Why Somalis move? An investigation into migratory processes among Somalis

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1. Introduction

Somalis are perhaps the most dispersed people in the world. Due to repeated periods of internal warfare thousand of Somali have fled their country. This exodus has led to a complicated settlement pattern including many countries and even several continents. Between the various parts of the Somali diaspora there are again regularly movements of remigration and resettlement, which are not always easy to explain. The Somalis in The Netherlands show for instance a high rate of out migration to the UK. This extreme migratory behaviour is often explained by some reference to the cultural background of nomadism. The Somalis are than portrayed as the archetypical nomads, who have an inborn need to move around. But this is an assumption that asks for further scrutiny. Because even when we accept the hypothesis that the specific Somali cultural background plays a role in their migrations, it is not clear in which way and to which extent this is the case.

Therefore the main question of this paper is: to what extend has the cultural background of nomadism and clans of the Somali’s influenced their migration patterns. In the next paragraphs we first describe some aspects of the cultural background of the Somali’s and their nomadic lifestyle (2.1). In section 2.2 we sketch the political situation in Somalia, the role of Islam (2.2) and the most recent developments (2.3). In section 3 we analyse the migration streams out of Somalia (3.1), why people choose certain European countries (3.2) and who end up the Netherlands (3.3). In section 4 we will look at removal processes of Somali’s within Europe, especially to the UK and investigate some explanations. In section 5 we draw conclusions.

2. Background: Somalia’s culture, political situation and religion

2.1 Cultural background; nomadism and clans

Cultural traditions play an important role in the way people see themselves and define their situation, even when these traditions are coloured by ‘imagination’. We therefore have to pay attention to the Somali heritage of nomadism and clans. As is described for many North African societies the divide between the nomadic tribes in the borderlands of savannah and desert and the peasants settled in the more fertile plains is an enduring characteristic of these Muslim societies. These societies are in the classification of Parsons based on a particularistic-ascription value system (Parsons, 1951: 101-112). That is to say that an individual is seen as belonging to a system of kinship relations that define his /her rights and obligations. Social relations are built around a heaped system of family-and (sub) clan relations. Such a system has a positive side in the sense that in the harsh and often precarious world of the nomads individuals can rely on the absolute loyalty of their kinsfolk. A negative side is that the system lacks an aspect of compromise. In the age old system of these tribal societies the settlement of conflicts for instance between the mobile nomads and the settled peasants has give rise to the role of ‘saints’ whose role is to mediate and to prevent an endless escalation of conflicts. It is a typical phenomenon of the Muslim societies in Northern Africa that the pre-Islamic institution of these mediating ‘holy men’ has become incorporated in local Islam. Gellner describes these Muslim societies
as follows; “the kind of society in which a weak state co-exists with strong tribes, in which the tribes have what may be called a segmentary structure, and in which the lack of political cohesion is accompanied by a striking degree of cultural and economic interaction (Gellner 1983: 180).

Divisions among clans and sub-clans based on descent have indeed always played an important role in political and social life of the Somalis. These social relations originate in the pastoral economy, in which internal solidarity and a task division in the group, made life possible under difficult circumstances and in periods of scarcity of food for both humans and their herds (Mahamoud, 2002: 54). Rivalry between sub clans is a permanent phenomenon and conflict and solidarity characterise the relations between sub clans. The Somali population is composed of two genealogical groupings: the Saab and the Samale. The Saab who can be subdivide into the Rahanwayn and the Digil, are predominantly (settled) farmers, while the majority of the Samale are nomadic cattle breeders. The four main clans of the Samale are: the Isaq (British Somaliland and Ethiopia), the Hawiya (South), the Dir (British Somaliland, Djibouti and Ogaden) and the Darood (Kenya, Ogaden, North and South) (Gebreyesus 1993: 12). Nomads consider the sedentary population as inferior.

Figure 1 Map of Somali clans and sub clans in Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya

![Map of Somali clans and sub clans](http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bestand:Somalia_ethnic_grps_2002).

Figure 1 shows a map with the largest clans and sub-clans per region. Farming takes place in the area with the large rivers, for instance along the Shebelle and the Juba in the South. In periods of draught, when the eco-system is under pressure, herdsmen take their cattle to areas where animals have food and water. In these periods quarrels between competing groups easily develop. Even though the nomadic groups tend to show a pride and superiority against towards the farming population, they are
mutually dependent for the exchange of food articles and the use of wells (Lewis 2002: 14). But during the rainy season life becomes easier, and conflicts are settled, weddings celebrated and the flock can multiply (Lewis, 2009).

The non-Somali minorities, like the Bantu groups in the South and those with Arab descent on the coast (Benadiri, Barawani and Jaaji) are traditionally not part of the clan structure, and therefore do not enjoy protection, except when a clan has promised to protect them (ACCORD 2009, Ambtsbericht Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2010). These groups are discriminated and are vulnerable during conflicts.

While skirmishes were limited to a small scale in the pre colonial period, the introduction of fire arms combined with international interference caused escalation of the problems. The political instability of Somalia after independence showed a number of peaks, and this caused streams of refugees to the neighbouring countries, but also further out to South Africa, the Arab world, Europe, the US and Canada and even to Australia.

2.2 Somalia’s historic background

In the second half of the nineteenth century, European powers divided the area where the Somali population lives, among five states. The French established themselves in Djibouti, in the North; the British joined the South West to Kenya and established British Somaliland in the North; the Italians called the South around Mogadishu Somalia; and the Eastern Ogaden desert area was joined with Ethiopia. The Somali Republic that came about in 1960 was a merger of two of the five parts, namely British Somaliland and the Italian Somalia. The new government nearly immediately attempted to regain the Somali lands on the Kenyan (1963) and Ethiopian (1964) borders. Pan-Somalism, the vision of unifying these territories as a single Somali nation, was popular at that time. People thought that Somalia with the same language, religion and culture, would have less problems than its multi-ethnic neighbours in Africa. But ethnic unity did not lead to peace and political stability. The country was torn apart by violent conflicts between clans and sub clans. Frustrations about the malfunctioning state led to the unilateral independence of the former British Somaliland in 1991 and to a declaration of autonomy by the region of Puntland in 1998. Somaliland has given up about Greater Somali, while Puntland considers a federation with other parts still possible. In contradiction to the south, Somaliland is functioning in a relatively stable way since then.

After the independence in 1960 skirmishes on the borders of Kenya and Ethiopia already caused small peaks in the emigration. But after the coup of General Siad Barre in 1969 the situation deteriorated fast. His strategy of ‘scientific socialism’ initially seems to neutralise clan discrepancies. But Barre’s regime increasingly showed dictatorial tendencies, and he eventually could not escape clan loyalties and kept members of the Isaq and Majerteen subclans away from his government. Consequently an armed opposition against his rule developed. The famine of 1974–1975 and the

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2 Hill (2010) describes the problematic situation of minorities for Human Rights Watch.

3 BBC timeline: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072611.stm
Ogaden war with Ethiopia in 1977–1978 caused a further rise in violence and resulted in an exodus of more than one million refugees.

In 1991, after Barre’s downfall, a new situation developed. In the North a unilateral independence was announced by the Republic SomaliaLand (with an Isaaq–government), and in the rest of the country the consequent power vacuum led to the re–appearing of armed conflicts, sometimes between clans and sometimes between organized militia’s (smaller units than clans), again accompanied with famine. The Americans attempted in 1992 to get control over the situation with the intervention force ‘Operation Restore Hope’ but this failed. The Americans did not take enough time to comprehend the complicated clan relationships and got stuck in contradictions between the warlords Aideed and Ali Mahdi (Lewis, 2002: 267–282). When dead bodies of American soldiers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by the troops of Aideed, the US–troops left in 1995. The way in which the properties of the US were dismantled, annexed and rapidly sold, shows how business people operate in a war economy. In 1996 Aideed himself got killed in a battle between two Hawiya sub clans (the Habar Gidir and the Abgal) about the control of the banana export. The situation reverted to the pattern of conflicts and lack of safety.


2.3 The role of Islam

One of the basic elements of Somali culture is the Islam. Already in the 7th century the first Muslim communities developed along the coast, conducting trade with the Middle East. Lewis (2002) describes how most of the men in traditional nomadic society were ‘waranhel’ (spear carriers) and a minority was involved with religion, the ‘wadads’ or ‘sheiks’. Their task was to educate the youth, to perform weddings, to administrate justice and to give direction to religious life of the community. Somalis are traditionally followers of a liberal version of Islam, namely the Sunni Sha’afi School. Although this is indeed true for the majority of Somali’s, there have also been diverse movements and leaders (sheiks). Samatar (1992) describes two old main streams, the Qadiriya and the Ahmadiya brotherhoods. In the 19th century a new and more puritanical brotherhood developed within the Ahmadiya stream, called the Salihiya. It was led by a national hero – Sayyid Mohammad Abdille Hassan – who started a crusade against the Christian colonisers. Most Somali’s adhere to the Qadiriya–stream, which promotes a moderate Islam wherein for instance smoking of tobacco is allowed and worshipping saints and their graves plays an important role. A minority is member of the Salihiya–stream, which focuses on ‘pure’ religious practice and considers smoking and dancing as improper. Their leader got into contact in Mecca with Wahabi teachers. The Salihiya consider improper dress or not joining the Friday prayer a reason to exclude someone.
The turnaround to a political involved Islam or ‘Islamism’ is a more recent phenomenon and a development that evolved under influence from abroad (Abdi Elmi 2010: 53). When in the nineteen sixties, some Islamic leaders called for resistance against Western imperialism and for tackling the underdevelopment of the Muslim countries. In Somalia the *Ikhwan* school developed, related to movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Salafi school in Saudi Arabia. Groups like *Al-Shabab* and *Hizbul-Islam* are new representatives of this school. Even though there is a lot of communication between Muslims from all countries through the pilgrimage to Mecca, the high numbers of guest labourers and the trade contact with the Gulf States, religious movements are not simply copied. The movements in Somalia develop in their own ways, and clan membership and the membership of religious streams interact. A sheik would for instance usually find his followers within his own clan or in related clan groupings. The interpretation of Al-Shabab is considerably more extremist than the one of for instance the traditional Muslim brotherhood and the majority of the Somali population thinks that this interpretation does not fit their traditions.4

2.4 Recent developments

After the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York of 9/11, a new phenomenon became apparent in Somali politics. A number of warlords started in cooperation with the American secret services, and the Ethiopian government to persecute individuals who were supposed to have connections with international terrorism and Al-Qaeda (Lewis 2002). But Islamic leaders who were against this persecution decided to take up arms against those warlords (Abdi Elmi, 2006: 61). In this way Islamic groupings started to gain direct political power since the beginning of 2006. The old system of Islamic courts, organised on sub-clan level, replaced the absent government in large parts of Mogadishu already for some time. Cooperation developed in the *Union of Islamic Courts*, and to the relief of the population, this new institution managed to control the fighting militias. With harsh punishments for both bigger and smaller offences, order was more or less restored. The courts were financially supported by the powerful businessmen of Mogadishu and after some time even the harbours and the port re-opened for the first time since 1995. For a short period normal life and trade was possible.5

The Americans were not content with the situation. Incidents took place at the Southern coast, with American navy ships firing at ‘terrorist cells’ and ‘Al Qaeda supporters’. In these raids citizens got killed. Reports of prisoners who have been interrogated on American vessels appeared in the media. At the same time, the Ethiopian army was send to Mogadishu through an UN resolution, to re-establish order. In December 2006 Mogadishu is conquer by the Ethiopian army and the remains of the Yusuf government troops and President Abdullahi Yusuf is reinstalled. The intention was to station a peace force of the African Union in Mogadishu for six months, but the Ethiopian troops did not manage to withdraw that fast, hindered by incidents. The Ethiopian president Zenawi states in 2008 that Ethiopian

4 Meer informatie over de ideologie van deze groepen in Somalïë is te vinden in het Ambtsbericht Somalïë September 2010 (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2010: 14). Informatie over salafisme is te vinden bij Roex e.a. (2010).

5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5051588.stm
troops will not withdraw before the ‘jihadi’s’ are defeated. Meanwhile, hatred increased among Somali’s about this foreign intervention, which they interpreted in terms of the growing contradictions in the World between Muslims and Christians. This political situation caused around 2006–2007 a humanitarian crisis and a serious peak in the refugee stream. The Red Cross speaks of the worst fighting in 15 years. In April 2007 a UN report showed that 320,000 people fled Mogadishu since February. On top of that, it is nearly impossible for food transports to reach the harbours because of worsening piracy in front of the coast.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is rounded off only in January 2009. At the same time the radical Islamic movement of youngsters Al-Shabab advances, after they have chased their rival – the Hizbulla Islam militia – away from the Southern harbour town Baidoa. In February 2010 Al Shabab concentrates its troops in South Mogadishu and prepares a large offensive on the capital (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2010). In December 2010 cooperation between Al-Shabab and Hizbulla Islam is announced.

In the map in figure 2, the situation on the 24 March 2011 is depicted. The green area ‘Harakut al-Shabaab Mujahideen’ is under control of two Islamic movements, Al Shabab/Hisbul Islam, who use the name ‘Islamic Emirate of Somalia’, Al-Shabab strives for a supra national emirate (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2010: 14). Al Shabaab/ Hizbul Islam control most of South and Central Somalia and have established an administration based on strict Sharia laws. Persons who don’t live according the rules of the Sharia, and for instance visit traditional shrines run the risk of being abused, arrested and even killed (Human Rights Watch 2010). The blue area is controlled by the Temporary Federal Government (TFG). Puntland and Somaliland are autonomous. Puntland (grey) and Somaliland (yellow) are autonomous. Al Sunna Wahl Jama’a (ASWJ) – is an Islamic Sufi grouping, that cooperates with the TFG and that re-conquered the town Matabaan in Central Somalia.
3. Somali migration patterns

The political instability and periods of open violence have driven many Somalis into exile. In this paragraph we look at the migration patterns of Somali’s away from their country into the neighbouring countries (3.1) then further to their settlement in Europe (3.2) and finally we look into more detail at the situation of the Somalis in the Netherlands (3.3).
3.1 Refugees movement from Somalia to the neighbouring countries and further

Most Somalis who fled their country, first went to the neighbouring countries, Kenya, Yemen and Ethiopia. Only a small number went immediately further. In January 2010 the total number of refugees from Somalia was 673,309, and there were 1,550,000 internally displaced persons (UNHCR 6) on a population of 9.3 million Somalis (UN, 2010). Figures from the UNHCR year book 2009, as presented in table 4, show in which countries refugees are presently settled.

Table 4 Largest Somali population of recognised refugees according to UNHCR (end 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>11,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>58,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>310,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>9,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>10,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>8,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>32,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>161,468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* From the total number of 26,500 Somali’s in the Netherlands, 11,068 persons have a recognised refugee status. Source: UNHCR Yearbook 2009 (http://www.unhcr.org/4ce5327f9.html)

However the actual refugee population in the countries that are mentioned is much higher than in the table, since not everyone holds a recognised refugee status. Of those registered in Kenya (882,339), 331,570 are living in the refugee camps; while 46,351 live in the cities, but from the majority (504,004 persons) no residence is know (UNHCR 2009).

The refugee camps are not always the neutral safe haven that they should be. In the eighties for instance the members of Siad Barre’s Darod–clan were more welcome than members of other clans (Kenyan Somalis belong to the Darod clan). Attitudes of government can lack neutrality, for instance the attitude of the Yemeni authorities hardened towards Somali refugees after Al-Shabab seemed to associate with Al-Qaeda. Militias sometimes wield power in the refugee camps, and may use violent means to put people under pressure and to recruit youngsters as soldiers in the war (New York Times 2010 7). The Daadab refugee camp in Northern Kenya offers for instance shelter to 90,000 refugees, but towards the end of 2009, 300,000 refugees lived there (Horst, 2004; 2006) . The camps are

6 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a846.html. the population of Somalia is estimated at 9.3 million (UN, 2010).
overcrowded, there is little to eat, and it is nearly impossible to obtain extra income. Women who try to earn a little extra by selling firewood run the risk of being raped by bandits who bivouac around the camps. Although a number of the refugees fled Somalia because of the Islamic groupings, an increasing influence of Islamism is visible in the kind of clothing worn by women in the Kenyan camps (less colourful and more similar to the Iranian black cover). Some terrorism experts consider the combination of a hopeless situation, with little prospect for a solution in Somalia itself, and little hope for the improvement of the standard of living in Kenya, as ‘root causes’ for a potential development towards Islamic fundamentalism.

Some refugees decide to leave without papers to Nairobi after having stayed one or more years in the camps (Moret e.a., 2006). In the slums of Nairobi it is easier to survive, because one can start a little business. In this way a sizable Somali community has developed, some of them have managed to get very rich – legally or illegally. Journalists have suggested that money earned with piracy is being invested in Nairobi. Irrespective of the truth about possible connections, it is clear that investments in Somali towns can be more risky than in Kenya and that some people earn a lot in the war economy.

A small number, usually the better educated and/or wealthier ones, continue their journey to West European countries, the Gulf States and the US. Sometimes they succeed to bring money or gold along on their flight. For others the financial support of family members in safer places is indispensable for the second part of the trip. For assistance one may need enormous sums of money, and often people travel on another person’s passport (Van Liempt 2007).

Figure 5 The most used routes that Somali refugees took, according to Moret and others (2006)

The studies by Van Liempt (2007) and Moret et al ii (2006) contain heartbreaking stories of people who travel with the help of acquaintances or professional human smugglers to a safer country.
Most refugees have no knowledge at all about the country that they are going to, except the limited information that they have received by telephone from acquaintances. Usually the smuggler who may just as well be a family member, determines the route, depending on the papers that he has at his disposal and his estimate of specific border control situations.

Figure 5 gives an overview of the routes Somali refugees follow. Escaping eastwards generally leads to a boat tour overseas to Yemen, and access to the Arab World: Saudi Arabia, the Arab Emirates and Egypt. From Egypt the route can continue to Greece or Italy. Via an escape southward people can end up over land in Kenya and Tanzania, but also further via the sea as far as Mozambique and end in South Africa. Large numbers of refugees stay for years in the camps in Kenya and northern Tanzania. In cases that they have contacts in Ethiopia they can pass the Kenyan–Ethiopian border and reach Addis Ababa by car, and some go on to Djibouti (around the trouble areas in Somalia). As the figure shows, people reach Europe via nearly all countries mentioned.

After safety is guaranteed, the most important reason to stay somewhere, is the possibility to get a legal status. The next issues are finding work and being able to bring the family together, which determines staying or proceeding to the next location. The case study of Somalis in the UNHCR handbook 2009 (p. 50) adds a few issues of another nature that may stimulate people to move on, such as detention, illegal entrance, unfair asylum procedures, xenophobia and violation of human rights by the authorities of receiving countries. Though the UNHCR considers return usually as the best option, this is only considered realistic for Somaliland and for South Somalia as utterly unrealistic.

If we compare the countries where Somalis are settled with the settlement patterns of other Middle East refugees, Iraqi’s and Iranians, we come to the conclusion that the Somalis are indeed spread over many more countries. But to relate this to a cultural tradition of nomadism seems farfetched since the sheer location of the country provides more possibilities to move to other countries.

3.2 Somali’s in Europe

The largest number of Somali’s in Europe is found in the UK (32,299 with refugee status according to UNHCR data from 2009), as table 5 showed. The second largest population in Europe resides in the Netherlands with 11,068, followed by Sweden (10,636), Norway (7,064) and Italy (7,747). Since the UNHCR data counts only people with a refugee status, the actual population is about double as large.

EUROSTAT gives information on the number of asylum requests in 2010. From these data we can conclude that in 2010 Sweden is the most popular country for Somali’s to ask asylum (5,630 applications), followed by the Netherlands (3,670), Germany (2,260), the UK (720) and Finland (520). 8 The relative small number of Somali’s who directly ask for asylum in the UK may have to do with the higher rejection rates in the UK (figure 6).

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It is interesting to see in the EUROSTAT data that the different EU countries attract people from a few specific refugee producing counties. Some East European countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia) have higher number of Afghans and former USSR citizens (Russians, Georgians, Ukrainians) in 2010, while for Bulgaria and Germany Iraqi were the largest group. For Italy Nigerians are the largest group and for Greece Pakistani, while Chinese and Bangladeshi choose France in large numbers. Though it's difficult to see clear patterns for all these choices or to explain them geographical location and chain migration seem to be the main reasons for these figures. As soon as a community has developed in a certain country, it attracts others from the same country.

3.3 Somali’s in the Netherlands

The influx of Somali refugees into the Netherlands is taking place since the end of the 1980’s and had peaks in two periods, namely between 1992 and 1998, and between 2008 and 2010. During the years in between there was a constant influx of asylum seekers, and those who received their refugee status had the right to bring their direct family members to the Netherlands.

The first notable influx from Somalis in the Netherlands is related to the collapse in 1991 of the regime of Siad Barre. The highest point is reached in 1995. The peak is delayed because refugees arrive in Europe with some delay, and family reunification can only takes place after the first refugees have settled. During Siad Barre’s rule people fled who belonged to clans that were supposed to be
antagonistic to his rule, like Isaq and Majerteen. After Siad Barre's downfall, those who had involved themselves in his reign fled the country, like members of the Darod clan. The border war with Ethiopia caused another increase in refugee numbers.

After 2007 we see a second peak, as a consequence of the political situation in the South. The inflow exists at that moment mainly of southerners (Hawiya, Rahanwein and Digil) of whom a substantial number from Mogadishu. In this period we hardly see any northerners (Isaq), since Somaliland is relatively safe. In 2010 the asylum laws became stricter and it has become more difficult for Somali’s to get a refugee status, but there is still an inflow of refugees into the Netherlands, though less than in 2009. Even when the direct fighting diminishes, there are still people who leave Somalia because of the rule of Islamist courts or to unite with family members who have already migrated earlier.

The number of Somali’s in the Netherlands shows strong fluctuations in the last 15 years. In figure 7 we have depicted the development of the total Somali population residing in the Netherlands from 1996 till 2010, including refugees and those with other permits like family members. Between 1996 and 2010 we see a strong increase from 20,000 to nearly 30,000, while after that in the period between 2001 and 2007 a decrease is visible back to less than 20,000. Recently we see the number of Somalis increasing again.

![Figure 7 Development of the Somali population in The Netherlands 1996-2010](image)

Source: CBS, Statline 12-10-2010

In figure 8 the reasons for the fluctuations become clearer. We already mentioned that there is lower immigration in the years 2002-2006, but figure 8 shows that there is also a higher emigration. In 2007 the immigration and emigration are more or less equal, and from 2008 onwards the immigration is again higher than the emigration. Since 1987, refugee reception in the Netherlands is organised in asylum centres, where asylum seekers have a bed, bath and bread and limited pocket money. After the refugee status is granted, the accepted refugees are placed in homes in cities and villages in all parts of the Netherlands, usually in the cheapest sections of public housing owned by housing corporations.
Since it can be quit lonely as the only foreigner in a tiny village somewhere in the countryside, all refugee groups tend to move on to the big cities in the centre of the country, so concentrations in the provinces Noord- and Zuid-Holland are normal. Klaver & van der Welle (2009) interviewed people and conclude that all refugees tend to move on to the larger cities, because of better educational and employment possibilities. Somalis have ended up spread out throughout the Netherlands, but with higher concentrations in the provinces Noord- and Zuid-Holland and Noord-Brabant. Somali concentrations developed especially in Rotterdam (1539), Den Haag (1299), Amsterdam (1071) and Tilburg (1069).

On average 2% of the Somali’s move, a percentage that is actually the same as the percentage among Iraqi’s and Iranians (Klaver & van der Welle 2009: 25). There is no indication that Somali’s are more inclined than other refugees to move inside the Netherlands. But they seem to manage to move more often to concentration towns where other Somali’s live. The concentration in the city of Tilburg in the South of the Netherlands, where 4.6% of all Somali’s in the Netherlands live, cannot be explained by the housing policies of the asylum system, nor by the tendency to move to the centre of the country. Although Afghans also managed to form a concentration in Arnhem, only 2.5% of Afghans live in this concentration town, whereas 4.6% of Somali’s live in Tilburg. So actually not the fact they move is striking, but the place where they move to. As Permentier & Wittenbrood (2011: 129) conclude in their comparative study Afghans, Iraqi’s and Iranians who have been more than 10 years in the Netherlands, live more often in a ‘white’ neighbourhood, but the opposite is true for Somali’s: those who live longer in the country live more often in a neighbourhood with a concentration of immigrants.\footnote{A concentration neighbourhood is defined as: at least 10% immigrants and at least one third higher than the mean in this municipality; while a white neighbourhood has less than 10% immigrants and one third less than the mean in that municipality.} The educational level seems to explain the differences between the refugee groups. Iranians have the
highest educational level of the refugee groups, and tend to live in white neighbourhoods after 10 years, while Somali’s who have the lowest educational level of the refugee groups, and live in the areas where immigrants are concentrated. Finding a job is much easier for Iranians than for Somali’s: the unemployment rate is 33% for Somali’s and, 28% for Afghans and Iraqi’s, and 20 % for Iranians (Dagevos 2011: 109). The Dutch labour market is much more problematic for immigrants than for Dutch, since the unemployment rate for Dutch is only 4%.

The Somalis seem to be in an even more vulnerable position than other refugee immigrants in The Netherlands. One reason is mentioned already; the extremely high percentage of people without any school attainments, which makes entry on a modern labour market of course very difficult. But there are some other factors, which though difficult to quantify, impede the integration of Somalis in the Netherlands. In comparison with other Muslim immigrants, the Somalis have no religious organisation to speak of. There are hundreds of mosques in The Netherlands, some with a clear national background (e.g. Turkish or Moroccan) some with a specific orthodox character (sometimes financed from abroad) or just a more liberal interpretation of the Islam. But only one specific Somali mosque was founded and contacts with other Islamic communities is hampered by the specific character of Islam in Somalia. The point that is isolating the Somalis both from the Dutch society and the more general Muslim communities is the circumcision of women. This is strictly forbidden by Dutch law and also unacceptable for the other Muslim communities. It is by the other Muslims considered to be a pagan custom in contradiction with the Koran.

For the time being it seems premature to explain the high migration rates of the Somalis towards and from The Netherlands by their nomadic background. The Somalis are dispersed over a great number of countries, but this has to do with the periods of civil war in Somalia and the geographical location and traditional connections of Somalia. It is not surprising that in this Somali diaspora there is a high level of communication and exchange of information. To what extend the functioning of these networks of international contacts is related to the cultural background of nomadism and clan is a matter of further investigation.

4. Emigration from the Netherlands.

The high rate of onward mobility tot the U.K. by the Somalis in The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries was studied by van Reek and Hussein (2003) and Nielsen (2004). This research was later supplemented by studies of Somalis who had moved to the U.K (Valentine et.al. ii, 2009 and Van Liempt, 2010, 2011). The respondents in the study by van Reek and Hussein gave the following motives for the migration from the Netherlands to the U.K.

a) Economic factors: the better educated ones move to the UK. Those who move know the English language, and think it will be easier to find a suitable job than in the Netherlands. Diplomas from the country of origin are sometimes recognised in the UK, but not in the Netherlands. Starting you own shop or business is easier, because there are less rules. "In the Netherlands is everything that you try to do difficult. There is always an official that tells you that what you want it is not possible".

b) Social factors are a pull factor: In the UK old colonial ties exist, and a community of mainly Isaq from Somaliland is well established. Other clan groups joined this community in the last 15 years,
and concentrations of Somali’s live in cities like Leicester and Birmingham. A large community means social contacts, Somali shops and facilities, and also more social control, support and possibilities to educate your children in a Somali sphere and culture. Most emigrants had family members in the UK, who helped them with their first steps.

c) Unhappiness about the Netherlands is a push factor. The Netherlands are experienced as a country where you have to assimilate and where you are not allowed to enjoy your own culture. The attitude of the Dutch towards immigrants and Muslims is experienced as more and more negative. Besides this the social system is based on meddling and patronizing, with advisory house visits and annoying rules. The UK on the other hand is seen as ‘really multi-cultural’, having respect for individual initiatives, and therefore suits better to the independent mindset of Somali’s.

These motives may of course play a role in the minds of the Somalis and may represent significant reasons for part of the migrants. But if we realise that 58% of the Somalis between 18 and 34 years old have no school attainments at all, the familiarity with the English educational system can be in reality only a migration motive for a limited number of Somalis. The same reservation applies to the anti-immigrant feelings in the Netherlands. There certainly has been a rise in anti-Islam ideology during the last years, fuelled by social problems in some of the older parts of the cities and by the terrorist acts by Islamic groups as for instance the bombing of the London underground. But this does regard all Muslim residents in The Netherlands, who nevertheless generally do not show the same tendency of out migration and prove to be able to integrate sometimes successfully. Even when we consider the case of the Moroccan mayor of Rotterdam Aboutaleb as an exceptionally successful immigrant, we see that the majority of Muslims is also slowly improving their social position. A few issues have not helped Somalis to be part of the larger Muslim community. For instance they may have been somewhat singled out among other Muslims because of the role of Ayaan Hirsi Ali played, a Somali women who made a carrier in the Netherlands and became even a member of parliament for the conservative party VVD. She was popular among anti-Islam groups exactly because she pointed at the Islam as a religion suppressing women and at the circumcision of women as a barbarous custom. It is therefore possible that especially the Somalis are met with more distrust and discrimination than others.

The respondents of Van Reek & Hussein were not always well informed about the disadvantages of the English situation, for instance the lesser quality of housing, or any of the other problems that accompany life in the UK. The unemployment rate is for instance about the same among Somali’s in the Netherlands and the UK. But even then most respondents in the study, who had moved, were more satisfied with their life in the UK than in the Netherlands. Exceptions were youngsters who had grown up in the Netherlands: among them several moved back when they reached the age of 21. Especially for girls, life in a completely Somali surrounding has disadvantages, like social control, gossip and marriage arrangements.

The studies by Van Liempt (2010, 2011) provide a similar picture of the motives to migrate from The Netherlands to the UK. Most of the interviewees that Van Liempt talked to, had been many times in Britain to visit family members before they decided to move. But her respondents again mention the unhappiness about their position in the Netherlands, both in terms of educational and employment opportunities and in terms of the ability to practice Islam. According to this author it is
especially the concentration of Somali’s that is highly appreciated. It is of course too early to state that this may be especially true for the first generation of Somali refugees. But the tendency among the younger generation to move back to The Netherlands may give an indication in that direction.

Though these studies provide insight in Somali’s motives, it would be helpful to put them in perspective by a comparison with other refugee immigrants, especially from Muslim countries.

Figure 9 shows the emigration rates of refugees from the Netherlands, added up for the period of 1998 to 2008. A problem with this figure is that it does not show where the refugees move to. In the case of ex–Yugoslavians for instance, the removals are probably to a large extend back to the countries of origin, because peace returned there. But let’s assume this is not the case for Somali’s, Afghans, Iraqi and Iranians. The Somali’s have the highest percentage added up in 10 years: with 12%, compared to Afghans (7%).

Figure 9. Emigration of refugees from the Netherlands 1998–2008

![Figure 9. Emigration of refugees from the Netherlands 1998–2008](image.png)

Source: Klaver & van der Welle (2009: 29) based on CBS data

When we systematically examine the factors that Van Reek& Hussein present as motives for the Somali out migration we get a picture to what extent they apply to comparable groups and in how far they are characteristic for the Somalis.

Ad a) Economic factors. With the unemployment figures that we see among refugees, we are wondering why not more refugee populations move to other European countries. One would expect that particularly Iranians with their high educational standard, and Iraqi’s with their colonial links to the UK would easily move, but it are actually the low educated Somalis, who leave the Netherlands more than other refugee groups. Economic factors don’t seem to give a full explanation for the high out migration of Somalis.
Ad b) Social and historic ties. Groups with historic ties to the UK move more easily there. Quite a few communities have historic ties to the UK. Therefore we compare Somali’s in Table 10 with three other groups that have historical ties with the UK, namely Ghanaians, Pakistani’s and Iraqi’s. We have to be aware that there may be a difference between refugees (Iraqi) and economic migrants (Ghanaians and Pakistani). Moreover the historic ties only hold for Somaliland that was colonised by the English and the old Somali community is actually one of what are now Somalilanders. This would mean that not all Somali’s are attracted to the UK, but mainly Isaq. But only Griffiths (2002) gives some information on the newcomers, and it seems that not only Isaq are attracted by the UK.

Table 10 Percentage of the population of six ethnic group in the Netherlands that emigrates in 1996, 2000, 2005 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Afghans</th>
<th>Ethiopians</th>
<th>Ghanaians</th>
<th>Iraqi</th>
<th>Iranians</th>
<th>Somali’s</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS statline May 6th 2011

Ad c) Dutch anti-Islamic feelings as a motive to leave the country. Table 10 provides not only six other nationalities, but also the year of the removal. It shows the Somali removal rates were higher between 2000 and 2005, and were at a similar level as those of Ethiopians, Iraqi and Iranians in 1996 and 2009. The anti-Islam mobilisation in Dutch politics became around 2000 indeed more important than before. But the anti Islam sentiment has not diminished and is one of the main propaganda points of the populist party P.V.V. that has been successful in the last elections. Still we see a lower percentage of out migration in 2009. It is also noteworthy that Somali’s are not the only Muslims in the table. Afghans, Pakistani and at least a section of the Iraqi and Iranians are also Muslims, and do not show an increased removal rate between 2000 and 2005.

Altogether the factors studied till now on, do not explain the full picture. There seems to be something else than the factors mentioned till now on that actually causes the higher removal rates between 2000 and 2005.

5. Conclusion

The central question of this paper was to what extent does the specific cultural background of the Somalis influence their migration patterns. In the first sections of this paper we looked at the migration from Somalia. It is clear that the political instability and outbursts of violence in Somalia have to do with the cultural background of clans and nomadism. But that that does not explain the emigration from Somalia. All over the world people flee from war situations, as we witness more recently again in Tunisia and Libya. To which countries people flee is always determined by more or less accidental factors as location of the country, the presence of earlier migrated families; or commercial contacts and last but not least by the routes that the people who organise the flight out of
humanitarian or pecuniary reasons are familiar with. In this way the Somali refugees became dispersed over a great number of countries and part of them settled in European countries like The Netherlands. So far there is no need for an explanation of the migration and settlement patterns that is specific for the Somalis. However when we take a closer look at the Somali population in The Netherlands and for that matter also in countries as Denmark and Sweden we see a remarkable process of out migration that is specific for the Somalis.

Several reasons are put forward to explain the high rate of migration of the Somalis to the U.K. They make the wish of the Somali refugees to move on to the U.K. understandable, but do not add up to a full explanation. It is true that unemployment among the Somalis, even in comparison with other refugee groups, is extremely high. We suppose that this is related to the high percentage of the Somalis that has not any school attainments. It is also true that the rise of anti-Islamic feelings in The Netherlands makes life for Muslim refugees harder and sometimes downright unpleasant. However, this anti-Islamic mood is also affecting the much more numerous Muslim populations from other countries. Perhaps the specific character of Somali Islam, especially the issue of female circumcision, isolates them more in Dutch society than the various other Muslims. But this is of course difficult to prove.

When we shift our attention from the push factors in The Netherlands to the pull factors in the U.K., the picture becomes clearer. Due to old colonial ties there exists in the U.K. a well established Somali community, especially in the cities of Leicester and Birmingham. These concentrations attract the Somalis from other West European countries who feel more at home among each other where the life is regulated by family and clan ties than in the strange world of the modern welfare states, where life is regulated by laws and bureaucratic rules.

The high migration rates of the Somali refugees are often explained by a reference to their nomadic past. For instance in the study by Warfa et alii (2006) the Somalis are described as considering themselves as nomads and regard nomadism as a way of life to solve problems. It seems to be primarily a romantic image about the past. One could wonder how many of the present day refugees have indeed personal experience with the pastoral life in the semi-deserts, where the movements are dictated by the sequence of seasons along often age-old routes and individuals are highly encapsulated in family and clan ties. However though the image of nomadic life may be more romantic than realistic, this does not mean that it cannot have an impact on the behaviour of the refugees in Europe. For as W.I. Thomas observed already: “When men define situations as real, they become real in their consequences”.

It is obvious that there is not an easy answer to the question why Somalis move, especially if we disregard for a moment the flight from situations of open civil war, hunger and outbursts of violence. But the movements of Somalis within and between the countries where they have settled as refugees invite a more complex explanation. Regularly the high rate of mobility among the Somali refugee populations is simply attributed to their nomadism. But our analysis has made clear that this answer does not explain the specific migration movements such as from The Netherlands to the U.K. In looking for an explanation for a complicated social process we have be aware that causation of social behaviour is due to a layer of ‘causes’ that direct or indirect influence the actual process (MacIver

10 This theorem is well known it has among others informed Thomas Merton’s well known essay on The self-fulfilling prophesy (Merton, 1957, 421–455.)
In the literature on the Somalis several factors are mentioned, such as high unemployment and anti-Islam sentiment, that indeed may have contributed to the out migration towards the U.K. But these factors do not offer a conclusive explanation because comparable populations do not react in the same way on these factors as the Somalis. However the factor that seems to be really specific for the Somalis is the strong wish to reside in a more or less closed community with family and clan members. This factor is obviously related to the historical and cultural background of the Somalis.

To understand the behaviour of present day generation of Somali refugees we have to realise that these people have often gone through agonising and traumatic experiences. Their need to find not only material but also psychic security is understandably great. And here we think the background of nomadism and clans comes into play. In the often precarious world of nomadism the individual is encapsulated in the absolute loyalty of (extended) families and clans. Outside the backing of this context the individual is vulnerable and insecure. This aspect of the cultural background of the Somalis is according to our analysis the most direct cause of the migration movements of the Somali refugees from countries where the direct material needs are provided for. It remains an interesting question in how far this explanation is special valid for the first generation of refugees. To what extent and in what way the cultural background of the Somalis will guide the behaviour of the next generations is impossible to predict.
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