Background paper prepared for the
Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2011

The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education

Dutch aid to education and conflict

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2010

This paper was commissioned by the Education for All Global Monitoring Report as background information to assist in drafting the 2011 report. It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not be attributed to the EFA Global Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011, The hidden crisis: Armed conflict and education” For further information, please contact efareport@unesco.org
GMR background paper: Dutch aid to education and conflict

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Executive Summary

Within the field of educational aid to conflict affected states the Dutch are widely seen as playing an important leadership role, both in terms of their funding commitment, their receptivity and support for educational interventions in conflicts, and for their innovation in developing new funding mechanisms to deliver aid to conflict affected countries. This background paper analyses the role of a range of departments within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) that are involved in the area, the most important one being the Social Development Department (DSO), followed by the Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit (EFV) and the humanitarian aid department (DMH/HH). We also include the role of UNICEF and Save the Children as being influential multilateral and non-governmental actors and recipients of Dutch financing, and we provide some initial insights into the role the Ministry of Defence.

The first part of the paper outlines the rationale and main policy developments regarding Dutch aid to education in conflict affected situations and emergencies. Dutch aid to conflict and education is characterised by a very diverse system of aid channelled through multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental/private channels, with the involvement of a variety of Ministerial departments and actors. The subsequent section briefly discusses the country or area selection processes, and the various labels and lists that are used by the Netherlands government to distinguish fragile states or conflict affected regions. We then turn to analyse the biggest Dutch investment in education and conflict, the UNICEF Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme, totalling 201 million US dollars. The paper elaborates on the rationale and the genealogy of the UNICEF programme, as well as some of the initial lessons learnt since its inception. Following on from that we provide an overview of the variety of initiatives supported by the Dutch MFA in the cases of Afghanistan and Sudan. Throughout the paper, we draw from evidence of the involvement of the Netherlands in other countries such as Colombia, Pakistan, Haiti and Yemen².

In conclusion, we reflect on the role of Dutch aid and a ‘Dutch way’ of doing development which is said to be flexible (in terms of partnerships through a variety of aid channels); it mostly refrains from flag-planting or earmarked aid; it is decentralised to Embassy levels, and stimulates context specific approaches; it aims for a combined short term and long-term commitment in fragile environments; it strives for a harmonised and aligned donor cooperation approach; and it endeavours to seek out new and innovative ways of funding education in fragile situations, for instance through the UNICEF programme, as well as by pushing for a revision of the FTI framework. Overall we believe that the Dutch have broken new ground in the provision and delivery of education in conflict affected states, and have matched innovation with financial commitment. However, this process is complex and difficult and we have described a range of institutional challenges relating to providing aid in conflict affected countries.

¹ Disclaimer: While this background document could not have been written without the excellent help and assistance of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff, Save the Children the Netherlands and UNICEF, the entire content of the document and all errors and omissions are entirely the responsibility of the authors. To contact the authors please email to t.a.lopescardozo@uva.nl or mnovelli@uva.nl.

² Due to the fact that programmes in the area of education and conflict have only been running for a few years at the most, this research was limited in the sense that there was little evidence based material available. Due to these limitations, as well as a limited time frame, we included those examples of multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental experiences which were accessible and available.
**Introduction**

This report focuses on developments in Dutch aid to education in conflict affected areas in the last decade, with a focus on the period 2007-2010, when ex-Minister for International Development, Koenders was in office. In this relatively brief time frame, Koenders prioritised development cooperation in ‘fragile states’ and his policies coincided and aligned themselves with wider international tendencies toward increased attention to conflict affected regions or emergency situations.

We start by outlining the rationale and main policy developments regarding Dutch aid to education in conflict affected situations, emergencies and fragile states. Aid to conflict and education from the government of the Netherlands is characterised by a very diverse system of aid channelled through multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental/private channels. Furthermore, various (development, humanitarian and fragile states departments) departments within (and outside) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) are involved in providing funding and policy advice in education sectors in conflict affected regions. We then turn to discuss the country or area selection processes, and the various labels and lists that are used to distinguish fragile states or conflict affected regions. The UNICEF Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme, totalling over 200 million US dollars, has been the largest investment of the Dutch government directed to foster education in emergencies and crisis situations. The paper elaborates on the rationale and the genealogy of the UNICEF programme, as well as some of the initial lessons learnt since its inception. Following on from that we provide an overview of the variety of multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental/private initiatives supported by the Dutch MFA in the case of Afghanistan and Sudan, including both short term and immediate responses, as well as longer term capacity building programmes. Throughout the paper, we draw from evidence of the involvement of the Netherlands in other countries such as Colombia, Pakistan, Haiti and Yemen. The paper concludes with some reflections on Dutch aid to education in conflicts and emergencies, and briefly anticipates possible future directions.

**Policy developments for education and conflict**

Historically, the Dutch see themselves as pioneers in the field of international development. The end of the Cold War and later on the attacks of 9/11 has seen the Dutch relationship with the United States strengthen and increasingly operate through the prism of mutual insecurity, which continues to date. From a former Dutch international position of neutrality and the promotion of international stability, the military has again become a major instrument of foreign policy, as is exemplified by Dutch engagement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Tromp 2006). As with many other large bilateral donors, this has complicated the relationship between development policy and security.

Within the field of educational aid to conflict affected states the Dutch are widely seen as playing an important leadership role, both in terms of their funding commitment, their receptivity and support for educational interventions in conflicts, and for their innovation in developing new funding mechanisms to deliver aid to conflict affected countries. Save the Children in their background paper (2009; 20) for UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report 2010 notes that ‘The Netherlands’ substantial weight as one of the key education donors has given them considerable sway in influencing the shape of international aid architecture’. They particularly refer to the Dutch influence as the largest donor

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3 We consider ‘fragile states’ as a complicated and value laden concept, however we chose to use the term for this report in order to stay close to the language used in Dutch policy environment. Later on, we describe the various Dutch definitions of what a fragile state is.
to the FTIs catalytic fund in opening up the system for countries under fragile or conflictive conditions, and the UNICEF-EEPCT programme. Furthermore, in the recent Save the Children report *The future is now* (2010a) the Netherlands is noted as the only donor that has lived up to ‘its fair share of aid’ pledges to meet basic education needs in low-income countries.

The education and development department of the MFA (DSO) started to actively work with the theme of education and conflict roughly in 2005 although earlier interest in the theme became apparent in the wake of the World Education Forum in Dakar, 2000. The first proposal for the UNICEF Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme (UNICEF-EEPCT) was written in 2006 (MFA 2006a), and in the same year the Dutch were involved in working toward opening the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) to fragile states.

Since that period, there has been no specific official policy documentation developed on working in education in conflict affected states. However, within the ‘Peace Building and Stabilisation unit’ of the MFA, a policy document on fragile states and development in conflict areas does include some references to the need to support the education sector. Within this part of the MFA, education is seen as an instrument to create a peace dividend. In this policy document, the UNICEF programme is mentioned a few times as a core programme, and only in the case of Afghanistan is there a direct reference to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund that supports the ‘Equip’ project of the Ministry of Education (MFA 2007). Besides this document from EFV, there is no formal written policy on education in conflict affected situations from the Social Development Department (DSO). The work of DSO is still largely based on the human rights approach described in the 1999 general policy on ‘Education as a right for everyone’ (MFA 1999). The MDGs and the EFA goals are core to their present work and aimed at quality education for every child, including those in fragile states.

However, internally there have been various workshops and working groups involved in this theme. Furthermore, DSO has also been involved in supporting the publication and dissemination of two UNESCO-IIEP publications on this theme, together with the ‘IS Academie’ research group on Education and Development based at the University of Amsterdam. Despite the lack of formal written policy, DSO has been the main department in the MFA involved in supporting schooling in emergencies and conflict areas and we see four main reasons for this growing involvement.

Firstly, addressing education in conflict affected states in order to achieve the MDGs has been the main reason expressed by various Ministry officials of the social development department DSO to justify prioritising education in conflicts and emergencies. Internationally, there seem to be two lines of justification for prioritizing education in situations of conflict. One is what we could call the ‘security agenda’, which aims to win the hearts and minds of the local population during ‘peace keeping missions’ and/or sees educational reconstruction in conflict affected states as a means of enhancing the international communities concerns relating to security. The other could be called the ‘MGD-EFA agenda’, that perceives a lack of education opportunities particularly in areas of conflict as a core obstacle to reaching the MDGs and EFA. The Social Development Department within the

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4 DSO/DD is the education and research department within the Dutch MFA. Until recently, they were a separate unit only focusing on education, however it has now been merged together with the themes of health and civil society into the Social Development Department, DSO. DSO/DD is the main actor working in the education sector in development cooperation and this focuses on this actor accordingly. However, we also found that two other departments, the Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit and the Humanitarian Department DMH/HH, in some instances also work with education in fragile or emergency situations.

Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs portrays itself using the MDG justification. The justifications of the Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit and the Ministry of Defence however, for its Civil Military Cooperation programme on Cultural Affairs and Education, comes closer to the security agenda. The two dimensions are of course not necessarily incompatible though there may be tensions between them in terms of priorities.

Secondly, by 2006 the ex-Minister of Development Cooperation Agnes van Ardenne prioritised education and allocated 15% of their total ODA to education (around 600 million Euros) to this area. When Koenders became the new Minister in 2007, he prioritised conflict affected and fragile states. Together this led to a financial opportunity to open up resources for the theme of education and conflict. However, although Koenders promised to stick to these education aid commitments, there have been budget cuts in the field in the past three years.

Thirdly, this financial opportunity paved the way for the Dutch government to strengthen their strategic international leadership on the issue of education and conflict. The Dutch-UNICEF programme was a response to the failure of the FTI to include fragile states in the short term, and according to one MFA official ‘We were able to show other donors that it was possible to do something. That we shouldn’t just wait for the FTI. We had the courage to explore new possibilities to fund education in conflict affected areas through UNICEF.’ (Interview 06-04-10)

Fourthly, there was an enabling international and national/institutional context for the rise of investment in education in conflict situations. Internationally, since Dakar in 2000 and the emergence of the Inter Agency Network For Education in Emergencies (INEE), awareness of the need to invest in education in emergencies and conflict has grown rapidly. Similarly, at the national level, there appear to have been individual institutional factors which played a role in pushing the theme of conflict up the development agenda, because fragile states and development cooperation in conflict areas became a major priority of the ex-minister of International Development Koenders. This enabling context was thus the product of a combination of both international interest and the personal and agenda setting politics and processes of the Dutch government.

As for the other two relevant departments in the MFA, the Humanitarian Department and the Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, this enabling context also played a role in their efforts for education. However, for the humanitarian department education is still not seen as a priority when providing basic human needs to people in emergency situations, even though Save the Children’s ‘Last in Line, Last in School’ Report urges the Dutch Government to include education in its humanitarian strategy (STC 2007: 32). The fragile states department EFV on the other hand has started to acknowledge educations’ pivotal role in prevention and reconciliation processes. As a result they now turn to the DSO for content related questions.

Despite the surge in interest and resources for education in conflict affected states, when analysing various speeches given by minister Koenders, we can observe an uneven commitment to the theme. At the ‘high level education event’ in Brussels in May 2007, Koenders placed considerable emphasis in his speech ‘keeping our promises on education’ on the need to prioritize education in conflict situations (MFA 2007c). However, exactly half a year later (2 October 2007) in a speech delivered at the Society for International Affairs in The Hague called ‘Engagement in Fragile States: a balancing Act’ he hardly mentions education (MFA 2007d). In the New Year speech given by Koenders in January 2010, DSO managed to get one sentence in that refers to education in conflict situations: ‘To get the children that are hard to reach into schools, we keep on focusing on conflict areas and on girls’ (MFA 2010a). Clearly, there are internal disagreements within the MFA, where the social

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6 Ministry of defence: [http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cimic/cultural_affairs__education](http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cimic/cultural_affairs__education)
department tries to push for and keep education and conflict on the overall agenda. Unfortunately, recently education as a priority development policy sector appears to be losing ground to other sectors and issues, a point we will return to in our conclusions. There also appears to be a shift away from basic education to the whole education sector, including post-secondary forms of education and technical and vocational training.

Minister Koenders and the Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit, created whilst he was in office, both support the so called ‘3D-approach’ (combining Development, Diplomacy and Defence). In a policy document of the Ministry of Defence (2010), it is stated that this 3D approach exists not only on paper, but is effectively being put into practice, mainly in Afghanistan (including the (re) building of schools which is discussed later on) and Burundi. Based on the principles of this approach, Koenders claims ‘we cannot solve the problem of fragile states through development cooperation alone. Complex problems demand complex, multifaceted solutions. [...] In tackling the multiple causes of fragility, my colleagues and I seek to integrate three aspects: development, diplomacy and defence (the three Ds). This consistent multi-track strategy involves a solid, joint analysis of the problem; intensive international cooperation; investment of sufficient resources and people; long-term political commitment; support for parliaments (SGACA) and other countervailing powers, and unfailing attention to state performance. We also need to bear Western businesses and governments in mind, as they sometimes play a role in the abuse of power by elites in fragile states. This government has therefore opted for an integrated approach’ (MFA 2007b).

There are clear signs that this integrated approach is also present outside of the MFA, for instance through the Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) mission of the Ministry of Defence. In CIMIC, education is seen as a crucial instrument for development and to stimulate hope for the future. The network of Cultural Affairs and Education consist of reservists that are experts in the education or cultural sectors. ‘The network ensures a contextualised understanding of the socio-cultural aspects of development projects’.  

This CIMIC network is involved in defence missions mainly in Afghanistan, but also to some extent in Iraq and in its initial stages in the African continent. ‘Education is often the only way to self realisation. It is the purpose of this network to pave this way for the local population in a mission area.’

For some, this renewed interest in the role of education from both Diplomatic and Defence sections of the Dutch state is to be welcomed. However, we would like to recall the warning signs of integrating development (and education therein) into the area of security. Serious criticism has been expressed both from parts of the academic community as well as from other civil society actors on the dangers of integrating security and development issues. The Southern Aid Effectiveness Commission in a recent report noted that: ‘Development cooperation is a policy in its own right. Distortions by other policies need to be avoided. Mixing development cooperation with other policies, or even subordinating it, makes ODA hard to align with internationally agreed aid effectiveness principles. Although this practice is more profound in the USA than in the European countries visited by this Commission, the importance of delinking development cooperation from commercial, security or geopolitical interests cannot be overemphasised’ (SAEC 2010: 24). Oxfam also reports how ‘an uncomfortable ‘marriage’ has been created in Afghanistan between the three D’s of development, diplomacy and defense. In the desire to win the hearts and minds of the people of Afghanistan the foreign military has developed visible good-will projects. This thinking has not taken into consideration what the community needs or giving the community ownership over the project. One

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7 Ministry of Defence: [http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cimic/cultural_affairs__education](http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cimic/cultural_affairs__education)

8 Ministry of Defence: [http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cimic/cultural_affairs__education](http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cimic/cultural_affairs__education)
Oxfam aid worker living in Afghanistan describes a school that was built which was not needed and is now used for storing animals’ (Oxfam 2008: 14).

Similarly, there are concerns that the merging of security and development objectives might lead to short term policy activities (to address contingent security concerns) which might detract from longer term developmental and more sustainable needs. More importantly, there is often a notable imbalance of power between those Ministries responsible for defence and foreign policy to that of the area of International Development, increasing the possibility that long term development objectives can be subordinated to short term commercial and security objectives (Novelli, 2010). In the next section we will explore the range of channels that the Dutch government uses to coordinate and distribute financial aid to conflict affected countries.

**Three main channels**

In this section we explore how aid to education and conflict is allocated through three different channels (multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental/private channels). At the same time we examine the aid provided by three relevant institutions of the MFA: the social development department (DSO/OO), the humanitarian aid department (DMH/HH) and the new ‘Peace Building and Stabilisation unit’ (EFV). Although the preferred channel for all three departments is the multilateral one, Appendix 1 presents an overview in tabular form of the wide variety of educational interventions. This section aims to highlight the variety and flexibility in choice between the various aid channels and mechanisms. One the one hand because of a decentralised system in which local embassies can make context specific choices on what type of aid is most needed, and on the other hand through restraining from Dutch flag-planting and through non-earmarked multilateral aid mechanisms, such as the UNICEF EEPCT programme.

**Multilateral channel**

We begin with the social development department DSO, since supporting education in conflict situations is part of their core business. Although the lines between ‘multilaterally funded’ and ‘bilaterally funded’ assistance appear to be used in quite fluid ways in the MFA in order to justify budget lines, for our analysis we stick to the more general understanding of bilateral aid as resources given from the (Dutch) government (The Hague or the embassies) directly to another government, and of multilateral aid as finances provided through the intermediary of international organisations (e.g. UN agencies, the World Bank, the EU or the FTI framework). The preferred aid channel to support education in emergencies and conflict situations from all departments is multilateral (and ‘bilateral when needed’). However, some of the major multilateral programmes are officially allocated under the bilateral budget channel which makes it hard to unravel the financial data available. With regard to general aid to education, Branelly et al (2009: 134) report that 74% of the total Dutch budget for education (15% of ODA) was spent through bilateral channels, and 14% through multilateral channels. In this case, FTI is counted as bilateral aid, and funding to UNICEF, UNESCO-IIEP and the ILO were included in the latter channel (2009: 135). (For an overview see appendix 1).

The relatively young Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit aims to make the general development activities of the MFA more conflict sensitive. The Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit EFV has begun to acknowledge education’s pivotal role in conflict prevention and reconciliation processes and is seeking to find ways to engage with and in the education sector. Within this part of the MFA, education is seen as an instrument to create a peace dividend (MFA 2007b). Providing schooling to local populations in conflict areas is seen as part of the ‘integral 3D-approach’, particularly in the case of Afghanistan. In this case, they see it as part of their integrated approach to cooperate with the military as well as with civil society and the private sector. The multilateral channel is also used in
Sudan, where both EFV and DSO supports education through multilateral organisations (see below for an overview of support in Sudan).

With regard to the humanitarian aid channel, the majority of funding is multilateral, from which 80% is channelled through UN agencies. The total budget is approximately 180 million a year. The majority of humanitarian aid is non-earmarked. Funding does sometimes find its way to educational activities, although this cannot be traced in detail. This non-earmarked humanitarian funding (on the basis of Consolidated Appeals) is provided to UNICEF (21 million in 2008, 13 million in 2009) and through pooled funding (where it is again difficult to trace education investments precisely). Examples of these pooled funds are the CERFs (Central Emergency Respond Funds) or CHFs (Common Humanitarian Funds). Furthermore, the only directly traceable investment from the humanitarian department in improving the quality of education in emergencies is through the SPHERE project. DMH/HH funded the (re)writing of the SPHERE-handbook, which includes standardized guidelines for education in emergencies, in cooperation with INEE. This rewriting process included cross-referencing INEE’s Minimum Standards Handbook.9 OCHA FTS data on Dutch humanitarian aid to education in emergencies shows some more detailed information on humanitarian aid to education, mostly through UNICEF.10

Besides UNICEFs EEPCT programme, UNICEF also receives regular core funding from the MFA. The total Dutch funding to UNICEF for all themes (including education in conflict) and including both core and non-core funding (of which the EEPCT programme is a part) was 132 million Euro in 2009.

Although the government of the Netherlands does not directly support the Inter Agency Network for Emergencies (INEE) on a multilateral basis, it is indirectly funded by the Dutch through the UNICEF-EEPCT programme. Over the period between September 2007 - July 2010 this indirect funding to INEE was 1,258,591 US$. This funding has been channeled through the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for work related to the INEE Minimum Standards, and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) for work related to network services. In 2009 this also included a contribution towards the INEE Global Consultation which was held in Istanbul.

The Netherlands have had a very active role in the creation, funding and further development of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) and continue their involvement. They were the first co-chair and the main donor of the Catalytic Fund. Dutch funding covers 29 per cent of the total FTI budget, with 470 million US$ committed for 2005-2009, of which 430 US$ already being spent. In the first four years, the insistence on a credible education plan as one of the criteria for FTI endorsement made it very difficult for fragile states to apply for funding. With active engagement from the Dutch, a Task Force was created to think about how to serve fragile states better.11 However, development around the creation of an alternative ‘progressive framework’ for fragile states has been a slow and complex process, and from 2006 onwards the Dutch sought an alternative route through their

9 Internal documentation DMH/HH and conversation with Ministry official.
funding to the UNICEF EEPCT programme. In Zambia and Madagascar, alternative models are being implemented respectively by the Netherlands and UNICEF as supervising entities of Catalytic Fund grants (INEE 2010: 37). Recently, some progress has been made and a decision was taken to create a Separate Fund. However, there is no agreement yet on the exact working processes and procedures - such as the progressive framework - that will be used (Ministry official, personal communication 10-06-2010). Yet, according to one Dutch ministry official the FTI (and the World Bank) is keen to be more responsive to fragile states; from the 36 countries currently financially supported by FTI, 12 of them - and thus one third of the total FTI countries - also appear on the World Bank list of fragile states for 2010.

The Netherlands government has searched for ways to coordinate and harmonise donor activities, particularly in conflict affected areas, through the mechanism of a Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF), such as the UNICEF-EEPCT and FTI mechanism. At country-level, in Yemen the Dutch (bilaterally) invest in a (multilateral) pooled education fund. Here, the management of the fund is decentralised and disbursements are made according to a four-year-strategy-plan in order to overcome the generally bureaucratic and slow nature of these MDTFs (Brannelly 2009: 135).

**Bilateral aid channel**

In terms of bilateral aid, there is a perceived ‘direct development relationship’ between the Netherlands and their partner countries (see below). The Dutch feel that embassies are best placed to manage delegated funds at the national level of partner countries, since political and policy related dialogue takes place within the country context and embassies are directly able to cooperate with the government and civil society. The Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit provides all profile 2 and other relevant embassies with assessments and advice on conflict related issues, the drafting of year plans, and generally stimulates conflict sensitivity. In Yemen and Pakistan, particular attention will be paid to the role of the education sector and the water sector in this respect. In these cases, more cooperation with the DSO department is also aimed for. In Yemen a context assessment resulted in increased awareness of the impact of conflict and fragility on sectoral programmes on education and water and initiated a dialogue among sector partners on how to adjust the programmes on the basis of a conflict sensitive approach. In Pakistan, a context assessment is likely to take place in the near future, again focusing on education and water. The Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit also provides training, capacity building and advice on peace building, conflict prevention and conflict sensitive approaches for of MFA staff in The Hague and at Embassies.

The social department DSO’s delegated funds are invested in various programmes, implemented by national and local governments, but also in cooperation with international organisations such as the WB or UNICEF, or by NGOs. This again shows the complexity of tracing funding through the three different aid channels, as different actors cooperate on different levels, in different programmes and through different aid channels. For instance, Save the Children receives money through the bilateral channel on specific in-country projects, as well as ‘general’ funding from The Hague that they can

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12 In 2007/2008, a ‘progressive framework’ was designed for those countries, which often have difficulties to provide a ‘credible sector plan’ straight away. This alternative framework provides more flexibility than the ‘indicative framework’, and aims to provide more flexibility for countries to opt for funds for education needs in fragile environments or conflict situations. It seems to relate closely to the ‘two-tier’ system Sterling had proposed in his recommendations for the FTI Fragile States Task Team in 2006; besides existing FTI regulation, this system would open up a second tier in which non-FTI countries – including fragile states – could opt for FTI endorsement through a continuous and guided process (Sterling 2006). In 2008, EFA FTI partners approved to support ‘countries in crisis or transition situations through a single, consistent EFA FTI process, particularly with improved access to EFA FTI financing. These countries have the opportunity to present and Interim Plan for FTI endorsement and funding while they develop a full education sector plan’. FTI website: http://www.educationfasttrack.org/themes/fragile-states/
spend according to their own needs and programming (which ‘belongs’ to the non-governmental channel). UNICEF, similarly, receives funding through the multilateral channel (EEPCT and general core funding), but also through bilateral delegated funds in several partner countries.

In addition, the Afghanistan example we discuss below shows there are no clear borders between the aid allocated through the different aid channels, since international organisations and NGOs receive funding through different channels. However, we see it as important to have an insight into these various aid mechanisms (see appendix 1), not least for understanding the different rationales and dynamics of the different players involved. Interestingly, also within the MFA there is no clear consensus on what programme belongs to what aid channel.

The Netherlands Initiative for Capacity Development in Higher Education (NICHE) that is coordinated by Nuffic, is for instance financed through a central budget line from DSO, and not by embassy budgets (although Nuffic operates in close contact with embassies). It is however still placed under the bilateral aid programme, while, NICHE – as well as two other Nuffic projects - support capacity building in higher education institutes in the South, and therefore also fit within the civil society channel. NICHE received funding of 150 million (between 2009-2012). In this programme at least one of the higher education institutes should be a Dutch partner country. Within this programme, there is an acknowledgement of the challenges of fragile environments and Minister Koenders underlined these challenges in a policy letter to the Dutch parliament. Some strategies were developed in an internal workshop named ‘NICHE and NFP in Fragile States’ at the MFA (March 2009) in order to deal with the often low capacity within fragile environments, and to stimulate development as part of a broader peace building process. These should be implemented on the basis of the same goals and principles as other NICHE programmes: ‘poverty reduction, Human Rights and reducing (inter) national threats’ as well as ‘ownership, coordination, harmonisation and alignment’.

In Colombia, although education is not a key sector in the Embassy’s bilateral programme, the Dutch have played an active role in facilitation and monitoring at a strategic level in the Nuffic programmes NPT and NICHE. The NPT projects started in 2004 in Colombia and aligned with the Embassy’s bilateral programme focal points: Good Governance, Peace and Human Rights; and Environment. Six NPT projects were developed in Colombia, and according to Embassy staff all projects have been relatively successful in terms of capacity building in higher education. ‘In particular, we could mention as positive experiences the strengthening of the National University located in the Amazonia region and the support to the area of education of the High Council for Reintegration of ex-combatants (ACR). We could say that the main challenges the NPT programmes faced in Colombia, were the articulation with each other and with other initiatives of cooperation’ (personal communication Embassy in Bogota, 30-06-2010). In 2009, with the launch of the NICHE programme: ‘the Colombian authorities together with the Dutch Embassy chose to work in the field of higher education in

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13 Nuffic is the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education, besides the NICHE project they also receive funding for 1) the Netherlands Programme for the Institutional Strengthening of Post-Secondary Education and Training Capacity (of 30 million, but being phased out), which functions in 15 countries and 2) the Netherlands Fellowship programme, that operates in 61 countries on in-service training and institutional development (27 million, with 50 % of the bursaries determined to women and Sub-Saharan candidates). See http://www.nuffic.nl/
14 These funds are aimed at fragile states and non-fragile countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Buthan, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Surinam, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009), Brochure ‘Nuffic/NICHE’. And: www.nuffic.nl/niche
marginalised areas (known as the ‘other Colombia’, areas greatly affected by the conflict) and also the strengthening of capacities of civil servants in those areas’ (ibid.). Currently, the NICHE programme is defining the first project profiles and they are expected to start in the second semester of 2010.

Non-governmental/private sector channel

The general Social Development Department DSO (but not the education unit within it) provides a significant part of their general budget in supporting Dutch NGOs (coalitions) through the MFS-funding system. With this system, 114 NGOs are funded by the Dutch state with a total amount of 2.1 billion Euros (2007-2011). Some of these NGOs have focal programmes for education in conflict affected zones; as an example Save the Children Netherlands has a project in Northern-Uganda, Ivory Coast, Sudan and Burkina Faso and Oxfam-Novib in OPT, Afghanistan and Somalia (MFA 2010b). A joint initiative was the ‘Schokland’ Millenium Programme on Education and Conflict that developed from the Knowledge platform on Education in Emergencies – a platform that shares and develops thematic knowledge, with cooperation from DSO, Dutch NGOs and higher education institutes. The Dutch government invests 200.000 Euros in this programme for education in Afghanistan, Sudan and Colombia. Compared to the UNICEF investment, the Schokland programme is a ‘minor financial input’ according to a Ministry official. The following Dutch NGOs cooperate, with a leading role for Save the Children: Save The Children; War Child Nederland; Oxfam-Novib; ICCO & KerkinActie; Woord en Daad; and Dark &Light Blind Care.

The Dutch social development department also supports the SII programme – a Cooperation of International Institutes in the South, to a sum of 4,5 million Euros a year. There are different areas of support: policy development, capacity development, curriculum development, Master and PhD courses etc. Besides a whole list of others, the following conflict affected countries are involved: Afghanistan, DRC Congo, Pakistan, Sudan and Sri Lanka.

The ‘IS-Academie’ on Education and Development is a joint research and capacity building programme with the research group on Education and International development at the University of Amsterdam and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Within this area a series of research projects relating to the theme of Education and Conflict have been undertaken since 2006: e.g. 2 publications with UNESCO IIEP, University of Amsterdam and Dutch Ministry on the themes of certification of refugees, and opportunities for educational change in (post)conflict societies. In February 2007, an international seminar was co-organised on Education and Conflict, which brought together policy-makers, academics and civil society and the IS Academe continues a strong focus on education and conflict issues.

15 MFA Funding system for NGOs: 
http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/Onderwerpen/Subsidies/Ontwikkelingssamenwerking/Medefinancieringsstelsel_2007_2010_MFS


17 See http://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/ for more information on the work of the research group on Education and Development.
The Peace Building and Stabilisation unit EFV organises ‘Knowledge-circles’ and a Knowledge network Millennium Accord on Peace Security and Development – similar to the knowledge platform of DSO explained above – with the aim of knowledge sharing between EFV, civil society organisations (including NGOs and higher education institutes), private sector organisations and the Ministry of Defence. Interestingly, regardless of the similar themes and objectives, these knowledge platforms have no institutionalised links between them. EFV also funds a small number of projects through embassies, for instance a Cordaid programme in DRC\(^\text{18}\). Interestingly, this Cordaid programme formerly received funding from the humanitarian department and currently the transition of funding responsibilities going to EFV is an attempt to bridge the humanitarian and peace building work of the MFA.

As a conclusion to this overview of the complex multilateral, bilateral, civil society and military channels for aid to education in conflict areas, some reflections can be made. Firstly, all three departments within the Dutch MFA prefer multilateral channels, but also support through bilateral and civil society channels where deemed necessary. It seems that in some ‘fragile environments’, the choice for these channels is also dependent on other international donors and organisations’ willingness to join multilateral multidonor funding mechanisms. The Dutch however through the UNICEF EEPCT Programme fund 38 countries through the multilateral channel. The choice for bilateral support mostly depends on the partnership-relationship between the Dutch and other countries (see below). In addition, we have seen the difficulty of distinguishing between funding streams, since there seems to be no coherent and consistent idea of what counts as multilateral, bilateral or even civil society funding. Secondly, because of the urgent nature of aiding education in emergencies and conflicts, the choices of donors – including the Netherlands - are often more ad hoc than strategic in nature. On the positive side, because of a decentralised decision-making mechanisms those responsible for choices for particular channels or funding mechanisms are located at embassies and are well aware of local contexts. On the negative side, in an urge to solve immediate needs these ad hoc (decentralised) decisions might overlook the complexities and possible unintended outcomes of well intended aid programmes in conflict situations. As a recommendation, more strategic, longer term and thoroughly analysed programmes would be preferable over (only) ad hoc choices of aid channels, not only because of ‘efficiency’ reasons, but also to ‘do no harm’. Thirdly, at the level of the Dutch MFA this complex aid architecture with all its various channels and funding streams feeds into a fragmented and sometimes uncoordinated aid structure. The three different departments discussed above clearly have common goals, but at the same time their prioritisation and strategies (an ‘MDG-approach’ versus a ‘3D-approach’) differ significantly. Although initial attempts have been made to overcome this fragmentation – as well as to bridge humanitarian and longer term development phases - there is still a lack of coordination and communication between these departments. However, as noted earlier, better coordination should not mean the subordination of broader developmental goals to short term security concerns. We will return to this in the last section of the paper.

**Partner country selection**

Influenced by the World Banks Assessing Aid report (1998), the Dutch have limited the number of partner countries drastically over the last decade from over 100 to around 33. The Dutch have recognised that a former focus on ‘good governance’ as a selection norm led to the neglect of countries that do not fulfil those criteria: countries that are ‘fragile’ or affected by conflicts (STC

\(^{18}\) Education development based on ‘social contracts’ and performance based financing, creating a peace dividend. DSO is not involved.
2009: 23). The policy note Our Common Concern specifies the partner countries in three different types; profile 1 countries are selected on criteria linked to the ‘accelerated achievement of MDGs’, profile 2 countries belong to the ‘security and development’ group and profile 3 countries have a ‘broad-based relationship’ with the Netherlands (see Table 1 below). Included in the profile 2 list are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia19, Democratic Republic Congo, Guatemala, Kosovo, Pakistan, OPT, and Sudan. This list is incomplete and various other countries are added sideways to it: Zimbabwe, Somalia and Yemen are counted as profile 2 ‘plus-countries’, Haiti is included on the basis of humanitarian aid from DMV/HH and reconstruction from EFV and Bangladesh, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Rwanda, Uganda and Yemen are profile 1 or profile 3 countries with a star (*), because of their ‘actual or potential security problems’.20 The Dutch have education experts based in embassies in 15 partner countries (with underlined countries also being included above as a fragile state or as having ‘security problems’): Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, South-Africa, Suriname, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia. In addition, education is also supported outside these 15 countries, for instance in conflict areas such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Colombia, Zimbabwe and Yemen (among others). A ministry official admitted it was not very clear how the profile 2 country list was created.21 Furthermore, the Dutch also draw from lists created by other institutions, such as DFID lists or the FTI list of fragile states produced by the WB, which was provided by the FTI secretariat. In addition to these open partnerships, the Dutch also support education through so-called silent partnerships, where non-partner countries such as Nicaragua and Rwanda receive non-earmarked funding through the programmes of other donors.

19 Colombia is classified as a fragile state, but the Netherlands does not specifically support the education sector. Taking into account the limited resources of the Embassy in Bogota, its focus is on three mayor programmes: 1. Good Governance: Human rights/peace building 2. Environmental programme and 3. Public-Private Partnerships. ‘The Good Governance programme focus on institutional strengthening and peace building, on the base of human rights, focused on victim’s rights. The Embassy supports several training programmes oriented to improve the capabilities or the judicial functionaries as an attempts to get Colombian justice system stronger, thus to carry out victims rights to truth, justice and reparation, and to contribute to peace and reconciliation building in Colombia. The embassy also funds training activities in order to strength Citizen Participation and to create the necessary conditions for community empowerment to fight against corruption’(personal communication Embassy in Bogota, 30-06-2010).

20 Aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eritrea and Sri Lanka is being phased out.

21 It is hard to trace Dutch aid to education and conflict in countries or regions, because of the various channels through which this aid is provided, and the various lists and criteria used. Also, it is hard to distinguish between ‘general education aid’ and ‘special aid’ to education in conflict affected areas. Therefore, any educational aid programmes in conflict affected areas are included in the analysis of this report, leaving aside the (un)intentional conflict sensitivity of the programme design.
### Table 1: Dutch classification of partner countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accelerated achievement of MDGs</th>
<th>Security &amp; development</th>
<th>Broad-based relationship</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main criteria:</td>
<td>Main criterion:</td>
<td>Main criteria:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Low-income country</td>
<td>1. Fragility or major</td>
<td>1. (Prospective) middle-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Fragility not dominant problem</td>
<td>inequality blocking</td>
<td>income country</td>
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<td>3. Government structures offer</td>
<td>poverty reduction</td>
<td>2. Fragility not dominant</td>
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<tr>
<td>enough potential to work with</td>
<td></td>
<td>problem</td>
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<td>them</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh*</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Egypt*</td>
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<td>Benin</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Georgia*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia*</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Congo, Democratic Rep.</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Ethiopia*</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Kosovo SC Res. 1244</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
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<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Suriname**</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
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<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Rwanda*</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Uganda*</td>
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<td>Yemen*</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Development cooperation to be phased out over next four years:

- Bosniah-Herzegovina
- Eritrea
- Sri Lanka***
- Albania
- Armenia
- Cape Verde
- Macedonia, FYR

* = countries that also have an actual or potential security problem
** = agreement reached on phasing out of framework treaty resources
*** = only humanitarian relief in response to current security situation


Two Dutch DSO ministry officials commented on the problematic nature of using such lists. They both argued for a context specific approach to each case, and therefore avoiding to ‘place countries in certain boxes’. A term that was used in the process of opening up the FTI trajectory for ‘fragile states’ was: ‘a country is where it is’; in order to underline the very specific context and approach needed in each and every conflict affected area (interviews on 06-04-10 and 14-04-10). There is awareness within DSO of the need to take into account the phase, duration, and intensity of a situation of conflict when designing education programmes. However, since most of these programmes are either through UNICEF or civil society organisations, there is little direct involvement in conflict sensitive programme design by the Dutch donor. The EFV division stimulates conflict sensitivity in general policies as well as in certain embassies (such as Yemen and Pakistan). It is the Humanitarian department that mostly considers the need to support (displaced) populations in conflict affected areas. However, as mentioned earlier, education is only rarely part of their core funding and is not seen as a policy priority. The total humanitarian aid budget for 2009 was around 198 million Euros, and for 2010 there is an aid allocation of 164 million Euros. According to OCHA FTS data, the Dutch have spent the following amounts of humanitarian aid to education: 2006: 6,9 mln (2% of total); 2007: 1,7 mln (0,4%); 2008: 13,6 mln (2,9%) and 2009: 3,5 mln (1,1%). Allocation to the United Nations CERF (Central Emergency Reconstruction Fund) is approximately 40 mln per year. ICRC

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receives (non-earmarked) core funding: 30 million (2009) and 20 million (2010). Education is not a priority, but youth education programmes are part of ICRCs work.²³

**Analysis of the NL-UNICEF Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme**

The biggest single grant ever donated to UNICEF (201 million US$ or 166 million Euro) came from the Netherlands in 2006 for its Education in Emergencies and Post-Crisis Transition Programme (EEPCT) programme²⁴. From the Dutch perspective, the programme came about for four key reasons: at the time there was enough money available in the Dutch MFA to invest in this theme; the FTI Catalytic Fund as it was designed was too restrictive to allow for allocations to fragile states and the Dutch sought an alternative route; it was a response to the void between humanitarian and development stages of aid; and there were good connections and former experiences between the Dutch and UNICEF. ‘The programme seeks to establish innovative strategies and delivery mechanisms so that educational interventions in fragile countries are a first step in a continuous reform process that will get countries back on a development path. Flexible funding is provided to accommodate the changing needs of a country’ (Eijkholt forthcoming). From the point of view of UNICEF, who agree with the above reasons, there was an additional reason for this programme, as it would give UNICEF strategic leadership in ‘a gap area where we could make a real strategic difference and raise the profile of this theme’ (interview UNICEF official 04-06-2010).

The overall goal of the programme is to ‘to put education in emergency and post-crisis transition countries on a viable path of sustainable progress towards quality basic education for all’ (UNICEF 2006). The programme also aims to be innovative: ‘the programme will seek breakthrough solutions that serve to reconnect affected countries more rapidly and more efficiently into the normal development process. In turn these solutions are expected to lay the foundation for more informed national policies and strategies for education service delivery in these countries, as well as more evidence-based external aid policies and “fit-for-purpose” external financing instruments in support of emergency and post-crisis countries.’(UNICEF 2006: 18)

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²⁴ The following analysis only includes preliminary insights into the EEPCT programme, because of its relatively short implementation period, and the limited evaluation documents available. Unfortunately, the reports on UNICEF EEPT developments in 2009 were not yet available at the time of writing, and an independent global scale evaluation of the project will only be available toward the end of 2010.
Box 1. UNICEF EEPCT programme’s designated goals: retrospective reflections from UNICEF

The framework is still relevant; we have not changed any of the objectives formally, although we added disaster risk reduction later on.

1) Improved quality of education response in emergencies and post crisis transitions

What could be still improved is that our programmes in emergencies are still supply-driven to an extent, focused on the distribution of the material and (improved) packages we have available. On the other hand, providing educational materials has been crucial and a key aim in for instance Liberia and Zimbabwe. Having learning materials makes an important difference and the biggest jump in educational quality. We focus more and more on system/policy development, and at country level are more engaged in key education sector groups. We improve quality, particularly through the application of the Safe and Child-Friendly Schools approach. Other strategies included life-skills programmes, and the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in schools. We revised our emergency packages in our Supply Division in Copenhagen and by creating more efficient business mechanisms reduced the transaction costs of procuring educational supplies.

2) Increased resilience of education service delivery (that also reduces the risks of slippage and promotes “turnaround”) in chronic crises, arrested development and deteriorating contexts

The actual impact of interventions on resilience is hard to trace, we need specific research in this field. With the Dutch funding, we will be looking into case studies on peace building. Recently, we started working with a new framework, in which we simultaneously provide humanitarian responses as well as early recovery, which links to longer term developments.

Within education systems, accelerated learning programmes have been used to address the threat of mass dropout or non-attendance by the majority of average learners who are usually part of a ‘lost generation’ that is excluded from education because of civil conflict. Initiatives such as home-based schooling and community-based school programmes to strengthen decentralized and community-based models of service delivery were also developed.

3) Increased education sector contribution to better Prediction, Prevention and Preparedness (the 3Ps) for emergencies due to natural disasters and conflict

The programme has really taken a step forward in disaster risk reduction strategies for instance in the Latin American and Caribbean region, in Nepal and Uganda; this was an unforeseen achievement. Another strategy has been capacity development on education emergency preparedness and response: we have trained more than 1500 front line responders in Sub Saharan Africa and Asia so far in emergency prone countries. These very practical trainings focused on preparedness for context specific scenarios. Anecdotal evidence shows clear positive effects in the quality and speediness of responses.

4) Evidence-based policies, efficient operational strategies and fit-for-purpose financing instruments for education in emergencies and post crisis situations

The less realised objective is that of working with an innovative financing mechanism. However the Liberia Pooled Fund is widely recognized as an example model, which influences discussion globally on the need for such flexible mechanisms. We only extended the lessons learned to the case of Zimbabwe, but of course there is a very different context and government. Another area for improvement is documenting and disseminating our experiences. Now, in our fourth year, we will work on that.

Sources: interview 04-06-2010 and UNICEF (2006; 2008)

In the initial design of the programme, 50% was allocated to education in emergencies/crisis, 24% to strengthening ‘resilience’ of education systems, 16% to preparedness for education systems, and 10% to knowledge on reliable policy-interventions and instruments. Most (75%) of this funding was
intended for the national level, a maximum of 15% to regional and 10% to the international level (MFA 2006a). UNICEF is solely responsible for country selection, and UNICEF’s strategies are aligned with CAPs and JAMs. Furthermore, UNICEF is also the key risk taker, and no additional measures for risk reduction are taken on the side of the Dutch. DSO coordinates the programme from within the Dutch MFA, and the humanitarian and peace building departments were informed and provided advice in the initial stages (MFA 2006a).

The EEPCT programme has contributed to ‘rebuilding and revitalising education systems in post‐crises contexts, including investing in Education Management Information Systems, curriculum reform, systems to develop teacher capacity, and a teacher payroll system in Southern Sudan’ (UNICEF 2008; STC 2010a: 49). So far, education activities were supported by the EEPCT programme in around 38 countries. UNICEF also sees the (Dutch funded) achievements of the Education Cluster in co‐coordination with Save the Children as one of the key successes of the EEPCT programme as well as the ongoing (Dutch funded) work by INEE. ‘The Dutch found it important that we invested in partnerships, so we decided to go for the two core global ones of INEE and the Cluster. Therefore, the impact of the Dutch funding has been considerable also beyond UNICEF’ (interview UNICEF official 04-06-2010).

Unfortunately, it is very difficult to separate out the precise allocation of total Dutch funding to UNICEF. However, there is data available on UNICEFs total own spending on education in emergencies and conflict affected countries. When we analyse the top recipient countries from UNICEFs total expenditure in conflict affected countries on Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE) we see in the Table 2 below that in 2006 and 2007 Southern Sudan was the major recipient of UNICEF’s aid, and in 2008 and 2009 this was Indonesia. Pakistan almost constantly receives relatively large amounts of funding (between 25 and 30 million), Iraq disappeared from the top 10 list after 2007, Afghanistan and DRC reappear each year in this top ten list.

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25 CAP = Consolidated Appeals Process; JAM = Joint Assessment Mission.


27 In 2008, there were 28 Education Clusters at country level among 36 countries implementing the cluster approach. UNICEF is the lead or co-lead in all the clusters, Save the Children serves as a co-lead in 15 clusters, with other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) serving in leadership roles at a sub-national level (UNICEF 2008: 15).

28 We have inserted these data for possible use in the overall report, but we want to stress this does not reflect the use of Dutch funding by UNICEF for Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE) in conflict and emergency zones.
Table 2: UNICEF’s total BEGE spending in conflict affected countries and emergencies (including non-Dutch funding)

Source: Internal document ‘Netherlands request for BEGE analysis’ provided by UNICEF, May 2010, providing overview of UNICEF’s total (and not just Dutch funded) spending in conflict areas. Countries selected for analysis: countries with valid humanitarian appeals (CAP, HAR, FLASH) as well as recipients of Netherlands EEPCT from 2006-2009.

The work of UNICEF has been very wide-ranging, and unfortunately there is only limited space available to discuss some of the examples. Interestingly, it was mentioned how in some cases bilateral support from the Netherlands to UNICEF was much bigger (and thus had a bigger impact) than the EEPCT programme, as was for instance the case in Pakistan were the Dutch bilateral support to UNICEF was larger and more influential than the funding through the EEPCT programme (interview UNICEF official, 04-06-2010). UNICEF through the EEPCT programme is for instance very active in both North and South Sudan, with a focus on longer term capacity building (see Tabel 4 for an overview of Dutch funded activities in Sudan). UNICEF’s work in Haiti provides an example of UNICEF’s immediate emergency relief activities in a historically conflict prone environment (see Box 2 below on Dutch aid to Haiti). The recent earthquake in Haiti is the last in a line of conflict and crisis situations that have shattered the country.
Box 2: Dutch funded emergency relief in Haiti: choices for multilateral and civil society aid channels

Haiti knows a long history of (colonial) exploitation, poverty, internal conflicts and unstable governments. In this fragile context, the hurricanes in August and September 2008, and the recent earthquake of January 2010 deteriorated Haiti’s humanitarian situation even further. The Dutch have prioritized aid to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, with a combined approach to support both immediate humanitarian relief but also longer term development programmes aimed at for instance reconstruction and state building.

**Multilateral aid channel:**

- In 2008, UNICEF-EEPCT helped provide access to education for more than 100,000 children, an estimated 35 per cent of children affected by human-made or natural crises. UNICEF’s strategy was to help restore learning in already deprived areas particularly affected by social/political conflict and natural disasters, mainly through basic infrastructure rehabilitation and distribution of equipment and school supplies for teachers and students helping to reduce marginalization and promote social cohesion (UNICEF 2008: 29,30).

  After the earthquake in January 2010, there is still an urgent need for a safe and protective environment for school-aged children. To meet that need, UNICEF-EEPCT and one of its partners, the Haiti Out-of-School Youth Livelihood Initiative (known by its French acronym, IDEJEN), have created a haven for children next to the Police Commissioner’s Office in an area of the Haitian capital. As an example of immediate service delivery of UNICEF, this child-friendly space serves about 120 children and young people, ranging from 5 to 24 years of age. Some 75 per cent of them were displaced by the earthquake (UNICEF www.educationandtransition.org).

  Haiti is part of the UNICEF/STC coordinated Education Cluster, with a Humanitarian Coordinator (UNICEF 2008: 78).

- In January 2010, the FTI secretariat announced plans were made to accelerate the signing of the anticipated 22 million US$ Catalytic Fund grant and make money available immediately for a slightly changed programme (now more focused on rebuilding schools, supporting teachers and school feeding programmes) (source: FTI website). However, almost 5 months later there is still no money available from this fund. The World Bank is the appointed FTI Supervising Entity in Haiti. The case of Haiti according to some shows how the World Bank as a supervising entity of the FTI is not (yet) suitable to provide hands-on emergency relief, whereas UNICEF as a Multi Donor Trust Fund manager has shown more rapid responses.

- In addition to Dutch aid to Haiti via UNICEF (and possibly via the FTI), ex-minister Koenders also immediately allocated 2 million Euros from Dutch ODA to humanitarian aid after the earthquake (MFA www.minbuza.nl). One million was spent through the IRC, the other million is invested through the World Food Programme.

**Civil Society aid channel**

- A joint campaign from Dutch NGOs (SHO – Cooperating Aid Agencies) raised 41,7 million Euros, and Koenders promised to double that amount, with around 12 million for direct humanitarian aid and the majority aimed at longer term reconstruction activities (internal documentation DMH/HH).

The Dutch funded UNICEF EEPCT programme was seen as an alternative for the (initial) failure of the FTI Catalytic Fund to deliver support to fragile states. The most often heard example when speaking about innovative financing mechanisms in UNICEFs EEPCT programme is Liberia. According to STC (2010a: 49), in just nine months, the Liberia Primary Education Pooled Fund (LPEPF) disbursed 12 million US$ to procure textbooks, build and rehabilitate schools and teacher training institutes. The 2008 allocation provided by the Netherlands Government to UNICEF was US$13.5 million higher than originally planned in the payment schedule. In 2008, it first appeared that there would be scope in
Haiti for a similar arrangement, and funding was allocated to Haiti on that basis (UNICEF 2008). Due to changes in the country, however, this was not realized. Recently, in the case of Liberia the Minister of Education decided that a 20 million US$ aid grant to Liberia would in the future be invested in an FTI pooled fund managed by the World Bank mechanism, instead of working through the LPEFP UNICEF pooled fund. UNICEF explained this as follows: ‘Although the funding mechanism worked well, it has not yet been audited and it is different from the World Bank mechanisms.’ In the end, it was the Liberian government who asked for new funding from the World Bank.

In general terms, UNICEFs programme is seen by many as a successful initiative, because of its innovative character and the flexibility for UNICEF to quickly decide on large amounts of aid. At the time of writing, an external evaluation is being undertaken on the status of the programme. As an initial hint into what might be improved, we build on some of the insights we gained during the research for this paper. There is at this point, with an evaluation under way, still some vagueness of where most of the aid seems to be going (what percentage goes to emergency situations and what goes to longer term activities?). Secondly, when more donors started to be interested in contributing, discussions opened as to whether this programme could function as a kind of MDTF. The idea would be to open up the fund for more donors to get involved and UNICEF could function as a ‘supervising entity’, similar to the FTI system. However, it seems, there has been little external involvement in terms of co-funding or co-implementation at country level, since only the European Commission has joined since 2009. UNICEF confirms that the multi-donor Pooled Fund Liberia experienced was a unique one. Perhaps, future programme design could take into account some of the issues around levels of responsibility and (financial) incentives for those at local (UNICEF) levels that manage and coordinate the implementation of a pooled fund, as it was felt that they were not benefitting sufficiently from the funding. Some other NGOs are also critical about UNICEF’s lack of cooperation, and they sometimes argue UNICEF operates in ‘splendid isolation’. UNICEF itself, in contrast, stresses its cooperative nature and cooperation in partnerships such as INEE and the Education Cluster.

We can see various positive developments and achievements in these last 3 years characterised by a very broad spectrum of initiatives, from emergency service delivery to longer term system developments. This broad spectrum of interventions were possible because of the flexibility the Dutch provided with their funding mechanism: ‘it gave us the flexibility to really respond to the needs in each specific context’. However, ‘because of a wide range of interventions it is difficult to articulate the value added and overall impact of the programme. If there is to be a next global programme more focus might be helpful; for instance on education systems in post-crisis situations. Such a focus would also help us to evaluate more efficiently, and come up with more concrete lessons learned. A clear lesson we have learned now is that we need to start from the beginning with a clearer plan on evaluations’ (interview UNICEF official HQ 04-06-2010). Another ‘lesson learned’ with regard to the FTI system and other Multi Donor Trust Funds, was highlighted in UNICEF’s Consolidated Donor Report of 2008: ‘It requires working in new ways, taking greater risks, designing an appropriate governance mechanism for the global level and linkages with governance at the country level, and consensus building among a large group of stakeholders – including the EFA-FTI Secretariat and partnership, key donors interested in contributing to the fund and UNICEF. The complexities of getting all the various pieces in place were to an extent underestimated, but the process also illustrates bottlenecks in the aid architecture that the Education Transition Fund is designed to overcome.’ (UNICEF 2008: 72). Later on, UNICEF reconsidered their position and it seems there will be no Education Trust Fund managed by UNICEF under the umbrella of FTI.

In conclusion to this section we can state that while it is far too early to pass judgment on the UNICEF EEPCT programme, as an intervention in the area of education and conflict it is both innovative and imaginative, meriting both further research and investigation and evaluation to assess whether this
partnership can develop into a mechanism that embraces more bi-lateral partners and more agencies operating in conflict affected countries.

**From policy to practice: Dutch Aid to Education in Afghanistan and Sudan**

As priority countries for the international community at present, both Afghanistan and Sudan are perhaps good examples of the complexity and variety of Dutch involvement in the education sector, the different channels through which aid is delivered, and the competing rationales for engagement in the education sector. This section first outlines these issues in the case of Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the integrated 3D-approach, and secondly it provides an overview of activities in Sudan.

*A wide variety of Dutch aid channels in Afghanistan*

In common with many other bi-lateral donors, the Dutch are part of the NATO led International Security Assistance Force and deploy between 1200-2000 troops in the Uruzgan Province in Southern Afghanistan. The official reason for Dutch 3D engagement in Afghanistan was ‘to support the international community in its efforts to ensure that after September 11 2001 Afghanistan would no longer be a shelter for international terrorism. [...] The aim is more security, government capacity building and sustainable development programmes. [...] First, small scale projects have to prepare the population and the region for more large scale development’.29 As a result of this Dutch international development assistance has been focussed both at introducing and supporting educational interventions and reform at the national level and also specifically targeting the Uruzgan Province.

Promoting Good Governance has been at the heart of Dutch policy in Afghanistan (MFA 2009:256). For that reason capacity development has been at the core of Dutch international development assistance in Afghanistan, a country that has suffered from decades of conflict and a resultant lack of skills in core sectors. In education policy interventions the Dutch operate through a wide variety of channels including bi-lateral aid, multilateral support, civil society support, Higher Education support via the Netherlands Initiative for Capacity Development in Education (NICHE) and through the Fast Track Initiative, with a focus on longer term capacity building efforts (see Table 3 below).

**Table 3: Overview of Dutch aid instruments in Afghanistan for Education in Emergencies and Post-Conflict Situations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument used by GoN</th>
<th>Main capacity building components</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Support</td>
<td>Policy Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sub)-Sector support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast Track Initiative</td>
<td>Education Sector Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of credible sector plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to Education reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Support</td>
<td>Innovative strategies and delivery mechanisms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Under bilateral aid the Dutch have delegated approximately 10 million euro annually between 2008-2011. Through this funding they have contributed to the EQUIP (Education Quality Improvement Programme) led by the Afghanistan Ministry of Education with support from the World Bank. This project aims at ‘education reform, teachers’ education, strengthening capacity of the Ministry of Education and the provision of learning materials’ (Eijkholt forthcoming). While the project operates in ten provinces, the Netherlands contribution is targeted at the Uruzgan Province. The second major bilateral project has been in the area of Agricultural Education. Working alongside the Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development the Dutch are involved in supporting a wide range of initiatives including the development of a National Afghan Vocational Education and Training Policy, the construction of a National Agricultural Centre (NAEC) and the setting up of an agricultural school in Uruzgan (Eijkholt forthcoming). The third major project that Dutch aid to education has contributed to is the Save the Children led ‘Quality Primary Education Programme (QPEP) which provides out of school children with accelerated learning programmes to facilitate their re-entry to schooling. Table 4 provides an overview of the wide variety of aid channels and programmes through which the Dutch support education in Afghanistan.30

Table 4: Overview of Dutch funded programmes on Education and Conflict in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Programme description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Budget allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proposal is submitted for FTI endorsement</td>
<td>Through the Education Programme Development Fund, Dutch support was provided to the MoE to develop an education sector plan and for strengthening institutional and technical capacity. The Afghan National Education Sector Plan-2</td>
<td>National level</td>
<td>In development</td>
<td>The level of support from FTI depends on the resource envelope - commitments from the government of Afghanistan and the local donor community - and the existing funding gap.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 This overview provides a wide range of examples, however, it is not meant to be fully comprehensive in the sense that it might not include all Dutch education initiatives in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it was also hard to trace some budget allocations for the programmes mentioned.
(NESP-2) is about to be submitted to the EFA Fast Track Initiative for endorsement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit and NGO The Liaison Office Multilateral channel</td>
<td>The Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit works with the local Afghan NGO ‘The Liaison Office’ (formerly Tribal Liaison Office) to monitor and map Dutch funded education programmes in hard to reach remote areas.</td>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aid channel Multilateral channel</td>
<td>Budget allocations include general reserved humanitarian aid, and education is not part of the ‘Humanitarian Action Plan’ for 2010. OCHA FTS data shows the Dutch provided humanitarian aid to education through UNICEF and Stichting Vluchteling in 2002 to improve education for girls, refugees and focused on community participation, and through UNICEF again in 2009 for winter preparedness.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2002 and 2009</td>
<td>7.5 mln in 2009, 6.5 mln for 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Quality Improvement Project of the Ministry of Education -</td>
<td>The Netherlands supports the Afghan government through EQUIP. With technical support from the World Bank, this programme aims for Mainly Uruzgan</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
<td>Approximately 10 million Euros annually for all bilateral projects; this includes funding to EQUIP and Agricultural vocational</td>
<td>2008-2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **EQUIP**  
**Bilateral channel** | education reform, teachers’ education, strengthening capacity of the Ministry of Education itself and learning materials. The World Bank finances this project in ten provinces through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The Netherlands supports the financing of school management committees, pre and in-service teachers’ training, learning materials and the reconstruction of schools in Uruzgan Province. | education (see below). |
|---|---|---|
| **Bilateral support to Agricultural Education**  
**Bilateral channel** | The Dutch are involved in supporting capacity building in vocational training centers for agricultural education, in cooperation with Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Dutch University of Wageningen. Examples include the development of a National Afghan Vocational Education and Training Policy, the construction of a National Agricultural Centre (NAEC) and the setting up of an agricultural school in Uruzgan. | National level and Uruzgan  
Continuing  
See above. |
| **Save the Children led ‘Quality Primary Education Programme’ (QPEP)**  
**Bilateral/civil society channels** | STC’s QPEP provides out of school children with 130 accelerated catch-up classes (Accelerated Learning Classes), clustered in 13 centers. Students receive certificates allowing them to enter the formal school system in agreement with the Ministry of Education. As of 31 December 2009, 3,671 children (956 girls and 2,751 boys) attend grade 2 or grade 3 ALC classes. These classes are accommodated in private houses or communal buildings such as mosques. The Provincial Education Department is involved decision-making on the locations, enrollment of pupils and choice of mentors. In 2009, 30 teachers from 7 schools attended trainings to build their teachers’ skills, knowledge and attitudes. In 2009, 524 teachers, ALC mentors, parents and other | Tarin Kowt,  
Dehrawud and Chora districts  
2008-2012  
The bilateral embassy contribution to QPEP amounts to € 2.691.495, with an additional 9.134.671 US Dollars for the ‘QPEP Annex’, aimed at providing extra activities to improve both acces and quality of education (STC personal communication). |
stakeholders were trained in ‘Whole School Approach modules’ (human rights and child protection, lesson plan, home work correction class management and health education). STC also works together with local teachers, Resource Centre staff, District Education staff and Student Council members for the New Year enrollment campaign. (MFA 2010c, internal document ‘Schokland programme’ update Afghanistan, March 2010; Save The Children Jalalabad Sub Office Education Programme 2010d).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO support</th>
<th>National level and Uruzgan</th>
<th>The Dutch embassy supports the DCU with € 14.000.000 for the whole period (STC personal communication).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil society/ Bilateral channels</td>
<td>2007-continuing</td>
<td>According to Oxfam, the Dutch government in 2008 had allocated 0.6 million for Dutch NGOs working in Afghanistan which includes some education projects – such as Oxfam-Novib partner funding (Oxfam 2008: 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) The embassy of the Netherlands in Kabul directly supports NGOs to deliver a range of education services and capacity development activities in Southern Afghanistan (Eijkholt forthcoming). An example is the DCU (Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan) that includes Healthnet TPO, CORDAID, ZOA, Dutch Committee for Afghanistan and is coordinated by Save the Children. Education is one of the components.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) The Netherlands also supports NGOs that provide education services and capacity development through ‘MFS-I’: a subsidy framework for Dutch civil society organizations supporting partner organizations in developing countries. Under this subsidy framework, various Dutch civil society organizations are implementing activities in Afghanistan. MFS-I covers the period 2007-2011, new bids from NGOs for the MSF-2 framework are underway.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A consortium of various Dutch NGOs led by Save the Children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>The budget of the Afghanistan Schokland programme is 70.410 Euros, the Dutch MFA (DSO) contributes 36.460 Euros.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society channel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with the same organisations).

Schokland members and partners (Save the Children NL, US, UK, Sweden/Norway, War Child Holland and CHA) held a two-day Peer Review and Activity Planning workshop at the SC-US office in Kabul on 24 – 25 January 2010. Results so far have been the establishment of a structure to share their knowledge, experiences and partner-networks leading to a structural improvement in cooperation and coordination, and therefore a more concerted effort towards MDG2 and MDG3. An example of a joint effort is a collective assessment of the constraints and hurdles of female teachers to perform their job (Eijkholt forthcoming).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuffic-NICHE and Nuffic-NFP (Netherlands Fellowship Programme)</th>
<th>Capacity Building for Higher Education, Afghanistan is included in the NICHE programme since 2010.</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>2010 and continuing</th>
<th>NICHE: 150 million Euros allocated for all countries, Afghanistan is one out of 23 countries. NFP: 27 million, for 61 countries.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>Provincial reconstruction teams (PRT’s) and civil-military - CIMIC operations: (re)building of schools.</td>
<td>Uruzgan</td>
<td>August 2006-August 2010</td>
<td>The total Dutch investment in development in Afghanistan since 2002 is 617 million Euros, with 126,3 million Euro to projects in Uruzgan, and 484,7 million Euros for national level projects (webiste MoD).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of multilateral support the Dutch government is supporting attempts to facilitate FTI funds being released for Afghanistan. Through support to the Education Programme Development Fund assistance has been provided to the Afghanistan Ministry of Education to develop the Afghan National Education Sector Plan-2 (NESP-2) which is currently being submitted to the FTI for endorsement. Via UNICEF’s Dutch funded EEPCT the Netherlands are similarly supporting a wide range of educational projects such as the Basic Education and Gender Equality Programme’ which develops community based schools (CBS) aimed at hard to reach rural communities and specifically targeting girls education.

A further financial support channel is via Dutch Civil society organisations that receive funding under the MFS-1 subsidy framework (see Table 4). A wide range of organisations such as War Child and Save the Children receive funding for Afghanistan projects. The Dutch government is also funding the Netherlands Initiative for Capacity Development in Education (NICHE) which from 2010 is providing post-secondary capacity development for government, NGOs and the private sector in Afghanistan. Earlier on, we highlighted the joint ‘Schokland’ Millenium Programme on Education and Conflict (in Colombia, Sudan and Afghanistan – see also Table 4).
The Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit works with the local Afghan NGO ‘The Liaison Office’ (formerly Tribal Liaison Office), particularly to monitor Dutch funded education programmes in hard to reach remote areas. They work on ‘education scans’ that map educational needs, based on local actors’ perceptions. There is little cooperation with the DSO department, as ‘most of the work is done locally at the Embassy in Kabul and in ‘Camp Holland’ in Tarin Kowt’ (interview Ministry official 08-06-2010).

Finally, in terms of support for networking and knowledge building the Dutch government have been funding initiatives such as the Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies and supporting the application of its Minimum Standards in Afghanistan. Furthermore, it has also been supporting research initiatives on education and fragility via the University of Amsterdam based IS-Academie on Education and Development and IIEP-UNESCO. In the next section we will explore how these initiatives fit into the broader integrated approach of the Dutch government towards Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and the 3D-Approach

Dutch intervention in Afghanistan follows an integrated approach, linking security and development in line with the 2008 Dutch Policy document ‘Security and Development in Fragile States’ which emphasises the important of the 3D-approach linking Defence, Diplomacy and Development. According to the document, Dutch ministers of Development Coordination, of Foreign Affairs and of Defence work together, because ‘stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan is not only important for the country itself, but also contributes to more security in the Netherlands and the rest of the world.’ This combined security-development strategy is seen as ‘a powerful tool in the struggle against radicalisation’ (MFA 2006b). At the national level, 25 million Euros per year is invested through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), managed by the WB, to cover salaries of ministry officials, offer microcredit loans, support the national solidarity programme (NSP), the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the EQUIP education programme. A total of 27 donors contribute to the ARTF with five donors (including the USA, UK, EC, The Netherlands and Canada) providing 80 percent of the funds (INEE 2010: 80). In addition, an amount of 50 million is invested by the Dutch until 2011 to support the judicial system and policy through the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan, managed by the UNDP.

The 3D approach with its civil-military cooperation in Uruzgan is perceived as a success story, since ‘development aid reaches most of the local communities, which consequently choose to turn against the insurgents [the Taliban].’ Aspects of development assistance and education therein are part of a Dutch counter-insurgency strategy in the Uruzgan province. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of the Dutch military work through a so-called ‘inkblot method’, where they first support the Afghan military in creating safe areas and consequently work on reconstruction of infrastructure, school buildings and basic health care facilities. According to the MFA, this is also called ‘the Dutch Approach’, which means: ‘a combination of respect for the local population, an understanding of religion, local values and customs and act as less aggressive as possible. Still, there are situations in

31 Website MFA, http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/Onderwerpen/Afghanistan

32 Education Quality Improvement Project together with the Afghan Ministry of Education and also funded by the World Bank (Eijkholt forthcoming).


34 MFA, Presentation of the 3D approach by the Netherlands in Afghanistan, http://www.minbuza.nl/dsresource?objectid=buzabeheer:140511&type=org . The presentation also stresses that ‘the population sees the development coming from foreigners, and they do not see a role there still for the Afghan government.’
which the army has to act forcefully in their struggle against the Taliban. It is essential for every success to be an Afghan success. Therefore we act together as much as possible with the Afghan military and police’ (MFA 2006b). Schools are being (re)built as part of the ISAF or the civil-military CIMIC activities. A captain explains ‘we have built 5 brand new schools, and one protective wall for an existing school against floods. [...] These quick projects are psychologically important because they create goodwill with the local population. We call them force-acceptance activities’ (MFA 2006b).

However, while the Dutch have seen some successes in their strategic activities in Uruzgan Province, levels of insecurity remain high across the country and threaten to undermine these gains. Furthermore, it has been mentioned by Ministry officials how combining both development and security in Afghanistan is often quite problematic, because it is hard to show the difference between the two strategies in a dynamic and complex context. Though, there has been improved coordination, communication and understanding between the military, diplomats and development workers over the last three four years in Camp Holland. Every PRT is coordinated by a diplomat, according to a Ministry official. The recent collapse of the Dutch Coalition over the issue of maintaining troops in Afghanistan reflects the highly sensitive political nature of Dutch involvement in the Afghanistan conflict. The crisis also demonstrates the problems associated with linking development aid to security strategy, as Dutch withdrawal from the Uruzgan Province – or the threat thereof - may serve to undermine the logic, efficacy and sustainability of the Dutch development focus in the Province.

The case of Afghanistan provides insight into the multi-pronged engagement of Dutch development assistance to fragile states. It also illustrates some of the immense difficulties of operating in conflict affected states, their highly politicised nature, and the danger that military and security strategy and priorities may have an effect on developmental and educational imperatives. The case of Afghanistan is exceptional, in terms of the – to some extent – integrated efforts for education in Uruzgan by different parts of the Dutch government.

Various aid channels from the Netherlands to Sudan

The various departments of the MFA as well as the Ministry of Defence are also involved in Sudan. Below, Table 4 provides a brief overview of Dutch supported initiatives in the education sector in both Northern and Southern Sudan. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Verhagen stated in a speech in 2008 that the 3D ‘comprehensive approach’ in Sudan consists of ‘active diplomacy, investments in peace building processes, humanitarian aid, reconstruction activities, and military investments in order to strengthen stability’ (MFA 2008, translated by authors). The Dutch have a relatively small military engagement since 2006 in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (24 military and 4 civil police officers in 2010) and only a few military since 2008 in the joint United Nations - African Union Mission In Darfur (UNAMID). The overall goal of these missions is to sustain the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. There is, however, no evidence on specific cooperation on (re)building schools through CIMIC such as in Afghanistan (Ministry of Defence 2010).

With regards to the Development part of the 3D approach, similar to the case of Afghanistan, we see the use of a wide range of aid mechanisms from multilateral and bilateral to civil society channels. Furthermore, both in Afghanistan and Sudan there seem to be a focus on longer term capacity building and reconstruction programmes. While this exploratory study already provides some initial insights into similarities and differences between Dutch aid to education in Afghanistan and Sudan, further research could help to uncover: 1) the (decentralised) levels of agency of (local and Dutch) embassy staff members, 2) the (de)centralised choices for different aid channels, and 3) the negotiation processes between the Dutch and national and local governments, (inter)national civil society and other donors.
Table 5: Overview of Dutch funded programmes on Education and Conflict in Sudan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Programme description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Budget allocations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Go to School Initiative’: improving access and quality to education and rebuilding the education system. Delivery of educational material. ‘Child friendly Schools’, quality improvement at school level, including support to teacher training and school management teams.</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>6.617.876 Euros</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Multidonor Trustfund:** **MDTF-S, which includes the ERP (Education Rehabilitation Programme).**  
**WB administers, UN implements.**  
**MDTF-N** | **Multilateral channel** | **ERP: Construction and rehabilitation of County Education Center and primary schools. Strengthening of County Education Centre Services; Management Training; Pilot Fast-Track Teacher Training & In-Service Teacher Training; Survey of Alternate Learning Programs; Sustain/Expand Alternate Learning Systems; Workshops Secondary Education Curriculum; Professional Skills Development Program; Annual Education Census.** | **South Sudan: MDTF-S North Sudan: MDTF-N** | **2008-2011** | **There are 14 external donors (Canada, Denmark, Egypt, European Commission, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, World Bank) as well as counterpart funding from the Government of Southern Sudan.**  
Donors have contributed a total of 524.31 million US $ to the MDTF-S. The Government of Southern Sudan has contributed $178.6 million.  
Dutch funding includes 42.3 million US $, with 38.4 million US $ for the MDTF-SS and 3.9 million US $ to the MDTF-N. |
| **Humanitarian aid channel** | **Multilateral channel** | **Dutch humanitarian aid is channelled mainly through the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). In 2010, the focus of the CHF is on food programmes, education, water/sanitation and health are also targeted.** | **Sudan** | **Continuing** | **18.1 mln Euros in 2009, with 16.2 million for the CHF and 1.9 million via NGOs. For 2010 7 mln Euros are allocated (general reserved humanitarian aid, amount is lower because of left over funding from 2009).** |
| **Basic Services Fund**  
**Administered by a private company (source: DSO).**  
**Bilateral channel** | **DFID, Norway, Canada, Netherlands (see [http://www.bsf-south-sudan.org/](http://www.bsf-south-sudan.org/)).** | **South Sudan** | **2006-2010** | **DFID’s contribution to the extension (2009-2010) will be £9 million, and is lead donor. Netherlands and Norway have signed delegated cooperation agreements for resp. £6.5 and £3.7 million. Canada joined in March 2009 with £4.2.** |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Nuffic-NICHE and Nuffic-NFP (Netherlands Fellowship Programme)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Capacity Building for Higher Education</strong></th>
<th><strong>(South) Sudan</strong></th>
<th><strong>2009-2012</strong></th>
<th><strong>NICHE: 150 million Euros allocated for all countries, Sudan is one out of 23 countries. NFP: 27 million, for 61 countries.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Save the Children, ICCO, Woord en Daad, Dark en Light, Oxfam Novib, War Child, Dutch MFA</strong>&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Civil Society channel</strong></td>
<td>'Schokland' Millennium agreement: Education in Fragile States. See Table 4 on Afghanistan.</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>The budget is 85.180 Euros, with 45.300 Euros from the Dutch MFA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ICCO &amp; Oxfam Novib NL, partly also Dark &amp; Light Care, SNV and the Royal Dutch Embassy (and in close cooperation with local actors).</strong>&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<strong>Civil Society channel</strong></td>
<td>A joint initiatives of Dutch NGOs to rehabilitate primary education in the Upper Nile region; Provision of educational materials, teacher and school management training, illitaracy campaing for adult women and improving access to education for disabled children.</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2007, 2008-2010</td>
<td>2.350.000 Euros</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Dutch NGOs, supported (partly) by the Dutch MFA**<br><br>**Civil Society channel** | • Oxfam-Novib: supporting acces to education for children, and (women) adults.  
• Save the Children: quality of education, Hiv/AIDS programmes, teacher and community workshops.  
• ICCO: training teachers and providing material for refugees. Adult education, TVET.  
• War Child: acces, | South Sudan | 2007-2009 | 1.250.000 Euros |
| | | South Sudan | 2007-2010 | 551.434 Euros contributed by the Dutch MFA and 393.000 Euros own resources of NGOs |
| | | Mainly South Sudan, some projects in North Sudan. | Projects run from 1,5 to 4 years | 840.000 Euros for 4 year programmes, 100.000/200.000 Euros for smaller scale projects. |
| Dutch Military support to UNMIS and UNAMID | quality of education and teacher training. | Sudan: Juba, Khartoum, Yei, and maybe later on also in Bor. | South Sudan | 2009-2011 | 2008: 50.483 Euros 2009: 228.690 Euros approximately, depending on own resources. 540.000 Euros |
| No specific cooperation on (re)building schools through CIMIC such as in Afghanistan (Ministry of Defence 2010), overall goals is to sustain the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005. | Khartoum and El Fasher | UNMIS since 2006, UNAMID since 2008, both continuing in 2010. | In 2010: 26 military (1,3 million Euros) for UNMIS, 4 civil police officers (0,2 million Euros), and 2 military for UNAMID. The total UNMIS budget for 12 months is 1,5 million Euros (website MoD/MFA). |

Sources: internal DSO/OO documentation except when mentioned otherwise.

**Concluding reflections**

When asked about a ‘Dutch way’ of development aid in conflict affected areas in general, several characteristics were brought forward by officials working at the MFA. The most often mentioned qualities of Dutch aid were its *flexibility* (in terms of partnerships through a variety of aid channels); the *retraining from flag-planting or earmarked aid*; the attempts to decentralise Dutch decision-making and stimulate *context specific approaches* in embassies; a long-term commitment also in fragile environments; a focus on both *short term emergency relief* as well as *longer term capacity building; a harmonised and aligned donor cooperation* approach; and the ‘guts’ to seek for new and *innovative ways of funding education* in fragile situations, for instance through the UNICEF programme, as well as by pushing for a revision of the FTI framework. Box 3 below elucidates the main conclusions of this paper with country examples where relevant. Overall we believe that the Dutch have broken new ground in the provision and delivery of education in conflict affected states, and have matched innovation with financial commitment. However, this process is complex and difficult and we have observed a range of institutional challenges.

Firstly, there seems to be a lack of cooperation and communication between the three main departments of the MFA, which leads to a fragmentation of aid. Because of these parallel activities in separate departments, it is questionable if the MFA uses its capacity to full strength. Linked to this issue is the weak transition between a humanitarian phase into a development stage, that is acknowledged by the different departments of the MFA. A coherent strategy to resolve this transition phase is not yet in place (Brannelly et al 2009: 137), although the UNICEF-EIPCT programme is seen as a potential solution as they can coordinate emergency relief as well as post-
crises reconstruction activities. Amidst the overall fragmentation, there are a few exceptions to the rule. EFV and HH work together in some areas, such as the Cordaid programme in Congo. Another bridge that is being constructed in some instances is between EFV and DSO, to dialogue about content information regarding education in emergencies and conflict zones, for instance in the case of Yemen there has been some initial cooperation. Furthermore, recently DSO has started to push for its involvement and cooperation with EFV (the Peace Building and Stabilisation Unit) to work together with the OECD-DAC guidelines on state building in fragile situations, and to include not only ‘service delivery’ but specifically education as a Dutch key priority in its approach to fragile states (personal communication Ministry official, 06-07-2010). These developments are in its initial stages, but mark a positive move towards more strategic institutional cooperation. While some initial attempts thus have taken place to bridge the work of the three different departments in The Hague, the complex internal system of aid allocation and separate budget lines remains to exist. Regardless of all good intentions, this results in a fragmented, complex and hard to trace funding system to education in emergencies and conflicts. Further research could help to understand whether decentralised decision making at embassy levels may work to overcome these fragmentations.

Secondly, because of a high pressure environment and the sometimes ad hoc nature of working in the area of education and conflict, there might be a need to strengthen the resource basis of the departments and further develop knowledge capacity in core issues related to education and conflict. Ministry officials confirmed there is, for instance, a general lack of evidence based material on ‘what works and what does not work’. This point also ties in with a further issue of the absence for Dutch ministry officials of an ‘institutional memory’. Because of regular changes of responsibilities and positions within the MFA (and between The Hague and Embassy posts), there is a loss of continuity in the various programme lines. Many officials are only partly aware of the historical developments of the programmes because this was part of the work of their former (or latter) colleagues. As an example, since 2006 prime responsibility for the theme of education and conflict shifted between at least 4 different persons. An even greater concern might be the absence of education experts at the embassies of ‘profile 2’ fragile states.

Thirdly, because of a lack of clear policy guidelines and because of the early stages of the development of experiences with aid in this field, there is a sense of ‘learning as we go’. This is of course understandable given the fact that there is still little evidence based material on the role of education in conflict affected states, and most other donors appear to be working in similar ways. However, we argue that a systematic process of self reflection, possibly including further dialogue and reflection together with external research institutes, could foster a better understanding and a stronger set of arguments both within and outside of the MFA to keep pushing for support to education in situations of conflict.

Fourthly, because of the Dutch approach to funding bilateral, multilateral, (non-) governmental as well as private sector partnerships in fragile or conflict-affected areas, and to restrain from ‘flag planting’, there lies a difficulty in distilling or ‘measuring’ the effectiveness of Dutch aid. Moreover, it requires a very careful selection of partners that share the same values, since the Dutch commitments to the Paris Declaration and DAC principles have to be endorsed through these partnerships. This also signifies placing responsibilities for decision-making away from the Dutch political level (either in The Hague or in embassies) and into the hands of implementing agencies (Branelley et al 2009: 131-132).

Finally, there is a general sense of insecurity because of the recent elections (and ongoing coalition formations) and the broader impacts of the ongoing global financial crisis on Dutch aid priorities. A recent high profile report of the Academic Council for Governmental Policies (WRR 2010) stressed the need to shift the focus of development cooperation (again) to economic development, and away from ‘the social sectors’ – including education. A ministry official argued how ‘the social sectors are under great pressure now, and this might become worse in the context of the economic crisis and
budget cuts. We find ourselves in a very uncertain situation, we will have to wait and see about the elections [in June 2010] and the following government formations and its implications for education within development cooperation’ (interview 31-03-10). It is hoped that the Dutch will be able to continue their committed role and innovative attempts to seek out the best way for the provision and delivery of education in conflict affected states.

Box 3: Overview of the main conclusions

- **Flexibility in aid partnerships**: although the Dutch support ‘multilaterally when possible and bilaterally when needed’, both the cases of Afghanistan and Sudan (see Tables 4 and 5) show the wide variety of aid channels that the Dutch utilise in order to support education in conflict affected regions. Besides multilateral and bilateral aid, a range of civil society partnerships are included in for instance Afghanistan, Sudan, Colombia and Pakistan.

- **Decentralised decision making leading to context specific approaches**: in Pakistan it was decided at the Embassy level to shift away from a focus on sectoral support to the government, and emphasize the need to invest in education through various NGO programmes, such as Save the Children’s education programme in Balochistan (8.820.000 Euros for 2010-2014), and a reconstruction programme in Allay Valley (19.422.416 Euros for 2007-2011) (STC personal communication).

- **Refaining from earmarked aid and flag planting**: becomes apparent through 1) the large Dutch support to Multidonor Trust Funds in various cases (among which Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Haiti), 2) the large 201 million US$ funding to UNICEF-EERPCT programme, whit UNICEF deciding on when, where and how to invest and 3) the majority of humanitarian aid invested through Common Humanitarian Funds.

- **Combining short term emergency relief and longer term capacity building**: this combined approach is for instance visible in the cases of Haiti (see Box 2), and in Afghanistan (see Table 4) and Sudan (Table 5).

- **Internationally aligned and harmonised approach vs internally fragmented initiatives**: although the Dutch work toward an aligned and harmonised approach to aid with other donors, there is a lack of internal harmonisation. For instance in Afghanistan, the three different departments within the Dutch based MFA (social development; peace building and stability; and humanitarian) all invest to some extent in education in Afghanistan, yet there is no complete understanding between these departments of each others’ work. Initial attempts to bridge these fragmented aid initiatives have been undertaken. There is a need for further research into how these fragmentations are negotiated at embassy levels.

- **In search for innovative strategies**: the Dutch have shown a major commitment over the last five years to the area of education in conflict affected areas, both in terms of funding and taking a lead in finding new aid mechanisms, for instance through involvement in the revision of the FTI framework and consequently the commitment to the UNICEF-EERPCT programme.

**Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank the staff members of the Dutch MFA, of Save the Children the Netherlands and of UNICEF New York for their generous cooperation and time that made the writing of this report possible. We are also grateful for the helpful comments of the GMR staff during the writing process.
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University of Amsterdam, research group on Education and Development:
http://educationanddevelopment.wordpress.com/
### Appendix 1: Brief overview of Dutch channels of aid to education in conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral channel</th>
<th>Bilateral channel</th>
<th>Civil society/ Private sector channel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNICEF-EEPCT</strong>: 201 million US $ = 166 million Euro: nov 2006-dec 2011(MFA 2010b); 50% allocated to education in emergencies/crisis, 24% to strengthening ‘resilience’ of education systems, 16% preparedness education systems, 10% knowledge on reliable policy-interventions and instruments. Most (75%) of this funding aponted to national level, 15% to regional and 10% to the international level (MFA 2006a). UNICEF makes country selection independently. Strategies aligned with CAPs and JAMs. DSO coordinates programme, DMH and EFV are informed and provide advice (MFA 2006a). <strong>UNICEF</strong> – also receives regular core funding to basic education and gender equality. The total Dutch funding to UNICEF for all themes and including core/non-core funding was 132 million Euros in 2009. <strong>INEE</strong> – (indirectly through UNICEF-EEPCT). September 2007 - July 2010: 1,258,591 US$. <strong>FTI</strong> - 29% Dutch funds, 470 million US$ committed for FTI (2005-2009), of which 430 spend (2009). Aim coming years is approximately 40 million/year. Discussion continue to whether and how the Catalytic fund could open up for FS (FTI 2009). <strong>Embassies with education experts (and programmes) in 15 partner countries</strong>: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Macedonia, Mali, Mozambique, Pakistan, Zuid-Afrika, Suriname, Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen en Zambia, (underlined are also ‘fragile’ or ‘having security problems’). List of Dutch ‘Profile 2 FS’: Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, Democratic Republic Congo, Guatemala, Kosovo, Pakistan, OPT, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Yemen count as ‘plus-countries’ (and Haiti is added for humanitarian aid). NL has phased out support to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Eritrea and Sri Lanka. <strong>Silent Partnerships</strong> - funding of programmes other donors in non-partner countries: e.g. Nicaragua, Rwanda <strong>UNICEF</strong> in some partner countries also receives funding via embassies. <strong>Nuffic/NICHE</strong> – NL Initiative for Capacity development in Higher Education (including vocational training), 150 million (2009-2012); funds also to non-FS countries. <strong>Nuffic/NFP</strong> – NL Fellowship programme, 61 countries, in-service training/institutional development, 27 million, 50 % of bursaries to women and Sub-Saharan candidates.</td>
<td><strong>General Dutch MFS-funding</strong> through Dutch NGOs: 114 NGOs funded, 2.1 billion Euro (2007-2011 from DSO/Civil Society Department budget line). Education and Conflict programmes for instance to: among others STC-NL (N-Uganda, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Burkina Faso) or Oxfam-Novib (OPT, Afghanistan and Somalia – Oxfam 2008). <strong>Millenium Programme</strong> Education and Conflict ‘Schokland’: 200.000 Euro Joint efforts for education in Afghanistan, Colombia, Sudan. Cooperating Dutch NGOs: <em>Save The Children; War Child Nederland; Oxfam-Novib; ICCO &amp; KerkinActie; Woord en Daad; Dark &amp; Light Blind Care</em>. <strong>SII</strong> – Cooperation International Institutes in the South, 4,5 million/year. FS involved: Afghanistan, DRC Congo, Pakistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka. <strong>Knowledge platform</strong> ‘Education in Emergencies’ – platform that shares and develops thematic knowledge, with cooperation from DSO, Dutch NGOs and IS Academie members (see below). <strong>IS Academy on Education and Development with University of Amsterdam</strong> - various research projects relating to the theme of Education and Conflict.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**DSO/OO = development channel**

Main MFA department responsible for education in conflict zones.

**Education in fragile states (FS), (post) conflict areas and emergencies are high priority. No written policy documents.**

**The OEC/DAC principles are leading in working effectively in the complex context of fragile environments.**
**EFV = peace building and stabilisation channel**

Education is mentioned in FS policy, but is not a policy priority. Education is seen as a vital element for reconstruction/peace building. Acknowledgement of the need to bridge gap between humanitarian aid & development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Humanitarian aid to education (OCHA FTS data):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6,9 mln (2% total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,7 mln (0,4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>13,6 mln (2,9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,5 mln (1,1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>not yet specified</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multilateral support given in Sudan and Afghanistan which can include educational programmes.

EFV supports all profile 2 embassies with advice on conflict related issues, the drafting of sector year plans, and generally stimulates conflict sensitivity.

Making education sector plans more conflict sensitive in Yemen and Pakistan.

Combined Civil Military (3D) approach to education (re)building in Afghanistan.

**DMH/HH = humanitarian aid channel**

Education is at present not a policy priority for the humanitarian aid department. No additional humanitarian subsidies are granted to earmarked activities in the field of education. However, need to bridge humanitarian aid to development aid is acknowledged.

STC’s ‘Last in Line, Last in School’ Report urges the Dutch Government to include education in its humanitarian strategy (STC 2007: 32).

Majority of humanitarian aid is multilateral, from which 80% through UN agencies (budget approx. 180 million/year).

Majority funding is non-earmarked. Funding will find its way to educational activities although this cannot be traced in detail.

Non-earmarked general humanitarian funding (on the basis of Consolidated Appeals):
- UNICEF (21 million 2008, 13 million 2009)
- Pooled funding (difficult to trace), e.g. CERFs (Central Emergency Respond Fund), CHF (common humanitarian fund), etc. Allocation to UN CERF (Central Emergency Reconstruction Fund): approx. 40 mln/year.
- ICRC receives (non-earmarked) core funding: 30 mln (2009) and 20 mln (2010). Education is not a priority, but youth education programmes are part of ICRCs work.

Quality of education in emergencies through rewriting the SPHERE handbook, in cooperation with INEE.

**Knowledge-circles:** Knowledge sharing between EFV, civil society organisations (including NGOs and higher education institutes), private organisations and the Ministry of Defence.

**Knowledge network**

Millenium Accord on Peace Security and Development.

Funding of small number of projects through NGOs (e.g. Cordaid in DRC).

All indicated levels of aid in Euros, unless mentioned otherwise. Data obtained through internal and external documents, as well as through interviews. All numbers should be considered more indicative than absolute.