The place where streams seek ground. Towards a new territorial governmentality: the meaning and usage of the concept of territorial cohesion in the European Union

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Chapter 17  The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

Introduction

This chapter will set up the rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse and thereby indicate the necessary and forbidden articulations of concept's expertise. Yet, it appears to be characterised by having to do with multiple discourses. Before an overview of them is presented (§17.1.2 until 17.1.7), territorial cohesion is therefore considered as Discursive Nodal Point, as through this perspective three ways come forward in which it can include these discourses (§17.1.1). We are namely concerned with how also such inclusions establish the lines that structure and demarcate territorial cohesion expertise (§17.2.1). This is caught in the hypothetical rules that individualise the system of territorial cohesion knowledge and its associated practices, that is, the discourse (§17.2.2), and their conditions (§17.2.3) and the relations to its context (§17.2.4). The conclusion then suggests how this discourse can be understood as a territorial governmentality in creation (§17.3).

17.1 Territorial cohesion as Discursive Nodal Point of many discourses

17.1.1 The ways in which territorial cohesion functions as a Discursive Nodal Point

The discourse analysis carried out thus far shows that territorial cohesion can be considered as a Discursive Nodal Point, because the concept accords to most if not all of their four features (see §7.2.2). It surely is essentially contested (i), as its creative phase, semantic and epistemic arbitrariness (see Part I), and systematic uncertainty (see Part II) attest. It could also be a central political concept around which knowledge and power are re-inscribed into the scientific and political debates (ii). Territorial cohesion's tactical productivity would ensure this re-inscription (see Chapter 16).

However, the concept's centrality is questionable, as it is used in rather marginal areas of European Union action (e.g. European spatial planning, a small if any role in European funds). When ESPON for instance conducted interviews in the European Union's administration, territorial cohesion, as most of the crosscutting concepts with a specific spatial dimension, was 'not considered very important by many interviewees' (Nordregio, 2006a: 78). The concept might for example less be about growth, cohesion, or balance between both, but more about a way in which such issues can be dealt with (e.g. analysed, structured, deliberated). Although territorial cohesion knowledge and power might then be re-inscribed without much ado, it can still be treated as a central concept, for the involved marginal areas of action that is (iii). Moreover, when the concept is indeed crosscutting and about a way to deal with various issues, this points to another feature of discursive nodal points: in it discourses (e.g. on more general concepts) tie together (iv). The question then becomes how discourses tie together in the case of territorial cohesion.

They could do so in three particular ways (see §7.1.2). As territorial cohesion knowledge did not stratify (yet) and the concept's power practices are uncertain, its discourse did not develop into a definite stage, which might therefore emerge through the combination of existing ones. Another way in which discourses could tie together in the concept comes forward in Waterhout's (2003; in Faludi, 2007) storylines that indicate the potential elements of future territorial cohesion policy (e.g. Europe in Balance, SG(E)I, Policy Coherence). For his two orders of discursive interdependencies (see §16.2.2) he namely follows Hajer (2000: 140; Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007) in that storylines bridge different policy discourses (e.g. 'SG(E)I' and 'Territorial Governance'), which would then tie together in territorial cohesion. When territorial cohesion is a crosscutting concept, this of course also brings forward a way in which territorial cohesion combines discourses. The possible (partial) transposition of spatial planning's tactical productivity into territorial cohesion for instance reminds us of the multidisciplinarity of the former. Planning would namely have no endogenous body of theory (Sorensen, 1982), but 'draws upon a wide range of theories and practices from different disciplines' (Allmendinger, 2002: 78). We
can therefore treat territorial cohesion as a **Discursive Nodal Point** which is essentially contested in several ways, re-inscribes knowledge and power into marginal debates, and in which multiple discourses tie together in a new combination, as policy discourses, and/or in the concept’s particular form.

Most steps in the analysis of territorial cohesion through the **Discursive Nodal Point** perspective (see §7.2.3) are already taken, except for the role discourses play in this. Although territorial cohesion conceptualisations are reconstructed (see Part I), they are not represented as coming from various discourses. In a similar way the concept’s metanarratives are reconstructed (see Part II), but not as on what these various discourses draw. Besides that these two roles of discourses should be explored, the final step of reconstructing the rules according to which discursive practices tie territorial cohesion conceptualisations and metanarratives together should be taken too of course. Which brings us to the question how then to bring discourses to the fore.

Below this is first done by cross-referring to discourses which might be combined in territorial cohesion. Discursive articulations could namely stabilise a field of them through the pinning down of both territorial cohesion meanings in metanarratives and their mutual relations (see §7.2.2). The large overlaps between territorial cohesion pro/positions (see §16.2.3) give many possibilities for this. When the concept functions as **Discursive Nodal Point**, it could for example pin down both social cohesion as policy objective meaning and competitiveness as instrumental meaning in the ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area (see §12.2.2). The two roles of discourses then come forward: when ‘social cohesion’ and ‘competitiveness’ come from different discourses (see §17.1.4), these thus provide different territorial cohesion conceptualisations while being supported by the same territorial cohesion metanarrative; note that not only the metanarrative does so, as also shown by the narratives with an own dynamic. The conceptualisation of territorial cohesion as social cohesion for instance does not emerge out of nothing, and when territorial cohesion is used thus it does not only strengthen the concept but also the discourse social cohesion comes from, because a discourse that is not used in practices would disappear. However, as the large amount of overlapping territorial cohesion pro/positions testifies, the concept might pin down so many meanings in power practices, and therefore try to stabilise so many discourses, that it could perhaps better be called a discursive nodal surface than a discursive nodal point.

If so, the three ways in which discourses tie together in the concept become more particular (see §7.2.3). When discourses tie together in a new combination, territorial cohesion can thereby be seen as formation surface, when they do so as policy discourses, then as an aggregation surface, and when in its particular form, as thoroughfare surface. For the formation surface, a partial transposition of spatial planning’s discourse – and not only its tactical productivity – in territorial cohesion would for example indicate that also more discourses can transform into one territorial cohesion discourse. For the aggregation surface, the concept’s multi-ordered discursive interdependencies indicate a tightly knit web for, for instance, cohesion and spatial policy discourses, this as their battle arena or convergence towards territorial cohesion policy. As thoroughfare surface territorial cohesion might go through an unfixed number of discourses just as spatial planning would do according to Graham & Healey (1999). That is, because ‘the discourse community which clusters around planning practice has such a confused and limited conceptual vocabulary with which to describe what they are adjusting to, planners readily slip back into earlier conceptions, or slide away into the specifications thrust on them by the dominant circuits of power’ (Graham & Healey, 1999: 641). An example they give of such specifications is important here: these would largely be aspatial conceptions of which relationships to consider. Spatial planning then has to relate, if not spatialise, varying aspatial conceptions to make them its own. Hence, territorial cohesion as formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare surface perhaps more resembles a concourse than a discourse. Either way, the question remains which discourses territorial cohesion thereby includes (see §17.1.2 until 17.1.6) and how so (see §17.1.7).
17.1.2 Through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective towards an overview of discourses that form territorial cohesion

When you see territorial cohesion through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective, many discourses\(^a\) can be referred to that the concept appears to include in combination. An extensive list of those that appear in the intertextual territorial cohesion text and its context and/or this research’s departure-point of spatial planning is presented below while noting their two roles regarding the concept (i.e. providing territorial cohesion conceptualisations shown in Part I and drawing on metanarratives shown in Part II). Even though this list might not be all-embracing, the overview it gives already exposes the main problematic.

The concept is of course part of Community discourse, as Faludi&Waterhout (2002) note. All territorial cohesion metanarratives are concerned with the European Union, and some conceptualisations even explicitly name it (e.g. territorial effects of Community policies). Radaelli (2000: 13) then thinks ‘it is useful to distinguish the general discourse on Europe’ (and the specific discourse on public policy). Policy discourse namely ‘provides a rationale and justifies change at the policy level’ (Radaelli, 2000: 13, 24). Yet, these three discourses do not (directly) provide territorial cohesion conceptualisation. For territorial cohesion their distinction does underline the specificity of its policy-centred tactical productivity though, especially the research done for policy’s sake and the way the metanarratives of the (post-)ESDP process and Regional/Cohesion Policy usages areas differ from those of the IGCs and European Funds usage areas (i.e. directly policy-related or not respectively).

Different discourses entail different policy priorities though. As shown for the fundamental discourse of economic chance and social cohesion (§17.1.3), specified in competitiveness, Social European Model, Europe of the Regions, and Europe of flows discourses (§17.1.4), which the discourse of monotopia iterates (§17.1.5). All these discourses return in the spatial policy discourse, while even more, such as the discourse of justice, seem to do so in territorial cohesion (§17.1.6). Because of this the conclusions on territorial cohesion seen through the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective direct us to the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse (§17.1.7).

17.1.3 The fundamental neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses

Fairclough (2003: 128) makes a fundamental distinction between two discourses: the neo-liberal discourse of economic change which represents ‘globalization’ as a fact which demands ‘adjustments’ and ‘reforms’ to enhance ‘efficiency and adaptability’ in order to compete; and [a] political discourse which represents societies in terms of the goal of ‘social cohesion’ and threats to ‘social cohesion’. While the latter represents the feelings of people (e.g. sense of belonging to a community), social cohesion is also ‘constructed in economic terms as ‘source’ or ‘human quality’ (Fairclough, 2003: 128). This would reduce ‘people to forces of production which rank along with others, such as information technology’, what shows a legitimisation of ‘the discourse of social cohesion in terms of the neo-liberal discourse’ (Fairclough, 2003: 128). Yet, despite their contrasts, Fairclough (2003: 133) notes that both discourses abstract from ‘events in mainly policy-formation contexts’. The neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, this relation between them, and what they have in common return in territorial cohesion.

The concept's policy coherence meaning of coordination of policies for efficiency might for instance come from this neo-liberal discourse, which then also draws upon the ‘coordination’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area, its territorial governance stories to be more specific. The above-noted ‘social cohesion’ (see §17.1.1) could simply come from the so named discourse, just as it is this discourse which also draws on the ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative noted above. You could see the concept’s territorial capital intension as coming from the neo-liberal discourse's legitimisation of the social cohesion discourse, but in an altered form: not so much reducing people but territories as forces of production (which include people too). This legitimisation then also draws on the ‘territories and accessibility’ metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area, in particular its territorial capital stories. The abstraction from events in policy-formation

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\(a\) In these paragraphs the discourses mentioned are not (necessarily) a discourse in the sense this research defines one (i.e. a system of knowledge and its associated practices). However, the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective does not define discourses but either what dominates the problem of treating them lesser without such a strict definition. This difference does come forward in the demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse, whereby the research definitions is of course followed.

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contexts of both discourses also clearly returns in the concept with the lack of territorial cohesion facts and
that most positions are about policy while none correspond to propositions which do not do so (e.g. those on
territorial identity). Moreover, that territorial cohesion propositions nonetheless point towards concreteness
(see §9.2.2) even seems to exemplify what Fairclough (2003: 132) says about these discourses: although they
are ultimately referencing to concrete events, they exclude the people, objects, and places involved. Other
discourses which could combine in territorial cohesion show this fundamental distinction of neo-liberal and
social cohesion discourses, their relation, and policy-centred abstraction more specifically though.

17.1.4 The neo-liberal and social cohesion discourse specified

Discourses in the vein of the neoliberal discourse which territorial cohesion includes might be a rationale of
economic competitiveness which ‘remains a central driver in the EU discourse’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003),
the Lisbon Strategy as the dominant discourse in European Union politics (Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007),
and a hegemonic economic discourse (Davoudi, in Faludi, 2007). The policy objective of competitiveness as
territorial cohesion meaning might for instance derive from the first, the concept’s instrumental meaning of
fitting in, amongst others, the Lisbon Strategy from the second, and the dominance of economic indicators
to measure territorial cohesion from the third. These discourses could then also be supported by the (post-)
ESDP’s usage area’s ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative, especially by the many economic stories
on competitiveness, and how stories on the Lisbon Strategy structure all the metanarratives of the Regional/
Cohesion Policy usage area. However, that the hegemonic economic discourse could also draw upon the
‘territorial specificities’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area points to more specific discourses that
combine in territorial cohesion, because in its discussions on indicators the “old” economic indicator of GDP is
mostly confronted. That is to say, the discourses that territorial cohesion includes are not only in the vein of the
neo-liberal discourse, but also in the vein of the social cohesion discourse.

The initial concerns of territorial cohesion have namely been with, following Faludi (2003a), ‘equity, with
maintaining services and life styles under the onslaught of privatisation and de-regulation’. This fits according
to Waterhout (2003) into a discourse of the ‘Social European Model’. SG(E)I for instance feature prominently
as a descriptive, normative, and policy objective meaning of territorial cohesion and as a metanarrative, as
in the IGCs usage area, or as a part of a metanarrative, as in the other usage areas. Then again, voices are
raised that the cohesion policy pursued in the European Union detached from its redistributive origins and
became incorporated by a discourse of competitiveness and growth (Rumford, 2000; Ó Cuiv, in DCRGA,
2004: 36). Such incorporation specifies the legitimisation Fairclough (2003: 128) mentioned: of the discourse
of social cohesion in terms of the neo-liberal one. The descriptive territorial cohesion meaning of balanced
competitiveness might then come from this combination of discourses, while this combination could also draw
on the (post-)ESDP usage area’s ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative, especially when it promotes
balance for competitiveness. The combination of the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses and their relation
in territorial cohesion can therefore be specified in, respectively, competitiveness and Social European Model
discourses, for instance, and then an incorporation of the latter discourse by the former.

Interestingly enough, Rumford (2002) says that due to this incorporation cohesion policy is less about
a redistributive agenda than the ‘creation of a harmonized European economic space’. His mention of ‘space’
directs us to other discourses that can combine in territorial cohesion: those on (partially) spatial entities and
relations. A basic example of the former comes from Le Galès (2002). He says that the development of cohesion
policy, the Structural Funds, and the related principles contributed to establishing a discourse on the making of
the Europe of the Regions, and a little later, on the Europe of Cities (Le Galès, 2002: 100). The former discourse
might have provided territorial cohesion with its territorial governmentality meaning of integration of regions
and draw on the ‘territories and accessibility’ metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area where
many specific territories come to the fore; while no territorial cohesion conceptualisations appear from the
discourse on the making of the Europe of the Cities, the same metanarrative does include urban areas. The
points here are that discourses on spatial entities can also combine in territorial cohesion and both with the
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neo-liberal and/or social cohesion discourses (e.g. competition or balance between regions, balanced regions for a competitive European Union).

Hajer (2000) then seems to give us an example of a discourse on spatial relations that relates the neo-liberal economic and political discourse of social cohesion in a specific way. The economic and political discourse of European integration would namely create specific demands on mobility, such as an increasing demand for personal mobility and the development of new technologies that enable a more footloose approach to economic development (e.g. Just in Time logistics), which necessitate a discourse of an Europe of flows (Hajer, 2000). He mentions many features to characterise it as a policy discourse: more general ones, such as market integration, global competition, and the European Union as both an ‘enabling state’ and ‘welfare state’; a vocabulary of ‘modernist commitments’ (i.e. a belief in integration, distribution, management and control), ‘ecological modernization’ in particular; and infrastructure as the primary policy instrument, this with an enhancement of mobility and connectivity, the identification of ‘missing links’ of infrastructure, and an anticipation of more international transport demands (Hajer, 2000). The general features appear to iterate the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses and how these return in territorial cohesion more or less specifically as shown above (e.g. globalisation and competitiveness, the redistribution of the welfare state and services). Also the other features of the Europe of flows discourse appear to combine in territorial cohesion in one way or another.

The vocabulary of modernist commitments thereby seems to reiterate two other discourses as well: the one of governance and ecological modernisation. The specialist discourse of governance would then involve governing being represented as ‘managing’ (Fairclough, 2003: 199); probably related to the managerial discourse in which you have goals and plans instead of intentions and judgment and means instead of ends (Clarke&Newman, 1997: 16; Stenson&Watt, 1999: 194). The conceptualisation of territorial cohesion in its territorial governmentality meaning of combining spatial thinking and governance might then (partly) come from this discourse, while the discourse could then also draw on the ‘coordination’ metanarrative of the IGCs usage area due to its calls for an institutional framework for good territorial governance. Other examples of how the vocabulary of modernist commitments of the Europe of flows discourse appears to return in territorial cohesion are easy to find (e.g. positions for territorial policy integration, the dominance of distributive knowledge in descriptions).

The discourse of ecological modernisation can then be considered as being about a particular form of this "modernism". According to Hajer (1996: 249), it namely holds that ‘the ecological crisis can be overcome by technical and procedural innovation’, such as the calculation and management of risks. Gouldson&Murphy (1996) argue that the European Union progressed towards this modernisation by adopting the belief that the environment and the economy can achieve synergy for further economic growth, by integrating environmental policy into other sectors, by exploring innovative policy measures, and by promoting new clean technologies. This might have provided the components of territorial cohesion, a descriptive intension of the concept, with its territorial efficiency component (i.e. the combination of the systems of the economy and the natural and built environment). The discourse could also draw upon the ‘substantive objects’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area insofar it links territorial cohesion to the sustainable development part of the Structural Funds objective of (regional) competitiveness and employment. The Europe of flows discourse thus seems to have a large role to play in territorial cohesion.

However, what then surprises is the role of the primary policy instrument of the Europe of flows discourse (i.e. infrastructure) in territorial cohesion. Following Jensen&Richardson (2003: 19), the challenge for infrastructure networks would thereby namely be ‘to enable such frictionless mobility, a challenge which has featured prominently in the EU policy agenda. Yet, although this discourse could for instance draw on the ‘accessibility’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area when it is concerned with TENs, it hardly gives rise to territorial cohesion conceptualisations. Infrastructure does appear as one of the three layers in the layer approach, a descriptive intension of territorial cohesion, but this without referring to features of the
Europe of flows discourse such as the enhancement of mobility or missing links. Likewise, polycentrism as policy objective extension of territorial cohesion merely implies infrastructural networks. As spatial form polycentrism does give us a direction though. According to Jensen & Richardson (2003: 19), the challenge for infrastructure from the Europe of the flows discourse namely reflects ‘political struggles over the framing of future mobility and spatial organisation’. Moreover, they argue that a remaking of European space as a Europe of flows is a necessary precondition for the creation of a monotopic Europe (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 214).

Because the discourse of monotopia does clearly return in territorial cohesion, discourses on spatial relations perhaps do not so much combine in territorial cohesion directly with infrastructure and mobility, but with spatial organisation.

17.1.5 The discourse of monotopia

All of the discourses listed above seem to take part in the discourse of monotopia, which might therefore structure them. Spatial organisation then has a central role to play in it, as Jensen & Richardson (2003: 3) also characterise its vision as ‘an organised, ordered and totalised space of zero-friction and seamless logistic flows.’ More specifically, this discourse would envision cities as urban nodes in global networks of flows of capital and information, a reorientation of the urban towards a polycentric form, and a reconciliation of Europe as a space of urban competition and balanced spatial development, such as a balance between the interests of core cities (e.g. knowledge-intensive entrepreneurial ones) and peripheral regions (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 4). While the feature of flows iterates Hajer’s (2000) Europe of flows discourse, the one of spatial organisation, and polycentricity in particular, do not. The policy objective extension of polycentrism as territorial cohesion conceptualisation might thus come from the discourse of monotopia, a discourse which could thereby also draw on the ‘spatial/territorial structure’ metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area which is mostly about this particular spatial organisation. More of the discourse of monotopia than polycentrism returns in territorial cohesion though.

What thereby reminds us of the relationship between Fairclough’s (2003) neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, is Jensen & Richardson’s (2003: 99) argument that the ‘twin mirrors of European policy, of growth and cohesion, of competition and balance, together require and reproduce monotopia.’ A counter-discourse which combines spatial entities with features of the social cohesion discourse would for instance also form it: the regions against market integration discourse (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 77). Moreover, they detect ‘a hierarchical ordering which places the environment as subsidiary to the logics of material growth and market expansion’ and an ‘accommodationist’ vocabulary of ecological modernisation in the discourse of monotopia (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 4). This thus iterates the ecological modernisation of Hajer’s (2000) Europe of flows discourse. Examples of ways in which these twin mirrors and ecological modernisation seem to return in territorial cohesion are mentioned above. However, the discourse of monotopia would more underline the spatial.

When Jensen & Richardson (2003: 226) for instance pose that ‘the imagined community of monotopic Europe needs cohesion as its vehicle for the idea of a level and coherent playing field in order to carry forward the message of ‘one Europe’, it only reminds us of Rumford’s (2002) note about a harmonised European economic space. Yet, for Jensen & Richardson (2003: 226) this does not only amount ‘to thinking about cohesion in terms of sharing growth, environment[ , but also] space.’ Sharing space thereby does not only have to do with the discourse’s reorientation of the urban towards a polycentric form, but also its reconciliation between core cities and peripheral regions. Territorial cohesion’s policy objective meaning of balancing human activities and competitiveness over territories might therefore come from the discourse of monotopia, which could also draw on the ‘territories and accessibility’ metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area that at least seems to exclude no specific territory. The spatial way in which the discourse of monotopia relates the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses (i.e. polycentricly reconcile territorial interests to share space) then also returns in territorial cohesion.
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Yet, one might ask whether accounting for territories underlines the spatial (e.g. the territorial). Jensen & Richardson (2003) see this as a part of the next phase of the discourse of monotopia though. This phase is namely marked by new linguistic wrappings (the change from ‘spatial policy’ to ‘territorial new institutional settings and practices (the SUD and the aim to include the common document in the Third Cohesion Report), but still with the rationale of offering an arena for policy articulation outside formal EU competency, founded on voluntary interaction and a view of the European Union’s territory as based on the seamless flows of goods, services and citizens’ (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 151). The significance of this would go beyond that the territorial dimension, territorial development, services, and citizens return in territorial cohesion (e.g. its territorial governmentality meaning of the territorial dimension of European policy and ‘territorial dimension’ metanarrative of the IGCs usage area, its normative meaning of equality between citizens wherever they live and ‘economy/society/environment’ metanarrative of the (post-) ESDP process usage area with similar articulations). That is to say, if monoptic Europe would indeed need cohesion as a vehicle and “territorial wrappings” mark the next phase of the discourse of monotopia, ‘territorial cohesion’ itself could become the spatial, or better, territorial expression of the monoptic community imagined in this discourse.

If so, territorial cohesion expresses the discourse of monotopia territorially. The way in which this discourse structures all of the discourses that take part in it then becomes the more important, as this structure might return in territorial cohesion. However, there does not seem appear such a structure, only an emphasis on the spatial/territorial does. Moreover, although services and citizens return in territorial cohesion, seamless flows of them, as would be the case in the discourse of monotopia, do not, quite the contrary. A policy objective extension of the concept for instance puts territorial cohesion against the “level playing field”, as adhesion of citizens to a political body that is, and the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ metanarrative of the European Funds usage area mentions State aid. Discourses that go against (features of) the discourse of monotopia could thus return in territorial cohesion too.  

17.1.6 The spatial policy and justice discourse

Then again, the discourse of monotopia can return in territorial cohesion more fully (i.e. including flows). Its next phase, or better: the institutional settings Jensen & Richardson (2003: 151) mention thereby (e.g. the SUD, an informal arena), directs us to a way for this: the European Union’s spatial policy discourse. All of the discourses which take part in the discourse of monotopia namely seem to do so in the European Union’s spatial policy discourse as well. For Richardson & Jensen (2003: 7) this discourse is for instance ‘based on the language and ideas of polycentricity and hypermobility’, which are both mentioned in the discourse of monotopia (‘hypermobility’ not as such, but the implied ‘seamless flows’ are), and it would be wrapped in a new language of ‘territorial” and ‘development’ instead of ‘spatial’ and ‘planning’ too (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 150). It also harbours a balance between growth-ecology-equity, even an emphasis on economic development (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 98). Many of these features return in territorial cohesion, as shown above, but not all them.

That is to say, just as the spatial relations in the above-mentioned forms of improvement of infrastructure and seamless flows, (hyper)mobility lacks territorial cohesion conceptualisations. However, Jensen & Richardson’s (2003) reasoning for the European Union’s spatial policy discourse points to an indirect way in which the concept could be concerned with spatial relations nonetheless. They namely hold that this discourse frames mobility as accessibility (i.e. what can be approached instead of the movement) (Jensen & Richardson, 2003: 80), which does return in territorial cohesion. This in an intensional fragment of its territorial governmentality

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8 These discourses do not appear on the list presented here though, what perhaps has to do with the departure-point of this research (i.e. European spatial planning in particular).
9 This would be far from surprising if you follow Faludi’s (2003a) argument that the French spatial planning tradition affects territorial cohesion a lot, as aménagement du territoire, would even have been limited to an economic discourse, but now also includes notions of sustainability and cultural, social, and institutional dimensions. Faludi (2003a) could partly be right in this, because aménagement du territoire does return in territorial cohesion, but not fully: although the French spatial planning tradition is a spatial policy meaning of the concept, it does not appear in any metanarrative, only in their context (e.g. the ‘governal organisation of the territory’ narrative of the European Funds usage area).
knowledge that links knowledge and governance, as the tentative common framework for spatial concepts puts forward 'parity of access' as policy means (what entails the improvement of physical accessibility and access to information and knowledge). Do note though, that this framework is not a territorial cohesion intension but merely a fragment, because territorial cohesion is just one of the concepts in it instead of the framework itself for instance (see §10.2.7). Still, the weak territorial cohesion conceptualisation of mobility framed as accessibility, or at least the latter, might thus come from the European Union's spatial policy discourse, and this discourse could then also draw on, as mentioned above, the 'accessibility' metanarrative of the (post-)ESDP process usage area. Via this "accessibility route" territorial cohesion would not only include spatial relations in the form of spatial organisation, but (partly) in the form of flows as well, and therefore include the discourse of monotopia more fully.

However, Jensen&Richardson (2003: 80) also hold that the European Union's spatial policy discourse frames accessibility 'in economic rather than social or environmental terms'. Although changing spatial relations would lead to new patterns of socio-economic exclusion, according to them the policy debate (e.g. TEN-T, ESDP) merely notes accessibility in economic analysis (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 220). This showcases the policy dilemma of balancing growth-ecology-equity with accessibility in economic terms while this leads to socio-economic exclusion. According to Jensen&Richardson (2003: 98), this 'suggests that the EU's spatial strategy will be played out in competition between cities and regions, between urban and rural, between core and periphery, and along growth corridors.' With accessibility from the European Union's spatial policy discourse territorial cohesion would thus include a tension.

This tension comes forward with the above-mentioned counter-discourse which represents the regions against market integration, as it would also run throughout the European Union's spatial policy discourse (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 77). The ESDP is for instance concerned about 'pump' and 'tunnel' effects where new high-speed infrastructure removes resources from structurally weaker and peripheral regions or such areas are crossed without being connected (CSD, 1999: 26). Yet, 'all of the policy options identified pursue the general aim of improving accessibility as an unproblematic generic response' (Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 77). According to Richardson (1995; Jensen&Richardson, 2003: 77-79), the European Union's spatial policy discourse avoids this tension by relying on a series of unproven assumptions for and about infrastructure development: regional competitiveness and regional balance are the same, the outcome is even development of regional economies, there is a causal link between infrastructure provision and economic development, and regions are the correct units of measurement. Avoiding a tension is not the same as resolving it of course. Still, when territorial cohesion indirectly (and partially) includes the Europe of flows discourse in its primary policy instrument (i.e. infrastructure) and the discourse of monotopia in its seamless flows, the question for territorial cohesion becomes how the tension of balancing growth-ecology-equity with accessibility returns.

A few stories that relate metanarratives in the Regional/Cohesion Policy usage area come closest to balancing growth-ecology-equity with accessibility, but merely close; whereby one could argue that ecology plays no role thereby. As could have been expected with the absent territorial cohesion conceptualisations when it concerns infrastructure and flows, also here none appears. Although territorial cohesion includes accessibility (hesitantly), the concept thus neither avoids nor resolves the tension of how accessibility can provide such a balance. Therefore not all the features of the European Union's spatial policy, Europe of flows, and monotopia discourses return in territorial cohesion. Hence, the partiality of the transposition of spatial planning into territorial cohesion, both qua the former's system of knowledge, discursive interdependencies, and the European Union's spatial policy discourse. In a sense, you could then say that territorial cohesion is less than spatial planning: it lacks a role for infrastructure or accessibility in the balancing of growth-ecology-equity.

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2. Vickers&Wright (1995) for instance identify the uneven distribution of accessibility within regions (e.g. due to concentration, shadow effects).
3. One story for instance tells us: a key challenge for territorial cohesion in view of promoting sustainable economic growth is to strengthen, amongst others, connectivity because the development of the European Union territory needs stronger balance and competitiveness. It 'sustainability' here means having an economic growth which maintains itself instead of anything ecological, even this story does not come close.
In another sense, however, you could say that territorial cohesion is more than spatial planning. Discourses against monotopia (e.g. featuring political bodies) could namely return in territorial cohesion while they do not take part in the European Union's spatial policy discourse described above – merely those discourse that show its 'twin-mirrors' of growth and cohesion do. Moreover, Davoudi (2005a: 437) says that the discourse of territorial cohesion has added a spatial justice dimension to European spatial policy. Logically seen, this perspective then was not part of the European Union's spatial policy discourse. Following Davoudi (in Faludi, 2007), this perspective even challenges the technical rational approach that dominates the European Union's spatial policy research (e.g. ESPON). The spatial justice dimension would thereby extend and apply 'John Rawls' theory of justice[,] with its emphasis on equity, to territorial development' (Davoudi, 2005a: 437). You could then also say that we therefore have yet another discourse that territorial cohesion includes, one on justice that is.

Then again, Giannakourou (1996) already brings a discourse of justice forward that might be a part of the European Union's spatial policy discourse. That is, '[t]he central idea underpinning the new European planning rhetoric is that of a more general reorientation of the traditional spatial fairness concept in the new context provided by the competition principles of a spatial integration process that is market-oriented' (Giannakourou, 1996: 603). This would lead to a 'transition from a unitary and substantive rationale of fairness towards a pluralist and procedural one' (Giannakourou, 1996: 605). As Rawls' (1999) justice as fairness is both unitary in its decision on how society should look and substantive in the benefit it should have to the least advantaged (see §10.2.3), there might thus be different discourses of justice at work.

Jensen & Richardson (2003: 29) then note three driving conceptions of the pluralist and procedural discourse of justice which Giannakourou (1996) distinguishes: i) 'competitive spatial justice' (i.e. promising the levelling of spatial imbalances through the redistribution of competitiveness among European areas), ii) 'diversified spatial justice' (i.e. tolerating discrimination of goals, instruments and actors for the handling of divergent problems), and iii) 'pluralist spatial justice' (i.e. appealing both to public and private stakeholders to contribute to the redistribution of spatial prosperity). Together these would express 'a specific notion of 'spatial fairness' that involves the paradox of invoking a welfare principle in order to ensure global competitiveness' (Giannakourou, 1996: 604). This of course brings us back (full circle) to the legitimisation of the social cohesion discourse by the neo-liberal discourse and how the discourse of monotopia iterates it with its twin-mirrors. Besides that this returns in territorial cohesion with competitive and pluralist spatial justices (e.g. balanced competitiveness, governance), the diversified spatial justice does so too. It for instance might provide the concept with its variety of policy objective and instrumental meanings and could also draw on the rather broad 'substantive objectives' metanarrative of the European Funds usage area. Territorial cohesion thus includes the discourse of pluralist and procedural justice.

Yet, as hinted at above, another discourse of justice appears to return in territorial cohesion as well, one which was not mentioned as part of the monotopic or European Union's spatial policy discourse. This discourse would namely, to follow Davoudi (2005: 437), provide the Rawlsian normative meaning of territorial cohesion and could also draw on the 'territories and accessibility' metanarrative of the Regional/Cohesion Policy metanarrative, especially when it promotes the assistance of (naturally) disadvantaged areas (i.e. emphasises equity in territorial development). This underlines that, even though all the other discourses listed above take part in the monotopic and European Union's spatial policy discourses, territorial cohesion could include more than these "two".

17.1.7 Territorial cohesion as seen through the Discourse Nodal Point-perspective

That territorial cohesion includes all of the particular discourses listed above, or at least parts of them, characterises the concept as a Discourse Nodal Point. Note thereby that we are not interested in their causal relationships, such as what discourse was first and therefore gives territorial cohesion this feature. For us the main problematic brought forward with this overview is namely the way in which these discourses tie together. That is to say, listing so many discourses pictures them as sticking together like grains of sand. We therefore
want to know the ways in which territorial cohesion combines which discourses. Does the concept for instance stabilise them as a Discursive Nodal Point would or does it as discursive nodal surface more resemble ‘imperial overstretch’?

With the dynamic and complexity of discursive interdependencies between territorial cohesion knowledge and the concept’s usage (see §16.4.2), it is not surprising that is hard to come up with the structure in which territorial cohesion ties discourses together, no matter whether you consider the concept as discursive formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare surface. When you see it as a discursive formation surface, many discourses could combine to transform into one territorial cohesion discourse, as listed above: the neo-liberal and social cohesion discourses, their specification in economic and Social European Model discourses, and the discourses of Europe of the Regions, ecological modernisation, governance, monotopia, regions against market integration, and unitary and substantive justice and pluralist and procedural justice. However, it is unclear how these discourses would do so; and because the list above is not all-embracing, there might be even more. One might wonder why the Europe of flows and European Union’s spatial policy discourses presented in the list above are not mentioned for such a formation surface.

They are not mentioned because territorial cohesion could combine policy discourses as discursive aggregation surface. Waterhout (2003) mentions two policy discourses when it concerns territorial cohesion: SG(E)I and territorial governance. However, the storylines which tie them together change (e.g. see Waterhout, in Faludi, 2007) and the involved stories are also told without the concept. Still, the territorial governance policy discourse seems at least to overlap with the European Union’s spatial policy discourse, because it would originate in the ESDP process. What is more, SG(E)I can be added to territorial cohesion as policy discourse, just as cohesion policy and economic policy discourses probably could. Yet, even though this aggregation surface reminds us of the topical order of the concept’s usage in power practices (i.e. a battlefield; also see §17.2.3), it is unclear how such policy discourses would convergence to a territorial cohesion policy discourse or combine in the concept as battle arena.

A partial transposition of spatial planning into territorial cohesion then suggests that territorial cohesion forms other discourses (e.g. those listed above) as discursive thoroughfare surface (e.g. by spatialising a wide range of theories; see §17.1.1). Then again, how the concept would do so is unclear as well (e.g. different from spatial planning in which way?). Moreover, if these three discursive surfaces mutually exclude each other, it is unclear which one territorial cohesion actually is, and if the concept can be more than one at once, the relations between its parts are unclear. When we look at territorial cohesion, the only clarity the Discursive Nodal Point-perspective thus brings is that we cannot see how the concept’s functioning is its own. Whether territorial cohesion stabilises discourses is then a moot question. It could pin down many meanings in power practices, but it is unclear which and how. This presses us to the question of what makes a statement a territorial cohesion statement. Below this research answers with the ways in which the rules followed by the concept’s discursive practices demarcate them before its structure is revisited.

17.2 Demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse

17.2.1 Following Foucault to draw the boundaries of territorial cohesion expertise

Even though the many discursive ‘streams’ running through territorial cohesion are unpetrified (see §16.2.3), we can speculate about the demarcation of its discourse. Besides that such a demarcation would clarify what the concept is about, it might be essential for four technocratic reasons: i) the European Union’s informal bureaucratic ways without a centre of power (see §1.1.2), ii) the large role for potestas programmes in the concept’s usage (see §15.3.1), iii) territorial cohesion’s policy-centred tactical productivity (see §17.1.2), and iv) the possible transposition of spatial planning’s technical-rational approach in the concept (see §16.4.2). According to Pellizzoni (2001: 64), the power wielded by technocratic elites namely ‘hinges on the creation of
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boundaries,' such as 'the distinction between expertise and layman.' This could exactly be what the territorial cohesion discourse does, that is, demarcating territorial cohesion expertise.

Moreover, Pellizzoni (2001: 64-65) suggests that discourses (e.g. through elite peer review) circumscribe 'the area within which the best argument can be sought' by drawing lines in two ways: by 'establishing the boundaries with the outside' and 'structuring the inner space of the debate on the basis of specific conceptual frames.' For territorial cohesion the latter might not only involve how the concept links the conceptualisations in the system of territorial cohesion meaning/knowledge on the one hand and the concept's power practices which come forward through metanarratives on the other hand, but also the concept's functioning as Discursive Nodal Point, that is, the ways in which these two sides tie discourses together. The objective of this research then is to descriptively interpret the rules regulating territorial cohesion statements through discursive practices. This because only these practices form the territorial cohesion discourse by linking its system of meaning/knowledge and power practices and the rules thereby demarcate what reasonable arguments are in the case of territorial cohesion. Yet, the rules followed by these discursive practices are necessary instead of sufficient "causes", as they do not determine statements, at least not totally.

Also note that the rules demarcating all territorial cohesion statements (i.e. the boundaries) do not themselves form the linkages between the meaning/knowledge and power practices sides (i.e. the structure) – although the latter of course have to abide by the former. These would only be the same when either territorial cohesion's functioning as Discursive Nodal Point demarcates it as a discourse, then the rules form the overall argumentative structure of discursive articulations (see §7.2.2), or there is no clear structure for linking the two sides, then arguments merely have to accord to the rules for all statements. That is to say, respectively, the rules point out which territorial cohesion articulations are considered to be reasonable due to the way they relate metanarratives or all these articulations are considered to be so as long as the rules include them as being about territorial cohesion. Yet, Pellizzoni (2001: 72) warns us for situations in which 'the force of the best argument is only a myth.' Our question would then become whether territorial cohesion is such a situation.

Insofar territorial cohesion articulations are 'entangled in the web of strategy, technocracy or rhetoric' (Pellizzoni, 2001: 72), argumentation about it could be a myth. In such situations, following Pellizzoni (2001: 72), intractable problems 'cast doubt on the solidity of the cognitive basis of deliberation', as 'dialogue becomes more problematic, conflict grows fiercer[, and reason] seemingly shatters into fragments impossible to reassemble.' The concept might then be too fluid to stabilise discourses or fill 'territorial' and 'cohesion' with meanings to pin down in metanarratives, that is, to function as Discursive Nodal Point. In any case, the discursive interdependencies of the territorial cohesion discourse would cognitively be too unstable for argumentation.

Yet, even with a solid cognitive basis for deliberation, territorial cohesion is entangled in power relations as long as the concept's discursive interdependencies accept power as it is said to exist and "naturalise" a part of the world to govern (see §7.2.3). The pattern discursive practices follow while thus interweaving knowledge and power relations might further circumscribe the territorial cohesion articulations that are considered to be reasonable. Paradoxically enough, this consideration is thus not lead by the absence or presence of argumentation, nor by that statements cannot mutually exclude each other. Instead, when the concept's discursive practices continue to follow a same pattern, we can speak of its discursive structures – i.e. the 'trunk' which is re/inserted into the debate (see §7.2.1). It is this structuring of discursive interdependencies (i.e. the branches) which can marginalise alternative statements even if warrants could be put forward for their claim. Territorial cohesion pro/positions which are weakly linked in the concept's power-knowledge network – e.g. its descriptive meaning of territorial identity without a usage or its usage for infrastructure without a meaning (see §16.2.3) – might be such alternatives. Although not every statement belongs to the territorial cohesion discourse, it thus is a changing entity nonetheless. We can then not only demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse, but also specify which changes are more likely to occur in it than others.

The stability of the territorial cohesion discourse therefore depends on the depth of the concept's discursive structures as well. This depth and stability are relative of course (see §7.2.1); compared to other discourses the territorial cohesion discourse could for instance have no trunk but merely branches. Yet, the
deeper this structure, the stronger it defines what makes statements territorial cohesion statements, and the clearer the rules would be that demarcate the discourse. This research then follows Foucault to demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse, that is, by individualising it with criteria of formation, threshold, and correlation (see §7.3.1). To recuperate them, these entail, respectively, the rules that count for all objects, operations, concepts and/or theoretical options in the discourse, the set of discursive conditions which must have been possible for its objects, operations, concepts and theoretical options to have been formed, and the relations of the discourse to other discourses and its non-discursive context. The concept's discursive structures then take part in this individualisation insofar they for instance define all territorial cohesion objects, conditions for their appearance, or the discourse's relations to power practices. In any case the criteria of threshold and correlation thus derive from the criteria of formation. Hence, it are the rules involved that demarcate territorial cohesion expertise.

17.2.2 The rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse

This research's whole discourse analysis carried out thus far led to this point: the rules that regulate the territorial cohesion discourse. To be able to put such rules forward while setting them up in this case is a tour de force, they will be hypothetical. First the structure of rules that governs the territorial cohesion pro/positions is formulated and explained (§17.2.2). After these criteria of formation follow the conditions for them (§17.2.3) and the relations of the territorial cohesion discourse to other discourses and its non-discursive context (§17.2.4). The ways in which the concept could function as a Discursive Nodal Point complexes these criteria though. They are therefore treated in combination with the threshold criteria. Together with the three criteria they individualise what are considered to be reasonable territorial cohesion articulations.

However, the semantic/epistemic and political variation of territorial cohesion articulations is large. The rules that regulate them thus need to leave much open. Nevertheless, the following rules could individualise the territorial cohesion discourse:

- all objects can neither be political nor tangible;
- all operations must be policy-centred in specific ways and lack reflective argumentation;
- all concepts must be open to relate their content to that of others;
- all theoretical options must be adopted.

Although these rules are broad and unspecific, as also shown by their often negative formulation, they do exclude articulations, as explained below per rule.

Notwithstanding the large variety in territorial cohesion articulations, the objects involved are never political or tangible. Sometimes the concept might imply the inclusion of politics about an issue (e.g. balance versus competitiveness, which competencies), but its pro/positions always exclude politics in itself (e.g. territorial demarcation, competency). What exemplifies this is a way in which the concept's narrow variation in ideals outlines the common ground of territorial cohesion meaning: some of its normative propositions contradict politically (e.g. for or beyond competitiveness), but they never propose a political ideal (e.g. of the State). Territorial cohesion also sometimes includes facts, however, if so, these are policy objective extensions (e.g. polycentrism), and these are not, arguably, tangible. Another feature that outlines the concept's common ground of meaning can be mentioned here, as not even its spatial planning meaning provides a rational ground to tangibilise objects. Hence, with the rule that none of its objects may be political or tangible, the territorial cohesion discourse would make an apolitical and not-tangible world "natural".

Moreover, this 'naturalisation' could be for a specific government, as all the operations of the territorial cohesion discourse are centred on, or at least around, policy. The specificity of this comes forward in a commonality of the concept's knowledge claims and in its tactical productivity. Epistemically the apolitical and tangible world of territorial cohesion is namely looked at with a (state-)government and policy focus. However, not any policy will do, as the concept's reciprocal productivity further specifies this policy-centredness, that is, only the policies in, or related to, the IGCs, (post-)ESDP process, Regional/Cohesion Policy, and European Funds usage areas will do. Many argumentations then appear in these policy-centred operations, such as how or
why to reach territorial cohesion, what (in policy) lead to a particular interpretation of it, what its consequences could be, or to what the concept relates. Yet, there are no arguments about the why. There for instance only appear premises that certain articulations belong to territorial cohesion, the 'Grounds' that is. Yet, no argument comes forward for why this is actually the case (e.g. one instead of another meaning, as there are many), as no 'Warrants' justify the inference to this 'Claim' (see §4.5.3). Perhaps for territorial cohesion the force of the best argument is therefore not so much a myth, but they more appear to be based upon unreasoned for pro/positions, that is, upon premises without argumentation. If so, then apolitical and not-tangible objects operate in the territorial cohesion discourse unreflectively and in the specified policy-centred ways.

That all concepts must thereby be open to relate their content to that of others does not oblige them to relate everything they include (at once) with what lies "beyond them". Another commonality of the concept's knowledge claims is their relational perspective though. Its hyper-cube intension is an extreme example of this, because it is a complex web of properties to describe territorial cohesion and even leaves its trade-off with extensions open to add more entities (see §10.2.2). Yet, also when concepts do not do so, they should have the possibility for this. The descriptive territorial cohesion meaning of access to SG(E)I shows this: it appears to be the most unrelated conceptualisation, but in the components of territorial cohesion intension also combines with other properties of territorial quality to describe territorial cohesion (again, see §10.2.2). Territorial cohesion conceptualisations therefore cannot be limited to only economics for instance, at least not definitively. What can therefore be added to the structure of rules of the territorial cohesion discourse, is that conceptualisations of apolitical and not-tangible objects are open to relate their content unreflectively while centring on or around specific policies.

The concept’s theoretical options must of course follow the other rules just as the territorial cohesion conceptualisations have to. As territorial cohesion would more constitute a political than theoretical debate (Tatzberger, 2003), its theoretical options are for instance policy-centred as well. Yet, sometimes a theory does appear in the territorial cohesion discourse. In those instances, however, it does not seem indigenous to the concept. Rawls’ theory of justice is for instance such a theoretical option for ideals, but the concept’s normative intension merely applies this theory to territorial cohesion, by filling it in as communities living in territories engaging in collective projects of creating shared wealth that is (see §10.2.3). Rawls’ theory of justice thus is not a territorial cohesion theory but an adopted option. Besides such options of theories in the discourse, it has options which are theoretically possible.¹ The ARL (2003) then holds that the theoretical possibilities of some form of European Union territorial cohesion policy heavily relies on what is meant by the concept and what (spatially-relevant) “means” it should use as public policy. Then again, no territorial cohesion Bedeutung seems to come with a previously unknown meaning (e.g. but one from another discourse; see §17.1.1). They at most appropriate meanings and combine them in an own way (e.g. the descriptive definition of economic and social cohesion in territories). What is more, also the crux in the dynamic interplay of defining and knowledge creation might lie in combining information as territorial cohesion knowledge. Likewise for the “means” of this territorial cohesion policy, as the ordinal topic formed by the concept’s usage appears as a bricolage of areas of action (see below). Hence, the territorial cohesion discourse can only adopt theoretical options whose unreflective conceptualisations of apolitical and not-tangible objects relationally centre on or around specific policies.

The hypothetical rules demarcating the territorial cohesion discourse thus seem to be neither definitive nor highly informative. Yet, they do point out the concept’s forbidden articulations: each which does not accord with the criteria of formation (e.g. by being about a political object). They also point out that the concept has no necessary articulations, as much is left open – what also characterises the discourse. Together the rules then govern territorial cohesion pro/positions, as the irrelevance of a rule for an articulation is the sole reason for that it does not have to abide that rule (e.g. a proposition of an object which does not articulate a theoretical option of course does not have to abide to the rule for the concept’s theoretical options). As a structure the rules

¹ Note that this are two different interpretations of what theoretical options means. Although they differ, and Foucault (1968, in Burchell & Gordon & Miller, 1991: 54) probably means options of theories – these can namely mutually exclude each other, which he says they often do, while theoretical possibilities cannot –, here both are accounted for, just to be sure.
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therefore regulate how the discourse links the involved meanings/knowledges and power practices. These links are namely formed by all the articulations which abide to these rules in their various connections. However, as shown below, more structures the territorial cohesion discourse.

17.2.3 The conditions for the rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse

The indefinitiveness and unspecificity of the rules that demarcate the territorial cohesion discourse result in a vagueness. This also makes the formulation of its criteria of threshold and correlation trickier, as they have to point out the conditions and relations of a discourse which cannot be pin-pointed down. This might have three reasons: i) the discourse is in its phase of creation (i.e. its limits are not yet really drawn); ii) holisticness is one of its key features (i.e. these limits will never be drawn); or iii) the territorial view is the focus\(^*\) (i.e. its demarcation is not meant to be limiting). These reasons return when you consider territorial cohesion as a discursive nodal surface.

However, the criteria of threshold of the territorial cohesion discourse also bring ways forward in which the concept could function as Discursive Nodal Point, what would further structure the discourse. The discursive conditions for the formation of all its objects, operations, concepts, and theoretical options are therefore first formulated (in random order). These are that:

- the concept of ‘cohesion’ grows in importance (Hooghe\&Marks, 2001);
- ‘territorial’ emerges as a new linguistic wrapping;
- in general territorial cohesion can have many meanings and contradicting ones in particular;
- scientific data exist to put into a territorial cohesion perspective;
- in general territorial cohesion can be used as an undefined concept and as undefined policy objective in particular;
- the non-decisions of the dominant status quo accommodate a future territorial cohesion policy;
- territorial cohesion can be interpreted beyond its official base;
- the common ground for decision-making on territorial cohesion is systematically uncertain;
- every territorial cohesion position is contested due to infighting, the contested nature of the concept itself, its built-in bricolage, officialness, and ownness, and due to its place in larger struggles;
- the concept’s functions as a moving three-way crossing on a fuzzy line of in/formality;
- at least the neo-liberal, social cohesion, economic, Social European Model, Europe of the Regions, ecological modernisation, governance, monotopia, regions against market integration, unitary and substantive justice, pluralist and procedural justice discourses appear as appropriate;
- at least the following policy discourses appear as appropriate too: the Europe of flows, European Union’s spatial policy, territorial governance, SG(E)I, cohesion, and economic ones.

Probably, there are more discursive conditions of the territorial cohesion discourse – not to mention the countless events that condition the concept’s particular appearances –, what makes these mentioned above non-exhaustive. Moreover, they of course picture the conditioning of indefinitiveness and unspecificity. That is to say, they show what is needed for territorial cohesion’s discursive interdependencies to appear as fluid as lava (see §7.3.2). Yet, also these criteria of threshold individualise the territorial cohesion discourse.

The criteria of threshold at least do so with a paradoxical double: the discourse seems to accept power as it is said to exist (i.e. the status quo) while the stability of what of the world the discourse includes is not a condition for its rules of formation. This tension between stability and constant flux can be solved by considering the selection of territorial cohesion objects. Political ones, such as power relations, are excluded, while the ones included operate for power in the form of (state-)government and the specified policies. That is to say, power relations might be taken for granted while the included objects do not have to be fixed. Discursive interdependencies as firm as a glacier thus stand outside the discourse, and a reason for this could be that its gaze appears to be directed from power instead of on power.

\(^*\) This territorial view might come out of nowhere, but is mentioned in the discussion of ways in which the discourse of monotopia could return in territorial cohesion (see §17.1.5).
What is more, three of these discursive conditions point towards the concept's functioning as *Discursive Nodal Point*, what would further individualise the territorial cohesion discourse due to the entailed discursive structure. These three are the many territorial cohesion meanings, the concept as a three-way crossing, and the many (policy) discourses. When territorial cohesion functions as *Discursive Nodal Point* every discursive articulation would namely simultaneously attempt to stabilise a field of discourses through the pinning down of specific meanings in the metanarratives and their relations with each other (see §7.2.2). With the large overlap between territorial cohesion pro/positions, the concept can thus pin down many meanings in metanarratives. It can also relate these metanarratives in particular ways and stabilise the many discourses providing those meanings, so many that we can speak of a discursive nodal surface (see §17.1.1). Yet, no structure appears in which the concept's dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between these many meanings and metanarratives tie these many discourses together (see §17.1.7).

Then again, the territorial cohesion meanings/knowledges are structured in their inherently inconsistent system of contradicting kinds of meaning. Also the concept's power practices, of which the metanarratives are an index, are structured, in their bricolage of informal areas of action that is. When the concept moves through power practices as three-way crossing, its usage in the IGCs namely filters how territorial cohesion may appear, the concept's usage in the (post-)ESDP process delivers almost all the content, its usage in Regional/Cohesion policy cherry-picks from this, and its usage in the European Funds usage area resonates the three others in a guerrilla-like deployment. Although the involved topical order bares the systematic uncertainty of the concept's usage, it does form the ways in which the metanarratives can relate. Hence, even if this semantic system and topical order did not structure the ways in which the concept's ties discourses together as discursive nodal surface, both could therefore structure how it might do so. As possibilities of territorial cohesion articulations would be specified thus, this could individualise its discourse as well.

Together the concept's semantic system and topical order could structure the possible territorial cohesion articulations in three ways: as a discursive formation, aggregation, or thoroughfare structure (see §17.1.7). As discursive formation surface the first mentioned reason for why the discourse cannot be pin-pointed down returns. It would namely mark (out) a surface on which at least the listed discourses combine. However, if the territorial cohesion discourse is in its phase of creation, this would merely entail a fuzzy line around a yet indefinite entity and no structure whatsoever. Its criteria of formation therefore allow for indefinite trans/formations of the structure of rules of other discourses, structures territorial cohesion could appropriate. One of the four criteria exemplifies this: if the rule is that all concepts should be able to relate their content to that of others, it does not specify the contents. Territorial cohesion can then pin down any meaning in any corresponding metanarrative which can relate to any other metanarrative. This does not structure the tying together of discourses any further. Hence, when territorial cohesion would function as such a discursive formation surface, possible articulations do not appear to be specified any further than the rules which demarcate the discourse already do.

As discursive aggregation surface the second reason for why the discourse cannot be pin-pointed down returns. It would namely circumscribe a surface for the listed policy discourses. However, if holistiness is a key feature of the territorial cohesion discourse, this could entail that the bundling framework remains ajar for policies. The concept's functioning as three-way crossing shows this with is movement. The meanings pinned down in the metanarratives, such as the contradicting ones of territorial cohesion as either SG(E)I or policy coherence, are then played out in the contested positions. In that case policy discourses are aggregated according to the topical order where they encounter each other in the (mental) power practices which are in line with the ways metanarratives can relate. To follow the same pro/positions, the IGCs can for instance give official backing to the policy discourse of SG(E)I, while the (post-)ESDP process can equip the one of territorial governance with policy coherence, and they meet in battle. Territorial cohesion can then only appropriate these policy discourses together with a surface tightly knit for contests between them. Still, when territorial cohesion would function as such a discursive aggregation surface, just the topical order specifies possible articulations beyond the rules which demarcate the discourse.
As discursive thoroughfare surface the (indeed) third reason for why the discourse cannot be pin-pointed down returns. It would namely draw a structure in which discourses can constantly combine. If the territorial view itself is the focus of the territorial cohesion discourse, this view would structure how other discourses can combine in the discourse while a constant transformation remains possible within the boundaries set by its broad rules of formation and their criteria of threshold. This way in which territorial cohesion relates to other discourses individualises it more as a discourse (as mentioned with its criteria of correlation; see §17.2.4). What is more, because the territorial view would constitute its essence, all the meanings and metanarratives of the discourse should then operate accordingly. Yet, again any meaning can be pinned down in any corresponding metanarrative which can relate to any other metanarrative, as long as they abide by this rule. Hence, when territorial cohesion would function as such a discursive thoroughfare surface, possible articulations only appear to be specified further by the rule that all the operations of the discourse must express a territorial view.

Probably neither a functioning of territorial cohesion as discursive formation, aggregation, nor thoroughfare surface will structure all of its possibilities of articulation. Still, as three discursive prospects they together do individualise the territorial cohesion discourse further. What is more, these surfaces could (partly) be the same. The structure of thoroughfare namely might not be fixed yet and also be formed by the discourses that combine in territorial cohesion as formation and aggregation surface (e.g. the discourse of monotopia and the European Union’s spatial policy discourse). Either way, to be considered reasonable, territorial cohesion articulations might have to fit in (at least) one of these three prospects. They could therefore show the ways in which the concept’s branches (i.e. discursive interdependencies) might grow into a trunk (i.e. discursive structure) due to their re/insertion into the debate.

One can then speculate about the kind of changes in the territorial cohesion discourse that are more or less likely, this within the rules that demarcate it of course. When articulations follow the discursive formation surface, only the same broad rules apply, what makes many transformations possible. Yet, because this does not imply major changes in the discourse and its criteria of threshold – which, arguably, do not change all of a sudden – picture the conditioning of indefinitiveness and unspecificity, this is a very likely prospect.

When articulations follow the discursive aggregation surface instead, those broad rules would be made narrower by the topical order which forms the battlefield of the concept’s usage, what turns territorial cohesion in a battle arena of both the concept’s meanings and usages. In this battle arena positions of for instance spatial/territorial development objectives (polycentrism in particular) and services (specifically for all territories) appear to weaken, while those of balanced development, coordination (of policies), and the territorial dimension to gain strength (see Chapters 11 until 14). Although each of these changes is likely, they are in general less so than the prospect above, because in themselves fragile (i.e. those which weaken might strengthen later on and vice versa).

When the articulations conversely follow the discursive thoroughfare surface, those rules that demarcate the discourse would be less broad, because all of the operations of the territorial cohesion discourse have to express a territorial view. This implies a fundamental change in the discourse, one that also needs a major overhaul of the (political) agenda by favouring explicit territorial positions over others (i.e. territorial specificities and the territorial dimension over balance, services, and coordination; see §16.1.2). This change therefore seems the least likely. Hence, in the territorial cohesion discourse no marginalisation of statements seems the most likely, the definite marginalisation of particular ones less likely and the marginalisation of non-territorial ones unlikely. This unlikeliness of major marginalisations (i.e. almost everything goes) again brings the indefinitiveness and unspecificity forward that individualises the discourse.

### 17.2.4 The contextual relations of the territorial cohesion discourse

What lastly individualises the territorial cohesion discourse are its criteria of correlation, in which what is said above about the concept’s functioning as a discursive nodal surface comes back. Some criteria of the discourse’s correlation are its relations to other discourses, which are (in random order):
The demarcation of the territorial cohesion discourse

- the discourses of its criteria of threshold;
- the policy discourses of its criteria of threshold;
- the general discourse on Europe, the Community discourse, the European Union's public policy discourse;
- the managerial discourse;
- probably the Member States' national spatial planning discourses.

The three prospects in the territorial cohesion discourse, that is, the concept's functioning as a discursive formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare surface, then structure the relations of territorial cohesion to the (policy) discourses of its criteria of threshold. Then again, just as with the criteria of threshold, probably even more discourses can be mentioned here, also because as a discursive nodal surface the concept could relate to every discourse it can tie together with others while it follows the rules that demarcate territorial cohesion as a discourse. Moreover, when you consider that each of the discourses that territorial cohesion could tie together has relations with other discourses, many more could be mentioned, as then these relate to the territorial cohesion discourse as well. For when these discourses would tie together in territorial cohesion, each also remains a discourse in itself, which thus relates to the territorial cohesion discourse in a specific way.

Other criteria of correlation of the territorial cohesion discourse are the relations it has to its non-discursive context. This context is formed by (in random order):

- the many positions in power practices as indexed by the narratives with an own dynamic;
- the larger struggles in four spheres of action to add a European Union competency (i.e. in the IGCs), promote European spatial planning (i.e. in the (post-)ESDP process), substantively expand Regional/Cohesion policy (i.e. in this policy), and to channel European funding (i.e. in the European funds);
- the European Union's shifting agendas and the absence of an imposed order.

The relations involved are straightforward. Almost all the territorial cohesion positions are namely the same as their older contextual positions which remain to show other dynamics. The discourse can thus mis/appropriate them for its power practices. The indecision about these practices could then re/organise institutional spaces into uncertainties: on the European level towards an indistinct symbiosis in which European spatial planning is subjected to Regional/Cohesion policy, solely in/formal concertedness, selection of content within the new topical order of the concept, and a flexibility in ways to manage European funding and nebulosity on lower levels (see §15.5.3 and 15.5.4). Then again, the larger struggles frame and structure territorial cohesion battles while the concept's usage merely stirs them vice versa. These asymmetrical power relations could therefore entail a minor role for the discourse in general (i.e. marginal and/or subordinate). The concept's transforming usage also fits its institutional framework in which “everything flows” and agendas therefore shift and order lacks. The discourse is thus well-adapted to its setting. Still, probably also more non-discursive contexts can be mentioned where it relates to. Hence, in a nutshell: the power practices of the territorial cohesion discourse relate to more power practices than those of European spatial planning.

All in all, three ways therefore individualise the territorial cohesion discourse beyond the rules that demarcate it: i) the conditions for these rules, ii) how they point towards three prospective structures of the discourse (i.e. as discursive formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare surface), and iii) its relations to other discourses and its non-discursive context. Each thereby comes with a defining characteristic. The conditions bring forward that the discourse’s lavaness could be due to its gaze from power. It could then be structured to tie other discourses together by being in creation, a holistic battle arena for policy discourses, and/or a territorial view. And the territorial cohesion discourse could be called marginal and/or subordinate to its context. Hence, territorial cohesion does not so much appear to be a basic concept that alters the deepest discursive structures, but a concept that is easily modified by them.
17.3 Conclusion on the demarcation and structure of the territorial cohesion discourse

17.3.1 The hypotheses that individualise the territorial cohesion discourse

This chapter speculated about the ways in which the demarcation and structure of the territorial cohesion discourse individualise its creation. To thereby take the large semantic/epistemic and political variation into account, its structure of rules of formation is indefinite and unspecific in demarcating the statements which can be articulated (e.g. there are no necessary articulations). Still, the construction of territorial cohesion knowledge and contested transformation of the concept's usage appear to follow these four rules: i) all objects can neither be political nor tangible, ii) all operations must be policy-centred in specific ways and lack reflective argumentation, iii) all concepts must be open to relate their content to that of others, and iv) all theoretical options must be adopted.

The many conditions for these rules further individualise the territorial cohesion discourse. Especially that the dominant status quo which accommodates territorial cohesion policy would be fixed outside the discourse's gaze from (state-)government and the specified policies does, because this might condition that everything within this gaze can appear in a constant flux. Moreover, that many territorial cohesion meanings can be pinned down in metanarratives, these can be related in the concept whilst it moves as a three-way crossing in power practices, and many (policy) discourses can be tied together thus, would condition its functioning as Discursive Nodal Point. Because these multitudes seem to hinder stability, the concept might merely harbour prospects for functioning as such a nodal point though.

Nonetheless, because the dynamic and complex network of discursive interdependencies between its largely overlapping pro/positions can be structured as discursive formation, aggregation, and/or thoroughfare surface, possibilities of articulation emerge that individualise the territorial cohesion discourse too. That is, when it, respectively, ties discourses together by being in creation articulations merely have to follow the rules of formation, when it appropriates policy discourses with a holistic battle arena the individualisation by these rules is specified by the concept's topical order, and when it structures related discourses with a territorial view the rules become more specific. The first entails no fundamental changes to the discourse and the conditions for its indefinitiveness and unspecificity and the second only contested particular ones. The obligation of having a territorial view on the other hand does imply a fundamental change. The re/insertions of these discursive structures in the debate are therefore of a decreasing likeliness, what probably results in a continuing vagueness of the territorial cohesion discourse.

17.3.1 Towards a new territorial governmentality

The territorial cohesion discourse hypothesised above could play a pivotal role in technocratic government, because it circumscribes the boundaries and structure of the concept's expertise. These namely limit which territorial cohesion articulations are considered to be reasonable and can therefore mediate between, in the concept's case, several marginal and/or subordinate areas of action and many naturalised objects of its politique. Because they thereby delineate objects and limits of politics and justify 'particular ways of exercising power', the discourse can be seen as a political rationality, or a composite of interweaving rationalities, that imbues policy with (legitimising) "reason" (Rose&Millar, 1992: 175; Diez, 2001: 16).

The involved re-inscription of some instead of other knowledges and powers into debates then allows particular questions to be asked and not others. However, as the territorial cohesion discourse might not be pinpointed down, many questions can come up in it. To mention just a few meta-questions:
- cohesion and growth or cohesion or growth?
- is the answer to the question 'What is territorial cohesion?' the answer to the question 'What is European spatial planning'?
- is territorial cohesion a structure for other discourses (e.g. a federating concept, coordination) or a discourse on its own (e.g. a single policy objective, an own rationality)?
- should these choices be decided on or not?
What is more, the unity of the territorial cohesion discourse could also lie in the emerging array of questions which are never known beforehand. How do the discourse's broad limits to questioning then correlate with an organisation of governing?

As the concept stands for systematic uncertainty, its usage can re/organise institutional spaces around European spatial planning and Regional/Cohesion policy into indistinct symbioses, solely in/formal concertednesses, flexibility in management, and/or nebulosity on lower levels, each and all of course accompanied by the selectivity of territorial cohesion's topical order. Hence, even if the discourse can only play a major role in these margins of the European Union, it surely correlates with an organisation of governing: its institutional context in which "everything streams" (see §1.3.2). As the territorial cohesion discourse might thus have much in common with, moreover, combines parts of its non-/discursive contexts, it might be part of a new territorial governmentality, one which does not oblige a territorial view.