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ARTICLE



'Tired of Waking Up on the Floor'¹ the Temptations and Horror of Cold War Multilateral Diplomacy

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses non-conventional diplomatic tools. It does so by focussing on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks and suggests that individuals and individual creativity to make use of non-conventional tools, in combination with attention to working conditions, impact the outcome. CSCE ventured in entirely new territory and promoted such novel concepts as the indivisibility of security, and the free flow of individuals, information, and ideas. As such it appealed to negotiators' creativity; by contrast, MBFR was about reducing conventional forces in the given constellation of a divided Europe – it treated this division as a fact of life; as such it may have offered far less opportunities for individual diplomats' creativity to fully blossom. Taken together a discussion of these tools also contribute to the structure – agency debate: they provide additional evidence that individual diplomats – though often simply seen as tools of their respective governments and merely acting within a certain constellation – and close attention to the conditions they have to work in, do matter, even when, of course, it is governments, not diplomats, that will have to sanction the results they achieve.

Introduction

Oh, when these bloody talks are over,
oh, how happy I shall be.
I will spend my life in clover.
No more plenaries for me.
(...)
No reporting to the Council
No more formulations fine
Let them print it in *Die Presse*
No more talking, just more wine,

sang a choir of seasoned diplomats during an after-dinner session of the conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR).² This song is a nice example of a somewhat neglected aspect in the study of

diplomacy, i.e., the extent to which what diplomats do when they are not at the negotiating table affects their effectiveness when at that table. To be sure, negotiations between diplomatic representatives of states have been amply studied and to a somewhat lesser extent this also applies to elite cultural undertakings, the *salons*, et cetera. It appears that the way these interact and how the one affects and is affected by the other, has attracted considerably less attention, in part no doubt because it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. This ‘anthropological’ approach to diplomacy is pursued in, among others, Martin Heyer and Johannes Paulmann’s *The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society, and Politics From the 1840s to the First World War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) and Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte’s edited volume, *The Diplomats’ world: a cultural history of diplomacy, 1815–1914*. The modern and contemporary periods by contrast have been neglected. Iver Neuman’s *Diplomatic Sites* is somewhat of an exception, even though its focus is not on the intersection between diplomacy and culture, or diplomatic culture as such but queries whether there will be a crisis in diplomacy.³

In spite of this neglect in academia, the acknowledgement of the importance of the shape of the negotiating table excepted – a round table signals equality between delegations – every practitioner of the art of diplomacy will readily acknowledge that their diplomat’s toolbox contains considerably more than the classic ingredients of diplomatic culture: protocol, rules of procedure, and diplomatic language.⁴

In this contribution I intend to discuss a few of these non-conventional tools. I will focus on multilateral diplomacy as this form of diplomacy requires greater stamina and, perhaps, more creativity. By comparison, bilateral diplomacy seems to be rather straightforward, even though, as Jönsson and Hall remind us ‘whether in bilateral or multilateral forums, [diplomats] *always* [italics mine] negotiate on behalf of others, in the sense that they are agents of a principal with ultimate authority, be it an individual king or a collective government’.⁵ This means that regardless of whether they are involved in multilateral or bilateral diplomacy, diplomats will need to attune their personal skills, style and preferences to the wishes of this ‘principal’.

Multilateral diplomacy offers an even more complex playing field. Its dynamics pose different challenges and offer different chances than those of bilateral diplomacy. In multilateral fora, the aim is consensus building or preventing that such a consensus will materialise. To this end, coalitions will need to be cemented, and concessions will need to be coordinated between ‘like-minded’ delegations. In addition, there will not only be some sort of coordination between participating states *at the conference*, its dynamics also require that ministries of Foreign Affairs will be in close contact, especially when the conference takes on a bloc-to-bloc approach. Lastly, within each polity various interest groups will need to be reconciled. Depending on the issue and the power a state can bring to bear, domestic concerns impact the

international scene. In view of this complexity, in multilateral diplomacy factors that are not directly content-related are likely to figure more prominently, think of the atmosphere between and within delegations, the quality of hotel rooms and dwellings, the number and quality of the meals and cocktails served, etcetera. After all, in what has been termed ‘culinary diplomacy’, even food can be used as a diplomatic tool.⁶

However, the dynamics discussed impact the mental stamina of a delegate and their ability to carry out their instructions and achieve the maximum result in a given constellation. Even when told to ignore personal feeling and preferences, diplomats are not machines. In fact, it is reasonable to hypothesise that it is precisely these skills, style and preferences, rather than some undefined ‘national interest’, that are key to understanding diplomatic failure or success.

As an illustration I will concentrate on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, two of the most complex multilateral negotiations in the Cold War era. They were multi-layered and multilateral diplomatic undertakings that involved both great powers and smaller states. Each involved a considerable span of time, CSCE running from 1972 – 1973 until 1975. It was turned into a process after 1975, with recurring ‘follow up’ meetings to discuss progress in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. As such it helped pave the way for the peaceful ending of the Cold War. In contrast, MBFR, which started in October 1973 lay claim to the title of the most pointless conference in diplomatic history. It was known beforehand that that reaching agreement on force reductions would be difficult but when it was decided, in early 1989, to end the conference this was its only result.⁷

Anecdotal at first glance, the examples I discuss therefore not only offer insight in the dynamics of multilateral diplomacy in a crucial phase of the Cold War. Taken together they also contribute to the structure – agency debate and come out strongly in favour of the latter: they provide additional evidence that individual diplomats – though often simply seen as tools of their respective governments and merely acting within a certain constellation – and close attention to the conditions they have to work in, do matter, even when, of course, it is governments, not diplomats, that set the goals, define their representatives’ bandwidth, and will have to sanction the results they achieve.⁸

While the focus will be on CSCE and MBFR, the sources from which I draw are varied. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, I conducted research into the Netherlands’ policy towards ‘Eastern Europe’ in the 1972–1989 period. As part of this research I interviewed many of the key players on the Dutch side. Later, in 2005, I attended an expert meeting with CSCE delegation leaders and other diplomats at the *Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule* in Zürich, Switzerland that confirmed many of my impressions.⁹ Lastly, in more recent years, I consulted a number of memoirs, source collections and interview

collections,¹⁰ that suggested that the study of non-conventional diplomatic tools is, potentially, a rich field, the importance of which for the understanding of the dynamics of (multilateral) diplomacy transcends the anecdotal. The reader will find that experiences of Dutch diplomats figure rather prominently in this piece. In part this is justified given their prominence in CSCE, but I hope readers will feel challenged to go out and contrast the experiences of Dutch participants with those of other diplomats.

'Why don't we sing this song all together?'¹¹

During the 1960s relations between East and West gradually improved. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968 notwithstanding, rapprochement continued. Proposals to discuss the core issues of the Cold War in Europe were rekindled and new ideas were launched. The Soviets proposed to discuss security issues and in 1969 NATO suggested talks on reduction of the number of conventional forces in Europe. The two blocs engaged in a 'dialogue of communiqués' and after many discussions between Kissinger and Gromyko, it was decided, in September 1972, that these issues would be the subject of negotiations that were to be held simultaneously but that would, nevertheless, not be linked formally. The two resulting conferences, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Multilateral Balanced Force Reduction talks, were difficult negotiations because they were open-ended. There was no fixed timetable, and the result of the negotiations would determine whether the conference would be closed and in what way.¹²

CSCE started in July, 1973, MBFR a few months later. When it did trouble was already brewing for detente. Perhaps as a sign of things to come, even the name of the conference was debated for weeks, but it was expected that regardless of such acts of psychological warfare an agreement would be within reach by 1975. However, a few weeks into the MBFR conference the various delegations had come to understand that, whatever the instructions from their capitals, they had to make the best of it. And so they did, as the lines quoted at the start of this article testify.

These lines were taken from a reworking of a Church of England hymn with far more solemn lyrics and were preserved for posterity when they were included in the third volume of the Third Series of the *Documents on British Policy Overseas*. The reworking offers a fine example of the exploration of non-conventional diplomacy as it was taken from the so-called *MBFR Song Book*, that stemmed from NATO efforts to break the ice between the delegations and create an atmosphere in which the conference could deliver. Soon after the conference started, Jonathan Dean, the assistant leader of the United States delegation and an enthusiastic accordeonist came up with the idea to sing after the usual diplomatic means to break the ice – cocktail parties, lavish dinners and other socials – had failed miserably. Initially, the Soviet delegation leader

proclaimed that ‘all Russians (were) equally proletarian and (did not) indulge in such bourgeois activities’ but after a while, Dean’s suggestion was taken up by Soviet delegation leader Oleg Khlestov. The *Song Book* eventually included songs from each participating country and, it appears, inspired after-dinner singing on a regular basis.¹³ Its contents remained a secret until its partial publication in the *Documents on British Policy Overseas* series, making it ‘probably the only example of a “NATO” document which never leaked’, as one-time British diplomat sir Clive Rose jokingly remarked.¹⁴

As it happened, Dean had more ideas to overcome the cold. At one time during winter he organised a 30 km walk through the Austrian forests that due to the icy conditions gradually started to resemble a scene from a film about Napoleon’s retreat from Russia in 1812, if sir Clive is to be believed.¹⁵ The ordeal made participants forget about their ideological differences and induced them to jointly take on the snow and the wind. This in turn stimulated the idea that human beings from both East and West were people with similar hopes, needs and fears, irrespective of the quality of relations between the two blocs or the inevitable rivalry that ideology prescribed. This sudden, perhaps unexpected discovery of shared humanity created inter-bloc friendships and inter-bloc personal contacts, even when the KGB tried to isolate Eastern participants as much as possible from their Western counterparts and each evening shipped them to their lodgings. It is conceivable that while MBFR itself produced no tangible results, such contacts and deepened mutual understanding helped ease the tension between East and West, at least in the long run. In the same vein, Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky’s ‘Walk in the Woods’ in July 1982 can be cited. When formal talks about intermediate-range nuclear missile reduction stalled, the two had a long private discussion walking through the woods above Lake Geneva, that although it did not produce any immediate results, and in fact triggered a reprimand, in hindsight is credited as a break-through in East-West relations.¹⁶

‘We keep on playing those mind games forever’¹⁷

Like its counterpart in Vienna, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was an open-ended conference. But CSCE faced additional problems. One was that it included *all* European states, Albania and Andorra excepted,¹⁸ and the United States and Canada, whereas MBFR was limited to delegations from the USA, the USSR, Canada, the Netherland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and both German states. As its rulebook stipulated that each state would participate as a sovereign state, achieving consensus proved challenging. The other complication was that CSCE was to discuss a rather undefined mass of topics that were or could be made to seem related to security and cooperation in Europe, while MBFR’s theme was clearly defined: it dealt with conventional force reductions in a designated area.

As a result of the initially undefined nature of its subject matter, CSCE's agenda was the subject of months of long-drawn negotiations. In order to put pressure on the Soviets who had desired a conference on European security, several Western states argued they would not commit beforehand to taking part in the main conference. Their participation would depend on what would be on the agenda.¹⁹ Accordingly, discussions about the agenda, the so-called Multilateral Preparatory Talks which started on 22 November 1972 at Otaniemi Polytechnic in the Helsinki suburb of Dipoli, acquired a life on their own. But even before the delegations convened the MPT had posed considerable challenges. One of these was about the seating order of the delegations. The Finnish foreign ministry who had acted as honest broker had intended to seat them in alphabetical order using each state's own designation, and communicated as much to the intended participants just days before they were to meet. Unexpectedly, the West-Germans reacted furiously, threatening they would not participate as the proposed order would leave the *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* in possession of the national marker 'German', while the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland* would be designated by its political structure as a federal state only. Bonn's threat received support from the European 'Six' who also indicated they would stay home if the matter was not solved. The Finns then decided to base the seating order on the participating states' French designation, which led to the descriptions *Allemagne, République Fédérale d'*, and *Allemagne, République Démocratique d'*. Both German delegations would now be seated next to each other but at least the GDR could not pose as the legitimate claimant to the name of Germany.

However, at this very instance Austria expressed second thoughts, as its French name *Autriche* would place its delegation right next to the two German delegations. Vienna indicated it preferred not to be included in the 'German corner', as it evoked memories of the wartime German *Reich*, even more so when this was a conference that aimed to deal with post-Second World War European security. This unexpected new problem was solved by another subtle change: *États-Unis d'Amérique*, originally seated next to *Espagne*, now became *Amérique, États-Unis d'* and so the American delegation was seated between the West-Germans and the Austrians.²⁰

In the end, the seating order only mattered in the plenaries, and the distinguished delegates managed to produce an agenda and a timetable that was acceptable to all participating states, but it took many months of hard work before these were agreed upon. In the process, negotiators stretched their linguistic skills to the limit, and they and the states that employed them learned valuable lessons for the actual conference that eventually started in earnest in September, 1973. As several Western states objected to the idea that talking about an agenda implied an unconditional commitment to take part in the proposed conference, diplomats felt unease at calling their business in the

Otaniemi Polytechnic by their true name, i.e., negotiations, and came up with the nomer of *Salon de thé*. In spite of this rather informal and somewhat idyllic description, it must have been a surrealistic experience since all they were tasked to do was to recommend topics for an agenda. Content and concrete formulas were off limits. But since this was so, how was one to argue the relevance of a particular topic?

In the end, the various proposals were grouped in four virtual and then, after journalists had found out about the term, real baskets. These proposals were then discussed in separate informal ‘mini-groups’. This approach hadn’t been sanctioned by the governments that had sent delegations, and could therefore be considered ‘clandestine’, but it was the only way to try and structure what was going on in the *Salon de Thé*. Time and again, suggestions were made as to substance – which was hard to avoid as the other participants had to be convinced that a certain topic should in fact be included on the list of recommendations for the agenda of the proposed conference. These proposals were listed as ‘non-paper’ because technically they could not be formal proposals, they contained ‘non-texts’ for the same reasons and it was self-evident they dealt with ‘non-matter’ as the conference itself would address the subject in depth. However, this required a considerable amount of mental flexibility and a well developed sense for the absurd as diplomats of the participating states engaged in lengthy negotiations that tested their language skills and good humour to the limits, as often the discussions seemed to go nowhere. But for some this came at a price: five months into the Multilateral Preparatory Talks, a Polish interpreter was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, as is clear from a poem he wrote which I recovered from the archives of the Dutch Foreign Ministry:

PRÉ-ANNONCIATION DE LA PRÈ-NON-MATIÈRE

Ils sont venus, les distingués représentants,
ils ont apporté des corbeilles,
ils ont ouvert des volets,
ils ont entrouvert des portes,
ils ont présenté des libelles,
ils ont présenté des addendas,
ils ont présenté des corrigendas,
ils les ont coiffé de chapeaux,
ils ont présenté des pré-brouillons,
ils ont présenté des non-papiers,
ils ont fait circuler longuement,
des non-textes de non-documents,
ils ont délibéré d’un ton solennel
dans leur mini-groupe clandestin informel
presque irréel et surnaturel
distingué, éminent, immortel,
et, parmi eux égaré
j’ai pris soudain

ma tête dans mes mains
et... j'ai pleuré.²¹

In overcoming this mindblowing, surrealistic, at times absurdistic word game, a venue dubbed the *Sexy Bar* played a pivotal role. The Otaniemi Polytechnic great hall itself was hardly suited for negotiations –

One ambassador said the principal conference room reminded him of a circus tent (...). There are no dark hidden recesses for the traditional corridor bargaining that is such an essential element of international negotiation,

British-Austrian correspondent Hella Pick wrote in a contemporary piece.²² In addition, Pick continued, the Finnish hosts had closed down the nearby *Sexy Bar* where ‘young good-looking waitresses in sexy clothes serve and dance with their guests’ and which clearly had plenty of such dark corners.

Undeterred, the diplomats now created their own version of it in a smaller room in Otaniemi Polytechnic. Those involved prudently kept silent on the subject of the dress code, but this new *Sexy Bar* became the bustling heart of the Multilateral Preparatory Talks because it provided the much needed space for confidentiality. The *Sexy Bar* hosted informal meetings, and diplomats would complain, discuss, drink, socialise, drowse and eventually lay the groundwork for agreement on the agenda and the timetable, even though its wording usually contained such a degree of vagueness that it would lead to frequent clashes over their meaning during the actual CSCE negotiations. What had been agreed upon was not only a break-through in the usual range of subjects in international relations. The very fact that East and West had accepted that neutral and non-aligned states also had a legitimate interest in discussing topics related to security and cooperation in Europa was novel.²³ Additionally, valuable lessons had been learned as to how to approach both these topics and the opposing and Neutral/Non-aligned sides whose participation, skill and outlook generated a new dynamic.

‘By the lake Geneva shoreline’²⁴

When, in September 1973, delegations reconvened for the negotiations phase of CSCE, they did not do so in Helsinki, but in Geneva, Switzerland. Notwithstanding the make-shift *Sexy Bar*, and the verbal creativity displayed by the delegates, the Helsinki environment had hardly been ideal. After all, Otaniemi Polytechnic was a then state-of-the-art educational facility, not a conference centre. A few weeks into the MPT several if not most delegations concluded that the Finnish capital was ill-equipped to accommodate a diplomatic circus of this size. The venue itself was not suitable, and it was felt that the number of hotel rooms was too low to house delegations from over thirty countries and their quality left much to be desired.²⁵

But there were other considerations behind the decision to move to Geneva, such as the fact that in winter the sun would hardly rise above the horizon. At least in some Western capitals, it was feared that this would increase the risk of exhaustion and cause depression. It is hard to tell whether this fact actually would have weakened the Western position; if anything, it would probably have affected all delegations. But civil servants at the Netherlands foreign ministry believed Helsinki's unfavourable geography made it highly undesirable to have Finland host anything more than the ceremonial opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Other Western states had expressed similar objections, but the Scandinavians voiced strong support of Finland's offer to host the next phase. The Hague interpreted this as yet another sign of weakness of what it dubbed the 'wet front' (At the time, those responsible for Dutch security policy – apart from the minister of Foreign Affairs Max van der Stoep, these included his political director Charles Rutten, and consecutive directors of the NATO Directorate, Joop van der Valk and Willem van Eekelen, among others – considered most manifestations of supra-alliance Nordic solidarity and cooperation a risk for Dutch security and NATO unity. Similar sentiments seem to have existed in the Dutch parliament).²⁶

Other considerations included the idea that Finland, having been 'Finlandized' in 1947, had very little room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and would therefore not be in a position to reject demands related to the organisation of the conference. A closely related concern was that Helsinki's proximity to the Soviet Union ensured that the city was full of Soviet agents and that telephone communications were all tapped by the local KGB station. While no doubt true – one West-German diplomat is on record as having remarked that his calls from Helsinki to Bonn were often routed via East Berlin²⁷ – this concern was somewhat insincere as the proposed alternative, Geneva, must have been as infested with spies as Helsinki had been, or more. Lastly, and perhaps more convincingly, many Western diplomats felt that the Finnish Foreign Ministry's translators were below standard. In contrast, the Swiss lake town had a long tradition of hosting negotiations, had plenty of facilities and hotels, and of the desired quality at that. It also could boast a far more benign climate.²⁸ In the end, the Soviets concurred because, as negotiator Lev Isakovich Mendeleevich conceded: 'Vladimir Ilyich Lenin lived for some years in Switzerland, including Geneva, of which he had very good memories. It's a wonderful city'.²⁹

Although CSCE negotiators fared substantially better in the *Centre International de Conférences de Genève*, the negotiations there took a staggering twenty-nine months to conclude, and were deadlocked a number of times. In part this had to do with circumstances related to the wider world – American defeat in Vietnam, Watergate, proxy-wars in the Middle East and Africa, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, growing moral

outrage in the US and elsewhere over détente as such, etc. – and while observers and participants at times described CSCE as a quarantined laboratory, it was definitely not immune to these outside influences.

But there were also complicating factors related to CSCE itself. The composition of the delegations differed from that of the MPT and so the mutual trust that had gradually grown at Otaniemi Polytechnic could not simply be transplanted unto the Geneva negotiations. For instance, the Dutch, who had been represented by their ambassador to Helsinki, Theodore Valck Lucassen, and a designated ambassador-at-large, Brian Quarles van Ufford, and who for a number of subjects had flown in technical specialists, sent a largely new team to Geneva. The Foreign Ministry seems to have made great efforts to select the strongest possible delegation. Somewhat surprisingly, their pick was unexperienced in multilateral diplomacy and relatively young. As access to their personnel files still is restricted, it cannot be demonstrated this involved a deliberate choice, but the delegation typically consisted of married young diplomats that had served in the small Dutch embassies in Eastern Europe. Between them they mastered most Eastern European languages, including Serbo-Croatian – which was of great help in contacts with Non-Aligned Yugoslavia. As one of the delegates also spoke Hungarian, it is difficult to believe that these language skills were coincidental. In any case, they were put to good use in informal bilateral contacts with Moscow's allies who felt flattered.

In addition, a one-time Dutch negotiator noted that as they were all new to the trade of multilateral diplomacy, the team lacked the reflexes of more experienced diplomats for whom finding a compromise had become their *raison d'être* and who formed the core of most other delegations.³⁰ Lastly, even when domestic consensus on NATO membership had crumbled, none of the Dutch negotiators could be accused of being 'soft on communism' – years later one of them admitted that he still objected to using the word 'détente' because it sounded defeatist, but he maintained that it was his chief Reinier Huydecoper van Nigtevecht, a future ambassador to Moscow and, later, London, who was the 'professional anti-Muscovite' in the delegation. He also insisted that the delegation's approach to the negotiations had not been informed by their personal political preferences, but only by the restrictive instructions emanating from The Hague.³¹ While technically true, as diplomats negotiate on behalf of others,³² diplomatic *style* is personal. Instructions from The Hague *were* indeed restrictive, but how these translated into its diplomats' activity *was* influenced by their characters and backgrounds.³³

As with MBFR, numerous efforts were made to break the ice, and delegations were gastronomically out-dined and out-drunk, but initially, it seems, to little effect. In 2005, at an oral history session in Zürich organised by the Parallel History Project in conjunction with representatives from the *Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule*, one of the veteran diplomats that took

part in the CSCE negotiations remembered that at one point a football match had been organised. Unfortunately, he was unable to produce the score and the composition of each team, or say anything meaningful about its date. The match may or may not have coincided with the World Championship taking place in West-Germany in June and July of 1974, but little else is known about it.³⁴

Somewhat better known is the so-called 'fifth basket', a term that could be applied to what in the end became a CSCE basketball competition of sorts. It started when during a coffee break US representative Jonathan Greenwald was approached by Eskol Riakofsky, the number two of the Finnish delegation. The Finn proposed a game of basketball for the following Monday. Greenwald accepted and assembled a team. This one-off event, followed by a joint visit to a sauna, inspired a second one, this time between the Finns and the Soviets that ended in Lenin's favourite Geneva café. A third match was also scheduled and for two months or so, delegations played basketball on Monday evening and had a party afterwards.³⁵

Greenwald is certain that activities such as these helped ease tensions and contributed to a more productive negotiation.³⁶ The veteran diplomats that shared their experiences with the scholars that were present at the Zürich expert meeting, suggested the same. In fact, they claimed that they had truly liked each other and that their time in Geneva had been rather harmonious. And indeed, a number of friendships developed and so did a sense of comradeship and mutual appreciation. At one point, one of the delegates from the Vatican performed a wedding ceremony of his Spanish colleague and a Dutch translator, a ceremony that was celebrated by diplomats from all or most of the participating states.³⁷ Likewise, one Dutch diplomat fondly remembers how seasoned Soviet negotiator Mendelevich who knew every trick in the book and did not hesitate to use them, gave him a signed photograph of himself at the end of Stage II in July 1975. They had had numerous confrontations over Basket I issues, especially over the key Dutch proposal on the right to self-determination but the young Dutchman had managed to save most of its contents. On the back of the photograph Mendelevich, many years his senior, wrote: 'To my esteemed opponent'.³⁸

'Get together, we could have a bad time'³⁹

In spite of this we should not overlook the fact that diplomats remained acutely aware that they represented opposing sides. Whatever their personal sentiments, and in spite of the basketball competition, the football match and the marriage, the idea that the Geneva talks were rather harmonious is demonstrably false. Numerous sessions and caucus meetings were acrimonious and Soviet delegation leader Dubynin frequently mounted personal verbal attacks. On a fairly large number of occasions,

the negotiators had to report home that ‘the discussion consisted of two coffee breaks’, as Dutch delegation leader Jo van der Valk did. Ironically, the exact wording of the principle of peaceful co-operation took more than fifty sessions and at one time or another every word was parenthesised.⁴⁰

Fraternization with delegations from other blocs was not without risk even though it could be a valuable source of information. However sympathetic the opponent might be or show him/herself, he or she still represented a country from the opposing side. And while there was much speculation about who was an operative of the KGB or one of its counterparts, one could never be entirely sure. What was admissible and what was not often depended on the gut feeling of individual heads of delegation. For ordinary delegates this meant that fraternising with representatives of the other side often was a delicate balancing act. US assistant delegation leader John J. Maresca remembered he used gossip to keep his delegation on the right (i.e., his) track. Concern over one’s reputation led to caution in engaging in overly cordial contacts with the other side.⁴¹

This delicate balancing may even have been necessary within the Western caucuses where differences arose over tactics and strategy. Furthermore, during 1974 a number of Western delegations experienced conference fatigue, which manifested itself in an increasing willingness to make concessions, a willingness that was further stimulated by a growing lack of political interest (as in the FRG)⁴² or fear that asking too much would risk bilateral relations and the fruits these could bring (France).⁴³ But even before that, the Dutch and Italians found themselves at odds with other allies, among them the Germans, the French and the Scandinavians, over the extent to which concessions to the Soviets were necessary or desirable. Personal contacts between the delegations may have remained good, but highly restrictive instructions from The Hague coupled with the personal inclination of the consecutive heads of the Dutch delegation caused serious friction within the Western caucus, and led Moscow to accuse the Netherlands of sabotaging the conference, a sentiment that was shared by a number of Western delegations.⁴⁴

This accusation no doubt also contained an element of psychological warfare, a tactic from the diplomat’s toolbox that the Soviet delegation excelled at. Their negotiators sometimes assumed the role of Sirens, and then again that of Cassandra, while also mastering the specialism of the Mosaic wrath to perfection. A special tactic was that of the supplicant: the Russian diplomats indicated that they would certainly lose their jobs if they agreed with the proposed text. So their Western friends would surely want to withdraw or rephrase. But as the Western delegates – and their Neutral counterparts – were rarely prepared to do so, the tactic backfired as Eastern delegates who employed it could no longer do so convincingly: after all, few delegates were recalled. And thus agreement remained difficult to reach.

This reflected the wider political constellation, in this case the Cold War. Mutual distrust was deeply rooted even though much had improved since the 1950s. CSCE was not a quarantined laboratory but in fact yet another Cold War front. But perhaps the difficulty to reach agreement also reflects the dynamics of multilateral diplomacy in general. As each grouping of states discussed common positions before engaging the other side(s) in a plenary, what was tabled in the plenary more often than not already was a compromise. Taking back or rephrasing a proposal that had reached the plenary stage, usually entailed asking new instructions and new, tiresome discussions in each caucus before a new joint text could be presented in the plenary. Some delegations had been given considerable leeway, whereas others were under strict orders to consult with their capitals.⁴⁵

Regardless of personal relationships, lavish dinners, long walks, football and basketball matches or not-so-subtle mind-games, this dynamic put considerable strains upon the participants, but could also be put to good use, as it contributed to a 'conference of attrition', something the West originally had aimed for, because it was Moscow, not the West that had wanted CSCE in the first place. The Western delegations, at MPT and during CSCE, kept the pace of negotiation deliberately slow, even on topics where agreement could have been reached sooner. Personal interactions, both within and outside each bloc, cemented coalitions of interest to slow down matters (or speed them up if so desired). To some extent, the growing disagreements within the Western camp over tactics and over-all aims also contributed to the effect of this delaying tactic: as long as there were major substantive objections within the European Nine to a certain text, and as long as negotiations were still being conducted in the EPS caucus in Geneva or the European *Comité Politique*, negotiations with the other side were deadlocked.

The ultimate act

But in the end, the negotiators were quite productive. While diplomats with singing talents seem to have been absent in Geneva – in any case, no song book was compiled – they produced the Helsinki Final Act that helped transcend the division of Europe. They also produced an *Ultimate Act*. This document, it seems, was primarily the work of British negotiator Roy Reeve who participated in both MPT and CSCE negotiations. I was given my copy by Harm Hazewinkel, a Dutch negotiator at the Madrid follow-up meeting in 1980–1983, but he could not remember who compiled it and how or when he obtained it. I raised the subject in Zürich in 2005 and sir Crispin Tickell, formerly of the British Foreign Office, attributed authorship to his colleague Reeve, an attribution I have no reason to question. Unfortunately, it is difficult to say anything about its circulation. Mentioning the document seemed to bring back memories with some of Reeve's erstwhile colleagues from other

NATO countries, but certainly not with all those present. This could suggest that circulation was limited to the NATO caucus in Geneva. However, the fact that over thirty years had passed may likewise explain this. My copy was xeroxed and may be a direct copy of the one that was given by Reeve to members of the Dutch delegation. It may even be that original document itself, as I haven't been able to find any trace of it in Dutch Foreign Office material pertaining to CSCE. As it was hardly a serious contribution to discussions, it is conceivable that it was decided not to store it with material that was. But then again, the poem composed by the Polish translator cited above *was* filed. Be that as it may, the *Ultimate Act* started as follows:

With much mutual self-congratulation the individual participating delegations who have laboured long, mightily and with complete disregard for all instructions, often long into the day, have with this document finally given birth. Putative parenthood will be denied.⁴⁶

The remainder of the text is similar. It proudly announced that the Mediterranean would be converted into a parking space, and that youth rallies would be organised in the Gobi Desert. As to personal contacts, a subject that during the negotiations for the Final Act were a stumbling block that took a stunning fifty-nine sessions to remove, the *Ultimate Act* simply stipulated that these were to be welcomed. Mothers-in-law and children would be excluded from these, though. And sex in all its possible manifestations was to be applauded and warmly promoted. Other bits are less straightforward and in all probability reflect discussions or running gags within delegations and within the Western caucuses.

Assessing whether the *Ultimate Act* had any meaningful impact is quite a challenge. In all probability it had not. Rather, its existence reflects the creativity needed to find formulae that fit the purposes of the participating states. Every sentence, every word in the Helsinki Final Act is a compromise, yet the message that Basket III issues were the key to a lowering of tensions between the blocs, and that borders and political systems could be changed, was crystal clear.⁴⁷

Epilogue

Had they hoped to avoid the drudgery and the additional risks of Helsinki by moving to Geneva, policy makers and diplomats from East and West would soon be disappointed, but in mid-July 1975, the agony was finally over. To everyone's astonishment, agreement had finally been reached – not least thanks to Henry Kissinger, who had previously referred disparagingly to the CSCE as a *Kindergarten* – although at the time many felt the text was little more than an agreement to disagree and many Western

observers, erroneously, believed it was the Soviets who had won; the West had succumbed to their pressure. The Dutch delegation for one had not been entirely immune to this sentiment and it certainly had felt these pressures. Perhaps the attention The Hague had paid to the psychological aspects of multilateral diplomacy – the aversion of gloomy autumn and winter evenings, the need for comfortable lodgings, the ability to be engaged in something seemingly pointless for years on end, and the presence of their diplomats' families – conflicted with the composition of the team of negotiators that only had experience in bilateral relations. In fact, for one Dutch, unmarried, delegation member the strains inherent in multilateral diplomacy had been too great: even in the pleasant surroundings of Geneva, the hotel room was empty and depressing, and the liquor bottle all too close at hand, a sad reminder that 'negotiation is always done on behalf of a seemingly disembodied collective, namely the state, and as a result the ideal of being a negotiator is also a threat to the integrity of the diplomat's self', as Iver Neumann once wrote.⁴⁸

No doubt other delegations in Geneva had been confronted with similar problems. It was only in hindsight that Western diplomats could take pride in having been part of the process that helped lay the framework to overcome, or even win, the Cold War. Rather than cement the Iron Curtain, and solidifying Soviet control over Eastern Europe, their language skills, creativity and mental stamina ensured that CSCE cut holes in that curtain and helped erode that control. This outcome markedly contrasted with MBFR, where, as indicated, diplomats struggled until 1989 to move forward. Perhaps this can be explained by the very different nature of both conferences; CSCE ventured in entirely new territory and promoted such novel concepts as the indivisibility of security, and the free flow of individuals, information, and ideas. It was about redefining Europe and transcending the divide and as such appealed to negotiators' creativity; by contrast, MBFR was about reducing conventional forces in the given constellation of a divided Europe – it treated this division as a fact of life; as such it may have offered far less opportunities for individual diplomats' creativity to fully blossom.

At the time only the most optimistic recognised the explosive nature of the contents of the *Final Act*, and most of the negotiators were simply glad the agony was over. It was Eastern European dissidents that exploited the opportunities the document offered, and Western governments, not diplomats, that decided to act on it. When, on 1 August 1975, champagne was served at the closing ceremony in Helsinki, the diplomats that had negotiated the *Final Act* 'with much mutual self-congratulation' finally found closure and moved on to ostensibly more rewarding postings. Some even may have given a last smile at the contents of the *Ultimate Act*, before forgetting all about it. The singing of the MBFR choir in Vienna however still continued, until it finally died away in the night:

(...)
 We are little plenipotentiaries
 who have gone astray
 baa baa baa
 Gentlemen negotiators off on a spree
 doomed from here to eternity.
 May God have mercy on such as we
 baa baa baa.⁴⁹

Notes

1. The title ‘Tired of Waking Up on the Floor’ is taken from *The No No Song*, composed by David P. Jackson Jr and Hoyt Wayne Axton where the singer announces he will stop drinking and taking drugs because he’s ‘Tired of Waking Up on the Floor’. It was recorded in 1974 by Ringo Starr and released on his *Goodnight Vienna*. At the end of the song Starr murmurs he really needs another drink. Perhaps this is not the best place to thank the two anonymous reviewers of an earlier version of this article, but I’d like to express my gratitude for their valuable comments and suggestions.
2. ‘Oh, When These Bloody Talks Are Over’ (to the melody of ‘Oh, What a Friend We Have in Jesus’) in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series III, vol. III (London: The Stationary Office, 1997), 479. This contribution is partly based on an earlier Dutch language piece I wrote. This earlier piece was called ‘After hours late in the bar. De verlokkingen en verschrikkingen van de multilaterale diplomatie’, and was published in a liber amicorum edited by Bob de Graaff and Duco Hellema: *Instrumenten van buitenlandse politiek. Achtergronden en praktijk van de Nederlandse diplomatie* (Instruments of Foreign Policy. Dutch Diplomacy’s Backgrounds and Practice) (Amsterdam: Boom, 2007), 114–22. The present text was thoroughly revised and substantially expanded.
3. For other examples, see: Jennifer Mori, *The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe*, c. 1750–1830 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), and Brian Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2014). There is, of course, ample scholarship on rules, the diplomatic procedures, and the like, e.g., Brigid Starkey, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Mark A. Boyer, *Negotiating a Complex World: An Introduction to International Negotiation* 2nd edn. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).
4. Paul Meerts, ‘The changing nature of diplomatic negotiation’, in Jan Melissen, ed., *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 1999), 79–93, at 86. Cf. Raymond Cohen, *International Politics: The Rules of the Game* (London and New York: Longman, 1981).
5. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 84.
6. Neumann, *Diplomatic Sites*.
7. MBFR attracted limited scholarly interest in recent years. Exceptions include Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Control Management or Reform* (Abingdon, Ox.; Routledge & Keegan Paul Ltd, 2021).
8. Martin D. Brown and Angela Romano, ‘Executors or Creative Deal-Makers?: The Role of the Diplomats in the Making of the Helsinki CSCE,’ in Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds., *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human*

Rights, 1972–1990 (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 43–73; Roger Beetham, ‘Observations on British Diplomacy and the CSCE Process’, *British Scholar* III, no. 1 (September 2010): 127–38, at 132.

9. This resulted in a PhD: *Het heeft onze aandacht. Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972–1989* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2001), and a number of articles and book chapters, i.e., “The Netherlands and the Rank of Denmark,” in Carol Fink, Lubor Jilek and Antoine Fleury, eds., *Human rights in Europe after 1945 – Les droits de l’Homme en Europe depuis 1945* (Berne: Peter Lang, 2003), 333–54; “Détente or human rights: the Netherlands and the Soviet Union,” in P.R. Baehr, M.C. Castermans and F. Grünfeld, *Human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands* (Antwerp, Oxford & New York: Intersentia, 2002), 123–48; “Tradition oder Kalkül. Die niederländische Menschenrechtspolitik mit Hinblick auf Jugoslawien,” in *Jahrbuch Zentrum für Niederlande Studien* 2002,13 (Münster: Zentrum für Niederlande Studien, 2003), 99–114; “‘Im Osten nichts neues’. De veiligheidsdimensie van de CVSE in Nederlandse ogen”, *Militaire Spectator* 174, no. 3 (2005): 125–30; ‘It was Cold War and We Wanted to Win. Détente, Human Rights and the CSCE’, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., *Origins of the European Security System. The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75* (London: Routledge, 2008), 183–98; “‘That Poland be Polish again?’ Dutch policy on Poland, 1975–1979,” in D.A. Hellema, R. Zelichowski and A.C. van der Zwan (ed.), *Poland and the Netherlands. A case study of European relations* (Dordrecht: Republic of Letters, 2011), 185–210. “NATO needs more than planes and tanks and guns,” in P.A.L. Ducheine and F.P.B. Osinga (ed.), *Winning without killing: the strategic and operational utility of non-kinetic capabilities in crises*. NL ARMS 2017 (The Hague 2017), 55–66.
10. *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series III, volume III (London: The Stationary Office 1997); Alice Němcová, ed., *CSCE Testimonies. Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act 1972–1989* (Prague: OSCE, 2013), and the site of the American Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (<https://adst.org>), among others.
11. Mick Jagger and Keith Richard, “Sing This All Together,” from the Rolling Stones’ 1967 LP *Their Satanic Majesties Request*.
12. Much has been written about CSCE; recent literature includes Michael Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War 1965–1985* (Copenhagen 2010); Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder ed., *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019); Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart eds., *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).
13. On Dean: Hans-Günther Brauch and Teri Grimwood, eds., *Jonathan Dean. Pioneer in Détente in Europe, global cooperative security, arms control and disarmament* (Cham: Springer, 2014).
14. Sir Clive Rose, letter to the editor as quoted in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series III, volume III (London: The Stationary Office 1997), 479.
15. Clive Rose to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 4 July 1974, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series III, volume III (London: The Stationary Office 1997).
16. Alisher Faizullaev, ‘Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations’, in *Negotiation Journal* 30, no. 3 (2014), 275–299, at 286; Bradford D. Johnston, ‘Ronald Reagan’s Race to Space:

- American Atomic Diplomacy and SDI in the Age of Reykjavik' (PhD dissertation, University of California, Merced, 2013), 55; Paul Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost; At the Center of Decision* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 366–369.
17. John Lennon, “Mind games,” taken from his 1973 LP of the same name.
 18. Albania refused the invitation, while Andorra’s foreign policy is conducted by France. Another micro-state, Monaco, did not participate in MPT but requested to be invited for the formal conference opening at Helsinki in July 1973.
 19. Alice Nĕmcová, ed., *CSCE Testimonies. Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act 1972–1989* (Prague: OSCE, 2013), 16.
 20. John J. Maresca, *To Helsinki. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973–1975* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 7.
 21. This translates as: ‘PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRE-NON-MATTER. | The distinguished delegates came | and brought baskets, | they opened shutters, | they set doors ajar, | they presented specifications | they presented addenda | and corrections. | They gave them headers | they presented pre-drafts | and non-papers | for a long time they circulated | non-texts of non-documents. | In a solemn voice they discussed | in their clandestine mini-group | almost surreal and supernatural | distinguished, eminent, immortal | and astray among them | I suddenly buried | my face in my hands . . . | and I started to cry’. Helsinki to The Hague, 15 March 1973 in: Archives of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Directorate of Atlantic Cooperation and Security, 1965–1974, inv.nr. 701.
 22. Hella Pick, *Invisible Walls: A Journalist in Search of Her Life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2021).
 23. See Thomas Fischer, *Neutral Power in the CSCE: The N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009); Thomas Fischer, Juhana Aunesluoma, and Aryo Makko, ‘Introduction: Neutrality and Nonalignment in World Politics during the Cold War’, *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 4–11.
 24. Deep Purple, ‘Smoke On The Water’ from their 1972 LP *Machine Head*. Technically, the song was about the 1971 fire in the Montreux casino, not about Geneva.
 25. The considerations in this paragraph and in the next are derived from various interviews I conducted with erstwhile Dutch politicians, civil servants and negotiators during research for my PhD in the 1999–2000 period. These include Foreign Ministers Norbert Schmelzer (1971–1973) and Max van der Stoep (1973–1977; 1981–1982), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Director Charles Rutten (1974–1980), consecutive heads of the Atlantic Cooperation and Security Directorate, Van der Valk (1970–1974) and Willem van Eekelen (1974–1977), and Niek Biegan (1972–1977), the head of the Political NATO Affairs Desk; CSCE Geneva chief negotiators Reinier Huydecoper van Nigtevecht (1973–1974) and Joop van der Valk (1974–1975), and Basket I negotiator Godert de Vos van Steenwijk (1973–1975).
 26. On contemporary Dutch ideas on the Scandinavian countries, see Floribert Baudet, “The Netherlands and the Rank of Denmark,” in Carol Fink, Lubor Jilek and Antoine Fleury, eds., *Human rights in Europe after 1945 – Les droits de l’Homme en Europe depuis 1945* (Berne: Peter Lang, 2003), 333–354. See also, on the topic of Dutch interest and actions in the field of human rights, Jan Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten. Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 440–62.
 27. Maresca, *To Helsinki*, 14.
 28. See fn 25 supra.
 29. *CSCE Testimonies*, 103.
 30. This ties in with observations by Martin Brown and Angela Romano, and Stephan Kieninger that highlight the ‘non-traditional’ background of several key negotiators,

- see Nicolas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, eds., *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2019), 352.
31. Godert de Vos van Steenwijk, personal communication to author, 20 April, 2000. Huydecoper himself readily admitted he was ‘not a friend’ of the Soviet Union, but vehemently objected to the description by his former colleagues. Personal communication, 18 February, 2000.
 32. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, *Essence of Diplomacy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 84.
 33. Floribert Baudet, *Het heeft onze aandacht. Nederland en de rechten van de mens in Oost-Europa en Joegoslavië, 1972–1989* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2001), 67–92.
 34. Parallel History Project, oral history session, Zürich, 10 September 2005. Participants included ambassadors Jacques Andréani (France), John Maresca (USA), Édouard Brunner (Switzerland), Sir Crispin Tickell (UK), Yuri Kashlev (USSR), Nicolae Ecobescu (Romania), Siegfried Bock (GDR), and Hans-Jörg Renk (Switzerland).
 35. (accessed March 23, 2022). <https://adst.org/2016/12/basketball-fifth-basket-helsinki-final-act/>.
 36. (accessed 23 March 2022) <https://adst.org/2016/12/basketball-fifth-basket-helsinki-final-act/>.
 37. Maresca, *To Helsinki*, 53.
 38. This was proposal CSCE/II/A/8, files 3 October 1973, which read ‘The participating States recognize the inalienable right of every people, freely and with all due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to choose, develop, adapt or change its political, economic, social or cultural system, without interference of any kind on the part of any State or group of states’, as reprinted in Igor I. Kavass, Jacqueline P. Granier and Mary F. Dominick, eds., *Human rights, European politics, and the Helsinki accord: the documentary evolution of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1973–1975 volume III* (Buffalo, NY: Hein, 1981), 121–22; Godert de Vos van Steenwijk, personal communication to author, 20 April, 2000.
 39. George Harrison, “Sue Me Sue You Blues,” taken from his 1973 LP *Living in the Material World*.
 40. Geneva (CSCE) to The Hague, 1 April 1975, Archives of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, Directorate of Atlantic Cooperation and Security, 1975–1984, inventory 1353, cf. cables Geneva (CSCE) to The Hague, 24 January 1975, The Hague to Geneva (CSCE), 28 January 1975, and Geneva (CSCE) to The Hague, 5 February 1975 in *ibid.* On coffee breaks, see also Maresca, *To Helsinki*, 48.
 41. John J. Maresca, communication Zürich, 10 September, 2005. There is nothing to this effect in his *To Helsinki*, that concentrates on the diplomatic exchanges that produced the Final Act.
 42. Petri Häkäräinen, *A state of peace in Europe: West Germany and the CSCE, 1966–1975* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011).
 43. Marie-Pierre Rey, *La Tentation du Rapprochement, France et URSS à l’Heure de la Détente, 1964–1974* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991); Marie-Pierre Rey, ‘France and the German Question in the Context of Ostpolitik and the CSCE, 1969–1974’, in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart, eds., *Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2008), 53–66.
 44. The Dutch had quite consistently tried to slow down the pace of negotiations, starting in November 1972; Floribert Baudet, ‘It was Cold War and We Wanted to Win. Détente, Human Rights and the CSCE’, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., *Origins of the European Security System. The*

Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, (London: Routledge, 2008), 183–198; For a general discussion on the impact of smaller powers in Europe during the Cold War: Laurien Crump and Susanna Erlandsson eds., *Margins for Manoeuvre in Cold War Europe: The Influence of Smaller Powers* (London: Routledge, 2019). Cf. interview with ambassador Jacques Andréani, in *CSCE Testimonies* (Prague OCSE 2013) 71–88, at 71.

45. The Belgian delegation, for instance, was generally given little leeway. Richard Smith ed., *Preparing for Helsinki: the CSCE Multilateral Preparatory Talks* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2020), 52.
46. [Roy Reeve], *CSCE Ultimate Act [1975]*, available through the author of this article.
47. Floribert Baudet, “It was Cold War and We Wanted to Win. Détente, Human Rights and the CSCE,” in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist, eds., *Origins of the European Security System. The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75*, (London: Routledge, 2008), 183–98;
48. Iver Neumann, *At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry* (Ithaca, Harvard University Press, 2012), 16.
49. ‘The Negotiators’ (to the melody of ‘The Wiffenpoof Song’), MBFR songbook, *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series III, vol. III (London: The Stationary Office 1997), 479–80.

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