Law, practice and convention in the constitution of the European Union
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Law, Practice and Convention in the Constitution of the European Union

1. Motives, Concepts and Method of Study  1

Part A: Reflections on Methodology

2. The Third Reading of Co-decision  19

Part B: Form and Foundation

3. Convention Based on Practice or Precedent: The Terms of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council  89

4. Convention Based on Written Agreement: The Case of Interinstitutional Agreements  201

Part C: Constitutional Structure and Development

5. The Commission Investiture and other elements of the European Constitution  293

6. Conclusions  373
Contents

1.  Motives, Concepts and Method of Study  1

1  Structure and development  1
2  Practical relevance and objective  4
2.1  Why constitutional conventions are conceptually relevant for both lawyers and political scientists  4
2.2  The bridge between law and politics  6
2.3  Objective and delimitation  6
3  The central question  7
3.1  Role: identification and significance  7
3.2  The concept of constitution  8
3.3  The concept of constitutional convention…  11
3.4  … and the concept of law  12
4  Methodology  14
5  Outline  14

Part A: Reflections on Methodology

2.  The Third Reading of Co-decision  19

1  Introduction to subject and methodology  19
2  The third reading of co-decision  21
2.1  The formal legal rules on the co-decision procedure  21
2.1.1  The third reading in case of failure of conciliation  22
2.2  The application of the third reading in practice  22
2.3  A conventional rule prescribing the disuse of the Council’s third reading powers?  24
3  How existing approaches in political science and legal scholarship fall short in the analysis of the third reading  24
3.1  Approaches that focus exclusively on the formal legal rules  25
3.1.1  Rational choice game theory: political scientists adopting a formal modelling approach  25
        Tsebelis and Garrett: the formal legal rules make the Council the effective agenda-setter  27
        Crombez: a simplified model of the third reading with two equal legislators  30
        Conclusions  32
3.1.2 Legal scholarship and the third reading of co-decision 32

Conclusions 36

3.2 Approaches that do take into account the application of the Treaty rules 36

3.2.1 Combining game theory with new institutionalism: institutional change analysis 37

   Hix: De facto operation leading to a change in the balance of powers 38
   Farrell and Héritier: an informal expectation that the Council would not use the third reading 40
   Steunenberg: the perception of a structure in which the third reading powers are abolished 45

3.2.2 Conclusions 46

4 The added value of an analysis of the third reading in terms of constitutional law, practice and convention 48

4.1 The role of contesting the Council’s third reading powers in Parliament’s rejection of the Voice telephony directive 49

4.1.1 Conflicting positions on the third reading 49

4.1.2 The first experiences with conciliation and the third reading 51

4.1.3 The Voice telephony directive 51

   Failure of conciliation and unsuccessful use of the third reading 52
   Why conciliation on the Voice telephony directive failed 53
   Why the Council used its third reading powers 55
   Why Parliament rejected the common position in third reading 56

4.1.4 Conclusions 58

4.2 The role of the third reading powers after the rejection of the Voice telephony directive 59

4.2.1 The Securities committee directive and the second failure of conciliation: no use of the third reading 60

   Why conciliation failed 60
   Why the Council did not use its third reading powers 62

4.2.2 Threat with failure of conciliation and with use of the third reading? 63

   Interpretation of actors involved 63
   A look at the more difficult conciliations 64

   The Packaging directive 65
   The Decision on the guidelines for the Trans-European Transport Networks 70
   The Novel foods regulation 71

4.2.3 Conclusions 73

4.3 The Council’s perception of the third reading powers after the rejection of the Voice telephony directive 73

4.3.1 Interpretation of members of Coreper 74

   ‘superfluous’ 74
   ‘a nuclear weapon that was not usable’ 75
4.3.2 The unavailability of the third reading powers: objectifying subjective interpretations

4.3.3 Understanding the third reading: formal powers, actual powers and bargaining power

5 Conclusions

5.1 Interpretation of the third reading

5.2 Methodological considerations

5.2.1 A combined methodological approach

5.2.2 Social laws versus social rules

5.2.3 How to determine the existence of a social rule? Objectifying subjective perceptions

5.2.4 Structural consequences of singular events

Part B: Form and Foundation

3. Convention based on Practice or Precedent: The Terms of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council

1 Introduction

2 Practice versus Convention

   The consensus method: regularity versus rules

   Regularity: political and constitutional practice

2.1 Constitutional conventions: departing from a mere practice

2.1.1 Social rules reflecting the constitutional morality

2.1.2 Normative foundations of constitutional conventions

   Beliefs of the actors

   Reason

   Mode of emergence

   Conclusions

2.1.3 Debating the distinction between practice and convention

   Brazier: predictability versus obligation

   Munro: the disutility of the concept convention

   Debating the arguments for and against the distinction

2.2 Political science and the distinction between regularity and rules

2.2.1 Ignoring the distinction between regularity and rules

   Institutions

   Informal institutions

   Conclusions

2.2.2 Does sociological institutionalism offer a satisfactory distinction?

   Norms reflecting a moral element

2.3 The consensus method
2.3.1 Taking decisions without a vote: regularity in conduct 115
2.3.2 Trying to accommodate all Council members: prudence 118
   Strategic and political incentives to look for consensus 120
   No moral or political obligation to accommodate 123
2.3.3 Taking into account the interests of a member state particularly affected 124
   Relation with the Luxembourg Compromise and the following veto power 125
2.3.4 Conclusions 127

3 Convention: a uniform category? 128
3.1 The power to initiate a vote 129
3.1.1 A new formal procedure in 1987 129
3.1.2 How the initiation of a vote is still left to the Presidency 132
3.1.3 Why Member states not in the Presidency refrain from initiating a vote on a vote 133
   Advanced television services: a rebellious ‘anti-Council’ in 1992 135
   Conclusions: prudence and convention 136
3.1.4 Why the Commission refrains from initiating a vote on a vote 136
   1999 Artists’ resale rights directive: acquiescence of the Commissioner 137
   End-of-life vehicles 1999: the risk of a Commissioner challenging the Presidency 137
   Tobacco advertising: a Commission initiative for a vote in 1997? 139
   Conclusions: a matter of prudence 140
3.1.5 Conclusions 140

4 Convention versus customary law 141
   The veto power: customary law and convention 141
4.1 Drawing normative practices into the legal realm: customary constitutional law 143
4.1.1 Practice 144
4.1.2 The normative foundations of customary law 144
   The continental approach: opinio iuris 145
   The British or Anglo-Saxon approach: court recognition/enforcement 149
4.1.3 Customary constitutional law and the European Union 152
4.1.4 Conclusions: an independent role for convention in both dominant approaches 155
4.2 Ignoring the distinction between convention and customary law 157
4.3 The Luxembourg Compromise and the power of veto 159
4.3.1 The dynamics of an early invocation of the Luxembourg Compromise 160
   An early invocation in 1969: the ambiguous Italian approach 160
4.3.2 Did the veto die with the conclusion of the Single European Act? 162
   1999: the UK blocks a decision on the artists’ resale right directive 165
   Conclusions 169
4.3.3 Two groups, two visions 171
4.3.4 Are we dealing with a true veto? 174
The 1982 invocation on farm prices: UK lacks necessary French and Irish support

Conclusions

4.3.5 The ‘Luxembourg Compromise Club’: keeping the ‘veto’ alive

The 1983 UK invocation: France and Ireland rewrite the rules for the ‘Luxembourg Compromise Club’

The Air safety directive indirectly touching on Gibraltar: Spain supported by France and the UK in early 1999

A Polish threat with invocation in 2005 that is not carried through?

A veto only for the large member states?

The internal position of some of the most ardent supporters of the veto

Conclusions

4.3.6 The original ‘Five’: trying to keep a closed front

Always a clear dividing line between the two groups? The 1985 invocation by Germany

A tempted Italian Prime Minister in 1992

A tempted German Minister in 1998

Conclusions

4.3.7 Understanding the veto: practice, convention and customary law

5 Conclusions

5.1 Conventional rules governing qualified majority voting in the Council

5.2 Practice, convention and customary law distinguished

5.2.1 Convention and practice

A distinction too often ignored by political scientists

Normative foundations of constitutional conventions

Arguments for and against the distinction between practice and convention

5.2.2 Category of convention is not uniform

5.2.3 Convention and customary law

An independent role for convention in both continental and British approach

4. Convention based on Written Agreement: The Case of Interinstitutional Agreements

1 Introduction

2 How to understand the normative character of Interinstitutional Agreements that are not legally binding

2.1 Why the concept ‘soft law’ is of limited use in the analysis of some Interinstitutional Agreements

2.1.1 Legally binding force versus indirect legal effects
Normative foundations of (written) constitutional conventions 247
What indicators of intention? 248
The 1975 Joint Declaration on conciliation about acts with financial implications 248

3.2.3 Conclusions 251

3.3 On the relation between existing and new rules: the limits to the power to change the institutional balance 251

3.3.1 The principle of conferred powers and the legal notion of institutional balance 251

3.3.2 The Interinstitutional Agreements on budgetary discipline 255
Impact on the annual budgetary powers under the Treaty 258
The ceilings on non-compulsory expenditure 260
What if the Interinstitutional Agreement allowed for less than the Treaty? 261
What if the Interinstitutional Agreement allowed for more than the Treaty? 262
Conclusions 267

3.3.3 ‘Rules of change’ and the relation between existing and new rules 268
The limits to alter the division of powers by legal agreement 268
How a reading as a conventional agreement can provide a better understanding of the relation to the Treaty rules 270

3.3.4 Conclusions 271

3.4 On the enforcement of rules 273

3.4.1 The Court’s task to ensure the observance of the law 273
Review of legality 273
A special category of not Court-enforceable acts: internal measures of the European Parliament/European Council 276
Sanctioning non-observance 276

3.4.2 The Court’s hands-off approach towards some agreements 278
The 1982 Joint Declaration on various measures to improve the budgetary procedure 278
The 1993 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline 282

3.4.3 On the enforcement of rules 283

3.4.4 Conclusions 285

4 Conclusions 287

4.1 Conventional and legally binding agreements distinguished 287

4.2 The character of constitutional constraints posed by Interinstitutional Agreements 288

4.3 Conventional Interinstitutional Agreements 290
Part C: Structure and Development

5. The Commission Investiture and other elements of the European Constitution 293

1  Introduction 293
2  Introducing the questions on constitutional structure through the facts of the Commission investiture 295
2.1 Parliamentary hearings for Candidate Commissioners: no open invitation 297
2.1.1 How a new convention was established 298
2.1.2 Why there is a conventional rule 300
2.2 Conclusions and new questions 302
3  The significance of conventions for creating constitutional structure in light of the distinction between political and legal constitutions 303
3.1 On political and legal constitutions 303
3.1.1 Political constitutions 304
3.1.2 Legal constitutions 305
3.2 Convention as product or part of the political constitution 306
3.3 Conventions and how the political constitution creates constitutional structure 307
3.4 Conventions and how the political constitution affects the legal constitution 308
3.4.1 Nullifying the effects of the law 308
3.4.2 The transfer of the exercise of legal powers to another institution 309
3.4.3 Supplementing the law 310
3.4.4 Conclusions 310
3.5 How the political constitution limits and empowers: on duty imposing and power conferring conventions 312
3.5.1 The debate in British academia 312
3.5.2 The relevance of the distinction for our understanding of the European constitution 314
3.5.2.1 Conventional powers of the European Council 314
3.5.3 The nature of power conferring conventions 317
3.6 Conventions and the autonomy and primacy of the political in relation to the legal constitution 321
4 Constitutional development through practice and convention: the Commission investiture between collegiality and individual responsibility 322
4.1 Step 1: The organisation of parliamentary committee hearings since 1995 322
4.1.1 Rigid versus flexible constitutional change 323
4.1.2 ‘Original’ versus autonomous constitutional change 323
4.1.3 Grand design versus accidental constitutional change 324
4.2 Step 2: A balanced package of changes in the 2004 investiture of ‘Barroso I’ 325
4.2.1 What the European Parliament did and did not do 325
   The rejection of Buttiglione (by vote) and Kovács by a parliamentary committee 326
   The (absence of a) plenary reaction: Parliament leaves the solution open 329
   Barroso’s initial resistance to any serious consequences 330
   Parliament’s majority threat with rejection, but again leaving the solution open 331
   Barroso is forced to turn to the member states 332
4.2.2 How the member states and Barroso were forced to come up with a balanced solution 334
   The Heads of State and Government collectively break the deadlock 335
   Barroso completes the changes and brings the political balance 338
4.2.3 Lessons about limits in the discretion to exercise legal powers in the investiture procedure 339
   The powers of the President-designate of the Commission 339
4.2.4 Autonomous, flexible and accidental constitutional development through convention 341
   The conventional powers the European Parliament did and did not (yet) establish 341
   A conventional power to impose changes and the limited discretion in the exercise of a member state’s power of candidacy 343
4.2.5 Conclusions 344
4.3 Step 3: An individual withdrawal in the investiture of ‘Barroso II’ in 2010 345
4.3.1 How Barroso’s hopes for a smooth investiture evaporated 345
4.3.2 How the Socialists and Liberals prevented their candidates from becoming part of a balanced solution 347
4.3.3 ‘Jeleva resigns before being pushed’ 347
4.3.4 EPP leader Daul does not repeat his predecessor’s 2004 stalemate 348
4.3.5 A new step in the development of individual political responsibility 349
4.4 Conclusions 351
5 Convention as a source of constitutional evolution of the European Union 351
5.1 An independent source of constitutionalisation 351
5.1.1 Convention as an anticipation of Treaty amendment 354
   From the Financial Perspective (IIA) to the Multiannual Financial Framework (Regulation) 356
5.1.2 Stable conventions which have not been followed by Treaty amendment, and are not likely to be 358
5.1.3 Conventions that disappear and re-emerge: the Ioannina Compromise 360
5.2 Autonomous constitutional evolution established by parties other than the 'pouvoir constituant' 362
5.3 A flexible source 365
5.4 An accidental source 367
5.5 General trends? On convention, authority and representation 367
6 Conclusions 370
6.1 Convention and the investiture procedure 370
6.2 Convention and constitutional structure and development 370

6. Conclusions 373

1 Law, practice and convention in the constitution of the European Union 373
2 Convention and the relation between law and politics in the constitution of the European Union 375
3 Questions for future research 377
3.1 Whether the existence of conventions is a good thing 377
3.1.1 Political versus legal constitutionalism 377
3.1.2 Convention and the process of European integration 379
3.2 On convention, representation, authority and legitimacy 380

Annexes

I Interviews 383
II The Luxembourg Compromise 387
III Key dates of the investiture of ‘Barroso I’ (2004) and ‘Barroso II’ (2010) 389
IV Multi-annual budgetary cycle 391

Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 393

Summary 394

Table of Cases 395

Table of Legislation 397