Cognitive Responses to Populist Communication

The Impact of Populist Message Elements on Blame Attribution and Stereotyping

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10 Cognitive Responses to Populist Communication

The Impact of Populist Message Elements on Blame Attribution and Stereotyping

Nicoleta Corbu, Linda Bos, Christian Schemer, Anne Schulz, Jörg Matthes, Claes H. de Vreese, Toril Aalberg, and Jane Suiter

Introduction

Populism, once seen as the unnatural, terrifying ‘spectre haunting the world’ (Ionescu & Gellner, 1969, p. 1), has become a commonly accepted political ‘thin-centered ideology’ (Mudde, 2004), a discursive frame (Aslanidis, 2016), a political style (Moffitt, 2016), a strategy (Barr, 2009), a frame (Caiani & della Porta, 2011), a discourse (Laclau, 2005), a language (Kazin, 1998), etc., all embedded in the mainstream politics of (not exclusively) Western democracies—in short, a zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004). Regardless of the perspective, the core of populism resides in the moral Manichean distinction between the ‘good people’ and the ‘corrupt elites’ who fail to represent the will of the ordinary people. Building on this common denominator, the most commonly elaborated construction of various ‘species’ of populism revolves around dichotomous dyads of the blameless people and culprit ‘others’ (out-groups) (Canovan, 1999; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000).

Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, and de Vreese (2017) make a strong argument in favor of studying populism, taking into account three main actors involved in the political populist communication: the political actors, the media, and the citizens. This study responds to the ‘calls by scholars who have emphasized that the effects of media populism on the receiver side of the populist discourse should be studied more thoroughly’ (Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017a, p. 871).

The burgeoning literature on the effects of populist communication spans effects on attitudes, emotions, support for leaders, and voting intentions (theory chapter by Hameleers et al. and Andreadis et al. in this volume; de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018). It
has been demonstrated in communication effects studies, using different designs and examining different country cases, that populist cues can be effective in changing people’s political opinions and behavior (see the theory chapter by Hameleers et al. in this volume for an overview of the psychological mechanisms behind these effects). However, these effects are not universal, neither across citizens nor across (political) contexts. Moreover, the attention paid to the underlying mechanisms of effects has been insufficient.

This chapter attempts to shed light on citizens’ cognitive responses to populist messages, taking into account specific effects of populist messages across 15 countries. It investigates how populist message strategies affect blame attributions and stereotypes related to the in-groups and out-groups, i.e., political actors, immigrants, and the wealthy. As outlined in the previous theory chapter (Hameleers et al., in this volume), these are key effect mechanisms of populist communication, but are also still under-studied.

Theoretical Background

This chapter highlights the cognitive impact of populist framing of media messages on attributions of blame and responsibility related to various social groups (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014; Iyengar, 1994). Additionally, we examine the impact of populist communication on the activation of stereotypical cognitions in people’s minds (Dixon, 2008; Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Schemer, 2012; Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002).

Populist media framing can produce effects through patterns of interpretation (Scheufele, 1999), particularly focused on a ‘causal interpretation’ and a ‘moral evaluation’ (Entman, 1993). Building on the previously defined populist frame as ‘us vs. them’ (Caiani & Della Porta, 2011), in this study we distinguish between various populist frames, adding the perspective of the exclusionist populist communication (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Thus, we will be further referring, in Jagers and Walgrave’s terms, to one vertical out-group, the culprit politicians, and two horizontal out-groups, the immigrants (for right-wing populism) and the wealthy (for left-wing populism). In line with cognitive priming literature (see Richey, 2012), we argue that, by emphasizing a binary divide between the ‘good people’ and the ‘corrupt elites’ (or culprit immigrants or wealthy for that matter), populist messages may prime similar schemata in people’s minds when exposed to these types of messages. Specifically, by framing political problems as a battle of the ‘evil’ elites or out-groups against good people, populist communicators clearly suggest these actors to be the root of all evil. Put differently, simplified black-and-white news portrayals of social problems as being unambiguously caused by political actors and/or out-groups such as immigrants or refugees impose corresponding causal attributions in the news audience.

Even though populism revolves around blame as a key feature of populist communication and at the core of populist strategies (Aalberg et al.,
studies have only recently begun to examine blame attribution in response to populist communication (for exceptions see Hameleers et al., 2017a; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017b; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018a). The assignment of responsibility (or blame) ‘reflects a disagreement between the actor and the perceiver. To the extent that the two individuals share a common view of morality, the perceiver’s assignment of blame is a claim that the actor has done something for which he or she ought to be ashamed’ (Shaver, 2012, p. 156). By making blame attributions to out-groups, populist messages make implicit or explicit causal links available in public discourse and in the minds of citizens. Such causal links are readily used by citizens when judging the performance of a government, institution, or a group (priming effect). Also, such causal links are in part already present in citizens’ perceptions and are activated, or even introduced, through populist messages.

In this chapter, we first investigate the potential for populist messages to affect message-congruent blame attributions. We expect that messages in which a particular out-group is blamed enhance blame attributions to that respective out-group (for previous studies using blame attribution as dependent variables, see Marsh & Tilley, 2010; Tilley & Hobolt, 2011). Therefore, if in populist anti-elitist messages the political elite are blamed for problems of the common citizens (see also the chapters by Blassnig et al., Maurer et al., and Esser et al. in this volume), we expect citizens who are exposed to these messages to attribute responsibility to the political elite more than the citizens who are not exposed to such a message (H1). Likewise, we expect a similar effect on immigrant blaming when, in a right-wing populist message, immigrants are blamed (H2). Finally, blaming of the wealthy for a social problem in a left-wing populist news story is likely to elicit blaming wealthy people in message recipients (H3).

Additionally, previous research on populist communication effects has seldom looked at the combined effects of blaming more than one out-group on people’s perceptions about who is responsible for a negative situation (blame attributions) (but see Hameleers et al., 2018a; Wirz et al., 2018). Blaming more than one group in populist communication, e.g., politicians and immigrants (in right-wing populist messages) or the wealthy (in left-wing populist messages), can have different effects. As argued in the theory chapter by Hameleers et al. in this volume, populist framing of media messages resonates with social identity theory; thus, components of in-group threats, a credible scapegoat, and efficacy are seen as predictors of social identity framing. However, arguments about the threats of various out-groups in populist messages could be more credible in some contexts and in some countries. On the one hand, blaming two out-groups can enhance blame perceptions of either group in people’s minds because the social problem may appear worse since two groups may have conspired against the good people. On the other hand, blame may be dissipated between the two different out-groups, possibly
because it is interpreted differently (the *vertical* out-group of the culprit politicians may be considered as unwilling to represent the interests of the people, whereas the *horizontal* out-group of immigrants or the wealthy may be perceived as competitors for material resources). Since we cannot know whether there is an additive effect or not, we treat this as a research question: What is the combined effect of blaming both politicians and immigrants (RQ1), or both politicians and the wealthy (RQ2), on blame perceptions of the respective groups among citizens?

In the next step, we focus on *stereotyping* as an outcome of exposure to populist communication. Stereotypes can be defined as ‘simplified mental images that help individuals to interpret the diversity of their social reality’ (Matthes & Schmuck, 2017, p. 560), or judgmental heuristics used to simplify various cognitive tasks (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985). As argued in the theory chapter by Hameleers et al. (in this volume), populist messages are likely to perpetuate these often negative stereotypes by priming associations of out-groups such as the elites or minorities with specific negative attributes (Arendt, 2013a; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017).

Building on schema theory (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984), most modern approaches to understanding the mechanism of stereotype formation and enhancement argue that there are two stages of the stereotyping process, *association* and *activation*, and two types of stereotypes, *implicit* and *explicit* (Devine, 1989; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald et al., 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). The association stage is characteristic of the automatic processes of retrieving information from memory through familiar nodes (concepts) and links (associations) (Greenwald et al., 2002, p. 4), in other words, the inevitable activation of mental associations in memory (Amodio & Devine, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Therefore, implicit stereotypes are considered an outcome that could (or could not) further be expressed as overt judgment: this is the activation stage, which leads to explicit stereotypes. In contrast to the association process and the (inescapable) formation of implicit stereotypes, explicit stereotypes are the results of a cognitive conscious process, which finally leads individuals to decide whether or not to use stereotypes in overtly expressed judgments (Greenwald et al., 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In this study we focus on effects on *explicit stereotypes* about the in-group (the people) and different out-groups (the politicians, the immigrants, the wealthy).

Stereotypes as dependent variables have been studied mostly in association with topics such as crime (Akalis, Banaji, & Kosslyn, 2008; Arendt, 2013b; Dixon, 2008), video games (Burgess, Dill, Stermer, Burgess, & Brown, 2011), racial attitudes (Valentino et al., 2002), etc., but little attention has been paid to derogatory portrayals of various out-groups in populist messages. The notable exceptions (Arendt, Marquart, & Matthes, 2015; Matthes & Schmuck, 2017) focus on right-wing populist political ads. At the same time, most studies focusing on stereotype activation show effects on implicit stereotypes, but not on explicit ones.
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(Arendt et al., 2015; Brown Givens & Monahan, 2005; Burgess et al., 2011).

In the context of populist political communication, the function of stereotypes can be two-fold. It can feed into the negative stereotypes of out-groups, but it can also feed into the positive stereotype of the in-group, the people, which in populist rhetoric is the positive beneficiary. In line with theorizing on media priming, we expect a populist message, which attributes positive characteristics to the in-group of the common people, to positively enhance the stereotypes of this in-group ($H4$), whereas blaming the political elite, immigrants, and the wealthy for social problems in news stories will negatively affect the stereotypes of these out-groups, respectively ($H5–7$). Additionally, we investigate whether or not blame attribution to more than one out-group in media messages could yield into more (or less) stereotyping of various out-groups ($RQ3$). Will blaming more than one out-group subsequently enhance stereotypes associated with primarily one or both groups, or dissipate the effect entirely? Moreover, would media messages cueing people centrality and blame of various out-groups rather enhance stereotypes by priming the moral gap between the ‘good’ and the ‘evil’, or would these associations be perceived as too far-fetched and dismissed as exaggerated ($RQ4$)?

Method

Experimental Design

To test our hypotheses and to answer the research questions, we ran a comparative experiment in 15 countries in which we varied the presence and absence of the in-group—the ordinary people (people centrality cues)—as well as three out-groups—the political elite (anti-elitist cues), immigrants (right-wing out-group cues), and the wealthy (left-wing out-group cues). In all 15 countries, the design of the experiment was identical. The setup was a 3×2 between-subjects experiment with two control groups. Specifically, we investigated the differential impact of a focus on the national in-group and of the blaming of vertical (political elite) and horizontal (the immigrants and the wealthy) as out-groups in a news article (see the previous chapter by Hameleers et al. for an overview of the experimental design). The topic was the alleged decrease of purchasing power in the respective countries. This social problem was raised by a representative of a fictional foundation. Both the topic and the source of the populist messages were held constant across all conditions and in all countries.

Sample

The sample of citizens in the 15 countries was diverse with respect to their level of education and age ($N_{\text{Total}} = 16,549$). After cleaning the data
(see Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann in this volume for additional details), 2,050 low-quality responses were removed, resulting in a total of 14,499 respondents. The data was collected in the first months of 2017 by both international and national research organizations, which were thoroughly instructed with regards to the recruiting procedures, sampling, stimulus presentation, survey layout, and data collection. The final dataset represents a sample of European citizens with diverse characteristics (see Appendix B for an overview of the respondents’ background characteristics by country).

**Procedure**

The experiments were conducted online. All participants gave their informed consent and filled in the pre-test part of the questionnaire (demographics, control variables). Afterwards they were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions. In each of these conditions, participants were instructed to read a news article for at least 20 seconds (for a report on randomization and manipulation checks, see Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann in this volume). The post-test part of the survey contained the dependent variables and manipulation checks, as well as a debriefing and message of thanks.

**Stimuli**

The mother versions of the stimuli were produced in English. They were translated by native speakers in all countries after thorough discussion about potential inconsistencies and cultural specificities. The control stimulus consisted of a piece of news allegedly published on a fictional online newspaper (news.com), which closely mimicked the euronews.com template—a common familiar template in all European countries. The story referred to a future decline of the purchasing power in the country, reported by the fictitious foundation FutureNow, with a picture of an empty wallet accompanying the text. In the six treatment conditions, the typology of populist communication as outlined in the theoretical framework was manipulated (see also Hameleers, Andreadis, and Reinemann in this volume). Two additional conditions served as controls (see Appendix A for all stimuli).

**Measures**

**Blame Perceptions**

The first set of dependent variables concern blame perceptions. Specifically, respondents were asked who they deemed to be responsible for causing the future economic downfall on a scale ranging from 1 (not at
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e all responsible) to 7 (fully responsible). We distinguish between different
causal agents that the participants could blame: citizens from their own
country ($M = 3.97, SD = 1.64$), immigrants or refugees, which were
summarized to form a single scale ($r_{sb} = .893, N = 14,445, M = 3.42,$
$SD = 1.76$), the EU ($M = 4.75, SD = 1.70$), the national government
or national politicians, which were summarized to form a single scale
($r_{sb} = .906, N = 14,470, M = 5.37, SD = 1.56$), and the wealthy ($M = 4.50,$
$SD = 1.66$).

Stereotypes

As previously mentioned, we considered explicit stereotypes only. This
construct was measured by using four items referring to evaluative traits
of four different groups: ‘most people in country X’, ‘most politicians’,
‘most wealthy’, and ‘most immigrants’. In addition, it was noted that
‘descriptions like this are bound to be sweeping generalizations. None-
theless, they do often seem to contain some element of truth’. The four
traits were ‘trustworthy/untrustworthy’, ‘hardworking/lazy’, ‘honest/
dishonest’, and ‘sympathetic/unsympathetic’. Again, we used 7-point
rating scales. For each group a stereotype measure was created based
on the four items, with lower values indicating more negative stereo-
types and higher values indicating more positive stereotypes. The four
items were targeted at the people loaded on the same factor, with factor
loadings ranging from .79 to .88 ($\alpha = .86, M = 4.71, SD = 1.23$). The trait
items referring to the political elite also loaded on one single factor, with
factor loadings ranging from .87 to .93 ($\alpha = .93, M = 3.03, SD = 1.51$).
The same measurements showed one factor for the wealthy stereotypes
(factors loadings ranging from .74 to .91, $\alpha = .87, M = 3.72, SD = 1.34$),
and for immigrants with factor loadings ranging from .88 to .94 ($\alpha = .93,$
$M = 3.95, SD = 1.48$).

Analyses

The dataset has a hierarchical structure in the sense that observations are
nested within countries. Therefore, the general results are analyzed by
running multilevel (mixed-effects) models in Stata, with intra-class cor-
relation coefficients varying between .07 and .21, which shows that more
than 7 percent of the variability in the dependent variables is due to the
country level (see the methods chapter by Hameleers, Andreadis, and
Reinemann in this volume for a justification of using multi-level models
with a relatively small number of Level 2 units). Yet, within-country dif-
ferences are still much larger than between-country differences. Analyses per
country were conducted using OLS regressions. The OLS regressions used
blame perceptions for the individual groups as dependent variables and
populist cues as independent variables. Similar to the multilevel analysis,
main effects for people-centrism cues, anti-elite cues, anti-immigrant cues, and anti-wealthy cues, as well as interactions of anti-elite/anti-immigrant and anti-elite/anti-wealthy cues, were taken into account in the respective models.

Results

Blame Perceptions

The subsequent section looks first at the distribution of means across countries. Then, we test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. General means of blame attributions show considerable variation across countries (Figure 10.1; see Appendix C for exact mean values). There is an almost general consensus about blaming politicians the most and immigrants the least. Thus, there seems to be a normative tendency to blame those in power for social problems. The highest gap between blame attribution for the two out-groups is observed in Greece, whereas the lowest difference is registered in Sweden. Moreover, France is the only country in which immigrants are viewed as more responsible than the people for the decrease of the purchasing power described in the news story. Even though the variables were measured in the post-test part of the questionnaire, they offer a general overview of the subject matter.

Table 10.1 shows the impact of the different cues used in populist communication—people centrality, anti-elite (or anti-politicians), left-wing out-group cues (or anti-wealthy), right-wing out-group cues (or anti-immigrant)—on blame perceptions in the public.

![Figure 10.1](image-url)  
**Figure 10.1** Blame perceptions by country and group (country-by-country analysis; ascending order by blame attribution to politicians)  
Notes: Mean values for blame perceptions by country and group based on scales from 1 (not at all responsible) to 7 (fully responsible).
Table 10.1  Effects of populist cues on blame perceptions (multilevel model; unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Blaming the people</th>
<th>Model 2: Blaming politicians</th>
<th>Model 3: Blaming immigrants</th>
<th>Model 4: Blaming the wealthy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intercept</strong></td>
<td>3.97 (.08)**</td>
<td>5.28 (.12)**</td>
<td>3.45 (.09)**</td>
<td>4.41 (.09)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 fixed effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People centrality cue</td>
<td>.01 (.04)</td>
<td>.04 (.04)</td>
<td>−.05 (.04)</td>
<td>−.02 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite cue</td>
<td>.01 (.04)</td>
<td>.05 (.03)</td>
<td>−.03 (.04)</td>
<td>.03 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant cue</td>
<td>−.05 (.05)</td>
<td>.01 (.05)</td>
<td>.17 (.05)**</td>
<td>.03 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-rich cue</td>
<td>−.10 (.07)</td>
<td>−.02 (.05)</td>
<td>−.07 (.05)</td>
<td>.30 (.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite cue × anti-imm. cue</td>
<td>−.02 (.06)</td>
<td>−.01 (.06)</td>
<td>.17 (.07)*</td>
<td>.01 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite cue × anti-rich cue</td>
<td>−.10 (.06)</td>
<td>.09 (.06)</td>
<td>.11 (.07)</td>
<td>−.01 (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Random effects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-level variance</td>
<td>.07 (.03)**</td>
<td>.20 (.08)*</td>
<td>.09 (.03)*</td>
<td>.10 (.04)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level variance</td>
<td>2.61 (.03)**</td>
<td>2.26 (.03)**</td>
<td>3.02 (.04)**</td>
<td>2.69 (.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-country correlation</td>
<td>.03 (.01)**</td>
<td>.08 (.03)**</td>
<td>.03 (.01)*</td>
<td>.03 (.01)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>−27,505.38</td>
<td>−26,473.54</td>
<td>−28,498.81</td>
<td>−27,692.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14,474</td>
<td>14,470</td>
<td>14,445</td>
<td>14,454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Positive coefficients for Level 1 fixed effects mean that the respective populist message cues, or their interactions, significantly increase blame attributions to the respective groups. *p < .05, **p < .01.
Blaming the People

It was expected that simply portraying the people as victims of an economic problem (i.e., people-centrism) would represent a heartland cue that can positively affect the perception of the people or de-emphasize blame attributions of the people. However, a news story about an economic problem with a people-centrality cue without blaming any group does not affect blame perceptions of the people. Other cues that blamed immigrants, politicians, or the wealthy do not affect blame attributions of the people either. Finally, the interaction of anti-elite blaming and blaming of either immigrants or rich people does not result in changes of blame perceptions of the ordinary people. Thus, blaming of social groups in the news for a future crisis from which the ordinary people would suffer does not change blame perceptions of this group.

Blaming Politicians

The results of Model 2 show that exposure to news stories that blame politicians or the government for economic problems does not affect blame perceptions of politicians in the public. This finding is inconsistent with our hypothesis. News blaming of politicians does not translate, in any countries, into blaming of the political elite. In addition, there were no interaction effects of anti-elite blaming with scapegoating of immigrants or wealthy people. Finally, blame shifting to politicians does not affect the blame perceptions of other social groups.

Blaming Immigrants

In line with our assumption, news stories about an economic problem that is attributed to immigrants cause readers to blame immigrants for this economic problem. The adoption of this blame frame in the news story fully materializes in France and Ireland (Figure 10.2). Specifically, blaming immigrants in the news compared to blaming other groups, or nobody, increases blaming by more than two-thirds of a scale point on the responsibility rating scale. Remarkably, no negative effects are apparent in some of the Southern European countries that have become the first destination of migrants (e.g., Greece, Italy) or in other Central and Northern European countries that have taken in a high number of immigrants per capita in recent years (e.g., Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands). In Sweden, blaming immigrants or refugees for economic problems in the news even backfires. Put differently, exposure to a news article that blames immigrants for future economic problems results in less blame attributed to this group. Blaming immigrants in the news does not affect blame attribution to other groups such as the people, politicians, or the wealthy. The findings also suggest an interaction effect of news stories that
blame immigrants and the political elite on blame perceptions. This result indicates that blame perceptions are most pronounced after reading news articles that blame immigrants and politicians as compared to blaming just one group or no group at all. This finding is most pronounced in Spain and in the UK, where no main effect occurred.

**Blaming the Wealthy**

News blaming of wealthy people resonates well with the audience, lending support to our third hypothesis. Specifically, exposure to news stories that blame rich people for future economic problems increases perceived blame of this group in the public. This finding receives support in six
out of 15 countries, i.e., Austria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands, whereas in all other countries no effects are detected (Figure 10.3). The largest effect size (two-thirds of a scale point on the blaming scale) are found in Germany and Austria. However, we found no interaction effect of the anti-wealthy cue and anti-elite cue on blame perceptions of rich people. Finally, blaming rich people in the news for future economic problems does not affect blame attributions of other social groups.

Stereotypes

The subsequent analyses look at whether attributions of blame for a specific problem depicted in a news story are generalized to the evaluation and
perception of the whole group. Before testing the hypotheses, a quick look at the means per country is useful. As a general observation, the mean of the stereotypes scales show differences across countries (Figure 10.4; see Appendix D for exact mean values), with a clear leaning towards perceiving national politicians most negatively. Politicians are most negatively stereotyped in Italy, Greece, and Romania. The people are perceived in the most positive way in countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden. These findings mirror the results on blame perceptions.

In the next step, we analyzed whether group cues in the news affect stereotyping of this specific group in the public. The findings of a multilevel model that includes the news cues as predictors of stereotypes are depicted in Table 10.2.

**Stereotyping of the People**

Participants reading a news article which portrayed the people as victims of the future decline of purchasing power perceive the people more stereotypically positive than in the control condition, which is in line with H4. Individual country analyses reveal that this effect occurs mainly in Germany and Poland, but is absent in the other countries. Other news cues did not affect stereotypes of the people as being virtuous. Finally, there is no evidence of any interaction effects of group cues on stereotypes of the people.
Table 10.2: Effects of populist cues on stereotype perceptions (multilevel model; unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 5: Stereotypes of the people</th>
<th>Model 6: Stereotypes of politicians</th>
<th>Model 7: Stereotypes of immigrants</th>
<th>Model 8: Stereotypes of the wealthy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>4.68 (.09)**</td>
<td>3.11 (.20)**</td>
<td>3.99 (.12)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level 1 fixed effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People centrality cue</td>
<td>.09 (.03)**</td>
<td>–.04 (.03)</td>
<td>–.01 (.03)</td>
<td>.02 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite cue</td>
<td>–.04 (.03)</td>
<td>–.03 (.03)</td>
<td>–.02 (.03)</td>
<td>–.02 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant cue</td>
<td>–.01 (.04)</td>
<td>.04 (.04)</td>
<td>–.11 (.04)**</td>
<td>.01 (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-rich cue</td>
<td>–.07 (.04)</td>
<td>–.03 (.04)</td>
<td>.01 (.04)</td>
<td>–.18 (.03)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite cue × anti-imm. cue</td>
<td>.03 (.04)</td>
<td>.02 (.05)</td>
<td>.03 (.06)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-elite cue × anti-rich cue</td>
<td>.07 (.05)</td>
<td>.01 (.05)</td>
<td>.05 (.05)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Random effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country-level variance</td>
<td>.13 (.05)**</td>
<td>.56 (.21)**</td>
<td>.19 (.07)**</td>
<td>.25 (.09)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level variance</td>
<td>1.394 (.02)**</td>
<td>1.69 (.02)**</td>
<td>2.00 (.02)**</td>
<td>1.53 (.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-country correlation</td>
<td>.08 (.03)</td>
<td>.25 (.07)**</td>
<td>0.09 (.03)**</td>
<td>.14 (.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>–22,842.47</td>
<td>–24,276.12</td>
<td>–25,282.92</td>
<td>–23,488.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>14,391</td>
<td>14,402</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>14,372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Negative coefficients for Level 1 fixed effects mean that the respective populist message cues or their interactions significantly increase negative stereotypical perceptions of the respective groups. Stereotype indices were inverted to make them congruent with the negative cues in the manipulation. *, ** p < .05, ** p < .01.
Stereotyping of Politicians

The findings from the mixed model (Model 6) indicate that message recipients did not engage in more negative stereotyping of politicians in response to a news story in which politicians are blamed for economic problems. This finding does not lend support to H4. Only in Poland and Austria did people perceive politicians more negatively after the exposure to anti-elite cues. Thus, there is no general effect of news blaming of political actors for societal problems on negative perceptions of politicians as a social group. Blaming other social groups in a news article does not affect stereotyping of politicians. Finally, no interaction effects of group cues on stereotyping of political actors occurred.

Stereotyping of Immigrants

In line with H6, exposure to news stories blaming immigrants for economic problems enhances negative stereotypical perceptions of immigrants as a social group. However, this immigrant stereotyping effect is significant only in France and marginally significant in Austria. This stereotyping effect parallels the blaming effect that was also obtained in France. As revealed by individual country analyses, no such effects are observed for the other countries. Other cues in the news story did not affect stereotypes of immigrants in the public. A significant interaction effect in France indicates that blaming immigrants alone results in more negative stereotyping as compared to blaming politicians alone, politicians and immigrants, or nobody.

Stereotyping of the Wealthy

When wealthy people are blamed for future economic problems, readers then engage in negative stereotyping, i.e., they perceive the wealthy to be more lazy, more dishonest, and less sympathetic (Model 8)—confirming our expectation as laid out in H7. This effect is significant in Austria, Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands (Figure 10.5). The impact of left-wing populist blaming on negative stereotypes of the wealthy is most pronounced in Israel. Participants exposed to news blaming the wealthy engage in negative stereotyping that is about half a scale point lower as compared to other participants exposed to blaming of other social groups or no groups at all. However, blaming the rich does not affect stereotypes of wealthy people in other countries. Thus, there is partial support for the hypothesis that exposure to news stories in which wealthy people are blamed for societal problems results in negative stereotypes of wealthy people in the public. Other cues in the news story did not affect stereotypes of wealthy people in the public. No interaction effects occurred.
Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, we tested the effects of news framing using various populist cues in 15 European countries on blame attribution and explicit stereotyping. As a key finding, we observed that anti-rich cues in the news have the largest impact and that people are willing to quickly blame the wealthy for being unsympathetic and out of touch. In particular, it seems that people were more likely to react to anti-wealthy cues than to anti-immigrant or anti-politician cues. This can be explained by the specific nature of the news articles used in the present experiment: there was a clear focus on an economic issue in the news. This makes the economic elite, as the main responsible actors, salient, and, therefore, the very same populist messages were more powerful when it comes to economic elites compared to...
political elites or immigrants. Respondents were also more likely to react to anti-immigrant cues than to anti-politician cues. This suggests that our experimental blame attributions were more likely to increase perceptions about responsibility when using cues of left-wing anti-elite, or right-wing anti-immigrant, populism. At the same time, anti-elite cues had limited effect, most probably due to a ceiling effect, since blame attributions to politicians were already very high across countries.

As far as ‘the people’ are concerned, results show that people-centrality cues do not cause significant effects on blame attribution, and very limited effects (in two countries, Germany and Poland) on stereotypes. Being at the core of the populist discourse of not only populist, but also of mainstream parties, it may be the case that citizens are actually so used to such ‘empty’ appeals to the people that they are hardly ever affected in any way by these kinds of arguments.

Anti-elite cues in media messages, i.e., messages focusing on the political elite, have equally limited effects on blame attribution (significant only in Austria and Spain) and stereotypes (significant only in Poland and Austria). Politicians have long been a source of annoyance for many citizens, and it would appear that many of the citizens in our experiment have negative perceptions of politicians already. This suggests a ceiling effect: when cognitive responses are already negative, an additional increase in negative responses is unlikely. Descriptives of blame variables support this argument, as the means of the variable ascribing blame to politicians (M = 5.35, SD = 1.58) is much higher than for all three other groups (immigrants, the wealthy, politicians) in all 15 countries (see Figure 10.2). Poland, however, is the second to last country (before Sweden) with the lowest mean of blame attribution to politicians (M = 4.77, SD = 1.95), which could explain the significant effect of enhancing stereotypes in this country. Austria, in turn, is the country in which the Austrian Freedom Party’s speech is impregnated with anti-establishment and anti-immigrant messages (Schmuck, Matthes, & Boomgaarden, 2017, p. 85).

When it comes to immigrants, there were effects on blame attributions in some countries (e.g., France and Ireland) but not in others. Additionally, in Spain and the UK, we found an interaction effect: blaming both immigrants and the political elite yielded significant results. These findings suggest that blaming immigrants, a key strategy of almost all right-wing populist actors, does not automatically lead to more negative cognitive responses with respect to immigrants in any context across Europe. Even though this chapter does not take into account contextual variables, which could be helpful in trying to explain cross-country differences, one may speculate that national debates about immigration could play an important role in explaining those differences. France is known to have fostered animated debates with regards to immigrants long before the refugee crisis in the EU. In Ireland, a recent report jointly elaborated by the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission and the Economic and
Social Research Institute, using the European Social Survey 2014, reveals that negative attitudes towards immigrants were registered among the Irish population, especially in relation to negative economic consequences (McGinnity, Grotti, Russell, & Fahey, 2018), and therefore one possible explanation could be related to the topic of the news items used as stimuli. At the same time, the populism literature about Ireland often evokes the 2004 referendum on the withdrawal of Irish citizenship rights for ‘non-national’ children as a political response to immigration (Suiter, 2017, p. 131). Moreover, Ireland is among the top four European countries with the highest proportion of foreign-born residents. The UK and Spain also have a relatively high percentage of foreign-born people in their populations, and populist parties have been successful in these countries in recent years, which could explain the interaction effect.

For negative stereotyping, we were only able to observe significant effects in two out of 15 countries (i.e., France and Austria). One could argue that stereotypes are more stable cognitive structures and less prone to short-term effects of media framing. The effect in France mirrors the effect we found with regards to blame attribution, which is in line with the long-lasting xenophobic discourse of the Front National since the mid-1960s (Hubé & Truan, 2018, p. 181). As already mentioned, in Austria, ‘the Austrian Freedom Party’ communication is characterized by ‘an anti-immigrant and anti-establishment rhetoric’ (Schmuck et al., 2017, p. 85). The success of anti-immigrant cues might be related to the credibility of the blame attribution: immigrants might be a threat to the cultural heritage or social security but, at least in some countries, not so much to the economic situation of the country. Another way to look at the findings is that immigrants and refugees were already a hot-button topic in most of the countries. Thus, one additional article blaming immigrants for social problems will not be so consequential anymore. In addition, while the article is explicit about blaming of social groups, it does not explicitly refer to any negative traits of the groups that were blamed.

As mentioned above, blaming the wealthy in media messages seems to be the most successful recipe for obtaining effects on both blame attribution and stereotype enhancement. People in three countries (Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands) are sensitive to left-wing out-group cues, yielding significant results for both blame attribution and stereotypes. Irish, French, and Italian citizens are significantly influenced by left-wing cues to attribute more responsibility to the wealthy for the economic decline described in the news story, whereas Israelis reacted with more negative stereotypes about this specific out-group when faced with anti-rich blame. Interestingly, Greece, the country in which the left-wing populist Syriza party has been very successful in recent years, does not seem to be especially prone to left-wing populist arguments spread in the media. At the same time, the spectrum of countries in which we found significant effects is rather heterogeneous in terms of purchasing power.
and/or general standard of living. Most probably, the topic of the news story used as a stimulus is one of the causes for why left-wing cues were much more effective than right-wing, people centrality, or anti-elitist cues.

When trying to make sense of the country-level data, one interesting question raised is related to patterns of behavior across countries. In Aalberg and de Vreese (2017), a general divide into four geographic regions across Europe has been proposed, accounting for some similarities among various countries (p. 8). Thus, of the 15 countries selected for this study, Western Europe (Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK) and Southern Europe (France, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Spain) were over-represented when compared to Northern Europe (Norway and Sweden) or Eastern Europe (Poland and Romania). More often than not, the populist traits specific to these regions are not sufficient to suggest expected patterns. For example, people living in southern parts of Europe where left-wing populism has been more successful in recent years were not more prone to be affected by left-wing cues. Neither were anti-establishment arguments more effective in Western Europe, which is characterized by ‘populists’ parties influence on long-established, mainstream parties’ (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017, p. 8). An interesting case can be found in the two Eastern European countries represented in the study, Poland and Romania, with Poland being the country in which we found the most significant effects and Romania (along with Sweden) in which no expected significant effect occurred at all. Both Poland and Romania have been characterized by a volatile populist political spectrum, meaning that populist parties have come and gone. Some have been very short-lived but successful, and others have died when their leaders, for one reason or another, faded away from the political arena. However, the very recent success of populist parties in Poland could provide an explanation for the appeal of populist cues for Polish respondents, whereas in recent years in Romania, the political arena has not seen any successful populist actor. This is also suggested by Hameleers et al. (2018b) on the basis of the data used in this chapter. They found that the electoral success of populist parties within a country seems to provide opportunity structures that foster effects of populist messages on political engagement.

What is also interesting is that simple blaming in news stories does not unambiguously trigger explicit stereotypes of social groups in the public. Of course, this should be interpreted in light of the stimuli we employed which did not directly convey strongly negative stereotypes. Yet it is also possible that populist messages which perpetuate negative stereotypes by cumulatively priming associations of out-groups with specific negative attributes may not have the strong impact that researchers fear. In some countries, participants were immune to the populist claims that were expressed, e.g., in Switzerland, Norway, Romania, Greece, and Sweden. Citizens’ responsibility ratings and stereotypes did not vary as a function of populist blame shifting. In Sweden, right-wing populist communication cues even resulted in less blaming of immigrants (backfire effect).
There are, of course, a number of important limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting our findings. First of all, conducting an experimental study in 15 countries comes with tremendous challenges. Although we kept all stimuli, materials, measures, and procedures equal in all countries, it is almost impossible to rule out all potential country differences in the perception or employment of stimuli, measures, or procedures. Related to that, we observed significant differences between the countries in terms of the size and direction of the effects of populist communication. Yet, we were unable to explain those differences with the models we used. Future analyses should therefore strive to develop theoretical ideas in order to test cross-level interactions that explain why populist communication succeeds in one context but not in another. Indeed, as some recent findings show, theoretically derived macro-level variables can help to explain why cognitive effects occur in some national contexts but not in others (Hameleers et al., 2018b). In addition, the present study assumed universal effects across countries and individuals. However, we know from previous research that people differ with respect to their susceptibility to populist communication (Bos et al., 2013; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; Müller et al., 2017; Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). Therefore, studying individual differences is definitely an important avenue for future research.

Furthermore, the next chapter (by Andreadis et al.) will also look at the consequences of blame attributions on attitudes and voting intentions, following the path of a recent study that used contextual data to explain political engagement effects of populist communication (Hameleers et al., 2018b). Finally, cognitive responses, as measured in our study, may be corrected or negated by some respondents due to socially desirable responding. Especially when it comes to immigrants as victims of negative stereotyping, implicit attitude measures can provide additional insights that are unobtainable with explicit measures used in questionnaires. We therefore urge scholars to replicate the idea of multi-country experimental studies on the effects of populist communication using implicit, in addition to explicit, measures.

From a communication perspective, the results of this study suggest that empty populism cues or anti-establishment arguments used as rhetoric strategies might not sway citizens’ attitudes to conform to populist propaganda. At the same time, anti-immigrant and anti-wealth arguments might be pervasive in some cultures, depending on prior cognitive links relating either immigration or a social inequality gap to negative economic consequences.

Notes

1. The removal of these respondents results in more precise estimates, yet yields to similar findings and conclusions.
2. The wording of the question measuring blame attribution was: ‘In society, there is disagreement on who or what is responsible for causing a decline of
purchasing power. Could you indicate to what extent you believe the following actors are responsible for causing this development where ‘1’ indicates they are not at all responsible, and ‘7’ indicates they are fully responsible?

References


