FinTech and the Law and Economics of Disintermediation

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1 Financial technology and disintermediation

Are banks dead? Or are the reports greatly exaggerated? Boyd and Gertler’s title article has managed to stay coherent after a quarter of a century, pushing one to rethink the dimensions of the banking industry and its future. Boyd and Gertler’s dismissal of the growing consensus according to which disruptive financial innovation, such as securitisation, was about to erase the need of banks as financial intermediaries was novel and unorthodox, but time shows us that they were right; the reports were greatly exaggerated, as the banking industry exhibited resilience and adaptiveness to technological developments.

History does not repeat itself, though we cannot help but note some similarities with the current fever for FinTech and financial applications of the blockchain technology. However, the two waves of innovations differ in scale and in scope. In fact, the current technological step forward is arguably bigger, and its target is financial intermediation as a whole.

This chapter will discuss the wave of technologically enabled disintermediation of financial services, which is broadly referred to as FinTech. We take a law and economics approach, consisting of two questions. First, what market failures does FinTech involve? Second, how can FinTech regulation cope with such market failures?

Financial intermediation refers to a heterogeneous set of financial services that facilitate the efficient allocation of funds and are carried out through professional intermediaries. Financial intermediation is costly. Despite financial and technological innovation this cost has remained relatively constant over the past 130 years.


a variety of services to facilitate participation in financial markets, matching sellers and buyers without transforming their claims.\(^7\)

FinTech can be defined as the use of information technology to provide financial services alternative to those that financial intermediaries offer.\(^8\) Huge technological developments have created the possibility to provide services that were not even imaginable until a few years ago: from digital wallets for payment (eg, PayPal), to cryptocurrencies (eg, Bitcoin), to investment advice through automated algorithms (eg, ‘Robo-advice’) and many more.

Information technology can achieve significant efficiency improvements compared to traditional financial intermediation. First, it can reduce transaction costs, making financial exchange more efficient. Think, for instance, of faster and cheaper money transfers via digital wallets and lower operating costs of Peer-to-Peer (hereinafter ‘P2P’) and Peer-to-Business (hereinafter ‘P2B’) lending platforms compared to bank loans. Second, information technology can reduce information asymmetries, exploiting the growing computation powers and the amount of available data, for instance in the case of Big-Data automated credit scores.\(^9\) Third, information technology can provide some liquidity advantages, notably by improving the efficiency of the payment system and the transmission of monetary policy.\(^10\)

This chapter focuses on the risks associated with disintermediating finance via FinTechs. Financial intermediaries are regulated because the industry is particularly prone to market failures.\(^11\) Disintermediation potentially challenges this regulation.

Financial regulation pursues two goals in general: (1) financial stability and (2) investor protection.\(^12\) On the one hand, regulation deals with the negative externalities that the instability of financial institutions, banks in particular, cause. Qualitative Asset Transformation, while fostering lending and thus economic development, makes banks inherently fragile and exposed to runs on short-term, money-like debt.\(^13\) Moreover, banks are leveraged and interconnected institutions, so that the failure of one can trigger contagion and generate large adverse consequence for the whole financial system and the real economy, as the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008 exemplified.\(^14\) On the other hand, investor protection regulation addresses problems of asymmetric information between investors, intermediaries

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\(^10\) The net contribution of FinTechs to liquidity is unclear, as many technological applications (eg, cryptocurrencies) seem to dramatically increase volatility.


\(^14\) For a functional overview of the main cornerstones of financial regulation, see Brunnermeier and others (n 11).
and borrowers which in many cases means between unsophisticated and professional market participants. If investors fear that their funds are not safe and that there is potential for fraud, then they will avoid investing in the first place.\textsuperscript{15}

Therefore, the first law and economics question addressed in this chapter is: will technology-enabled financial innovations generate market failures or worsen existing ones? Without the ambition to answer this question conclusively, this chapter focuses on two types of intermediation, one related to banks and the other to investment services. FinTech promises to increase competition for both banks and investment firms. More competition is usually welcomed as it fosters innovation, improves quality and reduces prices. However, in the financial industry, more competition may undermine financial stability and investor protection.\textsuperscript{16} This can happen both directly through FinTechs, and indirectly through the adjustments incumbent intermediaries implement to maintain their competitive edge. This brings to the second law and economics question: is the current regulatory framework efficient?

This chapter will articulate the theoretical framework to answer these questions, highlighting the role financial regulation plays and making recommendations on the legal tools and strategies to determine the optimal level of disintermediation. The scope of the analysis is particularly broad. Therefore, we do not strive to be exhaustive. This chapter will only lay down the analytical foundations to discuss different FinTechs and their regulatory implications.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses disintermediation of banking services. It highlights the crucial features of banking intermediation and focuses on two distinct cases of disintermediation: P2P Lending and cryptocurrencies. Section 3 discusses disintermediation of investment services and focuses on the opportunities and challenges of disintermediating non-banking services. Section 4 presents the law and economics analysis in two parts: first, the market failures of FinTechs and second, a regularity strategy towards FinTechs. Section 5 concludes.

2 Disintermediation of banking

2.1 What banks do and why is it special?

Banks are known to be a special type of firm. As like any financial intermediary, banks collect funds from economic units with a surplus, typically households, and allocate these funds to economic units with funding needs.\textsuperscript{17} Yet, differently from any other intermediaries, banks perform this task following a special business model.

Banks are highly leveraged institutions whose funding comes predominantly from short-term liabilities, such as demand deposits. On the other side of the balance sheet, commercial

\textsuperscript{15} For a comprehensive introduction, see Armour and others (n 12) Ch 5.
\textsuperscript{16} Notably, the UK Financial Conduct Authority has promotion of competition in the financial sector as an additional goal to the aforementioned ones. Whether these objectives are compatible and how to strike the appropriate balance between them remains an open question. Stephen Dickinson, David Humphry, Paolo Siciliani, Michael Straughan and Paul A Grout, ‘The Prudential Regulation Authority’s Secondary Competition Objective’ (2015) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q4.
\textsuperscript{17} Allen and Santomero (n 7) 273.
banks’ assets mainly consist of long-term loans and other illiquid assets.18 Banks perform Qualitative Asset Transformation (QAT), which is to say, they turn liquid, short-term and safe claims into illiquid, long-term and risky assets.19 This characteristic makes banks inherently fragile, prone to runs and panics because assets cannot be liquidated quickly enough to honour the short-term liabilities at once.20

The long-lasting success of banks depends on their unique ability to perform QAT.21 In a world without banks, lenders and borrowers would meet in the marketplace. Information on the creditworthiness of borrowers is unknown to prospective lenders. Private, more accurate, information can be produced at a cost through screening and monitoring the perspective borrowers. Many lenders are unwilling to bear the cost of monitoring, so they decide to delegate it to economic actors that are willing to invest in such activities.22 In this view, banks act as delegated monitors on behalf of depositors, who entrust the bank with their money, and in return the bank promises to lend only to creditworthy borrowers.23

Therefore, bank intermediation solves a problem of information asymmetry as many other intermediaries can do.24 But, performing asset transformation makes banking especially valuable for borrowers and lenders (depositors), as both categories get the type of financial contract that suits them best. Crucially, banks lend long against short-term deposits but also against a fraction of equity so to limit risk-taking incentives; equity operates both as a curb on the size of banking and to counter moral hazard.25

On the asset side of the balance sheet, banks engage in costly monitoring, gaining private information on their borrowers. The information becomes even more valuable in case of repeated interaction, the so-called ‘relationship banking’. The cost of monitoring decreases over time and the long-term relationship provides the bank with flexibility to adjust the terms to the ever-evolving situation.26 Competition and innovation have progressively driven banks away from pure relational lending towards a more transaction-based

18 Financial innovations that happened over the past decades incentivized banks to move from relational to transactional banking. See Boot and Thakor (n 8) 681. Nonetheless, this does not alter much the basic representation of banks as firms performing transformations activities. On this, see Armour and others (n 12) Ch 13.
19 Bhattacharya and Thakor (n 6) 15.
23 Ibid. Diamond also shows that in equilibrium, delegated monitoring represents a commitment device to solve the problem of ‘monitoring the monitor’. This way, banks disincentive depositors to simultaneously withdraw their money, triggering a run. This latter aspect is modelled in Diamond and Dybvig (n 13).
24 See Section 3.
25 In this context, moral hazard means the incentives to take on more risks than socially efficient, expecting that someone else bears the downside of the risk. See, Jihad Dagher and others, Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital (IMF Staff, International Monetary Fund 2016).
banking. Handling portfolio risk through monitoring is costly and financial innovations, such as securitisation, made market solution cheaper at the expense of financial stability. Section 2.2 discusses whether technology-enabled solutions can exacerbate this problem.

On the liability side of the balance sheet, banks offer their depositors safety and liquidity. Modern finance treats these concepts separately, but they are related. Safety implies liquidity: if tomorrow’s value of an asset is known with certainty, one could sell it today for a given amount of cash (market liquidity). Otherwise, one could borrow the same amount of cash using the asset as collateral (funding liquidity).

Liquidity is valuable to the extent that there is uncertainty and economic agents want to retain the option to liquidate their assets before maturity. Deposits are as liquid as money because these are funds repayable on demand: depositors can withdraw the face value of their claim anytime. Banks are unique providers of such safe and liquid assets. However, other institutions may too issue liabilities carrying the promise to convert into a given amount of cash on demand. These institutions are called shadow banks.

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, research showed that investors have a preference for safe assets beyond what the theory on portfolio diversification can explain. Another reason why bank deposits and other short-term liabilities are able to satisfy the increasing demand for safety is the regulatory safety net. First, deposit guarantee schemes cover demand deposits, making depositors insensitive to the bank’s riskiness. Moreover, banks have access to the liquidity central banks as lenders of last resort (LOLR) offer. Finally, banks traditionally benefit from the implicit government guarantee on their solvency in the event of a systemic crisis, although regulation has recently tried to limit the extent of this guarantee. The last two features apply to shadow banking too.

Liquidity and safety make bank liabilities a suitable medium for exchange, a key aspect of monetary policy transmission and one of the pillars of the payment system. Section 2.3 discusses the attempt of FinTechs to provide such service in a different way, particularly by way of cryptocurrencies.

28 Armour and others (n 12) Ch 13.
30 Similarly, Pistor defines liquidity as the ability to sell any asset at will. See Katharina Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315, 316.
31 The question, however, is whether the promise is credible. As Minsky puts it, ‘everyone can create money; the problem is to get it accepted’. See Hyman P Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (New Haven: Yale UP, 1986) 225.
34 See Gorton, Lewellen and Metrick (n 33) 102.
2.2 Disintermediating lending

The most prominent example of technologically enabled financial services, alternative to bank lending, is P2P lending. The idea behind P2P lending is to provide a platform where lenders and borrowers are matched without an intermediating bank. As will be further discussed in Section 4, FinTech and financial disintermediation are very heterogeneous concepts that do not necessarily involve blockchain technology. P2P lending represents a paradigmatic example in this sense. In fact, the first P2P lending platforms started to gain traction in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, when trust in traditional banks was at its lowest point.

P2P lending does not amount to a full disintermediation of lending. Rather, it uses technology to gain and process information substituting ‘heavy’ bank intermediation with a ‘light’ platform intermediation. Prospective borrowers apply for a loan to the platform, which screens the creditworthiness of borrowers and assigns them a ‘loan grade’ according to the project’s riskiness. The investors (lenders) bid on the projects and then the platform pools together the bids and originates the loan.

As opposed to banking intermediation, the platform itself does not invest in the loan and the platform does not issue any debt: the whole amount of the loan is a direct investment of the lenders. Therefore, there is no QAT and no possibility of withdrawal. The investors’ capital is locked in the project and its safety only depends on the probability of default of the borrower.

A P2P lending platform is not, however, a veil matching lenders and borrowers, but a corporation acting as an agent of both. To illustrate this point, it is interesting to analyse the compensation scheme of the platform. Platform compensation is fee-based. First, the platform charges a fee for loan origination, and typically a fee for late repayments. Moreover, they earn a percentage of borrower repayments (usually 1%) in the form of a service fee. P2P lending platforms are, therefore, profit-maximising entities, not just computer codes. As they take discretionary decisions that can be opaque, for instance by setting up the algorithm to screen the loan applications, trust of borrowers and investors is of essence.

P2P lending is a form of bank disintermediation that can achieve efficiency gains in terms of operating costs of a loan. To properly assess these efficiency gains, one should also consider the possible costs in terms of financial stability concerns. As mentioned before, P2P platforms do not perform asset transformation activities themselves, so they seem not to pose direct financial stability concerns. Yet, there may be more subtle, indirect effects.

First, the fact that systemic risk will not materialise at the platform level does not imply that P2P lending does not contribute to build up systemic risk. In fact, there is evidence

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36 Thakor (n 8) 3.
38 This confirms in a sense the trend of financial intermediaries of shifting from interest rate-based earnings to fee-based earnings, from relational banking to transactional financial intermediation. See Allen and Santomero (n 7) 291.
39 Thakor (n 8) 4.
that many lenders investing in these loans are highly leveraged themselves.\textsuperscript{41} Moreover, the fee-based compensation scheme of the platforms generates incentives to over-lend, originating riskier and riskier loans.\textsuperscript{42} Therefore, if the P2P lending market scales up, massive defaults due to an abrupt shock can trigger contagion potentially outside of any supervisory scrutiny.

Second, the increased competitive pressure on banks may induce those to engage more and more in transactional activities to save costs, abandoning more and more relationship banking. In this regard, one can note a certain parallelism with the reaction of banks to securitisation two decades ago.

Finally, if banks will acquire FinTechs, partner with them or set up their own platforms, the two threats to financial stability highlighted above may be magnified.\textsuperscript{43}

\subsection*{2.3 Disintermediating money and payment}

We now turn to discussing how FinTech can disintermediate the services provided by bank to depositors, namely safety, liquidity and payments. Cryptocurrencies are the most paradigmatic example.\textsuperscript{44} Cryptocurrencies aim to disrupt the centralised system of money and payments. Ideally, the blockchain technology should provide a completely decentralised and trustless system replacing the current system characterised by licensed intermediaries and trusted central gatekeepers, such as central banks that have a legal monopoly to issue fiat money.

In its simplest description, the blockchain is a chronological database of transactions recorded in a network of computers. Some participants to the network (miners) verify the validity of the transaction, and whether ownership of cryptocurrency is actually transferred, through solving complex mathematical problems that ensure there is no double spending.\textsuperscript{45} This decentralised method of verification allegedly makes intermediaries, such as banks, unnecessary to carry out transactions.

We contend that, at this technological stage, a completely decentralised and trustless system is far from being achieved, if it is ever possible. We offer three main reasons to support our claim. Firstly, cryptocurrencies are exchanged on the blockchain, but are stored in digital wallets. Moreover, digital platforms, such as Coinbase, usually support such transactions. Hacking the blockchain is extremely difficult and costly to an extent that it was deemed impossible.\textsuperscript{46} Even assuming that the blockchain cannot be corrupted, hacking

\begin{enumerate}
\item Thakor (n 8) 4.
\item Arnoud W A Boot, Jeroen E Ligterink and Jens K Martin, ‘Understanding Fintech and Private Equity’ 12.
\item Even though not the only one, especially in the area of payments. Think for instance of all digital wallet services, like PayPal, that do not necessarily work with the blockchain.
\item Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi, ‘Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia’ (2015) Available at SSRN 2580664.
\item But see the problem of the ‘51% attack’, where a member of the network that owns more than the half of the blockchain can double spend. See <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/19/239592/once-hailed-as-unhackable-blockchains-are-now-getting-hacked/> accessed 31 May 2020.
\end{enumerate}
digital wallets and platforms is much easier.\textsuperscript{47} Therefore, who uses cryptocurrencies might blindly rely on the blockchain to trade them, but still needs to trust the ecosystem’s intermediaries to store them.

Secondly, parties may want to condition the transaction in the blockchain to future, uncertain contingencies. In this case, parties can code the obligation they intend to undertake in ‘if-then’ type digital statements, creating a self-executing contract, a so-called smart contract.\textsuperscript{48} In this case, parties need to trust the coder.\textsuperscript{49} The coder can be a third party, acting as an agent of the contracting parties, or one of the contracting parties. Either way, coding contractual obligations is an opaque mechanism that a party may be unable to understand. Opacity can only be accepted if the counterparty or the agent is trusted.

Thirdly, cryptocurrencies cannot fully replace fiat money. First of all, there are transactions that cannot be settled via cryptocurrency, for instance all the transactions between private parties and the governments, which require legal tender. Relatedly, the majority of the sellers still do not accept cryptocurrencies as means of payment. The fact that states have a monopoly on fiat money affects the ability of disintermediate banks via the blockchain. Cryptocurrencies could be converted into fiat money, but that requires intermediaries. Moreover, because cryptocurrencies work on a decentralised basis and are not backed by any central authority, their conversion rate is highly volatile. The first reported purchase made using Bitcoin is a good example. In 2010, a man in Florida bought two pizzas worth 25 dollars for 10,000 bitcoins. In December 2017, the same amount was exchanged for almost 200 million dollars; at the end of May 2020 those were still worth more than 95 million dollars.\textsuperscript{50}

Traditionally, money is been defined according to three functions it performs in the economy: medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account.\textsuperscript{51} Arguably, given the current state of technology, cryptocurrencies perform none of these functions.\textsuperscript{52} In this respect, Facebook’s proposed Libra project is a little different. The cryptocurrencies issued in the Libra ecosystem would be pegged to a basket of main currencies to avoid volatility and increase public confidence in the coins.\textsuperscript{53} Here comes the importance of state monopoly on fiat money. The monetary authorities in the US and the EU have credibly threatened to subject the Libra project to financial regulation as dealing in currency-denominated assets requires a banking or an investment services licence, which is easy to enforce. On


\textsuperscript{51} William Stanley Jevons, Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (D Appleton 1876) Vol 17.

\textsuperscript{52} Thakor (n 8) 10.

\textsuperscript{53} The Libra Association is backed by Facebook. At this point it is not clear which kind of cryptocurrencies will be issued. The initial project aimed at backing Libra with a basket of multiple currencies but latterly it seems that Libra wants to offer stable coins, each of those backed by a single State currency. See <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/16/facebooks-libra-plans-new-crypto-offering-backed-by-just-one-currency.html> accessed 31 May 2020.
these grounds, the project has been put on hold: Facebook is currently considering downsizing Libra to a digital wallet.54

Finally, several central banks are experimenting with digital currencies.55 This is a way to exploit the promise of the blockchain in terms of management of money supply and efficiency of settlements, while maintaining the role of central banks as gatekeeper of money and monetary policy. Libra and government-controlled digital currencies could scale up in the coming years. Nevertheless, these projects hardly imply disintermediation of money and payments, as governments are either directly involved or require intermediaries to have a licence in order to convert digital into traditional currencies. Rather, these projects change the way money and payments are intermediated, exploiting the blockchain.

3 Disintermediation of investment services

3.1 Investment firms: problem solvers and problem makers

Banks are not the only financial intermediaries pursuing the efficient allocation of financial resources. Several investment firms intermediate investment in financial markets too. For instance, underwriters intermediate public offerings between the issuers and the investors; mutual funds invest in the financial market the investing public’s savings according to predetermined strategies; brokers-dealers intermediate between investors and a stock exchange. This section scrutinises how FinTech firms can disintermediate the services offered by financial firms other than banks and what the promises and the perils of such disintermediation are.

To understand disintermediation of financial services, it is important to understand first why investment firms exist in the first place, which are the problems they solve, and what are the market failures associated with them.

In the standard economic model of resource allocation, non-bank financial intermediaries play no role.56 However, the vast majority of investors are not involved in financial transactions and do not understand increasingly complex financial markets.57 Therefore, intermediaries acting in the financial markets reduce the ‘participation costs’ of financial transactions for non-professional investors.58 These services come at a cost, usually a fee that intermediaries charge to their clients. Interestingly, empirical evidence shows that the unit cost of financial intermediation has been rather stable in the last 130 years, despite technological innovations improving efficiency. This suggests that rent extraction by financial intermediaries increased overtime.59 This observation leads us to the market failures in investment services provision. First, there is significant asymmetric information between investment firms and investors. This depends on the participation services investment firms

59 Philippon (n 5).
provide. As a consequence of information asymmetry, the quality of the services offered by intermediaries remains unknown to customers, creating an adverse selection problem.\textsuperscript{60}

In theory, the market could self-correct the asymmetric information problem if the uninvolved investors could follow the signals that informed, marginal investors produce.\textsuperscript{61} In this setting, providers of investment services would compete for the marginal investors and this would in turn protect the uninformed. Yet, the marginal consumer argument seems not to hold true for financial services. Most financial services are experience goods that both marginal and uninvolved investors purchase infrequently. This fact prevents marginal investors from quickly learning all the quality aspects of the services purchased and engaging in comparison shopping.\textsuperscript{62}

Cognitive biases worsen the market failures that asymmetric information generates. Behavioural finance reveals that investors, especially the unsophisticated ones, suffer from a variety of cognitive biases in their decision-making.\textsuperscript{63} Financial firms exploit cognitive biases in financial decisions through the adoption of marketing and contractual strategies that appeal to those biases.\textsuperscript{64} This provides a further reason why marginal, informed investors cannot protect the inframarginal, uninformed ones. Marginal investors can identify aggressive marketing, opt out of harsh terms, and contract for better terms. Firms have incentives to cross-subsidise the better terms offered to marginal investors by introducing non-salient, harsh terms in the packages offered to unsophisticated investors.\textsuperscript{65}

Financial advice could seemingly ameliorate market failure, but that’s illusory. One would expect financial advisors to remedy the information asymmetry, providing even unsophisticated investors with guidance on which financial service or product to choose in a rational way. However, investors face the same asymmetry of information when they choose a financial advisor. Moreover, investors have no way of determining whether the performance of their investment depends on the quality of the financial advice or on the investment risks. This is to say, financial advice is a credence good and the quality of credence goods cannot be ascertained, not even after a process of repeated purchase.\textsuperscript{66} This leaves considerable room for financial advisors to extract rents from unsophisticated investors, colluding with other financial firms with which they share financial ties, customers and network.\textsuperscript{67}

The aforementioned arguments support regulatory intervention in financial markets.\textsuperscript{68} These also represent a suitable benchmark to assess the promises and perils of technology-enabled disintermediation: can FinTech cope with the market failures discussed above? Or is FinTech making the matter worse?

\textsuperscript{60} David T Llewellyn, ‘Regulation of Retail Investment Services’ (1995) 15 Economic Affairs 12.
\textsuperscript{61} Louis I Wilde and Alan Schwartz, ‘Equilibrium Comparison Shopping’ (1979) 46 The Review of Economic Studies 543.
\textsuperscript{62} Pacces (n 57) 483.
\textsuperscript{65} Armour and others (n 12) 215.
\textsuperscript{66} Pacces (n 57) 483.
\textsuperscript{67} Armour and others (n 12) 217.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 218.
3.2 Disintermediating financial services

Technologically enabled financial services can potentially improve the allocation of financial resources. At the same time, they also pose considerable challenges. This section discusses both issues.

As mentioned, there is a severe asymmetric information between investors and providers of financial services. This allows financial intermediaries to exploit investors by way of conflicts of interest. FinTechs can ameliorate this situation setting up arm’s length transactions between investors and issuers, which allegedly avoid conflicts of interests. Crowdfunding platforms are a case in point. Such platforms offer entrepreneurs, primarily start-ups, an alternative access to finance allowing the ‘crowd’ to directly provide capital in typically small amounts. The challenge is that crowdfunding doesn’t address the issue of investor protection. Small, unsophisticated investors have a limited capacity to assess the potential of a business, especially if it is a start-up. Moreover, their decision to join the crowd might be based on behavioural biases and herding behaviour.

Another paradigmatic example of technology-enabled financial service is Robo-advice. It consists in algorithmic-based financial advice with minimal or no human interaction. Early empirical evidence shows that Robo-advice increases return on investment and reduces volatility. Yet, unsophisticated investors have limited capacity to determine whether the advice fits their preferences. Likewise, consumers usually are not in the position to appreciate the soundness of the algorithm on which the advice is based, no matter how transparent such algorithm is.

Based on these examples, it is possible to identify a few pros and cons of FinTech in financial services. FinTech opens up great opportunities for entrepreneurs to access cheap finance and for investors to participate in a wide variety of financial transactions at a reasonably low cost. Moreover, algorithmic-based financial services and the use of Big Data can decrease the asymmetric information inherent to financial services. However, considerable challenges for investor protection remain. Algorithms do not solve the old investor protection issues but rather bring new issues of investor protection. They may obscure the same exploitative tendencies financial intermediaries have and are more difficult to monitor for deficits in investor protection. As discussed before, platforms and algorithms cannot be merely considered veils between lenders and borrowers. Platforms are profit-maximising corporations. Their conflicts of interests may be hidden in the way algorithms are programmed. As in the case of P2P lending, FinTechs provide investment services based on fees. Therefore, they have an interest to induce investors to trade and invest, exploiting their behavioural biases. Moreover, traditional financial institutions are increasingly

69 The efficient allocation of resources represents, in its essence, the ultimate goal of financial markets.
acquiring FinTechs, which results in more conflicts of interest depending on the provision of multiple activities.  

As a final note, the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ is attracting considerable attention among the proponents of financial disintermediation. According to the narrative, experts acting as intermediaries pursue their own interests at the expense of the crowd, whereas information technology allows the crowd to choose wisely without the need of self-interested intermediaries. Information technology is thought to improve the quality of the noisy public signals about investment opportunities, which used to call for intermediaries to improve financial information. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that crowds are not always wise. On the contrary, herding behaviour is a serious threat for investors that may fund suboptimal projects or be victim of fraudulent arrangements. Interestingly, FinTechs are sorting out ways to elicit the crowd’s wisdom, for instance making more salient to uninform ed investors the behaviours of better informed ones.

4 A law and economics approach to FinTech

4.1 FinTech and market failure

FinTech has a large potential to improve the efficiency of financial markets by disintermediating banking and non-banking services. However, this potential comes with the risk of exacerbating market failures because the regulations applicable to traditional financial intermediaries are not always neatly applicable to FinTech. In this section, we look at market failures more closely, discussing how regulation can cope with them.

The law and economics problem is twofold. First, banking and non-banking services result in different market failures. As mentioned, the main goal of banking regulation is to cope with the externalities stemming from financial instability, whereas the regulation of investment services is mainly concerned with protecting investors from the consequences of asymmetric information. Second, there is the issue of enforcement. Some FinTechs operate on the blockchain. Because the blockchain supports smart contracts, which are self-executing, blockchain-based FinTechs are harder to subject to regulation, which in turn affects the ability of governments to correct market failure.

QAT is a defining feature of banking. This transformation makes banking fragile because they are exposed to runs. For this reason, virtually anywhere in the world, banking requires a licence. Licensing triggers prudential regulation of banks and gives them access to the safety net, both of which aim to promote financial stability. Licensing, however, also shields banks from competition. FinTechs challenge banks’ monopoly to the extent

77 The best example of this might be the dotcom bubble of the early 2000s.  
79 For more detailed consideration on this point, see Armour and Enrique (n 71) 79.  
80 See Section 2.  
that they provide banking services without a licence. As the previous discussion reveals, it is difficult for FinTechs to provide core banking services such as, on the one hand, relationship lending and, on the other, repayable funds functioning as safe assets.

For instance, P2P lending does not involve core banking. Although some jurisdictions regard it as banking, P2P platforms do not take any position or risk in the loan concluded between the investors and the borrowers, and most importantly, do not promise liquidity on demand. Thus, P2P lending competes with banks on the extension of credit, but not on the provision of safe assets. Like other forms of crowdfunding, P2P lending raises concerns for investor protection but not for financial stability, as platforms do not issue liabilities, loans are illiquid and the scale of P2P lending is still small. However, the threat to financial stability might be indirect. P2P platforms potentially undermine the value of a banking licence and prompt banks to take more risk to the extent that P2P attracts better loans. Whether this is going to be the case is theoretically unclear as P2P platforms may be no match for bank’s trust in long-term credit relationships and banks increasingly acquire P2P platforms for arm’s length credit. Only time will tell whether P2P lending can grow as big as to make traditional banking riskier.

Cryptocurrencies are potentially more troublesome. In principle, they provide means of payment and of investment. As far as the payment function is concerned, cryptocurrencies exploit the efficiency of digital wallets and other technological innovations. Going a step further, they offer an alternative to fiat money. It is questionable whether cryptocurrencies can replace money. Private money creation is not the problem, as banks routinely engage in this, subject to regulation, and shadow banking does that too, trying to end-run regulation. Private money undermines financial stability to the extent that its safe assets status comes into question during a financial crisis.

However, private money needs the option to convert into fiat money to be credible. Convertibility makes banking and shadow banking dangerous. Because cryptocurrencies lack convertibility into fiat money, their ability to disintermediate banking is limited. Cryptocurrencies are extremely volatile as they are not backed by a financial institution or a pool of assets that could confer upon them liquidity and safety. Libra – the only attempt to overcome this limitation so far – has been effectively opposed by the monetary authorities. The lesson from this is twofold. First, money creation is too important for financial stability to be left out of the regulatory perimeter. On this perspective, central banks are increasingly considering issuing fiat money in digital form. Second, the effective way to stop FinTechs from creating a parallel monetary system is to deny access to (ie, conversion into) fiat money in the absence of a banking or non-banking services licence. This point has more far-reaching consequences than financial stability.

Regarded as investment, cryptocurrencies are paradigmatic of the investment services dimension of FinTech. As discussed, this includes crowdfunding (both equity and P2P lending) and Robo-advice, among others. All of these services share an important characteristic, which make them prone to market failure: they allow particularly (but not exclusively) retail investors to invest their savings at a negligible entry cost. It is

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82 These include, eg, Italy, France and Germany. See Ferrarini and Machiavello (n 70) 217.
83 Thakor (n 8) 3.
84 Nabilou and Pacces (n 32), 28.
86 Thakor (n 8) 10.
very easy to invest in cryptocurrencies, and in general low-key access to investment services is one of the competitive advantages of FinTech. This potentially exacerbates the market failures stemming from asymmetric information, such as unsuitable investment choice, vulnerability to aggressive marketing and exposure to conflicts of interest.\(^{87}\) Because financial services are experience goods infrequently purchased, or even credence goods, it may take some time (or some high-profile scandals) before FinTech undermines investor confidence in financial markets. Regulation should try to correct market failures before then.

### 4.2 How to regulate FinTech?

FinTech regulation faces two hurdles. First, technology-enabled financial services exploit some regulatory vacuum in order to offer alternative services competitively. Their competitive advantage could vanish were they simply subject to the same regulations as traditional financial services. This leads to the second challenge. In order to escape the threat of regulation, some FinTechs offer services through smart contracts.\(^{88}\) Because smart contracts are self-executing on the blockchain, financial regulators may be unaware of the services offered in this fashion. To stay under the regulatory radar, transactions must be settled in cryptocurrencies.

The first problem is a classic policy problem in the face of (financial) innovation. There is always a tension between the efficiency advantages of more competition in financial services and other market failures. Optimal regulation depends on context. Such a nuanced discussion of FinTech is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is worth noting, however, that regulation should functionally address market failures. For instance, the strategy for FinTechs to avoid regulation in the EU has been to avoid dealing with ‘financial instruments’ or otherwise falling into the scope of application of the MiFID.\(^{89}\) This is a sensible strategy because the MiFID, as securities regulation in general, triggers massive compliance obligations which are overly burdensome for lightly organised FinTechs. Nevertheless, bespoke regimes of disclosure, conduct of business rules, and conflict of interest should be able to commit FinTechs to investor protection without undermining their competitive advantage.\(^{90}\) Regulatory sandboxes and mentoring arrangements with licensed intermediaries are two promising strategies to design such regimes.\(^{91}\)

The second challenge is admittedly harder. It seems difficult to regulate what you cannot see, such as ‘smart’ investment contracts that are fully designed and executed on the blockchain. These smart contracts ‘can be described as computer programs that trigger certain prespecified actions (such as sending a certain amount of tokens to a specific address

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\(^{87}\) See Section 3.1.


in the network) if the conditions set out in the code are met. As the execution of smart contracts doesn’t require cooperation from the legal system, regulation cannot prevent it from happening unless smart contracts are illegal and the legal system can enforce their prohibition. And yet, the blockchain is not only a source of strength for such contracts, but also a limitation. Smart contracts cannot enforce actions outside the blockchain. A crucial action in the provision of financial services is the exchange of financial resources on specified dates or contingencies. On the blockchain, only the transfer of cryptocurrencies is self-enforcing.

FinTechs operating on the blockchain might be less difficult to regulate than it looks. The reason is similar to the argument, made above, that FinTechs are not a big threat for financial stability so long as they cannot operate as shadow banks, that is, so long as they cannot credibly promise the conversion of cryptocurrencies into fiat money. In order for such promises to be credible, FinTechs should own a sufficiently large amount of safe assets to support convertibility. However, governments control these assets either because they produce them, as public debt or fiat money, or because they can (not necessarily do) regulate the financial institutions and the contracts creating new safe assets.

On the one hand, a promise to convert cryptocurrencies into euro, dollars or assets denominated in one of these currencies requires the cooperation of the legal system to be enforceable, if only because FinTechs must own such assets via licensed intermediaries. On the other hand, investors need fiat money to pay for goods and services that cannot be purchased in cryptocurrencies and to settle transactions with the government. Therefore, to make blockchain-operated financial services emerge from darkness, financial regulation could restrict the conversion of cryptocurrencies into fiat money. This approach could address the quick emerge of stablecoins, of which Libra is just one example, tackling directly the attempt to decrease a cryptocurrency’s volatility by pegging it to assets denominated in fiat money.

We leave the discussion on how exactly to design a regulatory strategy focusing on the convertibility of cryptocurrencies for another day. However, it is important to note that it requires licensed intermediaries to operate as gatekeepers, denying convertibility to the FinTechs that do not comply with financial regulation. This isn’t trivial. It is not sufficient to focus on banks, because cryptocurrencies could also be converted via the shadow banking system. Shadow banking still needs liquidity and liquidity ultimately means trading securities, which also requires a licence. Nevertheless, it may be impossible for regulation to control access to every safe asset that could work as means of payment. The same problem applies to illegal markets. Still, reserving the conversion of cryptocurrencies to licensed intermediaries could be a first step towards attracting blockchain-based FinTechs to the regulatory perimeter.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have analysed the economics of FinTech and the case for its regulation depending on market failure. Based on the theory of financial regulation and its relationship

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93 Ibid.
94 Nabilou and Pacces (n 32), 40.
with FinTech, we distinguish between technology-enabled services that work outside and inside the blockchain. For the former, the crucial regulatory trade-off is between efficiency gains from innovation and regulatory arbitrage. For the latter, our analysis suggests that regulating the convertibility of cryptocurrencies into fiat money is a promising strategy not only to safeguard financial stability, but also to attract financial services to the regulatory perimeter, whenever it is efficient to do so.

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