Urban livelihoods, institutions and inclusive governance in Nairobi: ‘spaces’ and their impacts on quality of life, influence and political rights
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2. Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts on quality of life, influence and political rights

2.1. Introduction

Interest in responsive and inclusive governance has been central to the international development debate in the last two decades. On the one hand the international development policy agenda since the 1990 Washington Consensus focused on (good) governance, privatisation and responsive service delivery through decentralisation. On the other hand, (inter)national civil society and citizenship and deepening democracy literature (as well as social movements and livelihoods literature) focused on the ‘rights based approach’ for development and participation as primary citizenship right for civic engagement to claim other human rights. With the mixed record of results of the good governance and decentralisation agenda and the gradual refocus at (inter)national level on rule of law and state building rather than democratisation for development, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and 2008 Accra High Level Forum (AHLF) on Aid Effectiveness promoted an increased emphasis on endogenous development and ownership and intensification of the agenda through capacity development. Parts of the international development policy world called for investigation of alternative and mutually complementary informal channels. Examples are the Drivers of Change approach of DFID/SIDA, the OECD institutional programme and the recent Africa Politics and Power Programme. There has also been a shift towards understanding the role of power and multi-level institutional and structural constraints in action and research after a history of mixed results from the good governance agenda and the increased effects of globalisation on poverty. A coherent framework has yet to be formulated in order to analyse the conditions under which spaces of power (underpinned by multi-level formal and informal institutions) impact quality of life, influence and political rights of the poor.

This chapter starts with a general literature review of the debate on voice, responsiveness and (local) governance (2.2). It proceeds by discussing spaces through which citizens can potentially express their voice and make their claims for influence and political rights (2.3). After introducing the concept of spaces, the relevant theoretical notions with regard to individually claimed/created spaces, collectively claimed/created spaces, and invited spaces are reviewed. For each of these spaces the relevant theoretical conceptualisations are reviewed and the transition from an actor-oriented agency perspective, towards a balanced structural constraints perspective is discussed. Finally, the literature on impacts on poverty and influence though
these spaces is reviewed (2.4) in terms of impacts on quality of life and impacts on influence and political rights.

2.2. Voice, responsiveness, governance and citizen influence

Towards the end of the 1990s international development literature stressed the insufficient responsiveness of governance institutions and the additional need for channels of accountability and expression of citizen voice. The Consultations with the Poor report for the WDR 2001 (drawing from the Voices of the Poor reports of Narayan (2000/1)), indicated that many poor people in developing countries perceive institutions as distant, unaccountable and corrupt; furthermore the report states that poverty needs to be increasingly understood from the perspective of the poor. A study by the Commonwealth Foundation (1999, quoted from Goetz & Gaventa 2001) found growing disillusionment of citizens with their governments, based on concerns about corruption, lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor, and the absence of connection to or participation by ordinary citizens. The lack of responsiveness concerned especially delivery of public services.

Decentralisation, in the context of the 1990 Washington Consensus, was generally considered as a major way to enhance efficient and responsive delivery of service (Zanetta 2005, based on Oates 1972, Tiebaut 1956 and Musgrave 1963; Smoke 2003; Jütting 2004/5). Guided by the principle of subsidiary, responsibility for service provision should be allocated at the closest appropriate level consistent with efficient and cost-effective delivery of services. Due to their close proximity, local government officials are considered to be in a better position than state officials to assess the needs and preferences of their citizens; moreover they are in a better place to make decisions over the distribution and allocation of resources and public services. In addition, management of public services can improve in terms of accountability and performance in the hands of sub-national officials, rather than with far removed national bureaucracies and elected officials (Ostrom et al. 1993). Figure 2.1 shows an overview of the basic accountability relationships within a devolved system of local service provision. In addition, if successfully implemented, decentralisation can potentially reduce red tape and bureaucracy, improve credibility and legitimacy of the government, foster innovation while minimising the risks in case of failure (Rondinelli 1983) and promote local democracy among other things through greater representation of diversity by greater public input in pluralistic political environments (Pauly 1973, quoted from Zanetta 2005; Crook & Sverrisson 2003; Blomkvist 2003). Crook and Manor (1998) were very critical about the expectations of decentralisation, in the context of earlier experiences in the world. ‘The
outcomes of a decentralisation policy were supposed not to depend just on the relative weights of devolution and deconcentration in the institutional and fiscal structures, but also on their combination with the two other important elements: the kind of legitimation and accountability adopted (e.g. participatory, electoral, religious, monarchical) and the principles according to which the area (and hence size and character) of a decentralised authority are determined’(Crook & Manor 1998: 2).

Figure 2.1: Basic accountability relationships

Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of responsibilities for public functions and services from central government to lower levels of government. It can take on different functions and intensity in different countries. Decentralisation can consist of three functions: fiscal, institutional or administrative, and political (Smoke 2003). Fiscal decentralisation refers to the resource allocation to sub-national levels of government, such as the assignment of responsibilities of own-source revenues. Institutional or administrative decentralisation aims at transferring decision-making authority,
resources and responsibilities for the delivery of public services from the central government to sub-levels of government. It concerns administrative bodies, systems and mechanisms which help to manage and support decentralisation. It is also comprised of procedures which link formal government bodies to other key local actors such as NGOs and the private sector. Political decentralisation refers to the transfer of political power and authority to sub-national levels of government. Decentralisation may also differ in intensity or degree. Rondinelli (1999) distinguishes between the modes of deconcentration, delegation and devolution.³ Deconcentration is considered the weakest form of decentralisation, with a geographical dispersion of state responsibilities rather than the actual transfer of authority to sub-national governments. Delegation implies a transfer of decision-making authority and administrative functions to the sub-national level, in which sub-national authorities are not controlled by the state but are accountable to it. Devolution concerns the strongest form of decentralisation, with transfer of competencies, especially in service delivery, to local authorities that elect their own mayors and councils, gain financial autonomy, and have independent decision-making authority in the allocation of investments. Devolution is therefore an inherent political process and has also been termed ‘democratic decentralisation’ (Litvack et al. 1998). Decentralisation can be implemented as a gradual process or as a big bang operation. Whatever the function and mode of decentralisation, interrelations between various levels and parts of government remain crucial elements in the functioning of the public sector.

Decentralisation is often, but not necessarily, accompanied by a shift from hierarchy to markets for provision of public goods and services and the related shift from government to (local) governance (see also Baud, Post, De Haan & Dietz 2001). Governance takes on the form of multi-actor arrangements and has been described as ‘a notoriously slippery term that vaguely refers to non-hierarchical attempts at coordinating public and private interests, actions and resources’ (Pierre & Peters 2000: 7). It concerns forms of cooperation between the state and the private – including both civil society as well as the private for profit sector (Pierre 1998).

The main commonality in definitions of governance is the notion of institutions as ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990), while especially differing in terms of specificity and normativity (Grindle 2005/7).⁴ Institutions are generally defined as ‘regularised patterns of behaviour between individuals and groups’ (Leach 1999: 226), or ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape interaction’ (North 1990: 3) or ‘social practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, sanctioned and maintained by social norms and have a major significance in the social structure’ (Abercombie et al. 1984). Institutions can be formal (rules and conventions, including constitutions, laws, regulations, property rights,
markets and enforcement characteristics like sanctions) and informal (codes of behaviour like traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all other norms of behaviour that passed the test of time) (North 1990; see also Ellis 2000; Jütting 2003).

From a critical perspective, Swyngedouw (2005: 1991) suggests that hybrid and ambiguous ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ not only rearticulates the state-civil society relationship, but also erodes the democratic character of the political sphere by the encroaching neo-liberal imposition of market forces that set the rules of the game, empowering new actors and disempowering others. Swyngedouw indicates that ‘considerable risks may be involved in the proliferation of ‘unauthorised’ actors: a vast terrain of contestation, potential conflict, capacity to exercise entitlements and institutional power without official restraints may emerge from it. Systems may become non-transparent, ad-hoc and context dependent and questions remain with regard to inclusion, legitimacy, representation, scale of operation and internal/external accountability. Whereas in formal ‘democracy’ the rules are clear and all have the opportunity to participate – if only to vote –, in multi-actor governance arrangements participation itself becomes contested and governance becomes limited ‘in terms of who can, is, or will be allowed to participate which in turn is related to power and status’.

Early citizenship literature and ‘deepening democracy’ literature was much more positive about the possibilities of inclusive governance. This literature emphasised that for promotion of development with poverty reduction through local governance, it is necessary to rebuild the relationships between citizens and their local governments by working on ‘both sides of the equation’ and on their intersections (Gaventa 2001; Cornwall & Gaventa 2001b). Focusing on just one of these perspectives was considered to hold the risk of leading to either ‘voice without influence’, when participation is not linked to power and politics, or to reinforcing the status quo when reform of political institutions does not include consultation and participation (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001).5

Citizenship and deepening democracy literature moved beyond voice as consultation and presence, and included influence on decision-making and holding accountable those who make policies in participatory processes regarding service delivery (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001; Goetz & Gaventa 2001).6 Citizenship literature emphasises the rights of citizens to participate and exert influence ‘as makers and shapers’ rather than ‘users and choosers’ of interventions and services designed by others (Cornwall & Gaventa 2001; Goetz & Gaventa 2001). The reconceptualisation of participation as a right of citizenship – aligning with concepts of rights-based approaches to development - , indicates that it represents an expression of human agency in the political
Chapter 2

arena: citizenship is a right that enables people to act as agents (Lister 1998, quoted from Cornwall & Gaventa 2001b). In addition, it was suggested that if rights and citizenship are attained through agency - not only bestowed by the state – the right to participate is a prior right necessary for making other rights real. While social rights were seen as freedoms helping people to realise their political and civil rights, participation as a right was considered as a positive freedom enabling citizens to realise their social rights (Ferguson 1999; DFID 2000; Lister 1997, quoted from Gaventa 2004). In this study participation is interpreted as a right of citizenship that enables access to other rights. Direct participation is however not viewed as the only channel through which other rights can be accomplished.

2.3. Spaces

The concept of spaces

The notion of spaces was first introduced to the development literature by Grindle and Thomas (1991), who conceptualised policy arenas as spaces. The notion of spaces for participation was more widely introduced to the development literature towards the end of 1990s in the context of growing attention for (local) governance and accountability, viewing inclusive governance as a right for all citizens as opposed to earlier need based conceptions of participation (Gaventa & Valderama 1999; Brock 2000; Brock, Cornwall & Gaventa 2001; Cornwall 2002).

The concept of spaces originates from 20th century German (Habermas, Arendt) and French (Lefebvre, Foucault, Bourdieu) social theorists (Cornwall 2002). Spaces for participation were defined ‘in abstract terms as the ways in which opportunities for engagement might be conceived or perceived, and in concrete terms of the actual sites that are entered and animated by citizens’ (Lefebvre 1991, quoted from Cornwall 2001/2/4a).

Initially spaces for participation of citizens were mainly defined in relation to the state and differentiated into invited and claimed or created spaces. In invited spaces citizens are acting in and with the state. In claimed or created spaces citizens are acting without the state, both outside and in the absence of or in relative autonomy from and on the state.7 Later the notion of spaces was also increasingly used for non-state spaces, referred to as ‘new democratic spaces’ or ‘spaces of change’(Gaventa 2007a: xv). These spaces exist in a dynamic relationship in that whatever happens in the one influences the other. Similarly, power, experiences and capacities gained in one space, can be used to enter and affect other spaces (Cornwall 2004b).
More recently the notion of spaces for participation was adapted in the context of the growing recognition of the importance of power relations and globalisation (Gaventa 2004/6b). In the so-called ‘power cube’ the dimension of power is explicitly added to the dimensions of spaces and places, while redefining them as levels, spaces and forms of power (Figure 2.2). Levels consist of global, national and local places. Spaces are divided into closed, invited and created/claimed spaces. Forms of power, based on Lukes’s conceptualisations (1974/2005) and VeneKlasen and Miller (2002), are divided into visible, hidden and invisible power (Gaventa 2004/6b/7a/7b). Visible power (observable decision-making) includes the visible and definable aspects of political power – the formal rules, structures, authorities, institutions and procedures of decision-making. ‘Hidden power (setting the political agenda) concerns the maintenance of influence of certain powerful people and institutions by controlling who gets to do the decision making and what gets on the agenda. Invisible power (shaping meaning and what is acceptable) shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation. Significant problems and issues are not only kept from the decision-making table, but also from the minds and consciousness of the different players involved, even those directly affected by the problem. By influencing how individuals think about their place in the world, this level of power shapes people’s beliefs, sense of self, and acceptance of the status quo – even their own superiority or inferiority. Processes of socialisation, culture and ideology perpetuate exclusion and inequality by defining what is normal, acceptable and safe’ (Gaventa 2004/6b, based on VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). The power cube framework is meant to facilitate the assessment of possibilities for transformative action in various political spaces. Spaces are then viewed as ‘opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests’ (Gaventa 2006b). Each of the continuums involves contestation over the boundaries of spaces and places for participation, and the dynamics of power which influences which actors, voices and identities may enter or are excluded from them (Gaventa 2004).

Gaventa (2006b) indicates that other relevant terminologies have been added to the continuum of spaces, such as ‘conquered’, ‘instigated’ or ‘initiated spaces’. Recently the term ‘negotiated spaces’ was proposed to refer to processes of expanding spaces and claiming spaces (Baud & Nainan 2008).
This study discusses spaces at the local level and their intersections with spaces at the national level. The study still applies the original core differentiation between claimed/created and invited spaces. Claimed/created spaces are differentiated into individually and collectively claimed/created spaces. The added forms of power in the ‘power cube’ are captured more dynamically in the research through the analysis of processes and the accommodating and constraining metropolitan, national and international institutional contexts. These institutional contexts - that underpin spaces and accommodate and constrain processes within spaces - consist of formal rules of the game/institutions (rules and conventions, including constitutions, laws, regulations, property rights, markets and enforcement characteristics like sanctions) and informal rules of the game/ institutions (codes of behaviour like traditions, customs, moral values, religious beliefs and all other norms of behaviour that passed the test of time) (North 1990). While the concept of spaces offers a good framework for the assessment of possibilities for transformative action in various political spaces and their intersections, it needs to be complemented by additional theoretical conceptualisations to answer the research questions of this study.
Individually claimed spaces

Individually claimed spaces are claimed or created by individual households or their representative members. A wide array of studies has revealed the ways through which social relations create communal systems of exchange, based on principles of reciprocity and redistribution, which are embedded in the dynamics of culture and cultural change (Douglass 1992). These relations can potentially provide access to assets in different realms of urban life, such as work and livelihood, personal health and well-being, habitat and environment (see also Douglass 1998). Social capital can thus be defined as ‘the ability to secure benefits through memberships in networks and other social structures’ (Portes 1998: 6).

The concept of social capital gained renewed attention during the 1990s in the context of the increased attention for non-economic factors for well-being and in the context of the neo-liberal development agenda as the ‘missing link’ between (retreating) states and markets (see for example Grootaert 1998; Woolcock 1998). It was based on earlier concepts of strong and weak ties (Granovetter 1973), vertical ties through associations or networks (Coleman 1988) and bridging and linking capital (Putnam 1993/5). The conceptualisations of various levels and types and ways of measurement of social capital have been extensively discussed in the literature and are assumed sufficiently familiar to the reader here (see amongst others Portes 1998; Bankston & Zhou 2000; Uphoff 1999; Uphoff & Waijayaratna 2000; Gootaert & Van Bastelaer 2002; Krishna & Uphoff 2002; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Onyx & Bullen 2000/1).

The mainstream concept of social capital has been heavily contested in international development literature over its (normative) belief in the accommodating nature of institutions - at micro, meso and macro level - through trust and shared values. Many criticised the lack of proper consideration of the negative aspects of social life or the structural constraints on empowerment of the poor like power inequality and the struggle over access to resources, leading to (reproduction of) social exclusion (Levi 1996; Portes & Landolt 1996; Silvey & Elmhirst 2003; Cleaver 2005). Others emphasised the potentially ‘victim-blaming’ effect of the (boundedly) rational individual (Schuurman 2003) and overemphasis on the role of institutions as mechanisms for uncovering latent shared values, sanctioning anti-social behaviour, and channelling individual action in collectively desirable directions (World Bank 2000, quoted from Cleaver 2005). Others severely criticised the grand social capital agenda of the World Bank over forming an ideological part of the anti-politics agenda of the post-Washington consensus promoting neo-liberalism (Schuurman 2003; Harris 2002; Fine 2001; see also Gonzalez de la Rocha...
2007). Instead these critical views propose Bourdieu’s critical theory (Bourdieu 1980) of reproduction through the structures of class relations (Edwards et al. 2003) or reconceive social capital as embedded social resources (Beall 2001) or as social networks and processes (Long 2001) which are dynamic and negotiated.

Portes and Sennsenbrenner (1993) already pointed out both positive and negative consequences of social capital in their famous model of social capital (see Figure 2.3). This model distinguishes between four sources that motivate people to accept claims (Portes & Sensenbrenner 1993). The first two sources, norms of reciprocity and enforceable trust, are instrumental reasons. Reciprocity refers to social chits that develop out of previous good deeds and are backed by the norm of reciprocity. Enforceable trust is the result of individual members’ disciplined compliance with group expectations that are based on notions of ‘good standing’ and expected benefits or punishment. In consummate motivations for social capital moral imperatives are the main forces for behaviour, either in the form of value introjection or in the form of bounded solidarity. Value introjection refers to norms and value imperatives that people learn during socialisation processes and become appropriate behaviour within groups. Bounded solidarity is similar to this except for the fact that it emerges from specific, space and time-bound situations. Positive consequences of social capital are amongst others norm observance, family support, network mediated benefits. Negative consequences are amongst others restricted access to opportunities, restrictions on individual freedom, excessive claims and downward leveling norms. This study takes into account the sources of reciprocity, enforceable trust and bounded solidarity, and includes both positive and negatives consequences of social capital.

Figure 2.3: Sources and consequences of social capital

Some studies suggest differentiating political and social capital, in order to overcome problems of using social capital as a catch-all concept for non-material factors in poverty. Some authors define political capital in more general terms in relation to multiple channels for influence and applicable to both individuals and collectives. For Baumann (2000: 6) political capital ‘is one of the key capital assets on which people draw to build their own livelihoods’. Claims and assets are defined as ‘rights’ that are politically defended, and that ‘how people access these assets depends on their political capital’. Booth and Richards (1998) describe it as the mechanism of patronage, negotiation, persuasion and influence, enabling other assets to become better realised. Rakodi (1999: 318) stresses the importance of ‘access to decision-making’ in the political process for the poor. Devas (2002: 208) defines political capital as ‘the scope which individuals and/or groups have to exert influence on decision-making which affects them, decision-making being defined widely as both formal and informal and both de facto and de jure which affects them’. Others define political capital especially in relation to policy making and applicable to organisations of the urban poor (McLeod 2001a). Still others distinguish between instrumental and structural political capital (Birner and Wittner 2000: 6). Instrumental political capital ‘consists of the resources which an actor….can dispose of and use to influence policy formation processes and realise outcomes which are in an actor’s perceived interest’. Structural political capital ‘refers to the structural variables of the political system - including ‘perverse political capital’ such as institutions of repression - which influence the possibilities of diverse actors to accumulate instrumental political capital and condition the effectiveness of different types of political capital’. This study differentiates social capital into social, organisational and political relations.

Collectively claimed spaces

Collectively claimed or created spaces are defined as relatively autonomous spaces created ‘from below’ by people for themselves (Cornwall 2001/2). These spaces emerge out of sets of common concerns or identifications and may come into being as a result of popular mobilisation, such as around identity- or issue-based concerns, or may consist of spaces in which like-minded people join together in common pursuits (Cornwall 2002). They might also be ‘third’ spaces, where social actors reject hegemonic space and create spaces for themselves (Soja 1996).

The debate on collective action and social movements is rooted in late 19th century Europe, in particular with the work of the French psychologist Le Bon (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). The concepts of social movement
theory have been especially applied to European, American and South American contexts. They have been much less applied in sub-Saharan African contexts, and if so predominantly with regard to South-Africa. Recently social movements and collective action theory is gaining renewed attention in the context of the chronic poverty (Bebbington 2006/9; Mitlin 2009) and globalisation debates (Clark 2003; Keane 2003; Taylor 2005).

There are many definitions of social movements in the literature. A widely accepted general definition views social movements as ‘interlocking networks of groups, social networks and individuals, and the connection between them is a shared collective identity that tries to prevent or promote societal change by non-institutionalised tactics’ (Della Porta & Diani 1999). This definition, just like the definition of Mamdani (1995) which refers to social movements as entailing ‘…..the crystallisation of group activity autonomous from the state’, suits African social processes as it is ‘inclusive and encompasses the distinctions not only between community and class or popular and elite movements, but also between organised and unorganised, spontaneous or anomic movements’ (Nasong’o 2007). The definition of Della Porta and Diani (1999) in addition to Mamdani’s definition also includes social movements that oppose formal bureaucratic organisations for institutional change, which seek to control the state or effective inclusive citizenship, or defend and maintain their autonomy and rights against domination and violation (Amadiume 1995; Olukoshi 1995, quoted from Nasong’o 2007).

Theories on social movements can be classified into four dominant perspectives or paradigms (Della Porta & Diani 1999). The recently formulated framework by Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2009) further classifies them under the umbrella of classical or contemporary approaches (Table 2.1). For reasons of definitional clarity it is chosen to present the four perspectives on social movements on the basis of the latter. Each approach also represents a more specific definition of social movements.

Classical approaches are collective behaviour theory, mass society theory and relative deprivation theory. These theories rely on the same general causal sequence moving from ‘some form of structural strain (for example industrialisation, urbanisation, unemployment) that produces subjective tension and therefore psychological disposition to engage in extreme behaviours (such as panics, mobs) to escape from these tensions’ (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009).
### Table 2.1: Theories on participation and the emergence of social movements

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Classical approaches</th>
<th>Contemporary approaches</th>
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<td><strong>Why people protest</strong></td>
<td><strong>Classical approaches</strong></td>
<td><strong>Resource mobilisation</strong></td>
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<td>Mass society, collective behaviour</td>
<td>Resources, opportunities, social networks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grievances, discontent, anomie, class conflict</td>
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<td><strong>Who protests</strong></td>
<td>Alienated, frustrated, disintegrated, manipulated, marginalised people</td>
<td>Well-organised, professional, resourceful social networks; embeddedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forms of protest</strong></td>
<td>Spontaneous, irrational, expressive, violent (panics, fashions, mobs, crime)</td>
<td>Rational, planned, instrumental (institutional politics, lobbying, interest groups)</td>
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Contemporary approaches concern resource mobilisation theories, the political process approach and social-constructivistic approaches (ibid: 20). Resource mobilisation and political process are examples of structural and rational approaches. Structural approaches consider grievances as omnipresent and view as the key question in participation research not so much why people are aggrieved, as why aggrieved people participate. Resource mobilisation places an emphasis on the internal features of resources and organisational aspects. Resources can be material resources - jobs, incomes, savings and the right to specific incomes and service - as well as non-tangible resources – such as authority, leadership, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills and habits of industry. Organisational aspects are considered a function of the resources controlled by an organisation to accomplish its goals. Resource mobilisation theory has been criticized over its heavy leaning on vocabulary of economics and its depiction of social movements as rational entities weighing up the costs and benefits of their action (McCarthy & Zald 1977, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009), its failure to acknowledge the strength of indigenous resources like informal networks (Mc Adam 1982, based on ibid),
and its failure to acknowledge the power inherent in disruptive tactics (McAdam 1982, based on ibid).

The political process approach emphasises the external features of the political and institutional environment in which social movements operate. The three central ideas of the political process approach are: ‘first, a social movement is a political rather than a psychological phenomenon; second, a social movement represents a continuous process from its creation to its decline rather than a discrete series of developmental stages; third, different forms of action (‘repertories of contention’) are associated with different spatial and temporal locations’ (Tilly 1986, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). The form of action chosen by social movements are not purely random and depend on factors such as the structure of the political system (e.g. democratic institutions, the existence and structure of political parties, and possibilities for direct participation), the level of representation and cultural traditions (Tarrow 1994, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). Criticism on the political process approach concerns the divergent results in different contexts and the lack of theory concerning the specific mechanisms that link political process to movement activity for explanation (Koopmans 2005, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). In addition, incentives and expectations as well as opportunities and constraints necessarily involve interpretation (Goodwin & Jasper 1999, based on Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009).

The social-constructivistic approach represents an agency approach. It concentrates on how individuals and groups interpret the material and social-political conditions and focuses on the role of the cognitive, affective and ideational roots of contention. Social-constructivistic approaches were initially dubbed New Social Movements theory. New social movements, also referred to as ‘political’movements’, ‘cut across class lines, work with high levels of autonomy from the state … lobby and pressurize government agencies over development and social issues, and tend to be organized on an ad-hoc basis (Della Porta & Diani 2006). Social constructivistic approaches show similarities with classical approaches regarding the recognition of the importance of cognition and emotion to collective action. Classical approaches however perceive cognition and emotions as pathological, while social constructivistic approaches see them as normal, central aspects of social and political life. ‘Social constructivistic approaches try to understand why people who are seemingly in the same situation respond so differently’ (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). Collective action is a group rather than an individual phenomenon, but in the end it is individuals who decide whether or not to participate. This raises the question of what connects the individual to the collective. Central to the social constructivistic approach are the social psychological notions of the construction of meaning, identity, emotions, motivation and culture. A common framework for integration of these
variables has not yet been formulated (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009).

In the last two decades there have been several bridging and synthesizing efforts of contemporary approaches. Rather than placing the currently influential focus on agency (identity) approaches of New Social Movements in opposition to structural approaches, the current international globalising context necessitates emphasis on the complementarity of agency and structural approaches and their underlying - structural, political, sociological, social psychological and cultural sociological - theories (see also Della Porta & Diani 2006; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2009). This study aims to integrate or synthesize structure and agency approaches and draws on selected aspects of contemporary approaches.

The literature on social movements and collective action mentions additional observations concerning urban contexts in African contexts. With regard to urban contexts in developing countries, Walton (1998) observes a gradual shift through time from collective action focused on labour issues and individual versus collective goods (during the early urbanisation period), to collective action focused on collective consumption and labour (during the developmental state period), to collective action focused on political rights and collective consumption (during the neo-liberalism period) (Table 2.2). Habib and Opoku-Mensah (2009) further nuance observations in their discussion on the role of ‘social movements in Africa’ vis-á-vis ‘the role of African social movements’ to social movements theory. They challenge the two common assertions in current social movement theory, first, a shift from the arena of production to consumption, and second, replacements of overtly material movements by identity movements and struggles, as too simplistic for the South-African and wider African context. Case studies suggest that movements in the arena of production retain vibrancy and are also crucial to the sustainability of struggles of consumption. Furthermore, while identity movements and struggles are indeed on the increase, material issues are as relevant to these struggles as they have been to the earlier social movements. In regard to the struggle for democracy in Kenya, Nasong’o recently distinguished between transformative, redemptive and reformatory social movements, and identifies an increase in political and human rights civil society organisations - especially at national level - during the nineties (2007).

The shift towards collective consumptive action is (partly) reflected in the development literature on civil society and urban poverty of the 1990s - early 2000s. Mitlin (2001/4b) stresses the presence of some form of grassroots organisations as the norm rather than the exception and indicates the prevalence of many types of local organisations in low-income urban
settlements. Among the more common factors instigating and supporting these grassroots organisations are kinship, ethnicity, trade union involvement, city based federations, NGOs, religious organisations, political parties, and the private sector (Mitlin 2001/4b). These self-help groups are often catalysed into action by need to secure land, resist eviction, provide themselves with public goods that are not supplied (e.g. water, security) and services that the market will not provide to them (e.g. savings and insurance) (Mitlin 2001/6). Rakodi

Table 2.2: Summary of collective action patterns by major influences and periods of development

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<td>Major influences</td>
<td>Conflict generally low.</td>
<td>Conflict moderate to high.</td>
<td>Conflict moderate to high.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economy →</td>
<td>Collective action mainly focused on labour issues and individual versus collective goods.</td>
<td>Collective action focused on collective consumption and labour.</td>
<td>Collective action focused on political rights and collective consumption.</td>
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<tr>
<td>State →</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society →</td>
<td>Political relations based on craft and rural traditions.</td>
<td>Institutionally channelled political relations.</td>
<td>Growing popular movements independent of state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(1993) also indicates that collective action by poor households in urban areas is widespread, especially in organising shelter, basic services, employment and security, occurring without government assistance. The World Bank report ‘Can Anyone Hear Us’ also found that informal networks and associations of poor people are common both in rural and urban communities, and that in the absence of state resources they are experienced by the poor themselves as critical for their survival (Narayan et al. 1999). Jenkins (2001) found that urban social movements in the developing world tend to be formed around basic issues of survival and struggles to gain access to basics of collective consumption, and less around broader issues such as state power and the basic underlying economic structures (Jenkins 2001).19

The shift towards collective political and human rights action is only currently taken up more widely in the context of the growing attention for social movements in chronic poverty literature (Mitlin 2006/8). Mitlin (2006) suggests that social movements in urban contexts generally engage with the political system through a need, asset or freedom. Political engagement strategies of these social movements are divided into three categories: social movements engaged around issues to do with the scale and security of incomes (as related to employment and entrepreneurship) and which are concerned with
exploitation in labour markets; social movements engaged around issues related to shelter and related services (particularly the consumption of public goods) and which are concerned with the dispossession and denial, and the protection and extension of assets; social movements that engage around issues of social and/or political exclusion and inclusion (for example those based on political interest and/or ethnic identity). Mitlin compares the extent to which movements by catalyst/cause are supportive to of social movement activity (i.e. politicised, collective, mass movement), have potential to include the poor, and to in the interests of the poor (Table 2.3). Belbin (2009) stresses that movements are unlikely to emerge around issues of poverty per se - though may emerge around issues of impoverishment – but rather emerge around economic and cultural phenomena, i.e. the causes of poverty.

Table 2.3: Summary of movements by catalyst/cause of movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forms/locations of exploitation, dispossession/denial, exclusion</th>
<th>Supportive to SM and SMO (i.e. collective and political)</th>
<th>Inclusion of poorest</th>
<th>Act in the interests of poorest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour markets</td>
<td>Yes, in terms of collective action through unions.</td>
<td>Not really. Poorest not that likely to be formally employed. Informal workers not sufficiently protected to be able to organise.</td>
<td>Unlikely, because the poorest are generally not included. Unions may make alliances and/or have a larger political agenda (e.g. macro-economic policies, minimum wages) but not that many examples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street traders - markets in goods and services, denial of access to trading space</td>
<td>Weak but some seek political support for informal trading. Primarily defensive. Strongly related to urban management and zoning. Rarely large scale.</td>
<td>Differentiation of movements in terms of the profitability of trading; not many examples of solidarity between trading groups. Poorest are the weakest.</td>
<td>There is potential – but seems to be rare. Many of the poorest do not trade in the more profitable place, so even if access to the central city land is secured the poorest may not benefit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro/small entrepreneurial activities, home workers</td>
<td>Weak political orientation</td>
<td>Differentiation of movements. Many of these self-help groups are organised through micro-finance initiatives and do not include the very poor.</td>
<td>Potential. But market orientation may result in exclusion. Rules such as minimum contributions are not in the interest of the poor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups facing eviction – neighbourhoods</th>
<th>Yes. Generally strong political orientation. Defensive action in these cases.</th>
<th>Generally some in neighbourhood – incentive to include if squatters. May be tenants and hence not involved directly in ant-eviction struggles.</th>
<th>Depends on ownership structure. Success may exclude in time if formalisation of tenure results in withdrawal of the poorest. Poorest likely on most precarious sites – least likely to win the struggle.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups without secure tenure – neighbourhood</td>
<td>Yes. Generally strong political orientation. Collective imperative.</td>
<td>May include poorest but poorest may not see as relevant, or may hesitate to engage with political process. Once more, poorest may be tenants and therefore not able to benefit.</td>
<td>Depends on outcomes. Options may require some finance, in terms of payments for land, and hence poorest may struggle to be included.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups without basic services - neighbourhood</td>
<td>Yes. Generally strong political orientation. May be little linking of neighbourhoods across the city.</td>
<td>Generally includes all in the neighbourhood. Tenants may not benefit.</td>
<td>Access may depend on the solutions that are secured, which are likely to be dependent on the market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion on grounds of race/ethnicity</td>
<td>Yes. Strong political orientation.</td>
<td>All included on ‘group’ basis.</td>
<td>Tendency for class interests to dominate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion on grounds of gender</td>
<td>Maybe, but may resist strong political identity for gender roles.</td>
<td>May be interested in drawing in the poorest. However, seem to be most successful in being inclusive if they are orientated to basic services.</td>
<td>Tendency for class interests to dominate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion on grounds of being very poor or poor/class</td>
<td>Requires some kind of class identity. This is turn seems related to economic structure, spatial development options, and political structures,</td>
<td>Differentiation within the poor may be significant.</td>
<td>May be vulnerable to majority interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Invited spaces

Invited spaces are defined as inclusive spaces legitimately provided ‘from above’ by government, donors and/or NGOs in which citizens are invited to participate (Cornwall 2001/2/4a). These invited spaces can be policy arenas or ‘new forms of governance’ like governance networks and partnerships. Central to this study are especially the invited spaces of governance networks.

Governance networks have in the last two decades been discussed as post-liberal approaches for direct democracy, supplementing neo-liberal institutions of representative democracy (Gaventa 2006a; Sorensen & Torfing 2007). Democracy is then considered a concept constantly contested and under construction, with different forms in different settings and contexts, not as standard recipe of a set of rules, standards and institutional designs (Gaventa 2006a). Governance networks can be defined as ‘relatively stable horizontal articulations of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors; who interact with one another through negotiations; which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary relatively institutionalised framework; that is self-regulating within limits set by external forces and which contributes to the production of public purpose (Torfing 2005; Sorensen & Torfing 2007; Marcussen & Torfing 2003; see also Rhodes 1997; Jessop 2002).

In the context of the debate on local governance and service delivery, neo-institutionalists defined governance and institutions as the ‘rules of the game’ (Coase 1991; North 1990/3), though implicitly specifically referring to the allocative and distributive rules of the game at the level of implementation. Neo-institutionalists predominantly viewed institutions from the perspective of ‘constraints to realisation of actor preferences and how these rules can be changed to lower transaction costs and reduce other constraints associated with implementing policy’. Thereby they ‘optimistically supposed that institutions can be instrumentally designed and reformed’ (see Hyden 2008).

The need for simultaneously building the ‘capacities to respond and demand’ was initially indicated by citizenship literature (Gaventa 2001), though later also recognised wider in the literature (Romeo 2003; Krishna 2003). Mainstream attention and donor funding remained however heavily focused on building the ‘capacity to respond’ of governments. Both the literature on ‘capacity building to respond and demand’ in this period were characterised by an almost exclusive focus on governance process components of amongst others transparency, inclusion/exclusion, representation and accountability. In addition they showed an in retrospect somewhat naive belief that process improvements would almost automatically lead to improved results, which was
Chapter 2

Later by the citizenship literature itself described as ideological (Robins, Cornwall & Von Lieres 2008).

Literature on ‘capacity building to respond’ focused on responsive and efficient service delivery programmes. It was built and supported through public sector reform programmes based on concepts of New Public Management (NPM) originating from the early 1980s in a number of OECD countries22 (see also Mutahaba & Ally 2008). The NPM discourse propagates a strict division of policy formulation and implementation in its effort to develop self-regulating public markets and self-governing agencies through design of competitive games. Public sector reform programmes aim at a small, cost-efficient, private sector enabling government, with mainly medium and high level staff through simultaneous capacity development and downsizing and retrenchment of public sector personnel – though few sub-Saharan African countries have been able to set up effective mechanisms for controlling the growth and costs of the public service (Mutahaba & Ally 2008). Originally these programmes were especially focused on central government.

With the introduction of decentralisation, government capacity building programmes shifted towards multiple-level capacity building. Three hierarchical ordered levels of capacity building for ‘getting good government’ were distinguished (Grindle 1997), predominantly from an internal government perspective. Firstly, human resource development focuses on training of staff and improvement of recruitment procedures and work conditions. Secondly, organisational strengthening focuses on improving management systems by changing management structures or the organisational culture. Thirdly, institutional reform targets the macro-level, including policy and legal change and constitutional reform. The reforms in sub-Sahara Africa placed an emphasis on improving performance in delivery of public services by: performance incentives, sanctions and measurement; reinforcement of the merit principle in public service; and the further rationalisation of the role of the state and its functions (Mutahaba & Ally 2008).

The literature on ‘capacity building to demand’ focused on examining or creating the preconditions for voice (promoting citizenship learning and awareness-raising, building civil society organisations and the capacity to mobilise), and amplifying citizens’ voices and fostering social movements engaged in governance processes (ranging from advocacy research to citizen lobbying for policy change, and citizen monitoring of performance) (Gaventa 2001; Goetz & Gaventa 2001; Gaventa 2004). It also discussed conditions which constrain citizen participation, such as poor levels of citizen organisation (e.g. tradition of social movements), low participatory skills to effectively exercise influence, lack of political will, low levels of participation (e.g.
consultation in stead of decision-making), insufficient financial resources inhibiting local governments to facilitate effective participation (Gaventa & Valderama 1999), and constraining legal frameworks and contextual features for citizen participation (McGee et al. 2003). Furthermore, the worldwide transfer of the notions of participatory budgeting and citizens voice and the related notions of deepening democracy and citizenship from their original predominantly Southern-American contexts, were considered a potential obstacle for a sub-Saharan African context, where even the existence of civil society as such is questioned (Makumbe 1998; Lewis 2002).

Towards meta governance at the constitutive level

Towards the middle of the 2000s there was an increased realisation of the mixed record of results of decentralisation and understanding that citizen and civil society participation as well as voice did not automatically increase civic influence. Furthermore, there was a gradual reorientation at (inter)national level towards rule of law and state building rather than democratisation as the primary cause for development. This context increasingly shifted the focus of attention from voice and influence on the allocative and distributive rules of the game towards influence on the constitutive rules of the game or politics (Hyden et al. 2004).

Hyden indicates a shift in development thinking through the years from the micro-level of project, to the meso-level of program, the macro-level of policy and currently, the meta-level of politics. Governance is consequently defined at the meta level as ‘the formation and stewardship of formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state, as well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions’ (Hyden et al. 2004: 16). The optimistic assumption of Neo Institutional Economists that institutions can be instrumentally designed and reformed with little or no attention paid to underlying politics and power dynamics turned out to be unrealistic (Hyden 2008). Governability literature contributes to further clarification of meta-governance in relation to the other levels of governance and indicates the need for complementarity and adequate attention to all levels (Kooiman et al. 2008). First-order governance takes place wherever people and their organisations interact in order to solve societal problems and create new opportunities. Second-order governance focuses on the institutional arrangements within which first-order governing takes place. It constitutes the meeting ground for those being governed and those governing and implies the reconsideration and adaptation of the parameters of first-order governance. Meta- or third-order governance feeds, binds and evaluates the governing exercise. In meta-governance, governors and governed alike take each other’s measure in
formulating norms by which to judge each other and the measuring process too (Kooiman et al. 2008; see also Kooiman 2000; Jessop 2002).

The main response of adherents of decentralisation to the mixed record of results has been the strengthening of the ‘capacity to respond’ through the repetitive widening of the scope of capacity building over the years (Kuhl 2009). In the context of the increased emphasis on endogenous development and ownership in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra High Level Forum (AHLF) on Aid Effectiveness, capacity building was recently reformulated into capacity development (OECD 2006) and three major changes to overcome limitations were proposed in the literature. First, intensification of the current agenda through the current widely applied Result Based Management (RBM) approaches in international development cooperation, increasingly propagated by donors to ‘demonstrate’ results of their activities (Baser & Morgan 2008: 91). The comparative advantage of RBM is its focus on short-term products rather than longer-term processes. It can be helpful in tracking immediate outcomes, but it has little to say about capacity outcomes that emerge over the medium and long term. RBM approaches are especially designed for situations to address problems of low complexity where means and ends are clear, but are less applicable or may need to be adjusted to deal with increasing complexity and uncertainty (Baser & Morgan 2008). Second, increased acknowledgement of the importance of linking context and content of capacity development. Grindle (2007) extends her earlier concept of good enough governance with contextual factors. The short list of minimal conditions for good enough governance, could be more appropriately formulated when taking into account the contexts in which governance reforms are introduced and the ways in which their contents affect interests and institutional capacities (Grindle 2007). Baser and Morgan (2008) reformulate capacity development and performance from a systems thinking perspective based on the huge body of capacity literature beyond that produced by the international development community. Capacity is defined as the ‘emergent combination of individual competencies and collective capabilities that enables a human system to create value’ (Baser & Morgan 2008: 3; see also Morgan 2006). It includes five core capabilities: to commit and engage (volition, empowerment, motivation, attitude, confidence), to carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks (core functions directed at the implementation of mandated goals), to relate and attract resources and support (manage relationships, resource mobilisation, networking, legitimacy building, protecting space), to adapt and self-renew (learning, strategising, adaptation, repositioning, managing change) and to balance coherence and diversity (encourage innovation and stability, control fragmentation, manage complexity, balance capability mix) (ECDPM 2008; Baser & Morgan 2008). Performance is then interpreted as an emergent pattern that comes about
through the interactions of both internal and external elements and contextual factors. Third, more emphasis on the role of politics or contextual political factors affecting public sector capacity building initiatives (Grindle 2006). Political preferences of elected and appointed leaders determine whether capacity building initiatives are invested in or ignored. Political calendars or electoral cycles create moments when significant new capacity initiatives can be introduced or abandoned. Formal and informal political institutions determine how much scope public officials have for introducing change (Grindle 2006).

The main response with regard to ‘capacity to demand’ also faced three major changes in the context of the mixed record of results, the increased realisation that citizen and civil society participation and voice do not automatically imply increased civic influence - with increased focus on meaningful participation and actual changes in policy and practice (Cornwall & Coelho 2006) - and the changing international development agenda. First, an increased recognition that context matters and modifies the possibilities of state-society relationships (Cornwall & Coelho 2006). The analysis of participation needs to be set within the histories of state-society relations that have shaped the configurations and contestations of the present. Political histories and cultures may embed dispositions in state and societal actors that are carried into new democratic arenas of participation, while at the same time these might form the beginning of a process of change (Cornwall & Coelho 2006). Second, a shift towards influencing (local) politics and power through new channels or methods focused on the political arena and political agenda setting. In addition to the more traditional methods of political capacity building through civic and political education, more innovative channels are suggested, like linking with the political strategies of the growing middle-classes and their residents associations (Chakrabarti 2008), formation of or building links with political parties, running civil society leaders for office, monitoring existing political organisations (Gaventa 2006a). Third, the shift towards increasingly simultaneous coalition building at local, national and global level to increase influence and impact of coalitions and alliances on power relations and increased globalisation (Brock, McGee & Gaventa 2004; Gaventa 2004/6b/7a+b; Bebbington 2006).

**Mutuality of informal and formal institutions**

Currently informal institutions are increasingly acknowledged as potential alternative or complementary channels by parts of the development policy world, in the context of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness calling for greater local ownership of foreign aid. Examples are the Drivers of Change
approach of DFID/SIDA and the OECD institutional programme (Hyden 2008; Jütting 2007; see also UNECA 2007). This acknowledgement concerns both social informal institutions and political informal institutions (see Helmke & Levitsky 2006; Booth 2009). The central aim for both is to build on rather than condemn informal institutions in order to contribute to national development goals like reducing poverty and promoting economic growth.

In line with this, informal institutions are conceptually more precisely distinguished from formal institutions and defined as the ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 5). Formal institutions by contrast are defined as ‘the rules and procedures that are created, communicated and enforced through channels that are widely accepted as official’ (Helmke & Levitsky 2004: 5). Easterly (2006/8) uses a related but less precise differentiation between top-down and bottom-up institutions, whereby the term ‘bottom-up institutions’ more or less equals ‘bottom-up informal institutions’. Informal institutions may or may not have deeply rooted cultural determinants.

These formal and informal institutions can be mutually conflicting, complementing or undermining (Jütting 2007) and while undermining they can still produce positive outcomes (Hyden 2008). Helmke and Levitsky (2006) distinguish four types of informal institutions based on divergence and convergence with effective and ineffective formal institutions: 1) complementary institutions which fill gaps in formal rules or enhance their efficiency; 2) accommodative informal institutions which blunt the effects of dysfunctional formal institutions; 3) competing informal institutions, which directly subvert the formal rules; 4) substitutive informal institutions, which replace ineffective formal institutions. Informal rules can also be part of formal institutions. Table 2.4 presents a comparison of formal and informal institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formal institutions</th>
<th>Informal institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of exchange</td>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td>Personal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to rules</td>
<td>Rule-of-law</td>
<td>Rule-in-use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of rules</td>
<td>Written</td>
<td>Unwritten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of exchange</td>
<td>Contracted</td>
<td>Non-contractual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time schedule</td>
<td>Specified</td>
<td>Non-specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor premise</td>
<td>Organisational goal adherence</td>
<td>Shared expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications of agreement</td>
<td>Precise compliance</td>
<td>Ambiguous execution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Potentially open to scrutiny</td>
<td>Closed and confidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict resolution</td>
<td>Third party body</td>
<td>Self-enforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social informal institutions are often generally considered a gradual and more equal alternative to development than formal institutions (Rakodi 2004/6; OECD 2007; Easterly 2008). Motivations for the creation of social informal institutions can be cultural or customary practices, but can also be for reasons of incompleteness of formal institutions, second best strategy (for reasons of lack of power, reduced costs, ineffectiveness), or public non-acceptability of goals pursued (Helmke & Levitsky 2004). The mutually accommodating and constraining character of informal social and formal institutions, eventually has to be compared with the contributions to public outcomes.  

Political informal institutions are considered to increasingly dominate formal institutions in the sub-Saharan African context, despite recent immense support for democratisation and good governance (Hyden 2008). The African Power & Politics Programme recently suggested to look comprehensively at the mutually accommodating and constraining character of formal and informal political institutions and the overall effects on both public sector and associational life (Hyden 2008). It discusses how the specific combination of informal and formal institutions in the African context – with power predominantly based in informal institutions of personal relations between people rather than formal institutions founded in agencies that control it - affects politics and by extension policy.  

Politics is interpreted and discussed as power configuration consisting of the basis, the reach, the exercise and the nature of power (Hyden 2008). The basis of power in Africa is considered as bifurcated and narrow. It is made up of, on the one hand, a small enclave-like set of actors dominated by transnational corporations and diplomats adhering to formal rules, on the other hand a myriad of relations of dependence stemming from social structures that yet have to modernise and still rely on informal institutions. The challenge is to further formalise the basis of power in order to extend the ‘boundaries of possibility’- determined by the degree of social external dependency and social stratification - for building and managing a society in an increasingly globalised context. The reach of power often remains extensively reliant on informal patronage networks and competing alliances of political leaders, whereby the rulers are more likely to keep the regime going rather than trying to use power to transform society. Migration to cities and urbanization tend to increase transaction costs of power relations built on dependence for maintaining a regime. The challenge is to move beyond merely responding to social change towards creating true development states with both strong capacity for change and development through constructive counter forces of formal institutions. The exercise of power by African political leaders is often not in a vacuum, as (informal) relations of accountability and reciprocity are strongly present. The challenge is to formally institutionalise the self-binding
Chapter 2

‘inclusivist’ and ‘exclusivist’ elements of accountability and accepting defeat, as opposed to discretionary ‘inclusivist’ and ‘exclusivist’ approaches of co-opting and alienating (Hyden 2008: 21). The nature of power is often not rationalised in an economically instrumental sense, while exchange relations are often characterised by a dual utility weighing the inherent value of the exchange relation more heavily than one’s own narrow interest – based on value based clientelistic rationality. The challenge is to institutionalise dual utility based instrumental and value-based rationality of empathy and clientelism, as opposed to single utility instrumental and value-based rationality of technocratic and dogmatic nature.

With regard to the consequences of power, Hyden (2008) indicates that the public space in African countries is better described as predominantly ‘affective’ rather than ‘civic’, both for the governmental and the associational arena (see table 2.5). Challenges to authority are too costly and improving governance in these settings should start from other premises than those based on the presence of values and norms which are found in already consolidated democracies.

Table 2.5: The consequences of power in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arena</th>
<th>Affective</th>
<th>Civic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>Nepotism</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Public accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Needs-oriented</td>
<td>Rights-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>Activist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In relation to both social and political informal institutions it is warned for culturalist-traditonalist explanations in which modern day African societies are treated as if they were still shaped by their pre-colonial history or framed within predetermined cultural/ancestral patterns, or as if their history had a meaning (a grain) derived from the distant past (De Sardan 2008; De Sardan & Bierschenk 1998). The terms of neo-patrimonialism, clientelism and informality are considered as often used in a too sweeping, too general and too partial manner, while in any country there are divergences between norms and practices and it is mainly the scope and forms of these divergences that vary depending on the context (De Sardan 2008; see also Erdman & Engel 2006/7).²⁹ In this study clientelism and patronage are considered as divergences between norms and practices that are influenced but not predetermined by historical, international and other factors.
2.4. Impacts

Impacts on quality of life

The concepts of quality of life, well-being and poverty

In the last decades there have been major debates over alternative conceptions for development and poverty, challenging the dominant conventional economic conceptions that merely focus on money, commodities and economic growth (Gough, McGregor & Camfield 2007). The first debate revolved around the extension of the idea of development from economic to human development during the last quarter of the past century, amongst others by Sen and Martha Nussbaum (2000). This resulted in the annual international monitoring of a range of basic needs and capabilities through the Human Development Reports of UNDP since 1990. The second debate concerned the reconceptualisation of poverty from money poverty to multi-dimensional poverty of resources and agency that mitigate vulnerability, by various livelihood frameworks during the 1990s (see Rakodi 1999). The third and most recent debate concerns the transition from money-poverty to subjective well-being and quality of life, returning to the individual subject and questioning substantially the ends of development and how we conceive and measure them (Gough, McGregor & Camfield 2007: 7).

Phillips (2006) discusses the rich landscape of families of approaches to quality of life (QoL) and well-being (WB), with variations in the dimensions of types of conceptualisations, value priorities, research methodology, purposes and standpoint, and theoretical sources. Gasper (2009) summarises these 6 main families of research approaches to QoL and WB ranging from more individualistic to more social, with one approach consisting of two research streams (Table 2.6): 1) Subjective Well-Being (SWB), the currently prominent approach which has spread from psychology to economic and sociology. SWB approaches are however not sufficient for all purposes. The remaining approaches, except perhaps the preference fulfilment variant (3a), are diverse interpretations of Objective Well-Being (OWB) (Gasper 2009, based on Phillips, 2009); 2) Health Related Quality of Life; 3a) Utility - as interpreted in 20th century economic -, looking at purchasing power and/or imputed preference fulfilment; 3b) Needs and Capabilities, which contains several variants concerning needs fulfilment or achievement of valued capabilities (including Sen’s capabilities approach, interpreting capabilities as positive freedoms to achieve reasoned values); 4) Poverty Studies, which concentrate on the potential quality of life of an individual in terms of opportunities and their social determinants; 5) Community Studies, which focus on the social
context/fabric and the quality of life of a community; 6) Societal Quality of Life Constructs, which integrate a number of the above aspects.

**Table 2.6: An analytical summary of QoL and WB approaches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families of approaches</th>
<th>Focus and scope (per variant)</th>
<th>Discipline(s)/ Theory base</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Purposes and standpoint</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Subjective well-being (SWB)</td>
<td>Individual well-being (WB) as felt by the individual. Work on ‘instant happiness’ stresses aspects 1 &amp; 2 more than does work in a eudemonic/reflective well-being tradition.</td>
<td>Psychology, and neo-utilitarian economics and sociology. (But psychology has diverse schools). Aristotelian philosophy stresses aspect 3.</td>
<td>(Priority to) Individuals’ judgements of A. pleasure/pain B. meaning</td>
<td>- For description and explanation; &amp; - For evaluations by the individual or that seek to represent the individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Health-related Quality of Life</td>
<td>[2a] Individual WB/QoL - Physical (and mental) functioning’s &amp; capabilities; listed by professionals (or the subject individuals), then measured by professionals (or selfrated). [2b] Health-related QoL of communities</td>
<td>Health sciences</td>
<td>- Ideas about normal capabilities and functionings - Either belief in superior knowledge and judgement of professionals; or belief in rights and superior knowledge of patients</td>
<td>For allocation of rights and resources for medical care: - policy level - programme level - individual cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a) ‘Utility’</td>
<td>Here individual WB is imputed from individual’s resources and/or choices, especially choices in real or simulated markets.</td>
<td>Mainstream market-oriented economics</td>
<td>Values of market: 1. spenders’ values, insofar as moneybacked; 2. income distribution given; 3. people held responsible for own choices (which are assumed to reflect preferences)</td>
<td>For describing, explaining, and conducting allocation according to market principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3b) Needs and capabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>Theory/Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Prudential values theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Human needs theories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Doyal &amp; Gough’s theory of need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Sen’s capability approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Nussbaum’s capabilities approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts

**3b) Needs and capabilities**

- **Humanistic economics.**
  - In A: what makes lives go better.
  - In B: requirements of a decent life.
  - In C: avoidance of serious harm; social participation.
  - In D: positive freedom to achieve reasoned values.
  - In E: As B plus D.

**Humanistic philosophy.**

**Philosophy.**

**Critical social policy.**

**Humanistic psychology.**

**Social economics.**

**Social policy.**

**Variants B, E: for explanation**

**All the theories: for public policy**

- (constitutional and legal frameworks; strategies, programmes, projects, specific allocations to persons)

---

### 4) Poverty studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>Concept</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Work on poverty lines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Wider concepts of deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Attention to processes and outcomes of social inclusion and exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Social economics.**

**Social policy.**

**Sociology.**

**Similar to 3b, but:**

- Variant A is often limited to material aspects and values; variants B & C are not.

**Variant A: for description, and public policy.**

**Variants B & C: also for explanation**

---

### 5) Community studies

**Study of the direct value and indirect impacts of various forms of social capital and social cohesion**

**Sociology.**

**Social policy.**

**Public health.**

**Emphasis on people as group members**

- Explanation.

- Background work for public policy

---

### 6) Societal Quality of Life constructs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variant</th>
<th>Construct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>Bernard’s democratic dialectic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Berger-Schmitt &amp; Noll: overarching QoL construct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Social Quality approach (Beck et al., 2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sociology.**

**Social policy.**

**Liberty, equality, fraternity implies all the values listed above.**

**Similar to values of [3b], plus of [5].**

**For public policy**

- (through from constitutional and legal frameworks, to projects).

---

Source: Gasper (2009), based on David Phillip’s Quality of Life (Phillips 2006).

Conceptions of the terms of QoL and WB vary in correspondence with the multitude of approaches and research streams within and convey different meanings. Gasper (2009) stresses the importance of conserving this richness,
rather than attempting to formulate a uniform definition of QoL and WB and ‘making well-being assessment to a form of mental temperature-making’. This corresponds with Amartya Sen’s principle that interpretations of inherently ambiguous ideas should illuminate, not attempt to eliminate, the ambiguity.

What is considered important is to acknowledge and express that these concepts concern evaluative judgements and express the differing values and research instruments as well as the differing standpoints, purposes, theoretical views and ontological presuppositions (Gasper 2009).

This study uses a social conception of quality of life, combining the approaches of poverty studies, community studies and societal quality of life constructs. Quality of life is conceptualised by on the one hand vulnerability of households and collectives and on the other hand service delivery to the wider society. Vulnerability refers to the ability of households, individuals and communities to bend and bounce back when confronted with adverse situations (Moser 1998). Vulnerability is assessed through the components of resilience, diversification and regularity. Resilience expresses the ease and rapidity of recovery. Diversification refers to reduction of risk through the quantitative spreading of access to assets and minimising the risk of missing any one asset. Regularity expresses the reduction of risk through the qualitative frequency or stability of access to assets. Service delivery to the wider society is assessed as the variety of urban services that is delivered. The concept of quality of life as such then serves as an expression of the extent to which impacts are both serving the poor and matching the scale and the scope of the problems.

**Impact of individually claimed spaces on quality of life**

Contributions of individually claimed spaces to poverty reduction and development have long been predominantly interpreted positively. Mainstream social capital theory emphasises the importance of social capital for people to reduce risk and vulnerability and increase resilience to shocks (Narayan & Woolcock 2000; Moser 1998; Grootaert 2001). More critical and explanatory research questions and nuances the contribution of social capital to poverty alleviation. Some authors also explicitly point out its negative implications (Portes & Landolt 1996; Portes 1998; Silvey & Elmhirst 2003). Coleman (1988) points out that a given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others. Portes in addition brings together four forms of negative social capital: exclusion of outsiders (especially in case of bonds), excess claims on group members (especially in later stages), restrictions on individual freedoms and downward levelling norms (Portes 1996/8, 2000; Portes & Landolt, 2000; see also

Impact of collectively claimed spaces on quality of life

The recent revival of social movements theory is focused on the impacts of social movements on poverty reduction. Currently it is however widely acknowledged that establishing a causal relationship between social movements and any observed change in societies is problematic. In particular attribution is difficult because there are usually multiple variables available involved in any process of social change, including other actors and networks (GSDRC 2009). Many case studies of social movements conclude their impact on long term processes of development and institutional change remains limited.

Until recently the majority of studies on social movements did not focus specifically on assessing their impact, but rather on describing their goals, tactics and experience of engagement with the state. In addition, the literature on civil society and urban poverty until recently, especially in the early 2000’s, for a large part explained the limited positive results of grassroots organisations and collective action through internal features in line with the resource mobilisation approach. Mitlin (2001) indicates that the nature of relationships and the level of participation inside grassroots organisations suggest that they may be limited in their capacity to assist in the reduction of urban poverty and vulnerability (such as the exclusion from access to basic services). Leach (1997) finds that the level of representation of the local community is debatable, as grassroots organisations do not always make decisions according to consensus or to principles of democratic or equity-oriented decision-making. Devas (2001) observes that many grassroots organisations act to reinforce patterns of inequality and social exclusion, and are often dominated by men, particularly men of higher status and/or higher income. Dia (1996) noted that grassroots organisations are often inflexible to changes.

The contributions to poverty reduction and development might be somewhat positively influenced by the scaling-up of promising local grassroots initiatives - providing assistance in technical issues and group dynamics - through linking with or participating in programmes of professional support organisations. Some scholars in addition emphasise the potential contributions of grassroots organisations to personal transformation and growth in self-esteem of (some of the) members (Cleaver 2007). Recently, in the context of the increased globalisation effects and the increased acknowledgement of the role of power,
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it is largely related to the institutional constraints. This is further discussed/taken up in the paragraph on impacts on influence and political rights. Impacts of the social informal channels are considered to be more gradual and different for various sectors (Jütting et al. 2007; Rakodi 2004/6).

Impact of invited spaces on quality of life

Conditions for contributions of invited spaces until recently were mainly formulated normatively in terms of process factors of responsiveness, transparency, participation, representation, accountability and legitimacy. The general belief – in approaches focusing on the ‘capacity to respond’ as well as those focusing on the ‘capacity to demand’ - was that strengthening these process components would automatically imply positive impacts and that ‘the strong process dimension of governance would make it hard to draw simple conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses (or positive and negative nature) of outcomes at any specific point in time’ (Mitlin 2004a).

Towards the middle of the 2000s it is increasingly acknowledged that decentralisation as such does not automatically contribute to development and poverty reduction (Von Braun & Grote 2002; Bonfiglioli 2003; Devas & Grant 2003; Jütting et al. 2004/5). Crook and Manor (1998) in their study of four South Asian and West African countries already indicated the poor results of decentralisation on responsiveness in the two African countries. A major OECD-DAC study assessing the determination of pro-poor decentralisation by country specificities and the multi-faceted design of the decentralisation process, found that in two-third of the analysed countries the impact of decentralisation on poverty was either ‘somewhat negative’ or ‘negative’ (Jütting et al. 2004/5). Partially corresponding with other literature, the decentralisation process was found more likely to have a positive impact on poverty, if the central government is committed to the purpose, the involved central and local actors have the financial and human capacity, checks and balances are established at local level to control for rent-seeking and corruption, and internal and external policies are sufficiently coherent with the decentralisation policy (Jütting et al. 2004/5).

Many authors emphasise the importance of relations between and within government organisations for effective decentralisation. National level political commitment (by the president, members of parliament, political leaders as well as central bureaucracy) plays a key role in the regulation, redistribution, enforcement, and monitoring and evaluation (Zanetta 2005; see also Jütting 2004), as well as in defining the rules or policy framework for decentralisation that determines the behaviour of lower tiers of government (Burki et al. 1999).
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Incentives have to align with political objectives. In addition, a good balance between authority and responsibility is important to ensure the satisfactory performance of politicians and bureaucracies at lower levels of government (Burki et al. 1999). Decentralisation often involves delicate compromises as it ultimately aims at redistributing power and changing existing social power structures. Often there is considerable self-interest and conflict at the central level (movers and blockers) and between central and local level involving clientelist relations and accountability systems (Jütting et al. 2004). Misalignment between the structure of the government bureaucracy and the assignment of service responsibilities to different tiers confuses incentives, weakens accountability for service delivery, and creates conflicts of interest instead of checks and balances – for example through the appointment of local administrative staff by an upper tier government or belonging to a national service (Ahmad et al. 2005).

Ensuring local capacity through mechanisms promoting good knowledge of local conditions, political accountability, and technical and institutional capacity is considered important (IBRD governance site, quoted from Zanetta 2005). Local human capacity for good performers depends on support policy by central government, training, recruitment of staff (exclusive central government recruitment of staff tends to reduce local human capacity), information, technical equipment, experience, clear distribution of roles and responsibilities, and decision-making capacity (Jütting et al. 2004). Local financial capacity that stems from both central government transfers and local taxes as well as substantial independent tax-raising powers seem to contribute positively to pro-poor decentralisation, with the latter tending to increase regional inequalities. Needs-based transfers from central government can be helpful in targeting the poor. Transparency, stability and predictability of transfers also contributes positively.31 Furthermore, the power and freedom to decide how to spend resources – i.e. the degree of autonomy of council over own budget (Cabannes 2004) -, generally supports poverty-focused decentralisation, especially through increased possibilities for responsiveness and despite the higher risks of improper and unequal allocation (Jütting et al. 2004).

Checks and balances at the local level are necessary to avoid or reduce practices of corruption and local elite capture of the agenda. Decentralisation in the African context often does not challenge local elites who are resistant or indifferent to pro-poor policies. Therefore ideological commitment to the poor by the centre and strengthening and broadening democratic accountability both at the national and local level are crucial conditions for poverty reduction (Crook & Manor 1998; Crook 2003). Democratic local governance initiatives have encouraged participation and increased representation, but have provided

31
little in the way of empowerment and even less in making the distribution of benefits more equitable or reducing poverty (Blair 2000). In line with this, Manor (2003) found that fiscal and administrative systems tend to promote centralisation and that for decentralisation to be beneficial it must have a significant democratic content. Furthermore, strategies and outcomes are often very much related to the motivation of the mayor or leading group within the council and the nature and scope of groups drawn into budgeting processes (Cabannes 2004; Mitlin 2004a). Recent research in India indicates elite capture of the (metropolitan) governance agenda through middle-class activism of residents or neighbourhood associations (Baud & Nainan 2008; Chakrabarti 2008). A fundamental problem with promoting participation in ‘invited spaces’ is that often, entrenched relations of dependency, fear and disprivilege undermine the possibility of the kind of deliberative decision-making they are to foster (Cornwall 2004a). Comparative action-research on gender, citizenship and governance in South Asia, India and Southern Africa, found that it is more difficult for women to penetrate as independent political actors or to raise controversial issues, as local government is often more embedded in local social structures than national government and prevailing gender ideologies are more concentrated at the local level. Furthermore, procedures were often found to be gender neutral and gender blind, incorrectly assuming that women and men have equal power and status (Mukhopadhyay 2003/4).

Finally, and somewhat ideologically, decentralisation was found more successful when it is part of a broader agenda of government reforms and consistent with donor strategies (Jüttting et al. 2004). Policy coherence can for example be enhanced through linkages with prior and/or parallel strategies of economic liberalisation and democratisation or land reform programmes. Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) and their possibly related trade-offs with expanding local capacities, need to also be considered in terms of policy coherence.

**Impacts on influence and political rights**

**Influence and political rights**

Impacts until recently were mainly analysed in terms of development results and assets or resources. Only recently international development research has started to bring back politics and power into research and to address ‘why and how questions’ of poverty - involving dynamic, structural and relational factors - in addition to ‘what questions’ (see also Harris 2007; Mitlin & Bebbington 2006; Hyden 2004/8; De Haan 2007). In this study impacts are - next to being measured in terms of quality of life - also assessed in terms of influence and
Inclusive governance: spaces and impacts

political rights. Influence was earlier defined by citizenship literature as ‘a tangible impact on policy making and the organisation of service delivery’ (Goetz & Gaventa 2001). In order to clearly distinguish influence and political rights, for the purpose of this study the definitions of influence and political rights have been formulated on the basis of conceptualisations of institutions in the literature. Influence refers to the tangible impacts on the allocative and distributive rules of the game or policies, processes and implementation of service. Political rights refers to the tangible impacts on the constitutive rules of the game. The study analyses both increases and decreases in rights and influence.

Impacts of individually claimed spaces on influence and political rights

Impacts on influence and political rights through individual claimed spaces were only limitedly touched upon in the literature. The Chronic Poverty Research Centre indicates that studies of political capital have mainly focused on the links between political capital and poverty reduction, rather than those between low levels of political capital and poverty itself, chronic or otherwise (CPRC website, December 2009). Attempts to promote inclusion of the relationship between political capital and other capital assets within the sustainable livelihoods framework (Baumann 2000; Rakodi 1999; Devas 2002; Birner & Wittner 2000), failed to gain wider recognition and largely remained limited to discussion of analytical, conceptual and practical relationship issues (Baumann 2000; Rakodi 1999).

Impacts of collectively claimed spaces on influence and political rights

The literature so far only contains limited research findings with regard to the impacts of collectively claimed spaces on influence and political rights. As indicated earlier, the majority of the research literature on collective action and social movements has been focused on describing goals, tactics and experiences of engagement with the state, rather than the formulation of conditions (GSDRC 2009; Bebbington 2009). Most of the available case studies on social movements indicate that their impact on long term processes of development remains limited (GSDRC 2009). As social movements can mainly exert influence indirectly through other actors, they can merely modify rather than alter processes that determine the creation of poverty (Mitlin & Bebbington 2006). In addition, much of the literature suggests that the primary importance of social movements is to change the ways in which society understands poverty, rather than affect poverty through the state by placing pressure on governments to adapt new policies (GSDRC 2009).
Currently the chronic poverty research agenda is reformulated – in preparation of phase 3- towards inclusion of dynamic, structural and relational factors of poverty (Shepherd 2007; see also Bebbington 2006; Mitlin & Bebbington 2006; Harriss 2007; Mitlin 2008; Bebbington 2009). Within this context of increased focus on power and structural causes of poverty, it is initially looked for possibilities of bringing the until recently largely separated themes of social movement and poverty together (Bebbington 2009). Bebbington (2009) on the basis of a literature study identifies several causal pathways through which social movements can potentially impact poverty: through challenges of institutions that underlie the political economy of poverty (challenging processes of exploitation or dispossession); through reworking the cultural politics of poverty (challenging ideologies surrounding poverty debates); through direct effects on assets of the poor (providing access to land, water, shelter) and through engagement with the state (varying on a continuum from collaborative to adversarial relationships). Bebbington (2009) finds that the relative significance of causal pathways to poverty reduction depends on the domain of contention in question, the type of social movement involved and the more general political economy context. In addition, the internal constraints to relationships and participation inside grassroots organisations can also hinder to address some of the more structural causes that result in a lack of empowerment and powerlessness (Mitlin 2001). Examples are problems of internal representation and democracy (including how far they can represent the poorest), the difficulty of sustaining coherence and convergence among actors, and tensions within movements (Bebbington 2009; Mitlin 2008). These internal explanatory factors are almost similar to the ones the literature mentioned earlier with regard to contributions of grassroots organisations to poverty reduction. On the basis of the literature Bebbington suggests that one of the most important effects of social movements (when they are ‘successful’) is to induce the creation of new public institutions that contribute to poverty reduction (Bebbington 2009).

More concrete conditions on how the context could be made more favourable or better anticipated through longer term strategies are however often lacking in the literature, or it is referred to policies or to action and limited in taking into account the roles of other actors that the social movement and the state. Earlier citizenship literature indicated that the created issue-based ‘popular spaces’ can potentially serve as a base from which to launch a direct confrontation of authority from an ‘outsider’ position (Cornwall 2004a). Habib and Opoku-Mensah (2009) also indicate the continued importance of material struggles for other struggles in the African context. If processes of popular protest, direct action, campaigns, lobbies, strikes and demonstrations can achieve ‘critical mass’, they can influence decisions in otherwise closed spaces. Furthermore, they can also function effectively in serving to prepare,
empower, support and legitimise those who are then delegated to enter the ‘lion’s den’ on their behalf and engage in policy deliberation in an invited space. The literature however also indicates that ‘linking’ social capital can negatively impact associations, in general and with regard to democratic governance in particular, if not accompanied by sufficient ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital (Titeca & Vervisch 2008). Cornwall and Coelho’s (2006) suggestions for citizens to participate in popular education and mobilisation in order to learn to recognise themselves as citizens (rather than beneficiaries or clients) and to learn ‘to cut their political teeth’ in participatory sphere institutions and transfer these skills to other spheres, also by no way seems to be a short and/or easy route. Some studies stress the importance of unintended impacts by successful social movements through the spurring of influential counter-movements (Kirmani 2008). They stress the importance of counter-balancing the assessment of positive outcomes of social movement activities with recognition of the limitations and possible negative implications of engagement.

**Impacts of invited spaces on influence and political rights**

The research literature with regard to impact of invited spaces on influence and political rights has been limited so far. The literature mainly focused on pointing out the importance of voice through consultations and participatory inclusion of the poor and taking their realities into account by showing these realities, rather than formulating conditions for actual impact on influence on policies and processes. Some writers are optimistic about the potential to stimulate further participation and democratisation from below (Baochi 2001; Avritzer 2002, quoted from Cornwall & Coelho 2006). Others pointed out the ambivalent effects of institutionalised participation on social and political energy and further on democratisation (Piven & Cloward 1971; Dryzek 1996; Taylor 1998, quoted from Cornwall & Coelho 2006). Coelho and Cornwall (2006) indicate that ‘more contingent factors can alter the balance of power, such as unintended consequences of mutations and processes of politicisation that accompany resource negotiations or subtle shifts that new discourses of rights, social justice and citizenship create as they circulate through networks that support different social actors and expand their interpretive and political horizons’. Recent research on India found that negotiating rights through ‘political spaces’ was more effective for vulnerable low-income groups, while negotiating rights through ‘executive spaces’ was more effective for middle-class citizens (Baud & Nainan 2008). Linking with the political strategies of the growing middle-classes and their resident associations is also suggested as a viable alternative (Chakrabarti 2008). Impacts of informal political channels are currently being explored, particularly by the Africa Power & Politics
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Programme. Mitlin already indicated possibilities through offering authorities information they don’t have and gaining confidence and trust through joint operations (Mitlin 2004a) and co-production, going well beyond the material advantages to achieve a broader set of political objectives (Mitlin 2006/8).37

2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter an overview of the current debates on governance networks, (democratic) governance assessment, decentralisation, citizenship and deepening democracy, social capital and livelihoods, social movements and chronic poverty was presented to set the framework for this study. Several elements from these general debates are of particular importance to understand the discussion on the conditions under which spaces can contribute to improved impacts on quality of life, influence and political rights for the poor.

Spaces are understood in abstract terms as the ways in which opportunities for engagement might be conceived or perceived, and in concrete terms as the actual sites that are entered and animated by citizens. The further differentiation of spaces into the types of individually claimed spaces, collectively claimed spaces and invited spaces will serve to enable the identification of conditions for improved impacts with regard to the full spectrum of relevant spaces at local level and national level for the poor in metropolitan cities. The analysis of the literature in addition shows that there is often still a limited constellation of relevant actors to these spaces included in research, for example with regard to the collectively invented spaces of social movements and collective action, but also with regard to invited spaces of governance networks. This study, where possible, will take into account the full spectrum of relevant actors and their roles in processes, which amongst others leads to interpreting donor agencies not only as part of the institutional context, but also as actors with interests in concrete negotiation processes over spaces, as well as the positive and negative internal features which influence the impacts of spaces.

With regard to these spaces the literature shows that all debates are currently shifting from a perspective of agency to a realistic structural approach. Moreover, the literature recognises the role of power and the multi-level institutional context in relationships. Spaces will therefore in this study be conceived as underpinned by formal and/or informal institutions. Processes within and outside these spaces will be conceived as accommodated and constrained by formal and/or informal institutions, including structures of opinions, beliefs and cultural norms. Institutions are thus considered as rules that are separated from the players, which allows for the investigation of both
the accommodating and constraining roles of institutions on processes. With regard to individually claimed spaces the factor of instrumental political capital will be explicited next to the factors of social and organisational capital, allowing for analysis of the relationship between political capital and other non-material and material capital assets.

The analysis of the literature shows that until recently the focus in all research strands was predominantly on processes rather than impacts, which were often more or less normatively interpreted as positive. The literature also shows that currently there is an increased call to include the factors of (positive and negative) impacts on poverty as well as the factor of influence on institutions by the poor in research. In this study a comprehensive approach including the factors of processes, impacts on quality of life and impacts on influence and political rights will be applied. Impacts on quality of life is defined on the basis of a mixture of the social approaches to quality of life of poverty studies, community studies and societal quality of life constructs. This allows for assessment of impacts on quality of life in terms of vulnerability of households and collectives and service delivery to the wider society. It expresses the extent to which impacts are both serving the poor and matching the scale and the scope of the problems. Impacts on influence and political rights are defined on the basis of the notion of influence in citizenship literature and conceptualisations of institutions in new institutional economics, governance network and (democratic) governance assessment literature. This allows for assessment of impacts on influence and political in terms of tangible impacts on the allocative or distributive (formal and/or informal) rules of the game (including policies, processes and implementation) respectively on the constitutive (formal and/or informal) rules of the game.

Finally, the literature review also shows that the challenge of the shift in focus from the ‘what’ to the ‘why and how’ of development is to avoid a relapse to the structural perspective of the 1970s and 1980s that mainly provided insights and explanations of power (im)balances without many action repertoires, and to rather stay focussed in a balanced way on formulating conditions under which spaces of power can sustainably deliver for the poor.

The literature review has now positioned this study within the body of relevant literature and set the framework for research. The research questions and further operationalisation of the theoretical concepts discussed here will be addressed in the next chapter on research methodology.
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Notes

1 The Washington Consensus of 1990, right after the end of the Cold War, made for the shift from the economic agenda of Structural Adjustment Programmes towards the neo-liberal political agenda of good governance, democratisation, decentralisation and private sector enablement. The shift towards decentralisation in Africa was mainly driven by external interests, although it was the fourth time on the African continent to introduce decentralisation, but the first time for this reason (Owusu 2001). For additional information on the Washington Consensus and meta-narratives see amongst others Maxwell (2005).

2 The conditions for impact of (democratic) decentralisation on poverty reduction are further discussed in section 2.4.1, sub-section impacts of invited spaces on quality of life.

3 Some authors consider privatisation (UNDP 2004) or outsourcing to Community Based Organisations (Ahmad 2005) also as a form of decentralisation, though generally the term decentralisation is exclusively reserved for transfer of functions and powers within the public sector. Furthermore, sometimes federalism is considered the strongest form of decentralisation.

4 Normativity especially plays a role in regard to defining good governance and good enough governance –mainly in regard to measurement of governance at the national level-, with the latter referring to the minimal conditions of governance necessary to allow political and economic development to occur (see Grindle 2005/7).

5 Some authors from other research strands also emphasised the need for capacity to demand in addition to the capacity to respond. See for example Romeo (2003) and Krishna (2003).

6 Citizenship literature defined voice as ‘the range of measures – such as complaint, organised protest, lobbying, and participation in decision-making and product delivery – used by civil society actors to put pressure on service providers to demand better service outcomes’ (Goetz & Gaventa 2001). Consultation involves the ‘opening of arenas for dialogue and information sharing’. Presence and representation involves ‘institutionalising regular access for certain social groups in decision-making’. Influence concerns citizen engagement whereby citizens can translate access and presence into a tangible impact on policy-making and the organisation of service delivery (Goetz & Gaventa 2001).

7 Originally invited and claimed spaces were also further differentiated on the basis of the temporal dimension of relative durability of spaces for participation into regularised relations (invited/long-term), fleeting formations (invited/ad-hoc), movements (invented/long-term) and moments (invented/ad-hoc) (Cornwall 2002/4).

8 Mitlin (2006) indicates that in urban contexts place based-movements of the poor are especially at the micro and meso-level, as the poor have an essential struggle for political inclusion (citizenship) at the level of the city.

9 The difference between formal and informal institutions is further elaborated upon in the section 2.3.4 on invited spaces.

10 Gaventa (2006) himself also indicates that the power cube is an ‘analytical device which can be used – along with other approaches - to reflect on and analyse how strategies for change in turn change power relations’.

11 Social theorists like Durkheim, Weber, Marx and Simmel laid the foundations of these conceptualisations of social capital (Portes 1998).

12 Cleaver (2005) attributes the structural reproduction of exclusion of the chronic poor in social relations especially to the inability to sustain their able-bodiedness; the little room to manoeuvre in their kin and wider social relationships due to small fragile families, unstable marital arrangements and wider derogatory perceptions of the poor; and the inability to articulate successfully in public fora – and even where the voices of the poor are heard they are given little weight and exert negligible influence (Cleaver 2005).

13 While the structural approaches in the US tend to pay a great deal of attention to the how of collective action, the social constructivistic approaches in Europe attempt to explain why individuals are inclined to such actions (Klandermans, Kriesi & Tarrow 1988).
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15 The new social movement perspective was renamed in the revised second edition and could also be called the cultural representations perspective (Della Porta & Diani 2006). The shift especially since the WSF in Seattle.

16 Collective action focused on consumption concerns the mobilisation of consumers of urban services, action focused on the availability of collective or public good and urban services, and expressed in actions such as land invasions, squatter protests and street demonstrations. Collective action focused on political (and human) rights action evolves around the non-material issues of justice, security, freedom from repression and democratisation.

17 The article of Habib and Opoku-Mensah is part of a wider venture on whether social movements are a global phenomenon that happen to be situated on the African continent, or whether it concerns social phenomena of a sort unique to Africa and therefore difficult to analyse in a comparative perspective (Ellis & Kessel 2009). Habib and Opoku-Mensah address the debate on social movements in the global academy from the perspective of the African continent’s contemporary social struggles. Despite the fundamental differences in socio-economic contexts - African societies are not post-industrial societies – they question whether it is intellectually sustainable to develop a theory of social movements with universal ambitions on the narrow experiences of post-industrial societies (Habib & Opoku-Mensah 2009).

18 Hickey and Bracking (2005) also do not describe to a language of ‘new’(lifespace) and ‘old’(workspace) social movements.

19 They often take the form of self-help groups. Self-help can be defined as ‘any voluntary action undertaken by an individual or a group of persons which aims at the satisfaction of individual or collective needs or aspirations’ (Verhagen 1989). It is characterised by a substantial contribution of the individual’s or group’s own resources in terms of labour, capital, land and/or entrepreneurial skills. As formal membership arrangements are often not in place (equal sharing of risks, costs and benefits amongst the members; liability of leadership and/or manager to be called to account by the membership for their deeds), it is preferred to speak of self-help groups in stead of self-help organisations, reflecting better the informal character of these groups. Since the 1990s residents associations have also become a common phenomenon in urban contexts mechanism for the delivery of services by people themselves, but also for claiming rights.

20 Klijn & Belcher (2007) differentiate four conjectures of compatibility between representative democracy and governance networks: incompatible, complementary, transitional, instrumental. Incompatible conjecture refers to governance networks as challenging representative democracy and decision rules of representative democratic institutions. Complementary conjecture refers to governance networks as providing democratic institutions with additional linkages to society. Transitional conjecture refer to governance networks as offering greater flexibility and efficiency than representative democratic institutions and will increase as the primary mode of decision making at the expense of representative democratic institutions. Instrumental conjecture refers to governance networks providing a means for democratic representative institutions to increase their authority in the face of societal complexity (emphasising agreements over outputs rather than inputs to the decision process).

21 A partnership can be viewed as a particular form of governance networks consisting of the following features: it involves 2 or more actors; it refers to a more or less enduring relationship between the actors based on a written or verbal agreement; mutually beneficial relationship, without assuming equality between actors; expressed in concrete, physical activities; contributing either directly or indirectly to a public goal (Baud & Post 2001).
Common types of partnerships are those between government and private sector companies, between communities and private sector, and between communities, NGOs and local government (Baud 2000).
22 UK, New Zealand, Australia, United States and Canada (UNDP 2003)
23 Result Based Management (RBM) is a life-cycle approach that integrates strategy, people, resources, processes and measurements to improve decision making, transparency and accountability. The approach focuses on achieving outcomes, implementing performance management, learning and changing and reporting performance.
24 The concept of capabilities is based on Sen (1999), who conceptualised development as developing the capabilities or freedoms of people by increasing the options available to them.
25 The top-down view of institutions sees institutions as determined by laws written by political leaders (the view of most Enlightenment intellectuals like Rousseau and Condorcet). The bottom-up view sees institutions as emerging spontaneously from the social norms, customs, traditions, beliefs and values of individuals within a society, with the written law only formalising what is already mainly shaped by the attitudes of individuals (the view of the leading critic of the top-down French Revolution, Edmund Burke) (Easterly 2008).
26 Civic-driven change literature seems to fit in here stressing the culture-based aspects of development, though not explicitly differentiating between formal and informal institutions and not clarifying concepts of how alternative civic driven institutions could be created (Biekart & Fowler 2007).
27 Hyden (2008) indicates the prevailing notion of the concept of power among DPs is ‘power to’ viewing power as a capability or ability as contrary to the conflictual approach’s notion of ‘power over’ viewing power as a relationship. In regard to the APPP it is suggested to define power as ‘the ability to achieve a desired outcome in competition with other actors who lay claim to the same resources needed to produce that outcome.
28 An extreme examples of coping is the imitation of the financing of patronage networks through enterprises officially owned by the ruling party in Malawi by Mozambique and Tanzania (Hyden 2008).
29 The terms are considered too sweeping because, for the majority of researchers, they provide a means of saving effort on empirical analysis of the relations to which they refer. Too general because they reduce the potential diversity of the divergences between norms and practices to a general, abstract, ideal-typical model, which cannot be shown to have exhausted the range of relevant situations. Too partial because they only focus on one aspect or dimension of divergences, for example, the public-private confusion, or the distribution of spoils (De Sardan 2008).
30 Country specificities consist of: size of the country, level of economic development, degree of democracy and capacities. Process design of decentralisation consists of: political factors (commitment to a real devolution process, policy coherence, donors’ involvement), administrative factors (anti-corruption measures, division of functions, building local capacity) and fiscal factors (type and amount of resources involved). (Jütting et al. 2004/5).
31 Predictability of transfers is enhanced through the use of formula-based allocation systems driven by simple measures of equity and efficiency (Bird 2003).
32 Research has so far focussed on the transformation of social into political capital, particularly in terms of how local communities and groups can influence policy (Birner & Wittner 2000; Booth & Richards 1998) and on the links between political capital and levels of democracy (Booth & Richards 1998).
33 In September 2010 an international conference will be held to set the research agenda of the Chronic Poverty Research Centre for the next ten years (2010-2020) (www.chronicpoverty.org, consulted January 2010).
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34 Bebbington (2007) mention some exceptions of studies in which the two themes were integrated. Obviously this is also often the case with collective action for material resources.

35 Recently Mitlin (2006), seemingly built on Morgan (2006), formulated five capacities for social movements to increase their effectiveness: the capacities to act, to be, to represent, to relate, to strategise.

36 The earlier mentioned methodologies for capacity development to demand are also applicable here (see 2.3.4).

37 Co-production is referred to as ‘a state that is both participatory in decision-making and which allows local groups to be directly involved in the implementation of state policy; or, alternatively conceptualised, a state that is willing to give financial support to development strategies defined and undertaken by the poor themselves’ (Mitlin 2006: 45). The latter is also named bottom-up co-production (Mitlin 2008: 7).