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Upper Silesia: Rebirth of a Regional Identity in Poland

LUIZA BIALASIEWICZ

Despite a decade of fundamental constitutional reforms, the question of the restructuring of the institutions of local governance continues to dominate the political scene in post-communist Poland. A far-reaching administrative reform of the Polish state was, at long last, implemented on 1 January 1999. The reform created 16 new regions (województwa), completing the process of administrative decentralization begun in 1990, and granting a whole series of capabilities to the new regional councils including, for the first time, responsibility for developing and implementing regional economic policies (see Kisielowska-Lipman’s contribution). The enactment of the new institutional architecture, however, has only further ignited the debate over the proper division of competences between the various levels of territorial governance and their relation to the national state. Decentralization holds high symbolic value in the post-communist political imagination and, since 1989, has been touted both by representatives of the Polish state and by citizen groups as a key indicator of the transition to participatory democracy. This phenomenon is not unique to Poland (see for example, Fowler’s discussion of the Hungarian case in this volume) and, just as in other post-communist contexts, in Poland too there exists broad consensus across party and ideological divides on the need for decentralization, a principle also enshrined by the new Polish constitution that ‘guarantees the decentralization of public authorities’ and recognizes the municipalities (gminy) as the basic units of territorial self-rule.

Calls for territorial-administrative reform also reflect the rediscovery of historical-cultural regional and local specificities within a national space declared homogeneous during the 45 years of communist rule. Such a rediscovery is emotionally charged, and opens up new opportunities for collective self-definition, with the articulation of local and regional difference becoming a key locus of cultural politics as people reclaim their past and declare their belonging. It should also be noted, however, that internal reforms in the post-communist states do not proceed in a geopolitical vacuum, and much has been written about the weight of ‘Western’ models in shaping domestic political and economic choices in
Central and Eastern Europe (see Pickles and Smith, 1997). The symbolic weight granted by post-communist elites to administrative decentralization and regionalization and the ‘natural’ association of these processes with democratization draws, in fact, upon received wisdom in Western ‘transitology’ (Burawoy, 1992) which identifies the devolution of state powers as ‘a natural progression in the evolution of representative democracy’ (Sharpe, 1993: 8). External actors, both states and transnational organizations, influence the processes of institutional reform not only by setting the conditions for accession to membership or allocation of funds, but also by functioning as the ‘legitimate repositories of knowledge about the democratic state’ (and thus its proper political, economic and cultural organization). The dominant model guiding the association of regions with ‘democratic progress’ remains that furnished by the European Union, which has done much to encourage the development of regional governance. At the level of the national state, administrative regionalization has come to be represented as a ‘European’ practice; within the new territorial units, the practice of regional governance has come to mark its practitioners as ‘Europeans’. It is a symbolic as well as a practical association: a variety of Union financial transfers and agreements are administered at the regional level, as local leaders are well aware. In Poland, as elsewhere, regions are overwhelmingly seen as a ‘European thing’ and I shall devote considerable attention to the long shadow of Europe – both as a conceptual and an institutional entity – in my examination of Polish regionalism.

My focus lies with the articulation of regional difference as a key locus of identity politics in one portion of Polish state territory – Upper Silesia – that has been progressively ‘regionalized’ in the post-1989 era: that is, legitimated as a distinct ‘historical-cultural region’. My approach is informed by recent theorizations in political geography that understand regionalization not simply as the administrative apportionment of segments of space but, rather, as the dynamic process of constituting regions as particular ‘imagined communities’ in space, legitimating distinct territorial divides and allocating governance (for an overview, see Paasi, 1986, 1991, 1996; Thrift, 1990).

The Plebiscite and the Inter-War Years: The National Question in Silesia
The territories of today’s Upper Silesia have always been a contested border area. From Polish and Bohemian rule in the 900s and 1100s, to later Prussian and Austrian domination (from the 1500s on), imperial ambitions have often clashed at this Central European crossroads. The struggles over Silesia’s ‘ownership’ by the Czechoslovak, Polish and
German states at the beginning of this century form only the most recent chapter in a long history of contested belonging. The end of the First World War, however, forms a useful starting point for a discussion of the region’s distinct past.

**BECOMING UPPER SILESIA I**

With the re-establishment of the Polish state in 1918, the question of Upper Silesia’s proper place in the international state system became a crucial political issue. Appealing to the principles of national self-determination consecrated at Versailles, Poland argued that the significant Polish-speaking population of the region should be regarded as ‘nationally Polish’ and thus annexed to the new Polish state. The German authorities rejected this, arguing that in a border region long characterized by multiple national belongings, the language criterion was an unreliable marker of national status. The task of allocating the territories of Upper Silesia lasted nearly three years (1918–21), one of the most contentious episodes of boundary settlement in recent European history. After a highly controversial plebiscite carried out in March 1921 (in which almost 60 per cent of the regional population voted for annexation to Germany and 40 per cent for inclusion within the new Polish state), and two Polish uprisings that were violently repressed, 30 per cent of the Silesian territories (along with 46 per cent of the regional population) were assigned to Poland. The borderline left over 530,000 Poles and the cities of Bytom, Gliwice and Zabrze on the ‘German’ side and a significant German population in Poland. In the ten years following 1918, over half (following Brubaker’s (1996) figures, approximately 600,000) would eventually emigrate. Upper Silesia’s national mosaic and its special legal status in the inter-war period merit further discussion, however, for it is during these years that the various visions of the region that inspire present-day Silesian regionalists were first formulated and became the object of intense struggles.

In July 1920, a special act of the newly reborn Polish state (the *Ustawa Konstytucyjna*) assigned the Polish portion of Upper Silesia a distinctive ‘organic status’, with wide-ranging powers and competencies (the only such autonomous region in inter-war Poland). Upper Silesia was given its own parliament (*Sejm*) with devolved regulatory and administrative powers both at the level of the region (*województwo*), and its counties (*powiaty*) and municipalities (*gminy*). Local authorities were able to regulate the public use of the Polish or German language and had control over police, schooling, and all public services within the region. The Silesian *Sejm* also won authority over the collection of taxes and public
fees, with a special formula to calculate the percentage of monies to be returned to the Polish state for ‘national purposes’ and the amount that was to remain in the regional treasury, the *Skarb Śląski* (see Ciągwa, 1979, 1988). Decision-making autonomy was further enhanced by the wide-ranging powers of the Silesian regional governor (*wojewoda*), who was free to exercise complete control over regional administration and schooling.

Besides its legal specification in the Polish constitution, the region’s status was also formally regulated by the Geneva Convention, ratified by Poland and Germany in May 1922. The Convention enumerated a set of measures to assure the continuity of economic and cultural life in the region and the protection of minority rights within both the Polish and German territories, guaranteeing a ‘soft’ division of the region between the two national states. Germany was obliged, for example, to purchase one million tons of Polish coal per annum, while in Polish Silesia legal constraints were placed upon the expropriation of German-owned industries. The Convention also assured bilingual schooling, and freedoms for minority political and cultural organizations. These guarantees, however, prevented the full legal and political integration of Upper Silesia into the Polish state. Until 1937 (when the terms of the Convention expired), Silesia was governed by an entirely different set of laws regulating mining, labour relations and even land ownership, and subsequent attempts by the Polish state at legal unification were strongly resisted (see Ciągwa, 1988; Nawrocki, 1993). Indeed, some historians have described the reunification of Upper Silesia with Poland as a ‘de facto union of two nations’ (*unia realna dwóch państw*) (see Leszczyńska, 1990), noting the almost ‘civilizational’ divides that lay between the region and the rest of the new Poland. As Nawrocki (1993) suggests, Upper Silesia’s unique status after 1922 granted it opportunities for economic and cultural development that only augmented its distance from the rest of the Polish state and prevented its full incorporation into the Polish economic, political and national-cultural spheres.

The place of Silesia vis-à-vis the inter-war Polish state was expressed within two broadly contrasting visions: that of the Silesian *chadecja*, a distinct brand of Catholic conservatism that argued for Silesia’s special nature and, in particular, its role as a ‘proper’ model of development for the rest of the newly born Polish state; and that of the *sanacja*, insisting on the absolute necessity of integrating the region into the national whole (see Kopec, 1986). For the *chadecja* (the term comes from the Christian Democratic tradition), the rest of the new Polish state had to ‘catch up’ with Silesia, the most developed region of the country with a large, highly educated and organized elite that, according to the *chadecja*, could lead
the whole of the new Poland. Silesian society was portrayed as a highly egalitarian one, where the rule of law was part of everyday life and universally accepted, unlike the other partition areas where legal norms and institutional arrangements were ‘foreign’ and had been imposed from above. Finally, the Silesian *chadecja* placed great emphasis on the work ethic as a distinguishing characteristic of local society that contributed to its economic success and its egalitarian nature. In Silesia, they argued, one’s status was determined by one’s achievements, not national or class attributes. The *chadecja*’s bourgeois conservatism was also closely tied to Catholic values, seen by its ideologues as the bulwark against social disaggregation, and with its leading figures coming from the circles of the local Catholic intelligentsia.

The *chadecja* enjoyed relative superiority in the Silesian Sejm until 1926, when, following the May coup, the forces of the *sanacja* came to power. Passing to the opposition, the *chadecja* opted for a defensive strategy: Silesia had to preserve its identity from the encroachments of the Polish state, and its distinctive values from utter Polonization. This platform found broad support among the regional population, largely dissatisfied with Polish rule after 1922 (Długajczyk, 1983; Kopeć, 1986). It is interesting to note that many elements of the *chadecja*’s vision and, in particular, their inscription of the regional identity would resurface in the voices of latter-day Silesian regionalists. Alongside evocations of Sileans’ distinct social values and work ethic, perhaps the most evident echo of this vision is the emphasis on Silesia’s distinct ‘border culture’, which had ‘produced individuals who are not only bi-lingual but also bi-national – just like the pear trees that line the frontier and bear fruit on both sides’ (Fr. Emil Szramek, cited in Nawrocki, 1993).

The *chadecja*’s relations with the German minority were ill defined, fluctuating according to political needs and the prevailing social climate. Although the German community was often enlisted in their struggle against the forces of the *sanacja*, regional leaders were well aware of the ‘German threat’ to Silesian autonomy, and most alliances with minority leaders were based on pragmatic considerations. As will be seen below, this sort of ambivalent attitude towards the Silesian Germans has, indeed, resurfaced in the narratives of present-day regionalists.

The proponents of the *sanacja* – of the full integration of Silesia into national structures – were considerably more diverse in their approaches. Overall, however, this political/ideological bloc was driven by the conviction that the region’s ‘organic’ status was a serious barrier to its full incorporation into the Polish state. *Sanacja* leaders did not reject Silesian distinctiveness entirely, however, but saw it as an integral part of the cultural mosaic that made up the new Polish state. They argued that
Silesians should abandon the temptations of separatism for a ‘modern cultural regionalism’ (see Nawrocki, 1993) that would allow them to reconcile their otherness with the framework of the national state.

*Sanacja* proponents concentrated on several key issues. The first was the need to integrate the region’s legal system with the national one (Długajczyk, 1983). A second was to enforce Polonization of the regional economy and administration and, above all, of the industrial elite: a necessary ‘nationalization of Silesian capital’ (*unarodowienie śląskiego kapitału*). Such visions were very often explicitly anti-German: unlike the *chadecja*, *sanacja* proponents rejected the multi-national and multi-cultural nature of the region and conducted a concerted campaign against purported German dominance in both the economic and cultural realms, drawing criticism from the League of Nations and German leaders upon more than one occasion (Rechowicz, 1971).

Another key locus of struggle was the question of regional boundaries. After 1926, numerous proposals were advanced for enlarging the Silesian *województwo*, adding to its territories several other neighbouring *powiaty*. Although the proposals were presented with the rationale of unifying the various industrial infrastructures of Poland’s south-western territories under one administration and creating more compact transport and communication linkages, the thinly veiled aim was, in fact, the ‘dilution’ of Silesia’s particularisms by increasing the number of Poles and thus consolidating its ‘Polishness’ (Rechowicz, 1971). Such proposals were vociferously opposed by Silesian regional leaders (both the *chadecja* and more radical separatist groups such as the *Związek Obrony Górnoslązaków*), who rightly feared the likely dilution of the region’s culture and autonomous status, and the weakening of their own political support with an inflow of non-autochthonous Poles. The boundary question would again resurface in the 1990s with regionalists’ proposals for the creation of a new Silesian region.

The heated regional political debates of the inter-war years contributed to a gradual ‘dilution of the common feeling of a distinct regional belonging that had previously united most Silesians, regardless of national identification’ (Błaszczyk-Waclawik, 1990: 29). The Polish state’s attempts at Polonization, coupled with the German minority’s increasingly reactive stance, led to a progressive ‘nationalization’ of the regional population (Błaszczyk-Waclawik, 1990: 27), and when Silesia was incorporated into the Third Reich in 1939, the question of national identification had already become paramount. The census of the Silesian population by the occupying forces in 1941 placed further emphasis on national belonging. The *Deutsche Volksliste* identified those individuals who could be formally conscripted for military service as ‘national
Germans’, while also marking out those whose national identification was considered ‘labile’ (estimated at over 60 per cent of the population in the ‘Polish’ Silesian provinces – see Błaszczak-Waclawik, 1990: 48). Although often discounted in post-war histories as facile opportunism, the extent of Silesians’ collusion with German authorities remains a complex question, for the choices forced upon the local population by the occupying forces were often tragic.

The ‘Workers’ Eldorado’

When my father went into the army during the war, the Germans asked him who he was. He said he was a German. So they told him that he could not speak German properly, that he was just a stupid Ślązok. When the Poles came after the war, you know, people from outside [the region], they considered us half-Poles or simply Germans … They would glare at me at work if by mistake I let a word in dialect slip out. They would say: ‘Listen to how these Germans ruin the Polish language … They would call us ‘Hitler’s sons’, ‘the Wermacht’, ‘Szwaby’ … (cited in Szczepański, 1997: 11).

The events of the Second World War gave the post-war Polish authorities ample room to argue for the need to ensure the region’s ‘full loyalty to the Polish state’ (see Błasiak, 1990; K. Wódz, 1995). This was to be achieved through mass population transfers and a number of legal measures designed to erase all traces of the German past and assure Polish national homogeneity. In the immediate post-war years, over 3.5 million Germans were expatriated from Silesia as well as the territories of what was once East Prussia. Their place was taken by 1.5 million Poles ‘repatriated’ from lands in the east (Magocsi, 1993; Białasiewicz and O’Loughlin, 2002; Kordan, 1997). A subsequent series of inter-governmental agreements for ‘family reunification’ allowed the remainder of those choosing to declare German nationality to emigrate in large numbers: between 1955 and 1989, it is estimated that over 1,198,000 people left for the Federal Republic of Germany under a system of ‘exchanges’ that provided substantial economic compensation to the Polish state for each re-patriant.

Between 1945 and 1946, thousands of Silesians accused of ties with Germany were arrested and deported to forced-labour camps in the Soviet Union (including many former ‘Polish patriots’ who had been imprisoned during the war years for anti-German activities – see Błasiak, 1990). In the years following the war, a set of laws designed to excise all memory of the region’s German population stipulated ten-year jail sentences for any ‘odstępstwo od narodowości’ – any ‘treason’ against Polish nationality. Such ‘treason’ was broadly construed by the special ‘Commissions for the
Fight against Manifestations of Germanness' (Komisje do Zwalczania Przejawów Niemczyzny) called up to enforce the new laws. ‘Police patrols would go through our houses and look for anything with German script on it – books, of course, but also porcelain, medicine bottles, anything’, recalls Dietmar Brehmer, founder of the German minority organization Pojednanie i Przyszłość in Katowice.¹

In communist Poland, the memory of Silesia’s special character as a multi-national borderland where several cultural and political worlds came together was erased, and ‘the region became simply a framework for economic planning. It was a space for the production of certain goods, a space within which a certain set of exchanges took place, a space containing a certain workforce’ (Pulinowa, 1998: 10). It became the Górnio-Śląski Okręg Przemysłowy (or GOP – the Upper Silesian Industrial District), an industrial agglomeration that at the end of the 1980s housed over four million people. It was a place whose ‘identity’ was marked exclusively by its economic role; the Polish Eldorado where in the 1970s and 1980s over one-quarter of the entire Polish GNP was generated. Its symbols were the Huta Katowice steel-mill, where workers from all around the country would build the socialist dream; and the expanses of new housing projects that irreversibly transformed the turn-of-the-century urban landscapes of Katowice and other towns. ‘The hard physical labour of coalminers and steelworkers placed them in the vanguard of the civilizational mission of real socialism. With their toils, they were to embody the new Poland’ (Szczepański, 1999b: 7). Upper Silesia was to be ‘the model region of “socialism with a human face”’; it was to provide ‘a living proof that we could easily reach – and overtake – the industrial successes of the corrupt West’ (Karwat, 1999: 29).

The thousands of workers who arrived in the GOP from all around Poland did, indeed, enjoy a number of privileges – better housing, vacation homes, even access to scarce goods through a network of special shops for miners (the famous gewexy). ‘The image of the region in the rest of the country was that of servile conformists, opportunists, “the guiding force of the nation”’, notes Katowice journalist Krzysztof Karwat (1999: 29) – ‘we were nothing but workers – Ślązki-robole – loyal to the authorities and just thinking of filling our always empty stomachs’. 1980 brought an end to such myths. The symbols of the workers’ paradise fast became symbols of workers’ revolt, with Huta Katowice becoming one of the most active centres of Solidarność in the early 1980s. It was also in Silesia, at the Wujek mine, that the brutality of the regime showed its face after martial law was declared.

For post-communist Poland, Upper Silesia became an economic nightmare. The GOP’s industrial complexes became the target of endless
restructuring proposals and the symbol of the economic disasters wrought by central planning. But it was also here, where only 30 per cent of the ‘local’ pre-war population had remained, that the most vehement regional identity claims in post-1989 Poland began to be articulated. In the past decade, Silesians have rediscovered themselves and their region. ‘We have spent the past ten years looking for Silesia’, Wojciech Sarnowicz, documentary film-maker and the director of TV Katowice, has stressed in numerous public appearances: ‘the Ślązak [the Silesian] did not exist in the party propaganda. We were all workers – working side by side for the good of the nation. We had to dig our past, our culture out of this web of lies.’

In the pages to follow, I will trace some of the processes that have accompanied this ‘excavation’ of the regional identity. My focus will not lie, however, with the overt autonomist proclamations that captured Polish media attention in the early 1990s as these proved only a marginal and transient phenomenon (see Błasiak, 1993; Nawrocki, 1993; and Szczepański, 1993a, 1993b). I will highlight, rather, the more diffuse practices of ‘banal’ regionalism (to twist Michael Billig’s (1995) term) that, since the 1990s, have sought to present and represent the region in the everyday lives of its inhabitants, ‘institutionalizing’ the regional representation and consolidating it as a locus of identity.

**BECOMING UPPER SILESIA II: ‘I LOVE ŚLĄSK’**

It is the most banal, everyday acts of ‘naming’ that constitute the first step in regional ‘becoming’. As Paasi (1996: 35) reminds us, the act of naming the region ‘brings together its historical development, its important events, episodes and memories and [joins] the personal histories of its inhabitants to this collective heritage’. Naming both expresses the ‘character’ of the region and also serves to reproduce it. It evokes powerful feelings of identification with the newly constituted territorial grouping and is thus capable of generating agency.

The repeated ‘naming’ of Upper Silesia in the past decade has certainly constituted a fundamental step towards the region’s institutionalization. The variety of political movements which arose in the early 1990s such as the *Ruch Autonomii Śląska* (Movement for Silesian Autonomy) and the *Związek Górniośląski* (Upper Silesian Association) defined themselves by evoking Upper Silesia as a distinct territorial ideal. Such overt acts of regionalization have been accompanied, however, by a series of more ‘banal’, everyday practices of representation that, over the years, have naturalized the idea of Upper Silesia in popular perception. An active protagonist in this naturalization has been the Katowice bureau of the *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Poland’s largest newspaper. In summer 2000, the
Gazeta began giving out a bumper sticker to its readers sporting the region’s new coat of arms emblazoned with the words ‘I love Slask’. The sticker, as the newspaper announced, was intended ‘for all those who care about this region and want to show it’. Although the emblem provoked a whole series of polemics, the initiative was ‘on the whole very successful’, according to editor-in-chief Andrzej Stefański, ‘it made people happy to be able to say “I care about this place”’. The Katowice Gazeta has also held annual competitions among local schoolchildren on the themes of ‘Why I love Silesia’ and ‘What it means to be Silesian’, and has co-sponsored and heavily publicized other initiatives such as the ‘Festival of Local Homelands’ (Festiwal Ojczyzn Lokalnych) that brought together over 2,000 local schoolchildren and featured theatre and music performances in Silesian dialect as well as ‘regional’ food and music (Final 2000, 2000).

The regional dialect or gwara is enjoying a vivid revival, in fact. Apart from a variety of folkloric events and gwara-speaking contests sponsored by Radio Katowice and countless other cultural organizations (Godka, choby w doma, 1999), the years since 1990 have also witnessed the appearance of numerous scholarly works and dictionaries (most importantly, the work edited by Cząstka-Szymon et al., 1999). The gwara, actively repressed during communist times as an ‘aberration of the Polish tongue’ and relegated to the private sphere of family conversations, is now, according to regional activists, a matter of local pride, a way of ‘being finally ourselves’. Efforts to codify the dialect in printed form – be it in the form of children’s books, dictionaries or academic treatises – have become an important focus of local authors and publishers. Best known is certainly the ‘trilogy’ tracing the ‘cultural history of the region’ published by Rybnik lyceum history teacher, editor of the Gazeta Rybnicka and self-styled Silesian scribe Marek Szoltysek (1998, 1999, 2000). Szoltysek’s books, which mix local dialect and ‘standard’ Polish and contain numerous photographs and cartoons illustrating the ‘Silesian world’, to use the author’s own words, ‘were written to finally tell us who we – Ślązacy – are’. As Anderson (1983) has noted, it was the advent of print capitalism that contributed to the establishment of the ‘imagined communities’ of nationhood through the creation of a common and permanent national language. The written codification of the Upper Silesian gwara (however partial, as it is a ‘living’ and territorially variegated dialect as its scholars note – see Synowiec, 2000a, 2000b) thus not only serves to confirm the dialect’s existence but, indeed, also that of a distinct (regional) community associated with it.

The wide success of such popular initiatives suggests that the set of regional representations and symbols upon which they draw is, to some
extent, ‘recognizable and recognized’, to paraphrase Paasi (1996). Certainly, it is just such representational practices that act to *construct* Upper Silesia as a region, as a distinct community of belonging. Yet any such identity-constituting practices can only be successful if they are recognized and legitimated by at least a portion of the population – and thus if they draw upon pre-existing iconographies, pre-existing regional ‘collective memories’. The re-assertion of a regional collective memory that counters communist historiography has been fundamental in Upper Silesian regionalism over the past decade. It is by making recourse to the past that Upper Silesia’s distinct identity has been asserted, delimited through an articulation of *difference* from the rest of the Polish state and *affinity* with the broader European whole.

**INVENTING REGIONAL TRADITION: THE SILESIAN PAST**

The processes of constructing a regional community can be likened in many respects to those of nation-building. Just as modern nationalism is, above all, ‘a discourse about space and time’, a ‘mode of constructing and interpreting a determinate social space – and its historical past’ (Williams and Smith, 1983: 502), so too is the constitution of regional ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983). In constructivist understandings, modern nationalism has been inescapably tied to what Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) have termed ‘the invention of tradition’: a declaration of the national community’s emergence from a set of (usually glorious) origins; origins which are located within the national territory and discursively bound to particular geographical locations. It is such a framing of a national past that helps to represent the national unit as a taken-for-granted, ‘natural’ continuity in time and space; as the only possible form of social organization to ‘evolve’ within that territory.

As Paasi (1986, 1996) notes in his theorization of regional institutionalization, narratives of the past form a vital facet of the regional story as well. In Upper Silesia, the past is everywhere: as Katowice mayor Piotr Uszok insists, ‘one cannot understand our region without understanding its history’. In the discourse of political leaders, cultural figures and other active ‘regionalists’, present-day Silesia is represented as but a ‘fragment of its true self’, if not ‘a historical mistake’. To understand the ‘true region’ one must thus look to the past. The past, in fact, is much more orderly than the present, and fits better with the idealized picture of the region that its proponents paint. Historical narrative is used to specify the distinctive traits that make the region ‘what it is’, while also marking its difference from the remainder of the Polish state. The key trope in the regional story is certainly Silesia’s place within
a broader European heritage – or, perhaps more accurately, the indivisibility of Silesian and European histories, whether conceived as distinct trajectories of economic development or political and social ‘progress’.

Scholars of nationalism have long stressed the social role of historians and other ‘writers’ of the historical imagination of the nation (see Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). Upper Silesia has its own scribes, both popular (such as Szoltysek, cited above) and academic. Sociologist Marek Szczepański, one of the most prolific academic commentators of Silesian regionalism, has repeatedly stressed in his work the place of Silesia in European history, and the distinctiveness of its ‘developmental path’ as compared to that of the rest of Poland. ‘It is well known’, he wrote in a recent issue of popular regional monthly Śląsk (Szczepański, 1999b: 6; see also Szczepański, 1997, 1998), ‘that Silesia, since time immemorial, formed an integral part of the Old Continent, not only in geographical but also in cultural and civilizational terms … Its path to Europe has always been different from that of the remainder of the current Polish state.’ In his recent articles, Szczepański (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b) has inscribed the region’s history and its ‘civilizational path’ within a series of ‘developmental phases’, a narrative of Rostowian progress which not only serves to explain Silesia’s current condition but that also, he notes, can tell us much about the region’s ‘possible’ future.

Szczepański is a figure of some import on the regional cultural and academic scene and, I would argue, his work provides an important theorization (and thus legitimation) of popular ‘collective memories’, of popular ‘ways of knowing’ the region, its past and, therefore, its identity. For the sociologist, the fundamental shift that would forever mark the fortunes of the region occurred two and a half centuries ago, when Upper Silesia abandoned its plebeian roots and started on the road to rapid industrialization. ‘It was already in the mid-1700s that the current shape of the Upper Silesian landscape began to take form. Factories and mines replaced stalls; peasants became miners and steelworkers’ (Szczepański, 1999a: 6). This shift not only transformed the regional economic landscape, but also firmly placed Upper Silesia ‘within the progress of European civilization’ (Szczepański, 1999a: 7).

Silesia’s place within the flow of European history and, in particular, within ‘European progress’, forms a recurrent theme in the narratives of regional political leaders as well as cultural figures. Kazimierz Kutz is perhaps the best known ‘Ślązak’, both within the region and in Poland as a whole, the man considered by many as the creator of the ‘mit Śląskości’ – the ‘myth of Silesian-ness’; in the words of Katowice journalist Michał Smolorz, someone who ‘finally told Silesians who they were’. Award-
winning film director, theatre producer, self-defined ‘all-around hell-raiser’, Kutz is now the region’s Senator representing the Unia Wolności (Freedom Union):

Silesia was an integral part of Europe when its most important transformations were taking place. It participated in the birth of the industrial revolution, of modern capitalism and of democracy with the rest of Europe – it was the Reich’s second-largest industrial area when the remainder of partitioned Poland was still just fields … And when the rest of Poland was just beginning its path to modernization, Silesia was already entering the second phase of capitalism – with the birth of trade unions, cooperatives, just as the rest of the West. Here, the proletariat was born just as it was being born in the rest of Europe – and with it, a new model of man, of society… A certain work ethic, but also a certain understanding of political culture, of social responsibility. Which still has not arrived in the remainder of the country…. But Silesia had already begun to move away from Poland in the Middle Ages; it left the Polish state as the Polish state was being born. So it has always been free of the absolutist traditions of the East.11

It would be foolish to deny the role of the industrial past (and present) in giving shape to the region, of course. At the turn of the twentieth century, Upper Silesia was the Reich’s second most important industrial heartland (after the Ruhr), and it remains Poland’s most heavily industrialized area, although hundreds of thousands of workers have been forced to leave the mines and steel mills during the past decade of restructuring. In communist times, it was the mythology of the heroic coal miners and steel workers that defined this region, while its industry exemplified communist progress (see Kubik, 1994). In the post-1989 processes of regional institutionalization, however, reference to the region’s industrial past has become a means of differentiating Upper Silesia from the rest of Poland by stressing an identity indelibly bound to industrial progress, but having little to do with the glorification of the latter by the (national) communist state. In fact, the re-signification of Silesia’s industrial past by today’s regional actors serves to locate the region in Europe while marking its distinction from the remainder of the Polish state.

Silesia’s ‘European’ industrial heritage is being celebrated in newly created museums and exhibitions (Jasnorzewski, 2000; Szczepańska, 1999) and forms a key part of regional education programmes in local schools (Pulinowa, in print; Nawrocki, 2000; Szczepański and Nawrocki, 1998). Moreover, in present-day narratives of the region, this heritage is rhetorically transposed into a series of attributes, loosely deriving from a
certain sort of industrial development and endowing its participants (i.e. the inhabitants of the region) with a series of traits that, in turn, define their, and the region’s, identity. Traits such as cleanliness, diligence, an ‘iron-clad work ethic’ that ‘emerged from the Prussian factory ethos’ (Szczepański, 1999a: 7) have, according to regional commentators, ‘survived even 50 years of communism’. Ślązacy, therefore, ‘don’t have to learn about Europe – they have always felt it in their toils, in their bones (mają ją w gnatach)’ for they have always ‘worked like Europeans – quite unlike the Asian work habits which seem to characterize other Poles’. To cite Senator Kutz, it is such values that make of Upper Silesia a ‘European Other within the Polish state’ (obcość Europejska w Polsce).

THE USES OF EUROPE

The ideal of Europe is firmly woven into the regional story narrated by Silesian regionalists over the past decade, serving to distinguish Silesia from the remainder of the Polish state and to locate it within a broader community of belonging. Echoing Paasi (1996), regional narratives always serve both to ‘express where the territorial unit has come from’, but also ‘where it is going’ – and Silesia’s future is quite clearly painted in European colours.

I noted how Silesia’s industrial heritage is being reconstructed as part of a European ‘civilizational trajectory’. The past is also being adopted by Silesian regionalists, however, to argue for Silesia’s belonging to a ‘European community of values’ by stressing, in particular, the region’s multi-cultural and multi-national history. As a border region that changed rulers and political alliances many times during the past centuries, Silesia was always inhabited by a population characterized by multiple national belongings. As a booming industrial centre, it always attracted men of fortune from all around Central Europe.

At the turn of the century, 12 languages were spoken in the territories of today’s Upper Silesia. Of course Polish, German, Czech, Hungarian and Russian. But also Hebrew and Yiddish, as well as the three Upper Silesian dialects. And the educated classes all knew ancient Greek and Latin that were taught at every state gymnasium… This sort of linguistic and identity mosaic was always considered a great value. Here, social divides were dictated by social roles – and not by national or ethnic belonging.

Former regional governor Wojciech Czech and the Związek Górnośląski, the regionalist movement with which he was associated in the early 1990s, have repeatedly stressed Silesia’s ‘multi-cultural and multi-national
nature’ in arguing for the region’s ‘rightful place in Europe’. ‘Europe is easily transposed onto Silesia – and Silesia onto the European project. We do not need to learn how to live together with other cultures, other nations – we have always done it’, echoes Katowice mayor Piotr Uszok.15

Europe not only provides the conceptual clothes-horse upon which to hang the regional representation, it is also a very real arbiter of the authenticity of Upper Silesia’s regional identity and difference. It is, in fact, to European institutions that those revindicating ‘Silesian nationality’ in recent years have turned: such as the group of historians from the Silesian University in Katowice, who recently deposited a petition to the European Court of Justice. It is to Union institutions and funds that local actors look in order to support their region-building initiatives and to provide frameworks for cross-border cooperation. ‘We do what we can to strengthen contacts with Union institutions as well as with the member states at the local level’, notes Chorzów’s mayor, Marek Kopel.16 Students from Silesian schools have been by far the most numerous of all Polish participants in EU youth programmes (Euroscola po polsku, 1999; Polacy na Świecie Europy, 1999), while regional government employees were the first from among their Polish colleagues to seize the opportunity to travel to Brussels for EU training courses on the formal and practical aspects of accession (Gazeta Samorządowa, 2000). Finally, despite the exceptionally high social costs of the economic transition, as hundreds of thousands of miners and industrial workers were progressively laid off since 1989, Upper Silesia continues to show some of the highest levels of support for European accession from among all of the Polish regions – surpassed only by the large and economically successful urban centres such as Warsaw and Kraków (on the attitudes of laid-off miners, see Szczepański, 1999c). Surveys carried out by the Committee for European Integration of the Republic of Poland in 1999 noted that over 69 per cent of Silesian respondents saw EU membership as ‘positive for the country’, while 58 per cent thought it ‘above all positive for their region’ (Śląsk bardziej Europejski, 1999; 4).

A PRIVATE HOMELAND

As successful as the regional representation may have become in the past decade, however, there exists a curious disjunction between the diffuse adoption of Upper Silesia as a locus of political, economic and cultural organizing and the continuing lack of regional institutions to reflect this. Even after the 1999 reform, for the most part, ‘regionalizing’ activities have proceeded outside of the formal structures of the new województwo, and the new region’s functionaries are generally perceived as marginal actors in the processes of regionalization.
The Silesian regionalists give two reasons for this. First, the Upper Silesian identity is portrayed as broadly anti-political or, at least, apolitical, located within the realm of private practices – the family, the Church, personal habits. It is here, in the private sphere, that Śląskość (Silesianness) was able to survive both earlier German domination and the subsequent repression by the Polish communist state. Secondly, as regional actors repeatedly assert, ‘Upper Silesia does not have – and never has had – a regional elite’ (Sarnowicz, personal interview, 2000; Stefański, personal interview, 2000; see also Szczepański, 1999a and the debate in the magazine Śląsk, Kijonka and Karwat, 2000) and thus cannot create a strong regional politics. A number of historical reasons are commonly cited: its industrial development at the peripheries of first the Prussian and later the Polish state, both of which deliberately prevented the development of institutions of higher education within Śląsk’s territories in order to import ‘colonial’ elites to run the region’s business. Many also extend the ‘colonial domination’ thesis to Silesia’s most recent past, arguing that ‘outsiders’ faithful to the regime were always imported to fill key political, cultural and economic leadership posts – mostly, to add insult to injury, from the neighbouring areas of the Zagłębie Dąbrowskie, just east of the Brynica river. The Zagłębie has always been considered a fundamentally ‘alien’ territory, historically separate from Upper Silesia because never part of the Prussian territories. In the post-war years, it was an area of heavy immigration from other parts of Poland, and was popularly seen by Silesians as a zone loyal to the communist state.

The arguments for ‘internal colonialism’ and, especially, for the absence of a regional elite point, however, to an important omission in the regional narrative of felicitous multi-national coexistence. ‘Saying that Silesia had no elite is equivalent to saying that only Poles are to be considered Silesians – because historically, the elite was, for the large part, German. Just as saying that there is no high culture here, only folklore. What about the five Nobel prize winners [all German] who came from Śląsk?’ argues German minority leader Dietmar Brehmer.17 It is important to note that while the German heritage is heavily stressed in regional narratives (and used to argue for Upper Silesia’s ‘Europeanness’), ‘living Germans are quite absent – they are not part of the vision of Slask that [the regional actors] paint’.

The ambivalent nature of Upper Silesian regionalists’ relationship with the region’s German past reflects, in part, the equally ambivalent nature of Polish–German relations in the post-1989 era. While Germany is perceived by many Polish state actors as the conduit to Europe and EU membership, such pragmatic considerations are often coloured by fears of a ‘renewed’ economic and cultural domination (articulated mostly by the Polish right wing).
Studies carried out in the post-1989 period have indeed confirmed that formal politics in Upper Silesia continues to be overwhelmingly associated with the (party) state (see, among others, K. Wódz, 1994; J. Wódz, 1995). Recent years have witnessed repeated calls in the regional press for a ‘Silesian lobby’ in the national parliament (see, for example, Kijonka, 1999), noting that the region’s interests cannot possibly be well served by ‘national parties’. What ‘works’ in Silesia, or, even better, who/what best represents Śląsk, are actors and organizations untainted by national politics, outside the sphere of formal politics. Although distrust in formal politics is widespread in post-communist societies, the underlying causes of such feelings in Silesia are somewhat different. Here, the actors and institutions of formal politics lack legitimation not only because they are still associated with party-state structures or with their often corrupt successors (as in other countries) but also, above all, because they are perceived as an ‘external’ incursion into the local territory.

Katowice political scientist Jacek Wódz has stressed repeatedly the absence of national parties from local and regional politics in Upper Silesia (J. Wódz, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; see also Wódz and Wódz, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). The post-1989 Silesian political scene has been dominated instead by what Wódz terms ‘proto-parties’: loose associations or coalitions of actors which come together around specific local problems and enter formal politics only at election time (the best example is that of the Związek Górnosłańskiego). Jacek Wódz also notes the strong personalization of Silesian politics, and the ‘collapse of the representativeness of existing political structures’. In Upper Silesia, he argues, ‘representation is claimed, rather, by single individuals’. The most evident case is that of Józef Małosz, Rybnik’s mayor for two consecutive terms, the sole representative of the ‘Movement for Rybnik’ (Ruch na Rzecz Rybnika). Małosz (according to Petaux and Wódz, 1996) was successful due to his distancing himself from the structures and discourses of formal politics and constructing his support base upon a highly personalized network of local associations. Upper Silesia’s regionalization thus appears to proceed despite (or at least alongside) the new administrative structures of the Polish state.

COMING ‘HOME’?

All through the communist years we, Ślązacy, continued to live in our homeland – but we never felt at home. Now we are at home. The progressive institutionalization of Upper Silesia as a legitimate locus of political, economic and cultural action is indisputable. To echo Senator Kutz’s statement cited above, Silesians are ‘returning home’. To what
extent is this return, however, related to the new opportunities provided by
the administrative decentralization of the Polish state? The regional
‘becoming’ of Upper Silesia in the past decade appears to have proceeded
alongside processes of state decentralization. While these latter have
provided the openings necessary for the articulation of various
regionalizing aspirations, they have not been the motivating factor for
regional revival. In fact, despite the decentralization of powers to the
regional level, regional authorities continue to be perceived by many as
agents of the central government and thus not the legitimate
representatives of the regional whole.

This is for two reasons. Firstly, the new Województwo Śląskie is
perceived as only a partial representation of Upper Silesia, for the
regional borders consecrated on 1 January 1999 ‘do not correspond to
anyone’s idea here of where the region should be’. For some, like the
Związek Górnoshląski, the new województwo is ‘too small’, as it does not
include the ‘historical territories of Śląsk’; that is, those of the pre-war
period. For others, echoing the arguments of the inter-war Silesian
regionalists, it is ‘too large’, for it ‘mixes up outsiders with Silesians’
including, for example, the territories around Częstochowa ‘which were
never part of Silesia’.

Secondly, the new regional government and its functionaries continue
to be perceived as ‘outsiders’ tied to national party politics. This popular
perception is rooted in the region’s and the regional governor’s
longstanding institutional roles, which underwent transformation only in
1999. Prior to this, the governors of the then 49 województwa acted
essentially as the territorial delegates of the central government whose
function was to ‘coordinate the activities of state administration on the
territory of the województwo in order to assure their conformity with
government policy’ (Wollmann, 1997: 469). The role of the regional
governor reflected the ‘dual model’ of local governance that developed
historically in Poland, entrusting local government functionaries with the
tasks of both local self-rule and of executing delegated national state
functions.

The 1999 reform has, for the first time, delegated a whole set of
competences and resources to the regional administrations that previously
lay solely in the hands of central government. These include the rights to
stipulate ‘regional statutes’ or ‘contracts’, to create strategies of regional
development and to generate regional income. The new regions now also
have responsibility for administering primary, secondary and higher
education; healthcare; social security/welfare provision; and broadly
conceived ‘spatial planning’ (although decision-making in the above must
still conform to national guidelines established by state bodies). Finally,
the reform has also enshrined a loosely defined principle of ‘subsidiarity’: ‘where appropriate’, competences may be devolved by the regional administration to the powiat (county) or the gmina (municipality) (Government Plenipotentiary for the Systemic Reform of the State, 1998).

It is perhaps too early to discern the effects of this reform on popular perceptions of the regional governor’s role; yet, two years after the reforms, the figure remains ‘an outsider’, only peripherally related to the everyday problems of the region. When governor Marek Kempski was forced to step down in December 2000 following a corruption scandal, popular commentaries noted cynically that ‘Silesia goes on without him anyway’. For most of the regional actors I have interviewed, the reforms have simply provided additional ‘tools’ for on-going processes of regionalization, tools most fruitfully put into practice not by the administrative region but by local authorities in the gminas or municipalities. It is within the municipalities (in the large urban centres of the GOP but also in the small country towns) that the most ambitious ‘regional initiatives’ have taken hold. It is municipal leaders who have been the most active ‘regionalists’, both in promoting the idea of Upper Silesia (through various celebrations of regional heritage and culture) as well as in creating the highly personalized and place-bound networks of association that inscribe the region in practice.

CONCLUSION

The disjunction between the administrative Upper Silesia (Województwo Śląskie) and Upper Silesia as constituted in socio-spatial consciousness points to the importance of the regional narratives traced above. Such narratives are revealing for they point to the practices that create the region – and not merely the boundaries that delimit it. It is just such narratives, articulated by those whom Paasi (1996) terms the ‘specialists’ in the production and reproduction of spatial distinctions (politicians, journalists, cultural and business elites, all those with the power to craft representations of territorial identity due to their social rank) that act to institutionalize the region as a territorial ideal. A territorial ideal that, in the case of Upper Silesia, appears only partially to correspond to the formal regional institutions sanctioned by the nation-state.
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NOTES
1. Interview with Dietmar Brehmer, 3 Jan. 2001.
4. Interview with Sarnowicz.
6. Interview with Stefański.
8. Interview with Kutz.
11. Interview with Kutz.
12. Interview with Sarnowicz.
13. Interview with Kutz.
14. Interview with Czech.
15. Interview with Uszok.
17. Interview with Brehmer.
18. Interview with Brehmer.
20. Interview with Kutz.
21. Interview with Czech.
22. Interview with Kutz.

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