

Table S2: Examples of proposed key enabling factors and conditions for various (aspects of) conservation interventions emerging from the literature.

Scholar	Enabling Factors and Conditions for Community-Centred Conservation	
<p>Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles for common pool resources</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Define clear group boundaries 2) Match rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions 3) Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules 4) Make sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities 5) Develop a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members’ behaviour 6) Use graduated sanctions for rule violators 7) Provide accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution 8) Build responsibility for governing the common resource in nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected system 	
<p>Agrawal’s (2001) 33 critical enabling factors for common pool resources</p>	<p><i>Resource System</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Small size 2) Well-defined boundaries 3) Low levels of mobility 4) Possibility of storage of benefits from the resources 5) Predictability
	<p><i>Resource User</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6) Small groups 7) Clearly defined boundaries 8) Shared norms 9) Good leadership 10) Past successful experiences 11) Interdependence between group members 12) Similarities in identities and interests 13) Low levels of poverty 14) Overlap between user group residential location and resource location 15) High levels of dependence on the resource system 16) Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources 17) Low levels of user demand 18) Gradual changes in level of demand
	<p><i>Institutional Framework</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 19) Rules are simple and easy to understand 20) Locally devised access and management rules 21) Ease in enforcement of rules 22) Graduated sanctions 23) Availability of low-cost adjudication 24) Accountability of low-cost adjudication 25) Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources
	<p><i>Externalities</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 26) Low-cost exclusion technology 27) Time for adaptation of new technologies related to the commons 28) Low levels of articulation with external markets 29) Gradual changes in articulation with external markets 30) No undermining of local authorities by central government 31) Supporting external sanctioning institutions 32) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation actions 33) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance
<p>Pomeroy et al.’s (2001) conditions for successful fisheries co-management</p>	<p><i>Supra-community level</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Enabling policies and legislation 2) External agents
	<p><i>Community level</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Appropriate scale and defined boundaries 2) Membership is clearly defined 3) Group homogeneity 4) Participation by those affected 5) Leadership 6) Empowerment, capacity building, and social preparation 7) Community organizations 8) Long-term support of the local government unit 9) Property rights over the resource 10) Adequate financial resources/budget 11) Partnerships and partner sense of ownership of the co-management process 12) Accountability 13) Conflict management mechanisms 14) Clear objectives from a well-defined set of issues 15) Management rules enforced
	<p><i>Individual and household level</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Individual incentive structure

<p>Cinner et al.'s (2009) institutional design principles for community-based management of inshore marine resources</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Clearly defined membership rights 2) Congruence between the scale and scope of rules and local conditions 3) Resource users have rights to make, enforce and change rules 4) Conflict resolution mechanisms 5) Nested Enterprises 6) Monitoring of monitors 7) Clearly defined geographic boundaries 8) Collective choice arrangements with affected individuals able to participate in changing rules 9) Graduated sanctions 10) Monitoring of resources 11) Monitoring of resource users
<p>Cox et al.'s (2010) Ostrom-modified design principles for Community-based Natural Resource Management</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1A) Clear boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers 1B) Clear boundaries are present that define a resource system 2A) Appropriation and provision rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions 2B) The benefits obtained by users from a common-pool resource (CPR), as determined by appropriation rules, are proportional to the amount of inputs required in the form of labor, material, or money, as determined by provision rules 3) Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules. 4A) Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the appropriation and provision levels of the users 4B) Monitors who are accountable to the users monitor the condition of the resource 5) Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and the context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to the appropriators, or by both 6) Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials 7) The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities 8) Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises
<p>Poe et al.'s (2013) guiding principles of a cultural dimensions approach to conservation</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Recognize the diverse cultural meanings and values embedded in human-environment interactions 2) Protect access to resources, spaces, and processes upon which cultural wellbeing depends 3) Involve communities who have cultural connections to ecosystems in science and management at all stages (from problem framing to assessment, to identifying and implementing solutions, to monitoring) 4) Allow for cross-scale and nested linkages when assessing and managing cultural dimensions of ecosystems 5) Recognize the integrated and coupled nature of sociocultural wellbeing and ecosystem health; and design conservation approaches appropriately
<p>BOISSIÈRE et al.'s (2014) four enabling conditions for successful and sustainable local participation in Measurement, Reporting and Verification for REDD+</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) relevance to local people 2) technical capacity 3) a reporting structure informed by existing systems 4) an appropriate verification system.
<p>Honig et al.'s (2015) factors key to the success of a private conservation area</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The value of demonstration 2) Prior experience in environmentally friendly farming practices 3) The importance of a champion to ensure implementation 4) The importance of buy-in from senior management 5) Flexibility and adaptability of the initiative 6) Human capital development is key 7) Social capital development is key 8) Sufficient internal and external capacity 9) The role of monitoring and auditing 10) The value of an easy-to-use and understandable framework to guide implementation 11) Long-term investment 12) On-farm support via extension services 13) A clear link between farm success and the biodiversity conservation 14) The importance of support and buy-in from staff

	Equity Principles			Enabling Conditions
	Recognition	Procedure	Distribution	
Schreckenberg et al.'s (2016) equity framework for protected areas	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Recognition and respect for human rights 2) Recognition and respect for statutory and customary property rights 3) Recognition and respect for the rights of Indigenous peoples, women and marginalized groups 4) Recognition of different identities, values, knowledge systems and institutions 5) Recognition of all relevant actors and their diverse interests, capacities and powers to influence 6) Non-discrimination by age, ethnic origin, language, gender, class and beliefs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7) Full and effective participation of all relevant actors in decision-making 8) Clearly defined and agreed responsibilities of actors 9) Accountability for actions and inactions 10) Access to justice, including an effective dispute-resolution process 11) Transparency supported by timely access to relevant information in appropriate forms 12) Free, prior and informed consent for actions that may affect the property rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 13) Identification and assessment of costs, benefits and risks and their distribution and trade-offs 14) Effective mitigation of any costs to Indigenous peoples and local communities 15) Benefits shared among relevant actors according to one or more of the following criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • equally between relevant actors or • according to contribution to conservation, costs incurred, recognized rights and/or the priorities of the poorest 16) Benefits to present generations do not compromise benefits to future generations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Legal, political and social recognition of all protected area governance types 2) Relevant actors have awareness and capacity to achieve recognition and participate effectively 3) Alignment of statutory and customary laws and norms 4) An adaptive, learning approach
Huber-Stearns et al.'s (2017) social-ecological enabling conditions for payments for ecosystem services (PES)	Biophysical conditions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Small resource area • Resource locations & arrangement • Well-defined boundaries of pes • Existing fundamental ecosystem science and baseline data • Linkages between ecosystem service provision and management practices • Clear threat or risk to ecosystem service 	Economic conditions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Significant value of ecosystem service • Low opportunity costs • Manageable transaction costs • Defining ecosystem service as an economic good or service • Economic growth 	Governance conditions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presence/ absence of intermediaries • Strong capacity among actors • Influential champion • Strong existing institutions • Secure land tenure & property type • Fit of governance structure with scale of PES • Multiple/ single PES objectives 	Socio-cultural conditions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trust & transparency among actors • Stakeholder communication & engagement • Preexisting market-based culture • Participant willingness • Proximity of actors to each other • Large/ small number of actors
Galvin et al.'s (2018) ten institutional processes for successful African Community-based Conservation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Length of establishment 2) Presence of key players/ leaders 3) Presence of supporting bridging organizations 4) Presence of diverse and multiple partnerships 5) Presence of collaboration in decision-making 6) Presence of social learning including monitoring and assessment 7) Devolution or rights to local community 8) Presence of monetary incentives for participating members 9) Presence of non-monetary incentives for participating members 10) Conservation model is in-line with cultural worldviews and practices 			
Child's (2019) foundational conditions for sustainable wildlife governance & community-based natural resource management	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Long-term rights and the legitimacy of local regimes 2) Clearly defined boundaries 3) Resources have value 4) Most individuals affected by the rules or decisions can participate in modifying them face to face 			

Biggs et al.'s (2019: p3) ten conditions of emergence for robust conservation governance	Theme A: Recognising the need for change	1) Collective recognition of the problem 2) Shared understanding of the problem
	Theme B: Expectations of positive outcomes	3) Collective interest in adopting new rules 4) High expectation and value of future benefits
	Theme C: Context that facilitates experimentation and collective learning among actors	5) Presence of policy entrepreneurs to champion the rule and advocate for its adoption 6) Context allows for collective learning within and outside the member group 7) Social norms that favour collaboration: Reciprocity, trust and cooperation should be valued by the actors in the system 8) Expectations that the group appropriating and benefiting from the new actions and rules will be stable.
	Theme D: Legitimate local scale governance	9) Perceived legitimate decision-making structure 10) Opportunity to generate new norms internally
CBD Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework (CBD, 2020)		1) The participation of indigenous peoples and local communities and a recognition of their rights in the implementation of the framework 2) The participation of all relevant stakeholders, including women, youth, civil society, local and subnational authorities, the private sector, academia and scientific institutions 3) Gender equality, women's empowerment and gender responsive approaches 4) Recognition of intergenerational equity 5) Synergies with other relevant multilateral environmental agreements and processes 6) Partnerships to leverage activities at the local, national, regional and global levels 7) Adequate inclusive and integrative governance is put in place to ensure policy coherence and effectiveness for the implementation the framework 5) Adequate political will and recognition at the highest levels of government of the urgent need to halt biodiversity loss

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