



UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

Agents, assumptions and motivations behind REDD+

Lovera-Bilderbeek, A.S.E.

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Lovera-Bilderbeek, A. S. E. (2017). Agents, assumptions and motivations behind REDD+.

General rights

It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations

If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: <http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact>, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

7. The Agency of Governments in REDD+

7.1 Introduction

Chapters 7 and 8 examine which actors have demonstrated clear agency in the development of the REDD+ regime, and which strategies they have deployed. As described in 2.3, an agent is an authoritative actor that has the capacity to influence policy processes and prescribe behavior (Schroeder, 2010). This chapter analyzes the governments that have demonstrated agency in the REDD+ negotiations, while Chapter 8 focuses on IGOs and other non-State actors. This distinction is justified as governments are the formal, authoritative parties in the UNFCCC negotiations process and can thus be direct agents. Non-State actors are observers to the UNFCCC negotiation process, they have no decision-making power and can only assert indirect agency by influencing government positions.

Using literature review, personal observations of REDD+ negotiations, an analysis of legal and political documents, and interviews with actors this chapter elaborates on the countries that were mentioned by more than one interviewee as an important agent in the REDD+ negotiations: PNG and the CfRN (7.2), Costa Rica (7.3), Norway (7.4), the US (7.5) and Brazil (7.6). It also discusses the agency of some other countries, including Bolivia, which has tried to halt the development of the REDD+ regime (7.7). The conceptual framework that was presented in Chapter 2 will be applied to analyze their legitimacy (as indicated by representativeness and accountability), authority (as indicated by expertise, influence and moral authority), success in pursuing their original objectives and agency in the eyes of other actors (7.8). The chapter ends with an analysis of the main motivations of the lead agents behind the REDD+ regime and the relevance of some of the regime development theories mentioned in Section 2.4.

7.2 Papua New Guinea and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations

The original proposal for what became the REDD+ regime was officially submitted by PNG and Costa Rica on behalf of the CfRN.⁴²³ The combination of PNG and Costa Rica is remarkable from a geopolitical perspective, but the two countries shared a strong financial interest in the inclusion of forest carbon offsets in mandatory carbon markets,⁴²⁴ and links with academic organizations and/or large conservation groups in the US.⁴²⁵

The link between PNG with the US was partly personal. The lead representative of the PNG in the REDD+ negotiations, Kevin Conrad, is a son of US missionaries in PNG,⁴²⁶ who graduated from Columbia Business School in New York.⁴²⁷ He often told the

⁴²³ FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1,

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf> (last visited 23 December 2016)

⁴²⁴ Interview 9, March 2012; interview 40, December 2012; Interview 44, June 2013.

⁴²⁵ Interview 7, December 2011; interview 11, March 2012; interview 44, June 2013.

⁴²⁶ <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/23/REDD+-plus-at-the-crossroads-in-papua-new-guinea/> (last visited 14 February 2015). See also http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1841778_1841779_1841795,00.htm (last visited 12 February 2015) and

anecdote that Prime Minister Somare of PNG, an old friend of his parents,⁴²⁸ had complained to him that it would cost the country USD 77 million to comply with World Bank conditionalities to a PNG forest sector loan⁴²⁹ that forced them to combat illegal logging and corruption in the forestry sector.⁴³⁰ Conrad subsequently convinced Somare⁴³¹ that he could claim financial compensation for reducing deforestation if forest conservation would be included in the follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol, so that it could be financed through carbon markets (Den Besten et al., 2014).⁴³² Conrad himself had elaborated this idea, which had already been explored by other scholars (see 5.2) in his Master's Thesis at Columbia Business School⁴³³ under the guidance of Professor Geoffrey

http://news.columbia.edu/files_columbianews/imce_shared/vol3307.pdf (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴²⁷ See also <http://www.REDD+-monitor.org/2010/01/11/forests-carbon-markets-and-hot-air-why-the-carbon-stored-in-forests-should-not-be-traded/> (last visited 6 February 2015).

⁴²⁸ See also <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/07/23/REDD+-plus-at-the-crossroads-in-papua-new-guinea/> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴²⁹ He was most likely referring to the Papua New Guinea: Governance Promotion Adjustment Loan (Loan No. 7021-PNG) and the subsequent Papua New Guinea Forestry and Conservation Project, which was implemented from 2002 until 2008. The objectives of the original loan, which were made conditional to the subsequent project, were, inter alia, to improve forest governance (see <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/020430PNGFINAL.pdf> (last visited 7 August 2016)). Such conditions would normally be seen by government officials as beneficial to PNG as a country, so it is remarkable that Somare himself mainly saw them as a financial loss. It should be noted that the PNG forest sector has historically faced serious governance issues. Seymour and Dubash described in 2000 how the PNG forest sector is plagued by corruption and fraud and that "...the rot uncovered in PNG's forest sector spread right to the top". (Seymour and Dubash, 2000, p. 34.) These governance problems had their consequences for forest carbon offset projects. As Melick (2010, p. 359-360) states, "in PNG we have seen the attempted development of unregulated carbon deals and preemptive trading... The rapid spread of these projects in PNG seemed connected to the lack of clear national policy or guidelines to identify the legal status of carbon ownership or the relevant roles of government agencies.... In PNG all the REDD+ focus was on money rather than on forest management. Carbon dealers implied fast money from carbon sales would flow to villagers as middle men raced to secure carbon rights from forest communities, and this gold-rush mentality was encouraged by the PNG government, which forecast ludicrous incomes from carbon trading (up to USD200 billion).... Within weeks of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's recognition of REDD+ in 2007 (even though REDD+ was little more than a concept), there were reports of villagers paying for valueless carbon certificates, and numerous carbon traders and project developers were attempting to buy carbon rights from isolated communities."

⁴³⁰ Interview 44, June 2013.

⁴³¹ It is worth noting that the involvement of foreign consultants in PNG's forest sector goes back to the 1990s (Seymour and Dubash, 2000). Its REDD+ plan and climate change and adaptation plans, for example, were developed by the international consultancy firm McKinsey for USD 2.2 million, a fee that was seriously questioned in the social media. See also <https://pngexposed.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/png-proposal.pdf> (last visited 15 February 2015) and <https://pngexposed.wordpress.com/2010/09/27/mckinseys-paid-us2-2-for-4-months-work-on-REDD+/> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴³² Interview 40, December 2012, interview 44, June 2013.

⁴³³ <http://medioambientesur.blogspot.com/2011/09/reducing-emissions-from-deforestation.html> (last visited 6 February 2015).

Heal. Then, Somare launched the idea for a scheme to compensate reduced deforestation at the 2005 World Leaders Forum at Columbia University.⁴³⁴

The idea was warmly embraced by other academics at Columbia University, including Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz (Den Besten et al., 2014)⁴³⁵, and especially Stiglitz was mentioned by some interviewees as a key agent behind REDD+.⁴³⁶ Moreover, one of the “cofounders” of the Coalition was Geoffrey Heal, Professor of Social Enterprise at the Columbia Business School.⁴³⁷ Yet, the suggestion, or, in the eyes of some, the “myth”⁴³⁸ that the CfRN was a developing country-driven coalition, was quite important for the negotiation dynamics, as it triggered more support for the proposal by countries like Brazil (Angelsen, 2008b).⁴³⁹ Brazil, China, Indonesia and India occasionally attended the meetings of the Coalition, even though they never became a formal member.⁴⁴⁰

None of the people who originally developed the REDD+ concept had significant prior expertise with forest conservation.⁴⁴¹ Conrad himself had been involved in various business enterprises, including tuna trade,⁴⁴² and Geoffrey Heal had, inter alia, served as the director of Petromin Holdings PNG Ltd., the national oil, gas and mining company of PNG.⁴⁴³ He also had strong links with North American NGOs, having been a Member of the Board and Director of the Union of Concerned Scientists.⁴⁴⁴ What Stiglitz, Sachs, Conrad and Heal had in common was that they were trained in economics or business administration rather than ecology. As described in 7.4, some of the key Norwegian actors

⁴³⁴ http://grocc.ei.columbia.edu/sitefiles/File/spring2005/07_Day_2_Somare.pdf (last visited 6 February 2015). See also

<http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/newsletter/2005/february05.pdf> last visited 15 February 2014 and <http://medioambientesur.blogspot.com/2011/09/reducing-emissions-from-deforestation.html> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴³⁵ https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/cfusion/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2007_OurPlanet.pdf (last visited 7 February 2015).

http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1841778_1841779_1841795,0_0.htm (last visited 14 February 2015) and

<http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/documents/HeroesofEnvironment--TimeMagazine.pdf> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴³⁶ Interview 23, September 2012.

⁴³⁷ <http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/ideas-at-work/publication/693> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴³⁸ <http://medioambientesur.blogspot.com/2011/09/reducing-emissions-from-deforestation.html> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴³⁹ See also interview 47, June 2013.

⁴⁴⁰ Interview 26, September 2012; interview 47, June 2013.

⁴⁴¹ Interview 7, December 2011; interview 33, December 2012. See also <http://medioambientesur.blogspot.com/2011/09/reducing-emissions-from-deforestation.html> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴⁴² Gov. resp. no 7. See also <https://www.linkedin.com/pub/kevin-conrad/1/970/b88> (last visited 28 May 2015).

⁴⁴³ Interview 7, December 2011. See also

<https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3830/Heal%20DVITA%20Jan%5F2015%2Epdf> (last visited April 2015). Some interviewees mentioned that Conrad and Heal met when they were “involved in an oil exploration deal in PNG”. They also suggested that Heal initially funded the establishment of the Coalition. Interview 7, December 2011; interview 51, June 2013.

⁴⁴⁴ <https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3830/Heal%20DVITA%20Jan%5F2015%2Epdf> (last visited April 2015).

that promoted REDD+ were economists too, which explains the strong economic rationale of the REDD+ proposal.

When Prime Minister Michael Somare resigned in 2011, Kevin Conrad's relationship with the PNG government became complicated. His position of main spokesperson was gradually taken over by other people, including Frederica Bietta, an Italian national who worked as Deputy Director of the CfrN and Director of Finance and Administration of Columbia University.⁴⁴⁵ Conrad himself became a lead negotiator on REDD+ of the Panamanian delegation in 2014, while Eduardo Reyes, a former lead advisor on REDD+ to the Panamanian government, became the spokesperson of PNG.⁴⁴⁶ Panama subsequently took over the position as lead spokesperson for the CfrN, including at the crucial climate negotiations in December 2015 in Paris. This shows the individual agency of Conrad.

A unique aspect of the Coalition was that its secretariat was based in New York and not in a developing country (Den Besten et al., 2014).⁴⁴⁷ As Geoffrey Heal himself described it: "The coalition is administered, and its strategy developed, at Columbia Business School"⁴⁴⁸ until 2011, although the PNG government also provided some initial financial support.⁴⁴⁹ Most of its staff members are citizens from industrialized countries.⁴⁵⁰ The Secretariat's location in New York allowed it to have strong contacts with the Permanent Missions to the UN of various countries, including Costa Rica and the countries of the Congo Basin, and some prominent individuals with close links to the UN system (Den Besten et al., 2014).⁴⁵¹ The CfrN also received financial support from industrialized country donors, including the EU through the Columbia Business School⁴⁵² and the government of Germany.⁴⁵³ It also received USD 3.58 million for the period 2009 – 2012 from the Norwegian International Climate Initiative, as part of a support scheme for CSOs.⁴⁵⁴ This was not the only time that the Coalition was classified as a CSO as it received a grant of USD 870,000 in 2011 from the CSO scheme of the Climate and Land Use Alliance.⁴⁵⁵ Yet, on its 2015 website, the Coalition calls itself an "Intergovernmental

⁴⁴⁵ Interview 44, June 2013. See also: <https://pngexposed.wordpress.com/2010/10/09/who-is-federica-bietta-pngs-international-climate-rep-that-is-who/> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴⁴⁶ Interview 61, January 2015.

⁴⁴⁷ Interview 5, December 2011; interview 25, September 2012.

⁴⁴⁸ See <http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/ideas-at-work/publication/693> (last visited 15 February 2015).

⁴⁴⁹ It originally was funded through the Eugene Lang Center for Entrepreneurship of the Columbia Business School and hosted at The Earth Institute. See <http://medioambientesur.blogspot.com/2011/09/reducing-emissions-from-deforestation.html> (last visited 15 February 2015). Interview 26, September 2012; interview 44, June 2013.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview 44, June 2013.

⁴⁵¹ Interview 44, June 2013.

⁴⁵² <http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/ideas-at-work/publication/693> (last visited 15 February 2014).

⁴⁵³ See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁴⁵⁴ See http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/3.-sivsa-2012---/cfi/norad_cfi-grant-recipients-2009_2012.pdf (last visited 18 June 2015) and <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁴⁵⁵ See http://www.climateandlandusealliance.org/uploads/PDFs/Global%20Initiative%20Grants%20List_Q4%202014.pdf (last visited 14 February 2015).

Organization”⁴⁵⁶ and during the negotiations participated as a country coalition that often intervened before any other country had a say in the REDD+ negotiations.⁴⁵⁷

The industrialized country roots of the CfrN caused several interviewees to question the legitimacy of the Coalition, and of Conrad as spokesperson for PNG and the Coalition.⁴⁵⁸ In fact, some interviewees felt that REDD+ had been imposed on developing countries and that it was disrespectful about broader societal needs in those countries.⁴⁵⁹

While some have called the Coalition a “cohesive voice” in the negotiations (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013: 1315) the actual membership of the CfrN was far from stable, and often not clear (Okereke and Dooley, 2010).⁴⁶⁰ Several developing country delegates complained that they were listed as a member of the CfrN on the Coalition’s website⁴⁶¹ while they were not a formal member. In fact, some developing countries deliberately refrained from membership out of irritation over this practice.⁴⁶² Between 2005 and 2012, the number of countries supporting CfrN statements varied between 7 and 28,⁴⁶³ and only PNG itself, Costa Rica and the Central African Republic have supported all CfrN statements during that period (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). Or as Okereke and Dooley (2010: 88) describe it:

“The CfrN, which purport to represent the views of vulnerable forest nations, is largely directed by a small secretariat based in New York. Recent tension between some of the member governments indicates that rather than being a coalition of the consensus views of many nations, the dominant voice in the debate has evolved out of a handful of member States which may have vested interests in promoting a particular outcome. This was demonstrated at recent UN climate talks when PNG took the floor on behalf of the Coalition and affirmed that it spoke on behalf of the countries listed on its submission (including Bolivia) even though Bolivia had tendered views which differed significantly. The situation demonstrates the

⁴⁵⁶ <http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/AboutTheCoalition.aspx> (last visited April 2015).

⁴⁵⁷ Personal observation.

⁴⁵⁸ Interview 5, December 2011; interview 23, September 2012; interview 25, September 2012; interview 49, June 2013.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview 37, December 2012.

⁴⁶⁰ Interview 26, September 2012.

⁴⁶¹ <http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/AboutTheCoalition.aspx>. First visited April 2012, last visited April 2015. Please note that between the first and last visit the relevant text on the website changed from “Members of the Coalition” to “Participating Countries in the activities of the Rainforest Coalition”.

⁴⁶² Interview 31, December 2012, and personal conversation with Paraguayan Minister of Environment Oscar Rivas, April 2011. By then Paraguay was one of the countries still listed on the website while they never supported one of the CfrN interventions (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013).

⁴⁶³ It is noteworthy that in his description of the Coalition Joseph Stiglitz talks about “over 40 countries”, while the maximum number of supporters of any CfrN statement was 30, even though the statements often refer to “the 52 countries” of the CfrN without clarifying their names. See for example

https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp2_5_Statement_by_papua_new_guinea_on_behalf_of_coalition_for_rainforest_nations_20140604.pdf (last visited 15 July 2016) and Allan and Dauvergne, 2013. Remarkably, the statement they made in May 2016 does not list the countries supporting the statement anymore, it just mentions Panama speaks on behalf of the “52 countries of the CfrN”, see http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/53_239_13108034937775_6376-CfrN%20SBSTA44%20opening%20Statement.pdf (last visited 15 July 2016).

dominant role held by PNG, and the extent to which many members of similar coalitions may be unable to project their candid views on important subject matters.”

One reason why countries participated in the Coalition’s activities and subscribed to the Coalition’s statements was that they had little capacity to follow the REDD+ debate themselves (Fry, 2011; Allan and Dauvergne, 2013), not least because of language deficiency and a lack of travel funds. Table 7.1 shows that many ‘members’ of the CfrN are relatively small and often French- or Spanish-speaking countries. The Coalition provided them with ideas, information and visibility and some travel support (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013) although it has been pointed out that they sometimes seemed to blindly follow PNG’s position.⁴⁶⁴ The CfrN caused a division within the G77 (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). The more powerful developing countries like Brazil, China and India chose their own path in the REDD+ negotiations, while the smaller countries gathered around PNG in the CfrN (Kasa et al., 2007; Allan and Dauvergne, 2013), which weakened the position of the South in general in these negotiations.

In summary, while the lead spokespersons of PNG were credited with a certain level of authority in light of their in-depth knowledge of the UNFCCC negotiation process and the rather complicated portfolio of land-use and forest policies under the climate regime, their legitimacy was questioned. No less than twenty-eight interviewees mentioned either PNG or Kevin Conrad personally as a leading REDD+ agent; one person highlighted the role of Frederica Bietta; and an additional twelve interviewees mentioned the CfrN. Five interviewees mentioned the links with Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, Geoffrey Heal or Columbia University.

In terms of the results of their agency, the CfrN succeeded in creating a REDD+ regime that was broadly in line with their original proposal, although little carbon market funding was generated (see 5.4).⁴⁶⁵ However, PNG obtained little to no financial support itself, due to its failure to properly implement REDD+ policies⁴⁶⁶ so the country has not been successful in achieving its objectives.

⁴⁶⁴ Interview 31, December 2012.

⁴⁶⁵ FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cop11/eng/misc01.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

⁴⁶⁶ The development of the REDD+ policy and REDD+ projects in PNG has been chaotic and controversial, and marked by significant institutional changes, little stakeholder engagement and several scandals around the sale of fraudulent carbon credits (Leggett and Lovell, 2012, see also 6.6). According to the data PNG itself submitted to the Voluntary REDD+ partnership Database it received no REDD+ support at all. Donors claim to have provided USD 22.02 million in REDD+ support, see <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/175/by/others> (last visited 28 May 2015). According to the July 2016 overview USD 3.33 million has been disbursed so far. <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

Table 7.1 Membership of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (as indicated by support to joint submissions and interventions to the UNFCCC process)

Year	English-speaking* countries	Spanish-speaking* countries	French-speaking* countries
2005	PNG	Costa Rica, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua	Central African Republic, Congo, DRC
2006	PNG, Solomon Islands	Costa Rica, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua	Central African Republic
2007, May	PNG, Fiji, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu	Costa Rica, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama	Central African Republic, DRC
2007, December	PNG, Belize, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Pakistan, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Ghana, Singapore, Cameroon, Guyana	Costa Rica, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama	Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, Gabon, Sierra Leone
2008	PNG, Belize, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Pakistan, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu	Costa Rica, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama	Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC
2009	PNG, Belize, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Vanuatu, Viet nam	Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama	Central African Republic, Congo, DRC
2011	PNG, Belize, Ghana, Guyana, Solomon Islands, Uganda	Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama	Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Gabon, Togo
2012	Bangladesh, Dominica, Fiji, Guyana, Kenya, Pakistan, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Uganda	Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Panama	Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, DRC, Gabon, Sierra Leone

* Official language or UN language normally used.

Source: Allan and Dauvergne, 2013, UNFCCC website.

7.3 Costa Rica

One strategic move Conrad made was to involve Costa Rica as a key partner in the CfrN. In light of the rather questionable reputation of PNG in the field of forest policy due to its history of flawed forest governance (Seymour and Dubash, 2000, see also 7.2), he decided to involve a country with a solid reputation in forest conservation and a track record of calling for the inclusion of forest conservation in the CDM during the UNFCCC talks.⁴⁶⁷ Costa Rica had gambled and lost as far as international carbon markets were concerned in

⁴⁶⁷ Interview 44, June 2013.

the 1990s: while its deforestation rates had already been declining due to amongst others reduced beef demand,⁴⁶⁸ it had established a nation-wide PES mechanism in 1996 under the expectation that it would be able to finance it primarily through an international forest carbon offset market (Sierra and Russman, 2006). The scheme required an investment of USD 30 million per year, which formed a significant financial burden for such a small country.⁴⁶⁹ As forest conservation was excluded from the CDM and forest-related credits were only temporary, carbon market funding never materialized (Sierra and Russman, 2006).⁴⁷⁰

It is worth noting that there was a close relationship between the Costa Rican government and Conservation International (CI), one of the largest US-based conservation NGOs. At least two key former government officials who played an active role in the REDD+ negotiations ended up working for CI, and one of them was on the payroll of CI while he represented Costa Rica in the crucial negotiations on whether REDD+ should be financed through public funds of carbon markets at UNFCCC COP-17.⁴⁷¹ Some interviewees therefore accused the Costa Rican delegation of promoting a policy regime favored by US actors that was basically not in its own interest as it had already stabilized forest loss.⁴⁷²

Costa Rica's authority was relatively high and based on its reputation as a country that had succeeded to reverse its deforestation. Its legitimacy was not disputed, although one might question the links of some of its representatives with US NGOs. Fourteen interviewees identified Costa Rica or its former Minister of Environment Carlos Manuel Rodriguez as a key agent behind the REDD+ regime. Similar to PNG, Costa Rica was successful in terms of establishing the REDD+ regime, but not in its efforts to obtain sufficient financial support for its national PES mechanism through international carbon offset markets.⁴⁷³

7.4 Norway

Norway was also mentioned by 14 interviewees as a lead governmental agent in REDD+. Norway is by far the main donor to REDD+,⁴⁷⁴ and its announcement to provide almost USD 3 billion for REDD+ actions at the moment governmental negotiations on REDD+

⁴⁶⁸ Interview 9, March 2012.

⁴⁶⁹ Interview 11, March 2012.

⁴⁷⁰ Interview 11, March 2012.

⁴⁷¹ Interview 40, December 2012.

⁴⁷² Interview 62, May 2015.

⁴⁷³ Remarkably, Costa Rica reported to the Voluntary REDD+ Database to have received USD 59.45 million as incoming funding until 2015, while donor countries themselves reported a contribution of USD 12.1 million to REDD+ in Costa Rica only. <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/50/by/others> (last visited 28 May 2015). The overview in 2016 reported a total of USD 51.57 million in contributions received. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁴⁷⁴ Until May 2015 it has contributed a little over USD 1.9 billion to REDD+, according to its own data. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/166/by/self> (last visited 28 May 2015). However, in the 2016 Voluntary Database it reported to have committed more than USD 4.3 billion to REDD+ arrangements of which it had disbursed more than USD 4.1 billion. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

were about to start in 2007 was instrumental in making this results-based payment scheme a reality (Johns et al., 2008).⁴⁷⁵

Two Norwegian NGOs, the Rainforest Foundation-Norway⁴⁷⁶ and Friends of the Earth-Norway⁴⁷⁷ played an important role as the proponents of the scheme (Angelsen, 2008b).⁴⁷⁸ In August 2007 they sent an open letter asking for a generous financial contribution from the Norwegian government to policies to conserve tropical forests under the UNFCCC.⁴⁷⁹ The NGOs were relatively new to the climate negotiations at that time, and it had actually not been their intention to promote market-based financial support for such a forest conservation scheme. In fact, they would have explicitly opposed this policy option if they had been aware of the risk that their proposal would be used to promote forest carbon offset markets.⁴⁸⁰

Their proposal received a broad-based welcome from the Norwegian government,⁴⁸¹ which had just decided to increase its development support. Climate change was a popular topic, also because the IPCC had just received the Nobel Peace Prize.⁴⁸² The fact that the 2007 UNFCCC COP took place in Indonesia triggered attention toward the high deforestation rates in that country.⁴⁸³ Practically all major political parties in Norway supported the REDD+ scheme, even though there was discussion about the best way to implement it.⁴⁸⁴ For a country with a rich history in international environmental policy⁴⁸⁵ (Rosendal, 2007) that was highly dependent on fossil fuel exploration for its economy and social protection schemes, generously supporting tropical forest conservation was an attractive manner in which to show leadership in the international climate regime.⁴⁸⁶

⁴⁷⁵ Interview 21, September 2012, interview 22, September 2012.

⁴⁷⁶ Rainforest Foundation Norway is a Norwegian NGO with an annual budget of a little over USD 16 million, most of which is dedicated to small grants in tropical rainforest countries. See <http://www.regnskog.no/en/publications/annual-reports> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁴⁷⁷ Norges Naturvernforbundet/Friends of the Earth-Norway is the oldest nature conservation organization in Norway. It was founded in 1914, has about 20,000 members and an annual budget of slightly over USD 2.4 million. See <http://naturvernforbundet.no/getfile.php/Dokumenter/Organisasjon%20-%20Årsmeldinger%2C%20styrende%20dokumenter%20etc/Årsmelding%202015.pdf> (last visited 21 July 2016). The two groups are closely connected. Rainforest Foundation Norway was originally founded by Friends of the Earth-Norway. It was a relatively small group until 2005, when it successfully lobbied the new Social Democrat government to invest significant financial support in tropical rainforest conservation as part of the climate regime. Ten years later the organization has grown about 10 times in size and budget, although it should be emphasized that, according to its annual reports, around 88% of funds received are re-granted. Interview 23, September 2012. See also <http://d5i6is0eze552.cloudfront.net/documents/Publikasjoner/Aarsmeldinger/Annual-Report-2013.pdf?mtime=20150905162504> (last visited 21 July 2016).

⁴⁷⁸ Interview 23, September 2012.

⁴⁷⁹ Interview 23, September 2012.

⁴⁸⁰ Interview 23, September 2012.

⁴⁸¹ Interview 54, November 2013.

⁴⁸² Interview 23, September 2012.

⁴⁸³ Interview 23, September 2012.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview 54, November 2013.

⁴⁸⁵ For example, the World Commission on Sustainable Development that developed the Our Common Future report that formed the basis for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development was led by former Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

⁴⁸⁶ Interview 22, September 2012; interview 45, June 2013; interview 52, June 2013; interview 54, November 2013.

Forests were seen as a “cuddly” theme.⁴⁸⁷ While Norway originally denied supporting REDD+ to offset its own emissions (Sun Park et al., 2013), this option was definitely attractive in the light of the Norwegian commitment to reduce emissions with 30%, of which no less than 10% was to be achieved through offsets.⁴⁸⁸ In its first reaction to the REDD+ proposal by PNG and Costa Rica in 2006, Norway opposed the option of including avoided deforestation in the CDM,⁴⁸⁹ but in its March 2012 submission on financing REDD+ Norway supported carbon offset markets as a potential source of REDD+ support.⁴⁹⁰ It became a strong supporter of the so-called phased approach of funding the establishment of carbon offset markets through public support, which had been elaborated in a Norwegian-financed report by the Meridian Institute (Angelsen et al., 2009; Den Besten et al., 2014). Norway even moved its goal of achieving “net zero” emissions forward from 2050 to 2030 in 2016, supposedly in reaction to the Paris Agreement’s suggestion that emissions could be compensated for by offsets.⁴⁹¹

Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (2000-2001 and 2005-2013), himself an economist, had strong personal agency in the establishment of the REDD+ financing scheme.⁴⁹² Similar to his colleagues representing PNG, he had limited experience in forest conservation policy and perhaps a rather simplistic view on it. At a New Year’s speech in January 2008 he presented the initiative with the statement that “...the technique of protecting a forest is simply not to take the saw”.⁴⁹³ Other countries, like forest-rich neighboring Sweden, did not believe REDD+ was going to be that quick, easy and scalable,⁴⁹⁴ According to some interviewees, Swedish forest experts felt that it was “a naïve assumption that throwing a lot of money to the South would suddenly halt deforestation”,⁴⁹⁵ and that “...it is the tail wagging the dog.”⁴⁹⁶

The key to the success of Norway’s agency in the REDD+ regime was that it distributed a relatively small amount of funding over a large number of influential actors in the REDD+ debate.⁴⁹⁷ As described, the CfRN itself received generous financial support from the Norwegian government, as did CIFOR, which is one of the most influential forest research organizations.⁴⁹⁸ Norway is by far the largest donor to the UN REDD+ Programme⁴⁹⁹ and a key donor to the FCPF. Through these two funds and bilateral support, no less than 54 countries have been or will be financially supported for REDD+

⁴⁸⁷ Interview 22, September 2012.

⁴⁸⁸ Interview 39, December 2012, see also <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/climate/innsiktsartikler-klima/agreement-on-climate-policy/id2076645/> (last visited 29 June 2015).

⁴⁸⁹ FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, see <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/misc05.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

⁴⁹⁰ FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.3, see <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/awglca15/eng/misc03.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

⁴⁹¹ See also <http://www.geoengineeringmonitor.org/2016/06/norway-shows-how-net-zero-rhetoric-is-utterly-meaningless/> last visited 14 June 2016).

⁴⁹² Interview 54, November 2013.

⁴⁹³ Interview 54, November 2013.

⁴⁹⁴ Interview 39, December 2012.

⁴⁹⁵ Interview 33, December 2012.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview 39, December 2012.

⁴⁹⁷ Interview 59, January 2014.

⁴⁹⁸ Interview 39, December 2012.

⁴⁹⁹ Until May 2015, Norway had provided USD 222.6 million to the USD 256.2 million budget of UN-REDD. <http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/CCF00> (last visited 28 May 2015).

Readiness, triggering broad-based political support for REDD+. ⁵⁰⁰ Norway also contributes generously to multi-donor REDD+ initiatives like the Central African Forest Initiative, a multi-donor initiative to “recognize and preserve” the value of forests in six Central African countries. Despite the involvement of five different donors and two IGOs, Norway has so far contributed the overwhelming majority of the funding for this initiative. ⁵⁰¹ Norway also gave generous financial support to CSOs like WWF, the influential Indigenous Tebtebba Foundation (see Section 8.9), and the Rainforest Foundation-Norway, which subsequently funded the participation of developing country members of the Accra Caucus on forests and climate change, an influential NGO coalition in the UNFCCC process (see Section 8.3).

Partly as a result of the strong pressure of Norwegian NGOs, Norway has always emphasized the social aspects of REDD+, and it has been a strong supporter of the development of REDD+ safeguards and subsequent safeguard information systems (Okereke and Dooley, 2010). Norway has tried to use its economic influence to convince REDD+ recipient countries to implement governance reforms and adhere to the safeguards (Okereke and Dooley, 2010), although it has not always been successful. ⁵⁰²

In summary, the legitimacy of Norway as an agent in the REDD+ debate is not disputed, although there has been critique on the role of Norway as a REDD+ funder. ⁵⁰³ Its authority is partly based on a long history of “intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership” (Rosendal, 2007: 440) in international environmental governance issues. It was identified as a REDD+ agent by 14 interviewees, and it has been successful in the establishment of the REDD+ mechanism.

7.5 The US

The US Government was remarkably cautious in its first official reaction to the REDD+ proposal, recommending a continuation of sharing of information only. ⁵⁰⁴ However, four

⁵⁰⁰ In total, Norway reportedly had contributed USD 1.927 million to REDD+ by 2014, of which more than a third was contributed to Brazil alone (USD 762 million <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/166> (last visited 27 May 2015). Recipient countries report slightly lower amounts, USD 1857.38 million, of which USD 758.6 million to Brazil. The July 2016 database demonstrates that USD 1 billion had been received by the Brazilian government for, especially, the Amazon Fund, USD 55.17 million has been disbursed to Tanzania so far, Indonesia had received less than USD 80 million and Guyana which has actually hardly suffered from deforestation until 2015, had received USD 163 million. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016). It should be noted that the total amount actually disbursed is significantly lower than the USD 2.8 billion for the period between 2008 and 2013 that the Norwegian government originally committed in 2007 (Angelsen, 2008b).

⁵⁰¹ See <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/climate/climate-and-forest-initiative/kos-innsikt/congo-basin-fund/id734156/#cafi> and <http://www.cafi.org> (last visited 26 December 2016).

⁵⁰² See for example <http://www.REDD+-monitor.org/2013/03/14/its-a-mystery-why-we-chose-guyana-norwegian-government-official/> (last visited 17 July 2016).

⁵⁰³ See for example <http://www.redd-monitor.org/?s=norway&submit=Search> (last visited 24 December 2016).

⁵⁰⁴ FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, see <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/misc05.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

interviewees mentioned the US as an agent behind REDD+.⁵⁰⁵ According to some actors, the US was always interested in REDD+⁵⁰⁶ as a strategy to divert the attention away from fossil fuel consumption. The concept of carbon offset markets itself was originally introduced in the climate regime by the US Government and US NGOs during the negotiations that led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Wettestad, 2009; see 3.2) and the US became a more active supporter of the REDD+ regime after the adoption of the Global Climate Change Initiative by the Obama administration in 2010 (Sun Park et al., 2013). According to the Voluntary REDD+ Database it is currently the 3rd largest REDD+ donor.⁵⁰⁷ It has been an active supporter of the REDD+ programs of the World Bank, UN-REDD and the GEF (Sun Park et al., 2013). The US Government has a tradition of frequent dialogue with its non-State actors, including REDD+ agents like Columbia University and US Conservation NGOs (see 8.3).⁵⁰⁸ US policymaking is also heavily lobbied by industry and NGOs that are involved in the voluntary forest carbon offset markets and these groups would have benefitted significantly from a successful global mandatory offset market (Andresen 2007).⁵⁰⁹ Through their access to financial resources and the media, these groups have a disproportional influence on US policymaking (Lahsen, 2005).⁵¹⁰ A representative of the lobbying firm Covington and Burling that represented a coalition of corporations and environmental groups advocating market-based finance for forest conservation even served as a chief negotiator for the US to the Kyoto COP in 1997.⁵¹¹

Industrialized countries in general were mentioned by six interviewees as the main agent behind REDD+, with countries like Germany, Japan and Australia contributing significant financial and overall support to REDD+ (Johns et al., 2008; Sun Park et al., 2013), but the US was seen as their intellectual leader,⁵¹² due to its hegemonic role in global policymaking (Andresen 2007) and the science-policy interface. For example, 13 of the 30 contributing authors to the influential 2014 report of the IPCC on Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use were from the US (IPCC, 2014). The US also has a strong influence in the World Bank (see 8.4) and the World Bank staff that promoted REDD+ included several former US government officials (see 8.4).⁵¹³

Some interviewees suggested that the US lobbied Norway to invest significant funds into the REDD+ scheme as the US administration itself did not succeed to obtain a

⁵⁰⁵ Interview 33, December 2012; interview 56, December 2013; interview 57, December 2013; interview 62, May 2015.

⁵⁰⁶ Interview 26, September 2012.

⁵⁰⁷ According to its own data, the US contributed in total USD 553.37 million to REDD+ until 2014 (USD 432.59 million according to recipient countries). See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/230> (last visited 27 May 2015). In the 2016 database it is reported it has committed more than USD 1 billion to REDD+, but that only USD 49.9 million of that has actually been disbursed. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁰⁸ Interview 62, May 2015.

⁵⁰⁹ Interview 16, June 2012.

⁵¹⁰ Interview 16, June 2012.

⁵¹¹ See <http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080305/full/452008a.html> (last visited 7 August 2016).

⁵¹² Interview 56, December 2013; interview 57, December 2012; interview 62, May 2015.

⁵¹³ Interview 57, December 2013.

go-ahead for sufficient funding from its legislators.⁵¹⁴ The US administration also failed to obtain legislative support for the creation of an internal cap and trade system, which would have benefitted significantly from cheap forest carbon offsets.⁵¹⁵ The collaboration between the US and Norway in the field of REDD+ and climate and forest policies intensified after the Paris Summit, and in June 2016 they announced that they would “continue and enhance” their existing cooperation, including by creating a carbon offset opportunity for the aviation industry that would generate support for REDD+, in line with a proposal that had been discussed with members of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Paris in December 2015.⁵¹⁶

In summary, the legitimacy of the US was not questioned by the interviewees, but its authority was not entirely undisputed in so far that some questioned their underlying motivations in the REDD+ debate. While only four interviewees and some scholars mentioned the US as a REDD+ agent, they made quite a strong case concerning the role of the US Government as a behind-the-scene agent that influenced several of the more visible governmental and non-governmental agents (see 8.3). If the main objective of the US was to establish an international forest carbon offset market, it has not been successful, but as an agent behind the REDD+ regime itself it can be seen as having been quite successful.

7.6 Brazil

Brazil is the country with the largest tropical forest estate on the planet, which gives it a strong position in forest-related negotiations (Humphreys, 2008, Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). Remarkably, while they have played an active role in other forest policies (see Chapter 3), and in climate change policy in general (Aubertin, 2015) and while reducing deforestation forms a cornerstone of its 2008 National Plan on Climate Change⁵¹⁷ (Von der Goltz, 2009), Brazil initially did not seem to have a strong position in favour of REDD+.⁵¹⁸ As described in Section 3.2. Brazil actively opposed the inclusion of forest conservation offsets in the CDM and some have suggested that it originally established the Fondo Amazonia as an alternative to REDD+ rather than a fund to receive REDD+ payments (Aubertin, 2015), even though others call it a central element in the National REDD+ Strategy (Van der Hoff et al., 2015). However, Brazil presented two REDD+ like proposals to the UNFCCC negotiations at the expert meetings in Rome in September 2006 and Cairns in 2007 (Alvarado and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007, Humphreys, 2008) and Brazilian researchers, in collaboration with US researchers were influential in developing some of the

⁵¹⁴ Interview 62, May 2015. Because the Obama administration, despite being convinced of the need to mitigate climate change itself, could not obtain support from the US Congress for a significant financial contribution to climate mitigation actions, most REDD+ funding had to be obtained from existing forest programmes (see also 5.4), which created REDD+ skepticism amongst some US officials who were frustrated about the resulting budget cuts in existing international forest support programmes. Interview 16, December 2012.

⁵¹⁵ Interview 16, December 2012.

⁵¹⁶ <http://www.State.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/06/258502.htm> (last visited 20 June 2016).

⁵¹⁷ Government of Brazil, Interministerial Committee on Climate Change, Decree No. 6263 of November 21, 2007, National Plan on Climate Change, Brasilia, December 2008. See http://www.mma.gov.br/estruturas/208/_arquivos/national_plan_208.pdf (last visited 29 June 2015).

⁵¹⁸ Interview 11, March 2012.

original REDD+ proposals (Van der Hoff et al., 2015).⁵¹⁹ However, it has been suggested that “this small collection of REDD+ stakeholders entails a mixture of corporate organizations, State-level governments and some NGOs that often do not act as a coherent group but nevertheless engage in similar practices” and that formed a “disconnected” group of stakeholders with little influence on the federal government (Van der Hoff et al., 2015: 35).

Once REDD+ was launched and fully embedded in the long-term cooperation track under the UNFCCC rather than the Kyoto Protocol track (see 3.3), Brazil saw REDD+ as a good opportunity to obtain public financial support for forest conservation and sustainable development in general (Okereke and Dooley, 2010; Van der Hoff et al., 2015),⁵²⁰ although it strongly opposed any discussions about the drivers of forest loss.⁵²¹ One interviewee suggested that the Brazilian support for the REDD+ proposal was part of a comprehensive diplomatic agreement between Norway and Brazil that included financial and technological support by the Norwegian State Oil company, Statoil, for the exploitation of newly found fossil fuels reserves off the Brazilian coast.⁵²²

Brazil persistently, and successfully, opposed the inclusion of avoided deforestation in the CDM or the inclusion of REDD+ in new market mechanisms, partly because it preferred a national policy approach over a project-based approach (Von der Goltz, 2009). It has also, together with China, persistently fostered the position that the first priority of the international climate regime should be to trigger emission reductions in industrialized countries (Karsenty, 2008; Von der Goltz, 2009). Brazil’s opposition against the inclusion of REDD+ in carbon markets stood in the way of its potential membership of the Cfrn, even though it had some sympathy for what they considered a developing country coalition (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013).⁵²³ However, Brazil feared that carbon offset projects would form a legal barrier to potential infrastructure projects or other national political interests (Van der Hoff et al., 2015)⁵²⁴ and considered itself too large for a project-based approach, as it would have needed millions of projects to conserve all its forests. It also feared that a market-based mechanism would not favor community-based conservation, which had become increasingly popular in Brazil.⁵²⁵ Meanwhile, as one of the main forest countries, the federal Government rightfully expected to be one of the main beneficiaries if REDD+ was supported through public funding streams (Humphreys, 2008). It has indeed become the main beneficiary, having received at least USD 862.33 million in REDD+ support.⁵²⁶

⁵¹⁹ Amongst the authors of the editorial essay by Santilli et al. (2005), which was seen by several people as the “origin” of REDD+, there were two Brazilian authors - Paulo Moutinho from the Instituto de Pesquisa Ambiental da Amazonia (the Institute for Environmental Research in the Amazon) and Carlos Nobre of the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (the National Institute for Space Research) - who were clearly in favor of a market-based approach for financing forest conservation (see also Nepstad et al., 2007). Interview 39, December 2012.

⁵²⁰ Interview 47, June 2013; interview 57, December 2013.

⁵²¹ Interview 47, June 2013; interview 58, January 2014.

⁵²² Interview 63, June 2015.

⁵²³ Interview 47, June 2013.

⁵²⁴ Interview 40, December 2012; interview 47, June 2013.

⁵²⁵ Interview 47, June 2013.

⁵²⁶ See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/31/by/self> last visited 27 May 2015. Please note that donor countries report a total contribution of USD 1144.36 million. By 2016 it reportedly had received more than USD 2.1 billion in REDD+ support. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

In summary, no one disputed the legitimacy of Brazil in the REDD+ debate. As one of the countries with the largest forest cover in the world and an active role in the overall climate negotiations, it is seen as a country with significant authority in this field (Humphrey, 2008). Allan and Dauvergne (2013: 1318) lauds Brazil for its consistency in its positions and points out that “Brazil has the ability to make or break negotiations for an international REDD+ mechanism”. However, only two interviewees mentioned Brazil as a key agent behind REDD+,⁵²⁷ even though Brazilian research organizations played a role in developing the idea. The final outcomes of the REDD+ negotiations are similar to the original proposals of Brazil,⁵²⁸ so from that perspective its agency has been highly successful. Brazil is also one of the countries that has profited most from the REDD+ mechanism so far.

7.7 Other Countries and Individuals

Several other tropical rainforest countries as well as the EU⁵²⁹ were mentioned once or twice by interviewees as agents in the REDD+ negotiations. The rainforest countries include the Congo Basin countries,⁵³⁰ Bolivia,⁵³¹ Indonesia,⁵³² Peru,⁵³³ Colombia,⁵³⁴ Mexico⁵³⁵ and Australia.⁵³⁶

DRC and a few other Central African countries were quite faithful and active members of the CfRN (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). Their first official submission on REDD+ in 2006 demonstrated strong support for the REDD+ proposal by PNG, and for the inclusion of REDD+ in international carbon offset markets.⁵³⁷ The Central African countries successfully advocated for the second “D” of REDD+. Together with India they pushed successfully for the inclusion of forest Degradation in the scheme (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007; Cerbu et al., 2011). This was fully in line with their interests as forest degradation by, especially, logging, occurs more in Central Africa than deforestation (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). There also was enthusiasm for REDD+ itself as a potential funding source of forest policy, or a platform for dialogue about forest policy.⁵³⁸

⁵²⁷ Interview 47, June 2013; interview 56, December 2013.

⁵²⁸ See <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/sbsta/eng/misc14.pdf> (last visited 28 May 2015).

⁵²⁹ Interview 62, May 2015.

⁵³⁰ Interview 11, March 2012; interview 17, June 2012.

⁵³¹ Interview 24, September 2012.

⁵³² Interview 56, December 2013.

⁵³³ Interview 50, June 2013.

⁵³⁴ Interview 62, May 2015.

⁵³⁵ Interview 31, December 2012.

⁵³⁶ Interview 58, January 2014.

⁵³⁷ FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, see

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/misc05.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

⁵³⁸ In fact, Brown (2010) concludes based on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders in DRC, the Central African Republic and Cameroon that there was significant interest in REDD+ as a potential funding source for forest policy, be it that the civil society and Indigenous groups particularly saw it as an opportunity to get more say in their country’s forest policy. While all African countries have subscribed to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, some African Governments continue to deny that there are Indigenous Peoples in their country even though according to the definition of Indigenous Peoples, an ethnic group is able to self-identify itself as Indigenous if it has a clear historical bond with its territory and in most African

The legitimacy of the Central African countries was not disputed. Their authority was occasionally questioned, in so far that it was feared that their positions were driven by financial interests rather than social or environmental motivations.⁵³⁹ Only two interviewees mentioned them as an agent in REDD+⁵⁴⁰ and some interviewees accused them of mainly supporting other people's ideas.⁵⁴¹ They were quite successful in advocating for the inclusion of forest degradation in the REDD+ regime, which was their primary interest.

Remarkably, the EU was only mentioned once as a REDD+ agent⁵⁴² although two interviewees mentioned the French parliament as one of the REDD+ agents.⁵⁴³ The EU is considered an "environmental pusher" (Andresen, 2007: 459) in the overall climate regime and especially the Germany, UK and French Government originally saw REDD+ as "an easy thing to do",⁵⁴⁴ also due to the influence of the Eliasch (2008) and Stern (2008) reports (see 3.2).⁵⁴⁵ The European Commission has supported the idea of compensated forest emission reductions (Levin et al., 2008) although it has opposed including such emission reductions in market-based mechanisms, despite pressure from some member States (Levin et al., 2008; Bozmoski and Hepburn, 2009). Especially the UK, and some influential UK individuals like Prince Charles of Wales, became enthusiastic REDD+ supporters (Humphreys, 2008). Until 2014 the UK had provided USD 785.74 million in financial support to REDD+.⁵⁴⁶ Germany has provided even more funding amounting to USD 1.5 billion, although many of its grants concern bilateral initiatives with a strong biodiversity conservation focus (Sun Park et al., 2013).⁵⁴⁷ The French Government claims to have provided USD 445.45 million to REDD+ until 2014, with the largest contributions made in 2010 and 2011.⁵⁴⁸

One interviewee mentioned Australia as one of the pro-REDD+ agents as it was interested in cheap offsetting opportunities due to its unwillingness to take any meaningful domestic action to reduce its GHG emissions.⁵⁴⁹ Already in 2010 the Australian Government committed almost USD 1 billion to REDD+ (Sun Park et al., 2013).

Japan was mentioned twice as an important agent in advocating the inclusion of LULUCF in the climate regime,⁵⁵⁰ which can be seen as the basis of the REDD+ regime. As described in 3.2, Japan played an active role as one of the main agents behind the inclusion of LULUCF in the Kyoto Protocol. Its main interests were to include the

countries there are such groups. See also <http://www.ipacc.org.za/eng/who.asp> (last visited 19 June 2015). Interview 13, June 2012.

⁵³⁹ Interview 11, March 2012.

⁵⁴⁰ Interview 11, March 2012; interview 17, June 2012.

⁵⁴¹ Interview 62, May 2015.

⁵⁴² Interview 60, June 2014.

⁵⁴³ Interview 41, December 2012; interview 53, October 2013.

⁵⁴⁴ Interview 26, September 2012.

⁵⁴⁵ Interview 59, January 2014.

⁵⁴⁶ See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/76> (last visited 27 May 2015). Please note that recipient countries report only USD 482.6 million in UK contributions. By 2016 it had reportedly disbursed USD 533.5 million. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁴⁷ See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁴⁸ See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/74> (last visited 27 May 2015). Please note that recipient countries report only USD 242.22 million in French contributions. By 2016 it had reportedly disbursed USD 374.7 million. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁴⁹ Interview 58, January 2014.

⁵⁵⁰ Interview 43, June 2013; interview 45, June 2013.

emission reductions related to its own national forests in its overall commitments, though, and none of the interviewees mentioned Japan as a pro-REDD+ agent, even though it provided quite some financial and technical support for REDD+ (Sun Park et al., 2013). In fact, in its first formal reaction on the proposal by PNG and Costa Rica, Japan mainly put forward a number of critical questions, while refraining from explicit support for the idea of results-based payments for reducing emissions from deforestation.⁵⁵¹ It used the opportunity to raise attention for the need to include SFM in REDD+, a proposal that was broadly accepted by other countries (Fry, 2008).

Bolivia has played a significant role in the REDD+ negotiations. While it has been one of the most vocal opponents of REDD+ since 2010,⁵⁵² one of the interviewees and the literature (Humphreys, 2008) mentioned it as an agent behind REDD+. Bolivia was amongst the first members of the CfRN and supported all its statements between 2005 and 2007 (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). It also accepted a contribution of USD 4.7 million from the UN-REDD program in March 2010 to elaborate a REDD+ Readiness program.⁵⁵³ However, the Bolivian government position on REDD+ changed dramatically as a result of the outcomes of the World People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, which took place in April 2010 near Cochabamba.⁵⁵⁴ With more than 35,000 participants, this was one of the largest gatherings of climate justice activists ever.⁵⁵⁵ It seems that the Bolivian government itself had not realized that the climate justice agenda included a strong opposition against REDD+.⁵⁵⁶ When the working group on forests of the Cochabamba conference, which elaborated the recommendations on REDD+, came up with a strong statement rejecting REDD+ as a neoliberal market-based mechanism, a representative of the Bolivian government literally tore apart the paper upon which the conclusions of the working group were written.⁵⁵⁷ However one of the two co-facilitators of the working group picked up the pieces of paper from the waste bin and insisted that the original outcomes were introduced in the final declaration of the conference.⁵⁵⁸ As a result, the conference declaration states:

⁵⁵¹ FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, see

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/misc05.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

⁵⁵² See

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/bolivia_awglca_10.pdf (last visited 18 June 2015).

⁵⁵³ [http://www.UN-](http://www.UN-REDD.org/Newsletter7_PB4_Countries_Reactions/tabid/3924/language/en-US/Default.aspx)

[REDD.org/Newsletter7 PB4 Countries Reactions/tabid/3924/language/en-US/Default.aspx](http://www.UN-REDD.org/Newsletter7_PB4_Countries_Reactions/tabid/3924/language/en-US/Default.aspx) (last visited 24 May 2015). Remarkably, Bolivia reports to the Voluntary REDD+ Database that it has received zero support for REDD+, while donors report a total contribution of USD 48.17 million. See

<http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/30/by/others> (last visited 27 May 2015). According to the 2016 database it has received USD 5.5 million in direct support. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁵⁴ See <https://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/> (last visited 18 June 2015).

⁵⁵⁵ See <https://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/> (last visited 18 June 2015).

⁵⁵⁶ In fact, the very first action of CJN! the global network of climate justice activists that was founded at the UNFCCC COP in Bali in 2007, was a “die-in” action against the launch of the FCPF, a facility established to make countries “ready” for REDD+ (personal observation). The action was co-organized by the GFC.

⁵⁵⁷ Interview 63, June 2015.

⁵⁵⁸ Interview 63, June 2015.

“We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and its versions + and + +, which are violating the sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior free and informed consent as well as the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, and the Rights of Nature.”⁵⁵⁹

Remarkably, the first submission of the Bolivian government to the UNFCCC in which it supposedly submitted the outcomes of the Cochabamba conference, did not include this outright rejection of REDD+. Rather, it proposed a large number of detailed recommendations to improve REDD+ actions, some of which were reflected in the REDD+ safeguards adopted by the UNFCCC in December 2010.⁵⁶⁰ This led to protests by several climate justice activists and by the time of the UNFCCC COP in December 2010, the delegation of Bolivia openly opposed REDD+ as a form of commodification of nature and a mechanism through which industrialized countries were trying to escape their GHG emission reduction responsibilities (Bottazzi et al., 2013).⁵⁶¹ REDD+ was one of their reasons to reject the 2010 COP outcomes (see also 3.4).⁵⁶² In the years that followed, Bolivia turned into a vocal opponent of REDD+, not only at the UNFCCC negotiations, but also for example at the negotiations for the outcome document of the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Bottazzi et al., 2013).⁵⁶³ In August 2012 Bolivia changed its strategy, and started actively promoting an alternative to REDD+ in the form of a “Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Approach for the Integral and Sustainable Management of Forests”.⁵⁶⁴ While some interviewees felt this proposal added little to existing forest initiatives,⁵⁶⁵ Bolivia did succeed to place the alternative squarely on the agenda of not only the UNFCCC, but also the Green Climate Fund. In the Paris agreement, the proposal was included as an alternative to REDD+.⁵⁶⁶ However, this has not led to the derailment of REDD+ itself.

Despite being the country with the second largest tropical forest areal in the world, Indonesia never supported the submissions of the CfRN (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). However, its official position was similar to that of the CfRN,⁵⁶⁷ and it has become an increasingly strong supporter of the inclusion of REDD+ in carbon offset markets (Allan and Dauvergne, 2013). It has also benefited significantly from the Norwegian support to REDD+ initiatives,⁵⁶⁸ although it was frustrated that the contributions received were significantly lower than the financial support they had expected.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁵⁹ See <https://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/> (last visited 18 June 2015).

⁵⁶⁰ See

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/bolivia_awglca_10.pdf (last visited 18 June 2015).

⁵⁶¹ Personal observation.

⁵⁶² Interview 60, June 2014.

⁵⁶³ Personal observation.

⁵⁶⁴ See https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/3_bolivia_ws_REDD+_bkk_august_2012.pdf (last visited 17 July 2016).

⁵⁶⁵ Interview 22, September 2012.

⁵⁶⁶ Article 5.2, Paris Agreement, see

http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (last visited 7 July 2016).

⁵⁶⁷ FCCC/SBSTA/2006/MISC.5, see

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/sbsta/eng/misc05.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2015).

⁵⁶⁸ According to Indonesia itself it has received USD 189.20 million but recipient countries claim to have contributed USD 665.58 million to REDD+ in Indonesia. See

Similarly, several Latin American countries with a large forest cover like Peru, Colombia and Mexico have been supporters of REDD+ and the inclusion of REDD+ in international carbon offset markets (Alvarado and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007; Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007; Corbera and Brown, 2008; Fry, 2008).⁵⁷⁰ However, some have suggested that these Governments were influenced by a number of, mainly non-governmental, US actors, who tend to play a large role in the Latin American conservation sector.⁵⁷¹ The individual agency of President Felipe Calderon of Mexico during the 2010 COP in Cancun was highlighted.⁵⁷² As described earlier (see 3.5), partly due to Mexican diplomacy⁵⁷³ this COP succeeded to agree on a broad number of issues including REDD+. Both prior to and at the conference Calderon openly supported REDD+, and market-based funding for REDD+, which was considered a promising source of financial support for the under-funded forestry sector in Mexico (Corbera and Brown, 2008).⁵⁷⁴

Another individual whose personal agency in the REDD+ debate has been highlighted is Tony LaViña from the Philippines, who acted for many years as an effective and enthusiastic co-facilitator of the official REDD+ negotiation meetings.⁵⁷⁵ LaViña is a Yale Law School graduate who worked for eight years in the Washington DC-based World Resources Institute prior to becoming the lead negotiator of the Philippines.⁵⁷⁶

7.8 The Agency and Motivations of State Actors

Table 7.2 provides an overview of the governmental actors that were identified as a pro-REDD+ agent, using the four indicators described in the theoretical framework of this study, namely (a) legitimacy, (b) authority, (c) capacity to influence processes according to the actor's objectives and goals, and (d) agency in the eyes of other stakeholders. This overview indicates that actors can be seen as important agents in a certain policy regime without necessarily responding to the qualifications that Corbera et al. (2010) and Partzsch and Ziegler (2011) identified as important for agency: authority and legitimacy.

Moreover, it is also interesting to note that several actors were seen by other REDD+ actors as important agents in the debate while they actually did not succeed in their ultimate policy goal, like PNG and Costa Rica. Meanwhile, a country like Brazil succeeded in its goals, even though its agency was only recognized by three interviewees.

<http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/100/by/others> (last visited 27 May 2015). According to the 2016 database it had received USD 165.24 million in direct support. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁶⁹ Interview 16, June 2012; interview 26, September 2012.

⁵⁷⁰ Interview 32, December 2012; interview 50, June 2013; interview 62, May 2015.

⁵⁷¹ Interview 62, May 2015.

⁵⁷² Interview 31, December 2012; interview 60, June 2014.

⁵⁷³ Interview 60, June 2014.

⁵⁷⁴ Interview 31, December 2012. Remarkably, in the Voluntary REDD+ Database Mexico reports to have spent no less than USD 1467 million on domestic REDD+ efforts, while it received only USD 68.7 million in external support. According to donors they committed USD 210.63 million until 2015, but by mid 2016, reportedly only USD 102.21 million had been received. See <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/entities/524/by/others> (last visited 27 May 2015) and see <http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/> (last visited 16 July 2016).

⁵⁷⁵ Interview 37, December 2012.

⁵⁷⁶ http://www.ciel.org/Staff_Bios/LaVina.html (last visited 27 May 2015).

Table 7.2 The agency of government actors in REDD+

Government actors	Indicators			
	Legitimacy	Authority	Capacity to influence the process according to the actor's goals and objectives	Number of interviewees that mention the actor as a REDD+ agent
PNG and the CfrN	Kevin Conrad's and Frederica Bietta's legitimacy as a spokesperson for PNG and a coalition of developing countries has been questioned by various actors both within and outside PNG.	The authority of the PNG delegation was mainly based on its extensive knowledge of the technical details of the negotiation process.	The PNG has been highly successful in terms of elaborating the REDD+ regime, although it has failed to include deforestation in mandatory carbon markets or benefit significantly from REDD+ support.	PNG, the CfrN it established, the CfrN's host organization or its spokespeople were mentioned by 45 interviewees as an important pro-REDD+ agent.
Costa Rica	While the legitimacy of the country delegation itself was not at stake, some people have questioned the participation of CI representatives in the delegation.	The authority of Costa Rica was significant, and primarily based on its reputation as a country that had reversed forest cover loss.	Costa Rica was successful in elaborating the REDD+ regime, but not successful in the inclusion of REDD+ in mandatory carbon markets.	Costa Rica or its representatives were mentioned by 14 interviewees as an important pro-REDD+ agent.
Norway	The legitimacy of Norway was not disputed.	The authority of Norway is quite significant and primarily based on the country's leadership in international environmental governance.	Norway succeeded to establish the REDD+ regime more or less along the lines of its submissions, but it did not succeed in the inclusion of REDD+ in mandatory carbon offset markets.	In total, 15 interviewees mentioned Norway or its former Prime Minister as an important pro-REDD+ agent.
US	The legitimacy of the US itself is not disputed.	The authority of the US is mainly based on its geopolitical dominance, but several interviewees questioned their motivations in the REDD+ debate.	The REDD+ regime was established along the lines of US positions since 2007, although it did not succeed in the inclusion of REDD+ in mandatory carbon markets.	Only four interviewees mentioned the US as an important pro-REDD+ agent, but several people identified the US government, or US non-State actors with strong links to the government as an underlying agent behind more visible pro-REDD+ agents like PNG, Costa Rica and Norway.

Government actors	Indicators			
	Legitimacy	Authority	Capacity to influence the process according to the actor's goals and objectives	Number of interviewees that mention the actor as a REDD+ agent
Brazil	The legitimacy of Brazil was not disputed.	The authority of Brazil as the country with the largest tropical forest area and an active participant in the UNFCCC negotiations is significant.	Brazil succeeded to promote a REDD+ regime that is primarily financed through public resources, and to block the option of financing REDD+ through the CDM.	Only three interviewees mentioned Brazil's agency and/or the assumption that REDD+ was "a Brazilian idea".

Looking at the three main regime theories it is clear that economic interests were both a strong motivation for most of the agents, and an important strategy to motivate other actors (see Table 7.3), in line with interest-based theories. One could also interpret the importance of financial flows in motivating support for REDD+ as an indicator of hegemony, in line with power-based theories. Knowledge-based theories have some relevance too, as the discourse about the importance of forest conservation was both a motivation for REDD+, and used as a strategy to convince other actors. Power-based theories that emphasize political rather than economic power seemed to have been less relevant, also because most REDD+ agents were States with relatively little political power.

Table 7.3 Regime theories and their relevance for government agents in REDD+

Government actors	Political interests	Economic interests	Knowledge base
PNG and the CfrN	Political interests seemed to have played a relatively small role in either motivating PNG or as an instrument for its agency	Economic interests in the form of potential financial support for their forest sector were a clear motivation for PNG and other members of the CfrN to pursue REDD+.	A knowledge base in terms of a neoliberal economic vision on forest conservation played a role in motivating the leadership of the CfrN. The same leadership used its knowledge and a reformist and prosaic discourse as an instrument for its agency
Costa Rica	Political interests seemed to have played a relatively small role in either motivating Costa Rica or as an instrument for its agency.	Economic interests in the form of potential financial support for its forest sector and its national PES mechanism were a clear motivation for Costa Rica to pursue REDD+.	Costa Rica's dedication to forest conservation formed part of its knowledge base and intellectual leadership and formed an instrument in its agency.

(Continues)

Government actors	Political interests	Economic interests	Knowledge base
Norway	Political interests seemed to have played a relatively small role in either motivating Norway or as an instrument for its agency. However, the way in which Norway used its economic power to gather support for REDD+ indicates the relevance of power-based theories that emphasize the importance of economic power.	The potential of cheap offsets to compensate its GHG intensive oil sector were one of the motivations for Norway to pursue REDD+. Moreover, it used the economic interests of other actors by strategically disbursing REDD+ financial support amongst a large number of countries and non-State actors, including the CfrN.	Dedication to tropical forest conservation played a role in motivating Norway, and it also used a discourse of dedication to tropical forest conservation to pursue its agency.
US	Geopolitical interests, in particular the interest to replace the principle of CBDR with a principle of universal participation in the climate regime played a role in motivating the agency of the US. There are also indications that the US used its political and economic power to convince other countries to become a lead agent in REDD+.	Economic interests of the US in the REDD+ regime included the potential of pursuing climate action without radical lifestyle change in the US itself. The US did not make such an intense use of economic interests as an instrument of agency, although it provided some crucial funding to the CfrN Secretariat and other actors.	The knowledge base of the US was formed by a neoliberal economic view on forest conservation.
Brazil	In a strategic manner, Brazil used its position as a key forest country to pursue its political interests in carbon space and industrial growth.	Economic interests played a key role in motivating Brazil's agency.	Diplomatic skills and strategy rather than knowledge base were the main factors in Brazilian agency, although it did also use a reformist and prosaic environmental problem-solving discourse.

7.9 Conclusions

In line with regime development theory (see 2.3), I conclude that the development of the REDD+ regime as a subsystem of the climate regime was the result of a remarkable configuration of party interests. It was remarkable because individual entrepreneurship, the nature and quality of policy networks, and especially the role of international financial support in generating chains of agency led to the formation of the regime. The strategic deployment of financial support by the Norwegian government to a wide range of countries played a key role in turning them into agents behind REDD+. Economic interests were both a key motivation for countries like PNG and Costa Rica to advocate

the REDD+ regime, and a key strategy deployed by the Norwegian government to generate support for REDD+. This reflects the relevance of interest-based regime theories for Earth System Governance. It is remarkable that interviewees did not mention the UK and Germany as key agents, despite these countries being major REDD+ donors.

The role of the US as an agent behind REDD+ demonstrates that power-based theories also have some relevance to the development of the REDD+ regime. Interviewees suggested that the US used its political influence to convince other countries, in particular Norway, to continue to support the REDD+ regime. Norway and the US are currently collaborating closely in their REDD+ policies. Norway itself had strong economic interests in a potential forest carbon offset mechanism to compensate for the emissions from its domestic fossil fuel sector. Norway was also keen to show its environmental leadership in a way that would not conflict with its own economic interests, thereby demonstrating that cognitive motives also played a role.

Furthermore, NGOs and organizations like Columbia University, the Rainforest Foundation-Norway and Friends of the Earth-Norway and CI strongly influenced more visible agents like PNG, Norway and Costa Rica. These findings support theories of Earth System Governance that will be further elaborated in Chapter 8, which analyzes how IGOs and non-governmental actors influenced the governmental agents that formally established the REDD+ regime.