Vertical relations in cartel theory: managerial incentives, buyer groups & antitrust damages

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Citation for published version (APA):
Background material to this dissertation is available at carteltheory.com. You can find my research and papers in their most updated form, as well as media files on cartels, such as a Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) film on leniency programs; the trailer of cartel movie The Informant featuring Matt Damon; and undercover FBI footage of the Lysine Cartel’s secret hotel meetings (Lysine Tapes).

PART II & III buyer groups & antitrust damages

key results

- Well-designed corporate compliance programs can complement leniency programs by triggering a "vertical race to the courthouse"
- Short-term employment contracts can facilitate cartels
- Intra-firm strategic delegation can improve cartel stability
- A buyer group on the input market can induce cartel profits on the output market without engaging in per se illegal interaction
- The overcharge imposed by a cartel on its direct purchasers is an imprecise proxy for antitrust harm suffered by indirect purchasers

Martijn A. Han

Managerial Incentives, Buyer Groups & Antitrust Damages

Martijn Alexander Han (1980) holds an MSc in Econometrics & Mathematical Economics (2007, “with distinction”) from the London School of Economics & Political Science. He also obtained an BSc in Econometrics (2006, “cum laude”), an MSc in Medicine (2008), and a propaganda studies (2009) from the University of Amsterdam.

Martijn’s research is on the economics of competition, with a focus on cartels. This dissertation was written from 2007 – 2011 at the Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics and during a research visit at the Tufts School of Economics. Chapter 2 was awarded the 2011 Robert F. U尔夫罗普 Prize for the best paper in antitrust economics at the annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC) organized in Boston, April 2011.

In the summers of 2007 and 2008, Martijn worked as an Assistant Economist at the U.K. Competition Commission and as an Economic Summer Intern at the U.K. Office of Fair Trading. He also assisted in several private economic consultancy projects.

In addition to his theoretical interest in competition economics, Martijn is an active market competitor himself. He co-created a small T-shirt label, runs an online shop in lamps, and recently founded a 501c3 fast-food preparation agency. Martijn enjoys applying economic theory to his ventures, which, in turn, serve as an inspiring source for academic research.

The Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics is a joint initiative of the Amsterdam School of Economics and the Law School at the University of Amsterdam. The objective of the ACE is to promote research in the fields at the interface of law and economics.

ACLE Dissertation Series No. 4 ISBN 978 90 817645 0 6