This chapter surveys the scholarly debate on EU policies pertaining to the integration of third-country nationals (TCNs) in member states’ societies. This is not at all self-evident, since the European Union has no competence to regulate migrant integration. In the classic distinction proposed by Thomas Hammar (1985: 7–9), ’immigration regulation’ refers to the control of entry and stay of foreigners, while ’immigrant policy’ refers to ’the conditions provided for resident immigrants’. With regard to immigration regulation, the European Union has been attributed competence to legislate by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), and the 2000s witnessed the development of a European Asylum and Migration Policy. However, immigrant policy – generally labeled ’migrant integration policy’ or ’integration policy’ in the EU context – has been carefully excluded from harmonization. This is not surprising, considering how closely related migrant integration is to other policy areas where member states have been reticent to relinquish national sovereignty, such as social security, labor market regulation, housing and education. In the Lisbon Treaty (2007), member states explicitly excluded ’any harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ pertaining to the integration of third-country nationals (Article 79.4).

However, notwithstanding these sovereignty concerns and lack of competence, the influence of EU law and policies on the integration of third-country nationals is far from negligible. Carrera (2009) points out that EU-level activity in this policy area has assumed two shapes. First, a series of soft governance measures have been elaborated to ’provide incentives and support for the action of member states with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals’, as the Lisbon Treaty states in its Article 79.4. Such non-binding forms of cooperation and coordination include exchange of best practices within the European Migration Network, the formulation of Common Basic Principles on Migrant Integration, and the establishment of a European Integration Fund and a European Website on Integration. Second, two directives have been adopted that, while formulating conditions for entry and stay, also affect integration. The Family Reunification Directive and Long-term Residence Directive regulate third-country nationals’ access to family reunion and secure residence and mobility rights, respectively. Access to these rights may in itself be considered a crucial aspect of promoting the integration process.
of third-country nationals. Furthermore, both directives touch upon third-country nationals’ access to employment and education, and include provisions for ‘integration measures’ which may condition access to rights.

The overarching question driving most scholarly analyses of EU migrant integration policies has been whether EU involvement in migrant integration policies has led to the improvement or deterioration of the position of third-country nationals living in the European Union. The development of EU migrant integration policies was kicked off by the European Council in Tampere in 1999 which called for ‘a more vigorous integration policy [that] should aim at granting [third-country nationals] rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens’ (European Council 1999). This set high hopes for academic observers such as Dora Kostakopoulou (2002: 454), who observed that ‘a rights-based approach […] has begun to emerge’, which was ‘likely to lower barriers to more inclusive policies’ (2002: 445). However, academics have also argued that EU citizenship and European identity have been built on the legal and symbolic exclusion of third-country nationals (e.g., Hansen and Hager 2010: 14–15; Rea et al. 2011: 9–11). Scholars remain divided as to whether EU engagement with the integration of third-country nationals is dominated by dynamics of inclusion or exclusion.

This chapter begins by summarizing the content of migrant integration policy in the EU: the Long-term Residence Directive, the Family Reunification Directive and non-binding EU migrant integration policy respectively, pointing out particular issues of scholarly interest for each of these three policy subfields. The second section surveys the literature on the negotiation and implementation of the two directives, exploring in particular the question whether Europeanization should be considered a ‘liberal constraint’ upon restriction-minded member states. The third and final section reviews the scholarly debate on the role of the EU in the emergence of a new policy paradigm in which integration and migration are fused.

**EU migrant integration policies**

**The Long-term Residence Directive**


The Directive stipulates that non-EU nationals are entitled to long-term resident status if they have resided for more than five years in a member state and are financially independent. Member states may require TCNs to fulfill integration requirements before granting this status. Initially, refugees were not covered by the Directive, but they were included in its scope in 2011. The Directive states that long-term residents must be treated equally to nationals in areas such as employment, education, social security, taxation and freedom of association; however, it allows member states to restrict equal access in certain circumstances. Long-term residents may move to live, work or study in another EU member state, provided they fulfill certain conditions, most notably sufficient resources. Member states may also subject TCNs’ mobility rights to integration conditions.

A focal point in the academic literature about the Long-term Residence Directive is the question of how it relates to EU citizenship. This is a highly normative debate dominated by scholars of law and philosophy of law. Maas (2008: 588) has argued that in parallel with the strengthening of EU citizenship rights, the rights of third-country nationals were ‘frozen or reduced’. Maas acknowledges the added value of the Long-term Residence Directive in guaranteeing a set of minimum rights throughout the Union, but emphasizes that these rights fall far
short of equal treatment with citizens. A long-standing advocate of granting third-country nationals access to EU citizenship based on residency is Dora Kostakopoulou (2007: 623), who sees the development of EU citizenship as an opportunity to work towards ‘a more inclusive, multi-layered and multicultural conception of citizenship’. In her view, this would logically entail freeing EU citizenship from its ‘quasi-nationalist trappings’ by rooting it in domicile rather than in nationality (2007: 644). Kochenov (2013: 106–107) states that ‘it is more or less accepted in the literature that EU citizenship is incomplete unless it takes third-country nationals onboard in some form’ and promotes full inclusion of TCNs in EU citizenship as the only sensible way to ‘diminish the harshness of apartheid européen’ (italics in original). Overall, however, scholars are pessimistic about the likelihood of member states accepting the decoupling of access to EU citizenship from access to their own nationality in the foreseeable future.

Given this political reality, some scholars see substantial inclusionary potential in the rights guaranteed by the Long-term Residence Directive and especially in its implementation by the EU Court of Justice. For instance, Wiesbrock (2012) has argued that the Court has shown a tendency to interpret the rights granted to TCNs by the Long-term Residence Directive and other EU law expansively, according to principles governing its jurisprudence on EU citizenship such as the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. If this trend were to persist, it would represent ‘a viable alternative to the full extension of Union citizenship’ to third-country nationals (Wiesbrock 2012: 91). According to Acosta Arcarazo (2015: 200), ‘the Long-term residence directive has created a status that can be considered as a subsidiary form of EU citizenship’. Like Wiesbrock, Acosta Arcarazo attributes a crucial role to EU Court jurisprudence which has turned the Directive into a solid guarantee of a set of rights for TCNs. Notably, the Court has ruled that, if a third-country national fulfills the conditions, member states are obliged to grant long-term residence status. This is fundamentally different from the attribution of nationality, which is at member states’ discretion. Acosta Arcarazo (2015: 217) argues that through this and similar jurisprudence, the Court has turned long-term residence into a ‘post-national form of membership’.

The Family Reunification Directive


The Directive applies to third-country nationals with a permanent residence permit living in the EU and wishing to bring over non-EU family members. It stipulates that spouses and minor children will be admitted if the applicant has health insurance, appropriate accommodation, and stable and sufficient resources. Member states may also admit parents, adult children and unmarried partners. Foreign family members who pose a threat to public order may be refused admission. Member states may require family members to comply with integration measures, and may set a minimum age for both partners of no more than 21 and a minimum residence period for the applicant of no more than two years. The Directive also contains guarantees for the procedure – such as examination of the application within nine months – and for the rights granted to family members following admission, notably with regard to security of residence and access to employment and education. All norms set by the Directive are minimum norms; member states are free to set less stringent conditions.

A recurring theme in the literature on the Family Reunification Directive is the ‘stratification’ (i.e., unequal distribution) of family migration rights in Europe. Groenendijk (2006:...
215–217) emphasized that three sets of EU rules apply to family reunification. First, EU citizens who live or have lived in another EU country can bring over foreign family members under free movement law. Second, family reunification by Turkish citizens is governed by the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU. Third, all other third-country nationals can bring over foreign family members according to the conditions set by the Family Reunification Directive (2006: 215–217). Strik and colleagues (2013: 107) add a fourth category, namely highly skilled workers who can bring along family members on very generous terms under the Blue Card Directive. The only category of people whose family reunification rights are not governed by EU law are nationals, i.e., EU citizens who have not moved to another EU country.

This ‘fragmentation of the family reunification rights in the European Union’ (Strik et al. 2013: 108) is generally deplored in the literature. Most notably, scholars criticize the disfavoring of both TCNs and nationals compared to mobile EU citizens (e.g., Kostakopoulou and Ripoll Servent 2016; Strik et al. 2013). Free movement law stipulates that this latter category may reunite with foreign family members under very favorable conditions: EU citizens can bring over not only spouses and children under the age of 21 but also older children, (grand)parents or grandchildren if they are dependants. Integration or language conditions may not be imposed. The family reunification rights granted to TCNs under the Family Reunification Directive are much less generous. Moreover, Strik and colleagues (2013: 107–108) point out that the family reunification rights of ‘first country nationals’ (i.e., EU citizens who have not moved to another country) are left entirely without protection by EU law and that several member states now apply more stringent conditions to their own nationals than to other EU citizens (cf. Block 2015: 1441; Bonjour and Block 2016: 790). This stratification has led to new migratory moves, with EU citizens moving to another EU country in order for the generous conditions of free movement law to apply and to allow them to reunite with their foreign family members (Wagner 2015).

Non-binding EU migrant integration policy

While the EU has no formal competence to harmonize national migrant integration policies, a series of ‘soft governance’ initiatives have been deployed since the 2000s (Rosenow 2008; Carrera 2009). In 2005, the Commission launched its first ‘Common Framework for the Integration of Third-country Nationals’, which entailed a series of measures coordinated by the Commission aimed at exchanging policy experiences and the dissemination of best practices. This initiative was guided by the ‘Common Basic Principles’ on migrant integration adopted by the Council in 2004 and reaffirmed in 2014. A network of National Contact Points on Integration was set up in 2002 with the aim of exchanging information and experiences. A European Integration Fund was introduced which spent 825 million euro between 2007 and 2013 to support migrant integration initiatives. As of 2014, the European Integration Fund was replaced by the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund. In 2009, a European Integration Forum was established, which brought together civil society organizations and EU institutions twice a year. It was reformed into the European Migration Forum in 2015. In addition, the Commission has seen to the publication of a European Website on Integration, a series of Handbooks on Integration, as well as European Integration Modules. Finally, the Commission has developed common ‘Indicators for Migrant Integration’ to allow for consistent monitoring of migrant integration and cross-country comparisons.

An aspect of EU migrant integration policies that has attracted scholarly attention is the interaction among researchers and policy-makers in the development of these policies. Pratt (2015) explores the involvement of researchers in the elaboration of the Commission 2000 Communication on migrant integration and the Council’s Common Basic Principles of 2004. She argues
that researchers exerted substantial influence on policy elaboration in these early days, as EU institutions and member states actively sought the input of academic researchers to help shape this new policy field. Geddes and Achtnich (2015) zoom in on the European Migration Network of National Contact Points as an important venue where knowledge about migrant integration is produced at the EU level and conclude that, rather than producing new insights, the Network tends to ‘be used as an arena for the substantiation of existing policy choices’ (2015: 311). Geddes and Scholten (2015: 42) argue that ‘the development of institutional relations between research and policy appears to be a key element of [the EU’s] “soft governance” strategy’. They show that, in the absence of formal competences, promoting the exchange and production of knowledge was a way for the Commission to carve out a legitimate role for itself, and to stimulate Europeanization based on the reframing of migrant integration as a ‘European’ problem that required a ‘European’ response.

**Negotiating and implementing the directives: race to the bottom or safety net for migrants’ rights?**

A core question in analyses of EU migrant integration policies has been whether Europeanization has been beneficial or detrimental to the level of rights protection enjoyed by third-country nationals. This debate has focused mainly on the two binding directives, since the non-binding policy instruments do not touch upon legal rights. A broadly shared observation is that, while the Commission and Court have tended to adopt pro-rights positions, member state preferences have overall been more restrictive (Luedtke 2009; Acosta Arcarazo 2011; Menz 2011; Strik 2011; Bonjour and Vink 2013; Block and Bonjour 2013; Roos 2013; Schweitzer 2015). The question is then, whether Europeanization has either enabled member states to push their restrictive policy agenda or, to the contrary, limited member states’ room for maneuver to restrict migrants’ rights.

The Long-term Residence Directive and the Family Reunification Directive were negotiated in parallel. In both cases, the Commission initially tabled proposals that set very high standards of protection for migrants’ rights. According to Groenendijk (2007), Roos (2013) and Strik (2011), NGOs significantly influenced the positions adopted by the Commission in this early stage. The Commission strove for harmonization and for the inclusion of TCNs in free movement within the internal market (Roos 2013). While member states’ positions diverged, they all strove to minimize adaptation costs, i.e., to ensure that new EU law would require as little modification of national policies as possible (Luedtke 2009; Strik 2011; Roos 2013). The Commission’s pro-rights stance was supported by Sweden, France and Belgium. Most member states, however, proved very reticent to cede sovereignty over migrant policies and sought to condition TCNs’ rights in different ways. Overall, scholars agree that restriction-minded member states, in particular Germany, Austria and The Netherlands, were most influential in the negotiation process (Leudtke 2009; Acosta Arcarazo 2011; Menz 2011; Strik 2011; Roos 2013). For instance, while the Commission proposed granting long-term residents virtually the same social and mobility rights as EU citizens, member states limited these rights by stipulating that long-term residents could be required to fulfill integration conditions before moving to live or work in another member state, and that access to social security could be restricted to core benefits. Similarly, member states successfully negotiated a series of restrictive adaptations of the Commission’s Family Reunification proposal, such as raising the minimum age for spouses from 18 to 21, excluding nationals from the scope of the Directive, and allowing member states to require family migrants to comply with integration measures (Strik 2011; Roos 2013; Bonjour and Vink 2013).
Thus, scholarly assessments of the outcome of the negotiations in terms of migrants’ rights protection are generally negative. Scholars who compare this outcome either to normative standards derived from fundamental rights law (Cholewinski 2002; Benarieh Ruffer 2011) or to the goals set by the Tampere Council Conclusions (i.e., equal treatment of TCNs and EU citizens) (Halleskov 2005; Foblets 2016) are especially critical. However, assessments are more mixed if the outcomes of the negotiations are compared to pre-existing national provisions, since the level of rights guaranteed by the Directive is argued to be below the level previously accorded by some member states, but above the level granted by other or even most member states. For instance, the Directive obliged Greece to grant permanent residence after five rather than fifteen years, while it made Luxembourg and Austria open up TCNs’ access to social security (Luedtke 2009; Roos 2013; Groenendijk 2007).

Evaluations are more ambivalent still when scholars assess the implementation of the Directive in terms of its impact on migrants’ rights protection. Different scholars have argued that national governments have strategically used Europeanization to implement restrictive reforms in two distinct ways. First, whereas the directives were intended to establish a minimum level of rights that member states were free to go beyond, member states have ‘presented convergence towards that minimum level of rights as a desirable form of harmonization’, thus ‘building legitimacy for a […]’, ‘race to the bottom’ (Block and Bonjour 2013: 215; cf. Barbou des Places and Oger 2005). For instance, the French government used the Long-Term Residence Directive to defend the extension of the minimum duration of residence before a permanent residence permit was granted (Barbou des Places and Oger 2005: 362–363). Second, the implementation of the directives is observed to have resulted in processes of policy transfer among member states, as it has increased both the availability of and the demand for information about policy practices in other member states (Block and Bonjour 2013). Both directives contain various optional clauses that leave substantial room for interpretation, and many national governments have observed closely how other member states have implemented these provisions. Government representatives in different member states, including The Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria and Belgium, have defended their restrictive reform proposals by pointing out that other member states were implementing similar policies (Block and Bonjour 2013; Bonjour 2014; Strik et al. 2013; Adam and Jacobs 2012). Thus, the introduction of EU law on family reunification and long-term residence is seen to have created new opportunities for member states to legitimate and exchange restrictive policy practices.

However, scholars have also argued that EU legislation has substantially limited the room for maneuver for member states to introduce restrictive reforms. First, the directives have created a ‘minimum safety net’ as Roos (2013: 108) calls it: a guaranteed level of rights protection that member states are bound to provide. Bonjour and Vink (2013) note that while Dutch negotiators were successful in shaping the Family Reunification Directive, they did not foresee that later governments’ preferences would shift ever further towards restriction. The Dutch government already made almost full use of the room for restriction allowed by the Directive at the moment of its transposition. As a result, succeeding Dutch governments have not been able to implement the restrictive policy reforms they favored, including education requirements and a minimum age limit of 24 for sponsors and foreign spouses, because these reforms would be in breach of the Directive.

Furthermore, the introduction of EU law has empowered the European Commission and the EU Court of Justice to assess member states’ respect for migrant rights. Different scholars have observed that these supranational institutions have positioned themselves as active protectors of migrants’ rights (Groenendijk 2004; Luedtke 2009; Acosta Arcarazo 2015; Block and Bonjour 2013). The Court, supported by the Commission, has expansively interpreted the
vaguely worded provisions of the directives. Jurisprudence is still limited at this point, but the EU Court has already established that the two directives are to be interpreted as guaranteeing subjective rights: if an applicant for long-term residence status or family reunification fulfills the conditions set by the directives, member states are no longer at liberty to reject the application. Moreover, the Court has emphasized that both directives aim to further the process of integration of third-country nationals and that member state policies must be effective and proportionate in relation to that goal. As a result, member states have already been obliged to lower income requirements and fees, and their room for restriction may be further reduced in the future as Court jurisprudence develops.

Thus, the picture that emerges from the literature is nuanced: Europeanization of migrant integration is neither purely beneficial nor entirely detrimental to the protection of the rights of third-country nationals. Instead, multiple and various Europeanization processes work in parallel, with often contradictory effects.

**Shifting policy paradigms: integration as condition for rights**

A final point that has attracted wide scholarly attention is the relative weight of different paradigms of migrant integration in EU policies, and the impact of Europeanization upon the paradigms that shape national integration policies. Community law on the freedom of movement is based on the notion that strong rights in terms of secure residence, family reunification and equal treatment are a condition for migrant integration. The assumption here is that newcomers can only build a life for themselves and participate fully in their host society if they do not fear expulsion, are not separated from their families, and have full access to employment, education, and social rights. This paradigm has remained dominant from the early development of freedom of movement for workers in the 1960s to current EU citizenship law. However, different scholars have noted that with the development of EU integration policies for third-country nationals, a different perspective on integration has been introduced at the EU level, namely the notion that integration is a condition for rights: only if migrants have achieved a certain measure of integration in the host society are they granted access to permanent residence rights, family reunification and mobility rights (Groenendijk 2004; Carrera 2009). Thus, migration and integration policies are fused, as integration becomes a condition for migration. The ways in which migrants are to prove sufficient integration vary, from doing voluntary work to participating in a course or passing a test. The premise here is that migrants will be encouraged to integrate if they are rewarded for their efforts and that the preservation of the cohesion and identity of European societies requires that only those migrants who are able to integrate be allowed to enter and stay. The two competing paradigms thus hold opposite views on the relation between integration and rights: in the first, rights are a condition for integration; while in the second, integration is a condition for rights. Most scholars studying this topic adopt a normative perspective and deplore the introduction of the second paradigm, which they criticize as exclusionary and illiberal (Groenendijk 2004; Carrera 2009; Guild et al. 2009; Kostakopoulou et al. 2009; Kostakopoulou and Ripoll Servent 2016).

Many scholars argue that the Europeanization of migrant integration policies has played a crucial role in the dissemination of the new migrant integration policy paradigm at both the EU and the national level, often referred to as the ‘civic integration’ turn in Europe. It is generally acknowledged that the new paradigm has its roots in domestic politics, and was introduced at the EU level by The Netherlands, Austria and Germany. It is due to their successful lobbying during negotiations on the Long-term Residence and Family Reunification Directives that member states are now allowed to require third-country nationals to fulfill integration conditions
at different moments: before allowing them to immigrate as family members; before granting them permanent resident status; and before allowing them to immigrate from another EU country once they have permanent resident status (Groenendijk 2004; Carrera 2009; Acosta Arcarazo 2011; Roos 2013; Geddes and Scholten 2015). ‘Uploading’ these policy practices to the European level not only helped entrenched integration conditions in Dutch, Austrian and German policies (Roos 2013); it also contributed to their transfer to other countries, including France, Spain, Denmark and the United Kingdom (Carrera 2009; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009; Bonjour 2014).

The ‘integration as a condition for rights’ paradigm is argued to have been further reinforced by the non-binding migrant integration policies adopted at the EU level. Thus the Common Basic Principles, adopted by the Council in 2004, include the statements that ‘integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union’ and that ‘basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration’ (Council 2004). The Commission is argued to have endorsed integration courses for migrants in different policy communications and agendas as well as through practical support for civic integration courses via the Handbooks on Integration, the European Modules on Migrant Integration and the European Integration Fund. Finally, exchange of information and ‘best practices’ via the network of National Contact Points is said to have contributed significantly to the dissemination of integration courses and tests among member states (Carrera 2009; Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009).

However, in contrast to these accounts, which argue that Europeanization has contributed to the dissemination of integration conditions, there are also scholars who emphasize that the European Commission and the EU Court have sought to counter the introduction of such policies. In its original proposals for the Long-term Residence Directive and Family Reunification Directive, the Commission followed the original integration policy paradigm, i.e., the notion that strong rights are a prerequisite for integration (Acosta Arcarazo 2011; Roos 2013). Elements of this paradigm are still present in the provisions of the directives (Schweitzer 2015). For instance, the fourth recital of the Family Reunification Directive states that ‘family reunification […] helps to create sociocultural stability facilitating the integration of third-country nationals in the Member State’.

More recently, the Commission has been very critical especially of pre-departure integration requirements. It launched an infringement procedure against Germany for allowing entry to family migrants only if they passed a language test and argued explicitly before the EU Court that pre-entry tests were not compatible with the Family Reunification Directive (Block and Bonjour 2013). It has been the long-standing hope of legal scholars that the Court would adopt the same position (Groenendijk 2006, 2011; Jesse 2011). In recent jurisprudence, however, the Court has ruled that integration requirements are admissible both before and after migration to the EU, provided that they represent effective and proportionate means to further the integration of migrants – rather than being used to select migrants. Law scholars take opposite views on whether this implies that the Court has endorsed (Thym 2016) or rejected (Acosta Arcarazo 2015) the ‘integration as a condition for rights’ paradigm favored by many member states. All legal analyses agree, however, that the EU Court has set limits to what member states can do when implementing integration conditions: for instance, they cannot impose excessive administrative fees (Acosta Arcarazo 2015; Jesse 2016; Thym 2016). The Commission for its part appears to have given up its outright resistance to pre-departure integration measures: in its 2016 Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, such measures are listed as a first policy priority. However, the Commission refers to ‘pre-departure/pre-arrival measures’, which are to be implemented not only in countries of origin but also in member states to prepare local
communities for the arrival of newcomers. Moreover, the Commission emphasizes the need for cooperation with countries of origin in elaborating pre-departure measures and focuses on the ways in which such measures may be included in resettlement programs for refugees (European Commission 2016: 5–6). Thus, the Commission implicitly continues its resistance to member states’ use of pre-departure integration measures as selection mechanisms, by reframing such measures as part of a pro-active migrant integration policy.

**Conclusion**

Notwithstanding its limited competences, the European Union’s policies and institutions have come to shape the field of migrant integration in significant ways. Scholars have explored EU involvement mostly from a normative perspective, inquiring to what extent it enhances or undermines the protection of the rights of third-country nationals. Their findings are mixed: processes of Europeanization appear to be complex and multiple, with contradictory effects. Scholarship broadly agrees that member states have predominantly used binding and non-binding forms of Europeanization to push restrictive policy agendas. The European Commission and Court appear to have overall adopted pro-rights positions, although they are also argued to have contributed to the propagation of the ‘integration as a condition for rights’ paradigm in Europe. Furthermore, the assessment of the impact of Europeanization varies depending on the benchmark adopted: a comparison with pre-existing national policies yields a more positive evaluation than a comparison with the equal treatment promised at Tampere, or with a normative standard derived from human rights law.

The prevalence of normative perspectives is not surprising considering the extent to which this field has been dominated by law scholars. With some exceptions, including Roos (2013), Geddes and Scholten (2015), Luedtke (2009) and Bonjour (2014), political scientists and political sociologists have neglected the Europeanization of migrant integration policies – in contrast to fields like asylum or border control policies where political science analyses have been much more forthcoming. As a result, a number of typical political science questions remain understudied. For instance, we know relatively little about the power relations among member states and EU institutions: how relative power is shaped by institutional structures, political context and strategic agency, and how power relations vary over time and in different subfields. Another black-box that begs opening is the preference formation of EU institutions, most notably the European Commission and Court: all too often their preferences are taken as given, rather than as shaped by internal and external circumstances and changing over time (cf. Bonjour et al. 2017). Finally, with the exception of well-studied countries such as The Netherlands and Germany, we know relatively little about the impact of Europeanization upon national and local migrant integration policies in different member states.

EU migrant integration policies remain a field in flux. The substance and scope of the impact of the European Union are continuously (re)shaped by Court jurisprudence, policy entrepreneurship of the Commission and political circumstances in member states. In the wake of the asylum crisis of recent years, both the family reunification rights of refugees and their integration are high on policy agendas in Brussels and in many European capitals. Now and in the foreseeable future, no student of inclusion and exclusion of third-country nationals in Europe can afford to neglect the role of the European Union in migrant integration policy.
Bibliography


Reunification and migrant integration


