Conflict and local immigration policy making

How conflict over immigrant day laborers in the United States shapes local policy responses

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CHAPTER 5

Inverted Mobilizations
The Case of Pro- and Anti-Immigrant Activism in Orange County, California

Pro-immigrant advocates mobilizing in Orange County, California, between 2010 and 2018 had access to more organizational resources and capacities than anti-immigrant advocates. In addition, the pro-immigrant side enjoyed broader public support. Despite these advantages, the anti-immigrant side achieved more policy wins in Orange County. This paper argues that the case of Orange County indicates inverted mobilizations, where asymmetries on one side are counterbalanced by asymmetries on the other side. Anti-immigrant advocates were able to achieve more policy wins despite their disadvantages when it comes to organizational resources and capacity, because they could rely on firm support from conservative elected officials. This paper suggests that divergence between the Republican and Democratic parties – where the Republican party has increasingly turned into a movement party, while the Democratic party has mostly maintained conventional ties to activists – increases the likelihood of inverted mobilizations to occur.

Introduction

Orange County, California has long been a regional hub of anti- and pro-immigrant mobilizations (McGirr 2001). During the 1990s, a core group of anti-immigrant activists in Orange County mounted a campaign to pass the "Save Our State" initiative in California (i.e., Proposition 187). The law was designed to ban unauthorized immigrants from most state services and institutions (Ellis 2006; Hopkins 2010; Jacobson 2008; Rodriguez 2008). The passage of this law laid the groundwork for a countermovement of pro-immigrant advocates in the region. They actively mobilized in opposition to Proposition 187 and started to build a robust organizational and political infrastructure in Orange County and across California. Since then, both sides have been engaged in continual battles with one another, culminating in sharp contests to counter or support the Trump administration's restrictive immigration policies in 2017 and 2018 (Nicholls and de Wilde 2022).

During this last cycle of mobilizations, the pro-immigrant side had important advantages in terms of organizational resources and capacities, and support from the public. The anti-immigrant side by contrast consisted of resource-poor and unprofessional organizations with very limited public and civil society support. Though Orange County was historically very conservative, it had also become more supportive of the Democratic Party, especially in its demographically diverse northern half. These opposing sides mobilized across municipal jurisdictions to pass policies that would cancel out the policies of their adversaries and advance their own agendas. Despite the asymmetric advantages of the pro-immigrant side, the anti-immigrant side achieved

more policy wins in Orange County. Why would a mobilization with seemingly asymmetrical advantages over its adversaries achieve fewer policy successes?

Despite the important findings generated by literatures on pro- and anti-immigrant activism, both are not able to answer our central question. The former literature has provided insights into the motives, political opportunities, resources, frames, and scales of pro-immigrant activism (Burciaga and Martinez 2017; de Graauw et. al. 2013; Gonzales 2014; Nicholls 2019; Steil and Vasi 2014; Terriquez 2017; Walker and Leitner 2011; Zepeda-Millán 2017). These scholars recognize the importance of adversaries, but there are no systematic analyses of dynamics between opposing sides. The scholarship on anti-immigrant activism is less robust and more narrowly focused on the motives driving individuals into xenophobic political movements (Jacobson 2008; Varsanyi 2011; Shapira 2013; Newman 2013; Steil and Ridgely 2012; Longazel 2016; Elcioglu 2020). It does provide insights into the organizational infrastructure of anti-immigrant activism, but largely ignores how opposed sides relate to one another. The broader literature on right-wing activism and the contemporary Republican Party has also generated useful findings (Grossman and Hopkins 2016; McAdam and Kloos 2014; Skocpol and Williams 2016; Pierson and Schickler 2020). Changes to the party have encouraged elected officials to embrace increasingly extreme positions on immigration and collaborate directly with right-wing activists. This has blurred the line between institutionalized insiders (Republican elected officials) and noninstitutionalized outsiders (right-wing advocates) (Goldstone 2004).

The literature on movement-countermovements stresses the relational dynamics of opposing activists. Their entanglements impact strategies as well as the likelihood of success. In federal systems like the United States, activists outflank their opponents by maximizing gains in politically opportune jurisdictions and offsetting the gains of adversaries in hostile jurisdictions (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Laschever and Meyer (2021) add that when one side has asymmetrical organizational resources and capacity advantages, this side will likely achieve more policy wins. This literature allows us to better understand the relational dynamics of pro- and anti-immigrant movements, but certain assertions are not entirely consistent with our case. The resource and capacity advantages of pro-immigrant forces in Orange County did not translate into more policy wins, suggesting that another factor may be at play.

Vermeulen's (2013) work on competing immigrant organizations in Europe points to what that missing factor may be. When weaker organizations compete with a stronger adversary, the weaker organizations can offset disadvantages by bolstering other assets (e.g., sharpen ideology, growth in grassroots mobilization, increase member numbers, develop better relations with elected officials). Weaker groups react collectively to the presence and strength of the opposite ideological population by intensifying activities. Asymmetries are important but activists are cognizant of comparative deprivations and, under certain conditions, offset disadvantages by turning to other sources of support.

Building on the above literatures, we argue that movement-countermovements can demonstrate symmetries and asymmetries, but also *inverted* strengths and weaknesses. "Inverted mobilizations" arise when the asymmetric weaknesses of one side (e.g., resources, capacity, public support) are offset by the asymmetric strengths of the other (e.g., elected officials coordinate with activists). In our case, anti-immigrant forces were able to compensate for weak resources and organizational capacities by developing strong alliances with right-wing elected officials seeking to advance their political and career agendas. Rather than serving as insider political targets of

outsider activists, Orange County elected officials became a part of the struggle, effectively dissolving the boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics (Goldstone 2004). By contrast, many moderate and liberal-leaning elected officials expressed sympathy for the pro-immigrant cause, but positioned themselves as institutionalized insiders responding to the demands and pressions by noninstitutionalized outside immigrant rights advocates. They did not coordinate campaigns with these advocates or lead campaigns on their own. The case of Orange County therefore reflects an inverted mobilization, with the asymmetric advantages of one side (resources, capacity, support for the pro-immigrant side) matched or even outmatched by the asymmetric advantages of the other (engaged elected officials for the pro-immigrant side). In the end, this support proved decisive for achieving more policy wins across Orange County.

We suggest that the divergence of political parties in the United States may make *inverted mobilizations* more likely. The Republican and Democratic parties have diverged in many ways (Grossman and Hopkins 2016; McAdam and Kloos 2014), including how they relate to activists on the right and left. The Republican Party has evolved into a "movement party" while the Democratic Party has largely retained conventional relations to activists on the left. Even when activists on the right experience a sharp decline in resources and organizational capacity (as has been the case for the anti-immigrant movement in Orange County), they can compensate for these weaknesses by turning to a growing number of elected officials anxious to demonstrate their conservative bona fides. Activists on the left cannot turn to Democratic elected officials in the same way, compelling them to amass resources from philanthropic foundations, invest in increasingly professionalized organizations, and pressure elected officials through protests and lobbying. The divergence of political parties, we suggest, therefore impacts movement-countermovement dynamics and increases the likelihood of inverted mobilizations.

Two ships passing in the night: Immigrant and anti-immigrant movements

The literatures on pro- and anti-immigrant movements provide important insights into the strengths and weakness of the different sides, but do not assess how these sides relate to one another or how relations to adversaries shape the likelihood of success.

Pro-immigrant movement: Infrastructure and relations to elected officials

The immigrant rights literature has shown that activists have been motivated by the threat of local, state, and federal repression (Burciaga and Martinez 2017; de Graauw et. al. 2013; Gonzales 2014; Nicholls 2019; Steil and Vasi 2014; Terriquez 2017; Walker and Leitner 2011; Zepeda-Millán 2017). Immigrants and their allies have mobilized against restrictive laws and in favor of laws to expand access to entitlements and protections. Anti-immigrant policies such as the proposed Sensenbrenner Bill of 2005 spurred hundreds of thousands of activists into the streets and helped solidify a distinctive racial identity among Latino immigrants (Zepeda-Millán 2017). Additionally, some scholars have shown that "political opportunities" across jurisdictions shape the strategic choices of activists (Burciaga and Martinez 2017; Nicholls 2019; Nicholls and de Wilde 2022; Walker and Leitner 2011). For cities and counties, Burciaga and Martinez maintain that the "localized political context" introduces "barriers and openings for change through mobilization" (2017: 455), consequently impacting their claims, strategies, and targets. Other scholars have shed light on the resources, networks, and organizations powering immigrant rights mobilizations (de

Graauw et. al. 2013; Gonzales 2014; Nicholls 2019). Strong networks have helped create a committed activist base while diverse organizational types and capacities – from small, grassroots organizations to large and highly professionalized organizations – provide a plethora of resources, repertoires, and capabilities. Far from being a resource poor and low-capacity social movement, immigrant rights activism during the 2010s became highly professionalized and gained access to enormous resources and support.

Scholars have also shed light on relations between elected officials and immigrant rights activists (Denvir 2020; Nicholls 2019). The support of Democratic elected officials to immigrant rights activism has been tentative partly due to the party's electoral coalition. The Democratic Party's electoral coalition has been shown to be more ideologically diverse than the Republican Party (Grossman and Hopkins 2016, McAdam and Kloos 2016). In many districts, winning elections depends on cobbling together coalitions with conflicting or inconsistent interests and ideologies. In such districts, ideologically polarizing policies like robust pro-immigration policies may alienate one part of their coalition and cost an election. Consequently, they tend to support policies to expand the margins of their coalition and avoid policies that alienate one part of the coalition. Democratic elected officials of the past 20 years are therefore more sympathetic than Republicans, but party dynamics in most districts – those outside of deeply Democratic districts – restrict their abilities to fully commit, coordinate, and engage with pro-immigrant activists. Party dynamics there encourage most of these elected officials to function as insider, institutionalized targets of outsider, noninstitutionalized activists.

Anti-immigrant movement: Infrastructure and relations to elected officials

The literature on anti-immigrant activism has documented three important features. First, anti-immigrant advocates began to form several national level, well-funded organizations headquartered in Washington D.C. in the 1980s and 1990s. These organizations were increasingly tied to one another through interlocking directorates, shared staff, and a common vision of immigrants as a fundamental threat to the nation (Denvir 2020). Second, anti-immigrant forces began to develop sophisticated grassroots campaigns in response to the influx of immigrants in localities (Horton 1995; Ellis 2006; Hopkins 2010; Newman 2013; Steil and Ridgely 2012; Varsanyi 2011). From the 1990s onwards, these local activists campaigned for English-only laws, banishing day laborers and street vending, and restrictive labor and housing laws (Horton 1995; Varsanyi 2011; Nicholls 2019). In 1993, sporadic anti-immigrant activists solidified into a campaign in California to restrict undocumented immigrants from access to public services and schools. Republican activists in Yorba Linda (a municipality in Orange County) worked with Ron Prince to draft a statewide referendum, Proposition 187 (Jacobson 2008). Though Proposition 187 was struck down by the courts, it provided grassroots activists in other cities and states a template to pursue their own campaigns. Third, some militant activists formed regionwide and horizontally structured organizations that resembled militias, the most famous of which was the Minutemen Project (Elcioglu 2020; Longazel 2016; Shapira 2013). Although such organizations have had unreliable financial support and wavering organizational capacity, they recruited extremely committed volunteers.

While anti-immigrant advocacy achieved prominence during the 1990s and 2000s, organizational resources, capacity, and public support waned in the 2010s. This coincided with the Republican Party's increased engagement in immigration and other high-profile right-wing battles. Immigration has also served as an issue that has catalyzed more ideologically homogeneous

conservative voters – largely through the media – to exert concentrated pressure on elected officials (Grossman and Hopkins 2016; McAdam and Kloos 2014; Skocpol and Williams 2016). This has made immigration a litmus test in the Republican Party (Nicholls 2019). Voters use immigration to evaluate the ideological commitments of elected officials and to differentiate conservative candidates in competitive primary elections (Newman 2013). Whereas political dynamics on the Democratic side have made their elected officials hesitant on the issue of immigration, political dynamics on the Republican side have made elected officials into supporters and leaders of increasingly vociferous and extreme anti-immigrant campaigns.

The Republican Party has adopted attributes of a "movement party", blurring the boundary between insider elected officials and outsider social movement activists. The concept of "movement party" was first used to describe social movement organizations that became political parties but maintained a movement infrastructure to advance policy agendas on the inside (Kitschelt 2006; Della Porta 2017). Examples include the Green Party in Germany, the National Front in France, and the Five Star Movement in Italy. Movement parties can also be traditional parties that have overlapping members with social movement organizations, coordinate activities, draw upon the same resources, employ the same mobilizing frame, and adopt the same general goals. Observers of the Republican Party have documented the progressive adoption of social movement attributes and increased coordination between the Republican Party and right-wing movements since the 1990s (Grossman and Hopkins 2016). The Tea Party movement marked a turning point in the Republican Party as movement attributes and coordination became central to the party's structure, political dynamics, and electoral campaigns (Skocpol and Williams 2016). The election of Donald Trump revealed that the movement rather than the party "establishment" had become the principal force shaping the party. Those candidates who could master the movement could consequently master the party.

In sum, the above literatures identify important attributes of the opposing sides but do not address relational dynamics between them. The two sides are conceptualized as ships passing in the night. Nevertheless, the literatures document consequential differences. On the pro-immigrant side, activists are bolstered by social movement organizations with diverse and extensive resources and capacities. Politically, Democratic officials express outward sympathy for pro-immigrant campaigns, but actual support for polices and laws is uneven and tentative because of reliance on ideologically diverse electoral coalitions. In this way, Democratic officials have retained a traditional relation to immigrant rights activists, serving as an inside target of outsider campaigns. On the anti-immigrant side, there are formal and professional organizations, but most such organizations are now national and headquartered in Washington D.C. Local, regional, and statewide organizations have declined in resources and capacities from the late 2000s onwards. Though declining in resources and capacities, changes in the Republican Party have made elected officials much more responsive to and engaged with anti-immigrant forces. Immigration became a litmus test issue in a party that is more ideologically homogeneous than Democrats. Rather than shying away from immigration controversies like Democrats, many Republican officials win elections and advance their careers by embracing anti-immigrant language and policies, or at least avoiding appearing soft on immigration. Since the Tea Party mobilization, the line between the Republican Party and right-wing movements has blurred further. Following from these observations, we suggest that the centrality of immigration as a litmus test issue in the Republican Party has

combined with its evolution into a movement party to motivate some elected officials to become direct allies and sometime leaders of anti-immigrant campaigns. Dynamics in the Democratic Party have led elected officials in the opposite direction, making them publicly sympathetic yet hesitant supporters of pro-immigrant campaigns.

From asymmetric to inverted mobilizations

Social movement scholars have stressed relational dynamics between opposing sides for shaping strategies and outcomes (Laschever and Meyer 2001; Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Zald 1979; Zald and Useem 1987). Activists do not develop strategies, targets, and frames in a vacuum. In addition to responding to their political and normative contexts, they are responding to their adversaries. Sometimes they seek to simply react to their adversaries by destabilizing them and undercutting their legitimacy. Other times, two separate social movements can develop in opposition to one another. Such opposing social movements include the gun control and pro-gun movements, pro-choice and anti-abortion movements, and the pro- and anti-immigrant movements. Though they may have their own strategies, organizational infrastructure, resources, and collective identity, these movements form in opposition to their adversaries, in addition to political and normative contexts.

Laschever and Meyer (2021) have added that the movement-countermovement literature has largely focused on variations in political opportunities across jurisdictions more than organizational resources and capacities. They suggest that political opportunities are important but opposing movements do not necessarily have symmetrical resources and capacities. Asymmetries can determine the ability of one side to achieve their goals against their adversaries, especially over the long term. They note that, "The asymmetries we find suggest that the extent of the resource imbalance between two opposing movements may be instrumental for explaining both how contextual shifts affect opposing movements and how each movement can capitalize on shifts in political opportunity" (2021: 15).

Though Laschever and Meyer maintain that asymmetries give one side advantages over the other, Vermeulen's study of competing immigrant organizations in Berlin suggests that weaker organizations may seek to compensate for their weaknesses by bolstering other assets (e.g., ideology, members, political relations, etc.). Weaker groups directly react with heightened activities to the presence, strength and influence of the stronger oppositional group, for instance by founding more new organizations, instigating more protest activities or intensifying the development of relationships with elected officials. The stronger side, because they have influence and presence in this asymmetric situation, does not react to the activities and presence of the weaker side (Vermeulen 2013). In certain cases, increased activities of the weaker side can be (in the longer run) highly successful and put the more resourceful side in a 'losing' position because they do not react to the activities of their 'weaker' opposition. They may rely too much on hoarding resources and become inflexible in response to adversaries. Thus, asymmetric resources are important, but actors are cognizant of their comparative deprivation and sometimes compensate through other means. The result may be opposing movements with *inverted* strengths and weakness rather than asymmetric ones.

In sum, we draw on these literatures to argue that pro- and anti-immigrant social movements have developed in opposition to one another. They have engaged in battles for "hearts

and minds" as well real policy wins. Though the balance of power between opposing movements can vary between symmetric and asymmetric, our case suggests there can also be an inversion of strengths and weaknesses. We suggest that differential changes in party dynamics are partly responsible for inversion. Changes to the Republican Party provided anti-immigrant activists in Orange County supporters, which compensated for accelerating organizational weaknesses. On the pro-immigrant side, elected officials continued to play a conventional role of institutional insiders responding to richer and increasingly capacitated outsider advocacy organizations. The result has been an inverted mobilization.

Methods

The three main data resources for this paper are comprised of newspaper archives, Internal Revenue Service data, and city council meeting data. This section discusses the data gathering process and how the data has been deployed to assess organizational resources and capacity, support, mobilization activities, and policy decisions.

The newspaper data originates from NexisUni, which hosts an online archive for news sources. From searches for the keywords 'immigration' and 'sanctuary' articles were selected that relate to Orange County, as the paper focuses on this geographical area. All relevant articles published in English were included and the sample contains 262 newspaper articles published in 19 different newspapers between 2010 and 2018. A large share of the articles originates from the Orange County Register (61.8 percent), a newspaper that can be categorized as right-leaning. The remaining articles were published by center-oriented newspapers (30.9 percent) and newspapers leaning left (7.3 percent).

Based on the newspaper data a list was compiled of organizations that expressed claims or mobilized on immigration issues in Orange County in the period 2010-2018. For each organization in the list, the total revenue, and number of tax units have been obtained based on information provided to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The list includes 237 organizations, of which 102 organizations reported information to the IRS. For each year the average total revenue and number of tax units per organization have been calculated for the pro- and anti-immigrant side. By calculating the total revenue and tax units per capita on each side, variations in number of organizations active on each side are accounted for.

For all thirty-four incorporated cities in Orange County, city council archives were explored to obtain information on local immigration policies and mobilization activities. Relevant documents – such as city council meeting agenda's and city council meeting minutes – have been gathered for cities in Orange County. In addition, more detailed information such as city council meeting transcripts and recordings have been examined for the period 2016-2018 because an uptick in immigration related activism occurred during this period. This in-depth information allows to map the pro- and anti-immigrant side in detail.

The data has been employed to assess the balance of organizational resources and capacity of the pro- and anti-immigrant sides in Orange County. Organizational resources and capacity are measured by three components. The first component consists of financial resources. Financial resources provide insight into the potential scope of organizations, as an organization with a larger budget is expected to have a broader scope than an organization with a small budget. To assess the financial resources of organizations the total revenue reported to the IRS is deployed as an

indicator. The second component of organizational resources and capacity is comprised of complexity. If an organization consists of multiple tax units, this indicates more capacity and complexity because the organization has operations in multiple locations. It is expected that such an organization has a broader reach than an organization that consists of only one tax unit. The third component of organizational resources and capacity consist of visibility in newspaper media. Organizations strive to capture media attention because visibility in news media provides opportunities to shape public debate (Laschever and Meyer 2021). If an organization is named frequently in news media – regardless of positive or negative coverage – this is an indicator of organizational capacity. The number of times the names of organizations are cited in articles published in Californian newspapers is used to indicate the capacity of organizations to be visible in public debate. This data has been derived from the archives of NexisUni, by looking at all newspapers published in California and using the names of organizations as search keys. The number of citations per capita for organizations on the pro- and anti-immigrant side have been calculated to account for variations in the number of organizations involved on each side.

Support expressed in public debate is measured by means of a political claims analysis. This approach entails focusing on statements related to immigration that are expressed by actors in newspaper articles (Koopmans and Statham 1999). A total of 1,751 claims have been identified. A claim can be defined as a statement made by an actor. We selected statements related to immigration. To measure the attitude of claim makers towards immigration, attitude scores have been coded for each claim. An attitude can be negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (+1) towards immigrants. A negative attitude is defined as a situation in which an actor expresses the preference to exclude immigrants and/or expresses hostility towards immigrants. A positive attitude is defined as expressing support for immigrants and/or favoring inclusion of immigrants. Instances where no clear negative or positive feelings towards immigrants are expressed are coded as neutral. To calculate attitude scores by group of actors or time period, attitude scores have been summed up and then have been divided by the number of claims to get an average attitude score.

An asset of the political claims analysis is that it allows to incorporate both institutional and noninstitutional actors (Koopmans and Statham 1999), and this is important to get a comprehensive understanding of the playing field (McAdam and Boudet 2012). However, it is important to note that the use of newspaper data is not free of criticism. It has been argued that claims and activities that are in accordance with the editorial policies of a newspaper tend to be published more often (Hagen 1993). To mitigate this possible bias, this research project has incorporated multiple newspapers, with 61.8 percent coming from a historically center-right newspaper of the Orange County Register. If there is a bias in the dataset, it is to the right rather than to the left. In addition, research has indicated that journalists objectively account the content of activities and claims (Hagen 1993; Helbling and Tresch 2011). Taken together, we argue that the data deployed in this project provides an accurate insight into the actors involved in immigration battles in Orange County.

The attitude scores have been deployed to assess support for the anti- and pro-immigrant side among governmental, organizational, and individual actors. Governmental support consists of the average attitude scores of all actors incorporated in the political claims analysis that are affiliated with a governmental institution. Examples include city council members, mayors, city managers, State Senators, U.S. Representatives, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials and sheriffs, among others. The average attitude score of all governmental actors indicates if the

general opinion among governmental actors in a certain year is favorable to the anti-immigrant side (score below zero) or the pro-immigrant side (score above zero). Organizational support is comprised of the average attitude scores of actors that are affiliated with an organization, such as a business, union, non-profit organization, or a religious organization. Individual support relates to the average attitude scores of actors that do not express their claim on behalf of a governmental or nongovernmental organization. The average attitude scores of governmental, organizational and individual actors are deployed as an indicator of support among these groups for the pro- or anti-immigrant side, to be able to assess if asymmetry exists.

Organizational resources, capacity, and public support provide insight into asymmetries between the pro- and anti-immigrant side, but in order to explore the consequences of these asymmetries mobilization activities and policy decisions are assessed. Mobilization activities have been mapped for the period 2016-2018 based on newspaper and city council data. In this period there were many policy developments at federal, state, county and city levels pertaining to immigration, which makes this a suitable period to explore mobilization activities. Mobilization activities have been identified by coding newspaper articles and city council meeting data for the occurrence of mobilizations that aimed to impact immigration related policies. Mobilization activities include, sending letters to a city council, speaking at a city council meeting, demonstrations, rallies, workshops, press conferences, lawsuits, townhalls, among others. Each mobilization activity has been coded as anti-immigrant (-1), neutral (0), or pro-immigrant (+1). The participants in mobilization activities have been recorded as well. The data on mobilization activities is used to explore how asymmetric resources and capacities impact policy outcomes.

Information on policy decisions in the period 2010-2018 has been derived from city council meeting data. All policies that were placed on the council agendas of Orange County municipalities and that relate to immigration issues have been entered into a database. For each policy, the date the policy was introduced, a description of the policy, and information on if the policy was adopted has been added to the dataset. In addition, for each policy an attitude score has been included. A policy can be restrictive (-1) which means that the policy aims to exclude immigrants, inclusive (+1) indicating that the purpose of the policy is to include immigrants, or neutral (0) which indicates that no clear preference for inclusion or restriction was identified. The data on policy decisions is deployed to assess the consequences of asymmetry and mobilization activities.

Lastly, qualitative analyses have been conducted on the mobilization activities data to provide in-depth case studies of the roles of different actors in local mobilizations. This material has been supplemented with data gathered in previous research projects on mobilization activities. Newspaper articles, minutes of city council meetings, supplementary material provided as part of city council agendas, and video recordings of council meetings have been examined.

Immigration battles in Orange County: An overview

The population in Orange County has long been a predominantly conservative, middle class to affluent, and white. Demographics and political preferences have changed markedly in the past two decades (Nicholls and de Wilde 2022). While the Latino population was mostly confined to the cities of Santa Ana and Anaheim and the Asian population to the cities of Fullerton, Garden Grove and Westminster, both populations have experienced fast growth in municipalities throughout the county, especially in the northern half of the county. Northern Orange County

has become diverse while the southern part of the county has remained predominantly white and affluent. In addition to these demographic changes, support for the Democratic party has been on the rise. Countywide support for the Republican presidential candidate decreased from 55 percent in 2000 to 43 percent in 2016, with sharp divergences between the county's north and south (Nicholls and de Wilde 2022). These findings suggest a fast-changing patchwork of municipalities positioned between more liberal and diverse northern Orange County and the county's whiter, richer, and more conservative south.

Within this politically fragmented region, activists on both sides of the immigration issue face a complex array of political opportunities and barriers, which has fueled opposing mobilizations (see, Figure 5.1) (Nicholls and de Wilde 2022). Newspapers published more articles on immigration topics in 2010, 2013 and the period 2017-2018, indicating peak cycles of mobilization during the decade. Deportation policies, immigration policies implemented by the Trump administration, and other policies – such as street vendor and day laborer policies – spurred some mobilization activities (see, Figure 5.1). However, the major mobilization were in response to Arizona's Senate Bill 1070 (2010), comprehensive immigration reform proposals at the federal level (2013), and the California Values Act (2017-2018).

Figure 5.1: Number of newspaper articles published on immigration issues in Orange County, 2010-2018



In 2010, the passage of Senate Bill 1070 in Arizona generated widespread protest and media coverage throughout the United States. The passage of SB 1070 provided opportunities to both the anti- and pro-immigrant side in Orange County. Immigrant advocates fiercely opposed the Arizona law arguing that the restrictive immigrant bill encouraged racial profiling. In more

liberal cities like Santa Ana, advocates demanded city councils to pass resolutions condemning Arizona Senate Bill 1070. Anti-immigrant proponents, on the other hand, applauded the implementation of Arizona's restrictive immigrant law and mobilized in cities such as Orange, Costa Mesa, and Yorba Linda in favor of resolutions expressing support for the law.
In 2013, proposals for comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level generated an uptick in mobilizations. The debate on comprehensive immigration reform provided momentum for immigrant advocates to mobilize. In response, the cities of Santa Ana and Anaheim adopted resolutions in support of comprehensive immigration reform.

In 2017 and 2018, mobilizations increased significantly. During this period, Orange County became a proxy battlefield in the broader contest between California and the Trump administration. Soon after its inauguration, the Trump administration implemented a series of restrictive immigration policies. For instance, the Trump administration introduced an executive order to compel state, county, and municipal jurisdictions to comply with federal immigration policies and cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies. Failing to do so would make a jurisdiction ineligible for federal funding. These policies triggered more liberal states and municipalities to consider the adoption of "sanctuary" policies. Such policies were designed to restrict cooperation with federal law enforcement in the area of immigration. The most important state to enact such a policy was California with its Values Act. The Values Act was designed to prohibit most cooperation between of California law enforcement agencies and federal immigration authorities.

The policies of the Trump administration and the California Values Act spurred a new round of mobilizations in Orange County. Immigrant rights advocates pushed the city of Santa Ana to adopt a sanctuary policy to protect immigrants who were not shielded by the California Values Act. Anti-immigrant advocates and Trump supporters in Orange County countered by supporting measures to undermine the California Values Act. Such measures included municipal exemptions from the California Values Act and support for a Justice Department lawsuit to challenge the California Values Act. Thus, Orange County became ground zero in the battle over immigration and the authority of federal, state, county, and municipal jurisdictions to shape immigration policies.

Organizational asymmetries in pro- and anti-immigrant mobilizations

Pro-immigrant side: asymmetric resource and capacity advantages

Pro-immigrant organizations that mobilized during the period 2010-2018 benefitted from extensive organizational resources and capacity and strong public support. Advocacy organizations involved national and regional organizations (most headquartered in Los Angles and more distant cities) and local grassroots immigrant rights organizations (most headquartered in Santa Ana and adjacent municipalities). We assessed organizational resources and capacities of pro-immigrant organizations by examining financial resources, number of tax units, and media visibility.

The total revenue per capita for pro-immigrant organizations ranges from $4.3 million in 2010 to $9.2 million in 2018 (see, Table 5.1). Resources were not distributed equally across organizations. For instance, a national organization like the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund had access to an average yearly budget of $6.9 million while local organizations

like CREER Comunidad y Familia (on average $78,000 per year) and Chispa (on average $100,000 per year) had far fewer financial resources. These local and more grassroots organizations did not possess enormous financial resources, but they could turn to better endowed organizations for support and resources.

An organization with more than one tax unit operates in multiple locations, making "tax unit" a fairly reliable indicator of organizational capacity and complexity. The number of tax units per capita for pro-immigrant organizations varies between 20 in 2010 and 16 in 2018 (see, Table 5.1). Most local organizations consisted of only one tax unit, signifying less organizational capacity and complexity. These local organizations were supported by some more complex regional and national organizations, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (on average 46 tax units) and the American Immigration Lawyers Association (on average 29 tax units). These organizations did not only have the resources to support campaigns in more distant regions, but they also had the capacity to coordinate closely with local activist groups. Local pro-immigrant organizations were therefore less capacitated and complex, but they could find support from regional and national pro-immigrant organizations.

Media visibility affects the capacity of organizations to influence public debate. Pro-immigrant organizations have been cited between 81.9 and 111.9 times per capita in Californian newspaper articles between 2010 and 2018 (Table 5.1). Local pro-immigrant organizations like Chispa (on average 63.9 citations) and Resilience OC (on average 46.3 citations) were less visible than regional and national organizations like the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (on average 262.9 citations) and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (on average 191.6 citations). In addition to visibility, pro-immigrant organizations also enjoyed broad support in public debate. Actors representing organizations and individual actors on average expressed pro-immigrant statements in newspaper media in the period 2010-2018 (see, Table 5.2). When zooming in on types of actors (i.e., government, organizations, individuals), the pro-immigrant side found limited support from most government actors (except state officials), but robust support from the region's civil society, including businesses, unions, religious organizations, and non-profit organizations.

To summarize, the data presented here suggests that the pro-immigrant side is well resourced and well capitated, yet resources and capacities are unevenly distributed between local, regional, and national organizations. Local pro-immigrant organizations are somewhat limited in terms of financial resources and capacity, but can turn to regional and national pro-immigrant organizations for support in their campaigns.

Table 5.1: Organizational resources and capacity per capita of anti- and pro-immigrant organizations in Orange County, 2010-2018

	Financial resources (average total revenue per organization)		Capacity and Complexity (average number of tax units)		Visibility (cited in Californian newspapers)	
	Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro
2010	$599,027	$4,363,832	1	20	33.0	101.3
2011	$666,484	$4,870,488	1	18	19.4	89.4
2012	$822,229	$4,896,617	1	18	20.8	92.7
2013	$767,081	$5,521,767	1	17	27.5	89.8
2014	$1,013,400	$6,353,838	1	17	22.9	94.4
2015	$1,198,995	$7,452,354	1	17	28.9	81.9
2016	$1,406,986	$7,903,781	1	15	45.2	83.4
2017	$2,055,607	$9,137,945	1	16	52.3	102.3
2018	$2,031,605	$9,263,083	1	16	51.4	111.9

Table 5.2: Average attitude of governmental, organizational, and individual actors with regard to immigration issues in Orange County, 2010-2018

	Average attitude
Governmental actors	**-.16**
Federal government	-.23
State government	.23
County government	-.23
City government	-.17
Organizational actors	**.41**
Business	.55
Union	.71
Religious organizations	.77
Non-profit organizations	.34
Individual actors	**.31**

Anti-immigrant side: asymmetric resources and capacity disadvantages

Organizations that mobilize in opposition to immigration have less revenue than their adversaries. On average, the total revenue of anti-immigrant organizations ranges from $599,027 in 2010 to $2 million in 2018 (see, Table 5.1). These financial resources are concentrated in two national organizations: the Federation for American Immigration Reform (on average $10.4 million) and Judicial Watch (on average $34.5 million). Most anti-immigrant organizations mobilizing on the regional and local level have limited budgets or do not file IRS 990 forms. For the anti-immigrant side, we therefore find extreme polarization between national organizations headquartered in Washington D.C. and local organizations with virtually no sources of financial support.

In terms of organizational capacity and complexity, most anti-immigrant organizations consist of only one tax unit (see, Table 5.1). Most anti-immigrant organization operate from one location, with the exception of the Eagle Forum which had eight tax units on average and the Minuteman Project that had two tax units. In contrast to the pro-immigrant side, well-resourced *national* anti-immigrant organizations lacked the organizational capacity to make sustained investments in campaigns unfolding in distant regions like Southern California. They could seek local buy-in for nationally coordinated efforts, but they could not participate and coordinate activities in sophisticated regional campaigns, as was the case for pro-immigrant organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union.

Anti-immigrant organizations had lower media visibility than their adversaries. They were cited between 19.4 and 52.3 times per capita by Californian newspapers in the period 2010-2018 (see, Table 5.1). However, it is important to note that the visibility of anti-immigrant organizations grew considerably during the decade. Organizations that were most visible in Californian news media were the Center for Immigration Studies (on average 157.9 citations) and the Minuteman Project (on average 130.6 citations). Regional and local anti-immigrant organizations were less visible, although some organizations such as We the People Rising (on average 95.2 citations) and Save Our State (on average 40.1 citations) succeeded in capturing considerable visibility.

With regard to support in public debate, the anti-immigrant side mostly drew support from governmental actors. Actors representing the federal, county, and city government on average expressed support for anti-immigrant policies and issues (see, Table 5.2). The anti-immigrant side had limited support among civil society organizations such as businesses, unions, and religious organizations. Most sided with the pro-immigrant side, leaving anti-immigrant advocates isolated in Orange County's civic trenches.

To summarize, the pro-immigrant side in Orange County enjoyed asymmetrical organizational advantages. The pro-immigrant side could rely on a sophisticated network of local, regional, and national organizations that had access both to the financial resources and organizational capacities (i.e., tax units) to mount sophisticated local campaigns. High mobilization capacities allowed them to increase their media visibility and win over all important segments of the region's civil society. The anti-immigrant side, by contrast, had fewer resources and limited capacity. Most local organizations had lost their 501(c)3 tax status and had almost no sources of financial support. Well-resourced national organizations lacked the organizational capacity (i.e., tax units) to participate and coordinate with desiccated local organizations. In this environment, the local anti-immigrant activist base was whittled down to the most ideologically committed and extreme elements of

Orange County's conservative milieu, which contributed to alienating much of the public and most sectors of civil society. The only advantage of the anti-immigrant side was lopsided support from federal, county, and city government officials. We will discuss how the nature of this support proved determinative in later sections of this paper.

Divergent mobilization activities in 2017-2018

Taking a closer look at mobilization activities in the period 2017 - 2018, we highlight differences in mobilization activities by examining participation at actual mobilizations (i.e., council meetings, rallies, town halls, etc.).

On the pro-immigrant side, local, regional, and national organizations, alongside religious organizations, and a union, played prominent roles in actual mobilizations, with 39 actors representing these different organizations appearing at city council meetings (see, Table 5.3). Local organizations included Resilience OC, Santa Ana Building Healthy Communities, Orange County Congregation Community Organization, and Los Alamitos Community United, among others. These local organizations found support from regional and national organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles, Mexican American Legal and Educational Defense Fund, and National Day Laborer Organizing. For example, in 2017 local organizations (Santa Ana Building Healthy Communities and Resilience OC) worked closely with regional and national organizations (Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice and the Arab American Civic Council) in a campaign to advance a pro-immigrant policy. Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network supported the local group Los Alamitos Community United in 2018 to file a lawsuit challenging Los Alamitos's ordinance to exempt the city from the California Values Act. The participation of elected officials in "other mobilization activities" remained limited, with only seven elected officials attending such events (see, Table 5.3).

The mobilization activities on the anti-immigrant side contrasted sharply with the opposition. Organizations had a diminished presence in actual mobilizations, as only four actors representing an organization appeared at city council meetings. Only one actor was from a national organization and one from a local organization. A large share of appearances at council meetings were of activists unaffiliated with organizations and aggrieved residents (see, Table 5.3). These activists and individuals had sufficient ideological commitment to show up at events and meetings but lacked concerted leadership from national, regional, or local organizations. However, appearances by elected officials in "other mobilization activities" (e.g., protest events, rallies, etc.) was three times higher on the anti-immigrant side (22 actors engaging in anti-immigrant mobilizations versus seven actors engaging in pro-immigrant mobilizations).

Table 5.3: Actors providing public input or involved in other mobilization activities in Orange County, 2016-2018

	Public input at city council meeting		Other mobilization activities	
	Anti	Pro	Anti	Pro
Activist	45	17	-	-
Elected officials				
Federal	4	1	2	1
State	1	1	0	2
County	1	0	5	0
City	1	0	15	4
Individual actors	289	477	-	-
Non-profit organization				
National	1	7	2	5
Regional	2	5	1	4
Local	1	22	0	14
Religious	0	4	0	5
Union	0	1	0	1

Information on who is showing up to events council and protest events provides insights into the shape of regional coalitions on both sides of the immigration issue. The coalition on the pro-immigrant side was mainly comprised of local non-profit organizations that relied on support from better resourced and capacitated regional and national organizations. On the anti-immigrant side, individual and ideologically committed activists and aggrieved residents served as the shock troops of campaigns with little direction and leadership from organizations. In proceeding sections, we will discuss how elected officials filled the organizational vacuum.

Skewed policy success

Despite advantages of the pro-immigrant side, the anti-immigrant side was able to achieve more policy wins. In the period 2010-2018, 31 restrictive immigrant measures were adopted versus 16 accommodating policies (see, Table 5.4). In addition, restrictive immigrant policies were more widespread. Eighteen municipalities out of the 34 municipalities in Orange County adopted restrictive measures while only six municipalities adopted accommodating policies.

In addition to fewer policy wins in fewer municipalities, all but one policy win for the pro-immigrant side were symbolic rather than substantive (see, Table 5.4). Symbolic policies are

measures that express support or opposition on a particular issue but do not involve institutional change, investments of public funds, or restrictions/support on certain activities. Symbolic policies state a jurisdictions position on an issue but yield few direct and tangible consequences (Huang and Liu 2018; Krause 2009). During 2010-2018, most symbolic measures consisted of resolutions on federal (i.e., Comprehensive Immigration Reform) and state (i.e., Values Act, Arizona's SB 1070) policies. The only substantive policy enacted during this time was Santa Ana's 2017 sanctuary city ordinance, which restricted local police cooperation with federal immigration agencies.

On the anti-immigrant side, 11 out of 31 restrictive immigration policies enacted during the 2010-2018 period can be qualified as substantive policies (see, Table 5.4). These policies included restrictions on day laborers, ordinances to implement E-Verify, a lawsuit against California, ordinances to exempt municipalities from the California Values Act, and signing on an amicus curiae brief in support of the Justice Department's lawsuit against California. These are substantive policies because they involved institutional change (exemptions from a state law), investments of public resources (lawsuits and amicus brief), or restrictions on certain activities (E-Verify and day laborer bans).

Table 5.4: Immigration policies implemented at the city level in Orange County, CA, 2010-2018

	Restrictive policies	Accommodating policies
Symbolic	20	15
Substantive	11	1
Total	**31**	**16**

Interestingly, the size of mobilizations at city council meetings did not have a determinative impact on policy outcomes. In most municipalities that adopted anti-immigrant policies, anti-immigrant forces were either evenly matched or outnumbered (see, Figure 5.2). For instance, in Aliso Viejo and Costa Mesa, the number of actors arguing in favor of restrictive immigrant policies was similar to the number supporting immigrants, but both cities decided to adopt measures in opposition to the California Values Act. In Los Alamitos, pro-immigrant actors outnumbered anti-immigrant activist, yet the city council passed a pivotal ordinance to exempt the municipality from the California Values Act. In the liberal leaning municipalities of Fullerton and Irvine, the pro-immigrant side had overwhelming presence at council meetings and support of residents, but both councils opted to stay neutral.

Following from these findings, the question arises of why did a side with asymmetric advantages over its adversary achieve comparatively fewer and less substantive policy wins?

Figure 5.2: Policy decisions on immigrants and public input during city council meetings in Orange County, CA, 2016-2018



Asymmetric political advantages

We argue that policy wins of the anti-immigrant side can, to an important extent, be explained by inversion. The weaknesses of actors mobilizing on the anti-immigrant side in terms of organizational resources, capacity, and broad support were compensated for by other factors. In Orange County, the anti-immigrant side greatly benefitted from the strong support from conservative elected officials across jurisdictions. The significant resources invested by elected officials made up for the advantages of the pro-immigrant side.

The anti-immigrant side found support among governmental actors representing the federal, county, and city government (see, Table 5.5). Federal officials expressed predominantly anti-immigrant statements in public debate in seven out of nine years in the period 2010-2018, while actors representing the county and city government did so in four out of nine years. In years that city officials mainly expressed pro-immigrant attitudes, a majority of those claims stemmed from actors representing the cities of Santa Ana and Anaheim; two municipalities with high concentrations of non-white residents and high densities of advocacy organizations. Attitudes of all Orange County elected officials did not become more pro-immigrant during these years. Instead, there was simply a larger share of claims from Santa Ana and Anaheim officials. Thus, support from elected city officials was unevenly distributed: support for the pro-immigrant side is concentrated in two cities, mixed and wavering support was prominent in cities like Irvine and Garden Grove, and support for the anti-immigrant side dominated many other cities, especially in the southern half of the county.

Table 5.5: Actors representing the government – number of actors making claims and average attitude, 2010-2018

	Federal level		State level		County level		City level	
	Number of actors	Average attitude	Number of actors	Average attitude	Number of actors	Average attitude	Number of actors	Average attitude
2010	11	-.25	4	.30	7	-.18	43	-.56
2011	4	-1.00	1	.00	0		12	-.57
2012	3	-.50	0		4	-.25	6	-.26
2013	9	.05	2	.50	6	.15	11	.29
2014	8	.32	0		4	.50	10	.23
2015	7	-.10	2	.00	3	.10	4	.00
2016	4	-.20	0		4	.00	14	.43
2017	4	-.22	9	.00	6	-.55	20	.48
2018	17	-.48	6	.43	14	-.30	57	-.30

More important than the attitudes of elected officials, elected officials across an array of jurisdictions – city councilmembers, mayors, county supervisors, state and federal representatives, and the county sheriff – actively coordinated with and/or led campaigns, actions, and mobilizations. Some of the most prominent have included County Supervisors Shawn Nelson and Michelle Steel, Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens, California State Assembly member Travis Allen, Republican National Committeeman from California Shawn Steel, and U.S. Representative Dana Rohrabacher. These elected officials provided support to the anti-immigrant side by proposing policy initiatives, campaigning on anti-immigrant issues, initiating lawsuits, and participating in mobilization activities such as organizing petitions, participating in rallies, and raising funds.

Elected officials: From movement collaborators to movement leaders

This last section highlights the changing relation between insider elected officials and outsider advocates by focusing on the engagement of a handful of elected officials in anti-immigrant campaigns. The section is a qualitative analysis based on our different datasets. These elected officials, among others, engaged with various campaigns instead of simply serving as inside targets of outside advocates (as was the case on the pro-immigrant side). However, the nature of their engagement shifted in ways that mirrored broader Republican shifts into a "movement party". During the late 2000s and early 2010s, there were various efforts to pass restrictions in municipalities. These campaigns consisted of collaborations between weakening advocacy organizations and elected officials. By 2017 and 2018, the advocacy organizations had mostly faded and the elected

officials assumed leadership in what became a three-pronged campaign to defeat the California Values Act.

Elected officials as movement collaborators

During his terms as council member and mayor of Costa Mesa (2002 to 2010), Allan Mansoor actively collaborated with anti-immigrant activists to enact restrictive policies. Such policies included measures to close the Costa Mesa day laborer center, support for Arizona's Senate Bill 1070, making the city a "rule of law city" (a policy mimicking Arizona's restrictionist law), and participation in local immigration enforcement. Mansoor developed close ties with anti-immigrant organizations such as the California Coalition for Immigration Reform and the Minuteman Project. The Gilchrist Angels – the women's chapter of the Minuteman Project – organized a fundraiser for Mansoor's 2006 reelection campaign. In one high profile event, Mansoor was named an honorary Minuteman, a nomination he proudly accepted.

Both anti-immigrant advocates and Mansoor benefited from the collaboration. For the anti-immigrant advocates, Mansoor served as an important ally who used the legitimacy, authority, and financial resources of his office to advance anti-immigration policies. During the 2010s, this relation became more important as the resources and capacities of California Coalition for Immigration Reform and the Minuteman Project decreased precipitously. In a context of accelerating organizational decline and fragmentation, Mansoor assumed an increasingly prominent and strategic role. Mansoor benefited as well by using immigration to differentiate himself from conservative competitors in elections and to elevate his media and political profile in the region. Mansoor and other elected officials at the time looked to Arizona's notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio as an example of how to politically leverage the immigration issue. The mayor went on to win an election to the California State Assembly in 2010 but lost an election for a seat on the County Board of Supervisors. He lost to Michelle Steele who neutralized Mansoor's anti-immigrant bona fides by running to his right. Thus, a symbiotic relation formed between elected officials and advocates: with once mighty yet increasingly enfeebled organizations turning to the leadership of elected officials and with once obscure elected officials turning to anti-immigrant advocates to bolster their media and political profiles in regional, state, and national arenas.

A council member from Villa Park, Deborah Pauly, played a similar role as Mansoor but moved from elected official to straight activist during the 2010s. In 2010, Pauly introduced a policy in support of Arizona's Senate Bill 1070. When her own city council rejected the proposed policy, Pauly campaigned for the policy to be passed in other Orange County municipalities. She was a frequent and vocal attendee of city council meetings in Yorba Linda and Cypress. In 2011, Pauly participated in a controversial protest event at an Islamic charity event in Yorba Linda. At the protest event, Pauly was captured on video stating, "I know quite a few Marines who will be very happy to help these terrorists to an early meeting in paradise" (Shadia and Esquivel 2011). Like Mansoor, Pauly used immigration to foster her political career, but her election bids for the Orange County Board of Supervisors and the California State Assembly were unsuccessful. Failing to secure elected office after leaving the Villa Park city council, Pauly departed institutional politics and committed herself fully to far-right activist networks. She joined the National Council of the John Birch Society in 2014, where she contributed to the organization's immigration position.[1] During this period, she was a regular attendee of council meetings throughout the county and spoke on a variety of right-wing issues. In 2017 and 2018, her attention once again focused

primarily on immigration as she became a committed activist in the fight against the California Values Act.

Elected officials as movement leaders

During the Values Act mobilization cycle, we find a shift in balance between elected officials and anti-immigrant advocates. Elected officials evolved from collaborators with (Mansoor) or fellow travelers with (Pauly) advocacy organizations to assuming leadership role in a *three-prong campaign* to defeat the California law.

First, before and after its passage, Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchens assumed a prominent role. She helped lead the California State Sheriff's Association campaign against the Values Act before it was passed. In media appearances, many of which were on the conservative punditry network Fox News, she maintained that the proposed law would provide safe harbor to "criminal aliens" and compel local law enforcement to violate federal law. After the passage of the Values Act, Sheriff Hutchens circumvented restrictions on information sharing by making the release dates of county inmates public. By sharing information publicly and not directly with federal officials, the Orange County Sheriff Department was in compliance with the Values Act, but federal authorities continued to have access to essential information. The Sheriff Department's consistent and impactful activism to undercut the Values Act made it an important target of pro-immigrant activists.

Second, the Immigration Reform Law Institute collaborated with long-time Orange County immigration foe, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, to recruit local support for the Trump administration's efforts to block the Values Act. Rohrabacher worked to secure signatures from local elected officials for an amicus brief in support of the Justice Department's lawsuit against California. The executive director of Immigration Reform Law Instituted noted that "We're lining up cities to join us with amicus briefs" (Kopetman 2018b). Because this and other Washington D.C.-based advocacy organizations lacked the organizational capacity to directly cultivate and coordinate local political relations, Rohrabacher functioned as a strategic broker between the national and local actors. He used his regional reputation and political capital to secure council support from Yorba Linda, Aliso Viejo, Mission Viejo, and Fountain Valley.

The third and perhaps the most important prong of this campaign was a municipal effort to exempt themselves from the Values Act. Los Alamitos, a small municipality in northern Orange County, played a large role by first initiating the strategy. A Los Alamitos council member proposed an ordinance to exempt the city from the Values Act. The mayor of Los Alamitos, Troy Edgar, subsequently became the driving force behind the ordinance. In addition to steering the policy through the political process in his city, he was very active on social media and appeared frequently in various news outlets, including Fox News. Like Sheriff Hutchens and other prominent officials at the time, Edgar framed the issue through a constitutional (e.g., Values Act forces the city to violate federal law) moral (e.g., Values Act forces the city to protect criminal immigrants instead of normal residents) lens. Once the ordinance passed, the city faced a barrage of costly lawsuits from the National Day Laborer Organization and the American Civil Liberties Union. The city's limited budget and lack of a city attorney's office obliged Edgar to start a Go Fund Me site to raise money for the lawsuit. Despite the financial burden facing the Los Alamitos, Edgar benefited greatly. In addition to frequent media appearances, he was invited to the White

House to meet President Donald J. Trump and was eventually offered a position at the Department of Homeland Security (where he continues to work).

Following Los Alamitos, other municipalities adopted measures to combat the Values Act. Fourteen out of 34 Orange County cities adopted policies in opposition to the California Values Act, with Lake Forest, Mission Viejo, Westminster, and Yorba Linda adopting measures to support Los Alamitos. Huntington Beach was the most important city to seek an exemption. The city sued California on the basis that the Values Act did not apply to "charter" cities. Cities with charters are allowed to develop their own governing structures and have greater autonomy from the general state law. Los Alamitos was not a charter city, but Huntington Beach was. Huntington Beach's city attorney explained, "As a charter city, we have autonomy over our local governance. We are arguing that SB54 is unconstitutional as it relates to charter cities only" (Goulding 2018a). There were 121 other charter cities in California that should, he argued, also be exempt from the Values Act.

Discussion and conclusion

As leaders in the struggle in a three-prong campaign to defeat the Values Act, the Orange County Sheriff Department, Congressman Rohrabacher, Los Alamitos, and Huntington Beach, among others, invested enormous resources in the effort. They generated powerful frames that circulated freely through the media, collaborated with other elected officials and some national advocacy organizations to develop a coordinated strategy, and invested resources to fend off costly lawsuits and attacks from their pro-immigrant adversaries. Huntington Beach dedicated its well-resourced legal department to the lawsuit against the state. Other conservative elected officials, like those in Yorba Linda and Fountain Valley, did not take the lead on immigration issues but were supportive of the leadership's efforts. This coalition of elected officials used the financial, symbolic, and legal resources afforded by their institutional positions to mount a highly contentious and outsider campaign against the California's Values Act. The traditional conceptual boundary between institutionalized (insider) and noninstitutionalized (outsider) politics completely dissolved. In this context, committed yet under resourced advocates with almost no local organizational support served as the shock troops of the campaign. They had enough resources, emotional energy, and coordination capabilities to unfailingly attend council meetings but not enough capabilities to become collaborators, let alone leaders, of this campaign.

This level of engagement was absent on the pro-immigrant side. The boundary between institutionalized (insider) and noninstitutionalized (outsider) politics remained largely intact. Elected officials in cities such as Santa Ana, Anaheim and Garden Grove expressed sympathy towards immigrants in public debate but were hesitant to put their words into legislative action. While anti-immigrant advocates and conservative elected officials cooperated in campaigns, pro-immigrant organizations targeted and exerted concerted pressures on hesitant and risk averse centrist and liberal elected officials. Even in Santa Ana, a city with 76% Latino residents and a major hub of pro-immigrant and progressive organizations, advocates needed to mount a major campaign (e.g., protest events, communication strategy, writing sanctuary city legislation, extended lobbying, ensuring high attendance at multiple city council meetings, etc.) to ensure passage of a watered-down sanctuary city ordinance. These elected officials worried that embracing substantive policies could weaken electoral coalitions, threaten federal repercussions, or both. A

Santa Ana councilmember stated that she's supportive of a "symbolic" resolution and would support an ordinance "if it doesn't jeopardize any federal funds" (Kwong 2016). Even in the most favorable case of Santa Ana, the incentive structure favored symbolic resolutions and watered-down policies. Engagement by elected officials on the pro-immigrant side contrasted sharply with engagement on the anti-immigrant side. It was not just attitudes and other political opportunities, but the qualitatively different nature of engagement. This, in the last instance, was determinative in securing more policy successes for the anti-immigrant side despite asymmetric disadvantages.

We derive two general implications from the Orange County case. First, resource and capacity asymmetries can certainly develop between opposing sides, and such asymmetries can be determinative for policy outcomes. However, in certain contexts, a weaker side can turn to other sources of support to compensate resource and capacity disadvantages. In our case, fast weakening anti-immigrant organizations collaborated with and then ceded leadership to elected officials (Vermeulen 2013). The result was an inversion of strengths and weaknesses of the opposing sides, with the political advantages of the anti-immigrant ultimately proving more important than the organizational advantages on the pro-immigrant side. Second, we hypothesize that broader changes in party dynamics make inversion more likely in U.S. politics. Right-wing advocates can turn increasingly to enthusiastic elected officials for support and leadership, but center-left and left-wing advocates are likely to face risk averse elected officials unwilling to fully cross the line into outsider contentious politics. The greater involvement of elected officials on the right-wing side can result in diminishing resources for advocacy organizations as elected officials can use their advocacy to capture donations and media. On the center-left, hesitant elected officials require advocacy organizations to amass more resources, capacity, and support to achieve limited policy goals. Thus, differential party dynamics can place opposing movements on the right and left onto self-reinforcing pathways of movement inversion.