Micro formations of hybrid security governance in ethnic riots

Mapping the interworkings of state forces, vigilantes, residents, thugs, and armed mobs in the violent slums of Jos, Nigeria

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Mapping the interworkings of state forces, vigilantes, residents, thugs, and armed mobs in the violent slums of Jos, Nigeria

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**Introduction**

Two disparate views dominate security governance literature. The first one casts the state as the sole manager and discharger of security. Security governance, according to this perspective, is “a process of political and social ordering established and maintained through authoritative discourses and practises of power, including but not confined to organised force”.¹ This perspective reflects the realist tradition in international relations literature.² Scholars and experts representing this statist perspective portray militias, rebel groups, and vigilantes as purveyors of greed, violence, disorder, and insecurity.³ The existence of such informal security stakeholders is considered problematic and constitutive of state failure or collapse.⁴ The underpinning logic is a Weberian notion of a state that claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a designated territory. Within this paradigm, restoring security and order also means demobilizing these informal armed assemblages.⁵ This perspective has informed the international security and peacebuilding agenda in post-colonial Africa with the disarmament and demobilization of militias and rebel forces as central tenets. United Nations missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Liberia (UNAMIL), Sudan (UNAMIS), and Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), among others, have within their core mandates the deconstruction and reintegration of armed groups into either armed forces or civil society, the overarching goal being to transfer authority and monopoly over the use of violence to the state.

Recently, a burgeoning body of literature has challenged this state-centric conception of security by drawing attention to ideas of hybridity in governance, notably in relation to security. The notion of hybridity questions “normative judgements about emerging forms of order involving actors or institutions perceived as informal, coercive or corrupt, in favour of a focus on practical outcomes in public service delivery under difficult conditions”.⁶ In other words, hybridity concerns how state and non-state institutions “negotiate, forge alliances and compete to
constitute public authority and political control”. Rather than conceiving informal or “irregular” structures as symptoms of state failure, these perspectives emphasize their constructive aspects, casting them as “authentic” channels of local authority and regulation. However, though hybridity perspectives raise valid theoretical, methodological, and empirical criticisms against what can be termed state essentialism, they have also come under scrutiny. One perspective suggests that current trends in the literature romanticize the role of non-state actors in governance. Arguing for a more historically and empirically informed comparative analysis that distinguishes between constructive and corrosive forms of non-state order, this view criticizes mainstream hybrid perspectives for disguising “coercion and political capture as popular legitimacy”. Another query raised against hybrid governance literature is its tendency for a binary and essentialist posture of the local and international as the repositories of authority and power. It is argued that this approach promotes an unrealistic interpretation of hybrid security frameworks and overstates the constructive role of local forces.

Using these critical observations as a starting point, this chapter specifies and attempts to address three related issues. First, hybrid security governance scholarship has disproportionately focused on security contexts emerging from large-scale conflicts such as civil wars and armed struggles that have to do with large rebel forces, militias, and paramilitaries, as exemplified in Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Democratic Republic of Congo. In these contexts, large forces that operate across extensive territories like the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Liberia, Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRV), and Republic of Logone are the units of analysis. Riots and clashes between ethnic categories involving smaller assemblages of militias and vigilantes operating within smaller spatial scales at the sub-city level such as neighbourhoods have received far less systematic scrutiny. Yet, findings from fine-grained analyses that zoom in on dynamics of security governance at the neighbourhood and street levels can offer insights that may elude macro- and meso-level studies. Second, dominant perspectives have been based on “snapshot” analyses that focus on a fixed period and context, largely ignoring how roles can change across space and over time. Third, even where the dynamic and shifting nature of hybridity is implicitly recognized, this has not been matched with a systematic empirical analysis, especially at the micro-level.

This chapter offers an explorative micro-level analysis of hybrid security governance in the riot-prone Nigerian city of Jos. It empirically examines complex patterns of interactions between state and non-state actors in engendering (in) security during episodes of deadly violence. The overarching focus is on the multifarious ways in which local populations, security forces, thugs, gangs, vigilantes, and other informal security networks interact with and circumnavigate the unstable landscapes of ethnic riots. Large-grained analyses often portray hybrid security governance as a linear set of activities that involve state and non-state actors either working collaboratively or in a state of hostility with constructive or destructive outcomes. Contrarily, the fine-grained neighbourhood-level analysis that this chapter undertakes reveals a complex and dynamic process that involves a wide range of actors, coalescing and conflicting interests, cooperative and
non-cooperative interactions, vehement resistance and collaboration, and shifting loyalties, coalitions, pacts, and enmities that change over short periods and across proximate spaces. It unmasks hybrid security governance as a hyper-dynamic process with both constructive and destructive tendencies and outcomes. The rest of the chapter proceeds thus: first it offers a brief note on research design and methods, followed by a chronological account of ethnic riots in Jos. The subsequent section illustrates the roles of state and non-state actors and then empirically illustrates different manifestations of hybrid security governance during episodes of ethnic violence in Jos with concrete examples from the various areas of limited statehood (ALS) in the city. The conclusion discusses the academic as well as practical implications of a disaggregated, micro-level analysis and understanding of hybrid security governance.

The chapter is based on an ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the central Nigerian city of Jos between September 2015 and August 2017. It aims towards a fine-grained, neighbourhood-level analysis of the micro dynamics of hybrid security governance in the wake of episodes of ethnic violence. The study combined several sources of data, including extensive observation, key informant discussions, and mobile interviewing. We draw from over 50 interviews and discussions with vigilantes, security forces, riot participants, NGO staff, thugs, gang members, youth leaders, and ordinary residents. The setting for the study spans some six neighbourhoods, all located within a kilometre or two of the city centre. These neighbourhoods include Ali Kazaure, Angwan Rogo, Angwan Rukuba, Nasarawa Gwong, Angwan Miango, and Dutse Uku, all among the worst areas affected by violence. In fact, Angwan Rukuba holds the distinction of being the scene of the first bomb explosions in the city on Christmas Eve 2010. A few years later, Angwan Rogo joined the ranks of neighbourhoods with a history of bombing when a suicide bomber targeted a football-viewing centre there. Although Nasarawa Gwong has not witnessed any bombings, it has experienced repeated violent clashes in the form of gun battles and direct combat between Muslims and Christians. There are no official designated boundaries for these settlements, and census figures are also unavailable. However, neighbourhood leaders and staff of the Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) estimate the populations of each of these neighbourhoods at between 15,000 and 30,000. Although sometimes unmarked, there is a fair agreement among local residents on neighbourhood boundaries. Main roads, bridges, and other physical barriers are common boundary markers in several of the neighbourhoods.

**Chronology of deadly riots in Jos**

Jos sits on a rocky embankment rising 4,000 feet above sea level in central Nigeria. It is the capital city of the aptly named Plateau State – one of Nigeria’s 36 constituent federating units. Geographically situated on the fault line between the country’s predominantly Muslim north and Christian-dominated south, the city’s 800,000 inhabitants belong to some 50 different ethno-linguistic groupings, divided into roughly equal halves of Christians and Muslims. Jos is both
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a melting pot and a clashing point. Once considered among the country’s most
peaceful regions, contestations over political representation, claims of indigenous
rights, and “ownership” of the city have in recent years culminated in episodic
displays of collective brutality. Though the conflict is primarily between the so-
called indigenes and settler Hausa, violence was perpetrated mainly along reli-
gious lines between Christians and Muslims. This is because boundaries between
ethno-linguistic and religious identities overlap, albeit imperfectly, and religion
presents a wider support base for mobilization.14 Most of the indigenes are Chris-
tian, while Hausa are unanimously Muslim. Because of the overarching role of
religion, residents belonging to other groups not ordinarily involved in the indigene–
settler dispute are entangled in the violence.15

The first of the recent bouts of large-scale killings occurred in 2001. In July of
that year, the national government of Olusegun Obasanjo appointed coordinators
for the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP), a federal government
agency mandated to curb poverty through economic empowerment schemes. For
Jos North LGA, one Mukhtar Usman Mohammed – a Muslim – was appointed.
Members of indigenous ethnic associations protested against the appointment.
After a few weeks of heated exchanges between rival associations and politicians
representing indigenes and Hausa, violence erupted on 7 September
2001. Armed
with sticks, cutlasses, bows and arrows, spears, petrol bombs, and locally made
firearms, Christians and Muslims engaged in open clashes. The police were over-
whelmed; it took the military to finally quell the violence six days later. About
1,000 people were gruesomely murdered in the course of the pandemonium. The
intervening years saw violence spreading beyond the capital city to other parts
of the state. There were clashes in Kaduna Vom, Farin Lamba, Heipang, Bisichi,
Vwang and Sabong Layi.

Another round of violence almost engulfed Jos in May 2002, but calm was
restored before it got out of hand. It started with skirmishes between Christian and
Muslim party loyalists at an electoral registration centre and ended in mobs ramp-
paging around Angwan Rukuba, Eto Baba, Nasarawa Gwong, and Dogon Dutse
areas. In the end, about 50 people were killed and up to 100 vehicles burnt.16 In
terms of scale, this was nothing compared to what had taken place in the previous
year or what was to come a few years later. In 2008, large-scale violence resumed.
The violence was directly linked to the LGA elections held on 27 November of
that year. The main contestants for the Chairmanship of Jos North LGA were the
candidate of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and that of the main
opposition, All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP). Christians mainly aligned with
PDP and Muslims with ANPP based on the religious identity of the candidates.
The elections were largely peaceful without any record of major disturbance.
However, a sudden change in the vote collation venue from a Muslim-dominated
area to a Christian suburb made ANPP party loyalists suspicious. Trouble started
later when these agents and loyalists started protesting what they suspected was
an attempt to rig the results of the elections by official of the PDP who also
doubled as top government officer at the time. The police used teargas to dis-
perse crowds. As those dispersed made their way back to their neighbourhoods,
crowds looted and destroyed shops while alerting their co-ethnics through phone and word of mouth to come out and fight. Before dawn, many neighbourhoods had erupted into violence. Once again, rampaging armed mobs were at the centre of the violence, killing, maiming, and destroying property. After two days of fighting, 700 people had been killed and hundreds of buildings and vehicles burnt and destroyed.¹⁷

Unlike the violence of 2001 and 2008, which were related to political positions (whether elective or appointive), the violence of 2010 was sparked by a seemingly trivial event. On Sunday, 17 January, a Muslim house owner whose home was destroyed in Dutse Uku during the violence of 2008 brought in labourers to start renovating the building. Accounts differ on who struck first, but the violence started as a result of an altercation between the Muslim labourers and Christian residents of the neighbourhood. Once fighting started, wild tales of massacres and killings soon went viral, presumably after Plateau State’s police commissioner went on state television to blame “some Muslim youths” for starting the attack.¹⁸ Other neighbourhoods erupted in violent clashes.

Although this study’s primary jurisdiction is the city of Jos, it is worth mentioning that the violence that originated within the city on Sunday, 17 January, having engulfed parts of Bukuru in Jos South, had by 19 January spread to neighbouring Barkin Ladi and Riyom LGAs. An attack on Kuru Jenta, where at least 150 people were reportedly killed by Christian Berom groups, was followed by a series of intermittent violent attacks and clashes that culminated in another horrendous attack, in which at least 200 hundred people were gruesomely hacked to death by armed militias believed to be Muslim Fulani.¹⁹ It is estimated that 400 deaths occurred within Jos metropolis in January of 2010 and up to 1,000 in coordinated militia attacks in rural parts of Jos South, Barkin Ladi, and Riyom LGAs. The city continued to experience violent incidents between 2010 and 2015, many of which were in the form of revenge attacks in the wake of bombings by Boko Haram.

The city is currently enjoying a fragile peace. The visible presence of a military taskforce and reconciliatory efforts of peacebuilding networks have contributed to creating a semblance of stability. The current governor has also adopted an approachable posture towards the Hausa community, which has contributed to a reduction in tensions. However, although the city has not recorded any violent incidents since 2015, it still suffers the consequences of past violence. In addition to high levels of ethnic segregation, mutual suspicion, and fear that pervade the city’s landscape, there have been increases in crime, drug abuse, and other so-called youth vices.²⁰

**State security forces in Jos’ security governance**

This subsection looks at state security forces and their role in engendering (in)security during episodes of ethnic riots. It focuses on the Nigerian Police Force, the Mobile Police (MOPOL), the paramilitary group Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCD), and the military – the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
With a 370,000-person staff serving a population of more than 180 million spread across a landmass of 923,768 square kilometres, the Nigerian police is considered grossly inadequate. Apart from the work strain that this disproportionate police–citizen ratio warrants, the Nigerian police are among the most ill-equipped and poorly remunerated in the world. Overworked and poorly paid, they engage in corrupt practices. In addition to colluding with criminals, they are generally known for indiscriminately setting up checkpoints and extorting cash from motorists. It is not surprising, then, that most Nigerians distrust the police, perceiving them as corrupt and incapable of discharging their principal duty of protecting the citizenry and maintaining order. Ostensibly, apart from struggling with its inadequacy in covering a large population and extensive landmass, the Nigerian Police Force is challenged by such negative public perceptions. Their unpopularity is often cited as a reason for the popularity of vigilantes and private security organizations throughout the country.

Apart from the conventional police, there is also the Mobile Police Force (MOPOL). The MOPOL is mandated to intervene in extreme situations when conventional police are incapable of coping. They are usually better equipped and trained for tackling riots, insurrections and other forms of crisis. They work collaboratively with the police but have their own chain of command, and as a strike force, their rules of engagement favour more offensive operations. The NSCDC is another body that works in cooperation with the police. The NSCDC is a paramilitary agency established by the federal government of Nigeria. Its origins date back to 1967, but its present configuration and mandate were established in 2003 under the government of President Olusegun Obasanjo. According to its website, its areas of focus includes engaging in broad-based information networking, monitoring of movements, and contributing to national security by using modern technology.

Another major intervenor in Jos is the Nigerian military – Army, Air Force, and Navy. With manpower of about 181,000, this is one of the largest military forces in Africa. Though its principal mandate is to fight against external threats and insurrections and to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country, the Nigerian military is often required to intervene in riots and other civil disturbances because of the shortcomings of the police. There has been a considerable military presence in Jos since 2001. In addition to the police and military, paramilitary organizations like the NSCDC and Immigration Service also play an important role in the security process.

The several episodes of ethnic violence in Jos have warranted the deployment of units from these different branches of the security forces since 2001. These deployments follow a trajectory that has become quite familiar to residents of the city. Following an outbreak of mass violence, the government first deploys the police and the NSCDC to restore calm. However, as is often the case, it soon becomes apparent that these two cannot tackle the situation alone. MOPOL are then sent in to intervene and, subsequently, the military – often after a series of logistical delays. Once deployed, security forces conduct joint patrols on the main roads in their pickup trucks. Each truck carries an average of eight armed
security officers. The vehicles move in pairs or groups of three or more. Their main responsibility is to identify conflict flashpoints, protect vulnerable groups and apprehend perpetrators of violence. Their rules of engagement vary depending on the volatility of the situation. In extreme circumstances, when the situation is considered highly volatile and dangerous and a curfew is in place, security forces may shoot on sight. Most times, however, they generally focus on dispersing fighting mobs and arresting individuals caught engaging in violence. When the situation is considered highly volatile, these ground patrols are supported by aerial reconnaissance.27

The various deployments of the police and military have sparked diverse reactions from members of the public across space and time. Residents of Jos and other violence-ridden parts of Plateau State tend to assess the performance of security agents on the basis of the ethnic and religious identity of the commanding officer. When a Muslim is in charge, Christians become suspicious and interpret interventions as biased and complicit. When a Christian is in charge, Muslims in turn become distrustful and fear they are unfairly targeted for violence by security forces.28 For example, in 2001 the Commissioner of Police in Plateau State was a Muslim – Muhammed Diko Abubakar (he went on to become the country’s Inspector General of Police). At the time, Christians accused him of giving undue advantage to Muslim communities by providing adequate security while leaving Christian communities open to attacks. It was also alleged that many police stood by while Christian homes, particularly around Congo Russia, were razed by Muslim mobs.29 The riots of 2010 broke out when Gregory Ayating, a Christian, was the Police Commissioner. The Muslim community accused him of gross misconduct and extrajudicial killings of Muslim youth in Angwan Rogo, Ali Kazuare, and Fillin Ball areas.30

Between 2001 and 2010, there were several military deployments under the command of the General Office Commanding (GOC) of the 3rd Armoured Division in Bassa, west of Jos. Accusations of complacency, complicity, and general misconduct were rife.31 Moreover, violent clashes and deadly attacks on local communities persisted and peaked in early 2010. Ostensibly, there was need for a more robust and better coordinated security framework. In March 2010, the federal government constituted a Special Taskforce (STF) dubbed “Operation Safe Haven” as a comprehensive response to conflict and violence in Jos and other parts of Plateau State, comprising a joint operation consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, police, NSCDC, DSSS, MOPOL, and Special Investigation Bureau (SIB). The establishment of STF did not halt the violence or stop complaints. Large-scale killings spiked, resulting in hundreds of fatalities in rural areas of Jos South, Riyom, and Barkin Ladi between January and April 2010.32 As the attacks persisted, tales of STF operatives colluding with assailants became widespread. Mutual suspicion and distrust along religious lines intensified. Ostensibly, members of the Muslim community had more confidence in STF. They believed because it received orders from the federal government, it was less likely to be biased. Moreover, they adjudged that many of the office and men of the military were Muslim.33 This trust and confidence did not extend
to the police whom they felt were biased in favour of Christians because of some presumed affinity to the Christian-dominated Plateau State government. Many police officers are indigenes of Plateau State and Christian. On their part, Christians seemed to have had more confidence in the police and MOPOL than in the military. They accused the military of assisting Muslim fighters to attack Christian communities.34

Apart from distrust of security agencies at an aggregate level, residents of Jos also trust or distrust individual security officer on the basis of that individual’s perceived religious identity. They tend to be generally sceptical and suspicious of security officers that are of the other religion. Once a group of security officers arrive at a neighbourhood, residents try to figure out their religious identities. Residents can guess the religious identity of a security officer through his name (security officer have name tags on their breast pockets) or speech.35 Hausa and Arabic-sounding names are generally associated with Muslims, while English or biblical names, or names indigenous to some parts of central and southern Nigeria, are generally thought to be Christian. Though generally applicable, this rule does not always hold because there are some Christians (particularly from the north) who bear Hausa-sounding names. Accent is also not foolproof, because a Christian that is born and bred in the north may speak with a Hausa accent since it is widely spoken and the first language for most people in the region. Nonetheless, as much as these methods of discerning the religious identity of security officer are not always accurate, they are commonly used by both Christians and Muslims to decide whom to trust or not to trust. One man explained to me why he was very suspicious of security officers that are Muslim: “they are very religious and they take their religion to be more important than their jobs or even their country . . . that is why I don’t trust them”.36 Another informant feels the same about security officer that are Christian: “that uniform they wear does not change who they are . . . they are Christians and to them every Muslim is an enemy”.37 On the basis of these variable public perceptions, responses to security forces are far from uniform and linear, although on balance the military are more likely to find cooperation in Muslim communities, while the police and MOPOL are more likely to be accepted among Christians.

Thus, we should expect that on both a group and an individual basis, security officer would be more likely to treat people that share their religious belief more amiably (since these people readily cooperate with them) and to treat those of the other faiths in an unfriendly manner (since they are less likely to cooperate). This dynamic reinforces existing mutual suspicions by seemingly giving credence to stories of bias and partial treatment. That said, it is difficult to verify allegations of partisanship and complicity; nonetheless, these claims are widespread and even seem to have informed decisions on deployments and peacebuilding strategies. As will be discussed in the next section, the establishment of the largest hybrid security programme in Jos and other parts of Plateau State came as a result of accusations of complacency and complicity by members of the public (particularly from Christians) against officers of the S .
Non-state actors in security governance

There are three broad categories of non-state actors that play prominent roles in security governance in Jos: vigilantes; neighbourhood watch and other security networks formed by residents to defend the community from external threat; local NGOs and other grassroots organizations, international NGOs, agencies of foreign governments and other partners working to enhance intercommunal reconciliation.

Similar to other parts of Nigeria, vigilantes are part of the traditional social order in Jos. These informal security networks are usually made up of anything between 20 to 100 young males and are formed within neighbourhoods. Individuals join voluntarily, and apart from small, occasional financial contributions from concerned residents for the procurement of equipment such as torchlights and whistles, they are usually not paid. Vigilante groups are crucial in bridging the vacuum left by state security organs that are lacking in the capacity and capability required to address the country’s pressing security challenges. This security vacuum becomes most noticeable during episodes of mass violence and necessitates the intervention of such informal security arrangements. Vigilantes represent an organized attempt by a group of ordinary citizens to enforce norms and maintain law and order on behalf of their communities, often by resorting to violence, in the perceived absence of effective official state action through the police and courts.

Their primary assignment includes apprehending thieves and robbers and promoting general safety. In addition to whistles and torchlights, they carry sticks and sometimes metal rods to protect themselves when the need arises. In periods of large-scale ethnic clashes, however, the mandate of vigilantes expands to include defending their neighbourhoods against incursion by armed mobs from rival communities. To monitor movements and keep potential troublemakers at bay, members usually patrol the area and position themselves at entry points to the neighbourhood. While ordinary sticks are enough for routine patrols in peacetime, they tend to be better armed during civil disturbances when the chances of encountering deadly violence are higher.

The Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) was registered in 1999 as an attempt to centralize and properly coordinate a myriad of vigilante groups scattered throughout the country. VGN has branches across all 36 states that make up the Nigerian federation. VGN has sub-branches in Jos and is represented in several neighbourhoods. However, because of the recurrent violence and the ethno-religious segregation it has warranted, most of the VGN units consist of either Christian or Muslim members. Since 2015, however, spatial boundaries between Christians and Muslims are becoming less rigid and some areas are beginning to become ethnically and religiously mixed again. VGN posts in these re-emerging mixed settlements reflect the heterogeneity of their host communities. For example, the predominantly Muslim VGN in Fillin Ball and other parts of Nasarawa Gwong
and their Christian counterparts from Angwan Rukuba and around St. Michaels have been reaching out to each other and sharing intelligence to enhance security in all the communities concerned.42

Both local and international NGOs are key actors in security governance in Jos and other parts of Plateau State. Their areas of focus are diverse, but ultimately they are driven by the need to improve security in local communities. Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has brought together key stakeholders from both sides of the conflict to discuss and resolve their differences. Through its media campaigns, advocacy activities and training of journalists and security agents, SFCG has been in the forefront of engendering professionalism among peacebuilding stakeholders and promoting interfaith dialogue and reconciliation in local communities. Other NGOs such as Community Peace Action Network (CPAN), and Mercy Corps contribute to security governance by collecting information on early warning signs from local communities and reporting to the appropriate authorities for timely response. Faith-based organizations like Justice, Development and Peace Caritas (JDPC) and the Interfaith Mediation Council’s Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Council (CMMRC) have been also active in the identification and reporting of early warning signs of conflict and violence. They have also continued to encourage tolerance and cooperation between Christians and Muslims through dialogue. Once it receives information on early signals, CMMRC uses it to plan advocacy and response activities such as mediation, media peace messages, and awareness and sensitization workshops.43

Manifestations of hybrid security governance in Jos’ violent neighbourhoods

There are different manifestations of hybrid security governance in Jos with varying levels of formality. At a more formal level, hybrid security governance has involved cooperation and collaboration between NGOs and state security agencies. These formal arrangements vary in scope and are coordinated at different levels. The foremost hybrid security framework is the security and peacebuilding taskforce Operation Rainbow (OR). This is a hybrid security outfit established by the Plateau State government in 2011. It was established following widespread allegations that the STF was complacent and possibly colluding with certain groups in attacks on local communities around Jos South, Barkin Ladi, and Riyom LGAs. These claims came mainly from the predominantly Christian communities of these areas. Reports from these communities alleged that most STF personnel posted there were Muslim and that some of them participated in deadly attacks against locals. OR was established with 2,000 officer and men drawn from the police (including the MOPOL), the military (Army, Air Force, and Navy) and paramilitary organizations, including NSCDC, and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). In its most active phase, a few years ago, OR’s civilian component reportedly consisted of about 3,250 informers and operatives drawn from the 325 electoral wards of the state.44 These individuals, mainly young males, were trained in approaches to neighbourhood watch and
how to monitor and report events and occurrences in their localities through a hierarchy of information channels. In 2013 OR partnered with the Israeli Protection and Counter Terrorism Centre under the International Security Academy to organize a two-week intensive training on personal protection awareness for 1,000 of these civilian operatives. About 30 of them were later sponsored to travel to Israel to receive training on how to truncate terrorist plots. Though much of the working relationship between the STF and OR is cordial and cooperative, they have had a few altercations. One such scuffle resulted in the stabbing of an OR agent by a member of the STF in Barkin Ladi in 2014.45

The civilian informers and operatives work within their communities. One of them described how he worked as “moving around the area, talking to different people and sniffin around for useful information on happenings and people”.46 Another informer described himself as “an intelligence gatherer and reporter”.47 This informant narrated how he reported two separate incidents of theft and a street fight that could have spiralled into violent clashes. In all three occurrences, he said, OR security personnel responded in a timely manner and tackled the situation before it got out of hand. In one of the incidents, a mob would have killed the suspected thief if not for OR’s intervention. Though top official and some operatives of OR think the security outfit has been a success story, it is not without some problems. One of these challenges is the organization’s inability to earn the confidence and trust of the Muslim community. Many Muslims in Jos view OR as a militant group created by Governor Jonah Jang to target non-Christians. Although there is no evidence of mistreatment OR is viewed with deep mistrust among Muslims. Moreover, OR is chequered by allegations of internal corruption and a lack of accountability. Former operatives and informers complained that though the outfit consistently paid their monthly allowance of 16,000 Naira (equivalent to 45 US dollars) at the beginning, it suddenly stopped at some point. One former operative who now sells second-hand clothes laments thus: “the people at the top are corrupt and that is what destroyed Operation Rainbow . . . they refused to pay us for a long time and some of just left to find other means of livelihood”.48 According to OR’s current commandant, interviewed by the press in early 2018, operatives were last paid in February 2012.49

Another strand of hybrid security governance concerns partnerships between NGOs, local populations, civilian government agencies, and state security forces. These partnerships are most visible in the area of early warning reporting. Owing to the increasing spate of violent conflicts and militancy in recent decades, Nigeria has developed a system of identifying and relaying conflict early warning signals. At the national level, the early warning architecture consists of government institutions, security agencies, and members of the public. Information is gathered at the grassroots by designated official and ordinary residents and then communicated through hierarchical channels that go all the way up. The Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) receives information from different actors working at different levels and then sends warnings to the Stability Task Force/Joint Task Force, a large security framework that coordinates military, police, and civilian government official in conflict flashpoints like Jos, Southern Kaduna, and
the insurgent-ridden northeast region. Once they receive a warning, state-level committees decide on how to respond at LGA and district levels. Civil society organizations and research institutions are also deeply involved in early warning and emergency response systems. University of Ibadan-based Nigeria Watch, Nigeria Security Tracker, Partners for Peace, and Fund for Peace work by gathering, mapping, and making public information on violent incidents and deaths.\textsuperscript{50}

There is a similar early warning mechanism in Jos and other LGAs of Plateau State. The system is coordinated by the Emergency Preparedness and Response Team (EPRT), a partnership of 11 faith-based organizations, NGOs, and government agencies: Jama’atul Nasril Islam (JNI); Christian Association of Nigerian (CAN); Country Women Association in Nigeria (COWAN); Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria (FOMWAN); National Council of Muslim Youth Organizations in Nigeria (NACOMYO); Centre for Peace Advancement in Nigerian (CEPAN); National Orientation Agency (NOA); Justice Development and Peace/Caritas (JDPC); Mennonite Central Committee (MCC); Nigeria Red Cross Society (NRCS); and the State Emergency Management Authority (SEMA).\textsuperscript{51} When I spoke with a staff member of JDPC in early 2017, EPRT was in the process of creating a central database where all reports of early warning signals received would be stored. So far, it has received hundreds of reports from different parts of the state.\textsuperscript{52}

Unofficial forms of hybridity involve ad hoc arrangements between local populations and state security forces. In this type of arrangement, security officer provide members of the public with phone numbers to call when there is any security threat. Usually, contact lines for security alerts are announced on TV, radio, and other media outlets. The GSM traffic for these public lines can become overloaded and difficult to reach; therefore, some residents prefer reaching out through personal lines of communication to military officers they consider trustworthy. There are many instances where security forces prevented what could have been large-scale destruction of lives and property by responding promptly. For example, one resident of Angwan Miango described how seven MOPOL officers arrived in his area in response to a distress call just as an armed mob from Rikkos was about to start setting houses on fire. After exchanging fire with the MOPOL, the armed men ran back to where they had come from. However, there have been many instances where security forces did not respond at all or came too late. In one such situation, a large armed mob overran part of Nasarawa Gwong, leaving about half a dozen people dead, over 20 others injured, and many homes destroyed. While the attack was underway, some residents tried to reach the police and the military through their mobile phones, but there was no response. It was several hours after the assailants had done damage and left that the police came. On seeing their trucks, the residents were very angry and shouted at them to leave. My informant concluded thus: “we needed help but they were nowhere to be found . . . it was after several our brothers were killed that they came so we told them to go away and leave us alone”.\textsuperscript{53}

To understand why it is difficult to foster cooperation and collaboration between local vigilantes and security forces, we need to appreciate the dynamics and actors
involved in the process of communal defence. While vigilantes play a central role in fighting crime during periods of calm, the duty of defending the neighbourhood during clashes is seldom carried out by them alone. Other residents also usually join to ensure the neighbourhood is not invaded by armed mobs from other areas. As one vigilante member puts it, “everyone comes out to fight for himself . . . at that time you’re not fighting because you’re a vigilante but because you want to protect yourself just like anyone else”. According to this view, which was corroborated by two other informants in separate locations, the mandate of the vigilante as a group ceases once a riot breaks out because most residents arm themselves and come out to fight. One non-vigilante youth who considers himself a defender of his community acknowledged this:

The task of defending the neighbourhood is everybody’s and not for the vigilantes alone. We usually go from door to door and call out people to join in keeping the area safe . . . we call everyone . . . everyone that is young and has the heart.

The animosity between vigilantes, thugs, gang members, and other residents seem to temporarily recede to the background during riots. Defending the neighbourhood supersedes all other considerations, and individuals that were once at logger heads become comrades in the battle to protect themselves and their families. Several vigilantes described to me how they found themselves on the same side as individuals they had in past confronted in their fight against crime: “there are people that you know are criminals because you’ve apprehended them before but we had to come together and fight our common enemy”. Another vigilante described how he preferred fighting alongside so-called thugs and gang members than ordinary residents: “I find them very dependable during riots because they’re not afraid of violence and know how to coordinate to defend the neighbourhood”.

This sense of comradeship and solidarity is not only between vigilantes and individuals considered to be miscreants; there is usually a general sense of solidarity in the neighbourhood during the riots. Several informants cited instances where residents showed solidarity in concrete ways, such as offering water or food to thirsty and hungry members of the armed mob. For example, a riot participant showed me a house where two young ladies served him and his peers a jug of water. Apart from offering water and inviting members of the armed mob for meals, residents were ready to offer them cover when the police were on their trail. He also showed a house where he and four others had taken cover after hearing loud gunshots believed to have been fired by the police on the morning of the riots. When they ran into the house one man pointed them towards the outhouse bathroom, where they hid until calm returned. Although it turned out the police were not close, many residents around that area opened their doors to members of the armed mob who were looking for hiding places.

Thus, when security forces come around the neighbourhood to enforce order, they encounter armed mobs made up of vigilantes, thugs, gang members, and other residents. Members of the armed mobs, such as the criminals or ordinary
residents who have had unfriendly encounters with the police and military, tend to react negatively to the police by shouting “go away... we don’t want you here” or throwing stones at them. The police either react by using tear-gas or firing shots in the air to disperse mobs. In situations where some members of the mob have firearms and use them, the police can react in kind and shoot directly at the mob. These types of altercations have resulted in hundreds of deaths in the course of different riots. In one instance during the riots of November 2008, a contingent of MOPOL chased and shot down more than 20 young men between Bauchi Road and Angwan Rogo. The same day, at least a dozen others were shot dead around Ali Kazaure. Residents believe MOPOL are far more likely to use extreme force than the conventional police. This is not surprising considering that they are a strike force trained to take over where the police have proven incapable. Other times, however, older members of the community intervene before the disputes between state security forces and mobs get out of hand. It is not, however, in all situations that mobs respond to police presence negatively. For example, when there is imminent threat from a larger armed mob in a nearby rival community, residents generally prefer police to stay.

Alliances and coalitions change in the post-riot context, indicating the dynamic nature of hybrid security governance. Around 2015, there was a sharp decline in incidents of ethnic violence in Jos. This coincided with Boko Haram’s devastating bombing of the terminus market in the heart of the city. Before this incident, the fundamentalist group had primarily targeted churches. From 2012, this targeting of Christian institutions sparked revenge attacks and fed into existing sweltering Christian–Muslim antagonisms in the city. However, Boko Haram became indiscriminate in their targets in 2014. On 20 May of that year, two bombs exploded within a short distance of each other in the vicinity of the city’s main market, killing over 100 people. Months later, in December, another twin-explosion killed some 200 people in the same area. On 5 July 2015, two explosions and a gun attack left some 44 people dead and dozens injured in predominantly Muslim areas. The first bomb exploded in a restaurant – Shagalinku – near the Bauchi Road Motorpark adjacent to Angwan Rogo, a mainly Muslim area. The second one, which was followed by a series of gunshots, targeted a mosque where a Muslim cleric and an avowed critic of Boko Haram was preaching. It is possible that as Boko Haram’s attacks became less discriminatory and also targeted Muslims, Christians and Muslims in Jos started seeing themselves less as enemies and Boko Haram as a common enemy. This is, however, only conjecture, and there is a need for research to investigate if this was really the case. The decline in ethnic confrontation in the form of revenge attacks at this time could have been the fruits of several years of grassroots peacebuilding efforts by NGOs, FBOs, and other reconciliatory networks. Perhaps it is more probable that it was due to a combination of these factors.

With the decline in incidents of ethnic clashes, the utility of thugs, gangs, and drug peddlers and users for their communities diminished. The patronage they enjoyed for presumably providing security for residents against invading forces from other areas during episodes of violence soon vanished. In their quest to
continue enjoying power, they instilled fear through the deployment of violence. Across the neighbourhoods, whoever tried to stand up to drug peddlers was threatened. Members of security organizations and vigilantes were threatened or even attacked when caught off guard. A man narrated to me how he was beaten and left in a pool of his blood for no reason other than being a security officer. Several vigilante members told me how they could not walk around alone for fear of being attacked. One said he always moved around in the company of other vigilantes or friends even when he was off duty because there was no telling when someone would attack him.59

The situation in Angwan Rukuba provides insight into security governance in the post-riot context. Residents of the area became very concerned about the general sense of insecurity and fear that these criminals created. In response, they became ruthless in their response to crime. Thieves and burglars caught in the act were mobbed and, in three separate occasions from 2013, killed. In the most recent incident, one young man was murdered for allegedly stealing a shirt. In an earlier incident, an alleged drug peddler was beaten by some youths, probably with the help of the police. The most coordinated and dramatic response to crime occurred between August and October 2017. A local “kingpin” had become very powerful. New youth leaders who had assumed office in early 2017 decided it was time to end the drug menace in the neighbourhood and once and for all uproot the negative effect and legacy of “Filin Shetan”.60 The “kingpin” was approached and warned to stop his illicit business. When he noticed that the youth group was really determined and had strong support, he agreed to quit. But he did not. Instead, he started a barroom where he served alcoholic beverages but then continued selling drugs under the table. This barroom became a very popular hangout for criminals from different parts of the city. Individuals trying to escape law enforcement agents found it a convenient place to hide. Aside from drugs, residents believed it also hosted prostitutes from different parts of the city. The kingpin also reportedly organized weekly raves outside the neighbourhood, where his customers converged at a remote part of town to freely sell and use drugs.61

To dislodge this criminal network, local vigilantes, members of the neighbourhood’s youth association, and other concerned residents made an alliance with the divisional police and some operatives of STF. After one of his Sunday parties in September, the kingpin was apprehended by the youth association in collaboration with the divisional police and the military taskforce. Once they saw him walking into the neighbourhood, they blocked off every possible escape route before arresting him. He was in possession of 400 grams of cocaine when arrested. One of his lieutenants, who was hiding in the dark when the arrest happened, picked up a large stone and threw it, aiming to hit the divisional police office (DPO) who led the operation, but the stone landed on the kingpin’s head, almost injuring him fatally. He was taken to the hospital and after treatment handed over to the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and then later detained at the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSDC) headquarters in Jos. He was, however, soon released on bail under shadowy circumstances. One of the youth leaders contested the bail and threatened to publicize the issue through the
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media. This led to a re-arrest. At the time of writing, he was remanded while court hearings were ongoing.

Though there is still drug peddling within Angwan Rukuba, it is not taking place in an audacious way as was previously the case. It is neither sold nor used openly and there is no part of the neighbourhood that is strictly under the control of drug peddlers. Their stronghold, Satan’s Field, has been renamed “New Jerusalem”, representing a site for Christian revivalism in the neighbourhood. Every Sunday, members of New Life for All and other Christian organizations meet there and broadcast biblical teachings through loudspeakers.

To summarize the foregoing, hybrid security governance in Jos’ ALS is a complex process with shifting alliances and coalitions. During ethnic riots, vigilantes, thugs, and other residents unify on the basis of ethnic identity to defend their communities against invading ethnic groups. They also resist security forces that do not share their ethnic and religious background. However, in the post-riot phase, vigilantes and other residents disassociate themselves from thugs and members of criminal networks. They align with security forces to dislodge these antisocial elements. The conclusion further discusses these processes and their theoretical as well as practical significance.

Conclusion

This chapter offered a fine-grained, micro-level analysis of hybrid security governance across neighbourhoods in the riot-prone Nigerian city of Jos. Existing literature on hybrid security governance predominantly focuses on civil wars and armed struggles. These studies utilize large peacekeeping forces, militias, rebel groups, and security networks operating at large spatial scales and territories as units of analysis. Conclusions from these macro-level enquiries have portrayed hybrid security governance as a linear arrangement that is entirely constructive. The micro-level scrutiny that this chapter undertakes, however, reveals it as non-linear, dynamic, and complex set of processes that involves diverse actors, interests, and loyalties, pacts, and enmities that change across space and time.

Focusing on the micro formations of hybrid security governance unearths how ethnic identity and solidarity shape coalitions and enmities across space and time. This chapter highlights that in polarized contexts, group solidarity can inhibit cooperation and collaboration between state and non-state actors. In divided societies, local populations are more likely to work with agencies headed by their co-ethnics. For their part, security officer tend to be friendlier and more lenient with members of the public that share their ethno-religious background because these individuals tend to trust them and are more readily cooperative. They are more likely to find themselves at odds with persons that belong to the “other” group since these individuals are less likely to trust them. It follows that hybrid security arrangements will work in a particular local community because the leadership at that time belongs to a certain ethno-religious group. Once leadership changes and an individual that belongs to the rival group takes over the position, the arrangement that was in place begins to lose its footing and soon collapses. This can
suggest that in ethno-religiously segregated cities like Jos, different strands of the security forces will gain varying levels of cooperation across different neighbourhoods depending on which group is predominant. In Jos, in residential areas predominated by Muslims, security outfits headed by Muslims seem to receive cooperation and in turn treat local populations leniently as opposed to the force they apply in areas of resistance. But it is not always just about the commandant; it is also about the individual security officer that conduct operations. A Christian security office in the field tends to gain the trust and cooperation of his co-ethnics even if the superior who sent him on the mission is Muslim. It is only a micro-level empirical exploration that can account for this dynamism and instability, phenomena that ostensibly elude large-grained analysis.

Apart from increasing levels of ethnic solidarity with implications for the prospects of hybrid security governance, the disorderliness and riotousness that characterize periods of ethnic violence make it difficult for security forces and vigilantes to work out means of cooperation and collaboration. Across Jos’ neighbourhoods, the assemblages that pose as vanguards of defence are more akin to armed mobs than regular vigilantes. Even where some members of the vigilantes and residents want to work with security forces, thugs and gang members who hide under the cloak of the disorder to get away with atrocities would do their best to obstruct any such arrangements. Evidence suggests these are the elements that usually throw stones and projectiles or even shoot at security forces to turn them against the local populations and scuttle any plans for cooperation.

While hybrid security governance involving security forces, civilian government agencies, civil society organizations, and members of the public has yielded some results in Jos, it has not been without noteworthy challenges. One of the problems is lacking inter-agency synergy. At the strategic level, security forces seldom make room for civilian roles and activities. Civil society organizations also come up with their agenda, mostly without considering how it can fit into and complement the military component of the existing security programme. Collaboration and synergy are difficult to establish at the tactical and operational level if the terms and fine details are not worked out as part of the strategy. Operatives of STF and OR have on occasion fought because of difference that could have been prevented at the planning stages of the operations. Apart from inter-agency synergy at the strategic level, communication between security forces, NGOs, and members of the public requires equipment and skill. One of the major problems facing the EPRT and its early warning mechanism is the unavailability of state-of-the-art communications technology and lack of ICT expertise. Though international agencies such as UNDP have made significant contributions in this area, more needs to be done in terms of providing informers and operatives with the gadgets and training required to send information on events and their location with reasonable precision. On the other end of the communication line, military posts are either slow in responding to distress calls or altogether nonresponsive. Poor GSM signals and the absence of designated units saddled with the responsibility of receiving and immediately dispatching a response team are key challenges. In addition to these challenges, corruption and unaccountability also constitute
a major setback. Timely payment of salaries and allowances commensurate with the duties of security officer and their civilian counterparts is important in maintaining morale and commitment. The last time operatives and informers of OR received their allowances was in 2012. Many of them have abandoned the assignment and are busy seeking other means of livelihoods.

Existing conceptualizations of hybrid security governance do not adequately capture the nuances, complexities, and dynamism of the phenomenon, at least not at a micro-level the way this chapter has sought to. Excavating the interworkings of state and non-state actors at the neighbourhood level questions essentialist and determinist understanding of hybrid security governance as entirely constructive and calls attention to a more process-based approach that recognizes the dynamism expressed in shifts in alliances, pacts, and enmities. Appreciating the complex and dynamic manifestations of hybrid security governance has practical relevance for more effectively formulating policy and response strategy to deadly ethnic riots and other forms of collective violence.

Notes
2 See Huntington, Political Order in Changing; Bates, Prosperity and Violence.
3 Collier and Hoeffl, Greed and Grievance, 563–595.
5 Møller and Cawthra, Integration of Former Enemies, 177–200.
9 Ibid., 1073–1101.
10 Paffenholz, “Unpacking the Local Turn in Peacebuilding”, 857–874.
11 Wallensteen and Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes”, 621–634.
12 Viewing centres are privately owned commercial halls where people pay a fee to watch football matches on cable TV.
13 “Jos Population”.
14 Madueke, “From Neighbours to Deadly Enemies”, 87–102.
18 Ibid., 25.
19 Ibid., 18; Krause, A Deadly Cycle, 12.
20 Madueke, “From Neighbours to Deadly”, 87–102.
21 “Daily Trust 370,000 Policemen to 170 Million Nigerians Grossly Insufficie – Lawmaker”.
22 Guardian, “How Poor Salary Leads to Rot, Corruption in Nigeria Police”.
23 Aremu et al., “The Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence”, 195–208
25 “NSCDC Mission and Vision”.
26 Interview with youth leader in Angwan Rukuba, 20 November 2015.
27 Interview with security agents, 4 November 2015.
28 Interview with religious leader, 15 June 2016.
29 Interview with resident of Congo Russia, 14 July 2016.
Interviews with religious leader, 23 March 2016.
Interview with residents of Nasarawa Gwong, 4 March 2016.
Krause, *A Deadly Cycle*, 12.
Interview with resident of Angwan Rogo, 23 June 2016.
Interview with residents of Angwan Rukuba, 27 June 2016.
Interview with religious leader, 11 March 2017.
Interview with resident of Dutse Uku, 13 December 2015.
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Ibid. Also confirmed in interview with religious leader, 15 June 2016.
Interview with JDPC staff, 23 March 2017.
Interview with resident of Angwan Miango, 12 May 2017.
Interview with vigilante, Angwan Rukuba 12 November 2017.
Interview with vigilante in Dutse Uku, 23 November 2017.
Interview with vigilante, 28 December 2015.
Ibid.
Interviews with a cross-section of residents of Ali Kazaure and Angwan Rogo, 15 December 2015.
Interview with security agent, 12 April 2017.
“Filin Shetan” is a Hausa expression that loosely translates into “Satan’s field”
Interview with youth leader, Angwan Rukuba, 13 March 2017.

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