Abstract: Immigration in Europe has been shaped by:

a) its particular development in time; b) the geographical patterns of migration within and towards European countries; and c) the shifting types of migration and characteristics of migrants involved.

The first part of this contribution outlines changes in these three basic migration-related factors. Migration outcomes are not haphazard nor are these the result of unhindered economic push and pull factors in a free market. Immigration policies of receiving countries do greatly influence the volume and patterns of migration, the place of settlement and the characteristics of migrants. Regulations on conditions of residence and integration do furthermore influence significantly the position of immigrants in their new destination, among others by setting conditions for their stay (residence rights) and access to the labour market. The second part of this chapter outlines the migration and integration regimes that have been developed by states of different parts of Europe and by the European Union.

In conclusion, immigration has become a relevant phenomenon in all EU countries. However, as a consequence of different timing of immigration, different socio-economic contexts and varying governmental migration and integration policies, European countries are confronted with different forms migration (immigration, emigration, transit migration) and with different types of migrants. European states have also developed different governmental policies of migration and integration. Historically, a common denominator in the framing of European policies is that countries do not see themselves as immigration countries; they are immigration countries against their will. In recent times, such framing is reinforced by populist and nationalist movements that see immigrants not only as economic competitors, but also as a threat to the national “culture and world views”. The more Europe needs immigrants for economic and demographic reasons, the less they are welcomed for cultural and political reasons.

Key words: migration, immigration, policies, Europe
1. Post-war immigration in Europe: time, space and size

Post-war migration in Europe has developed in four distinct periods:
- From the 1950s to 1974: the guest workers schemes and decolonisation;
- From 1974 to the end of the 1980s: the oil crisis and migration control;
- From the 1989 to 2004: East-West migration within Europe and asylum migration;
- From 2004 to the present: intra-EU-mobility and asylum migration.

Each period has its specific geographic patterns of migration, its specific causes and its characteristics of migrants. The periods also have their specific trigger events: the worker recruitment stop of 1974 marked the end of the first period; the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 opens the third period and the accession of ten Central and East-European countries to the European Union marks the beginning of the fourth one. I will use this periodization to describe the development of migration in Europe since World War II.

1950 – 1974: Guest worker migration, decolonisation migrants and European refugees in North-Western Europe

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Europe had to resettle some 20 million people across borders in the new newly established political map: it is estimated that 15.4 million moved from East to West between 1945 and 1950 and 4.7 million moved in the opposite direction (Bonifazi et al., 2008). Apart from these significant internal movements, Europe was at that moment basically an emigration continent: West-European states resumed pre-war emigration to classical destinations, like the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Latin America (see e.g. SVR, 2011 on Germany; Bruquetas et al., 2011 on The Netherlands). In this period, the term "emigrant" had this typical connotation of migration for permanent resettlement elsewhere.

This situation started to change at the end of the 1950s/early 1960s. Emigration decreased and immigration gained importance, starting in the (North-)Western part of Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s immigration took in the first place the form of temporary labour migration (guest workers): the economic reconstruction after the war was so successful that a number of West-European countries needed more hands than their national populations could provide. These booming economies needed particularly unskilled and low-skilled workers for their labour intensive Fordist production processes in mining and manufacturing. Some West-European countries, such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium and France, resumed earlier pre-war migration traditions to fill the vacancies at the lower end of the labour market. For the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden this experience of being an attraction pole for migrant workers was relatively new.
Gradually a sizeable labour migration system was built up, initially attracting workers from the nearest countries in the South – Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal – and the East - until 1961 from East-Germany and after the Iron Curtain was built from Yugoslavia (Van Mol & De Valk, 2015). The system extended itself in the 1960s to include Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Turkey and it became gradually more and more organised: the rules, conditions and procedures were set in bilateral agreements between recruiting and sending countries. It was supposed to be a regulated temporary migration of workers. In countries in which trade unions had acquired a strong position in tripartite socio-economic decision making – Austria, the FRG, The Netherlands and Sweden - the unions were actively involved in controlling and setting the conditions for recruitment and employment of these migrant workers (Penninx & Roosblad, 2000). How many millions of migrant workers have been involved in this labour migration system is difficult to estimate. Estimates of the numbers of individuals that left Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal alone between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million (Okólski, 2012). In 1950 immigrant populations were already settled in France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium. The size of the foreign labour force at the end of the period in 1974 in destination countries had grown to significant proportions: FRG 2.2 million workers; France 1.9 million; Switzerland 1 million; Belgium 0.22 million; The Netherlands 0.12 million (Cohen, 1987).

A second important source of immigration into Europe in this period comes from the decolonisation process. These migration flows from newly independent former colonies was generally not defined as "immigration", but as "repatriation" or return to the homeland (although most of these repatriates had never been in their homeland before). Bade (2003, quoted in Van Mol & De Valk, 2015) estimates that between 1940 and 1975 around seven million people left former colonies of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK to resettle in their motherlands in Europe.

In the UK case, labour immigration and the movement from the former British Commonwealth to the UK were tightly interwoven: during the 1945 post-war boom many Commonwealth immigrants were encouraged to come to the UK to fill jobs that indigenous workers were reluctant to take (Castles & Kosack, 1973). In 1962 the Commonwealth Immigration Act was introduced in a first attempt to restrict immigration from independent parts of the former British empire. It was followed in the 1960s and 1970s by several other restrictive Immigration Acts. Nevertheless, at the end of the period, in 1974, the "minority population" in the UK exceeded 4 million (Van Mol & De Valk, 2015).

Finally, in this first period there were some East-West migration flows within Europe, specifically after the political crises in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), but the number of people fleeing from East to West was limited compared to the 1945-1950 flows, or compared to those that were to follow the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In the logic of the Cold War, the ones that came to the West in this period were considered political refugees.

**1974 – 1989: Family migration and increasing worldwide refugee/asylum migration in North-Western Europe**

In the early 1970s the limits of the growth of the Fordist industrial economies became manifest and the need to restructure North-West European economies was evident. The
first oil crisis of 1973 speeded up this restructuring that led to a fall in demand for low-skilled work and thus for migrant workers. Switzerland (1970) and Sweden (1972) were the first countries to install an immigration stop for workers, followed by Germany (1973), and the Benelux countries and France in 1974 (Van Mol & De Valk, 2015). It heralded the beginning of increasingly restrictive admission policies.

Tab. 1. The development of immigrant populations in European countries between 1990 and 2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant stock</th>
<th>Mid-1990</th>
<th>Mid-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>x 1000</td>
<td>% of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>22,037</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Fed.</td>
<td>11,523</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North-Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>6,622</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South-Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West-Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>16,247</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,897</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Migrant Stock in Eur.</strong></td>
<td>49,048</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Popul. in Europe</strong></td>
<td>723,248</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The labour migration stop had specific effects for various immigrant groups. Migrant workers from South-European countries did return more often to their countries of origin, while those from North-Africa and Turkey did significantly less so. Return of the latter to their home country was not an attractive option, notwithstanding the sticks and carrots that were offered particularly in Germany in the Return Promotion Programmes. On the contrary, they started to bring their families to Europe, whenever possible: in Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and France their populations grew significantly under the policy category of "family reunion" and "family formation" of the "temporary" workers in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s.

The closure for worker migration since 1974 also led to an increasing importance of alternative ways of getting admission to North-West-European countries such as refuge and asylum. While in the period 1970-74 a mere 65,000 asylum applications were filed in
the first 15 member states of the EU\(^2\), that number more than tripled in 1975-79 to 214,000, more than doubled again to 540,000 in 1980-84, and doubled once more in 1985-89 to more than one million. In this period all of these refugees and asylum seekers came from outside Europe (Chili, Uganda, Vietnam, Turkey, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East), thereby introducing significant new diversity in immigrant populations.

During this whole period, North-West-European countries formed the attraction poles of this predominantly supply-driven migration, the same countries that had started the labour migration in the phase before. But at the end of this period, the first signs became visible of new countries in Europe that became attractive destinations for migrants. In the mid and late-1980 the migration balance of former emigration countries like Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Finland reversed: more (returning and other) migrants came in than left the country. In Denmark and Norway, where immigration levels had been modest until the mid-1980, immigrant population started to grow. The net migration figures were not spectacular yet, but announced the arrival of the second wave of immigration countries in the next phase (Tab. 1).

**1989 - 2004: revival of East-West migration, asylum peaking, new immigration countries and regimes**

The collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989 forms a watershed in European migrations, in that it generated a new geography of migrations. The opening up of the borders for exit induced significant new migration flows from Central and East European countries to the West. These took different forms. First of all, there were more or less irregular flows, not only to the "old immigration countries" in North-West Europe, but also to the new immigration countries, particularly in the South (Engbersen et al., 2010): Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal were popular destinations for migrant workers from Romania, Ukraine, Albania and Bulgaria because of these countries were easy to get in and tolerated irregular residence and clandestine work. Furthermore, part of the flows, particularly from Poland, were channelled through legal bilateral programmes for temporary employment in Germany and other North-West European countries (Glorius et al., 2013). Estimates suggest that between 1989 and 2004 a net migration outflow of around 3.2 million took place out of the ten Central and East European states that accessed to the EU later in 2004 and 2007 (Engbersen et al., 2010).

Secondly, the wars that followed after the collapse of former Yugoslavia reinforced the trend of growing asylum migration of the 1980s, but now asylum seekers had more often a European origin than in the period before. It led to the first asylum crisis: in the years of 1990-94 the number of new asylum applications surpassed 2.4 million, more than half of them coming to the FRG, followed by Sweden (197,000), France (184,500), The Netherlands (151,100) and the UK (150,880) (Van Mol & De Valk, 2015) Not all of these application were accepted, but return of failed asylum seekers turned out to be problematic, leading to an increasing irregular population.

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\(^2\) Many migrants who fled from Spain under Franco, from Portugal under Salazar and from Greece under the colonel-regime in the 1960s and early 1970s did so using the route of guest workers, because refuge and asylum was not accepted as a ground for their admission in Northwest-European countries.
The asylum crisis of the early 1990s’ solicited new measures of admission restriction and immigration control in North-West-European countries. These restrictions in its turn led to a spiralling rise of "innovative" new forms of entrance (like faked travel documents, smuggling and trafficking), which in turn generated new control-oriented requirements and procedures, particularly for asylum and family migration. Nevertheless, the number of applications dropped only modestly from 2.4 in 1990-94 to 1.6 million in 1995-1999. Asylum requests spread somewhat more among EU-members in this latter period, but it remained mainly a matter for the North-West-European partners of the Union.

Thirdly, the opening up of borders in the East of Europe also led to some specific migration flows, namely the "return" of (descendants of) earlier emigrants. The FRG was the first to open the opportunity for German emigrants (and their descendants) who had established themselves in former Central and East-European countries, the so called Aussiedler and from 1993 on called Spätaussiedler, to return to Germany. Before 1989 these came mainly from Poland and Romania. After 1990 they started to come in great number from the former USSR-countries. In total some 4.5 million Aussiedler have come to Germany between 1950 and 2010, three million of these have come after 1988 (SVR 2011). Finland followed this German policy in 1990, when it decided that Finnish speaking Ingrians who had been deported to Siberia and other places in the USSR were granted the right to return to Finland. Some 25,000 came until 2003 (Tanner, 2004).

In terms of destination countries, this period shows the strong emergence of the second wave of European immigration countries that had announced itself hesitantly in the second half of the 1980s. Economic development in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland had made these countries not only attractive for returning emigrants, but increasingly also for migrants from Eastern Europe, North-Africa and former colonies. In Italy and Spain, the large informal sector (in agriculture, building, tourism and domestic work) and the labour intensive manufacturing (King et al., 1997; Peixo et al., 2012) attracted millions of migrants under lenient admission regimes. Frequent and comprehensive regularisation schemes factually replaced planned and controlled immigration.

**2004 – present: new intra-European mobility, diversification of migration and of origin, asylum reviving**

The accession of ten new members to the European Union in 2004 marked the beginning of a new era. Eight of these ten were Central and East European countries that had been part of the Communist bloc behind the Iron Curtain: Poland, the three Baltic States, Slovakia, Slovenia the Czech Republic and Hungary (the A 8). Three years later, in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania (the A 2) also joined the EU. The effect of the accessions of 2004 and 2007 was twofold: on the one hand, a substantial (partly irregular) migration that had taken place from East to West/South since the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 was redefined as EU-internal mobility and legalised under the new regime; on the other hand, it reinforced migration from some new Member States, particularly Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, to Member States in the Western part of the EU whose labour markets attracted workers.

Old EU countries have reacted differently to the accessions: the UK, Ireland and Norway (not EU-member, but member of the EEA-countries) opened up their borders immediately in May 2004. Other countries opted for a transition period of five years in
which access to the labour market was subject to permits, and some countries opted later even for an additional two years extension. These national policies have shaped the East-West intra-EU migration significantly.

In terms of flows, Van Mol and De Valk (2015) show, first of all, that the scale of intra-EU mobility of EU-citizens clearly increased in the period after 2004. Data from Eurostat (2011) e.g. show that in 2008 alone nearly two million EU-citizens moved within the EU. For the whole period and calculated in absolute numbers, Polish migration (primarily to and from Germany and the UK) makes up for the largest share, followed by Romanian migration (primarily to and from Italy and Spain). As a result, migrant populations of the A10 and A2 countries, particularly from Poland and Romania, grew significantly in all of the 15 old Member States: while the immigrant population of A8 and A2 origin in the 15 old Member States amounted to app. 1.9 million in 2004, this population had grown to 5.2 million in 2010 (SVR, 2013).

While East-West migration (A8 +A2 to old 15) was clearly the dominant trend in intra-EU mobility, it was not the only one. Also mobility between the old 15 Member States increased: while the immigrant populations of the old 15 Member States in these same states amounted to app. 5.9 million in 2004, these populations had grown to 7.0 million in 2010 (SVR, 2013). These result from several distinct but growing kinds of migration, among others retirement migration, student migration and towards the end also increasingly highly skilled young people from crisis-ridden southern countries to the north. In sum, patterns of intra-EU migration are becoming increasingly diverse. European citizens enjoy the right of freedom of movement, and might decide to temporarily or permanently settle in another European country for a variety of reasons, including family formation, retirement, study, and work.

In general, the increase of intra-EU mobility in the period after 2004 goes hand in hand with a decrease of immigration of Third-Country-Nationals (= non-EU-nationals): between 2009 and 2012 e.g. the influx of non-EU migrants decreased from 1.4 million in 2009 to 1.2 million in 2012 (Eurostat, 2014). "Replacement" of non-EU-migrants by intra-EU-migrants has been prominent in Germany. Another feature of the recent non-EU-immigration is that it is more divers in origin, i.e. coming from all over the world: Migration from Africa to Europe had increased, especially in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, migration from East, South, and South-East Asia and from Latin America significantly rose, particularly after the start of the twenty-first century (Castles et al., 2014). The most important countries of origin in 2012 in EU27 - measured by absolute numbers of immigrants in the EU - are China, India, Morocco, Pakistan, United States, Russia, Ukraine, Nigeria, Australia and Brazil.

More diversity in origin went hand in hand with more diversity in migration motives. Until the 1990s, the vast majority of migrants could conveniently be classified under the categories "labour migration", "family reunification", and "asylum". Since the 1990s, new migration motives have appeared, such as student migration and retirement migration. According to Eurostat (2014), in 2012, 32% of migrants received a residence permit for family reasons, 23% for work, 22% for education, and 23% for other reasons including asylum. It should be noted that these categories report only the main migration motive as captured in the official statistics. In practice, these categories reflect migration motives as accepted in admission policies. Both categories and motives may shift in the course of
time. International students, for example, might become labour migrants upon graduation, and subsequently seek family reunification.

As for asylum, the number of asylum applications had dropped in the middle of the 2000s (after the second asylum crisis at the end of the 1990s) to a level of 180,000 in 2006 in the EU-15 countries, it started to increase as a consequence of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa and later the Arab spring. A real third asylum crisis announces itself in 2014/15, when Syrian refugees start to come to North-West Europe in number that are comparable to or higher than in 1992 and 1998.

As for organised labour migration from outside the EU, there have been modest labour migration schemes for specific low skilled workers, such as in agriculture and the care sector, in some countries (UK, Germany and the Netherlands). More political attention went to attempts to attract highly skilled or educated migrants during the last decade. National programmes exist today, for example, in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. The EU established its Blue Card Scheme, an EU-wide residence and work permit (Eurostat, 2011). Some countries’ governments have recruited students with the intention of incorporating them into their domestic labour market upon graduation. Several European countries, such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK also simplified procedures for international students to make the education-to-work transition (Van Mol & De Valk, 2015).

In terms of the geography of destinations, the beginning of this period (until the economic crisis of 2009) were the heydays of immigration in the new immigration countries. Tab. 1 shows that in countries like Spain, Italy and Ireland the percentage of the migrant stock – still very low in 1990 - had overtaken those of the "old" immigration countries in Europe by 2013. By 2010, Spain and Italy together had eleven million immigrants (UN migrant stock data, 2013).

At the same time, this period also saw the beginnings of immigration in some of the Central and East European countries: after EU-accession the number of immigrants that came to supply local demand for cheap labour increased rapidly in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria (Engbersen et al., 2010), although as a percentage of the population the figures remained still low. The Czech Republic and Hungary are the greatest attraction poles in this area and have taken serious steps to become immigration countries. The Czech Republic, for example, had a percentage of merely 1.1 immigrant population in 1990; this percentage had gone up to 2.3% by 2002 and reached 4% in 2013, by far the highest in Central and Eastern Europe.

The total picture that results from this historical outline of migration in Europe is clearly that Europe has become an immigration continent. In terms of stocks of migrants, UN-data count the number of immigrants on 72.4 million in all of Europe (including Russia) by mid-2013. The total population of Europe being 742.5 million at that moment, this meant that the immigrant population as percentage of the total population reached 9.8% (Tab. 1).

By 2014, the European Union of 28 member states counted 50.5 million immigrants among 506.8 million inhabitants; that is 10%. An increasing part of the immigrants in EU-countries (up to some 4% of the total population) originates from other EU member states, falling under different regimes of admission and access to labour market than the 6% of the population that are Third Country Nationals.
The total population of EU 28 as per 1 January 2014 is 506,847,612 persons.
Source: Eurostat online database: migr_pop3ctb

2. Migration and integration regulation in time and space: national regimes

For the post-war European context two fundamentally different forms of regulation of immigration and settlement are relevant for migrants themselves, but also for trade unions in the countries of destination. The first is the classical regulation by states of admission of foreigners (through residence permits) and access to the labour market (through work permits) by national states (this section 2.). The second is the situation within the EU in which gradually free mobility and access to the labour market has been introduced for all EU-citizens (plus long-term-resident TCNs) in an enlarged EU-territory
of more than half a billion residents. We will outline the former here and the latter in section 3 below.

In this section, I follow rather closely Doomernik and Bruquetas (2015) distinction of three migration/integration regimes that have developed consecutively in time and in different parts of Europe: The North-West European regime, the Southern European regime, and the Central and Eastern European regime.

**The North-West European regime**

In the first period (1950s-1974), there were two regimes in North-West European countries: the first was for immigrants that were defined as part of the nation, such as repatriates from former colonies and Aussiedler, and for refugees from the East. For these immigrants a policy of welcome and a rapid integration was foreseen. The second applied to all other non-national immigrants: for them the dominant ideology was that "we are not an immigration country" and as a consequence these newcomers were by definition "temporary guests" who would ultimately leave again.

This particular framing of not being an immigration country has had pervasive consequences, particularly for policies for "temporary guests". In the 1960s, when the demand for migrant workers emerged, admission procedures in North-West European countries were simple and lenient. Migrant workers came "spontaneously", and if they found work they would be given a work permit. Having a work permit would enable them to get a residence permit. Later, when they came through official recruitment, both permits were arranged as part of the recruitment procedure. After the economic recession of 1966/67, however, most destination countries started to apply more control in the system of admission: permission for legal entrance and a residence permit should be arranged with the Embassy or Consulate of the country of destination before arrival. In the Netherlands, for example, this new rule was introduced in 1969. Having introduced that new system of control made it also possible to implement the actual labour migration stops later between 1972 and 1974. These stricter policies for residence and work permits, combined with the stop on labour migration led in the second half of the 1970s to the first emergence of undocumented migrants and the call for regularisations.

The migration stop for workers, however, caused an increase in "family reunion" (and later "family formation") in the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s of guest workers that had decided to stay. Particularly for Turkish and North-African workers, return to their home country was not an attractive option, notwithstanding the sticks and carrots that were offered particularly in Germany in the Return Promotion Programmes at that time. Guest workers from Southern Europe did return more frequently.

Family reunion was a right that migrant workers had acquired after a number of years of residence. Nevertheless, most North-West European countries have developed rules that tried to restrict this family migration in the course of the late 1970s and 1980: conditions were set for such migration, such as having a minimum income and decent housing. Some countries also set limitations for the newcomers, such as not being allowed to work in the first years after family reunion or marriage migration. The measure of success of such measures (to limit inflows) varied significant: in the Netherlands it was not successful as is shown by the fact that the Turkish and Moroccan communities have
grown in 2013 to a size that is tenfold that of the 74,000 at the time of the recruitment stop in 1974. In Germany, where restrictive family reunion was combined with strong Return Migration Programmes, the Turkish community also grew significantly in 40 years, but at a slower pace: from 910,000 in 1973 to some three million in 2012.

When at the end of the second period, the numbers of asylum seekers grew significantly, culminating in the first "asylum crisis" in the early 1990s, this provoked new measures of restriction and control of entrance to try and prevent potential asylum seekers to reach the territory and apply. A system of visa requirements was built up in the course of time that made it difficult for people from certain (risk) countries to enter; control on such visas was done at airports of departure and carriers (boats and airplanes) were made liable for checking. Such measures, however, evoked also new ways of circumventing them: providers of fraudulent documents, smugglers and traffickers became stakeholders in the "migration business".

Many measures of control were devised and coordinated in the Schengen group of (West-European) countries since 1985. Also the registration of asylum seekers and exchange of information on applications was done in this group. In the course of time, also the evaluation of asylum applications became stricter and the percentage of refusals higher. But removal or return of the failed asylum seekers was often not possible or not practiced, and the asylum system contributed thereby to the emergence of growing group of undocumented immigrant residents. After the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (the birth of the EU) and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty this restrictive immigration regime became the standard of EU policies relating to immigration of Third-Country-Nationals (see section 3)

The ideology of not being an immigration country had also consequences for settlement and integration policies. For those immigrants who were defined a priori members of society, as in the case of the Dutch "repatriates" from the former East Indies and Übersiedler or Aussiedler in Germany, the policy was straightforward: full citizenship was offered and a full-fledged reception programme aiming at a speedy assimilation was put in place. For those who were guest workers, however, it meant limited facilities for temporary accommodation in anticipation of their eventual return. For this sizeable group of "guests" time created increasingly a contradiction of expectations: many guest workers factually stayed longer and longer and formed communities that grew by using their right to bring their families and spouses.

This growing contradiction led in some countries to early, comprehensive integration policies, covering not only the socio-economic, but also the political and cultural dimensions of life, such as the integration policies of Sweden (since the mid-1970s) and the Ethnic Minorities policies in the Netherlands (since the early 1980s). Remarkably, even in these cases this was done without revising the non-immigration-country-thesis. In the Dutch case, for example, a restrictive immigration policy was even defined as a condition for the success of a welcoming and integrating reception policy for those who actually resided already in the country (Scientific Council, 1979).

For most governments in Europe that had recruited guest workers, however, policies such as those of Sweden and The Netherlands, went too far. They maintained the illusion of return and confined themselves to ad-hoc adaptive measures, leaving the integration
responsibility in practice to parties in civil society, such as trade unions, churches and welfare organisations (Penninx, 2005).

Ultimately, such "policies of neglect" resulted in migration and integration questions becoming contentious topics in European politics in the 1990s and 2000’s. In the politicised climate of that period, immigration policies did not change – the norm of not being an immigration country remained - but integration policies did change thoroughly. Countries in Western Europe moved from earlier conceptions of rights-based integration policies, such as in Sweden and the Netherlands, to a conception of cultural integration policies that primarily focuses on cultural, value-based commonalities that are supposedly crucial for social cohesion. Consequently, demands for cultural adaptation were formulated for immigrants. These new cultural demands enforced on migrants formed the mirror image of how the receiving society’s defined its own "identity" (as modern, liberal, democratic, laïcist, equal, enlightened, emancipated, etc.). In practice, these identity claims have been translated into civic integration requirements and mandatory civic integration courses of an assimilative nature for immigrants. The compulsory pre-immigration courses, such as those developed in the Netherlands since the mid-2000s extend this logic even further: under the pretext of integration, such courses actually function as instruments to make immigration more restrictive and selective (Guild et al., 2009).

The migration and integration regime of West-European countries, as described above, is directly relevant for most other EU-countries, in as much as the institutional framework for the regulation of immigration and integration - developed by early EU-members - has actually become the blue print for policies of all EU-countries. This blue print and the institutional framework that goes with it, is forced upon them as part of the EU accession procedures through the EU acquis. (We will see later that this legacy did not determine the practice of policies completely in the Southern and East and Central European countries of the EU).

The Southern European Immigration and Integration Regime

The second migration/integration regime is that of the Southern European countries. In the words of Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo (2015) it is characterized "by a predominance of labour and family migration, scarcity of asylum seekers, illegality as an endemic feature, and the combination of restrictive admission and citizenship policies with frequent amnesties. Migration to South Europe is closely related to its colonial past, namely linked to African and Latin-American colonies, and to the opening up of Central and Eastern Europe". The Southern European countries have in principle borrowed the migration regulation system and institutional arrangements of West-European countries through the acquis, but the much more lenient admission practices, combined with frequent regularisations in the Southern European countries makes the implementation significantly different (see chapters on Italy and Spain in Zincone et al., 2011).

The 1980s brought an unprecedented economic growth in the Southern European countries, and they turned from emigration to immigration countries. Substantial labour shortages in low-skilled sectors created a strong demand for migrant labour, which resulted into a remarkable increase of foreign presence in the four countries. Spain passed the first foreigners law in 1985, pushed by the obligations acquired with its accession to
the EEC. The end of the Cold War and the gradual incorporation of Central and Eastern European countries in the EU migration system brought about a sharp increase of migration from Albania and the former Soviet Union to Italy and above all to Greece in the first half of the 1990s. In this context Greece (1991) and Italy (1998) developed their first alien laws (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2015).

Migrants were incorporated in low-status, low-paid jobs (not competing with native workers) in strongly segmented labour markets. The need for low-skilled labour was particular strong in the large informal economy of South European countries. Other niches of migrant labour are closely associated with the features of the Mediterranean welfare regime, particularly the large informal market of domestic work and care-giving services which employs primarily migrant women.

Gradually, governments saw the need to regulate labour migration, with Spain being the first to introduce a scheme based on a labour market test (Regimen General, 1985), followed by Greece in 1991 with an invitation scheme. Ultimately, all four countries ended up introducing a system of annual quotas for labour migrants - representing all skill levels (Italy 1990, Spain 1993, Greece 2000, Portugal 2001). However, this formalised recruitment system was ineffective and the actual inflows (of migrants with an irregular status) were much higher. That led governments of all colours to apply regularisation programmes regularly.

Arango (2005) formulates the "equation of irregularity" as: intensive flows, restrictive regulations, attractiveness of informal economy, geographical proximity, weakness of controls and effectiveness of smuggling activities. These specific characteristics of the Mediterranean model of migration pose other challenges to both governments and trade unions in South European countries that differ from North-West European ones. Irregular residence (rather than illegal entrance), irregular work, often in the shadow economy, irregular participation in general and work related social security are phenomena that both governments and trade unions try to avoid. Regularisation programmes are thus win-win opportunities for governments and trade unions, transforming irregular migrants/workers into regular ones, making them tax-payers, social-security contributors and possibly trade union members.

Integration policies in South European countries have followed much later than immigration regulation. Italy launched in 1998 its first migration law including integration, Spain in 2000, followed by Greece and Portugal in 2001. Up to then a labour approach prevailed – as in the guest worker system - in which immigration control and labour regulation were the main priorities and integration was relegated to a second place (Bruquetas et al., 2011). An economic conception of migration – rather than a humanitarian - legitimised regularisations as a mechanism allowing the legal inclusion of formally unwanted (irregular) immigrants provided that it enhances the utility of the migrant for the receiving country's economy and society: those who positively contribute to the country's economy become the Mediterranean answer to the question of who should be integrated (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2015).

Integration policies of Southern European countries have typically been elaborated bottom-up, starting by local and regional initiatives in the 1990s. Policies diverged from city to city and region to region. Since the turn of the millennium we witness in all countries initiatives to produce national frameworks of integration in an effort to
coordinate the policies produced at sub-national levels. Greece and Portugal have developed national plans that are managed in a more centralized way than Spain and Italy. Moreover, EU initiatives and financial instruments (European Social Fund, European Integration Fund) have promoted the application of integration projects initiated by immigrant organizations, NGOs, municipalities, and universities.

According to Zincone (Zincone et al., 2011), Southern European countries keep thinking of themselves as emigration countries which is reflected in more open integration policies when becoming an immigration country. With the exception of Greece, Southern European countries are very inclusive in legal terms, especially towards migrants with a cultural/ethnic link to the country. In Southern European countries regular immigrants have access to basic rights (work, welfare services, health care, education) on equal footing to natives, while irregular migrants' access depends on local authorities will and the discretionary practices of street-level bureaucrats.

As a consequence of their labour approach to migration, immigrant integration in Southern European societies is taking place mainly through labour market insertion. Typical of the Mediterranean welfare regime, Southern European countries offer coverage for unemployment and old-age pensions proportionally to labour participation and contribution to the social security. This implies that foreign-born citizens have less coverage since they more often have temporary jobs. Also, they are entitled to lower old-age pensions given that they have contributed to the social security for fewer years. Yet, Mediterranean welfare states combine such contributive systems with universal schemes – entitling them to full benefits in areas like health care or social services on equal footing to natives.

The foregoing implies that the process of integration is less directly mediated by explicit policies of integration, or by citizenship policies (that are generally restrictive and make naturalisation difficult): the process of integration is rather determined by immigrants' agency and interaction with local network and clientelistic relations that structure the labour market and the interaction with the state. Immigrants find their local niches of life and work and take part in the local life and networks regardless of their legal situation. In view of the segmentation of the labour market, this also means that migrants are often incorporated in the less protected segments of it and often in very precarious statuses and work situations (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2015).

Local societies in the Southern European countries are also important, because they are rather tolerant to irregular immigrants. This can partially be explained by the labour migration rationale explained above, but also by the role played by different actors. The Catholic Church in three of the four countries, for example, has lobbied for soft policies towards irregular migration (in Greece the Orthodox Church has not played an important role) and trade unions have adopted a cooperative position towards immigrants. Middle classes provide a broad base of social support, at least partly due to domestic and care services that many migrants provide for them. Low-skilled workers, however, might have negative feelings, if they feel that their wages and labour conditions have been affected by immigrants, but as we saw above, in the segmented and informal labour market migrants are not always directly competing with natives (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2015).
The third regime – of most Central and Eastern European countries – is characterised by very low immigration flows and low political priority for immigration, combined with nascent integration policies that result from the availability of EU funds and NGO-pressure rather than from societal or political demand.

For most of the thirteen EU-members that accessed in 2004 or later, the topic of migration and integration is relatively new. Migration has multiple forms there: emigration, immigration and transit migration co-exist in most of these countries (Black et al., 2010; Okolski, 2012), the former receiving more attention than the latter two. The use of the newly introduced institutional framework for migration and integration regulation – through the acquis – is being explored in quite different circumstances (than in North-West or Southern Europe) (Doomernik & Bruquetas-Callejo, 2015).

During the period in which Eastern and Central Europe were under Communist rule migration took the form of dissidents fleeing to the West or ethnic Germans leaving Poland and Romania to resettle in the FRG, as we saw above. After the end of the Cold War the former states of the Eastern Bloc were confronted with three challenges: first of all, the emigration to Western and Southern Europe. Indeed, the restrictions on departure being lifted, many took the opportunity to go West and South, but the movement took the form of brief mobility and temporary labour migration rather than permanent resettlement. Until the 2004 accession of ten new member states to the EU, much of this mobility was irregular. After accession it turned regular intra-EU mobility.

Generally speaking emigration poses no policy challenges in countries of origin. A major emigration country like Poland sees maintaining the diaspora connected with the fatherland as a strategic political objective as is the promotion of employment in the wider EU (Kicinger & Koryś, 2011).

Immigration, be it of refugees or workers, tends to be of minor political concern. Early migration policies were, where needed, fashioned on an ad hoc basis. Such policy responses were required towards the presence of guest workers from (predominantly) Vietnam who had arrived during the Communist era. Commonly these were granted leave to remain. There was also regional migration to regulate from Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Russian Federation, but little attempts were made to restrict it.

This changed once accession to the EU came in sight, as Kicinger & Koryś (2011) show for the Polish case. Existing migration patterns (often of a temporary nature) from eastern neighbours did not easily fit in with the EU logic of border management, and notably with that of the Schengen Agreement, but finally border commuting could be exempted from a strict implementation of the Schengen regime. For labour migrants from Eastern neighboring states simplified rules have been introduced in 2006 (exempting them from labour market testing). These workers are mainly employed in construction and agriculture (OECD, 2013).

Among the Central European countries first and foremost the Czech Republic became an attractive destination for economic migration from Russia, Ukraine and Slovakia (Drbohlav, 2012). In the Czech case an increasing demand for migrant labour has been documented, especially in booming areas like Prague or Mladá Boleslav. The Czech government furthermore aspired to attract highly skilled migrant workers by
means of a special scheme: in 2011 this scheme was used by 244 migrants, 80% of whom were Ukrainian nationals (OECD, 2013).

Integration policies in Central and Eastern Europe are absent in many cases and in statu nascendi in other cases. As we have seen above, numbers of foreign born residents are low, and accordingly, little has been done towards the design of national integration policies (Dbrohlav, 2012). In fact, the incipient policy initiatives in this field are largely EU-driven.

In Poland for example integration policies have been limited so far to asylum seekers, while other categories of migrants are only covered by scattered European funded initiatives. Poland’s ratification of the Geneva Convention in 1991 gave it international recognition for being a democracy, and therefore refugee protection has become the most important area of integration policies. Discussions are taking place currently about the introduction of a comprehensive policy (Pawlak, 2015).

Also, in the Czech Republic incipient integration policies are being articulated and updated yearly, with policy initiatives stressing both the acquisition of rights by foreigners as well as their acquisition of Czech language and basic civic knowledge. Since 2009 language tests have been introduced as a requirement to obtain permanent residence status. In addition, the government established since 2011 regional integration centres where TCNs and refugees can find practical support. The government explicitly mentions to rely on European resources (the European Integration Fund) for the funding of these centers and their activities.

A number of Central and East European states have recently reformed their naturalization law in order to facilitate the legal inclusion of migrants. In the Czech Republic for instance five years of legal residence presently suffices to apply for Czech citizenship. Furthermore, since 2014 the Czech Republic no longer requires relinquishing one’s original nationality. This is more liberal than the naturalization laws of Poland or Hungary. In these countries respectively ten and eight years of residence is the standard requirement while more relaxed conditions apply for spouses of nationals and refugees.

Pawlak (2015) argues that the development of integration policies in Poland, and probably other Central and Eastern European countries, should be analyzed against the background of the transformation of the communist regime. Such a process of deep institutional change is an opportunity for introducing new policymaking on the one hand, but it is foremost a challenge, because brand new policies must grow in an institutional framework full of incongruities. He sees a fundamental inconsistency in the logic of Central European economic and welfare institutions: new "neo-liberal economic institutions coexist with outdated, malfunctioning distributive institutions, which are fundamentally socialist in nature" (Szelenyi & Wilk in Pawlak, 2015).

3. The European Union’s free mobility regime

The preceding analysis of migration policies in Europe is based on (nation-)states as basic units of analysis. But there have also been significant supra-national developments in Europe that have created facilities for mobility unheard of before and elsewhere (this section is strongly based on Penninx (2014). They stem from the long term economic and political integration process in Europe that started as early as 1951, when the Treaty of
Paris instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an economic cooperation between six Western European states: The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The treaty presented guidelines for free movement of (at that moment only skilled) workers in the economic sectors concerned. The guidelines actually did not have a great impact in the period until 1968 in terms of migration flows.

The 1968-Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community (EEC) of the same six countries not only established that economic cooperation would cover all domains of economic activity, it also confirmed that in the common market there was not only free circulation of capital and goods, but also of labour. Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome formulated the principles and Regulation 1812/68 formulated concretely that any national of a Member State was eligible for employment vacancies in the territory of other Member States with the same priority as nationals of that State.

This principle of free circulation of labour was applicable in a growing area: the EEC grew from the initial six members of 1968 to nine in 1973, when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined. Free movement of labour applied to these three countries from the date of accession. In 1981 Greece joined the EEC and Spain and Portugal followed in 1986. With Greece a 'transition period' until 1 January 1988 was negotiated. For Spain and Portugal the date of 1 January 1993 was chosen as the beginning of free circulation of labour. In all of these cases there have been fears and predictions of significant new migrations after new members joining, but actually no significant new migration took place after accession. New accessions rather improved the position of migrants from these new joining countries already resident in established EEC Member States (Penninx & Muus, 1989).

The Single European Act of 1985 re-launched the idea of a complete internal market and introduced the next step: free movement of workers was widened to all citizens of Member States. The European Community (EC) should become "an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured". The Single European Act foresaw removing all physical, technical and fiscal barriers, to be implemented by December 31st, 1992. The decision to abolish internal borders made common policies for Third Country Nationals necessary. Five countries (France, the FRG and the Benelux-countries) were moving quickly towards open borders and signed already in July 1985 the Schengen Treaty that envisaged a system of international border controls and checks, a common asylum procedure and information exchanges on asylum and unwanted migrants, to be implemented by January 1st, 1990. The Schengen-model became later the standard for the EU.

In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU) as the successor of the EC. The EU created European Union citizenship and granted full freedom of movement to all citizens of Member States. It completed the earlier developments towards free movement between Member States in the sense that all obstacles for such movements were taken away and equal access to facilities was guaranteed. Moving between Member States within the borders of the EU that used to be defined as international migration had virtually become internal migration. Under this new regime the EU expanded further to 15 states through accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
However, the complete freedom of movement within the EU and the factual abolition of borders within the EU had also increased the need to coordinate Member States' policies relating to the admission of Third Country Nationals. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 concretely stipulated that five years after its ratification (i.e. by May 2004) asylum and migration should have become communitarian policy (being thus moved from the third pillar of intergovernmental collaboration to the first pillar of communitarian EU-governance) and that existing policies and practices would have been harmonised. This goal was reaffirmed at the Tampere Summit of 1999, at which also the explicit ambition was formulated that Third Country Nationals who are long-term residents should be granted rights that come as closely as possible to those of EU-citizens.

By May 2004 agreements had been reached of two kinds (Van Selm & Tsolakis, 2004). The first amounted to a synchronization of restrictive policies aimed to combat illegal immigration and keeping at bay potential asylum seekers, and the harmonization of asylum policies. The Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention at that stage had been made part of Community Law. These new policies – represented by the great majority of Directives developed between 1999 and 2004 - focus on the perceived problematic nature of (unsolicited) immigration of Third Country Nationals. They tended to develop restrictive immigration policies at the lowest common denominator of Member States. The second kind – represented by two EU directives – aimed to improve the position of Third Country immigrants: a directive on the immigrants' right to family reunification and one on the free movement between member states (after five years of legal residence).

This new EU-migration regime – that combined free intra-EU mobility rules with a communitarian restrictive immigration regime for Third-Country-Nationals - was largely in place when the EU expanded from its 15 members since 1995 to 25 members in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia acceded) and 27 in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania acceded). Although many old Member States delayed free access to the labour market of citizens of these new members for some years, by 2015 free movement has in principle been made possible in the EU of 28 (including recent accessor Croatia) for a total population of more than 500 million.

Attempts to develop a comprehensive approach to economic migration of TCNs into the EU have not been successful so far. In the 2000s, the EU has opted for a "category-by-category” approach: i.e. separate directives for migration of students and researchers, highly-qualified migrants, seasonal workers and intra-corporate transferees. The use of these policy instruments, however, has been rather limited and the discretion of national authorities in implementation have been large.

4. Resuming and concluding: the European migration paradox

The facts of migration and characteristics of migrants

North-West European countries have started to become immigration countries after WWII, receiving migrants from former colonies and "guest workers" initially and families of workers and refugees/asylum migrants afterwards. From the mid-1980s on an "new generation" of immigration countries started to emerge in the South of Europe (Greece,
Italy, Portugal and Spain) and on the fringes of Europe (Ireland, Norway, Finland). In the Southern European countries a "Mediterranean model" of demand driven immigration developed that attracted migrants from the recently opened CES countries and from former colonies and emigration destination countries. During the last decade immigration started to become of some significance in a few CES states, like the Czech Republic. However, in most of the CES states emigration and transit migration are still more important. The latter two have contributed significantly to intra-EU mobility and growth of foreign born population in European countries.

Both in Europe as a whole and in the EU, the foreign-born population forms around 10 per cent of the total resident population. In several immigration countries of the first and second generation this percentage is more than 20 per cent. Generally, migrants do have a higher (labour market) participation rate. This means migrants as percentage of the work force is higher.

The immigrant population and the immigrant workforce has not only grown, but has also become more divers in the course of time. This diversity can be expressed in the first place as diversity of (country of) origin: while the European migration system of the 1960 and 1970 consisted of the guest worker system embracing the Mediterranean countries plus Turkey, the migration from some former colonies, and East-to-West European refugee-migration, nowadays it brings people from all over the world to Europe, as is clear from the 20 main countries of origin of immigrants in Europe today. Refuge and asylum migration, particularly to North West Europe, has contributed significantly to that diversity, but recently also regular migrants of all sorts (students, medical and care professionals, entrepreneurs, highly skilled workers, domestics, retirement migrants, seasonal migrants, etc.) have come to all parts of Europe. This diversity of origin has gone hand in hand with diversity in profiles of migrants for the labour market and with cultural and religious diversity in general.

Finally, we conclude that there has been a shift in the nature of migration movements: where half a century ago two types of migration – the permanent resettlement of emigrants on the one hand and the temporary, often circular and seasonal worker migration on the other – dominated, nowadays migration takes a much greater variety of forms, such as posted workers, migration of domestics and care workers, and retirement and student migration. Movements are most of the time less permanent on the one hand, but sometimes also less clearly temporary as announced or expected on the other. Movements are clearly less bound to one origin-destination system but multi-directional. Migration has become more fluid or "liquid" (Engbersen et al., 2010), a term that was coined particularly for the intra-EU migration in which the EU-regime of free circulation leaves much more choice for individuals to leave, to return and to choose destinations.

**National migration and integration regimes and migration outcomes**

Migration outcomes as outlined above are driven by economic push and pull factors, but there may also be other drivers involved: political, cultural or educational drivers or simply the climate (for sunset migrants). When it comes to migration that involves the crossing of state borders and the temporary or permanent settlement in a state of which the migrant is not a citizen, destination states do have an opinion on the legitimacy, acceptability and desirability of such migration (and its drivers/motives). These are
reflected in the immigration and integration policies of destination countries. The basic conceptions combined with the institutionalised practices of these policies – that we have called regimes in this contribution - greatly influence the volume and patterns of migration, the place of settlement and the characteristics of migrants. Regulations on conditions of residence and integration do furthermore influence significantly the position of immigrants in their new destination, among others by setting conditions for their stay (residence rights) and access to the labour market.

We have described (the development of) three immigration/integration regimes. The first is that of North-West-European countries that basically do not want to be immigration countries. This regime that has developed from an initially open "guest worker system" (in whose recruitment and work conditions trade unions in a number of countries had an important say in the 1960s and early 1970s) towards a more and more control oriented, restrictive and selective admission policy for TCNs, leading to an increasing presence of excluded undocumented migrants. When not effective in actually preventing immigration, mandatory integration efforts are demanded from immigrants that should make them fit in the new society, not only socio-economically, but also culturally. Labour market driven immigration programmes are limited or absent, except for specific categories of unskilled (often seasonal) workers, specific (health care) professionals and highly skilled in general.

A second immigration/integration regimes is that of the Southern European countries. It is characterized by labour migrants who are attracted and absorbed mainly by the informal economy and bring their families; asylum seekers used to be scarce until recently. In terms of regulation the regime has an ineffectiv e system of formal regulation of worker immigration, combined with a weak control system for admission, which leads to illegality as an endemic feature, and to frequent amnesties as solutions. Immigration is in principle accepted when it contributes to the economy which is expressed in the criteria for acceptance in amnesties. Furthermore, local societies and civil society organisations like trade unions and churches provide a strong support for integration processes at the local level.

A third regime is that of Central and Eastern European countries. The key of this regime – if it deserves that name – is that all of these countries share in principle a rudimentary infrastructure for the regulation of immigration and integration of immigrants through the acquis, but that they also share the fact that immigration is not a political priority. It means that policy making and practical initiatives, particularly in the field of integration, are only taken, if they are required, stimulated, and financed by the European Union. In the practice of EU policies, civil society organisations are often financed to implement practical projects and these NGOs in turn often function as pressure groups that challenge governments to make policies, as is the case in the Czech Republic and Poland.

**The free mobility regime of the European Union**

The European Union has become a significant new political and policy unit which has created a new context for international mobility and migration in Europe since the late 1990s. On the one hand, EU Member States, particularly the early members in Western Europe, have transposed their national policies into common restrictive and defensive
admission policies in relation to potential immigrants (economic migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers) from non-EU countries. Furthermore, they have made these policies the "standard" for new members of the Union: the acquis requires the new members to build legislation and institutions in conformity with established EU-policies in this domain. This strand of EU-policies has been characterized by critics as the "Fortress Europe policies". During the last decade, Western European countries have furthermore increasingly "uploaded" their cultural integration requirements for new Third Country immigrants in EU-integration policies, thereby making these policies assimilative in nature and selective for immigration.

On the other hand, the EU created a fundamental right to move and settle within the EU area for EU-citizens (and for long-term Third Country residents of its Member States). For specific categories, such as students in higher education, the EU has actively promoted such mobility. The total area of free movement in the EU counts 28 countries now – i.e. before Brexit - with a total population of more than half a billion inhabitants. About 10% of these half billion have been born outside their country of residence. An increasing part of these immigrants are "internal EU-migrants": some 40% in 2014. This increase is due on the one hand to the fact that residents from new accessor states in other EU states change status at accession: from TCN to citizen of a Member State. On the other hand, we see that in the last decade immigration of TCNs in the EU decreases much stronger than immigration of citizens of Member States (Eurostat, 2011). The financial and economic crisis since 2009 has reinforced the dominance of intra-EU migration. Germany is a strong case in this respect (Sachverständigenrat, 2013).

The European migration paradox

National governments in (Western) Europe have shown in recent decades a growing inclination to protect their labour markets and welfare states, by exerting their sovereign right to control admission of non-citizens in general and restrict admission of those who are supposed not to contribute to the country’s interests (supply-driven migration). This expressed itself on the one hand in stricter immigration/admission policies, but in recent years increasingly also in requirements and demands on (potential) migrants in the framework of integration policies. On the other hand, demand for migrant workers leads to ambivalent policy reactions: unskilled, low-skilled and seasonal migrants should preferably be admitted temporarily and "circulate", i.e. not settle permanently. High skilled migrants are welcome, but are not offered the simple procedures and attractive conditions that make European states competitive destinations. In short, particularly Western, Northern and Southern countries of Europe have factually become immigrant countries, but are still unwilling to recognize this in their policies. They also refuse to recognize their longer term needs for immigrants as a consequence of demographic decline and aging of their working population. Short term political interests and feelings of threat – nowadays often framed culturally and religiously – stand in the way of long-term, pro-active immigration and integration policies.

The two different aspects of EU migration policies - the external and the internal one - amount thus to the paradoxical trend of full and increased free mobility for those within the EU, and increasing closure for those outside the EU. The financial and economic crisis that has hit many (but not all) EU Member States severely since 2009 reinforces the two trends that underlie the paradox. In the short term (of a few years) we should expect a
decrease of (demand determined) international migration in the EU in general, and within that continuation of the present tendencies towards replacement of TCN-migration by intra-EU migration. In such a context supply driven migration of TCNs will meet with substantive resistance and restrictiveness, as the asylum crisis of 2015 illustrates. We will probably have to wait until the present high unemployment in many Member States of the EU will have decreased before the (temporarily covered) longer term demographic deficits and specific labour demands in the EU will become manifest again and translate into sufficient political pressure for more open and pro-active immigration policies.

References


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МЕЂУНАРОДНЕ МИГРАЦИЈЕ И ОДГОВАРАЈУЋЕ ПОЛИТИКЕ ПРЕМА ЊИМА У ЕВРОПИ У ПЕРИОДУ ОД 1950. ДО 2015. ГОДИНЕ

Резиме: Имиграциони процеси у Европи су прошли кроз неколико значајних фаза, које су биле условљене степеном развоја у одређеном периоду, променама у географским показатељима миграција и променама у типовима миграција и карактеристикама лица која се пресељавају. С тим у вези у раду се истичу четири периода карактеристична за просторну мобилност на Европском континенту: период од 1950-1974. године, који је оznachen као период миграције гостујућих радника (гастарбајтера) и деколонизације; од 1974. године до краја 80-их година, који представља период нафтне кризе и увођења контроле миграционих токова; од 1989-2004. године када се интензивирају миграције унутар европског континента, од истока ка западу, уз издавање нових држава имиграције, а повећава се и број тражилица азила и све то упућује на креирање нових политика према миграцијама; и период од 2004. године до данас који се одликује интензивном мобилности унутар територије Европске уније, диверсификацијом типова миграција и држава порекла миграната, као и значајним повећањем броја тражилица азила. С тим у вези су изложене и различите миграционе политике (режими) које се односе пре свега на процесе прихватања или не прихватања миграната, као и на процесе интеграције на одређеној територији. Тако аутор издваја северозападни, јужноевропски, централно и источно европски миграциони и интеграциони режим, као и режим Европске уније који подразумева слободу кретања унутар њених граница. У закључку рада се наводи Европски миграциони парадокс, који се односи на то да су земље Северне, Западне и Јужне Европе постала земље имиграције, иако то владе ових држава невољно признају, и одбијају да према томе креирају своје миграционе политике. Такође, одбијају да препознају дугорочну потребу за имигрантима, што је последица центријског смањења удела радио способног и фертилног способног становништва, као и старења становништва у овим државама. Краткорочни политички интереси који су обликовани страхом и ксенофобијом стоје на путу дугорочним проактивним миграционим и интеграционим политикама. Када се ове државе суоче са демографским дефицитом и захтевима за одређеним типом радне снаге, уследиће политички притисак који ће довести до креирања отворенијих и проактивних политике према миграцијама.