After jihad: A biographical approach to passionate politics in Indonesia

Azca, M.N.

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CHAPTER 2

Jihad as ‘Passionate Politics’:
A Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The focus of this thesis is jihad and its aftermath in Indonesia. As discussed in the previous chapter, the term *jihad* is here used to refer in particular to participation in religious communal conflict that took place in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi in Eastern Indonesia. As was also explained earlier, this research focuses on non-local jihad actors (jihadists or mujahidin) who participated in the course of the conflict. As a consequence of the biographical approach chosen in this research I have examined three stages of the life story of jihad actors: *before*, *during* and *after* their jihad participation. Thus, this research begins by presenting the personal background and social profile of the jihad actors and then discussing the social process by which they became involved in the movement *pre* jihad; their roles and experiences *during* the jihad; and, finally, most critically, their later life trajectory *post* jihad. In this chapter I will present some of the arguments as to why and how I apply a ‘passionate politics’ approach of social movement theory as a theoretical framework to study jihad movements, actors’ experiences and the aftermath.

I begin with the premise that *jihad*, namely participation in ‘religious holy war’ from the viewpoint of its actors, is an instance of social movement. *Jihad* movement, as described in Chapter 1, meets some of the characteristics of social movement as formulated by
Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004: 11), namely, (1) collective, or joint, action; (2) change-oriented goals or claims; (3) extra-or non-institutional means; (4) some degree of organization; (5) some temporal continuity. As indicated, the conflict was a sort of social movement in which religious identity became a major cause and trigger. Thus, it could be referred to as a religious social movement.

Secondly, the jihad movement can be seen as an instance of ‘high-risk’ activism, based on the distinction proposed by Doug McAdam (1986) between ‘low-risk’ and ‘high-risk’ activism. In his study on the recruitment processes of the Freedom Summer in the USA, McAdam distinguished two kinds of activism based on the ‘costs’ and ‘risks’ of participation in activism. He used the term ‘costs’ to refer to “the expenditure of time, money, and energy required of a person engaged in any particular forms of activism,” while the term ‘risks’ refers to “the anticipated dangers—whether legal, social, physical, financial, and so forth—of engaging in a particular type of activity.” (1986: 67) Looking through the two lens of ‘costs’ and ‘risks’, participation in a jihad movement can be clearly classified as ‘high-risk’ activism because it requires both a high level of costs and risks.

I have applied a social movement theory approach to the study of the jihad movement because I was intrigued by the fact that phenomena of Islamism, or Islamic activism, had been so far excluded from investigation under the mode of inquiry developed by the social movement theory in the West, as observed by Asef Bayat (2005: 892). According to Bayat, Islamist movements are frequently viewed as highly homogenous and coherent social units which are to be associated with the discourse of their ideologues. On the other hand, many narratives of Islamism are either simply categorized as religious revivalism, an expression of primordial adherence, or are just thrown into the black box of ‘anonymous’, unable to be analyzed by a conventional social science approach. A similar observation was also made by Roel Meijer in his review essay on the contemporary Islamist movement: “Few subjects have attracted as much attention as the Islamist movement but have been so little understood.” (2005: 279).
In an effort to enhance understanding on contemporary Islamist movements, especially the jihad movement, I have attempted to employ the strategy of approaching the subject by focusing on the links between identity, meaning, and emotion. These issues have been marginalized by the burgeoning social movement studies in the recent period which have been developing under the ‘hegemonic’ approach of the ‘political process theory’ (Goodwin and Jasper, 2004a: vii). Instead of taking the hegemonic ‘political process’ approach, which assumes and emphasizes the primacy of ‘structure’ and the rationality of its actors, my approach will devote attention to the dynamics of the ‘micro-sociological’ aspects, and in particular the crucial role of identity, meaning and emotion in the jihad movement. Thus, following the term proposed by Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2003) to refer to a cultural approach that emphasizes the critical role of emotion and passion in social movement, I refer to the jihad movement as ‘passionate politics’.

Back to the research questions presented in the previous chapter, this chapter shall engage with three main questions, namely, first, “how did they become jihad actors?”; second, “what did the jihad experiences mean to the actors and how?”; and third, “how did the jihad experience influence the life trajectory of actors in the post-jihad period?” So I shall engage with three theoretical issues, namely, first, on participation into movement; second, on experience in movement; third, on post-participation of movement. I will discuss these three issues theoretically in the last section of this chapter.

I will begin this theoretical chapter with a literature review on communal violence and Islamist movements, two related topics in the studies of democratic transition in Indonesia. This is important since the jihad movements took place as a response to the religious communal violence that erupted in Eastern Indonesia in the context of the revival of Islamist movements during Indonesia’s democratic transition. By doing so I will show how my research on jihad movement will contribute to the study of both communal violence and Islamist movements in Indonesia. I will follow by presenting a literature review on social movement theory in order to situate my the-
oretical approach. Finally I will present a theoretical framework of the ‘passionate politics’ of social movement theory for the study of jihad movement in Indonesia. After presenting the theoretical framework I will articulate the three main arguments of this research, that were briefly introduced in the previous chapter, in order to contextualize the research questions posed in this project.

**On communal violence and Islamic movements: a review**

The topic of this research is located at the intersection of two related topics in the studies of democratic transition in Indonesia: communal violence and Islamist movements. I will start with a literature review on communal violence, followed by Islamist movements.

I will begin by discussing the paradox of the democratization process. While democratization has been a global mantra in the late twentieth century and marked by its ‘third wave’ of democratization since 1970s as prominently argued by Samuel Huntington (1999), it has led to a sort of paradox, i.e., the increasing possibility of the eruption of ethnic and communal violence during its initial phase. The end of an authoritarian regime and beginning of the democratization process does not diminish the likelihood of violence, instead serves rather to increase it. This paradox is nicely reflected in Jack Snyder’s (2000) influential book entitled *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*. He contends that the relations between the two are quite compelling, especially during the transition’s early stages. After making a comparative analysis of political transition and the rise of nationalist and ethnic violence in various settings and countries, from Sri Lanka to Malaysia from Rwanda to Burundi, Snyder concludes: “Thus, democratic consolidation rescued ethnic conflict, but the initial steps in the rocky transition to democracy increased it” (Snyder 2000: 29).

Snyder’s thesis was confirmed by Indonesia’s experience during its transition period following the collapse of the Soeharto au-
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authoritarian regime, as briefly covered in Chapter 1. The increasing number of violent incidents and casualties in the archipelago during the transition period was followed by the growing number of studies of violence in the post-Soeharto era.¹)

At the same time, Indonesia also witnessed the revival of Islamist movements in the wake of reformasi era which manifested in different arenas, from political parties to paramilitary forces, from social-religious organizations to ‘jihadi-terrorist’ groups. Post-Soeharto Indonesia has attracted worldwide attention particularly for its two most remarkable faces of the paradox: as the world’s biggest democratic Muslim country and simultaneously the hotbed of some radical Islamist fringe groups, such as Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI). Following the fall of the New Order regime, Indonesia has shifted dramatically by developing a newly democratic system that includes the implementation of direct political election to government offices from national to local levels as well as decentralization of political authority from the national to the district level. The same period has also been marked by the emergence of Islamist paramilitary groups, actively playing roles in the public sphere, such as FPI and Laskar Jihad, as well as the more radical fringe groups, such as JI. The eruption of religious communal violence in Ambon-Maluku and Poso-Central Sulawesi in 1999 mobilized thousands of activists from these groups to join jihad movement in the areas.

In the next few pages, I will discuss five books recently published on the related topics of communal violence and Islamist movements in Indonesia, by Jacques Bertrand (2004), Noorhaidi

¹) Glen Smith and Helene Bouvier-Smith (2003) published a working bibliography on conflict and violence with a special reference to Indonesia, consisting of a long list of studies on conflict related issues both by Indonesians and foreigners. It was part of a collaborative project between Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) and the Laboratoire Asie du Sud-Est et Monde Austronésien (LASEMA), part of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) of France, which began on 1 September 2001. In November 2001 they launched the website www.communalconflit.com which was later moved to www.conflictrecovery.org on 6 November 2006. The website states that the website’s change of name was made to better reflect the changing focus of conflict research and mitigation activities in Indonesia, where many areas are now undergoing post-conflict recovery.
(2005, also Noorhaidi Hasan 2006), Gerry van Klinken (2007), John T. Sidel (2006a) and Zachary Abuza (2007). While Bertrand and van Klinken studied the rise of conflict (Bertrand used the term ‘ethnic conflict’ while van Klinken preferred ‘communal violence’) in the archipelago in comparative fashion by examining some cases of conflict in different areas, Sidel and Noorhaidi focused on the religious dimension of the conflict: Sidel on the link between religious violence and structural backdrops from the colonial era up to recent developments; Noorhaidi on the emergence of the notorious Salafi paramilitary group Laskar Jihad and its quest for political identity, especially during the transitional period. Abuza, in a policy-oriented security studies perspective, focused his work on the link between political Islam and violence in Indonesia.

I start with Bertrand’s book, the earliest published and “the most comprehensive of the many recent studies of ethno-religious violence in Indonesia,” as praised by Robert Hefner (2008: 690). Bertrand took up and examined the social roots and context of ethnic conflict in various places in Indonesia; among the Dayaks and Madurese in Kalimantan; Christians and Muslims in the eastern Indonesia of the Moluccas, Flores, and East Timor; local Papuans and Indonesian authorities in Irian Jaya (later renamed Papua); the Acehnese independence movement and the nationalist government in Aceh; and Chinese and “indigenous” Indonesians in Java. Bertrand chose to study the conflict through what he terms the “historical institutionalist” approach by tracing the violence back to the “institutional context that defines and shapes ethnic identities, the official recognition of the groups, their representation in state institutions, and their access to resources.” (2004: 4). He contends that a nation’s national model, which formulates “the principles that define a nation” and “establish the inclusion/exclusion of its members and the terms of inclusion” is manifested in state institutions (ibid.).

In his analysis, Bertrand (2004: 20) puts forward the key concept ‘critical juncture’ to refer to historical moments when a political system comes under tension and, therefore, political institutions and the principles of national models are renegotiated. Furthermore he
argues that ethnic conflict is likely to happen at such ‘critical junctures.’ He suggests there were three ‘critical junctures’ in Indonesia’s institutional history, namely, the period of 1965-66, 1974-75, and 1997-98, where several ethnic conflicts erupted. Regarding the third ‘critical juncture’ which provided the context for the series of ethnic conflicts to unfold in the late 1990s, Bertrand (2004: 3) suggests that some elements of the national model were renegotiated: “the role of Islam in political institutions, the relative importance of national and regional governments, the access and representation of ethnic groups in the state institutions, as well as the definition and meaning of the Indonesian “nation.”

In the case of the Maluku conflict, where the religious element was a crucial factor in the conflict, Bertrand argues that the late Soeharto policies had disturbed the balance between Muslims and Christians, which led to a decline of the ‘traditional’ Christian domination over bureaucratic seats and associated patronage and privileged Muslims to gain new positions and resources. When the Soeharto regime collapsed and the new President Habibie began to launch political reform over state institutions and the electoral mechanism, Bertrand (2004: 114-5) suggests that it made Muslims anxious over the likelihood of losing their recent gains while Christians were anxious over the likelihood of further losses.

Although Bertrand’s framework has been quite successful in understanding and analyzing the institutional context and period in which ethnic conflicts are likely to erupt, his macro-structural and historical approach hindered him from answering some key questions such as why a particular kind of violence occurs and how does it escalate to the scale that occurred. Filling in some gaps left by Bertrand, Gerry van Klinken (2007) arrived with a comparable project to help explain some cases of communal violence that occurred during Indonesia’s transition period. Yet van Klinken chose to focus on a particular area: the towns beyond Java. He also took up some violent cases which were characterized by both ‘ethnic’ (between Dayaks and Malays against Madurese in West and Central Kalimantan) and
‘religious’ (between Muslims and Christians in Poso, Ambon and North Maluku) conflict which he termed ‘communal’ (2007: 13).

Unlike Bertrand, Van Klinken (2007) adopted a ‘contentious politics’ approach of social movement theory to study the phenomena. Following the Dynamics of Contention (DoC) analytical framework developed collaboratively by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001), van Klinken devoted his analysis to five key processes in contentious politics, namely, identity formation, escalation, polarization, mobilization, and actor constitution. A central question was posed to each key process respectively as follows: “how does a sense of bounded identity grow in a group?”; “how does a conflict that starts small escalate to involve many more actors?”; “how does the political space between rival claimants widen as they gravitate towards the extreme?”; “how do you get normally apathetic people onto the streets?”; and finally “how does a previously unorganized or apolitical group become a single political actor?” (2007: 11). Van Klinken chose to discuss each DoC process through a case study, thus, he elaborates identity formation in West Kalimantan, escalation in Poso, polarization in North Maluku, mobilization in Ambon, and actor constitution in Central Kalimantan.

This choice led to both positive and less positive results: on the one hand, it has allowed him to employ his rich fieldwork materials to discuss a particular episode of the conflict in a particular area within the solid theoretical framework. In discussing the process of escalation and mobilization of the conflict in Poso and Ambon respectively, for example, Van Klinken has successfully combined both strong data and sophisticated theoretical framework in an eloquent and convincing way. Yet, on the other hand, the choice has hindered and limited him from any critical engagement and further contribution to developing social movement theory.

Van Klinken took the further step of discussing the important role played by actors, especially the local elites, in the course of the conflict. While this choice is welcomed and seems closer to revealing the complexity of the true situation, rather than those who tended to blame national actors as orchestrating the conflict, his over-emphasis
on the political aspects of the conflict and the rationality of the actors was problematic. As closely analyzed by McRae (2008: 10-11) in the case of Poso, Van Klinken’s conviction that the violence was essentially political led him to become “less sensitive to shifts in the motivation and dynamics of violence during the conflict,” and to his “depiction of local elites as avowedly rational, cool-headed, wholly politically motivated actors who appear dispassionate in mobilizing the rank-and-file for violence.”

Although like Van Klinken I will be applying social movement theory, I have chosen to apply a distinct approach with a strong emphasis on emotion and passion rather than on structural factors as well as cognition and rationality as he did. I shall elaborate on this issue in the later section of this chapter.

While Van Klinken answered the puzzles regarding the dynamics and the process of escalation of the conflict quite convincingly, and paid attention to political actors in his analysis, especially the local elite actors and to some extent the non-local actors in the case of Ambon and Poso, he nevertheless left unanswered the question of how different patterns of violence emerged. John T. Sidel (2006a) attempted to answer the issue by formulating the shift in patterns of religious violence in Indonesia during the transition period as follows: from riots to pogroms to jihad.2) According to Sidel (2006a: xi; 2006b: 10), there was a shift in religious violence in Indonesia over a ten-year period from riots (1995-1997) to pogroms (1998-2001) to jihad (2000-2005). The term riots, he used to refer to social upheavals in provincial towns and cities mainly in Java; pogroms refers to anti-witchcraft campaigns in Java and inter-religious violence in Central Sulawesi and Maluku; while jihad refers to paramilitary mobilization and terrorist bombings under the banner of Islam. He argued that the

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2) Sidel follows the distinction between ‘riots’ and ‘pogrom’ made by Paul Brass (1996) as editor in the book Riots and Pogroms. Although emphasizing the critical and distinct elements of organization and planning in ‘pogrom’, Brass (1996: 33) was less confident of the two terms’ capability to capture the dynamics of most violent events involving large crowds. In practice, he suggests, there is virtually always some degree of organization and planning prior to riots and pogroms. Thus he warns that it is sometimes quite unrewarding to aim to define a particular situation as either a riot or pogrom.
shift from one form of religious violence to the other was indicated by the different locations, perpetrators, targets, processes of mobilization, forms of agency, and outcomes associated with each stage.

Informed by post-structuralist scholarship, Sidel developed an explanatory framework that links the changing forms of religious violence to identity uncertainty against the backdrop of changing political and economic structures at the national level. In his review essay, Aspinall (2008: 566) summarized Sidel’s thought-provoking thesis as follows: “the changing place of Islam in the nation’s politics and power structures produced changing uncertainties and ambiguities about Islamic identity and authority and, thus, changing forms of violence.” To a certain extent, the shift in backdrops of the position of Islam in public life at the national level echoes what Bertrand has called a ‘critical junture’ in Indonesia’s modern history.

Although Sidel’s analytical framework on the link between the changing faces of religious violence to identity uncertainty looks fascinating, his task was undermined by his failure to substantiate his bold thesis with strong empirical evidence. Unfortunately, in applying the framework, Sidel relies mostly on secondary sources and from-a-distance observation, especially for the narratives and descriptions of the context of local violence. Such shortcomings frequently lead to vagueness in making and drawing big narratives at the national level which are certainly open for further examination. I was particularly keen to examine and elaborate on his thesis with respect to jihad, a topic directly relevant to my present study. He describes jihad as a ‘notable narrowing of religious violence’ (Sidel 2006a: 197), that assumed two forms of violence, namely, ‘armed paramilitary assaults on Christian neighborhoods and villages in Maluku and Poso in 2000-2001’ and ‘terrorist bombing elsewhere in the country from 2000 to 2004’ (Sidel 2006a: 196). I will discuss these two kinds of religious violence later in detail in Chapters 4-6 through the life story narratives of the informant local actors.

Reflecting back on the three books reviewed, it appears that they all tend to focus their analysis on macro-structural context and factors as the main explanatory means. Although van Klinken
ventured further by discussing the conflict actors, his analysis was limited by focusing on local elite factors. While this effort proved to be fruitful in his analysis, there is “the absence, or the lack of emphasis, of the experiences or voices of the ‘foot soldiers’ in communal violence,” as rightly identified by Aspinall (2008: 570) in his concluding remark of his review essay. While warning of the moral and analytical risk of focussing on perpetrators of violence, Aspinall suggests attention be turned on them in order to develop persuasive theories and an explanation for violence. Despite the risks, he argues, it is important to take seriously the ideologies, motivations and experiences of ordinary perpetrators since “they are the connective tissue that links general theories about violence to the lived experience of particular violent episodes.” (2008: 571)

To some extent, the work of Noorhaidi (2005, see also Hasan 2006) on Laskar Jihad fills part of this gap. In his book Noorhaidi analyzes the formation and development of Laskar Jihad, the largest group that successfully mobilized thousands of non-local jihadists to the conflict area, primarily to Ambon-Maluku. Led by a flamboyant figure of Hadrami descent who was also a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, Ja’far Umar Thalib, Laskar Jihad also marked a significant shift of the Salafi-Wahabi movement from its traditional apolitical-salafism toward jihadi-activism against the backdrop of Indonesia’s political transition (2005: chapter 5). In addition to his coverage of the emergence of Laskar Jihad as a national political phenomenon during the transition period, Noorhaidi (2005: Chapter 2) also eloquently demonstrated the global expansion of Wahabism led by Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the oil boom in 1970s and the perceived threat of the emerging Syi’a movement following the success of the Iran Revolution in 1979.

Following the social movement theory framework, Noorhaidi (2005: 17) focused his analysis on the emergence of the movement and how it mobilized its followers to participate in the jihad movement. He applied the ‘political process theory’ of social movement theory using a rational choice paradigm to explain how the Laskar Jihad emerged by mobilizing its resources and structures as well as
by using strategic frames to recruit people against a backdrop of political turmoil which provided the political opportunity structure. I have described this process in the previous chapter to demonstrate how a local brawl perpetrated by youngsters in Ambon and Poso shifted to become an episode of protracted communal violence and arena of (global) jihad.

Noorhaidi (2005: Chapter 6) also sketched the social composition of Laskar Jihad activists based on interviews with 125 informants during his extensive fieldwork for more than a year in several cities and town in Indonesia. A simple profile of them follows: their ages ranged between 20 and 35 years old; almost half were university students, dropouts and graduates from a dozen universities, particularly in Central Java. Many came from lower class and abangan families, besides those from santri and upper-middle and middle class homes, and they were generally enrolled in prestigious science and engineering departments, such as Physics, Electronics and Biology. The life story narratives of some activists in their acquaintance with Islam and the movement were also presented in the same chapter including those who had experienced being “reborn as true Muslims.” He ends his book by briefly covering the delicate internal tensions and fragmentation of Laskar Jihad prior to and soon after its disbandment in October 2002.

Although Noorhaidi’s work has nicely contributed to an understanding of the peculiar phenomenon of the Salafi movement which emerged during Indonesia’s political transition, its rational choice approach seems to ignore the rich motives and narratives of the ‘foot soldiers’ of the movement. Although successfully portraying the rational and political dimensions of the elite, and especially its leader Ja’far Umar Thalib, he missed the colorful emotional dimensions of the movements to be reflected in the narratives of the ordinary and low rank activists. He also left some puzzles accurately articulated by Jemma Purdey (2009: 437) in the concluding remarks of her review: “where are these men today and in what cause or community are they finding their sense of purpose?”
It is such questions, actually, that have driven me to carry out my present research on this short-lived jihad movement by focusing attention on their post-jihad activism: on their current situation and networks, their ideology and identity, and their activities and life trajectory. Lack of attention on the post-movement situation has led us to know very little about the impact of jihad activism on both individual activists and groups as well as the recent dynamics and transformation of Islamic activism in the post-jihad period. However, I go further by expanding the number of units analyzed in my research: not just a single network of actors as focused on by Noorhaidi, that is the Laskar Jihad, but also other networks, less prominent but not necessarily less influential on the post-jihad situation and development, such as the Laskar Mujahidin and ‘Other Mujahidin’ networks—the latter those who focused their activism on non-paramilitary issues, such as medical, da’wa, and other social activities. Sharing a comparable range of Islamic activism networks as the subject of analysis, Abuza’s (2007) recent work dedicated his attention to the close link between political Islam and violence in the post-Soeharto Indonesia.

Abuza’s recent book was praised by reviewers such as Hefner (2008) and Barton (2007) as a better work than his previous Mili tant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2003) which was “edgy and uneven” as Barton (2007: 383) suggests. His focus on a broad spectrum of Islamist movements, from “political Islam” to “militant Islam” and “Islamist terrorism”, was also deemed good by Barton. After discussing the three variants of Islamist activism in different chapters, Abuza present a scenario of the future of Islamism in Indonesia (Chapter 5). He basically argues that those variants of Islamist activism have “common motives, divergent methods” so that “[w]hile people and organizations in these categories differ in terms of their willingness to use violence, they are all committed to, at the very least, establishing syari’a courts and having Islamic laws apply to all Muslims.” (2007: 84) He even furthermore contends that the rise of Islamist political violence and Islamic parties is not coincidental: “Political Islam’s
rise has created the context in which at the very least state authorities have had limited political support to crack down on violence and, more alarmingly, senior government officials have directly interfered with law enforcement and the judicial process” (2007: 3).

Abuza’s alarmist approach was criticized by several scholars, including Hefner (2008) and Sidel (2007). For Sidel (2007: 450), Abuza’s arguments are “profoundly one-sided and unconvincing,” since he chose “samples on the dependent variable” by “drawing selectively from election results, survey data, media coverage, and other sources to depict a broad set of worrying trends: political parties with Islamist agendas are gaining ground in parliament and in local government, and their agenda is being assiduously promoted.” Sidel also criticizes Abuza for his lack of attention to an historical comparative analysis of Islamist movements and, furthermore, being “guilty of anti-Islamist and anti-Muslim bias in his one-sided depiction of patterns of violence in Indonesia,” by seeing that “the aggressors are found among devout Muslims alone” (2007: 451). In fact, Sidel argues that “most of the worst large-scale atrocities in 1999–2001 were committed by armed Christian groups against Muslim communities in Poso, Maluku, and North Maluku, and it was partly in response to perceived Muslim weakness in the face of Christian attacks in these areas that Islamist paramilitaries like Laskar Jihad were mobilized in the first place” (ibid.)

Sidel’s last statement was accurately reflected in the case of mobilization for jihad that I discussed in the previous chapter. Following Sidel, I will also challenge Abuza’s alarmist conclusions on Islamist groups in contemporary Indonesia by presenting a variety of pictures and flows of Islamist movements based on different trajectories taken by former jihad actors in the post-jihad period. I will show that his static view of Laskar Jihad as an example of a “high violence” movement as presented in his figure on “objectives and tactics of Indonesian Islamic groups” (2007: 10) is certainly out of date and misleading. His analysis in locating KOMPAK as a group aimed at establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia can also be shown,
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through the narratives of some former KOMPAK activists, as wrong and inaccurate.

After reviewing some works on communal violence and Islamist movements in contemporary Indonesia, I move forward by presenting a theoretical framework for the study of jihad movements in Indonesia. Although following the pathway taken by Noorhadi Hasan and Van Klinken in the use of the framework of social movement theory to study the phenomena, I head in a different direction by applying a ‘cultural approach’ which focuses on the dynamics of identity, experience, and emotion of the actors. I will present and discuss my theoretical approach in the next section, starting with a brief review of the literature of social movement theory.

On social movement theories: from collective behavior to ‘passionate politics’

The study of social movements has been one of the most lively and interesting areas of sociology, as suggested by Louise Ryan (2006: 169) in her review essay *Rethinking Social Movement Theories in the Twenty-first Century*. Providing a framework for comprehending the dynamics of various social issues, including civil rights, feminism, environmentalism and religious movement, it has been a rich channel for empirical research and theoretical analysis since the 1960s. Reflecting the movements it studies, social movement theory is fragmented, highly charged and argumentative, allowing various concepts, paradigms and priorities to compete.

In this section, I will briefly describe some main theoretical perspectives of the social movement from the old fashioned approach of Collective Behavior that gained prominence in the 1960s up to the recent ‘Passionate Politics’ approach. The reason for presenting the different streams of social movement theory here is to make sense of the development of key notions and approaches which have informed the choice of my theoretical framework. This is not
intended to be a comprehensive review but instead a laying-out of some key concepts of each approach and how emotion was treated by each thus leading to alternative concepts and paradigms. Here I will present four main theoretical perspectives of social movement study, namely, Collective Behavior, Resource Mobilization, Political Process, and Cultural Approach.  

The Collective Behavior approach, based on the structural-functional school, basically considered social movements to be the side effects of over-rapid social change. According to Neil Smelser (1962), one of the key thinkers, in a system made up of balanced subsystems, collective behavior indicates tensions which homeostatic rebalancing mechanisms cannot accommodate temporarily. The rise of collective behaviors at times of rapid and large-scale transformations had a double meaning: “reflecting, on the one hand, the inability of institutions and social control mechanism to reproduce social cohesions; and, on the other, attempts by society to react to crisis situations through the development of shared beliefs, on which to base new foundations for collective solidarity” (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 4).

During this period, collective behavior tended to be seen under the same rubric of phenomena such as crowds, panic, mobs, manias, fashions, and so on, that characterized as irrational forms of behavior actions commonly classified as a kind of deviance. Until the 1960s many students of collective behavior had focused their attention on emotion which had been perceived as a key element for understanding all political actions that took place outside ordinary political institutions. Emotion, however, was basically regarded in negative and pejorative ways, as in studies conducted by Gustave Le Bon on crowds and Sigmund Freud on flawed personality. Goodwin and collaborators (2000: 69) argue the flawed ways in which emotion has been treated by two social science traditions, the crowd and the

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3) I share Della Porta and Diani’s (1999: 3) contention that such a distinction of social movement theory perspectives should be considered as arbitrary. First, there is variety in each perspective which cannot be simply merged; second, scholars are able to borrow concepts and insights from different theoretical perspectives; and finally, some scholars have subsequently transformed the perspective/s through their research.
Freudian, as follows. The crowd tradition portrays emotion as coming directly from crowds (or demagogues), having little to do with individuals’ own lives and goals, and only responding to the occurrence in the immediate surroundings with little significance. The Freudian tradition, on the other hand, see emotions as the outcome of individual personality conflicts rather than as responses to the social environment, thus only few flawed people are attracted to movements.

In contrast to Collective Behavior, the Resource Mobilization approach sees collective mobilization as rational action. By the early 1970s many scholars who had studied social movements had either become activists or sympathizers of the movement they engaged with. Throwing away pathological explanations, sociologists turned to rational-actor and organizational models, shifting from motivational “why” to strategic “how” questions (Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2000: 70). Thus they proposed a new way to see collective movement as an “extension of the conventional forms of political action; the actors engage in this act in [a] rational way, following their interests; organization and movement ‘entrepreneurs’ have an essential role in the mobilization of collective resources on which action is founded” (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 7). Collective action, hence, is seen simply as “politics by other means.”

Some principal scholars of Resource Mobilization, namely Mayer Zald, Anthony Oberschall and Charles Tilly defined collective actions as a “rational, purposeful and organized action” (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 8). According to this perspective, protest actions stem from a costs and benefits calculation and are affected by the availability of resources. Paying particular attention to the transformation of discontent into mobilization, it views the capacity for mobilization as relying on either the material resources (such as work, money, concrete benefits, services) or on the non-material resources (such as authority, moral engagement, faith, friendship) belonging to the group.

Formulating an influential “mobilization model”, Charles Tilly (1978) portrayed collective action as a function of interests, organization, the mobilization of resources, power, repression (or facilita-
tion) and opportunities (or threats). In his framework, these variables were presented as “structural” in nature, independent of the individuals’ beliefs and feelings (Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta 2000: 70). Therefore, although implicitly recognizing that emotions matter for people’s interest and their collective identities, as well as emotional reactions mediating between repression, opportunities, and threats, and actual collective action, Tilly’s rationalistic and organizational idioms and formulas dampened sustained analysis of emotions.

The Political Process approach shares Resources Mobilization’s view of the rationality of the actors in social movement. Yet it pays more systematic attention to the political and institutional environment in which social movements occur, with ‘political opportunity structure’ as one of its key notions. Sydney Tarrow (1983: 28; 1989: 35; see also Della Porta and Diani 1999: 10) developed a theoretical framework that integrates some variables, namely, the degree of openness or closure of formal political access, the degree of stability or instability of political alignments, the availability and strategic posture of potential allies and political conflicts between and within elites.

Dissatisfied with resource mobilization’s ignorance on the issues of grievances, sociologist Doug McAdam’s proposed a notion of “cognitive liberation” which was intended to capture the subjective processes by which people suddenly come to believe in the likelihood of protest. McAdam (1982: 49) defines the concept as capturing how “the altered responses of members to a particular challenger serve to transform evolving political conditions into a set of ‘cognitive cues’ signifying to insurgents that the political system is becoming increasingly vulnerable to challenge”. This notion, however, was criticized by Goodwin’s collaborators (2000: 71) as purely cognitive, so whereas the term “liberation” implies stimulating emotions yet the term “cognitive” then rejects that possibility. Thus, albeit the term seems to entail a radical change in perspective, cognitive liberation was merely an instrumental means to comprehend available information about the possibility of repression.

Sharing the “instrumental approach to questions of collective action” (Calhoun 2001: 49), Resource Mobilization and Political
Process approaches of social movements have been ‘hegemonic’ in recent English-language social science. As argued by Goodwin and Jasper (2004: 3-4), political process theory (PPT) has developed its tradition and dominated the field of social movement research by, "powerfully shaping its conceptual landscape, theoretical discourse, and research agenda.” There were at least two critical achievements of this approach as formulated in two influential books, namely, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framing* edited by Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald published in 1996 and *Dynamics of Contention* written collaboratively by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, published in 2001. The former attempts to develop a synthesis of social movement studies by taking into account and emphasizing the importance of the same three broad sets of factors to analyze the emergence and development of social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing. The latter, even more ambitious and bold in objective and scope, formulates eloquently a synopsis of the book in a quite long passage on the back cover:

Dissatisfied with compartmentalization of studies concerning strikes, wars, revolutions, social movements, and other forms of political struggle, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly identify causal mechanisms and processes that recur across a wide range of contentious politics. Critical of the static, single actor models...that have prevailed in the field, they shift the focus of analysis to dynamic interaction. Doubtful that large, complex series of events such as revolutions and social movements conform to general laws, they break events into smaller episodes, and then identify recurrent mechanisms and processes within them. *Dynamics of contention* examines and compare eighteen contentious episodes drawn from many different parts of the world since the French Revolution, probing them for consequential and widely applicable mechanisms, for example brokerage, category formation, and elite defection...The authors spell out the implication of their approach for explanation of revolution, nationalism, and democratization, then lay out a more general program for study of contentious episodes wherever and whenever they occur.
There have been, however, some criticisms articulated toward this dominant approach. Goodwin and Jasper (2004: 3-4) argue that the most important weakness of this perspective derives from the same sources as its popularity, a particularly strong bias in favor of metaphors of ‘structure.’ Thus, PPT sees and emphasizes ‘structural’ factors (i.e., factors that are relatively stable over time and outside the control of movement actors) more readily than others. Despite its extensive influence, nevertheless, PPT remains conceptually tangled insofar as political process theorists have been unable to reach agreement about the definitions of its basic concepts. As a consequence, “this imprecision has allowed PPT to be applied in diverse settings, but it has hindered the testing and refinement of theoretical propositions.”

Political process theorists have actually attempted to include and combine cultural elements into their framework, namely ‘mobilizing structures,’ which contain much that is not structural, and ‘cultural framing’ as presented by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1996). However, as criticized by Goodwin and Jasper (2004: 4-5), they tend to treat and analyze ‘non-structural factors’ as though they were structural factors. As a consequence, they “tend to wash the meaning of and fluidity out of strategy, agency, and culture so that they will look more like structures.”

The deficiencies of PPT in approaching cultural issues have also been discussed and criticized persuasively by Poletta (2004). Poletta critiques the distinction built up between ‘objective’ ‘structural’ opportunities and ‘subjective, cultural’ framings as argued by McAdam (1994), in which culture is located in the actor’s framing efforts. Poletta (2004: 98) suggests that such a division between structure and culture has proven unhelpful in sociological analysis generally and in social movement analysis in particular. Such an argument, Poletta (2004: 99) contends, produces two confusions: first, since the ‘structure’ is counterposed both to agency and to ‘culture’, the latter two are often implicitly aligned; and second, culture is perceived as merely a sphere of activity and target of protest rather than as a dimension of all structures and practices, including political ones.
Here we come to the Cultural Approach of social movement theory. Goodwin and Jasper (2004: vii) describe the simple distinction between the ‘cultural approach’ and PPT as follows: while the latter emphasizes economic resources, political structures, formal organization and social network, the former, drawn partly from symbolic interactionism, focuses on frames, identities, meaning, and emotions. This distinction, or simple division, to a certain extent parallels those in the discipline of sociology at large: the latter reflected in such approaches as Marxism or system theory, whereas the former is reflected in micro-sociological, constructionist approaches such as interactionism, pragmatism, and ethnomethodology.

The rise of the cultural approach in social movement theory echoes a ‘cultural turn’ in social science. Kate Nash (2001: 77) suggests two forms of ‘cultural turn’ in social theory: “the ‘epistemological’ case in which culture is seen as constitutive of social relations and identities; the ‘historical’ case in which culture is seen as playing [an] unprecedented role in constituting social relations and identities in contemporary society.” Furthermore, Nash (2001: 79) contends that one of the main reasons for the ‘cultural turn’ in sociology is the stress on agency and subjectivity and the repudiation of deterministic models of society associated with structuralist-functionalism.

One of the important issues of related to the ‘cultural turn’ in social movement studies is that of bringing passion/emotion back into the study of social movements. As argued by Deborah B. Gould (2004: 157), attention to emotions generates a new landscape for social movement research by revealing important insights and illuminating participants’ subjectivities and motivations, and, furthermore, helping in building forceful accounts of a movement trajectory, strategic choices, internal culture, conflicts, and other movement processes and characteristics. Gould (2004: 158) rejects the political process theories’ approach to “domesticate the emotional components by emphasizing the strategic uses of emotions and thereby incorporating them into a rational actor model,” as it “would strip them of all of their non-cognitive, non-instrumental attributes, thereby depleting them of some of their most interesting characteristics.
and sapping them of a large component of their conceptual force” (2004: 160).

Gould (2004: 161) criticizes political process theory as emphasizing rationality and strategic thinking as it often creates a picture of protesters as “exceptionally cognitive” and “unusually dispassionate” and “providing no insight into why such dispassionate people would ever be motivated to disrupt their daily routines and engage in collective action.” Furthermore, Gould shares with scholars from a wide range of disciplines that have challenged the dichotomy of thought/feeling and the equation of emotionality with irrationality, the contention that feeling and thinking are indivisibly intertwined, each necessary to the others. To restate this, Gould (2004: 162) argues, “emotions shape people’s notions of what is politically possible and desirable.”

As part of a concert of efforts to incorporate emotions into social movement theory, Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2001) co-edited a collection of articles in a book entitled *Passionate Politics; Emotions and Social Movements*. They argue that emotions, like other aspects of culture such as cognitive meaning or moral principles, can be seen as an aspect of all social action and social relations, formed by social expectations as much as the product of individual personalities. Opposed to the false dualism of cognition and emotion, they (2001: 16) suggest that “emotions are important in all phases of political action, by all types of political actors, across variety of institutional arenas.” Following the ‘passionate politics’ approach, I will show in the rest of this chapter how it has been used to study jihad movements in Indonesia.

**Jihad as ‘passionate politics’: theoretical framework**

The ‘passionate politics’ approach comes as a critique and an alternative to the hegemonic ‘structural approach’ and ‘rational action’ perspective in social movement research. Following this approach, instead of viewing jihad movement as the product of struc-
tural strain or an instance of rational choice action, I argue that the jihad movement is a collective action involving both cognitive and affective processes in the taking of action, in the dynamics of the action, and its repercussions. Without necessarily rejecting the roles played by structural factors and rational aspects in social movements, this approach emphasizes the critical roles played by emotions in different stages of collective action: in the making of the jihad movement, in the ongoing and dynamics of the jihad movement, as well as in the aftermath of the movement. Combined with the life story approach, it assumes that the dynamics of identity and emotions are reflected in the life story narratives of the actors. At the level of the life story narratives of the jihad actors, it suggests that emotions play an important role in the process of becoming a jihad actor in the pre-jihad, in making meaning during the jihad participation, as well as in shaping the life trajectory of the actors in the post-jihad period.

Following the passionate politics approach, I also discuss the important role of network and ideology in the different stages of the jihad movement: in the recruitment process, in the ongoing movement’s participation, and in the aftermath of participation in jihad movement. I argue that the social network and ideological framework play an important role in the recruitment process which leads to participation in jihad movement; it is the social network which bring the actor closer to the movement and then it is its ideological framework which bring causes and reasons for the participation. As presented in the previous chapter, I distinguish three types of Islamic activism, namely, pious, jihadi, and political Islamism. I contend that each type of Islamic activism contains a particular kind of social network and ideological framework which influence the ways in which a jihad actor interprets their jihad experiences and, eventually, influence the life trajectory of the actor in the post-jihad period.

How do social networks influence the life trajectory of the actor? I argue it happened through the dynamics of three kinds of social network, namely, core-network, tactical-network, and extended-network. Core-network is a social network through which the actor joins the jihad; tactical-network is a social network of jihadist networks
which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and extended-network is an extension of social networks which develop in the aftermath of jihad participation. I use the concept of social network in two meanings: first, the social network as the link between concrete actors through specific ties as articulated by a ‘realist’ view; and second, social networks as “phenomenological realities” and “networks of meaning” as suggested by phenomenologists, such as White (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27). I furthermore argue that the core-network, the social network through which the actor joins the jihad, is the most important network that provides the actor with an ideological framework and acts as ‘ideological network’ for the actor. Here I propose a sort of hypothesis: the stronger relationship between actor and its core-network the more likely actor will sustain engagement with the network of activism through which actor becomes involved in joining jihad. The converse applies, the weaker the relationship between the actor and their core-network the more likely the actor will disengage from the network of activism through which actor might join jihad.

I continue the analysis by combining the dynamics of social networks of the actor and pattern of membership affiliation that apply within the group with which the actor engages. As explained in Chapter 1, I follow the distinction between exclusive affiliation and multiple affiliations suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999) and contend that the different types of Islamic activism apply different patterns of membership affiliation: pious and jihadi activism commonly apply exclusive affiliation while political activism commonly applies multiple affiliations. Here I propose the hypothesis: the more extensive the extended-network of the political activist the more likely the activist will play a larger role within its core-network; the more extensive the extended-networks of pious or jihadi activist the more likely the activist will have trouble with its core-network. I will show how these hypotheses are substantiated in the life story narratives of the actors in the next empirical chapters (Chapters 4-6).

In the next sections, I will present some key concepts of the passionate politics approach, namely identity, emotion, and narrative, and how I will use them to discuss jihad movements in Indone-
sia. I will also elaborate two critical concepts, namely social network and ideology, and how it will be used in this research.

• **Identity in social movement studies**

Identity had been a minor issue in social movement studies until the rise of the so-called “New Social Movement” (NSM)\(^4\) in the late 1960s, especially in the aftermath of the 1968 student movement in France and the following waves of actions. It claims that what is ‘new’ in this movement was its shift of central issues from ‘class and ideology’ as the character of working class and labor movements to ‘ethics, life style and identity’ as the character of the new movements in the post-industrial society (Touraine 1981), the information society (Melucci 1989, 1996) and the network society (Castells 2004). The main attention is primarily paid to the complicated relationship between identity and collective action of the social movements in the radical shift of the society. The notion of identity, as argued by Melucci (1996: 45), refers to three features: “the continuity of a subject over and beyond variations in time and its adaptations to the environment; the delimitation of this subject with respect to others; the ability to recognize and to be recognized.”

Collective identity is a crucial concept in social movement study because it is the basis for the making of collective action. As argued by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 86), it happens through “the identification of actors involved in conflict, the activation of trusting relationship among them, and the establishment of connections linking events from different periods.” I will use the definition of collective identity formulated by Poletta and Jasper (2001: 285):

> [I]ndividual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution. It is a perception of shared status or relation, which may be imagined

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\(^4\) The claim of the “newness” of NSMs was problematized and criticized by Calhoun (1993) by demonstrating that some elements of NSMs could also be found in social movements in the late eighteenth and especially early nineteenth centuries.
rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal identities, although it may form part of a personal identity.

This definition stresses simultaneously the cognitive, moral and emotional connection of the individual to a broader social entity; furthermore it also emphasizes identity as fluid and relational rather than a fixed category. Following Della Porta and Diani (1999: 85, emphasis added) I approach identity not as “an autonomous object” or “a property of social actors” but “the process by which social actors recognize themselves—and are recognized by others—as part of broader groupings. On the basis of such allegiances, they give meaning to their own experiences and to their development over time.” Della Porta and Diani consider the relationship between the individual and collective dimension in defining identity involves an intricate process. On the one hand, individuals define and redefine individual projects and possibilities for action through the construction, maintenance, and revitalization of identities. On the other hand, the production of identity always involves a social process and cannot be simplified merely as a psychological mechanism. In sum, there is always a constant tension and interplay between personal and collective dimension in the making of collective identity.

Before moving forward, it is important to notice some problematic paradoxes entailed in the use of the concept of identity. There are at least three crucial problems to be recognized as suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999: 86), namely, first, the concurrently static and dynamic nature of social identification; second, the existence of multiple identities or “individuals’ feelings of belonging to several different collectivities”; third, the paradox of the role of identity within the framework of rational interpretations of collective actions. The last paradox is the most complicated issue to deal with and where the passionate politics attempted to go beyond the rejection of such a dichotomy between thought/feeling and reason/emotion. However, such a contention was just the beginning of a long endeavor to develop a more powerful framework through a series of systematic studies rather than the final resolution of the paradox.
In studying the relationship between identity and social movement, I will follow Jasper’s (1985: 85-6) suggestion to distinguish three kinds of identity: personal identity, collective identity, and movement identity. Personal identity is defined as a sense of self, combining attributes, activities and interests, and identification with collectivities that emerge from the personal biographies of individuals, whilst making use of wider cultural meanings. Collective identity “consists of perception of group distinctiveness, boundaries, and interests, for something closer to a community than a category.” Although defined as independent by both individuals and movements, collective identity strongly links to personal identity. On the other hand, collective identity varies from movement identity, “which arises when a collection of groups and individuals perceive themselves (and are perceived by others) as a force in explicit pursuit of social change.” Yet both collective and movement identities can be a factor to personal identity, which usually consists of a complex blend of identifications. Thus, Jasper concludes as follows: “personal identities exist on the biographical level; collective identities are part of the broader culture; the movement identities arise from the interaction between internal movement culture and the broader culture.” (1985: 87; emphasis in original)

From these abstract definitions I will present a concrete example through the biographical data of a life history informant named Awod Umar, a jihad activist from Solo. Here is part of Awod’s personal identities: a young man born in Solo in 1980 from a Gujarati descent father and an Arabic descent mother. Grown up in a Muslim devout (santri) family, he went to Islamic school from primary to high school. Due to his misbehavior, he dropped out from high school. Up to here his personal identity intersects with his collective identity: son of Gujarati-Arabic parents who grew up in the city of Solo, the heart of Javanese culture, under strong Islamic traditions. Gujarati-Arabic blood manifests in his appearance: a quite dark skin color with sharp-edged nose; but the way he speaks reflects the strong influence of Javanese culture: besides using the low-level Javanese (ngoko), he occasionally employs upper middle-level Javanese (kro-
mo madya) words—something which not all Javanese-born, like me, are able to use. Boundaries between identities are never fixed and clear-cut; it is the subject of negotiation and reinvention. It also reflects the existence of multiple identities of an individual. Rather than a fixed category, identity is the result of a set of social process of identification: to the self, the collectivity, and the movement.

While Awod’s ethnic identity, as a Gujarati-Arabic descent who speaks excellent Javanese, is somewhat ambiguous from the very beginning, his religious identity seems a little bit more obvious: Awod is a Muslim who was educated in Islamic schools from early childhood. But that did not mean that his story was a linear one. While a teenager, his behavior seemed at odds with his santri family culture: drinking alcohol, using drugs, gambling, and stealing—all things which were forbidden by conventional Islamic teachings. Anyhow, he remained identifying himself as a Muslim man—though with ‘bad behavior’. Nevertheless he had eventually turned his life trajectory when he was 18 years old following a period of identity crisis in the wake of reformasi: attracted by the festive season of the rising of new political parties he left his ‘street-bad boy’ subculture and joined a paramilitary group affiliated with the Islamist party, Brigade Hizbullah. Thus he enhanced drastically his identification to the Islamic group and his personal commitment to Islamic teachings in a process of shifting toward a new collective identity: being or becoming a Muslim activist. One year later he was elected leader of the Brigade Hizbullah and then joined the jihad movement in Ambon in 2000. Hence, a movement identity was formed through his affiliation with Brigade Hizbullah and furthermore through his participation in jihad movement in Ambon.

I also share Jasper’s (1985: 87) framework in making the distinction and breaking down of movement identity into levels: organizational identity (identification with a particular group of protest), tactical identity (identification with the use of particular tactic-like direct action or being in some wing of a movement, like the radical vanguard), and activist identity (identification with a broader activist subculture that might nourish several distinct movement). In the
case of the conflicts in Ambon and Poso, some jihadists attributed either organizational identity such as participants of Laskar Jihad or Laskar Mujahidin; or tactical identity such as participants of “pasukan bakar” (the arsonist troops) or “pasukan linggis” (the looting troops); or with activist identity as a jihad activist.

• The link of identity and emotions in social movements

But how does, then, identity link to emotion? “Emotions do not merely accompany our deepest desires and satisfactions, they constitute them, permeating our ideas, identities, and interests.” They are, as Jasper (1998: 399) suggests by quoting Collins (1990: 28): “the “glue” of solidarity—and what mobilizes conflict.” Suggesting the primary role played by emotions in social life, Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2001: 10) argue: “Emotions are part of the “stuff” connecting human beings to each other and the world around them, like an unseen lens that colors all our thought, actions, perceptions, and judgments.”

Jasper (1998: 399-400) describes that recently sociologists have rediscovered emotions, by emphasizing how emotions are culturally constructed rather than being automatic somatic responses. In contrast to older schools of thought that viewed emotions as natural sensations, originating in the body and hence potentially less controllable or less “rational”, the constructionist view emotions as constituted more by shared social meanings than automatic physiological states. Some theorists, as Jasper described, argue that bodily changes must be interpreted before they shift to become emotions; while others take the stronger view that bodies change only in reaction to cultural situations associated with particular emotions. Unlike the previous negative and pejorative interpretation of emotions, the new approach views emotion in a more sympathetic way.

While rejecting the supremacy of the rational choice approach in shaping human action, it attempts to build a conceptual bridge with cognition and moral values. On the link of emotions to moral values, Jasper (1998: 400-1) argues that emotions often arise from perceived infractions of moral rules. By referring to de Sousa’s (1976) notion
of “paradigm scenario”, Jasper describes how emotions commonly unfold in the context of common human narratives such the death of a friend leading one through several predictable emotional phases while other unexpected and unpleasant events may lead to surprise, sadness, anger, and outrage. Goodwin and collaborators (2001: 10) refer to Thomas Scheff and others who contend that “the emotions most directly connected to moral sensibilities, such as shame, guilt, and pride, are especially pervasive as motivators of action.” Jasper (1998: 400-1) also suggests that emotions involve beliefs and assumptions open to cognitive persuasion. Emotions rely at least partly on cognitive understandings and appraisals of objects as indicated by the fact that emotions normally have objects, for example, of which we are afraid, surprised, or we enjoy. Thus, he argues, this allows learning and adaptation to one’s environment.

Let’s say that emotions are important aspects of collective identity in the course of social movement. But the next question is: how? It is obvious that emotions are complex phenomena and exist in every corner of social life, including social movements. So, how do emotions play a role in social movements? To discuss this issue I follow a conceptual framework proposed by Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta (2004) in distinguishing four kinds of emotional dimensions in social movements, namely, reflex emotions, affective emotions, moral emotions, and moods. As will be discussed later in this chapter, I found that the first three kinds of emotional dimensions of social movements formulated above are useful concepts to explain the dynamics of identity and emotions as reflected in the life story narratives of the informants. Before explaining how they work I will describe briefly the three concepts below.

Goodwin and his colleagues define reflex emotions as certain emotions that “arise suddenly, without conscious cognitive processing, in an involuntary fashion.” (2004: 416) They suggest that these emotions involve the processing of information beyond normal cognition mechanism: “quicker, more primitive neurological routes that allow us to respond immediately.” They list six kinds of main reflex emotions, namely, fear, surprise, anger, disgust, joy and sadness,
and, by referring to Elkman (1972), claim that the expression of these emotions is similar across cultures. These emotions are often perceived by people as the exemplar of all emotions, being also mistakenly associated with irrationality: “out of control, with attendant bodily changes, causing us to act in ways that feel automatic and irrepressible, and passing quickly” (2004: 416).

Unlike reflex emotions, affective emotions, such as love and hate, respect and trust, normally persist over a long period of time. Goodwin and collaborators (2004: 418) define affects as “positive and negative commitments and investments that we have toward people, places, ideas and things.” By referring to Kanter (1972) and Zurcher and Snow (1981), they contend that commitment to a group or cause may be based on affection, as well as rational calculation and morality. They also suggest that affects give people basic orientations toward the world, especially what people care most deeply about, and mention trust and respect as examples of crucial factors in politics.

Goodwin and collaborators (2004: 422) define moral emotions as “emotions arise out of complex cognitive understandings and moral awareness, reflecting our comprehension of the world around us and sometimes our place in it.” They suggest moral emotions as perhaps the largest group of emotions in social movements which reflect cultural variations and constructions much more than reflex emotions do. They also suggest that some of these moral emotions reflect, frequently implicit, in our own actions. For example, people feel pride when they follow what they perceive to be sound moral rules and, conversely, feel shame or guilt when they do not. Other emotions involve judgments about actions of others, such as outrage or jealousy. Moral emotions sometimes are used by an organizer to define a movement, such as gay right movements often underscore pride, animal rights groups highlight compassion while the oppressed movements focus on dignity. Jasper (1997, also Jasper and Poulsen 1995) propose ‘moral shocks’ as a critical episode which often lead to inclination to action. Goodwin and collaborators state that as cultural deeds, moral emotions are especially closely tied to cognition, which are created and reinforced through narratives and discourse (2004: 423).
I will also use the distinction of emotions generated within a social movement as proposed by Jasper (1998). He distinguishes two kinds of emotions as produced and developed within a social movement, namely, \textit{reciprocal} and \textit{shared} emotions. The earlier emotions concern “participants’ ongoing feelings toward each other,” while the latter are “consciously held by a group at the same time, but they do not have the other group members as their objects” (Jasper 1998: 417). \textit{Reciprocal emotions} consist of the close affective bounds of friendship, love, solidarity, and loyalty, and other specific emotions they induce which together engender what Goodwin (1997) calls the ‘libidinal economy’ of a movement, generating many of the pleasures of actions, sometimes in forms of ritual of a movement. \textit{Shared emotions}, significantly influenced by ideological framework of the movements, foster anger and hostility toward enemies and antagonists, or resentment and cynicism over government policies and actions, et cetera. These two kinds of emotions reinforce each other, nurturing solidarity among movement activists, and thus building a movement’s culture. Jasper suggests, “They are key sources of identification within a movement.” What is also interesting is that attention to emotion cultures may help in explaining, as suggested by Poletta and Amenta (2001: 309), trajectories of movements and eventually, I argue, of its activists.

If the crucial role of emotions in identity-based social movement is recognized, the next challenge is methodological since “the subject matter of emotions also poses unique methodological dilemma,” as suggested by Poletta and Amenta (2001: 310). Here I assert the contention that the dynamics of identity and emotions are reflected in the life story narratives of the actors. I turn to the issue of narratives in social movement in the next section.

\textbf{On narratives in social movements}

Why is there a need to link social movements to narratives, and how? Here, we come to the ‘narrative turn’ in social movement studies. According to Jasper (2004: 241), it is part of the ‘cultural turn’ in
social movement studies which took, first, the form of frames (Snow et al. 1986), then collective identity (Taylor and Whitier 1992; Gamson 1995), eventually as discourse (Steinberg 1998, 1999) and later narrativity (Poletta 1998). This development, as suggested by Davis (2002: 3), is clearly part of a renewed emphasis in these fields on human agency and its efficacy, on context and the embeddedness of human experience, and the centrality of language to the negotiation of meaning and the construction of identity in everyday life. It is interesting, however, to notice that narrative “has barely been explored by social movement researchers,” as Gary Alan Fine (1995 as quoted by Davis 2002: 4) has observed. The abandonment of narrative seems a likely consequence of the continued swing of theoretical orientations that focus on structural and interest-oriented explanations, thus overlooking ideational factors. According to Davis, such negligence is quite surprising because “social movements are dominated by stories and story-telling, and narrative goes to the heart of the very cultural and ideational interpretation, public discourse, movement culture, and collective identity.”

The analysis of narrative, Davis (2002: 4) suggests, resolves key limitations in the framing perspective and elucidates interior features of identity building and meaning-making in social activism. It also illuminates another side of movement growth, internal dynamics, and public influence, and attends to the cultural dimensions of activism that have been disregarded in movement research. Furthermore, Davis (2002: 10) advocates a linkage between ‘cultural turn’ and ‘narrative turn’ in social movement studies: “the cultural turn in social movement research has opened the way for, and would greatly benefit from, another development: a new focus on narrative as a social practice.”

How does social movement link to narratives? I will start by presenting the concept of narrative used in this research. To answer the question “what makes a story a story?” Poletta (2006: 8) argues that a story, like a speech or a song, but unlike a chronicle, a frame, or an ideology, “has an identifiable beginning, middle, and end.” Using
the term *story* and *narrative* interchangeably.\(^5\) Poletta suggests that stories usually begin by instituting a setting, a time, and place where an event will unfold. She furthermore argues that “All stories have characters and a point of view or points of view from which the events in story are experienced.” (2006: 9) She introduces the important role of *plot*, the logic of the narrative, in the making of story. More than chronology, she argues, events are configured by plot, “the logic that makes recounted events meaningful. Plot is the structure of the story.” By referring to Polkinghorne (1988), she suggests that without plot, events would be mere occurrences, discontinuous and separate moments rather than episodes in an unfolding story (Poletta 1998: 421).

Linking narrative and identity, she contends that the two operate in everyday context. Referring to narrative psychologist, Poletta (2006: 12) suggests that action occurs, “not on the basis of identities defined in categorical terms but by locating events within an unfolding life-story.” Yet the stories that we tell ourselves, she contends, bring our actions into line with our identities, either personal or collective ones. “In telling the story of our becoming, as an individual, a nation, a people, we define who we are,” she asserts. On collective identity, she argues that narratives may be used strategically to enhance its entity or may pave the way for the development of collective action. Here she suggests that emotions play role. She explains how stories of exodus, revolution, enemies defeated, threats obviated enhance national identities by “stimulating emotions of fear, pride, longing, replaced by determination, grief replaced by joy” (2006: 12).

Of course, the dynamics of identity and emotions in the course of social movements as reflected in the narratives do not occur in a social vacuum. They are closely linked to social networks and the

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\(^5\) She refers to Charles Tilly’s (2002) concept of ‘standard stories’ as similar to what she calls ‘everyday stories’: “sequential, explanatory accounts of self-motivated human action.” (see *Stories, Identities, and Social Change*). She also refers to the definition made by Lewis P.Hinchman and Sandra K.Hinchman (1997) *Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences*. See footnote no. 9 in chapter 1. In conclusion (pp. 180-1), she discusses further some reasons why she refuses the distinction made by some scholars regarding the two, including the notion that story is descriptive while narrative is explanatory.
ideological framework of the actors. I move to this issue in the next section.

- **Network and ideology in social movements**

  The important role of social networks in the making of social movements is prominent and less debatable (Swain, 2001, McAdam 1986, Gould 1993). The puzzle specifically is, as Passy (2003) suggests: how does it matter? One of the most important factors explaining an individual’s recruitment is previous contact with someone in the movement as suggested by Snow, Zurcher, Jr., and Eckland-Olson (1980), and includes prior activism in other causes, especially participation in ‘high-risk’ activism (McAdam 1986). Some scholars distinguish two kinds of links to the movements, namely, *formal* and *informal* ties (Della Porta 1988; Kriesi 1993; McAdam and Paulsen 1993). While the former refers to membership in organizations, the latter are defined as interpersonal links such as family, friendships, and social contacts. As will be evident in this research, all the informants had previously engaged with Islamist activism, though through different networks and at a different level of engagement. In the process which led to their engagement with particular Islamic activism, *informal* ties were crucial factors especially the *peer-network* and *family-network*. After being involved in a particular Islamic movement, following a particular ideological framework, in the later stage they became involved in the jihad movement in various ways: for some ‘moral shocks’ played a crucial role while for another *fatwas* made by Salafi clerics were the most powerful factors. In some cases, the social network of particular Islamic activism played a role in maintaining commitment in between the two periods of jihad movement, as the case of some *jihadi* activists.

  Yet most studies on the role of social networks in social movements primarily focus on the mobilization process, particularly on the recruitment process leading to participation. The role of social networks in the aftermath of collective action or in the post-movement period has been significantly overlooked. This research, in contrast,
pays deep attention to this issue. As mentioned earlier, I argue that the dynamics of social networks play a significant role in influencing the life trajectory of the jihad actor in the post-jihad period through three kinds of social networks: core-network, tactical-network and extended-networks. Moving in this direction, I use the concept of social networks not merely as the link between concrete actors through specific ties, as articulated by the ‘realist’ view, but also as ‘phenomenological realities’ and ‘networks of meaning’ as suggested by some phenomenologists (Diani 2003: 6; Passy 2003: 27). As argued by Jasper and Poulsen (1995: 495; emphasis in original), “networks are important because of the meanings they transmit.” It is through the shared meanings that emotions flow and experienced by the actors. Here ideology comes into movement.

Ideology is a crucial element but has so far been quite overlooked in the studies of social movements. Buechler (2000: 200, as cited by Ahmad 2005: 19) even contends that “ideology has become an orphan in social movement theory.” Oliver and Johnston (2000: 45) in a review article on the link of frames and ideologies in social movement research suggest that the turn toward framing theory and away from ideology was mainly because of the legacy of pejorative theories of ideology which tied up the social movement studies in the early 1970s. While appreciating frames and framing process as powerful and productive concepts in studying social movement, they suggest that the distinction should be made between the two concepts: “framing points to process, while ideology points to content.”

Oliver and Johnston (2000: 37) summarize the distinction between the two as follows: “Frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction, and points to the way shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of events. Ideology is rooted in

6) In a quick scan of some recent publications on social movements I found that there is no index of ideologies entry in the Index of Dynamics of Contention (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald eds. 1996), Social Movements in a Globalizing World (Kriesi et al eds. 1999) and Global Movements (McDonald 2006). Yet there are a few ideology(ies) entries in Social Movements, An Introduction by Della Porta and Diani (1999) and The Social Movements Reader by Goodwin and Jasper (2003).
politics and the study of politics, and points to coherent systems of ideas which provide theories of society coupled with value commitments and normative implications for promoting or resisting social change.” Thus, they suggest that ideology is a larger conceptual tool than frame: ideologies can function as frames and can embrace frames. While frame theory offers a relatively shallow conception of the transmission of political ideas as marketing and resonating, ideology covers the social construction processes of thinking, reasoning, educating, and socializing.

I follow the line of argument of Oliver and Johnston and their definition of ideology as “systems of ideas which couple understandings of how the world works with ethical, moral, and normative principles that guide personal and collective action” (2000: 44). By this definition, Oliver and Johnston assert that ideology links a ‘theory’ about society with a cluster of values and norms. By ‘theory’, they mean, in a broad sense, “systems or sets of beliefs that explain how social arrangements came to be and how they might be changed or strengthened.” While values and norms consist of what is morally right and wrong as well as norms about what to do. Although this definition seems to lack emphasis on affective aspects, its stress on moral elements bridge the realm of moral emotions.

Linking this definition of ideology to the cases of non-local jihad actors from three types of Islamic activism in this research, I argue that there is a cluster of values and norms which they share as commonalities, at least three, as mentioned in the previous chapter, namely: the importance and the virtue of Muslim solidarity, the primacy of Islamic law (syari’a), the justification and the urgency of ‘defensive jihad’ in response to persecution of Muslims in eastern Indonesia. Yet they each has different ‘theory’ to ‘change’ the world around them, as reflected in the three types of Islamic activism: through political struggle for political activism; through cultivating and disseminating piety for pious activism; through armed struggle and the use of violence for jihadi activism.

Linking the nexus between social network and ideology, I develop an argument on the relationship between particular types of
Islamic movement and particular patterns of membership affiliation. Following the distinction between *exclusive affiliation* and *multiple affiliations* suggested by Della Porta and Diani (1999) I contend that the three types of Islamic activism apply different patterns of membership affiliation: *pious* and *jihadi* activism commonly apply *exclusive affiliation* while *political* activism commonly applies *multiple affiliations*. While exclusive affiliation means that its members usually affiliate only to its own group, multiple affiliations means that its members usually affiliate to different kinds of group. The different pattern of membership affiliation to the group also link to the dynamics of social networks to influence the life trajectory of actor in the post-jihad period as suggested earlier.

- **Identity and emotions in jihad movements:**
  *analytical framework*

  Here I attempt to link the passionate politics approach which link identity and emotion in social movement to my fieldwork data. First, I develop an analytical framework of *Muslim identity*. Following the distinction made by Jasper (1985), I distinguish three kinds of Muslim identity, namely Muslim as *personal identity*, as *collective identity*, and as *movement identity*. Muslim as *personal identity* means a sense of self based on identification to Islam as religion and faith which reflects in range of personal loyalties and commitment to religious teachings and symbols; Muslim as *collective identity* means identification to the Muslim community as a social group with distinct boundaries and interests; Muslim as *movement identity* means identification to a particular movement based on religious values, identity and symbols. Muslim as *collective identity* can be a basis of mobilization for social movement; for example when a Muslim group or interest was attacked or harmed by ‘others’. The call for *jihad* movement, or holy war in the name of Islam, in Indonesia was based on the perception that a group of Muslims were persecuted by ‘other’ groups, namely Christians in Ambon-Maluku and in Poso-Central-Sulawesi.
Although the call for jihad was oriented toward all Muslims in Indonesia, which numbered approximately about two hundred millions at this period, it eventually only successfully mobilized less than ten thousand Muslims. Many of them were Muslims who were already engaged with a particular Islamist movement, or Muslim activists, or Muslim as movement identity. As discussed in the previous chapter, those who participated in jihad movements come from different types of Islamist activism, namely, pious, jihadi, and political Islamism. As also discussed previously, the jihad movement can be seen as an instance of ‘high-risk’ activism since it involves high ‘risk’ and ‘cost’. Hence, those who participate in such activism usually have some particular qualification, as argued by Doug McAdam (1986: 71), namely, (1) have a history of activism; (2) be deeply committed to the ideology and the goals of the movement; (3) be integrated to activist network; (4) have a ‘biographical availability’, meaning being relatively free from personal constraints that would make participation especially risky.

By joining the jihad movement, the actors enhanced their movement identity as Muslim activists while simultaneously inventing new organizational identity, activist identity, and tactical identity. As described in the previous section, in the case of the Ambon and Poso conflict, some jihad actors invented organizational identity, meaning identification with a particular jihad group, such as activists of Laskar Jihad or Laskar Mujahidin or Mujahidin KOMPAK, et cetera. In the same period, some might invent tactical identity, meaning identification with a particular tactic or being in some wing of a movement, such as members of “pasukan bakar” (the arsonist troops) or “pasukan linggis” (the looting troops) or “pasukan khusus” (the special paramilitary forces) including the non-combat sections such as the education and da’wa section. They might also invent activist identity, meaning identification with a broader activist subculture that might nourish several distinct movements, as jihad activists, or as they were commonly called mujahidin pendatang (non-local mujahidin) during the conflict period. The variation and
transformation of movement identity by non-local jihad actors can be displayed categorically in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Identity</th>
<th>Pre-jihad</th>
<th>On jihad</th>
<th>Post-jihad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activist identity</td>
<td>Muslim activist:</td>
<td>Non-local mujahidin</td>
<td>Muslim activist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational identity</td>
<td>FAKWJ, JI, FPI, PBB, Tarbiyah, etc.</td>
<td>Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, Mujahidin KOMP-PAK, PKPU, etc.</td>
<td>Salafi, JI, FPI, PBB, PKS, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the post-jihad period, the non-local jihad actors returned to their movement network and recaptured their movement identity, generally returning to their activist identity as Muslim activists and to their organizational identity either as Salafi or JI or FPI or PBB activists. There is the case of Surahman, a former da’wa activist of PKPU from Jakarta, who shifted to become a PKS politician in Maluku. Yet the PKPU and PKS are actually two faces of the same tarbiyah movement: the former works in the area of humanitarian issues while the latter works in the political realm. So we could say that he moved from one room to another in the same house.

Like identity, emotions also play a dynamic role in different stages of jihad movement. Of course, a complex set of emotions are involved in each different stage of the movement. Based on a framework of emotional dimensions of social movement by Goodwin and collaborators (2004) and Jasper (1998), I make the following arguments on the role of different kinds of emotions in different stages of movement.

First, I argue that moral emotions are the most important ‘motivating factors’ for joining jihad movements. These emotions, particularly solidarity, outrage and compassion, emerge based on moral convictions originating from religious faith concerning the
unity of the Muslim community (*umma*) as reflected in the well-known Prophet’s saying, that the Muslim community is united like a body; thus “if one part of the body hurts, the rest of the body will also suffer.” Thus, an attack on a Muslim community by Christians in Ambon/Poso was perceived as an attack on their own body as the symbol of the unity of *umma*. It was why the news that circulated of the massacre of hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku, in late December 1999, or in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in May 2000, created ‘moral shocks’ which sparked *outrage* toward Christians, built a strong sense of *solidarity*, and developed *compassion* to help and to defend Muslim fellows in the areas of religious conflict. All these emotions eventually led to the rise of jihad movements.

Second, the dynamics of micro-sociology of *moral emotions* among Muslim activists that eventually led to participation in jihad movement should be situated against the macro-sociology background of *collective anxiety* among Muslim communities in Indonesia in the wake of *reformasi* era. I argue that the sudden collapse of the Soeharto New Order regime, which had expressed friendly political gestures toward the Muslim community in its late period, incited *collective anxiety* among Muslim groups, including the rise of nationalist-secular movements as symbolically represented by the presence of Megawati Soekarnoputri at the center of the political stage. It was a turbulent period, as Sidel suggests (2006a: xii), when “the Islamist networks…began to lose…[their] position of influence, access, and security within the national political class.”

Third, I argue that jihad as ‘high-risk activism’ involves strongly emotional experiences, which manifested in the two clusters of emotions, namely, first, *moral and reflex emotions* as a consequence of being involved in the violent conflict situation; and second, the combination of *reciprocal emotions* (mainly affective ones) and *shared emotions* (mainly moral ones) as a consequence of being involved with the jihad movement. Although those who joined the jihad movement had a great variety of roles and experiences during the jihad period, they shared a similar engagement with strong emotional experiences as a consequence of jihad as ‘high-risk activism’. I fur-
thermore argue that the jihad experience became the ‘pivotal event’ that brought about ‘pivotal meaning structure’ for the life story of the jihad actors because it consisted of highly emotional experiences.

Fourth, I argue that the dynamics of emotions in the post-jihad period was significantly affected by two main factors: the dynamics of particular networks of Islamist movements and the life trajectory of individual post-jihadists. The fragmentation of leadership which occurred both in the JI and the ex LJ community in the post-jihad period led some informants to take different position and affiliations and eventually damaged affective bonds among some of them. For those who came from political Islamist activism, jihad participation enhanced their credibility as Muslim activists and strengthened their moral emotions, especially the feelings of pride and dignity.

Theoretical arguments

Based on the concepts of the passionate politics approach and an analytical framework of identity and emotions in jihad movement presented above, I put forward my final theoretical arguments to address the three research questions posed in the initial section of this chapter.

• How did they become jihadist?

I argue that informants in this research became jihad actors after experiencing ‘radical reasoning’. By ‘radical reasoning’ I mean a set process involving both cognition and emotion through either ‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1997, 1998, see also Jasper and Poulsen 1995) or ‘cognitive opening’ (Wiktorowicz 2005) or both which eventually led to participation in jihad as an act of identity (Marranci 2006, 2009b). Radical reasoning often occurs in the context of, and as a response to, identity crisis (Erikson, 1968) experienced by the actor. I suggest that the decision to join jihad involved radical reasoning because it ruptures the ‘normal’ daily life of the actors: taking part in a deadly
violent conflict, putting their one and only lives at a huge risk, leaving families and relatives—sometimes job and occupation—far away, and being prepared to face hard experiences and even suffering.

To explain ‘radical reasoning’, I present the link between ‘cognitive’ and ‘affective’ approaches in explicating recruitment process in the social movement. As reflected in the use of the term, Wiktorowicz (2005) emphasizes the ‘cognitive’ aspect in the process of involvement into the radical Islamist movement that he calls ‘high-risk Islamic Activism’. He suggests that ‘cognitive opening’ is a critical step taken by activists through which they may join an extremist Islamic group, which usually occurs following a crisis that may have unsettled their certainties, including their identities, thus they become more receptive to the possibility of new ideas and world views (2005: 85). Yet, while many people experience ‘cognitive opening’ in different ways and contexts, only a few then join the movement. Wiktorowicz suggests that, “Those who are most likely to be drawn to a movement…. find these interpretations and their representative institutions wanting… [thus] religious seekers extend their search for meaning to perspectives outside the mainstreams” (2005: 86). From an ideological point of view, cognitive opening can be seen as an ‘ideological opening’, meaning a critical step to accept a particular ideological framework of Islamic activism.

While ‘cognitive opening’ highlights cognitive process which are likely to lead to involvement in the movement, ‘moral shock’ underscores the emotional process, or more precisely dimensions of moral emotions, which are often the first step toward recruitment into social movements. According to Jasper (1997, see also Jasper and Poulsen, 1995), ‘moral shocks’ occur when an unexpected event or piece of information raises such a sense of outrage in a person that she becomes inclined toward political action, whether or not she has acquaintances in the movement. As Jasper suggests (1998), the triggers may be varied: from highly publicized

7) It seems that Wiktorowicz was inspired by McAdam’s notion of ‘cognitive liberation’ as argued in his book Freedom Summer (1988; New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press).
public events to personal experiences such as the death of a child. Although admitting the term when first used by Jasper and Poulsen (1995) was primarily cognitive, it evokes the emotional power of these experiences as reflected in the term ‘shocks’. “Whether the underlying image is a state of shock or an electrical shock, it implies a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea. Strong emotions should flow from this,” Jasper contends (1998: 409). Based on Jasper’s thesis, I contend that moral shocks particularly bring about a particular moral emotion of solidarity, which becomes the main basis of participation in the jihad movement.

Like ‘cognitive opening’, ‘moral shock’ does not necessarily imply people’s participation in the movement. Yet I argue that the two processes, either both or one of them, are crucial steps taken by the core-informants leading to their decision to join jihad. According to Wiktorowicz (2004: 1), cognitive opening is usually followed by a series of mainly cognitive processes: religious seeking, frame alignment, and socialization. Emphasizing emotional dynamics, Jasper (1997, 1998) suggests that while most people remain in their inactive stance, some others, through complex emotional processes, guide their fear and anger into moral resentment and participation in social movement. In an effort to bridge the crucial role of emotion in the formation of identity, Marranci (2009b: 22) suggests that Wiktorowicz’ ‘cognitive opening’ is the product of a ‘moral emotion’.

In most cases for the core-informants, the two processes of ‘cognitive opening’ and ‘moral shocks’ were experienced, either together or separately, either cognitive first and emotions following or vice versa. Ali Imron and Fauzan, for example, had the two processes in a ‘package’: when they took part in a religious study session where participants watched videos on “Muslim wars in some places in the world” accompanied by a series of lectures on the ultimate values of jihad. In the case of Reza, ‘cognitive opening’ came first: his religious seeking led him to engage with Salafi activism. He was eventually moved to join jihad after attending a mass Salafi gathering campaigning for jihad by showing the massacre of Muslims in Poso. For those who experienced ‘moral shocks’, the news or the
video screenings of the massacre of Muslims in Tobelo, North Maluku, and Poso, Central Sulawesi, are frequently mentioned in addition to the news and videos of Muslim persecutions abroad, such as in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq. There is also an exceptional case which did not involve ‘moral shocks’: for Taufan, his participation in jihad is merely a moral consequence of his engagement with the Salafi movement. He claimed to not pay attention to the narratives of violence that unfolded; what mattered for him was the fatwas made by some authoritative Salafi clerics to conduct jihad.

Following Marranci (2006, 2009b), I refer to jihad an ‘act of identity’ because it is a consequence of, or a response to, a deep identity crisis experienced by the actors. Marranci (2006: 51; 2009b: 20) argues that an act of identity is a sort of self-correcting mechanism which is usually a response to schismogenesis, drastic changes in the environment, which produces a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity. By conducting an act of identity as a self-mechanism correction, the person can again experience his or her autobiographical self as meaningful.

On identity crisis, I refer to Erikson’s (1968: 16-7) notion of identity crisis as “a necessary turning point, a crucial moment, when development must move one way or another, marshalling resources of growth, recovery, and further differentiation,” which is usually applied to the age of adolescence and young adulthood. Erikson has furthermore suggested that personal growth and societal change, as well as identity crisis in individual biography and present-day crises in historical transformation cannot be taken apart because the two help to delineate to each other—as he tried to demonstrate in Young Man Luther (1958). Identity crisis, hence, may also happen at different stages of the life cycle.

Most of the core-informants began to engage with the Islamist movement, or even to take part in the jihad action, when they were in the age of adolescence or young adulthood; it was during the last years of senior high school or the early university period. In many cases, the shift of their collective identity, from Muslim non-activist to Muslim activist, happened in the turbulent years of Indonesian society: prior
or after the collapse of the authoritarian regime in 1998. So it confirms Erikson’s contention on the close connection between the identity crisis in personal life history and contemporary crises in the history of society since the two help to circumscribe one to another.

I call jihad an *act of identity* because it is a consequence of, or a response to, *schismogenesis*, drastic changes in the environment, that took place during Indonesia’s transitional period, producing a deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity. At the society level, *schismogenesis* manifested in the rise of various new Islamic movements, either societal groups or political parties, the emergence of open political and ideological contestation, and increasing tensions between antagonistic political and ideological groups. The most dramatic case was the eruption of ‘religious wars’ in Ambon and Poso of Eastern Indonesia—which created such ‘moral shocks’ to informants it led them to join the jihad movement. The *schismogenesis* coincided with identity crisis at a biographical level, which mostly took place in the period of adolescence and young adulthood. Thus, a decision to join jihad can be seen as *act of identity* because it was taken to resolve the deep crisis between the autobiographical self and identity, both in the personal and societal context.

In some cases, ‘radical reasoning’ can be seen as a sort of *conversion*, meaning personal transformation which coincided with a transformation of one’s basic meaning system (McGuire 2002: 73). As McGuire argues, conversion transforms “the way individual perceives the rest of society and his or her personal place in it, altering one’s view of the world.” (2002: 73-74). There is a variety of meanings of conversion among different people. Based on the degree of personal transformation that occurs, McGuire (2002: 74; emphasis in original) distinguishes three kinds of conversion: *radical transformation of self*, *consolidation of previous identities*, and *reaffirmation* of elements of one’s previous identity. While the first one is an extreme case, and usually rarely occurs, the next two types are more likely to happen among people.

Following the life story narratives of the informants on becoming a jihadist, some of them it seemed had experienced *radical self-*
transformation, as manifested in the case of those who come from abangan\(^8\) (non-devout) family backgrounds, such as Hendro (who later joined the JI) and Taufan (who later joined the Salafi). Some other cases, however, just followed the trajectory of parents or an older brother, as in the cases of Fauzan and Ali Imron. In these cases, what happened might be called “a reaffirmation of elements of previous identity,” a less extreme type of conversion as argued by McGuire (2002: 74). This type of conversion, McGuire suggests, often does not involve change in one’s religious affiliation but produce real changes in the individual’s personal religious behavior and sense of identity.

**What did the jihad experience mean to the actors?**

I argue that the jihad experience means a ‘radical experience’ to the actors. By ‘radical experience’ I refer to Sartre’s notion of the existence of a ‘pivotal event’ (as cited by Denzin 1989: 64-7) in a human’s life that brings about “a pivotal meaning structure that organizes the other activities in a person’s life.” Thus, I argue that jihad participation means a ‘pivotal event’ to the jihad actors that eventually shape their life trajectory in the post-jihad period. Jihad participation becomes a ‘pivotal event’ to the actors because it consists of at least two key elements, first, the nature of ‘high-risk’ activism, which involves high levels of ‘costs’ and ‘risks’, brings about powerful meanings to the actors through involving high level of emotions in it; and second, the use of religious symbols and meanings during the events, as reflected in the use of term jihad, producing powerful symbolic effects which embody in the actors. The combination of both elements lead to the creation of “a pivotal meaning structure” as reflected in the use of a marker or a signifier to call those who participate in jihad movement a jihadist or a jihad actor/activist or mujahid (Arabic: plural, mujahidin). Furthermore, jihad participation also marks the phase of life of the jihad actor/activist/mujahid.

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\(^8\) The term *santri* (devout Muslim) and *abangan* (nominal Muslim) is part of the trichotomy of santri-abangan-priyayi described by Clifford Geertz in his book *The Religion of Java* (New York: The Free Press, 1960).
activist by symbolically making the distinction between before and after the jihad.

Although people who joined the jihad movement had a great variety of roles and experiences, they shared at least two things: involvement in a violent conflict situation and involvement in a certain kind of jihad activism. Viewed from the conceptual framework of the emotional dimensions of social movement, I argue that being involved in a violent conflict situation leads to engagement with a great deal of moral and reflex emotions, whereas being involved in a certain kind of jihad activism leads to engagement with a significant part of reciprocal and shared emotions.

• How did the jihad experience influence the life trajectory of the actors?

I argue that jihad participation as a ‘radical experience’ informs the later life trajectory of the actors in combination with two main factors, namely their biographical traits and their social networks. Although jihad participation alone is a really meaningful experience and is such a ‘pivotal event’ in the formation of movement identity as a jihad activist, the way the experiences are interpreted is, however, significantly influenced by the ideological framework which is furthermore maintained and developed through their social networks.

I further argue that informants interpret their experiences based on ideological frameworks associated with a particular type of Islamic activism, namely, pious, jihadi, and political Islamism. Thus, jihad experiences were interpreted and then informed the actor according to a particular ideological framework of a certain social network: for pious activists it was an action and expression of piety; for jihadi activists it was action and expression of jihadism; for political activists it was an action and expression of political Islamism. Therefore, jihad participation is seen in different ways by different types of Islamist activism and brings about different kinds of actors in its aftermath: the making of pious actor by pious Is-
Islam; the making of jihadi actor by jihadi Islamism; the making of political actor by political Islamism. As we have seen in the life stories of the narrators in this dissertation, jihad participation has created different kinds of Islamist actors: Fauzan, Ali Imron and Hendro as jihadi activists; Reza, Fauzi, Taufan and Adang as pious activists; Awod Umar, Abu Ayyash and Syueb as political activists.

I also argue that social networks influence the life trajectory of the actor through the dynamics of three kinds of social network, namely, core-network, tactical-network, and extended-network. Core-network is a social network through which the actor joins jihad; the tactical-network is a social network of jihadist networks which occur temporarily during the jihad period; and the extended-network is an extension of social networks which develop in the aftermath of jihad participation. I furthermore argue that the core-network is the most important network which provides the actor with an ideological framework and acts as an ‘ideological network’ to the actor. Thus, if the relationship between actor and core-network was strong it would most likely lead to sustaining participation with a particular activism. On the other hand, if the relationship between actor and core-network was weak it would likely lead to disengagement with a particular activism.

I will discuss the issue of sustainment and disengagement, particularly in the case of JI activists, through the theoretical lens of disengagement and identity transformation in social movement in Chapter 5. From a social movement theory perspective, Klandermans (1997) elaborates the issue of disengagement in social movement by distinguishing two kind of disengagement from activism: passive defection or neglect, and active defection or exit. While the former usually occurs in the case of once-only activities, the latter commonly happens in the case of enduring forms of participation (Klandermans 1997: 98) I will examine Klanderman’s concepts with a framework of identity transformation, especially following the period of imprisonment experienced by JI activists.

Finally, some questions are left unanswered concerning how identity, emotions, experiences, and meanings are captured through
the life story narratives of the actors. How does a study of contemporary Islamist social movements combine with an oral history approach? There are also some queries (sometimes raised as doubts!) regarding the possible access to the life story narratives of such actors. I will deal with these issues in the next chapter.