither contrapositions, which some have, come forward. Some overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions shown by the table therefore present a partisan picture (see §16.3 for how meanings/knowledges then choose sides). Hence, to prevent rash conclusions, it should be kept in mind that these overlaps point to (possible) discursive interdependences instead of representing them (e.g. as the only way).

Still, Table 1 is rich in content. The positions on which propositions could depend for instance do not appear in every usage area. We side-step the implications of this here (again, see §16.3), as we are now concerned with the total overlap between all the pro/positions. When you then look at the overlaps seen from the kinds of meaning, some remarkable exceptions come forward. The descriptive territorial cohesion meaning of territorial identity for instance does not return in the usage of the concept, while the meanings do not cover the common usage of the concept in matters of specific territories and infrastructure (only). The latter even holds for the policy objective definitions of territorial cohesion as well. The positions do cover all policy objective propositions though, just as they do for all instrumental ones, for which many exceptions appear the other way around (e.g. sustainable development). This holds less so when seen from the normative meanings, as here exceptions on both sides appear. Then again, besides that thereby the will to be together does not return in the concept's positions, we could wonder why the propositions do not cover an ideal of political transparency. When you look at the usage areas seen from the policy coherence meanings, at first sight also many exceptions appear on both sides. However, together the positions in the four usage areas totally overlap with the propositions, save for some detailed positions (e.g. coordination of economic policies). Likewise for the spatial planning pro/positions – and that the propositions are not bothered by competencies and regulations as the positions are is not that remarkable, as both strongly relate to practices. While the positions cover all territorial governmentality propositions too, except for the essential combination of spatial thinking and governance, what is remarkable here is that there are so many positions which add to this (e.g. new territorial way of doing, (territorial) cooperation, territorial cohesion strategy). Yet, what comes forward from Table 1 as most remarkable is that almost all territorial cohesion meanings and usages overlap. This does not only hold for the concept's semantic propositions (which are shown in Table 1), but also for its epistemic propositions. The territorial cohesion knowledges only partly fill the frame set for them by the concept's common ground of meaning though (see Chapter 10). For instance, in the policy objective meanings SG(E)I appears, but it does not do so in the associated knowledges. Such meanings then show the possibilities for knowledge construction. Still, absolutely seen, the epistemic propositions thus correspond less with the positions. We can then list these overlaps as they come forward via the Bedeutung implied by the territorial cohesion knowledges (again, see Chapter 10), as these can be recognised in the labels for pro/positions in Table 1.

The epistemic territorial cohesion propositions correspond the most with the concept's positions when it concerns its descriptive, normative, and policy objective knowledges – which is not surprising, as far less claims appear for the other kinds. The descriptive hyper-cube and layer approach intensions thereby return in the pro/positions of a complex web over several aspects and scales, to which the components of territorial cohesion intension adds those of territorial sustainable development, while the territorial capital intensions returns in the value of specific territorial features. The normative Rawlsian, equal opportunities, and quality of place intensions are in their turn covered by the pro/positions of, respectively, social/spatial justice, the European Social Model and those against territorial discrimination, and equity wherever citizens live. With the concept's policy objective knowledge the extensions return in the pro/positions, as economic cohesion, social cohesion, and polycentrism are almost identical to the (territorial dimension of) cohesion and polycentrism pro/positions – this is not surprising either, as policy objective definitions are these policy facts. The only

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a Although the same could be said vice versa, the groups of positions grouped per usage area overlap far more than the groups of propositions grouped by kind of meaning. As the latter are clearer and more stable, they are taken as departure-point.
b SG(E)I do appear in the spatial planning kind of territorial cohesion knowledges though.
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

epistemic proposition which is not covered by the positions is the hyper-cube intension, as policy objective intension that is (yet again, see §16.3).

Also in the epistemic propositions of the other territorial cohesion knowledges, just one appears that does not correspond to a position of the concept in power practices, and it reflects the not-covered semantic propositions. This is the for the territorial governmentality knowledge essential combination of spatial thinking and governance (this is the implied Bedeutung). Its other intensional fragments, such as a new territorial way of thinking and territorial approach, are covered by the concept’s positions. We further only have to take a pointer towards an instrumental intension into account, that is: different foci return in the pro/positions for Cohesion policy/CEMAT/ESDP/Lisbon Strategy/Gothenburg European Council. That is to say, neither the policy coherence nor spatial planning knowledges back up territorial cohesion Bedeutung – the system of spatial planning knowledge might be transposed though (see §16.3.3). Perhaps even more remarkable than the large overlap between territorial cohesion meanings and usages (i.e. almost all) is therefore the relatively seen even larger overlap between territorial cohesion knowledges and usages (i.e. all but two). Hence, generally speaking, it is an understatement to say that most territorial cohesion pro/positions overlap.

The corresponding pro/positions might then denote linkages between the concept’s meanings/knowledges and usages, that is, the network of discursive interdependencies that forms the territorial cohesion discourse – and because there are many pro/positions and thus even more linkages, this would be a complex network. The propositions without corresponding positions (e.g. territorial identity descriptions) and vice versa (e.g. specific territories) can also be seen as part of the territorial cohesion discourse. However, although these propositions and positions do not have to be weak in themselves, they obviously do show differences in the discourse between the territorial cohesion meanings/knowledges and the concept’s usages (i.e. between the “blue and red lines”) – which could have certain effects (see §16.3.2). For now it is enough to recognise that not-corresponding pro/positions at most suggest discursive interdependencies that do not tie the territorial cohesion discourse together but only to its side of meaning/knowledge or power practices. Still, most pro/positions instead seem to evidence that, simplistically put, politics and science do not only share the territorial cohesion discourse because both depend on the same concept, but also that discursive practices thereby link them.

Tewdwr-Jones&Morais Mourato (in Faludi, 2005a: 70) then see territorial cohesion as new economic concept. This does return in the kaleidoscopic system of territorial cohesion knowledge (see §10.2.8): quantitative, economic, and distributive descriptions and economic and technocratic conceivings of policy objectives appear as dominant pieces. However, here the point is not to bring forward weaker non-economic pro/positions (e.g. social indicators), neither that there seem to be non-economic dominant ones as well (e.g. social ideals), nor that those which are economic are not always dominant (e.g. coordination of economic policies). The point is that we are not interested in the dominance of pro/positions, but in which are in-/outside the territorial cohesion discourse.

To find out which pro/positions are territorial cohesion pro/positions and which are not is difficult enough in itself. The more so because they keep on changing: territorial cohesion knowledge is in construction and the concept’s usage also transforms. While we left the orderings of discursive interdependencies between these pro/positions behind us, discursive practices would network them together. What is more, the overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions more point to an explosion of possibilities for discursive interdependencies than their non-existence. With changing pro/positions, the network of discursive interdependencies would therefore not only be complex but dynamic too. In this interplay between meaning/knowledge and power practices, the territorial cohesion discourse could then for instance produce a common vocabulary (e.g. in spatial analysis) and embed institutional forms (e.g. in policy implementation), which in their turn reproduce the discourse. What leads us to the question how discursive interdependencies ensure power effects of knowledge and vice versa in the case of territorial cohesion.
Chapter 16

16.3 The power and knowledge effects of territorial cohesion

16.3.1 Power-knowledge effects in general

The territorial cohesion pro/positions overlap so much that there is only slim chance this is due to coincidence. We then look at their interplay in a Foucauldian discourse analytical fashion: as a tactical reciprocity between knowledge and power (see §2.2.2). This section therefore first treats ways in which knowledge can have effects in and on power practices (i.e. power effects of knowledge) and power practices in and on knowledge (i.e. knowledge effects of power). The next section then places the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions within them (see §16.3.2).

Power effects of knowledge (e.g. through administering, analysing policy problems, proposing intervention techniques) are so well-known, that studies even focus on it. Researching an ‘epistemic community’ is an approach for this, that is, ‘a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’ within that domain (Haas 1992: 3; Radaelli, 1999: 761). Although we do not follow this approach, the three characteristics of the policy process Radaelli (1999: 761) says it introduces might be interesting for us nevertheless: uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalisation of ideas. In power practices territorial cohesion for instance stands for systematic uncertainty. Haas (1992) then argues that with such radical uncertainty ‘there is no clear perception of what the interest of the actor is: accordingly, an epistemic community can generate a definition of interests by illuminating certain dimensions of an issue, from which an actor can deduce her/its interests. Interests therefore become a dynamic dependent variable, framed by knowledge’ (Radaelli, 1999: 761). Besides “normal” ways in which territorial cohesion knowledge can have power effects (see below), it could therefore also illuminate which positions can be taken with the concept. Moreover, Radaelli (1999: 762) holds that ‘the production of meaning is the key to the definition of interests and to the institutionalization of policy ideas.’ Territorial cohesion definitions could play this role by proposing on what to take positions with the concept. As such, they would be a clear case of politique spirituelle. Hence, even if we do not research the epistemic community of territorial cohesion, what becomes clear is that territorial cohesion knowledge can have power effects in uncertain practices by clarifying positions and/or proposing clarifications.

That power effects of knowledge are mediated by power could be taken for granted. Indo Veld & de Wit (2000: 154) for instance note that ‘large quantities of knowledge produced for the benefit of policy are never used in that policy-making. ‘ Due to power practices some knowledges have power effects and others do not. However, power might not only affect the usage of knowledge through selection, it can have more sinister effects as well.

In general, knowledge reassesses established forces by crystallising power relations in forms (e.g. structures of the social world; see §3.5.2). Yet, more particular ways in which power has knowledge effects appear too. Owens & Rayner & Bina (2004: 1945-1946) even pose that ‘in many cases[,] rather than being ignored, the output of particular assessments is invoked – perhaps even deliberately manipulated – in order to rationalise decisions that have been reached on other grounds.’ That is to say, power then does not only have effects on the usage of knowledge – what could make some knowledges more dominant in both science and politics than others –, but also on the production of it: power calls forth certain knowledge. Also in the case of territorial cohesion, power can therefore have knowledge effects by being crystallised or even by invoking certain epistemic formations.

Again, when it concerns power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power, a Foucauldian discourse analysis is not interested in causal relationships. Even when you put its general scepticism towards the existence of ‘real world knowledge’ to the side (i.e. without real world knowledge, no knowledge of the real cause; see §7.1.1), power that in a certain way has knowledge effects could already be affected by knowledge. That is, instead of answering the question of where the beginning lies, we just note that territorial cohesion pro/positions reinforce each other.
This is similar to research on epistemic communities in their interplay with wider coalitions (e.g. Sabatier 1998), in that then the theoretical rationale ‘is that often knowledge and interests are in a symbiotic relation’ (Radaelli, 1999: 762). Owens & Rayner & Bina (2004) for instance point out that despite the extensive critique on the technical-rational model, it has had significant leverage in legislation, policy rhetoric, and evaluation techniques (also see §16.3.2). This model namely provides policy with rationality and legitimisation and it shelters science from political debate (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007), as it for instance allows for the provision of disinterested knowledge to power. Territorial cohesion pro/positions could likewise ensure a reciprocal productivity. However, even without such a model, these pro/positions reinforce each other when discursive interdependencies network them together in various ways (i.e. the above-mentioned and more). Before we can answer the question what tactical reciprocity this entails (e.g. which power practices need these knowledges and which knowledges need these power practices), we therefore have to show how the dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions can be placed in this reciprocal productivity of knowledge and power.

16.3.2 Territorial cohesion pro/positions in the reciprocal productivity of knowledge and power

To go beyond the general power-knowledge effects to their reciprocal productivity which is specific for territorial cohesion, we can start by cross-referencing to other territorial cohesion studies. Hamez (in Campbell, 2005: 401) for instance puts forward that ‘territorial cohesion is a concept derived from the policy sphere’, and Tatzberger (2003) that it is the outcome of a political rather than a theoretical and/or scientific debate. However, thus only beginnings are dealt with (i.e. policy, politics), power-knowledge effects at most one-sidedly (i.e. power with effects; although they do not mention knowledge), but reciprocal productivity is not. Evidence for both the concept’s power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power therefore becomes the more important.

Yet, such reciprocal productivity might merely be in creation, as there is no stratified territorial cohesion knowledge (yet) (see Chapter 10) – what makes power effects of knowledge for instance difficult to picture. Then again, for the concept much does point to power-knowledge effects such as those mentioned above, as territorial cohesion meanings, intensions, and extensions overlap with its positions in power practices. Territorial cohesion definitions could therefore indeed have defined interests. Moreover, a debate only about meaning that clarifies the concept is hard to find and always appears entwined with power issues. Even one of the two epistemic propositions which are not covered by positions could point to power-knowledge effects. The policy objective hyper-cube intension namely does not only filter the descriptive hyper-cube and components of territorial cohesion intensions for policy (see §10.2.4), but a hyper-cube that more gives a system for various directions than direction might also be too complex to be used in power practices. As the door stands wide open, territorial cohesion examples are therefore needed of power-knowledge effects ensured by discursive interdependencies.

As the concept’s overlaps between pro/positions differ per usage area, territorial cohesion knowledge could have effects in different power practices and vice versa. The positions that in this respect stand out in the European Funds usage area are those on combining policy making and research. Although many power-knowledge effects could result from such a combination, an important example comes forward which is related to the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area. Faludi (2003b: 135) namely states that ‘the Commission is searching for indicators on which it can base territorial cohesion policy’ (i.e. power with knowledge effects), and Husar (2006: 97) that the definition of territorial indicators ‘could potentially reform the distribution of the financial resources going to areas in need as part of EU Cohesion Policy’ (i.e. knowledge with power effects). Discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion propositions on indicators and positions in the
Regional/Cohesion policy and European Funds usage areas on the distribution of funds might thus ensure power-knowledge effects.

A less obvious example of power-knowledge effects relates to this. That is, in the Third Cohesion Report (CEC, 2004a) the relations between the various scales with territorial cohesion are not treated explicitly as such (e.g. which scale’s cohesion and/or growth to favour?). However, in the measurement of territories (with indicators) hierarchy does appear: politico-administrative actors seem only to measure their sub-territories (see §10.2.2); these actors are also presupposed identities, but this is more a general mental programme than one of territorial cohesion. For measurement by ESPON (also see §16.3.3) always a higher level, with its own preferences, then seems to be needed. Also discursive interdependencies between propositions on measurement (i.e. knowledge asked for and thus affected by power) and such positions on government levels (i.e. hierarchical knowledge has power effects) might thus ensure power-knowledge effects.

Another example comes forward due to the absence of certain territorial cohesion knowledge. In the usage areas positions are namely taken on specific territories. However, territorial cohesion knowledge always appears to treat all territories or the territorial in the general sense instead. In that case knowledge could reinforce the positions for a Cohesion policy for all regions, or at least not those of specific territories only. Still, in all in all, this does not give that many territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects. Yet, more come forward with certain discursive interdependencies, that is, those concerned with spatial planning – enough of them for an own section (see §16.3.3). Moreover, there might not be many specific territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects due to a general feature of the concept, that is, its openness.

Faludi (2003b: 135) for instance holds that ‘in the bands of the Commission territorial cohesion might become as abstract a concept as the celebrated, but spatially empty concept of a level playing field.’ While we are not interested in the European Commission or other particular institutions in the European Union, the concept indeed seems, to follow Husar (2006: 4), to be reinforced politically, but its contents, indicators, and targets to be left open. This could relate to power-knowledge effects too, as Husar (2006: 4) notes that ‘[t]his openness is an advantage considering the diverse interests and institutional settings which need to be combined to come to an agreement between Member States’. However, as Polverari&Bachtler (in Faludi, 2005a: 40) say: ‘The fact that territorial cohesion is ‘an undefined policy objective’ [is] likely to have evident implications for policy design and implementation with respect to the explicit targeting of territorial cohesion through future Structural Fund support’ (e.g. through indicators; see above). When it concerns the actual implementation of the concept the same openness might therefore be a disadvantage, according to Husar (2006: 4) because this ‘requires a common ground that can be communicated to all stakeholders.’ These power-knowledge effects due the concept’s openness thus lead to three deductions: i) the absence of certain territorial cohesion knowledge could be an effect of power, ii) knowledge of this openness could have power effects, and iii) these power-knowledge effects could change (e.g. for implementation). Territory cohesion knowledge could then play an essential role in power practices by clarifying positions and/or proposing clarifications.

We thus lack territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects, as merely four relationships come forward: i) between indicators and positions on the distribution of funds, ii) measurement and positions on scales, iii) knowledge of all territories and positions for a Cohesion policy for all regions, and iv) between openness and political agreement. That discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions lead to a tactical reciprocity between knowledge and power would then mostly be speculation. Then again, if there is so much smoke (i.e. overlap between pro/positions) and some finds of fire (i.e. the few examples above), the question could be why no-one is looking.

Perhaps the answer lies in that it might not so much be that this tactical reciprocity is not known, but that it is considered as unproblematic. In 2004, Robert for instance posed that ‘[a]fter 10 years of lobbying and
political debate, it is time to know what territorial cohesion really is and how it can be achieved. Such a more thorough debate will according to Husar (2006: 97) have to clarify how the concept directs policies ‘without imposing a rigid corset that fails to allow for adequate adaptation to specific territorial potentials and needs’; note that this might be the first time that an element of a mental programme shines through (i.e. clarifications about which positions can be taken). Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) even explicitly brings forward that the real problem for territorial cohesion ‘is not that the policymakers intervene in the discussion, but that they do not so sufficiently and in a more inclusive, transparent and explicit manner.’ No arguments for such a symbiotic relation appear though. Hence, the tactical productivity between territorial cohesion knowledge and power might not be researched because it is taken for granted (i.e. as beneficial).

16.3.3 A transposition of spatial planning’s tactical productivity into territorial cohesion with pivotal help from ESPON

In Part I came forward that a (part of) the system of spatial planning knowledge could be transposed into territorial cohesion. Although no reasons appear for why this is territorial cohesion’s system of knowledge instead of another, claims of for instance the layer approach, spatial visions, and a new rationality for organising European space do tie territorial cohesion knowledge together in a way familiar to spatial planning (see §10.2.6); the concept’s intensional fragments of territorial governmentality knowledge give room for a thinking spatial that resembles spatial planning too (see §10.2.7). Just as this system could fill in the undefined structure of territorial cohesion’s common ground, the concept’s power practices might partly come from European spatial planning, as the (post-)ESDP process is one of its four usage areas (see Chapter 11). Therefore not only the system of spatial planning knowledge might be transposed into the concept, but also the involved discursive interdependencies into the territorial cohesion discourse. Before it is shown that the resulting tactical productivity would then revolve around ESPON, below some of the involved power-knowledge effects in spatial planning are treated first.

If a shared discourse is as important for spatial planning as Faludi (2004d: 156) says it is, power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power might be easy to detect. The more so when a traditional symbiotic relation between knowledge and interests returns in European spatial planning. Its research would, according to Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007), namely largely be grounded in the technical-rational model Owen&Rayner&Bina (2004) point out, thereby helped by the technocratic nature of European Union policies (e.g. when it concerns easy to measure indicators). As in this model objective assessments directly lead to better decisions (also see §16.3.1), it clearly suggests power effects of knowledge. Befittingly, ESPON was to become a “survey before plan” observatory (Van Gestel&Faludi, in Faludi, 2005a: 89) and many of the experts involved act as expert advisors in their Member States (Husar, 2006: 91). That is to say, although no specific spatial planning examples of knowledge with power effects come forward here, the research tradition and institutions seem to be set up for such usage of it.

With a technical-rational model, the same would hold vice versa. As Schön (in Campbell, 2005: 396) states plainly: ‘strategic spatial planning also needs detailed knowledge about the development of territories and spatial relationships’. The creation of ESPON played a central role in the production of this ESPON knowledge on the European level. Interreg, through which it was financed, thereby drew thousands of (university) experts ‘within the orbit of the ESDP’, creating a European spatial planning community (Zetter, 2002; Faludi, 2003b: 126, 135) with few planners standing outside it (Officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006). Again, although this is not a spatial planning example of a knowledge effect of power, the research institutions are set for the production of knowledge that the exercise of power needs on the level of the European Union.

Besides that power brings forward the production of certain knowledge, it might have more particular effects in spatial planning too. With Territorial Impact Assessment, knowledge tools would for instance be pushed by the requirements to build big new infrastructure rather than the need for effective spatial planning (Williams&Connolly&Healey, 2000; Schindegger, 2001; Jensen&Richardson, 2003). For the European level Husar...
Chapter 16

(2006: 42n73) then mentions the influence of the Member States and the European Commission in the selection of indicators. Such particulars are important, because ESPON (2004: 113) tries to create scientific coherence through its programme, and thus to select which knowledges are part of this. Yet, the ESPON documents themselves state that they do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ESPON Monitoring Committee; this on top of the short time for reaching conclusions which could endanger scientific quality (Husar, 2006: 42n73). What leaves us wondering whether the ESPON's knowledge or coherence is scientific or accords with which opinions (which are always specific).

This difference between science and opinion is fundamental. When the coherence is a scientific one, it namely leads to knowledge (i.e. descriptive, e.g. useful for policy). When the coherence is based on opinions instead, it shows politique spirituelle in the form of a policy frame that orders the interpretation of behaviour. That is to say, this coherence then is part of a mental programme that prescribes which territorial cohesion positions can be taken up (e.g. a balance between or contraposition of economic and social cohesion). In that case we do not directly speak of power-knowledge effects (i.e. our focus), but a policy frame that can affect both knowledge and other power practices.

Jensen & Richardson (2003) then direct our attention to knowledge effects of power in European spatial planning more in general. They namely want to carefully scrutinise the development of the system of spatial analysis within the ESDP framework. Hereby policy ideas (e.g. spatial integration, peripherality) would 'become embedded in new frameworks for compartmentalisig our understanding of the world' (Jensen & Richardson, 2003), as they become criteria in analyses. One could ask which indicators will be used in this for instance; note that if these policy ideas would affect power practices instead of knowledge they would be part of a mental programme. However, while Jensen & Richardson (2003) see the development of such a system as a crucial step between rhetoric and institutionalisation, they also note it is difficult to track.

The lack of spatial planning examples attests for this – save for those studies on Territorial Impact Assessment and pointers to knowledge effects of power on the European level in the case of indicators. Because the research tradition and institutions seem to be set up for tactical productivity (i.e. a technical-rational kind), it might therefore in the case of European spatial planning be taken as much for granted as with territorial cohesion. This would suggest the transposition of spatial planning's discursive interdependencies into the territorial cohesion discourse too, or at least that it would be a good fit.

Yet, some reflect on these power-knowledge effects in European spatial planning. Bengs (2004: 2) wants to follow the dualism of science and politics associated with the technical-rational approach (e.g. there should be no power-knowledge effects), Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) believes that in ESPON the assumptions of this approach will be unravelled (e.g. no false assumption of disinterested knowledge), and Van Gestel & Faludi (in Faludi, 2005a: 89) even pose that ESPON became a dynamic research network instead of a 'survey before plan' institution that fits this approach. However, an unravelling of the technical-rational model and plea that science and politics should be separate do not matter much. Power and knowledge in European spatial planning can namely still have their interplay, also in a dynamic network fashion.

As Van Gestel & Faludi (in Faludi, 2005a: 82) for instance tell us: indicators from ESPON might always have a political element instead of being truly objective. Moreover, the tendencies in European spatial policy research could remain the same. That is to say, it could generally speaking remain overly-reliant on quantitative data (e.g. indicators) (Zonnveld & Waterhout, in Faludi, 2005a) and focus on describing European policy-making and spatial development trends (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007) instead of understanding the emerging new spatial focus in the European Union (Bohme & Richardson & Dabinett & Jensen, 2004: 1178). Also without a technical-rational approach, the tactical productivity of European spatial planning then delivers knowledge affected by and for the exercise of power.

The involved discursive interdependencies of spatial planning can then (partially) be transposed into the territorial cohesion discourse, especially with the former's research tradition (i.e. mostly technical-rational) and institutions (i.e. ESPON). Note though, that notwithstanding that European spatial planning might exist tangibly now (Janin Rivolin, 2005a: 22-23), such influences would be informal, as both lack an institutional
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

definition. That is to say, when Janin Rivolin (2005a: 23) is right in that such a definition of European spatial planning 'would also contribute to making territorial cohesion a truly accountable and effective policy', the influences remain between both with an unaccountable and ineffective territorial cohesion policy. Mental programmes could then support the transposition, such as territorial cohesion policies that use the language of European spatial planning (e.g. ESDP concepts). Then again, not so much mental programmes but expertise seems to play a pivotal role here, this in the form of ESPON.

As ESPON (2004: 7) notes itself: 'Observation of the European territory and its evolution is an important prerequisite to formulating territorial cohesion policies and for the application of the [ESDP] in Community, national and regional policies.' Following Husar (2006: 42), the latter appears to have been followed up, as 'ESPON findings contribute to a large extent to the elaboration of the document "Territorial State and Perspectives of the EU"' (i.e. a part of the post-ESDP process). The question then is which power-knowledge effects come forward from this spatial planning observation of the territory for territorial cohesion. However, these effects might not so much come with observation, but with the abovementioned creation of ESPON's scientific coherence; note that we for now follow the path that this coherence is scientific, else the expertise only lies in politique spirituelle (e.g. policy frames).

ESPON (2004) explicitly mentions power-knowledge effects in this creation of scientific coherence. Besides power effects of knowledge because this coherence is deemed especially important for the elaboration of policy recommendations, the committed support for a common terminology and methodology fixes knowledge effects of power (ESPON, 2004: 97). Spatial development goals, political goals that is, are namely interpreted and operationalised for a data-based statistical and empirical judgement of the coincidences and discrepancies of development trends compared with development goals' (ESPON, 2004: 97). This of course merely showcases the (technical-rational) tendencies in European spatial policy research (e.g. indicators for criteria). Yet, an area of innovation is 'the topics and issues analysed', territorial cohesion amongst others (ESPON, 2004: 98). This opens up a transposition of spatial planning’s discursive interdependencies and associated power-knowledge effects in territorial cohesion.

It should then come as no surprise when Husar (2006: 46) says that with ‘guidance from constant strategic exchanges between the CEC and the Member States in the ESPON Monitoring committee and the analytical tools developed so far, ESPON stays close to the development of the territorial cohesion discourse’. Moreover, according to an officer from the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (Personal interview in Brussels, 1st of February 2006), the “ESPON research community’s” interpretation of territorial cohesion slowly sides to the one of ESPON’s Monitoring Committee. The territorial cohesion discourse might thus be formed, at least partially, according to the knowledge effects of power ESPON fixes.

Some more specific and related examples then hint at tactical productivity, including power effects of knowledge that is. ESPON for instance holds that a more dynamic perception of territorial cohesion ‘is far from being accepted right now, what could explain that its implications have not yet been explored in the ESPON research’ (BBR, 2005c: 121-122). Whatever this dynamic perception entails, it seems to exemplify that only what is accepted in power practices will be researched.

As mentioned above, openness of the concept and political agreement on territorial cohesion relate (i.e. not everything, but much is accepted). ESPON itself then spells out the power-knowledge effects involved in ESPON: given the sensitiveness of the issue [of territorial cohesion], it seems more sensible in the ESPON context to focus on what is (seen) inside the concept (bottom-up) rather than to try to delineate it abstractly in a normative way (top-down) which would hardly fit with the current standpoints’ (BBR, 2005c: 119). These current standpoints in power practices thus affect the focus of ESPON, which in its turn has power effects. Namely, although ESPON’s approach ‘should be sufficiently broad in order to encompass the different visions (there is no a priori reason to eliminate some and keep others); it also gives ‘as much coherence as possible to the whole’ (BBR, 2005c: 119). That is to say, although the knowledge coming from ESPON then would not

Note that ESPON’s approach should also fit in a process, as it can be expected that the reflection on territorial cohesion will be an ongoing one, built step by step along with the progress of “territorial awareness” (BBR, 2005c: 119).
choose between the standpoints it takes up from power practices, it does clarify them in a descriptive order which is useful for these practices. Hence, the tactical productivity coming forward through ESPON is that the variety of standpoints in power practices limits the territorial cohesion knowledge to be produced, and when it is produced this knowledge is serviceable in power practices because it orders this variety.

Power-knowledge effects that such a tactical productivity entail for instance appear in ESPON project 3.2 which intended to develop a European Territorial Cohesion Index. As Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) says: 'This multi-faceted nature of the concept and the problems of developing an index which can effectively capture complexity have confronted ESPON with not just a technical challenge but also a highly political one (e.g. which criteria, weighting, thresholds). Hereby power effects of knowledge come forward in two ways: i) the index allows for European spatial planning knowledge, or at least ESPON, to enter debates in the European Union (see §14.2.3) and ii) insofar the index is used its content matters.

Consequential for the latter is that ESPON project 3.2 made some changes due to the substantial obstacles it faced; thereby staying well within the tendencies of spatial policy research (i.e. quantitative data and a focus on describing spatial development trends). It namely decided to postpone the research on statistical and cartographic tools and to focus more on the availability of data which could be used for the development of a composite index taking into account the three dimensions of the ESDP and the definition of territorial cohesion (ESPON 3.2, 2005: 32; Husar, 2006: 50). That this research starts with policy ideas shows the knowledge effects of power. And do note the mention of 'the definition of territorial cohesion.' Besides the arbitrariness of a definition (see §9.3.1) and ESPON’s notice of this (see above), the dominance of economic indicators (e.g. over social ones; see §10.2.2) has a role to play here as well. According to Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007), 'the institutional setting and the economic policy discourse within the European spatial development research perpetuate [the] policy emphasis on the economic dimension of territorial cohesion.' Because we might add that the same holds vice versa, also with ESPON’s European Territorial Cohesion Index a tactical productivity is thus shown by reciprocal power-knowledge effects.

When the discursive interdependencies are concerned with spatial planning, more territorial cohesion examples of power-knowledge effects thus come forward. This suggests a (partial) transposition of spatial planning's tactical productivity into the territorial cohesion discourse. The technical-rational research tradition and research institutions of European spatial planning thereby seem to be set up for the usage of knowledge in power practices (e.g. descriptions for policy) and for the production of that knowledge which the exercise of power needs (e.g. quantitative indicators). Insofar Territorial Impact Assessment is pushed for big infrastructure and politics influences the selection of indicators, they illustrate the knowledge effects of power this entails. The discursive interdependencies involved then form a taken for granted tactical productivity which also works in a dynamic network instead of the "survey before plan" observatory ESPON was meant to be.

The associated experts, which are often advisors too, might hereby form a planning community with few outsiders; and if ESPON’s coherence merely accrds to opinions instead of science, the involved expertise lays in mental programmes (see Part IV). Expertise then plays a pivotal role in the transposition of tactical productivity mentioned above, the more so because the concept belongs to the new topics and issues ESPON analyses and the creation of scientific coherence would be important for policy recommendations too. Examples of this are that: i) ESPON does not research a dynamic perception of the concept when it is not accepted, ii) the current variety of standpoints limits ESPON’s focus, and iii) ESPON’s order of those standpoints could be serviceable in power practices. ESPON’s European Territorial Cohesion Index for instance brings European spatial planning into debates of the European Union and its content reinforces power practices as it starts with policy ideas and economic indicators dominate. However, no coherence of knowledge appears – as could be expected after Part I showed the lack of a system of territorial cohesion knowledge. Instead, spatial planning’s reciprocal effects between power and knowledge might structure the territorial cohesion discourse, at least partly. What begs the question of how to characterise the resulting tactical productivity.

* Taking up certain standpoints (and not others) can have power effects too of course (e.g. see §16.3.2: knowledge on all territories or the territorial in general do not reinforce territorial cohesion positions on specific territories but those on a Cohesion policy for all regions).
16.3.4 Characterising territorial cohesion's tactical productivity

The dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between the overlapping territorial cohesion pro/positions seems to point to reciprocal power-knowledge effects. This tactical productivity can then be characterised in an oversimplified fashion by following Weis (1977), especially when it concerns ESPON. Whether technical-rational or not, it namely appears to emphasise ‘research for policy’s sake’, with the danger that this ‘leads to a selective construction of knowledge, leaving behind areas perceived as not having immediate policy relevance’ (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). Knowledge effects of power clearly come forward in – if not ‘research for policy’s sake’, then – policy-centred research.

Policy-centred research even clearer implies power effects of the produced knowledge of course (i.e. if used), also by reinforcing the status quo. The latter might work through education, especially insofar territorial cohesion follows its roots of aménagement du territoire (i.e. the French spatial planning tradition; see §12.1.3 for how stories on this structure the concept’s usage). French education namely endorses ‘the harmony of the French territoire, with its “natural borders” shaping a regular hexagon, mixing diversity into a unity guaranteed by the nation state’ (Peyrony, in Faludi, 2007). You can expect that if knowledge (e.g. education) and power (e.g. the nation state) limited each other so strongly, this could make the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse much easier.

However, the point is that territorial cohesion's tactical productivity builds forth upon links between semantic and epistemic arbitrariness and inconsistency on the one hand and a contested topical order that bares the systematic uncertainty of the concept's usage on the other. When Husar (2006: 103) desires that ‘the interplay of power and knowledge in influencing outcomes be acknowledged and serve the outcome’, our question thus becomes: what outcome?

Vogelij (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006) then sees the in-filling of territorial cohesion as important task for the field of spatial development and planning. This would underline a (partial) transposition of spatial planning's tactical productivity into territorial cohesion. For Vogelij (in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006), territorial cohesion can namely reinforce urban and regional territorial capital, and spatial planners could play an essential strategic role by identifying and reinterpreting it for future developments. Moreover, he does not only bring forward such power effects of knowledge, but also vice versa, by letting (this time) Dutch education follow policy. That is to say, Dutch planning education should also prepare for the importance of the policy objective of territorial cohesion due to its consequences on planning practices (Vogelij, in Janssen-Jansen&Waterhout, 2006). In the case of territorial cohesion even the acknowledgment of the in spatial planning taken for granted tactical productivity might thus reproduce policy-centred research.

A transposition of spatial planning's tactical productivity would not form the whole territorial cohesion discourse though, because a significant part of both the territorial cohesion propositions (e.g. applied social justice intensions) and the concept's positions (e.g. most in the Region/Cohesion policy usage area) lies elsewhere. When economic pro/positions dominate territorial cohesion, for example, one could ask in how far spatial planning is actually transposed, whether it changed thereby, and which pro/positions are simply economics instead of spatial planning.

Jensen&Richardson (2003) for instance hold for European spatial planning that economic evaluation elevated to hegemonic status. ‘Economic criteria will be used to justify EU intervention in projects, while environmental knowledge will support decisions rather than carry any binding power’ (Jensen&Richardson, 2003). Then again, also such critique on this dominance belongs to the territorial cohesion discourse, as shown by for instance Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) and André&Moreira (2002) when it concerns indicators (see §10.2.2). Moreover, as Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007) rather sees critical research conducted that brings the European Social Model forward and general stories on this model frame the concept's power practices in the Regional/Cohesion policy usage area (see Part II), also pro/positions running against the dominance of economics are part of the territorial cohesion discourse. The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse should therefore include both its various parts (e.g. spatial planning, economics) and debates around its dominances (e.g. economics).
Chapter 16

Note though that there is no critique on policy-centred research in itself, but only on its particular infilling (i.e. too economic, not enough social). Yet, even if territorial cohesion knowledge, power, and thus its discourse would be limited by this tactical productivity, the question is by what more it is too (see Chapter 17).

16.4 Conclusions on the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions

16.4.1 Evidencing the discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion pro/positions
This chapter evidences that the crux of the intellectual and political arbitrariness of the territorial cohesion pro/positions lies in the ways discursive interdependencies relate them. On the one side territorial cohesion knowledge thereby depends on the concept's common ground of arbitrary meanings which are inconsistently structured by seven kinds, and together the seven kinds of epistemic forms and objects then construct the territorial cohesion gaze. On the other side the territorial cohesion positions in the four usage areas appear to be contested in everything, due to which the concept stands for systematic uncertainty. That European politics would affect much of the territorial cohesion discussion and research on it might have policy implications then points to relations between these sides.

However, a chaotic picture of discursive practices appears when you see either the relations between territorial cohesion pro/positions through perspectives of actors in the European Union or the various institutional origins of a vague common content. Abstracter orderings with main political purposes of territorial cohesion (e.g. steer the regional policy after 2006) or its storylines (e.g. Green and Clean Europe) underline this due to their marked differences. Hence, the suggestion to conclude that the concept is too dynamic to descriptively order thus and/or that the discursive interdependencies which mark its discursive practices are multi-ordered.

Yet, when one crosses the concept's different kinds of meaning/knowledge and usage areas, this schematisation does remarkably show that almost all pro/positions correspond; relatively seen the smaller amount of epistemic propositions even more correspond with positions in power practices than the larger amount of semantic propositions do. Although some exceptions on this large overlap exist – such as the descriptive meaning of territorial identity that does not return in the concept's usages and positions on specific territories vice versa –, at least many possibilities for linkages therefore appear. The questions then are how possibilities of articulation emerge out of such a dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion knowledge under construction and the concept's transforming usage and what this means for territorial cohesion expertise.

16.4.2 From territorial cohesion's tactical reciprocity towards the demarcation of its discourse
In the case of territorial cohesion, pro/positions might not reinforce each other merely by overlapping, as the discursive interdependencies between them also seem to ensure reciprocal power-knowledge effects. Knowledge can thereby inform the activity of government due to the concept's uncertain practices, for which it can clarify positions (e.g. define interests) and/or propose clarifications (e.g. order positions to take). Besides that government can then select the knowledge to use, it can also affect knowledge by being mentally crystallised as a programme (e.g. potestas) or by invoking certain epistemic formations. For territorial cohesion such power effects of knowledge and knowledge effects of power come forward in relations between: i) indicators and positions on the distribution of funds, ii) measurement and positions on government levels, iii) knowledge of all territories and positions for a Cohesion policy for all regions, and iv) between openness and political agreement. These power-knowledge effects then form a tactical productivity.

Territorial cohesion's tactical productivity can be characterised as policy-centred (e.g. research for policy's sake), whereby knowledge reinforces the status quo (e.g. through education). Another feature is that economics dominates the associated critique and pro/positions running counter to it (e.g. more social). Moreover, spatial
The network of territorial cohesion pro/positions

planning's tactical productivity might (partially) be transposed into territorial cohesion as well, for which expertise and ESPON in particular seems to play a pivotal role. In general this could entail a research tradition and institutions set up for the symbiotic relation between knowledge and power of either the technical-rational approach or a more dynamic network interplay, as shown by descriptions of European policy-making and spatial development trends that are useful for policy and how quantitative indicators cater to policy needs.

Four more specific examples of this transposition appear as well. For instance, ESPON will not research a dynamic perception of territorial cohesion when it is not accepted. That ESPON's research on a European Territorial Cohesion Index starts with policy ideas then reminds us that those of the ESDP would be embedded in spatial analysis. Besides such knowledge effects of power, power effects of knowledge appear here too. That is to say, while European politics would influence the selection of indicators in the case of spatial planning, the same index could allow spatial planning to enter debates in the European Union and perpetuate the dominance of the economic dimension of territorial cohesion with its indicators. It is thus not surprising that ESPON deems its creation of scientific coherence as important for policy recommendations. This is shown by ESPON's descriptive clarification of territorial cohesion standpoints in an order, which is both useful for power practices and limits ESPON's epistemic focus. All of this suggests that territorial cohesion expertise does not only mediate between actions and objects of politique, but that its knowledge would depend on power practices too.

This tactical productivity of territorial cohesion might not be considered as problematic though, because it is overlooked, taken for granted, or seen as beneficial – just as in spatial planning. Nevertheless, our problem with this tactical productivity of territorial cohesion knowledge and the concept's power practices is that it limits which articulations are considered to be reasonable in the case of territorial cohesion. The question then becomes how it does so, that is, what demarcates the territorial cohesion discourse (see Chapter 17).