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### Vertical relations in cartel theory: managerial incentives, buyer groups & antitrust damages

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**Publication date**  
2011

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#### **Citation for published version (APA):**

Han, M. A. (2011). *Vertical relations in cartel theory: managerial incentives, buyer groups & antitrust damages*.


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