Bloodlands: critical geographical responses to the 22 July 2011 events in Norway

Published in:
Environment and Planning D - Society & Space

DOI:
10.1068/d303

Citation for published version (APA):
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Introduction

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These interventions reflect on the crimes that took place on a summer’s day in Norway on 22 July 2011. But they are less about the figure of their perpetrator (whose motives remain at the centre of legal and psychiatric investigation by the Norwegian authorities) than provisional attempts to place the violence within broader interrogations of the geographies of extremism in contemporary Europe and elsewhere. Our chosen title—“Bloodlands”—was intended to evoke both the events of that summer’s day in Norway and the wider imagined geographies of the European extreme right, which are based on dreams of demographic purification and the restoration of an idealized ‘original’ Europe. ‘Bloodlands’ is also the term used by the historian Timothy Snyder (2010) to refer to the region stretching from Poznan to Smolensk that suffered a series of occupations and invasions in the 1930s and 1940s and where, he argues, murder and genocide were not incidental consequences of Nazi and Soviet policies, but central to their logics. For Snyder these bloodlands are not simply a metaphor; they describe historical geographies of genocide that the end of the Cold War in Europe has rendered more visible—and hence nearer to the European present. Snyder’s book is part of a wider and ongoing historical revaluation of the Second World War that has foregrounded the multiple geographical dimensions and sites of that conflict, as well as its continuing resonances in the present (see also Stone, 2012). When set against the post-1989 ‘unfreezing’ of the past in Central and Eastern Europe, including the 1990s Balkan wars (echoing those in Cyprus in 1974 and the 1920s expulsions and pogroms that accompanied the collapse of the Ottoman Empire), Anders Breivik’s manifesto

†This publication originated in a session at the 6th International Conference of Critical Geography held in Frankfurt am Main in August 2011. We are thankful to the organizers for accommodating it at very late notice. We are also grateful to the editors and reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
and crimes, and the milieu within which they were formed, seem rather less unique. In one of his last books, the historian Tony Judt (2010) lamented just how quickly ideas of progress and equality—greatly shaped by socialist and social democrat parties after 1945 in Western Europe—appear to have been swept away since their 1960s and 1970s heyday. With their erosion and the collapse of state communist regimes, the floodgates against right-wing extremism (never entirely closed during the often violent decolonizations and ideological polarizations of the 1940s–1970s) came crashing open. The new ‘united’ Europe born after 1989 was not only about the smooth progress of rights, freedoms, and democracy.

Several of the interventions here therefore focus on the need to locate Breivik’s actions within a broader European moment of ‘cultural crisis’—or certainly what is perceived to be such by fringes of the extreme right. As both Kirsten Simonsen and Matthew Feldman remind us below, Breivik’s violent acts were intended as a wake-up call to Europe, as an attempt to ignite a European civil war. This civil war is directed not (just) at Europe’s visible minorities. Indeed, as Arun Saldanha notes in his intervention, European ‘race traitors’ are seen (by Breivik and also by extreme right movements across Europe) as more dangerous than easily identifiable Others; they are the real threat to Europe’s survival. Much has already been written about how Breivik’s manifesto draws upon (indeed, plagiarizes) existing texts from both sides of the Atlantic. These include writings on the supposed impending transformation of Europe into an Islamicized ‘Eurabia’ (such as those popularized by Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci) and those advanced in the past by US conservatives such as Pat Buchanan and the late Samuel Huntington warning against the impending ‘de-Westernization’ of the West [see the overview in Bialasiewicz (2006)]. Such dystopian imaginations evoked an original Europe/West that needed to be reaffirmed in the face of ‘foreign’ threats and reterritorialized along the lines of an ideal pure cultural and political order. This called for both firmly securing the external boundaries of the nation and (equally importantly) for eliminating any ‘traitors within’—those who, in Breivik’s words, were “contributing to a process of cultural and demographic genocide”. This focus on alleged traitors (seen as the key threat to Europe’s very survival) has been taken up by a variety of European right-wing movements from Northern and Scandinavian Europe (as several of the interventions here note), to fringes of the Lega Nord in Italy, to the Catholic right in Poland and Hungary, the former Freedom Party in Austria, the British National Party and allied movements in the UK, and the Front National in France.

These notions are certainly not new, and as we have already noted, they reflect ideas circulating in the period between the dissolution of the Habsburg, Prussian, and Ottoman empires and the Second World War. They also found new echoes in the 1950s–1970s era of the (often violent) end to significant European overseas empires and attendant demographic, economic, and political turbulence. And it must be recalled that the largest single loss of life in a terrorist bomb attack in Europe until those of Madrid in 2004 (and exceeding the death toll in London on 7 July 2005) was the bombing of the Bologna railway station by Italian fascists on 2 August 1980, killing eighty-eight people (including two geography students from the University of Birmingham, England(1)). What is more novel is the force with which these notions—and their associated geographies of blame—have been (re)articulated and reworked and the ways in which they enter into popular circulation, impacting on political debate, as well as some of the novel ideological twists (see Karpf, 2002). This is happening despite (and in some ways as right-wing reactions to) significant advances since the 1960s in the realms of legal equality, participation, recognition, and antidiscrimination.

(1) See the extraordinary account by one of their lecturers (Slater, 2004) of his visit to the site of the massacre seventeen years on.
In many ways Breivik’s actions are just a drop in the ocean: other sites and people are often on the receiving end of orchestrated violence and terror (Olds et al, 2005). But that is why we cannot dismiss Breivik as just another isolated (and demented) madman. The acts attributed to him—and the backdrop to and framings of violent madness—are an embodied measure of social forces. These acts take place, claiming victims who found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time, so to speak. For families and friends of those who were killed, the sites of their murder also become what Maddrell and Sidaway (2010) have termed ‘deathscapes’: “both intensely private and personal, while often simultaneously experienced and expressed collectively and publicly. Furthermore, these experiences of death, dying and mourning are mediated through the intersections of the body, culture, society and state” (page 2). It is our hope that this set of interventions will encourage further critical reflection on such intersections. Seventy-seven people were killed. As anniversaries come and go, so understandings and debate will evolve. But the implications of this violence, the possibility of justice, and interpretations of these and many other traumatic losses remain our collective responsibility to shape.

Breivik’s three acts of terrorism

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Anders Behring Breivik’s second act of terrorism, a nail bomb ripping through the heart of Oslo at 15.25 and killing eight people, was shocking enough. Yet it was but a calculated diversion for Breivik’s third act of terrorism, just under two hours later: a shooting spree leaving sixty-nine innocents scattered dead around Utoya Island—the majority teenagers, many as young as fourteen—in Norway’s darkest day since Quisling’s wartime regime. But Breivik’s first act of terrorism may prove to be the most destructive and murderous; namely, dissemination of his 1516-page tract, “2083: a declaration of European independence” (hereafter, 2083). Breivik trafficked in a ‘new far-right’ milieu in Europe and the US, though his manifesto was more than this: it was intended as a terrorist do-it-yourself kit.

Even so, how can a freely downloadable, easily accessible manifesto be considered as an act of terrorism? Without in any way intending to diminish his subsequent actions and especially their heart-breaking consequences, it needs to be acknowledged that they were intended as a form of publicity for 2083. Put another way, similar to a murderous inversion of Russian dolls, the initial bombing was followed by a shooting spree, all ultimately encased in a 777,224-word manifesto inciting a European civil war. In buttressing these propositions, I will survey Breivik’s manifesto and the online space it occupies by asserting these constitute a form of ‘broadband terrorism’.

I had cause to develop this term during several recent cases testifying for the United Kingdom’s Crown Prosecution Service, regarding abortive attempts in the UK to do what Breivik did in Norway. The first involved a putative lone-wolf bomber, Neil Lewington, who seems to have become radicalised through 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan. He surfed various far-right websites—including the neo-Nazi Blood and Honour forum—despite acting alone in turning his bedroom into what authorities later called a ‘bomb factory’ (CPS, 2010). Acting alone, that is, with the exception of the Internet, which was apparently used to both radicalise his views and provide logistical assistance in the creation of viable bombs clearly intended for use against
those he considered racially inferior (Feldman, 2009). A second case involving a
would-be lone-wolf, prosecuted a year later in 2010, was still more troubling. This
witnessed Ian Davison, a leading member of the avowedly neo-Nazi group, the Aryan
Strike Force, procuring and preparing up to a dozen lethal doses of ricin. As the first
person in Britain convicted under the 1996 Chemical Weapons Act, Davison single-
headedly crossed the chilling threshold of weapons of mass destruction—important
enough stuff to be the reason for invading sovereign states—using nothing more than a
modem, a computer, and a credit card (CPS, 2010; Feldman, 2011).

A tripartite dynamic underwrites such far-right terrorism by lone-wolf activists—
and, more generally, use of the Internet as an indispensable feature of what has been
called the ‘terrorist attack cycle’. The first condition is that of online incitement and
prejudice—whether provided by the likes of Robert Spencer’s Jihadwatch or Davison’s
far more extreme Aryan Strike Force. Of course, few trafficking on these and other,
sometimes aggressively racist, forums and websites attempt violence; yet, conversely,
online radicalisation seems a sine qua non for far-right extremists turning into lone-
wolf terrorists. The second condition, and further down the online rabbit hole, is that
of the dissemination of materials for extremist violence online—particularly weapons,
tactical and paramilitary manuals, bomb-making guides, and equipment (in terms of the
latter, this may include the purchase of castor beans, the necessary ingredient for
ricin, as in Davison’s case, or other materials for terrorism purchased online). Finally,
the application and/or transmission of terrorist preparations online connects the
virtual world underpinning broadband terrorism to violence of the kind so horrifically
witnessed in Norway on 22 July 2011.

These dynamics are exemplified by 2083. First, and long before starting prepara-
tions for his murderous actions, Breivik drank deeply from the Islamophobic chalice
circulating online. Spencer’s Jihadwatch, for example, is cited on forty-two different
pages of 2083. Breivik’s fears of a social democratic, multiculturalist, and thereby ‘Islamic-
ised’ Europe were thus the by-product of a much larger “right-wing populist movement
spreading across the U.S. and Europe” (Berlet, 2011a). As Chip Berlet has aptly summar-
ised elsewhere, Breivik’s ideology espoused in 2083 may be shorthanded as “Cultural
Marxism = Political Correctness = Multiculturalism = Muslim Immigration = Destruc-
tion of Judeo-Christian nations” (2011b). Although this ‘new far-right’ (Jackson et al, 2011)
discourse does not itself simply turn people into killers, of course, the language of warfare
and, in some cases, ethnic cleansing can just as obviously have violent consequences
when individuals take it upon themselves to translate rhetoric into political violence.

Yet most troublingly, 2083 is also more than a far-right manifesto. The final part,
“A declaration of pre-emptive war”, provides a step-by-step manual for lone-wolf
terrorism. This ranges from instructions for obtaining weapons, constructing explo-
sives, securing materials, and even ‘marketing’, to the use of Google Earth for logistical
support and target acquisition, instructions for hiding IP addresses, and, crucially,
summaries of many of the “bomb-making recipes, guides and other relevant instruc-
tions on the internet” preceding 2083. Under the section “How to disassemble an
AK 47”, for instance, Breivik’s answer is simply “See Youtube”; elsewhere, the use of
an internet café which facilitates multiplayer Modern Warfare 2 simulation” is rec-
ommended, while Breivik also claims that in the “first week of my ‘explosive research

(2) The terrorist cycle is commonly understood to have six stages: target selection, planning,
deployment, the attack, escape, and exploitation (eg. STRATFOR, 2005). Sometimes a seventh
stage is also added, namely of seeking media/political exposure.

(3) As Breivik asserts, “the internet truly transformed the market for acquisition of any imaginable
product which has resulted in a scenario where ANYONE now has quick and easy access to
suppliers worldwide.”
phase’ I googled for 200 hours over the course of 2 weeks.” In other words, the Internet provided motive, means, and opportunity for Breivik’s terrorist attacks.

Ultimately, the Internet also provided the platform for Breivik’s statement to the world at large. From an online context of incitement and radicalisation to the employment of virtual space in preparing acts of terrorism, this final feature of broadband terrorism—crossing from online to physical space—constituted Breivik’s first act of terrorism on 22 July 2011. In keeping with 2083’s instructions for “Sending announcements before an operation”, Breivik concluded his manifesto: “I believe this will be my last entry. It is now Fri July 22nd, 12.51.” The centrality of 2083 for Breivik is thus borne out not only by how long it took him to write—clearly in the order of years and long before planning his attacks—but also, perhaps even more so, by the thousands of avowedly like-minded “European patriots” who received it “seconds before the initiation of the operation”. Amongst Breivik’s actions, the dissemination of his terrorist DIY kit, 2083, may yet have the greatest impact. It also raises an important dilemma: what are we going to do about broadband terrorism?

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**Changing responses to terror: how Norway made sense of 22/7**

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According to the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, the terror that struck the country on 22 July 2011 was to be met with “more openness and more democracy”: Yet, as widely varied state responses to terror attacks in the US, UK, and Spain during the last decade have shown, there are no predetermined natural laws as to how societies react to terror (Malm, 2011). In Norway it is still unclear how and with what the Prime Minister’s concepts will be filled.

From the explosion of the bomb in central Oslo at 15.25, through the drawn-out massacre at the island of Utøya, and still some hours into the evening, the identity of a terrorist remained unknown. During these long hours there were few signs of ‘openness and democracy’. Various commentators immediately directed attention towards Muslims. The head of The Islamic Council of Norway, Mehtab Afsar, was, for example, contacted by both Norwegian and international journalists and asked why Norway was attacked and whether he knew the terrorists (NRK, 2011a). Terror experts linked the terror to Norway’s presence in Afghanistan and the publishing of Mohammed cartoons in Norwegian magazines. On the streets people who did not look ‘Norwegian’ became targets of suspicion, and media reported assaults, persecutions, and harassments by ‘native’ Norwegians, as people were being chased through the streets of Oslo and told to get ‘the hell home to where they come from’ (NRK, 2011b; Tøllersrud, 2011; VG, 2011). There were cases of immigrants physically thrown out of a bar (Nettavisen, 2011) and out of a bus and beaten (NRK, 2011c).

Although the leaders of the main political parties were cautious about giving comments, some loose cannons in local divisions used Facebook during these hours to pen opinions which, there is reason to believe, were shared by quite a few people in Norway. One member of the Christian Democrats in the municipality of Karmøy wrote on Facebook that this was the start of the ‘war between religions’ and that Norway now had to ‘close its borders’ to immigrants (Haugesund, 2011). The Deputy Mayor in the municipality of Lyøy and local head of the right-wing populist Progress Party wrote that the Social Democrats were naïve, and that people had to ‘wake up’ before more tragedies happened. As soon as it became known that the terrorist was a white
Norwegian ‘crusader’, the same Deputy Mayor replaced his comment with “OK everyone, we are all shocked on a day like this, and emotions might get out of hand. Now we must stand together against this attack on democracy and innocent people” (Tollersrud, 2011). A similar tone would dominate the debate over the following weeks and months.

There are several aspects that constitute this terror as a national tragedy. First, the bombing targeted national governmental buildings and institutions. Then there is the sheer size of the massacre and bombing: seventy-seven casualties in a country with fewer than five million inhabitants. The people camping out at Utøya, approximately 600, came from all over Norway. Young Labour is Norway’s largest political youth organization, and the geographical spread of the participants at its summer camp was extensive. And also, significantly, the terrorist was a blond, avowedly ‘Christian’ Norwegian, living in the richer part of Oslo. All over Norway people gathered, with the biggest rally drawing some 200,000 people in Oslo. Different speakers reiterated the same mantra: Crown Prince Haakon Magnus told the crowd that “tonight the streets are filled with love. We have decided to counter hate with unity.” The Norwegian Prime Minister pronounced that “the mass gathering I see in front of me and the warmth I feel from the whole country makes me sure. We will pass the test; evil can kill a single person, but never defeat a whole people.” And the conservative Mayor of Oslo, Fabian Stang, stated that “we will punish the murderer, and our punishment will be more generosity, more tolerance and more democracy” (Dagbladet 2011). When Norwegian ministers and The Crown Prince of Norway visited a Mosque in Oslo, the media could report that although the “Muslim society in Norway felt suspected in the hours after the terror, five days later many felt a stronger unity than ever before” (NRK, 2011c). Partly also because several of the victims at Utøya had minority backgrounds, priests and imams were standing shoulder to shoulder in grief. Nobody talked now of ‘us and them’ (Hylland Eriksen, 2011). The concept of ‘the new we’ was evoked, a ‘we’ independent of skin color, cultural background, or religion. Even to me, being a conscious antinationalist since around the age of eighteen, this new national ‘we’ was impressive and overwhelming. If this is what nationalism was all about, I would have to reconsider my antinationalist stance.

In the wake of the construction of this ‘new we’, the Progress Party became the major loser in the local and regional election held just one and a half months after the massacre (that Breivik was a former member of the party certainly did not help). It also seemed that the general response to the terror was less harassments and racism. Certain celebrities told of a drop in xenophobic e-mails after 22/7 (NRK, 2011d), and a survey conducted by Statistics Norway showed that Norwegians had become more positive towards immigrants compared with the weeks before 22/7 (SSB, 2011). However, during the autumn of 2011 the climate of polite debate that characterized discussions soon after the terror gradually vanished. Debates became polarized—for example, on whether or not public discourse is ‘coresponsible’ for actions, or whether Breivik was either ‘insane’ or an organized political fascist. The leader of Youth Labour, a survivor from Utøya, claimed that the Progress Party had contributed to a ‘hateful debate’ on immigration prior to 22/7, while the Vice-Chair of the Progress Party, Per Sandberg, accused the Labour Party of ‘playing victim’ after the terror (see NRK, 2001e). Even though Sandberg later apologized for this statement, it became clear that, during the weeks of November and early December 2011, the ‘peace treaty’ wrought by the national mourning process was coming to an end.

So if terror can be met with various politics, the question becomes: how can one ensure that the outcome is a more open, democratic, and less racist Norway? The terror in Norway happened during a time when civil rights were already being challenged by increased surveillance (Hammerlin, 2011). Although the Prime Minister
argued that there does not have to be a contradiction between a ‘safer’ Norway and our ‘openness’, there indeed can be. Responses to terror depend to a large degree on political choices, and such choices are related to power relations between political parties, interest groups, discourses, and classes. Questions concerning racism, surveillance, and democracy do not escape these fields of forces.

And what happened to my newly adopted nationalism? It dissolved together with the precarious peace treaty, and when Norwegians, so proud of ‘how we met the terror’, began to argue that the next Nobel Peace Prize should be awarded either to the Norwegian Prime Minister or, better yet, to the entire Norwegian people (see, for example, Verdibatt 2011).

Phantom Islam: scapegoat fetishism in Europe before and after Utøya

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When Anders Behring Breivik undertook probably the most brazen terrorist attack in a European capital in living memory—blowing up a centre of governmental headquarters, rather than randomly targeting commuters or shoppers—and proceeded to carry out the largest massacre of labour movement activists in Europe since the end of the Second World War, he put his signature to a decade of inexorably rising Islamophobia in Europe. What accounts for that rise? Not any single factor, of course. But a useful lens for understanding the trend was offered by French anthropologist Emmanuel Terray in 2004. Drawing upon Hungarian historian István Bibó’s analysis of why interwar politics in Central Europe ended in catastrophe, Terray (2004) wrote:

“[W]hen a community fails to find within itself the means or energy to deal with a problem that challenges, if not its existence, then at least its way of being and self-image, it may be tempted to adopt a peculiar defensive ploy. It will substitute a fictional problem, which can be mediated purely through words and symbols, for the real one that it finds insurmountable. In grappling with the former, the community can convince itself that it has successfully confronted the latter. It experiences a sense of relief and thus feels itself able to carry on as before” (page 18).

Such a community, Terray argued, is hysterical. By directing its energies towards a fictional problem, it solves nothing—but it creates a new, very real, problem, whose victims will eventually be of flesh and blood. Terray’s most immediate concern was the case of the French ban on hijabs in schools, but the diagnosis could be extended. Following Terray, we may argue that the relatively newly visible Muslim ‘minorities’ in Europe came to occupy a position structurally analogous to the fetish. Islam was construed as a thing with eternal properties: Muslims were ascribed all sorts of derivative essences. The Islam of Islamophobia truly acquired a “phantom objectivity”, all traces of relations between people being obliterated (Lukács, 1971 [1923], page 83). The mystified objects then gained real power over the minds of its creators: similar to money, a talisman, a pair of leather boots, or any other fetish, Islam and the Muslim minority became the object of obsessive preoccupation, as if they were indeed the source of every conceivable trouble—thus generating a novel social reality, a “second nature” of imaginary battles that conditioned the actual development of society (page 86).

(4) This text builds upon Malm (2009), where a more extensive analysis of Islamophobia in today’s Europe is offered.
But the analogy is not perfect. As a rule, a fetish is adored and admired, but the Islam and Muslims of Islamophobia are targets of hatred. A fetish is attractive; Muslims are seen to be loathsome. To complement the insights of Terray, we may therefore turn to chapter 16 of Leviticus, where Aaron is instructed to “bring forward the live goat”, lay both his hands on it “and confess over it all the wickedness and rebellion of the Israelites—all their sins—and put them on the goat’s head. He shall send the goat away into the wilderness” so that it “carry on itself all their sins to a remote place.”

This is, of course, the origin of the term ‘scapegoat’. In Islamophobia all the sins of society—be they gender discrimination, job loss, alienation, crime, hollow democracy—are put on the head of the Muslim minority and, discursively to begin with, expelled “to a remote place”. Hence we can specify Islamophobia as a form of scapegoat fetishism. It answered to a profound social need: hemmed-in political energies were channelled in a direction harmless for capital, whose power now blocked other routes leading through social reality. Islam was, in other words, constituted as a negative fetish, reified, personified in the Muslim minority, and ritually abhorred. At the ideological terminus, moreover, Muslims were perceived as the secret, sinister rulers of Europe: “Communities which feel themselves defenceless before a nature that they cannot control will people it with invisible powers—gods, djinns, spirits—that are its masters” (Terray, 2004, page 118).

It was the belief in the powers of the fictional entity known as ‘Eurabia’ that drove Breivik towards Utøya. His 1500-page-long megamanifesto “2083: a European declaration of independence” reads like a bulky précis of the logic of scapegoat fetishism. Islam is conceived as a thing, Muslims as carriers of all things evil, and the European Muslim minority, through its imposition of Eurabia, as the hidden locus of continental power. What strikes the reader of 2083 is thus, first of all, the terrible normality of it all. At least the first 650 pages, up to the initial musings on military tactics and the logistics of mass deportation, could just as well be found in many bookshops, blogs, or newspapers (see Fekete, 2012). As Matthew Feldman also notes in his comment, Breivik’s plagiarism, his excerpts and quotations from Roger Scruton, Daniel Pipes, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Melanie Phillips, Bruce Bawer, Robert Spencer, Mark Steyn, and—originator of the Eurabia thesis—Bat Ye’or are testimony to the breadth of anti-Islam ideology in Europe over the past decade.

Once Breivik descended upon Utøya, how did society respond? Largely by acting like Aaron: expelling all the sins of the community onto the head of Breivik, the lone-wolf, the lunatic, the loser, the not-one-of-us-normal-Norwegians-and-Europeans (see Holgersen’s contribution). On a continent where Islamophobic parties peddling the worldview which Breivik literally copied sweep into parliaments and sometimes prop-up governments, the links between Utøya and wider political reality were severed in yet another act of externalization.

Again, the analogy is imperfect. Breivik was not, of course, a fictional problem like the hijab: his crimes were horribly real. Probing the full depth of their roots, however, would have led to uncomfortable existential questions. Where did the idea of Muslims as the enemy come from? Who suggested that the left opened the gates to a Muslim takeover of Europe? What social processes drove the rise of this virulent Islamophobia in our midst? Is mass slaughter its logical outcome? Are Muslims an imaginary enemy and power—and, if so, where is the ‘real’ enemy and power? After Utøya the undeniable arrival of Islamophobia as a problem in today’s Europe was precisely denied as, essentially, a visitation from the inner space of individual psychopathology.
The immediate future of Islamophobia in Europe and the directions of antisystemic protest are uncertain (see Davis, 2011). The Islamophobic right may yet reemerge even stronger, and we might see more scapegoat fetishism with more bloodletting along the way. Either way, 2011 could be remembered as a turning point in the annals of European racism, as in so much else. It could be the year when 21st-century Islamophobia reared its ugliest head for the first time, or the last.

The mobilisation of fear by the organisation of hate: extremisms across Europe

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“Stopping radicalisation depends on an integrated society. We can all play a part in defeating extremism by defending British values and speaking out against the false ideologies of the extremists.”

British Home Secretary, Teresa May (2010)

“It’s important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group. Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse and warped interpretation of Islam and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens. We have to get to the root of the problem. We need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorist attacks lie—and that is the existence of an ideology, ‘Islamist extremism!’”

British Prime Minister, David Cameron (2011)

These comments, the first by the British Home Secretary, Theresa May, and the second by the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, underline the ways in which extremism and militant Islam have come to be taken for granted as synonymous—the Prime Minister attempts to delink extremism from a particular religion or ethnic group before foregrounding extremism as ‘overwhelmingly’ Islamic and violent. The British government is hardly alone in this, and Muslim communities have come under intense and meticulous monitoring and surveillance across Europe at national and supranational levels via a range of governmental technologies.

Such discourses suggest that multiculturalism articulates with increasingly porous national borders to produce an excess of difference, diluting the national community, inhibiting mutual empathy and affinity (Goodhart, 2004). The celebration of difference in multiculturalism has been seen as supporting the spatial self-segregation of visibly different, migrant communities and the development of ‘parallel lives’ (Phillips, 2006). It is suggested that migrants’ isolation from the mainstream and imbrication within global networks makes them channels for ‘alien’ ideologies that seep into the very pores of the nation, infecting it, weakening the social fabric from within (Nagel and Staehele, 2008; Phillips, 2006). Such discourses externalise the threat to the nation; danger flows in from an outside. Helen Crowley and Mary Hickman (2008) note how the ‘war on terror’ invokes the figure of the ‘outsider’, a figure that is avowedly out of place in Europe.

Anxieties around the problematic ‘outside’ have unleashed a frenzied concern with physical and symbolic borders (van Houtum, 2010) which manifest themselves in a variety of forms, including a rightward political shift. An insidious, populist, extremism has stealthily spread across Europe which, unlike Islamic ‘extremism’, is not external to its borders, nor ‘out of place’. These sentiments are being mobilised into organised movements, shifting right-wing politics in Europe from the margins to
the centres. Right-wing populism “[has been] expand[ing] its following ... for years, entering parliaments and governments, and ensuring that minarets were banned in Switzerland and burqas in Belgium” (Der Spiegel 2010). A particular cause for concern is how populist parties that fetishise borders—operating on anti-immigration and Islamophobia platforms—have become relatively mainstream. There is the True Finns party in Finland, whose nationalist platform has seen it become the third largest party, and the main opposition party, in Finland. Similarly in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid runs on Islamophobia mixed with nationalist populism and is now also the third largest party. In Denmark there is the Danish People's Party, which has increased its popularity by mobilising anti-immigration sentiments and promising to honour our “historic obligation to protect our country, its people and the Danish cultural heritage” (Dansk Folkeparti, 2002). This involved pushing through legislation to suspend the Schengen Treaty, reintroducing border controls with Germany and Sweden.(5) These parties are taking enough votes away from traditional social democratic, liberal, or conservative parties that in many states they now shape identity debates, and in significant cases they formally share power with or prop up the centre right.

On the one hand, the fetishisation of borders can be seen in the concerns for securitisation to ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ nations from ‘alien’ ideologies, represented most often in terms of Islam, so that Muslims are frequently represented as fanatical, violent, and intolerant, espousing values that are incompatible with those of the secular, liberal democracies of Europe (Al-Azm, 1991). However, although the Muslim presence in Europe is represented to a larger or smaller extent as pathological, the circulation and inflow of right-wing extremist ideologies seeking the annihilation of Islam in Europe is largely occluded. Muslims are charged with putting nations at risk by making their borders more porous, yet it is telling how Breivik invokes links with organisations across Europe and America.

It seems that it is the ‘border’ through which popular and political perceptions of and responses to extremisms are configured. Those that are perceived as ‘from without’ are racialised and seen as carrying unknown and unknowable risks. Fear of these risks is mobilised to nurture and promote populist ‘indigenous’ extremist ideologies expressed through both party politics and street violence. Politics offers itself up as a legitimate means for governing such risks. While Islamic extremism is thoroughly located as that which must be governed, right-wing populism is increasingly installing itself as that which must legitimately govern.

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**Guns, germs, and radical evil**

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The most chilling thing about Anders Breivik is his rationality. A survivor said Breivik was “very sure, calm and controlled. He looked like he knew what he was doing.” Though Breivik undoubtedly has a psychotic streak, what commentators find hard to accept is that he fully justified his actions. His manifesto, *2083*, is a compilation of encyclopaedic facts, interpreted through intellectual denunciations of multiculturalism. The massacre follows a biopolitical logic (war on terror, fortress Europe, forced assimilation) to its murderous extreme. This mass murderer was acting according to what he saw as his duty.

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(5) When the Danish Social Democrats replaced the People’s Party in government after the general election in September 2011, the border controls were abolished again.
For Breivik this duty consists in ridding Europe of the dangers of multicultural decadence and Islam. In classic fascist vein 2083 sees its scapegoats as recurring epidemics. The Crusades and the Reconquista contained the disease, but it is returning with a vengeance because of the moral misconduct and the immigration policy of what Breivik calls ‘cultural Marxism’. Breivik sees himself as inaugurating a guerrilla war against Islam and its European allies which will last seventy years. In 2083 Europe will be clean again. Breivik links sexual promiscuity and sexually transmitted disease to Marxism:

“My stepfather Tore, one of my best friends Marius and my more distant friends Kristoffer, Sturla and Ronny are all living manifestations of the complete breakdown of sexual morals. All five have had more than 300 sexual partners (two of them more than 700) and I know for a fact that three of them have one or more STDs (probably all of them). I have several other promiscuous (slut) friends and I could list at least 30 males and females in my social environment if I wanted to. I don’t blame them personally and it has absolutely nothing to do with envy. I could easily have chosen the same path if I wanted to, due to my looks, status, resourcefulness and charm. It’s just terribly sad that my country have [sic] been the victim of severe Marxist infiltration leading to the political doctrines which have been allowed to destroy all moral and norms, resulting in the complete breakdown of our once great ethical standards” (2083 page 1171).

These racial – sexual fantasies arguably draw together affects and discourses circulating through entire continents. His racism and misogyny are condensations of wider cultural political pathologies. Klaus Theleweit (1989) gives the template for understanding the ‘sick’ dimensions of such ‘white terror’. There are too many overlaps between Breivik and the ultranationalist Freikorps militiamen, neo-Nazis, and white power groups to enumerate here. Indeed, online reactions to the massacre from the latter suggest the lone gunman’s ideas gained traction. One ideological difference is the absence in Breivik’s universe of a strong leader. He was acting through his own megalomaniacal fervour. But there are the same fantasies of virile, uniformed white male bodies ready to sacrifice their lives for the purification of a race.

Why did Breivik kill ‘Marxists’ not Muslims? For Breivik, as for some white supremacists in North America, race traitors are more of a threat than minorities: in their vision not only do ‘traitors’ disavow their innate superiority but they also upset racial boundaries and contaminate the white race. Similarly, to Breivik it makes no sense to eliminate Muslims if cultural Marxists would invite more of them. In his view the root cause of European sickness is cultural Marxism, an insidious germ which has infected all organs in society, which has to be tackled head on in order to save the rest of the body politic.

According to Kant, writing in Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1998), the possibility to choose to disobey the moral law and invent one’s own is radical evil—radical because it is a universal and necessary condition for morality as such. But unlike original sin in Catholic doctrines, and unlike an instinct towards aggression, humans adopt radical evil freely as a general tendency. No human is entirely good; the categorical imperative is to work at being so. Hannah Arendt (2006) famously wrote that Nazism’s path towards evil was banal. Nazi officers merely followed orders. Breivik goes further; he follows a polity of his own imagination. In finding a rationale for his murders to the point of claiming he acted selflessly, in the service of European civilisation, Breivik perfectly parodies moral philosophy. He illustrates radical evil whereby the propensity to rationally negate all morality—all efforts of building a universal, just, and trusting society—is shown to be intrinsic to humanity. Evil is not inborn, not simply orchestrated by the devil, not simply individual, and not
absolutely other. Much more frighteningly, it is what is opened up as a possibility the
more we consciously work at living together in peace and interdependence.

Evil might sound like a thoroughly outdated term. However, it is not as a theological
but psychoanalytical term that it is used here—that is, as pertaining to the complexity
of human desires in relation to morality (see Copjec, 1996). Freud understands why one
secretly resents one’s neighbour more than one loves them. Lacan points out in “Kant
with Sade” (2002) that the Marquis de Sade’s cruelty and extolment of violence formed
the dark side of Kant’s contemporaneous Enlightenment philosophy. Kant and Sade
formulated very precisely but in opposite ways what humans can and should do with
their unique freedom: for Sade, indulging in one’s own enjoyment at the cost of others
and the law; for Kant, deploying reason to never use another person as a means, so
that what he calls an ‘ethical commonwealth’ can ensue. Breivik certainly celebrates
violence and presumably derived pleasure from killing, but as with the bureaucrats
of terror, the more disturbing aspect is that as self-proclaimed crusader he aims at a
‘Christian’ community, totally unlike Sade and more like Kant invented.

The sheer intellectual zeal behind Breivik’s upside-down moral programme and the
more irrational desire he has for guns and cleansing Norwegian soil of impure bodies
combine to make him an extremely worrying embodiment of European modernity.
That he is a well-educated, well-groomed young man from one of the wealthiest and
securest states in the world makes me shudder to think where the next such attack
could take place. With continuing economic and political crises, and most countries
spewing far more racist nationalism than Norway, it is imperative to explore how such
seemingly isolated men as Breivik see themselves as rational agents, thus tapping into
the possibility of evil enabled by wider political and cultural reaction.

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**Figuration of a cultural – political crisis across Europe**

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In their introduction to the collection of essays on *Violent Geographies* (2007), Derek
Gregory and Allan Pred describe how one reaction to the murderous events of 9/11
was to reduce the attacks to a barbarism that passed all understanding—terrorism was
located beyond the boundaries of civilisation and lodged in the pathologies of the
perpetrators. In the same way, one (convenient) reaction to the barbaric actions
of Anders Breivik was to see them as the work of an isolated madman that defies any
explanation or connection to contemporary political currents. This view gained support
with a (late November 2011) psychiatric diagnosis of him as ‘paranoid schizophrenic’.
However, Breivik is more than a madman or dangerously unwell individual. His mad-
ness is a reflection of his time, and his ideological ‘manifesto’ (named the “European
Declaration of Freedom”) is a distilled representation of a cultural crisis that pervades
the European continent and finds expression in an increasingly xenophobic populism.
The inconsistencies of the manifesto exactly reflect the internal contradictions in the
world view expressed by this populism. Therefore, Breivik should be seen not as a
specific Norwegian figure, but as a European one—as the figuration of a wider cultural

What immediately commands attention is the contradictory way in which Breivik
constructs his enemy. He does so through an activation and combination of three elements
that usually belong to separate lines of thought—namely, Marxism, multiculturalism,
and Islamism. As pointed out by Slavoj Žižek (2011a, for an English-language version
see 2011b), combining these very different ‘isms’ in one narrative appears as a revival of the old Fascist practice of attributing contradictory characteristics to the enemy (as in the imagination of a ‘Bolshevistic-bureaucratic Jewish conspiracy’) — only here in a new disguise. Even more significant is the mixture that Breivik activates in his construction of his own ideological standpoint. He introduces himself to the police as a ‘commander in the Norwegian resistance’, in this way activating the nation-state but in a way that distances it from any rational internationalist form and encloses it in a historical and ethnic nationalism. He professes Christianity, but simultaneously he shows other traits—for example, in relation to abortion and homosexuality. To him Christianity is merely a cultural construction by means of which you can oppose Islam. Furthermore, Breivik extolls Nazi characteristics, but combined with a bitter critique of the identity politics of the Third Reich and its deportation of Jews. He is openly racist but simultaneously pro-Zionist, since he considers the state of Israel as the primary line of defence against Muslim expansion. One could then ask: how are all these paradoxes possible?

European right-wing populism shares many of the same paradoxes in different combinations. They appear in iconic figures, such as Geert Wilders, and in a number of European parties, such as the Danish People’s Party and the Norwegian Progress Party. Similar to Breivik, they employ the contradictory trick of justifying xenophobia by way of representing it as forbidden. They perform their resentment, which has long become mainstream, as a taboo breach—a revolt against ‘political correctness’ (Charim, 2011). This paradox shows in the reaction to Breivik’s attacks by right-wing commentators in several countries, concurring that “we have to condemn his murderous actions, but at the same time we must not forget that they originate from legitimate worries about genuine problems in our society.” Multiculturalism and creeping Islamisation, in this view, undermine the European societies, and only a few ‘heroes’ are doing anything about it.

It is notable, however, that Breivik did not massacre inhabitants of Riyadh or Islamabad; nor did he primarily target Muslim inhabitants of his own country. Breivik slaughtered fellow Norwegians whom he considered too tolerant of ‘intruding’ strangers—people who, according to him, had betrayed the national cause. This idea of ‘traitors within’ — the Western traitors of the West—is an integral part of right-wing populism (Białasiewicz, 2006). For right-wing populists the threat to European existence certainly comes from the ‘Islamisation’ of European societies. But it also comes from an alleged popularity in intellectual and political circles of the doctrines of multiculturalism and diversity and the growing commitment of elites to cosmopolitan and transnational identities. The conflict in question, then, is not so much a ‘clash between cultures’ as it is a conflict between different views of the way in which different ‘cultures’ are able to and/or ought to coexist.

Even if our attention is currently predominantly on the financial crisis in Europe, its ideological—political side should not be forgotten. According to Žižek (2011), that dimension should be seen against the background of a deeper reconfiguration of political space in Europe. Until recently, the political field in most states was typically dominated by two blocs, both trying to appeal to broad segments of the electorate: a centre-right bloc (liberals, conservatives, Christian democrats, etc) and a centre-left bloc (socialists and social democrats). Gradually, however, a new type of polarity has advanced. On the one side we have the middle-ground orientated parties which all more or less connect to global capitalism. Amongst them, the predominant form of government becomes a depoliticised expert administration and regulation—a pragmatic postpolitics (Ganglbauer, 2011). Opposing that stand the vociferous anti-immigration populist parties, on the fringes of which openly racist or neofascist groups thrive. It seems as if the postpolitics of the European nation-states, not to mention the European
Union, bring about a situation where the only way passion and popular mobilisation can be reintroduced into the political field is through fear: fear of immigrants, fear of terror, fear of crime, fear of ecological catastrophe, etc [for more general discussions of politics of fear see, among many others, Bauman (2006); Gregory and Pred (2007); Pain and Smith (2008)].

Such politics always involves manipulation of emotions and construction of a political field that can work as a meeting point for the multitude of anxieties that circulates in the population. An illustrative example is the way in which anti-immigrant politics became mainstream. After honourably having rejected undisguised popular racism as unacceptable, governments support ‘decent’ racist precautions—as, for example, in what in Denmark has been represented as a ‘firm and fair’ politics of immigration. The best way to avoid violent hostility towards immigrants, the implicit argument goes, is to carry through ‘reasonable’ precautions against immigration.

Is there a way out of this destructive deadlock? Are other modes of common mobilisation possible? In connection to these questions, the reaction within Norway after the massacre might inspire hope. After the event—or at least after the recognition of the identity of the perpetrator (see Holgersen’s contribution)—Norway experienced a nationwide emotional mobilisation against fear and ‘for’ openness and democracy—as expressed by the Norwegian Prime Minister: “We shall fight back with democracy.” The mobilisation reached from the top of government to ordinary inhabitants all over the country—not least young people. People went to the streets to go against the fear that is the intent of all terror.

Writing in the aftermath of the events, the Norwegian author Jan Kjærstad (2011) reflected on the magnitude and the passion of this engagement. What really troubles, he noted, is that the terrorist is Norwegian. In his manic manifesto ‘we’ might recognise minor elements or distorted images of something, which have crossed ‘our’ minds in ‘our’ darkest moments. Therefore, the feeling is not only ‘never again a 22 July, but ‘never again a way of thinking that can lead to a 22 July. Will this feeling last? Nobody knows, but at least xenophobia might now have more difficult times in Norway. To the extent that such progressive responses can be consolidated and broadened, Breivik’s ideology will have been outmanoeuvred.

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