Agents, assumptions and motivations behind REDD+
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8. The Agency of Non-State Actors in REDD+

8.1 Introduction

In line with a pluralist view on the actors in international regime formation (McDermott et al., 2010), Chapter 8 contributes to existing literature on REDD+ by using the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 2 to analyze the agency of IGOs, NGOs, the private sector and social movements in REDD+. While IGOs, and civil society organizations are different categories of actors, they have in common that they are formal observers to the UNFCCC negotiations and can assert indirect agency, by influencing the decision-makers in the REDD+ regime through advocacy campaigns, well-targeted financial investments, or other tactics. However, that does not necessarily mean that these actors have less influence than State actors. Conservation NGOs were identified by no less than 32 interviewees as agents behind REDD+.

After a brief introduction about the typology and characteristics of actors involved in international forest policy (8.2), this chapter describes the non-State actors that were mentioned by three or more interviewees as an important agent behind the REDD+ regime: conservation NGOs (8.3), the World Bank (8.4), the private sector (8.5), FAO and UN-REDD (8.6), CIFOR (8.7), the ITTO (8.8) and IPOs (8.9). Based on literature review, interviews with key actors in international forest policy, a review of policy documents, and personal observations of international negotiations, the chapter analyzes the way in which these actors have played a role in promoting the REDD+ regime, and the extent to which their legitimacy and authority was recognized, and whether they reached their objectives. It also discusses their motivations and strategies in light of the main regime development theories mentioned in 2.3 (8.9).

8.2 Overview of the Main Actors in International Forest Policy

8.2.1 Intergovernmental Organizations

Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are organizations that have State members, a bureaucracy and chief executive officer at its center, and that are governed by a normative framework of principles and rules (Biermann and Siebenhüner, 2009). The IGOs most relevant for international forest policy are all members of the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF). The CPF was established in April 2001\(^{577}\) to support the work of the UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) and enhance cooperation and coordination among its members. Aside from the UNFF, CPF members include the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), which is the lead agency on forestry within the UN system, the UN Environment Program (UNEP), UN Development Program (UNDP), the UNFCCC Secretariat, the CBD Secretariat, the ITTO, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) secretariat, CIFOR, the International Union of Forestry Research Organizations (IUFRO), the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), IUCN, the World Bank and the GEF.

\(^{577}\) UN ECOSOC Resolution 2000/35. See also http://www.cpfweb.org (last visited 5 January 2014).
IGOs have a significant cognitive, normative or executive influence on the development and implementation of international regimes (Biermann et al., 2009b). Their cognitive influence is manifested through the provision of scientific and institutional information to negotiators, or the advancement of certain discourses in national and international debates. Their normative influence is manifested through the initiation of, or guidance provided to, international negotiation processes, while their executive influence is manifested through the provision of financial and other forms of support for international policy implementation (Biermann et al., 2009b). While all members of the CPF have at times expressed support for the REDD+ regime, only a few were mentioned by interviewees as REDD+ agents: the World Bank, ITTO, CIFOR, FAO and the UN-REDD program, which is a joint program of the FAO, UNEP and UNDP. These actors will be further discussed in 8.4, 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8.

8.2.2 Non-governmental Actors and Movements
Since 1992, the UN system has been classifying the diversity of non-governmental stakeholders and rightsholders in sustainable development in nine major groups: business and industry, NGOs, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, workers, farmers, science, and local authorities. Intergovernmental processes related to forests, like the UNFF, the CBD and the UNFCCC have gradually adopted a similar classification, although there are subtle differences. Only three major groups were identified by the interviewees as an agent behind REDD+: NGOs, business and industry, and Indigenous Peoples. While major groups try to collaborate through constituencies (Schroeder, 2010), they are internally diverse (Gillespie, 2006) and there are many NGOs and IPOs that have actively opposed the REDD+ regime.

8.3 Conservation NGOs and Aid NGOs
Remarkably, while IGOs tend to have more financial resources, a specific group of NGOs was mentioned most by interviewees as an important non-State REDD+ agent in REDD+. Sixteen interviewees pointed at the role of conservation NGOs as pro-REDD+ agents. On top of that, nine interviewees mentioned The Nature Conservancy (TNC), seven interviewees highlighted the role of Conservation International (CI), three

578 The three Convention secretariats and IUFRO are the only CPF members that do not feature on the latest list of recipients of REDD+ funding. See http://www.fao.org/forestry/vrd/download/en/ (last visited 16 July 2016).
579 As Peoples with recognized status under international law most Indigenous Peoples do not consider themselves part of civil society. See also 2.7 for the distinction between stakeholders and rightsholders.
581 Interview 59, January 2014.
582 The Nature Conservancy is a US-based conservation NGO with over 1 million members and an annual budget of over USD 800 million and over USD 6.7 billion in assets that operates in 69 different countries. See http://www.nature.org (last visited 10 June 2016).
583 Conservation International is a US-based conservation organization with projects in 30 countries and a budget of over USD 317 million. See
mentioned the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and Greenpeace International, Forest Trends, the Woodhole Research Centre, the World Resources Institute, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Rainforest Foundation Norway and Friends of the Earth-Norway were each mentioned once. Scholars have highlighted the role of CI, TNC and The Rainforest Alliance and foundations such as the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation in promoting REDD+ (Hajek et al., 2011, Stephan and Paterson, 2012). Conservation organizations were the principal advocates of REDD+, but many social development NGOs such as CARE supported REDD+ as a mechanism to trigger financial support for poor rural communities (Hajek et al., 2011; see also Vatn et al., 2011; Karsenty, 2012; Van der Hoff et al., 2015).

NGOs are a highly diverse group of actors that have little more in common than that they are non-governmental (Gillespie, 2006; Den Besten et al., 2014). While it is often assumed that NGOs, as non-profit organizations, are independent from commercial or other economic interests, this is not necessarily the case (Gillespie, 2006; Mitlin et al., 2007). With the increasing professionalization of the NGO world, many NGOs have become more financially strategic or even commercial, as they need significant amounts of regular income to sustain their staff and office costs (see also Mitlin et al., 2007; Corbera and Brown, 2008). For example, only USD 436 million of the 2015 budget of TNC was spent on conservation activities and actions (which includes staff costs), while more than USD 227 million was spent on support services (general, administration, and fundraising). Many NGOs accept financial contributions from private corporations, which can compromise their independence, and some NGOs have been established with the specific purpose to advocate for the commercial interests of certain industries. Similarly, there is a significant grey area between the numerous NGOs that are directly or

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584 The Environmental Defense Fund is a US-based environmental NGO with offices in China, the UK and Mexico and a budget of USD 145 million. It aims to provide practical and lasting solutions to the most serious environmental problems guided by science and economics. One of its approaches is to help craft markets that value nature and people. See [https://www.edf.org/about/our-mission-and-values](https://www.edf.org/about/our-mission-and-values) (last visited 19 July 2016).


592 See [http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/about](http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/about) (last visited 19 July 2016).


594 Interview 41, December 2012.

595 For example, at the 2008 World Conservation Congress in Barcelona, many NGO members of the World Conservation Union proudly wore a button with the conference slogan “Nature is Our Business” (personal observation).


indirectly dependent upon financial contributions by Governments and so-called Government Organized NGOs that are established by Governments (Bohmelt and Betzold 2012).

The independence of NGOs can also be compromised in subtle ways. The Accra Caucus, one of the most influential NGO groupings around REDD+ is a good example of how industrialized country donor NGOs subtly and probably even non-intentionally influenced the positions of NGOs from developing countries. The Accra Caucus was established by NGOs and IPOs attending a two-day conference on Forests and Climate Change that took place in Accra, Ghana, in 2008.598 The majority of the Caucus members were from developing countries, but especially Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) played an active role in the Caucus and while it was formally just one of the over 100 members, many of the Accra Caucus members that participated in the UNFCCC meetings received financial support from RFN. While there are few indications that RFN tried to put any pressure on its partners, this created an incentive for these Caucus members not to contradict their positions. Moreover, some of the developing country members of the Accra Caucus were in a clear position to benefit from potential REDD+ funding for forest conservation in their country. As a result, the positions of the Caucus were critical about REDD+ and highlighted the need to adopt and subsequently respect environmental and social safeguards,599 but they were also reformist. They never concluded that negative social and environmental impacts were inherent in the REDD+ regime and that the regime itself should thus be rejected. As such, the Caucus de facto legitimized REDD+ as a regime that could be satisfactorily improved (Den Besten et al., 2014). On a positive note, the Accra Caucus did include a clear majority of NGOs from developing countries, and as such it was more representative of the views of civil society in those countries than the large conservation NGOs.

The discourse about the need for strong environmental and social safeguards and ‘win-win’ approaches that support both REDD+ and the rights and needs of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and women, was also embraced by many conservation NGOs.600 However, Benjaminsen and Svarstad (2010: 403) argue that the discourse about win-win approaches is mainly used by Big International NGOs (BINGOs) to attract funding while it sometimes goes hand in hand with ‘fortress conservation’ on the ground. He assumes that,

“...the logic and power of conservation BINGOs are creating a certain dynamic, with or without commercialization, which leads to the extension of conservation areas at the cost of marginalized people” (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010: 398).

As Bohmelt and Betzold (2012) point out, the involvement of NGOs as observers in international environmental negotiations like the UNFCCC process has increased significantly over the last decades. Many important UNFCCC negotiations are held in

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informal sessions that are closed to observers, but NGOs are able to exert a lot of pressure on the negotiations, especially when they work closely with key negotiators. The Accra Caucus, for example, set up regular meetings with key REDD+ negotiators at each UNFCCC negotiation session, thus building up close personal links.

The extent to which NGOs were able to influence country positions also depended on the level of inclusiveness and transparency of the political system of the relevant countries (Schroeder, 2010). NGOs in PNG had relatively little influence on their government while, for example, Brazilian and US NGOs had quite significant influence, although with clearly different agendas. Another way in which NGOs influenced the negotiations, was by serving on national delegations, which could imply greater influence over their country’s position and participation in Government-only meetings, but it also meant they had to adhere to the official country position (Schroeder, 2010; Bohmelt and Betzold 2012). Moreover, NGO representatives often end up working for Governments or vice versa (Mitlin et al., 2007), including some of the REDD+ negotiators for countries like Brazil, Costa Rica and the Philippines (see 7.3, 7.5, 7.7). NGOs were also able to share their views with official negotiators by organizing side events, sharing publications, or sending in formal submissions to the UNFCCC (Schroeder, 2010; Bohmelt and Betzold 2012. Conservation NGOs sent in 25 formal submissions on REDD+ between 2005 and 2008 alone and organized no less than 18 side events on REDD+ during UNFCCC COP-13 in 2007. Their staff also advocated for forest carbon offset markets in peer-reviewed articles (e.g. Bonnie and Schwartzman, 2003; Johns et al., 2008).

Larger NGOs are able to invest in gathering relevant information, as a result of which they are often better positioned to analyze the negotiations than, for example, small developing countries (Bohmelt and Betzold 2012). The latter are often faced with the significant challenge of having to cover highly complex, multi-layered negotiations on up to 50 different UNFCCC agenda items with a delegation that consists of two or three persons only (Fry, 2011). As described in Section 7.2, this was one of the reasons they put

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601 It is worth noting that the CBD, which was set up by UNEP, allows much broader participation than the UNFCCC, which was set up under the auspices of the UN General Assembly (Schroeder, 2010). In the CBD, NGOs and other observers like Indigenous Peoples are normally allowed to attend closed negotiations sessions like contact group and even Friends of the Chair meetings, and they have often been allowed by the chair to make short interventions during such meetings. Indigenous organizations are even allowed to participate almost similarly to Parties in negotiations on traditional knowledge and other issues that are of direct interest to them (Schroeder, 2010, personal observation). While the UNFCCC has become slightly more liberal, the majority of contact group meetings are still closed for observers (personal observation).

602 Personal observation.

603 Interview 5, December 2011.

604 Interview 47, June 2013; interview 16, June 2012; interview 63, June 2015.

605 Interview 11 March 2012; interview 40, December 2012.


608 E.g the delegations of Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the 13th UNFCCC COP in 2007 consisted of only one or two members, while a country like the USA sent a delegation of 135 people. See
confidence in the guidance of the CfRN. International conservation NGOs have many years of experience in influencing international policy and promoting their message through the (social) media, while often using what Backstrand (2004, p, 696) calls “technical narratives leading to a simultaneous scientisation and de-politicisation of environmental governance” that permits a compatibility between environmental goals and economic development. TNC even went as far to contribute USD 5 million to the FCPF, the launch of which played an instrumental role in kicking off the negotiations on REDD+ in 2007 (see 8.4).

International networks, movements and constituencies of NGOs fostering similar interests and/or values strengthen the agency of NGOs (Schroeder, 2010; Di Gregorio, 2012). Most conservation groups mentioned were member of Climate Action Network International (CAN), the original Environmental NGO constituency to the UNFCCC. The CAN positions are normally elaborated by working groups. The CAN working group on REDD+ was originally strongly dominated by industrialized country conservation groups.

However, the overall NGO community was divided on REDD+ (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). In fact, most European NGOs including CAN Europe had strongly supported the decision of the European Commission to exclude forest conservation from the ETS (Bozmoski and Hultman, 2009; Stephan and Paterson, 2012) and many remained skeptical if not clearly opposed to market-based finance for REDD+.

Indonesian civil society movements, which had an active campaign against forest carbon offsets and REDD+, played a central role in the establishment of Climate Justice Now! (CJN), a network of progressive NGOs and social movements that shared a critical view on the climate negotiations and especially carbon trade. CJN! formed a


609 Interview 42, March 2013.
610 Interview 39, December 2012.
611 Interview 14, June 2012.
612 Frustration over the lack of developing country participation in CAN decision-making, including in the field of REDD+, was one of the reasons why Friends of the Earth International (FoEI), which used to be one of the three core group members of CAN (together with Greenpeace International and WWF) left CAN after the 13th UNFCCC COP in 2007. As Dombrowski (2010) notes, FoEI had a conscious strategy to base its positions on global issues on its commitment to grassroots groups in developing countries. By becoming more committed to developing country voices, FoEI became more critical of, for example, market-oriented environmental policies, because its developing country members were more concerned with the connection between environmental challenges and broader economic and political factors, including questions of equity in climate policy (Dombrowski, 2010, Stephan and Paterson, 2012). See for example the 2005 publication “Nature fo Sale: the Impacts of privatizing water and biodiversity. See http://www.foei.org/resources/publications/publications-by-subject/economic-justice-resisting-neoliberalism-publications/nature-sale-impacts-privatizing-water-biodiversity# (last visited 19 July 2016).

615 See http://www.climatejusticenow.org/cjn-network-members-november-2010/ (last visited 21 July 2016). It is worth noting that many of the NGOs and movements that came together to found CJN! knew each other from Our World is not for Sale, the network of NGOs and social movements that had been organizing advocacy and public mobilization campaigns around the World Trade Organization and other trade liberalization processes. See
discourse coalition of critical actors that openly opposed the discourse coalition of REDD+ advocates (Den Besten et al., 2014; see also Brockhaus and Angelsen, 2012). One of the first joint actions CJN! organized was a public demonstration against the establishment of the FCPF, whose inaugural meeting was literally ‘over-screamed’ by the protests outside.616

It has been suggested that opposition against REDD+ declined over time, possibly referring to the initial hesitance of groups like WWF to support REDD+ due to its potential impact on environmental integrity (see Skutsch and McCall, 2010; Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). The internal discussions in NGO networks showed another trend, though.618 Especially after the 2011 Cochabamba conference on the Rights of Mother Earth,619 in which many CJN! groups participated, opposition against REDD+ amongst social movements and grassroots organizations grew rapidly and significantly.620 However, the number of conservation NGOs that supported REDD+, including market-based REDD+, for economic reasons also grew significantly (Karsenty, 2012; Stephan and Paterson, 2012; Van der Hoff et al., 2015) possibly because market-based REDD+ formed a promising source of funding for conservation organizations (Corbera and Brown, 2008). Some interviewees stated that US conservation NGOs kept on pushing the REDD+ process forward even when the formal negotiations were almost stalled.621 Instead of fulfilling a watchdog function, many NGOs considered it their role ‘to accompany’ their government in implementing REDD+.622 NGOs indeed succeeded to play an active role in implementing REDD+ through demonstration activities. Cerbu et al. (2011) calculate that NGOs were twice as often involved in REDD+ demonstration activities than governments, while local and indigenous communities were involved as partners in only one of the hundred demonstration activities they analyzed.

While most developing countries preferred a national approach to REDD+, as they did not want to lose control over potential REDD+ funding (Skutsch and McCall, 2010), large conservation NGOs almost all favored a project-and market-based approach to REDD+ as it would allow them to receive REDD+ funding for their conservation projects (Corbera and Brown, 2008; Hajek et al., 2011; Karsenty, 2012; Van der Hoff et al., 2015).623 Especially TNC, CI and WWF have been successful (see also 9.5). CI was even asked in 2015 to administer the USD 50 million Dedicated Grants Mechanism for Local

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616 Personal observation. See also https://pwccc.wordpress.com (last visited 16 August 2015).
618 Interview 20, September 2012.
619 http://www.ourworldisnotforsale.org/en/members (last visited 21 July 2016). Both movements used a radical and imaginative discourse (see 2.4). See also Forsyth, 2007, on the distinction between “green” and “red-green” environmentalism.
620 Interview 55, November 2013.
Communities and Indigenous Peoples of the FIP, the largest existing REDD+ fund at the time.624

For large conservation NGOs that represented a constituency of individual donors in industrialized countries, REDD+ not only formed a potential source of funding (Corbera and Brown, 2008),625 it also allowed industrialized country consumers to continue with their unsustainable lifestyle while assuming to do something environmentally positive through carbon offsets.626 Some of the more progressive groups that had been campaigning against destructive logging companies saw REDD+ as an opportunity to keep the forest standing.627 Both groups saw integrating conservation into a market-oriented regime as an alternative for some of the old conservation models that had failed to be effective (Brown, 2010; see also Mitlin et al., 2007 and 8.10).628

NGOs are often seen as actors that are close to local communities, including indigenous communities (Bohmelt and Betzold 2012), which is an important factor in their assumed legitimacy (Dombrowski, 2010). International networks of NGOs and other actors that can play an important role in supporting local and national campaigns have often assisted indigenous communities in acquiring funding for their conservation initiatives.629 However, NGOs do not always adequately represent the views and interests of local communities630 and by having more access to communication tools like internet, and policymakers, NGOs are able to dominate consultation processes and overpower the voices of local communities and Indigenous Peoples themselves.631 Large conservation organizations often received large amounts of money for REDD+, including to pay first-world salaries to their developing country staff, while little REDD+ funding trickled down to local NGOs (Corbera and Brown, 2008).632 The Norwegian government, for example, which is by far the largest REDD+ donor to date, handed out more than USD 84 million to CSOs in 2009, but amongst its 21 beneficiaries there were only three developing country NGOs or research centers, which received less than 15% of all funding.633

626 Interview 57, December 2013.
627 Interview 20, September 2012.
628 Interview 42, March 2013.
629 Interview 24, September 2012.
630 Interview 18, June 2012.
631 E.g. indigenous colleagues in the Solomon Islands reported that only the large conservation NGOs have been consulted about the country’s National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan as they were the only one having access to internet – until July 2015 the Network for the Indigenous Peoples in Solomon Islands did not have any institutional internet access. The policymakers assumed that the NGOs represented the views of communities and Indigenous Peoples, but this was not always the case. (Bilateral discussions with NIPS members, July 2015.) A similar situation was reported by smaller national NGOs in Colombia, which complained that the consultation processes about REDD+ in the country were dominated by, mainly foreign, conservation NGOs that did not represent the views of local communities or Indigenous Peoples. See: http://vh-gfc.dpi.nl/img/userpics/File/publications/REDD+-Realities.pdf (last visited 14 August 2015).
632 Interview 20, September 2012.
633 See http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/3-sivsa-2012---/cif/norad_cfi-grant-recipients-2009_2012.pdf (last visited 18 June 2015). It should be mentioned that some of the industrialized country NGOs that benefited from REDD+ funding subsequently provided support to developing country NGOs and even
The interests of conservation NGOs and local communities in REDD+ are often contradictory, as the high administration fees some conservation NGOs claim for administering REDD+ projects use up resources that could have reached local communities and their organizations, while claims of local communities to manage and administer their own projects negatively impact the economic interests of conservation NGOs. Some interviewees also reported a brain-drain of capable staff in developing country NGOs, who started working for the large conservation groups that offer higher salaries.  

Table 8.1 REDD+ finance received by selected conservation NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservation NGO</th>
<th>Number of grants or other arrangements</th>
<th>Total amount received 2007-2016 in USD mln</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservation International</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature Conservancy</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Rainforest Alliance</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Wildlife Conservation Society</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>128.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


An analysis of all REDD+ recipients according to the latest overview of the REDD+ Voluntary Database clearly demonstrates that IPOs, or other rightsholder groups, have hardly benefited from REDD+. Of the 2119 grants and other ‘arrangements’ mentioned, hardly any grants or other arrangements are listed that benefited IPOs or other rightsholder groups. Meanwhile an organization like CI received at least 8 grants for a total of more than USD 17 million; the Nature Conservancy is listed with 9 grants for more than USD 21 million; the Rainforest Alliance received more than 10 grants for more than USD 46 million; the Wildlife Conservation Society 11 grants for more than USD 7.3 million; the World Conservation Union 15 grants of more than USD 28 million; and WWF received no less than 32 grants or other forms of financial support for a total of more than USD 128 million (see Table 8.1). The only Indigenous Peoples-led Organization that is listed with more than one project is the Tebtebba Foundation with two grants for a total of USD 6.5 million.

Partly because of the above-mentioned dichotomy, the legitimacy of NGOs is not necessarily undisputed. While NGOs assumingly provide positive contributions to environmental policy development (Gillespie, 2006), Lahsen (2005: 159) points out:

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IPOs, so some of the funding did end up supporting their operations. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the beneficiaries of this civil society scheme also included the CfRN and several World Bank-linked research centers. See below.

634 Interview 20, September 2012.

“The tendency to celebrate “civil society” without attending to the role of power inequalities is also evident among scholars working at the intersection of science, technology, and policy studies: they tend to exclusively highlight the positive aspects of increased public participation in the scientific process”.

The legitimacy of NGOs is questionable as they are not necessarily elected by, representatives of, or accountable to rightsholders or stakeholder groups they pretend to represent (Dombrowski, 2010; Brown et al., 2012). Constituency-based NGOs that are subject to democratic governance by their beneficiaries have a different democratic basis and political legitimacy than movement-based or mission-based NGOs (Brown et al., 2012). Movement-based International Advocacy NGOs (IANGOs) may be able to gain legitimacy from their commitment to certain values, and mission-based NGOs from their expertise, commitment to societal values and human rights, and “association with widely respected actors” (Brown et al., 2012:1101). However, these indicators seem more relevant for the authority than the legitimacy of NGOs, which remains “murky” (Brown et al., 2012: 1102):

“IANGOs that emphasize accountability to broader public values or to affiliate missions are vulnerable if they are not clear about how those commitments affect their governance and legitimacy. IANGO leaders can expect increasing pressure to clarify their primary accountabilities, how those commitments shape governance arrangements, and what they mean for legitimacy in advocacy” (Brown et al., 2012: 1106).

However, legitimacy seems to be a minor indicator for NGO agency (Gale, 1998). Their capacity to strategically and opportunistically identify the “critical issues of the day” and “exploit openings within global politics for … the organisation’s advantage” play a more important role as success factors in advocacy work (Gale, 1998: 346). The authority of NGOs is partly based on their technical expertise and scientific and policy analysis and they often focus on the crucial interface between science and international policy regimes (Bohmelt and Betzold 2012). Their commitment to societal values and human rights-based approaches can be a source of authority as well. Conservation NGOs were identified by 32 interviewees as a REDD+ agent, and they were successful in pushing for the REDD+ regime and obtaining benefits from it, even though most benefits consisted of public funding rather than carbon markets.

8.4 The World Bank

With ten interviewees highlighting its role, the World Bank was the non-State institution that was most mentioned by the interviewees as an agent behind the REDD+ regime after conservation NGOs, and the single most mentioned individual actor. Several interviewees highlighted the links between the Washington DC-based World Bank and other agents like US Conservation groups (8.3) and the US Government, (7.5). Some of them highlighted the individual role of people like Robert Zoelleck and James Wolfensohn, who were ex-
administrators in the US Government before they headed the World Bank.\footnote{\textsuperscript{638}} Especially Zoelleck played an active role in promoting REDD+ by launching the FCPF at the 2007 UNFCCC COP before negotiations on REDD+ had even formally started (Fry, 2007).\footnote{\textsuperscript{639}} Some interviewees also suggested that the Stern report (2006) has had a strong influence on the World Bank’s enthusiasm for REDD+, because Nicholas Stern was a former advisor to the World Bank.\footnote{\textsuperscript{640}}

The World Bank was established in 1944 to assist developing countries in their efforts to reduce poverty by providing low-interest loans and credits, grants and technical support.\footnote{\textsuperscript{641}} Projects financed by the World Bank include large infrastructural projects like hydroelectric dams and roads that can cause significant forest loss, including in sensitive areas like the Amazon. Until the adoption of its Tropical Forest Action Plan in 1987, its forestry sector policy mainly focused on exploiting rather than conserving forests, although the Bank already stated in a policy paper in 1978 that it would start to pay more attention to the environmental aspects of logging (Cock, 2008). Increased awareness of the environmental impact of deforestation in the 1980s triggered protests by environmental movements against the World Bank financing such projects. While the Bank attempted to respond to some of the criticisms by adopting safeguards, and even adopted a formal logging ban in tropical forests (Seymour and Dubash, 2000; Lele et al., 2000)\footnote{\textsuperscript{642}} it gained an image of environmental culprit, which it was eager to lose. So when UNCED 1992 put sustainable development squarely on the agenda of the world community, the World Bank positioned itself as a central player in financing such policies (Matz, 2005; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). It succeeded to become the trustee of the GEF, which had been elected as the interim financial mechanism to the two global conventions – the CBD and the UNFCCC – that were adopted at UNCED (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). It also provides direct finance for both climate change and biodiversity conservation projects (Kiss et al., 2002). Moreover, it forged active alliances with some large conservation NGOs like WWF (Cock, 2008).

The World Bank was certainly one of the first promoters of the idea of forest carbon offsets (Kiss et al., 2002; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). As early as 1996 it proposed a USD 100 million fund to facilitate carbon offset projects (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010), and forest-related carbon offsets were included from the start, despite


\footnote{\textsuperscript{639}} Interview 56, December 2013; interview 26, September 2012.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{640}} Interview 26, September 2012. See also info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/138946/SternBio.doc (last visited 8 August 2015).


\footnote{\textsuperscript{642}} It should be noted that some of the safeguards in its forest policy were weakened again during the Forest Policy Implementation and Review that was initiated in 1998 (Seymour and Dubash, 2000), only a year after the World Bank had started to become involved in forest carbon offsets.

161
the fact that the UNFCCC regime itself did not support carbon offsets from forest conservation. Its ‘Global Carbon Initiative’ was launched in 1997 (Matz, 2005; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010) and its subsequent ‘Carbon Finance Group’ laid the basis for a highly active involvement of the World Bank in global carbon trade, as a participant and as a sponsor of events like the annual ‘Carbon Expo’ trade fair (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). This was followed by the establishment of the Prototype Carbon Fund in 2000 (Kiss et al., 2002; Matz, 2005) and the BioCarbon Fund in 2004, which financed reforestation projects (Kiss et al., 2002, Matz, 2005). Hence, the Bank has been blamed for prejudging the outcome of formal negotiations by experimenting with carbon trading mechanisms long before the instruments were formally accepted, in 2003, by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Kiss et al., 2002; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). Moreover, the Bank has been blamed for false competition: as a subsidized actor with privileged access to information, donor governments and development finance in an otherwise private market. The Bank seems to have used carbon markets for its own commercial profit, selecting some of the most attractive projects, while crowding out other market players (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010).

Similarly, the World Bank influenced the REDD+ negotiations by launching a FCPF that aimed to make countries ready for REDD+ at UNFCCC COP-13 in 2007, before that COP had taken the formal decision to launch the REDD+ negotiations (Fry, 2007; Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). Benoit Bosquet, the World Bank senior specialist who was in charge of the development of the FCPF, has openly admitted that “the facility’s ultimate goal is to jump-start a forest carbon market that tips the economic balance in favour of conserving forests” (see also Sun Park et al., 2013; Lesniewska, 2014). Putting USD 100 million on the table for the development of REDD+ projects undoubtedly had a significant influence on the negotiations (Alvarado and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007), also because these funds were to be divided over many countries. Until today, no less than 47 developing countries have signed a partnership agreement with the FCPF, which means that they might become entitled for support, and 22 of them have already received around USD 4 million in financial support for REDD+ Readiness activities, which is quite a significant amount of funding for the average forest or environment department in a


644 Interview 25, September 2012. The World Bank originally claimed to play a catalytic role in global carbon markets only, by helping developing countries to overcome policy obstacles to well-functioning carbon markets (Kiss et al., 2002). However, its involvement has not decreased since other actors became more active. It has also been pointed out that both the BioCarbon Fund and the FCPF were promoted as Pilots that would explore a ‘earn by doing approach (Kiss et al., 2002), but that they did not really function as pilot projects as they mainly promoted one approach to REDD+ and forest carbon offsets rather than a broad range of different approaches.


646 Interview 57, December 2013.

647 https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/REDD+-countries-1 (last visited 14 August 2015).
developing country. In 2008, the Bank started to develop an even larger fund, the FIP, which currently manages more than USD 775 million in loans and grants for REDD+ projects in 23 different countries. The FIP is less oriented toward promoting carbon markets and aims to support more transformative initiatives to reduce deforestation, including through a dedicated grants mechanism for Indigenous Peoples and local communities. Remarkably, an internal evaluation report on its forest policy in 2000 concluded among other things that “Support for Bank leadership in developing carbon and other markets (certification, ecotourism, water) is not universal, and international willingness to pay for these services is questionable” (Lele et al., 2000: 5). The fact that the World Bank has remained so actively involved in forest policy is quite remarkable in light of the conclusion of senior bank staff in 2000 that the forest sector represented only 2% of the World Bank’s portfolio but 98% of the headache (Seymour and Dubash, 2000). However, several interviewees pointed out that there are important institutional incentives for World Bank staff to be responsible for the administration of large sums, including in the forest sector.

The legitimacy of the World Bank’s involvement in international forest policy is far from undisputed. Matz (2005) lists factors that can create an assumption of legitimacy of international organizations in international law including State consent, the equality of States in voting procedures, public participation, transparency, fairness and accountability, and points out that the World Bank scores particularly weak on public participation, as it often fails to properly consult affected local communities on proposed projects. Interviewees pointed out that the objections of the NGO and IPO observers against certain projects were almost always overruled, and that the Secretariat of the FCPF often tries to influence the observers to be in favor of certain investments.

The authority of the World Bank is less disputed, in so far as it is based on its significant economic power and technical expertise. Ten interviewees highlighted the role of the World Bank as an agent behind the REDD+ regime. The World Bank certainly succeeded in its original objective of promoting an active REDD+ regime and placing itself at the heart of administering the funding for such a REDD+ regime.

649 https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2015/May/FCPF%20Note%202015-1-%20Fy16%20Budget_1.pdf (last visited 14 August 2015). In comparison, the official Budget of the entire Secretariat for the Environment of Paraguay is around US 5.5 million per year. See also http://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/seam-maneja-presupuesto-paralelo-de-us-20-millones-con-el-pnud-405523.html (last visited 14 August 2015).


652 Interview 17, June 2012; interview 39, December 2012; interview 56, December 2013. See also Lele et al., 2000. According to the 2014 annual report of the Climate Investment Funds the FIP used USD 16 million, 5% of its overall portfolio, for project implementation services costs and an additional USD 11 million (4%) was used for investment plan preparation. As mentioned in 5.4, by December 2014 the fund had only spent USD 314 million of the USD 667 million it had received from its donors. See http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/content/delivering-scale-empowering-transformation (last visited 25 December 2016). See also https://www-cifclimateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/default/files/meeting-documents/scf_6_cost_of_mdb_nov2010.pdf (last visited 25 December 2016).

653 Interview 13, June 2012.

8.5 The Private Sector

The private sector has played a relatively limited role in the REDD+ negotiations in sending in official submissions or organizing side events.\(^{655}\) However, no less than nine interviewees identified the private sector, and specifically the World Business Council on Sustainable Development as a key agent behind REDD+.\(^{656}\) Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2007) also mentions their presence in the REDD+ negotiations. Several interviewees pointed out that successful REDD+ implementation would be highly dependent upon private sector investments, which already plays a particularly important role in financing REDD+ Readiness activities in Latin America, and that it was thus a key driver behind the entire process (see also Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007, Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-Apirak, 2008).\(^{657}\)

Several interviewees suggested that the private sector had strong motivations to support REDD+, as it considered REDD+ as an important opportunity for profit-making,\(^{658}\) and that it wanted to benefit from business-as-usual, creating the illusion for consumers that they could continue to use fossil fuels and fly without harm to the climate: “The same people who exploited the economic crisis are now exploiting the climate crisis.”\(^{659}\) Von Moltke (2002: 350) suggested that corporations aim to implement “no cost measures promoting sustainability” in light of the interest of consumers in sustainability issues \(^{660}\) and that some industries like Unilever saw REDD+ as a business-friendly alternative to more harsh measures like carbon taxes and border adjustments.\(^{661}\) One interviewee also suggested that the logging industry had successfully dictated the rules for LULUCF in a way that allowed them to continue logging while being able to claim credits for reduced emissions as compared to an imaginary future reference level.\(^{662}\)

Both the legitimacy and the authority of the private sector as an agent in international negotiations has been questioned. While nine interviewees saw the private sector as an important agent in the REDD+ debate, private sector involvement in the REDD+ negotiations themselves is not as significant as some had originally expected, even though they might have influenced their governments behind the scenes. If its main aim was to ensure business-as-usual as some interviewees have suggested, the private sector has been quite successful in achieving its original objectives.

8.6 FAO and UN-REDD

The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is formally the

\(^{655}\) E.g. the private sector organized only one side event at the 2007 13\(^{th}\) COP of the UNFCCC. (https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/reports/archive.html?session_id=COP13 (last visited 16 August 2015), and they sent in only one submission on REDD+ between 2005 and 2008 (http://unfccc.int/parties_observers/ngo/submissions/items/3689.php (last visited 16 August 2015).

\(^{656}\) Interview 50, June 2013.

\(^{657}\) Interview 55, November 2013; interview 27, October 2012.

\(^{658}\) Interview 52, June 2013.

\(^{659}\) Interview 57, December 2013; interview 35, December 2012.

\(^{660}\) Interview 57, December 2013; interview 35, December 2012.

\(^{661}\) Interview 52, June 2013.

\(^{662}\) Interview 58, January 2014.
UN’s lead agency in the field of forests, so it had an obvious role to play in the REDD+ debate. It hosted the first workshop that the UNFCCC organized on reducing emissions from deforestation in 2006 (Thompson et al., 2011). Its most important move was to join forces with the UN Environment Program and the UN Development Program in 2008 to establish UN-REDD, a global funding window for REDD+ Readiness programs (Thompson et al., 2011). As one of the administrators of UN-REDD, FAO was a beneficiary of REDD+ funding. It was able to expand some of its forestry activities on the ground, including by channeling REDD+ funding to the national forest inventory and monitoring efforts it had been supporting for a long time. These national forest inventory and monitoring programs are central elements of the Readiness efforts of the 23 developing countries that have received UN-REDD support.

UN-REDD competed with the FCPF in targeting the same donors and the same developing country partners. However, both funds have always denied this competition, and have tried to demonstrate their collaboration by organizing joint side events, capacity-building events and in-country initiatives (Thompson et al., 2011). Contrary to the FCPF, the donor basis of UN-REDD remains pretty narrow; more than 87% of its total budget of slightly less than USD 270 million has been provided by the Norwegian Government. It is remarkable that the Norwegian government chose to provide financial support to two seemingly competing initiatives, but it succeeded to generate the support of both the World Bank and three of the most important UN forest-related agencies for REDD+. UN-REDD and FAO were mentioned by four different interviewees as an important agent behind the REDD+ regime and as the UN’s main forestry agency its legitimacy and authority was not questioned. If its objective was to benefit from REDD+ it has been quite successful.

8.7 The Centre for International Forestry Research

While only three interviewees mentioned CIFOR as an agent behind the REDD+ regime, its indirect impact as a lead international organization in the field of forest-related research was significant. CIFOR was established in 1993 as the latest member of the international research centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Through strategic research combined with a well-developed outreach and communications strategy it plays an important role in the science-policy interface in international forest
policy and as such a lead role in the REDD+ discussions. For example, it has organized side events and exhibitions of materials at practically every negotiation session of the UNFCCC since 2007, and the majority of these side events and exhibitions focused on REDD+. In fact, CIFOR was one of the first CPF members that started to analyze and promote REDD+. Since 2007 it has published dozens of scientific publications on REDD+ and interviewees praised its intellectual role.

CIFOR was one of the main beneficiaries of REDD+ finance. Already in the first funding round of the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Support Scheme it received a grant of more than 9 million Euro (USD 13.5 million), by far the biggest grant of all CSOs that benefited from that round. While CIFOR’s analysis tends to present a fair overview of the many challenges and obstacles in the REDD+ regime (see e.g. Seymour and Forward, 2010) it always suggests that these can be overcome by proper design of the REDD+ mechanism and appropriate mitigation measures (e.g. Angelsen, 2008b; Seymour and Forward, 2010), thus representing a clearly reformist discourse (Den Besten et al., 2014).

One of the most influential activities CIFOR undertook was the organization of a series of ‘Forest Days’ – later the Global Landscape Forum – that took place in parallel to the UNFCCC COPs. The Forest Days are multi-disciplinary and multi-actor events organized parallel to the UNFCCC COPs. The convenient time and venue, and the well-designed program featuring a combination of influential negotiators, well-known scientists and other prominent speakers on themes like REDD+ governance drew a large and enthusiastic public of policymakers and other actors. The first Forest Day was organized in 2007, and with more than 800 participants its success almost came as a shock to CIFOR (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007). While it formally was a collaborative effort of all CPF members, CIFOR invested most time and resources into the organization of the event. Key messages were in line with the key messages of many CIFOR publications; that the challenges to a fair and effective REDD+ are significant but that they could be overcome with a proper design (Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2007).

The legitimacy of CIFOR was not necessarily disputed, but it should be noted that, as a research organization, it is supposed to have an objective stance on potentially controversial issues like REDD+. So the legitimacy of its role as a pro-REDD+ agent could be questioned. Its authority is significant, and mainly based on its reputation as a leading research organization in the field of forest policy. It did not have a formal position on REDD+, so its success cannot be compared to its official stance, but it is clear that it succeeded to economically benefit from REDD+. Three interviewees identified it as an important agent.

671 Personal observation. See also https://seors.unfccc.int (last visited 18 August 2015).
672 Interview 19, September 2012.
673 Interview 21, September 2012. See also http://www.cifor.org/library/ (last visited 21 July 2016).
674 Interview 39, December 2012.
676 Interview 37, December 2012; interview 19, September 2012; (personal observation).
677 Interview 4, interview 19, September 2012.
678 Interview 19, September 2012.
8.8 The International Tropical Timber Organization

Several other CPF members were active in the field of REDD+, and especially the ITTO was mentioned by three different interviewees as one of the agents behind REDD+. ITTO initiated its Thematic Programme on Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Environmental Services in Tropical Forests in 2009. It was active in terms of organizing side events and other advocacy activities to promote REDD+, but until December 2014 it had received only USD 9.2 million in funding pledges, which was hardly more than half of what it had set as a funding target. Moreover, more than USD 8 million of this amount came from one donor – the Norwegian Government. It also concludes in an internal report that “the short-term funding perspectives are not positive” (Simula, 2015: 76).

The legitimacy and authority of ITTO as an international organization was not openly disputed. Contrary to the other actors mentioned it was only modestly successful in securing benefits from REDD+, but it was identified by three interviewees as a pro-REDD+ agent.

8.9 Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs)

Three interviewees mentioned IPOs as agents behind the REDD+ regime, although all recognized that there was a significant diversity amongst IPOs and that it was mainly the larger international IPOs that were in favor of the REDD+ regime. In fact, quite some IPOs strongly opposed REDD+. After a few years of intense internal discussions in the International Indigenous Forum on Climate Change, in which practically all the IPOs involved in the UNFCCC negotiations participate, the forum reached a “No Rights, No REDD+” consensus position, which was supported by NGO coalitions like the Accra Caucus. However, as some of its members were actively involved in REDD+ projects it never took the step to subsequently denounce REDD+ when it failed to explicitly recognize indigenous rights, except for a footnote referring to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIPs) in the REDD+ safeguards. This reflects a reformist discourse.

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As described in 6.4, some IPOs saw REDD+ as an opportunity to participate in forest policymaking. They successfully advocated for a safeguard prescribing their full and effective participation in REDD+ and especially on the African continent REDD+ was seen by many IPOs as a once in a lifetime opportunity to draw more attention to the Indigenous Peoples’ rights. However, the agency of IPOs and local communities has been relatively weak, also due to serious capacity constraints, including lack of financial resources and language gaps (Schroeder, 2010). It is worth noting that only one IPO, Tebtebba, was able to benefit directly from the significant REDD+ funding offered by the Norwegian Government until 2015, although several IPOs benefited indirectly from REDD+ funds managed by NGOs.

It should be cautioned that IPOs do not necessarily represent entire Indigenous tribes. Some IPOs are democratically elected by and fully accountable to the Indigenous Peoples they represent, but other IPOs are relatively small environmental or political advocacy organizations established by Indigenous experts. Hence, while the representativeness and accountability and thus the legitimacy of IPOs, and especially IPO networks, is relatively higher than the representativeness of many NGOs, it is not necessarily a given.

The moral authority of IPOs is assumed to be high, but their overall authority is affected by the lack of respect for their traditional knowledge as a source of expertise (Stewart-Harawira, 2005), and their influence in the UNFCCC process is hampered by a lack of capacity. Three interviewees identified IPOs as an agent behind the REDD+ regime, but IPOs have not succeeded in their main objective of strong legally binding safeguards that respect and protect indigenous rights in REDD+, or obtained many benefits from REDD+ in general.

8.10 The Agency and Motivations of Non-State Actors

Table 8.2 presents the main non-State actors that were identified as important pro-REDD+ agents, using the four indicators described in the theoretical framework of this study, namely (a) legitimacy, (b) authority, (c) capacity to influence processes according to the actor’s objectives and goals and (d) agency in the eyes of other stakeholders.

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688 Tebtebba, the Indigenous Peoples’ International Centre for Policy Research and Education, is based in the Philippines. See http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php/content/who-we-are (last visited 25 December 2016). Phelps et al. (2010) describe how the active engagement of indigenous and forest-dependent community groups in national REDD+ deliberations in the Philippines has led to a relatively strong support of the Philippine IPOs for the national REDD+ strategy. In other countries, where there are strong tensions between IPOs and the Government, such support is often lacking (see also Stephan and Paterson, 2012, Interview 9, March 2012).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-State Actors</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Capacity to influence the process according to the actor's goals and objectives</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees that mention the actor as a REDD+ agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservation and other NGOs</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Capacity to influence the process according to the actor's goals and objectives</td>
<td>Number of Interviewees that mention the actor as a REDD+ agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While some feel that NGOs in general have some legitimacy as actors representing certain moral values or local rightsholders, the legitimacy of Conservation NGOs as an agent has been questioned, due to questions about their representativeness of and accountability to rightsholder groups</td>
<td>The research capacity and resulting expertise of NGOs forms a source of authority. In the eyes of many actors they also have moral authority and an authority as “voice of actors on the ground”, but this is often disputed by rightsholder groups themselves</td>
<td>Conservation NGOs and other REDD+ advocates succeeded in establishing REDD+, but they did not succeed in their objective to establish a global mandatory forest carbon offset market. Reformist NGOs succeeded only partially in including strong safeguards in the REDD+ regime. However, financially many NGOs benefited significantly from the REDD+ regime.</td>
<td>29 interviewees pointed at one or more NGOs as agents behind the REDD+ regime. The North American conservation NGOs CI, TNC, and EDF were specifically mentioned by 15 interviewees. Other NGOs strongly opposed REDD+.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>The legitimacy of the World Bank has been questioned due to its undemocratic governance structure, and the legitimacy of its role in the REDD+ debate has been questioned as it influenced a more democratic UN decision-making process.</td>
<td>The authority of the World Bank is partly based on its influence, which is based on its financial capacity, and to some extent on its expertise.</td>
<td>If the objective of the World Bank was to benefit from the REDD+ regime in terms of administering significant amounts of funding, it has been highly successful. It still administers the two largest REDD+ funding mechanisms.</td>
<td>Ten interviewees mentioned the World Bank as an agent behind REDD+.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>The legitimacy of the role of the private sector in international policymaking is highly disputed, due to its lack of representativeness and accountability</td>
<td>The moral and overall authority of the private sector in REDD+ has been questioned, also because actors question its motivations in the REDD+ debate.</td>
<td>If the objective of the private sector was to ensure continuation of business as usual as some interviewees suggested, it has been successful. Yet, only a few companies have clearly profited from REDD+.</td>
<td>Nine interviewees identified the private sector as an agent behind REDD+.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(Continues)
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-State Actors</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Capacity to influence the process according to the actor's goals and objectives</th>
<th>Number of Interviewees that mention the actor as a REDD+ agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FAO and UN-REDD</td>
<td>FAO’s legitimacy as a representative and accountable UN organization that is the lead agency in the field of forests was not questioned.</td>
<td>FAO has been reasonably successful in obtaining a central role in the REDD+ regime, including as an administrator of REDD+ funding.</td>
<td>Eight interviewees highlighted the role of either FAO or the UN-REDD program as an agent behind REDD+.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFOR</td>
<td>CIFOR’s legitimacy itself was not disputed, but the legitimacy of its role as a REDD+ agent could be questioned in light of its reputation as an independent research organization.</td>
<td>If CIFOR’s objective was to benefit from REDD+ it has been quite successful.</td>
<td>Three interviewees pointed at CIFOR as an agent behind REDD+.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITTO</td>
<td>ITTO’s legitimacy as a representative and accountable IGO that has forest conservation as one of its objectives was not questioned.</td>
<td>If ITTOs objective was to benefit from REDD+ it has not been very successful.</td>
<td>Three interviewees pointed at ITTO as an agent behind REDD+.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Peoples Organizations</td>
<td>IPOs are generally seen as representative of and accountable to forest-dependent Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>The moral authority of IPOs is esteemed to be high, but their knowledge is not always fully respected and their influence is limited.</td>
<td>Three interviewees pointed at IPOs as agents behind REDD+. Other IPOs opposed REDD+.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: CI = Conservation International; CIFOR = Centre for International Forestry research; EDF = Environmental Defense Fund; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; IPO = Indigenous Peoples Organization; ITTO = International Tropical Timber Organization; NGOs = non-governmental organization; REDD+ = Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus; TNC = The Nature Conservancy; UN-REDD = United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation.

Not all actors in the table meet all the four indicators of agency. Only FAO/UN-REDD and CIFOR meet all the indicators. Conservation NGOs, the World Bank and ITTO meet three of the indicators and otherwise played an active role in REDD+ regime building, as indicated by the number of formal submissions they presented. ITTO is remarkably less active and less successful than the World Bank, FAO, CIFOR, or conservation NGOs. The private sector only meets one indicator, the assumed agency in...
the eyes of nine actors interviewed. The private sector has not played an active direct role in the establishment of the REDD+ regime either. It sent a few submissions to the UNFCCC process, and private corporations seldom made public interventions about REDD+ (see 5.4). Hence there is little indication that the private sector was a major agent in the REDD+ regime although it might have played a role behind the scenes and many actors assumed that it was an important agent.

Table 8.3 shows that knowledge-based theories were most relevant to the agency of non-State actors as they were motivated by ideology, while their knowledge and environmental problem-solving reformist discourse (see 2.4) formed the main tools for their agency. Interest-based theories are also reflected in the experiences with non-State agents in the REDD+ regime, taking into account the strong economic interests of some of the pro-REDD+ actors in being an intermediary in REDD+ funding, and the way in which especially the World Bank and UN-REDD used funding as a tool to gather support for the regime. The role of NGOs is worth noting, as NGOs are often idealized as actors that mainly represent moral values and/or the voices of people on the ground (e.g. Bohmelt and Betzold 2012), but they have their own economic interests, and there are unequal power relations within the NGO sector, between industrialized country NGOs and developing country NGOs, and between NGOs and rightsholders (Lahsen, 2005, Mitlin et al., 2007, Stephan and Paterson, 2012). There is often a tendency to see NGOs as the main actors in civil society, overlooking the role of movements, unions and coalitions representing rightsholder groups like workers, farmers, women, youth and Indigenous Peoples (Mitlin et al., 2007).

In an analysis about the role of NGOs in promoting development alternatives versus alternatives to development, Mitlin et al. (2007) highlight the difference between the often partial, reformist, intervention-specific alternatives promoted by many NGOs, and the need for more structure-changing, radical, systemic alternatives. Within the climate movement, the large social movements representing rightsholders and the more radical NGOs that formed part of CJK! clearly supported the latter approach. In fact, their main common slogan was “System change, not climate change”, reflecting a green radicalist discourse (Dryzek, 2005; see 2.3). However, many industrialized country NGOs and some of the developing country conservation NGOs embraced a more reformist agenda regarding REDD+. As Mitlin et al. (2007) analyze, the expansion of civil society and shift toward democratization has closed the gap between many NGOs and the lead actors in mainstream development, and NGOs have increasingly become the arbiters of public opinion between civil society and governments, while especially Industrialized country NGOs might advocate for solutions and broadly hegemonic ideas that are not necessarily supported by more locally based and community organizations:

“NGOs become increasingly faced with opportunities related to the dominant ideas and rules that travel with development finance—in particular in the current context, ideas related to neoliberalism and security. Acceptance of such opportunities has made life difficult for many industrialized country NGOs, who in turn pass on these difficulties to their partners. It is a short step to move from such observations to suggest that NGOs are becoming vehicles of neoliberal governmentality.... disciplining local organizations and populations in much the

Table 8.3 Regime theories and their relevance for Non-State Agents in REDD+

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-State actors</th>
<th>Political interests</th>
<th>Economic interests</th>
<th>Knowledge base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservation and other NGOs</td>
<td>The main interests of NGOs are economic, and their political dominance is limited.</td>
<td>The strong economic interests of Conservation NGOs in REDD+ indicate a relevance of interest-based theories.</td>
<td>Ideology and knowledge were central to the agency of both pro-REDD+ and anti-REDD+ NGOs, both in terms of motivation and in terms of strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>The main interests of the World Bank are economic. The World Bank does have significant economic power, so in line with power-based theories they have agency to some extent.</td>
<td>The World Bank had an economic interest in REDD+ and clearly used its economic power as a strategy to exert agency, thus indicating the relevance of interest-based theories.</td>
<td>The neoliberal ideology of the World Bank formed a basis for its agency, and it used an environmental problem-solving discourse to support its agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>The main interests of the private sector are economic, and while it has significant political and economic influence, its agency in REDD+ regime building was limited</td>
<td>The private sector had some economic interests in REDD+ and to some extent it has used its economic influence to pursue its objectives.</td>
<td>Cognitivism did no play an obvious role in the agency of the private sector, although it did often use an environmental problem-solving discourse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO and UN-REDD</td>
<td>FAO and UN-REDD have limited political and economic power so in line with power-based theories they would have less agency.</td>
<td>FAO and the other UN-REDD partners had clear economic interests in REDD+ and they used their (limited) financial resources as an instrument in their agency.</td>
<td>Cognitivism played quite an important role in the agency of FAO and UN-REDD, both as a motivation and as a strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFOR</td>
<td>CIFOR has limited political and economic power so in line with power-based theories they would have less agency.</td>
<td>CIFOR had clear economic interests in REDD+ but they did not use economic interests as a strategy to exert agency.</td>
<td>Cognitivism played an important role in the agency of CIFOR, and its expertise formed a cornerstone in its agency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITTO</td>
<td>ITTO has limited political and economic power so in line with power-based theories they would have less agency.</td>
<td>ITTO had clear economic interests in REDD+ and it used its quite limited financial resources as an instrument to exert agency.</td>
<td>Cognitivism played quite an important role in the agency of ITTO, both as a motivation and as a strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPOs</td>
<td>IPOs have limited political and economic power so in line with power-based theories they would have less agency.</td>
<td>Some IPOs had economic interests in REDD+ and used their agency to that end.</td>
<td>Ideology and knowledge were central to the agency of both pro-REDD+ and anti-REDD+ IPOs, both in terms of motivation and in terms of strategy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: CIFOR = Centre for International Forestry research; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; IPO = Indigenous Peoples Organization; ITTO = International Tropical Timber Organization; NGOs = non-governmental organization; REDD+ = Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation plus; UN-REDD = United Nations Program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation.
same way as development programs have done in the past” (Mitlin et al., 2007: 1703).

This statement seems relevant to the role of conservation NGOs as REDD+ intermediaries.

8.11 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that North American conservation NGOs were lead agents behind the REDD+ regime. These actors had strong links with some of the Governmental actors that were identified as lead agents behind the REDD+ regime. For example, there were close personal and institutional links between the US Government, the World Bank and some of the North American conservation groups that were identified as lead agents behind REDD+. Furthermore, two Norwegian NGOs played an important role in convincing the Norwegian government to invest significant amounts of money into the REDD+ regime, triggering a chain of agency.

In fact, almost all non-State actors identified as an agent behind the REDD+ regime had in common that they themselves financially benefitted from REDD+ in general, as intermediaries and otherwise. Moreover, almost all of them received significant funds from the Norwegian government, which sometimes funded up to 85% of their REDD+-related initiatives. This demonstrates the relevance of interest-based regime theories and the influence of economic power on environmental regime development that is further elaborated in the next chapter.

Interest-based theories are also reflected in the strategies the World Bank deployed in motivating Governments and non-State actors like IPOs to support the REDD+ regime. Remarkably, while several interviewees assumed the private sector to be an important agent behind REDD+, it did not meet any of the other indicators of agency (i.e. legitimacy, authority or success in achieving its objectives), and in general it does not seem to have played an active role in the REDD+ negotiations, at least not openly.

Knowledge-based theories are relevant to the role and motivations of non-State actors in REDD+ too. It cannot be denied that many NGOs, and some of the other non-State actors, supported REDD+ out of a sincere conviction that this new forest regime would contribute to both forest conservation and climate change mitigation. Moreover, the strategies deployed by non-State actors like conservation NGOs, reflect knowledge-based theories, as their knowledge and technical expertise was an important instrument in their advocacy strategies. Having said that, most NGOs involved in the REDD+ negotiations, especially the industrialized country NGOs, embraced a reformist problem-solving approach to REDD+ that was quite distinct from the radical, systemic alternatives that were promoted by some of the rightsholder groups including, for example, global peasant movements like La Via Campesina.

With the exception of the private sector, non-State actors are assumed to represent public interests rather than their own economic interests, so the coincidence of the economic interests of these actors with their assumingly objective and cognitivist arguments raises questions about their accountability to wider public goals and their legitimacy as objective non-State actors. This is particularly questionable for NGOs, as
especially mission-based advocacy NGOs often lack a clear constituency, while they are assumed to reflect the views of wider civil society, including rightsholder groups. It is often assumed in the literature that the participation of NGOs and other non-State actors will enhance the democratic nature and accountability of international regimes, and the responsiveness of these regimes as far as the rights and needs of the assumed beneficiaries on the ground are concerned. Yet, with the exception of a few influential IPOs, rightsholder groups hardly played a role as agents in the REDD+ regime, and they have received relatively few financial benefits from the REDD+ regime so far (see also 6.6). The concluding chapter explores how more direct participation of rightsholder groups can address some of the risks of misrepresentation.