Afrikaner, nevertheless: Stigma, shame & the sociology of cultural trauma

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PART 1: Afrikaners after Apartheid
1. Upheaval About a Song

1.1 THE “DE LA REY” DEBATE

In the summer of 2007, it started with small groups of fans bringing the old apartheid flag of South Africa to Bok van Blerk concerts. The young Afrikaners would wrap the orange, blue, and white flag around them as they sang along to van Blerk’s song “De La Rey.” It was a typical rock song, almost a military march with a catchy melody, but it was the lyrics that made the song a hit. The song narrated the story of the Afrikaner General De La Rey, who battled British forces a century ago during the Boer Wars. In the Second Boer War, from 1899 to 1902, the much larger British force overwhelmed the Boers, or Afrikaners, in a scramble for gold and land but not before General Koos de la Rey inflicted punishing defeats on the British.1 “De la Rey, de la Rey,” van Blerk’s refrain pleads, “will you come and lead the Boers?” It was this call for leadership of the Afrikaners, as well as the provocative display of old apartheid symbols, that provoked a national debate.

Did the song incite violence from right-wing Afrikaners, a decade after the National Party had lost power? Or did it promote Afrikaner nationalism among young Afrikaners? Were the Afrikaners really looking for a heroic figure like De La Rey to lead the threatened Afrikaners to a safe place? Or was the song a cynical but commercially successful ploy of a cultural industry taping into cultural nostalgia? Did young Afrikaners long for the apartheid past? Or was it simply enjoyable to sing along to a catchy song in their native tongue? These were some of the questions the South African media raised. In a front-page article, the mainstream Afrikaans magazine Huisgenoot suggested that the song might contain coded messages. In response, the ANC issued a warning that “if De la Rey [was] in danger of being hijacked by a minority of right wingers,” this group should be aware that “those who incite treason, whatever methods they might employ, might well find themselves in difficulty with the law.”2 The statement drew a barbed retort from the Democratic
Alliance (DC), the largest opposition party: If the ANC thought that songs can incite violence, it might as well scrutinize the violent content of their own anti-apartheid songs. Although a few extreme right-wing Afrikaners had been tried on charges of antigovernment terrorism, this had always been a fringe movement. White right-wing parties have never received more than 1 or 2 percent of the votes and still do not. The focus on potential violent uprisings or resurging nationalism seemed misguided.

Instead, the response to the song exposed the complicated and conflicted emotions that come with being an Afrikaner after apartheid—which include remnants of pre-apartheid emotional attachments. The South African weekly newspaper Sunday Independent argued that the song answers a deep sadness in Afrikaners’ souls—a feeling that they have not merely fallen from power but also have been marginalized in South African society. In contrast, a headline in The New York Times framed the debate as: “Song Wakens Injured Pride of Afrikaners” (Wines, 2007). The Times described an atmosphere where Afrikaners were searching for a new identity and a comfortable place in a black-majority society. In the newspaper, Louis Pepler, the real name of Bok van Blerk, presented the lyrics as a claim to belong, and a testament to Afrikaner pride. “I’m part of this rainbow country of ours,” he said. “But I’m one of the colors, and I’m sticking up for who I am. I’m proud of who I am.”

This would be fine, the Times journalist commented dryly, except that nobody, not even Afrikaners themselves, agree on what an Afrikaner is these days.

The emotions provoked by “De La Rey” also points us to the inescapability of questions of identity and belonging for Afrikaners after apartheid, and how they continue to be difficult to resolve—even 15 years after apartheid. Koos Kombuis, the famous Afrikaner musician, acknowledged that the “De La Rey” song was one of the best Afrikaans songs ever written. The song made him long for his Afrikaner upbringing during apartheid. Kombuis, an alias for André le Roux du Toit, made his fame at the end of the 1980s being part of the Voëlvy Movement, one of the few protest movements from inside the Afrikaner youth against the National Party (Bezuidenhout, 2007). The response of Kombuis was peculiar, not only because he was a popular anti-apartheid singer, but also because he had symbolically renounced his Afrikaner-ness in a statement in 2006. This public rejection of Afrikaner-ness had caused a fierce debate in the media. Kombuis had stated that he wanted to no longer deal with the “psychological baggage” of being from Afrikaner decent. However, as much as Kombuis had forsaken his ethnic identity, he remained an Afrikaner nevertheless: the song pulled him back in, even though he argued that he could not politically identify with the message of the song. “It created an incredible tension in my body,” he wrote, like a puppet, he worried which heartstring had been tugged.
The “De La Rey” phenomenon shows that Afrikaners are in a moral transition. The Afrikaans poet Antjie Krog, an influential South African public intellectual, connects the emotional response to “De La Rey” to various moral challenges Afrikaners face. She argues that the apartheid past confronts the younger generation of Afrikaners with a set of uncomfortable questions: what is their relationship to the apartheid past? How is this connected to the bond with their parents? And how does it relate to their experiences in the present with affirmative action? Krog acknowledges that these moral questions are both avoided and confronted, but argues that few young Afrikaners can ignore them. But it is easy to think of other challenges, than just these three: Afrikaners need to confront their racism; they need to adapt to being a minority under black-majority rule; and they have to adjust to the loss of white privilege.

What unites these different moral challenges is the fact that it is often unclear how strong they are connected to the process of coming to terms with the past, or whether they are more directly related with the present position of Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa. None of the moral challenges for Afrikaners in the present is entirely unconnected to the apartheid past, whether it is related to racism or white privilege. However, Afrikaners’ moral struggle to acknowledge the crimes of the past is incomparable to Afrikaners’ struggle to converse with blacks without using the old superiority thinking embedded in the Afrikaans language. How are these moral struggles culturally resolved? Which struggle has the most emotional salience? And do the answers to these questions differ between groups of Afrikaners? These are the empirical questions this study addresses.

1.2 THE EMOTIONS OF TRAUMA

Since the TRC began, the dominant register in South Africa to study moral questions of collective responsibility is the language of trauma. “Trauma” also re-emerged as a trope in the “De La Rey” debate. Krog argues that the experience of moral transition can be studied through the prism of trauma. If trauma is defined as a “nonordinary human experience,” she writes, Afrikaners have been confronted by parts of themselves that are “not ordinary.” She likens the younger generation of Afrikaners to the children of Nazis, a group that also could not share their stories after the war because of the social stigma. She argues that the younger generation has to reach back to the “De La Rey generation” because their parents’ generation makes them feel too guilty and shameful to talk about their Afrikaner history. “De La Rey” helps to break the silence. The song, she argues, functions to the younger generation as a catalyst to work through their guilt and integrate their past into the new society. Although Krog has done more than many to illuminate the moral challenges of Afrikaners, her creative analysis here cannot mask the slippery definition of “trauma” that she uses.
In South Africa the label of trauma is used both for the victims of apartheid and for the (offspring of) perpetrators (H. B. Giliomee, 2010; Jansen, 2009; Tutu, 1999). The terminology of trauma is traditionally reserved for victims of extreme violence and their experience of loss. One would expect that the label of trauma is solely used for black South Africans and the consequences of apartheid. Desmond Tutu claimed that all South Africans were traumatized by apartheid, including its perpetrators: the Afrikaners. In the opening speech before the victim hearings at the TRC, Tutu said: “We are charged to unearth the truth about our dark past, to lay the ghosts of that past to rest so that they will not return to haunt us and that will thereby contribute to the healing of the traumatized and wounded people for all of us in South Africa are wounded people—and this manner to promote national unity and reconciliation” (TRC, 1997, p. vol. 6). For Desmond Tutu, trauma is a language of experience.

However, a distinction should be made between trauma as a language of experience and trauma as a language of analysis. When social theorists use the language of trauma, they conceptualize trauma as a language of analysis to relate present “suffering” to past violence in sociology and anthropology (Jeffrey C. Alexander, 2012; Caruth, 1996; Fassin et al., 2009). However, what is “suffering” in this context? Does that include the experience of perpetrators too? Perpetrator groups face a very different set of cultural and emotional challenges than victims. Cultural trauma as perpetrator trauma deserves a precise analytical definition that does justice to the perpetrator aspects of trauma, and does not legitimate any conflation with victim traumas (D. LaCapra, 2001; Tsutsui, 2009). Let’s return one more time to the “De La Rey” debate.

The response to “De La Rey” exemplifies the current emotional upheaval among Afrikaners as well as the difficulty to analyze the origins of these emotions. The media debate is emblematic of the free-floating character of most emotional explanations, and the need to define emotions more precisely. The analytical language of trauma is not a substitute for the subtle and detailed analysis of emotions. Rather, different emotional patterns can constitute a cultural trauma, and one has to be clear which emotional patterns constitute a trauma and why. My approach to the study of emotions is distinct in three ways. First, I define precisely what emotions are. Based on cognitive appraisal theory, I define emotions as an intentional state—they are about something. They always entail some kind of appraisal or evaluation of the situation; they express the intimate personal meaning of what is happening in our (social) lives. Second, I look at specific emotions and make a distinction in the analysis between emotions and the management of emotions. This choice is built on the idea of emotion specificity: each emotion has its own “thinking-feeling pattern” (Frijda, 1986; Jasper, 2011;
The scientifically proved patterns sometimes stand in contrast to common cultural misconceptions about emotions. Third, I analyze who has the emotion: every Afrikaner or specific groups of Afrikaners. I will first clarify my first two choices in this study, and then move on to the third.

1.3 LOSS, PRIDE, GUILT AND SHAME

Which emotions play the largest role among Afrikaners? This question can only be answered if the broader context of Afrikaners is taken into account. The loss of political power has been substantial, just as the “wages of guilt” for most Afrikaners. They hurt their own pride. Because the Afrikaner identity is so closely connected to the project of apartheid, shame lurks around the corner too. Below I discuss the “logic” of these emotions; their thinking-feeling pattern. I will rectify some common (sociological) misconceptions about these emotions, using new psychological research.

Loss

Loss is important in this study, because Afrikaners have lost dominance, status, and political power. Some have also lost their jobs and other economic opportunities. Others will feel they have also lost safety and clean public space. It is important to avoid speaking of loss as something that has to be “worked through” on a collective scale after apartheid (Jansen, 2009). Early sociologists such as Peter Marris saw the experience of loss as fundamental to social change. Loss was the flip-coin of social change. Whenever people suffered a loss, Marris claimed, their reactions express an internal conflict, whose nature is fundamentally similar to the working out of grief (Marris, 1974). Ideas about working out grief significantly evolved since the Marris study. The Freudian metaphor that grief has to be “worked through” is no longer seen as applicable nor is the famous “stages of mourning” theory from Deutch.

Modern research on bereavement suggests that the process of memory and emotional bonding is rather opposite to what Freud suggested. George Bonanno shows that although people cannot undo or erase a memory, they can weaken it by not thinking about it, because they weaken the neural pathway in our brains to the memories (Bonanno, 2009). He suggests seeing bereavement essentially as a stress reaction; “an attempt by our minds and bodies to deal with the perception of a threat to our well-being.” Like any stress reaction, grief is not uniform or static but comes and goes in a kind of oscillation (Bonanno, 2009, p. 40). Prolonged grief is very rare and most people are extremely resilient to loss.
Pride plays a central role in moral transformations. Moral revolutions, Kwame Appiah claims, depend in large part on the successful use of honor (Appiah, 2011). Pride acts to motivate people to perform socially valued behaviors. Modern definitions of pride have little to do with the Aristotelian thought that a proud person is someone who thinks he is worthy of great things and actually is worthy of great things (Aristotle, 2007). They see pride as a “primary” and universal emotion. Nevertheless, pride is different from other primary emotions in that it is a self-conscious emotion. It requires complex (self-)evaluative processes and depends on how someone evaluates his or her achievements in terms of successes and failures (Tracy, Robins, & Tangney, 2006).

Pride is particularly sensitive to modulation by culture, in comparison to other primary emotions. It is a self-conscious emotion whose function lies in the social domain, increasing one’s social status and value (L. A. Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Anthropologists have long been interested in honor and pride in the context of Mediterranean and Middle-Eastern societies (Abu-Lughod, 1985; Péristiany, 1974). Although some have questioned the relevance of honor and pride in modern societies (Berger, 1970), recent debates about recognition and dignity suggest rather the opposite (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). In a multicultural society like South Africa, every group struggles for honor and recognition, particularly stigmatized groups like Afrikaners. Social movement scholars have also emphasized this point. Pride is necessary to overcome the shame of stigmatized identities. Identity-based movements often have active pride/shame politics (Gould, 2001).

Guilt and Shame
For Afrikaners, guilt and shame arguably are the most important emotions related to apartheid. They are both self-conscious moral emotions, like pride, and are a consequence of moral transgressions. However, the two emotions have a different logic. People feel guilty about actions (or inactions) that they control and for which they accept responsibility. They feel guilt for what they believe they have done. In terms of associated action tendency, guilt is connected to a willingness to make reparations and to take moral responsibility for harm doing (Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994). Psychologists see guilt therefore as a positive emotion. People feel shame for outcomes that they could not, or were not in control of, but that when publicly revealed portrays them as weak or inferior (R. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). In other words, people feel ashamed not for what they do but for who they are. Shame consists of feelings of failure and inadequacy of the self (Leary, 2007; J. Tangney & Dearing, 2003; J. P. Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Martha Nussbaum traces what she calls
“primitive shame,” which has its roots in early development, to the demand for control.18

The difference between guilt and shame also has consequences for the study of collective guilt and shame among Afrikaners. The term “collective” stands for emotions one feels because one identifies with a group that is linked to historical crimes and transgressions (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Doosje, 1998; Zebel, 2005). Collective guilt is a consequence of wrong acts, but collective shame is related to loss of stature. Collective guilt leads to repair, but shame is linked to avoidance behaviors including hiding and withdrawing (J. Tangney & Dearing, 2003). Collective guilt is about repairing social relationships (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005). Collective shame is about feeling self-conscious, having fear of rejection, and feeling incompetent and dependent (Lickel et al., 2005). This psychological definition of shame is different from what some commonly understand as “shame,” which is often a weaker emotion and closer to embarrassment.

Collective shame is more likely to dominate among Afrikaners than collective guilt—among any group where identity concerns are as important as the historical perpetration of criminal acts.19 People feel collective shame when they feel that the moral transgressions reflect poorly on the image of their group. This shame is different from the type of shame that sociologist Sheff saw as ubiquitous for social life. Shame is connected to the realization that one is weak and inadequate to one’s expectations about being self-adequate. Scheff emphasized the role of shame in social bonds (Scheff, 1988, 2000). I argue that shame is a painful emotion—a sense of failure to attain an imagined ideal state. Culturally, the more groups hold untenable ideas about selves, the more likely people are to feel inadequate and to experience shame. Shame leads to anger, often in vicious circles, and this in turn to denial and narcissism. Shame is connected to patterns of denial and silence after historic crimes, as studied by Cohen and Zerubavel (Cohen, 2001a; Zerubaval, 2006). Social movement scholars have traced shame also to narcissistic cultural patterns and shame/anger cycles of conservative and aggressive movements (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1988; Stein, 2001).20

1.4 WHAT AFRIKANER?

It is not likely that all Afrikaners will be affected in the same way by apartheid. Categories of class, gender, and generation influence the relationship between culture and identity; where one is located in the group (rich, poor, old, young, man, woman) matters. These categories also influence how different sections of an ethnic group experience emotions about the past and the present. Moreover, categories also build on each other: class intersects with gender, gender with generation, and so on. I end this chapter with a short overview of the identity categories used in this study and how they relate to being Afrikaner after apartheid.
CLASS
Traditionally, class differentiates groups of people based on levels of economic security. Class divisions are marked by “distance from necessity” (Sayer, 2005, p. 79). However, class can also be seen as “identifications, perceptions, and feelings.” (Medhurst, 2000; Walkerdine, Lucey, & Melody, 2001, p. 4). Class is not just about economic security or social location; it is also a subjective experience. In this study I see class as a “felt thing”; the social and psychic practices through which ordinary Afrikaners live, survive, and manage their emotions. Whiteness scholars like Hartigan, McDermott and Weiss emphasize the relationship between white identity and feeling secure and in control (Hartigan, 1999; McDermott, 2006; Weis, 2004). Among Afrikaners, I am interested how the different classes of Afrikaners mobilize their cultural resources to feel in control, proud, and hopeful about their life and living. In other words, whether upper-class people, because of their class status, are able to think and feel differently about the moral transition than the lower-middle class.22

GENDER
Gender reflects one’s biological sex but also the social and cultural constructions of gendered identities (Chafetz, 2006). Gender is not just a set of characteristics that distinguish male from female, it is also a set of practices men and women perform to act out their gender (West & Zimmerman, 1987). I argue that gender practices influence men’s and women’s cultural discourses and their emotions (Nussbaum, 2003). Further, masculinity and femininity have each been studied in different ways.

Masculinity is a relatively new term. Goffman noted that man must present himself to others as a particular kind of social being: a man (Goffman, 1977). Masculinity studies focus on how men act as men, and how dominant cultural ideal types of manhood and male behavior influence this process (R. Connell & Connell, 2000). Ideal types are the most honored way of being a man. In Western societies, aggressiveness, strength, and self-reliance are part of this ideal (R. W. Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 832). Men need to signify a capacity to exert control over one’s self, the environment, and others (Schrock & Schwalbe, 2009, p. 286). By contrast, femininity has since been understood through the lens of relationality: the understanding that women from early on socialize in caring and nurturing relationships (Chodorow, 1999; Carol Gilligan, 1982). Girls are shown to emerge from childhood with a basis for empathy built into their primary definition of self, in a way that boys do not. As a consequence, social relationships and dependency are experienced differently by women and men. This idea has a strong impact on how emotions work in both genders.
In patriarchal societies like South Africa, gender ideals have a strong influence on the emotional life of groups of people (C. Gilligan, Lyons, Hanmer, & School, 1989). In this study, I will particularly focus on the relationship between masculinity and shame. Patriarchy is symbolized by the perfect father who rules supreme. But familial and cultural norms also prescribe the child to be without need. In traditional rigid family structures, there is often little room for the necessary playfulness and creativity to learn one’s incompleteness and overcome one’s primitive shame. Psychologists Dan Kindlon and Michael Thompson argue that this is particularly true for men and the socialization of boys (Kindlon, Thompson, & Barker, 2000). Boys are often told to be self-sufficient and have shame about their failures and needs for others. As a consequence, they hide their need for others and “avert their own gaze from their inner world” (Nussbaum, 2003, p. 193). As boys fail to understand their own emotions, they are at the same time pushed to appear like a controlling adult. It results in a vicious cycle of shame that leaves boys’ emotions unexamined and underdeveloped, and unable to understand their own feelings and those of others. The result of these gender ideals embedded in culture that lead to shame is tremendously harmful to half the society.

Generation
The potential role of “traumatic” historical events in shaping the outlook of a generation was first suggested by Karl Mannheim (Mannheim, 1998). However, Norman Ryder was the first to empirically confirm the strong congruence between social change and cohort identification. He showed that generations are distinctive by the changing content of formal education, by peer-group socialization, and by idiosyncratic historical experience (Ryder, 1965; See also Schuman & Scott, 1989). A generation, as a category, has an objective aspect in terms of temporal location, but generations also self-identify in terms of a historical or cultural trauma—a necessarily social process (Edmunds & Turner, 2002; Eyerman & Turner, 1998). Bourdieu stressed the importance of the cultural clashes between generations—the generational struggle—which is often about resources, including cultural resources (Bourdieu, 1990).

What about young Afrikaners? If I look at Ryder’s three distinctions I can conclude that formal education has radically changed after 1994 for young Afrikaners, as Christian-National education collapsed (Cross, 1986). Peer-group socialization occurs today in the context of desegregated schools, although this does not mean all schools are racially integrated (Soudien, 2007). The question is, if of the end of apartheid is an “idiosyncratic historical experience,” what is its influence today? Antjie Krog suggested a positive reading of the influence of “trauma” on young Afrikaners. By contrast, Jansen offered a negative interpretation of the influence of “trauma” on
youth (Jansen, 2009). Neither of these interpretations tells us much about the impact of actual events. One problem about the debate of what constitutes a generation is that it foregoes the influence of other categories like class and gender on the youth. Ultimately, the identification of generations is an empirical question, just like the question of whether there is a generational clash at a certain point in time.

1.5 CONCLUSION
The “De La Rey” phenomenon shows how the past haunts Afrikaners as an ethnic group and destabilizes their cultural identities in the present. But the confusing debate also demonstrates that it is problematic to rely on a media analysis for the study of a perpetrator-based cultural trauma. If the aim is a detailed sociological analysis of the interaction of culture and emotions within individuals, one needs to be specific about who experiences what emotion and where. In this chapter I detailed the emotions I wanted to study and the categories important for studying Afrikaners as a group. If we want to do justice to specific emotions and detailed categories, we have to shift our attention away from the macro and micro levels, to the meso level. In the next chapter, I aim to anchor my claims about Afrikaners’ emotional experiences after apartheid in the daily context of their lives. This is best done at the level of institutions. An institutional approach opens up a perspective on which emotions, in what way, play a role with different Afrikaners.
2. A View from the Middle

2.1 INTRODUCTION
Regarding Afrikaners’ moral transition, there are three levels of analysis found in South Africa’s academic literature. The dominant perspective on Afrikaners after apartheid is one from above, a macro level approach that often presents a monolithic image of Afrikaners. A second perspective is that from below, a micro-level approach that stresses individual variety. Both levels of analysis have their strengths and weaknesses, but only a study at the meso level can fruitfully combine their strengths while cancelling out their weaknesses. I advocate a meso approach over a macro or micro perspective because both levels of analysis forgo the influence of broader societal shifts when explaining individual variety. What is needed, I argue, is a meso level analysis that studies the personal narratives of Afrikaners within the context of institutional change.

2.2 PERSPECTIVES FROM ABOVE
The first dominant macro-level approach focuses on the political economy of South Africa and the role of the Afrikaner elite in the transition. During the democratic transition, the ANC government was persuaded to give up on its communist and socialist roots, and adopt a series of neoliberal economic policy arrangements that largely benefitted the affluent white minority (Bond, 2000, 2003; Gumede, 2007; MacDonald, 2006; Marais, 1999, 2011). The political transition firmly ingrained a set of capitalist principles like private-property rights in the constitution. Furthermore, the ANC adopted a pro-growth strategy GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution), a limited set of social policies, stable interest rates, tight control of government expenses, an independent national reserve bank, and the privatization of various public companies. The transition to democracy is therefore dubbed
an “elite transition” in which white business and political elite struck a class compromise with the ANC.¹

What is important for this study is that the macro-level approach in political economy studies equates “Afrikaner” with the white business elite—as if there are not different classes of Afrikaners. Although Afrikaners as a group have financially benefited from economic policy after apartheid, this contention obscures the class dimension of the transition among Afrikaners. In the past, various studies on Afrikaners explicitly emphasized class dimensions of nationalist politics (F. Johnstone, 1976; O’Meara, 1996; Wolpe, 1976). However, few studies have since explored the class dimensions of neoliberal politics for Afrikaners (but see R. Davies, 2009).

A second macro-level approach dominates political science in studies on changing political identities in South Africa. Many assert that at the national and regional political levels, whites have lost most political power, perhaps excluding the Western Cape. Indeed, after the end of the official negotiations and the first democratic elections, Afrikaners’ role on the national scene quickly declined. Many assert that the political project of Afrikaners has collapsed (H. B. Giliomee, 2010; Westhuizen, 2008). Courtney Jung argues that after 1994 Afrikanerdom as a political identity lacked resonance in the nascent politics of post-apartheid South Africa (Courtney Jung, 2000, p.134). Afrikaner political elite have attempted to mobilize Afrikaner nationalism for political purposes with no success. Jung concludes that although the salience, meanings, and boundaries of Afrikaner identity remain fluid, an Afrikaner political project is not likely to appeal to the majority of its potential (ethnic) constituency as long as it remains tied to a particular, extreme, ideological position. The political identities of most Afrikaners are no longer mediated by ethnicity. Jung’s claim that ethnicity no longer plays a role at the level of (political) identity is based on a narrow definition of political identity. If Jung is to be believed, the ideological dissonance that accompanied the end of the apartheid era for many middle- and upper-class Afrikaners has been replaced by an ideological outlook based on capitalist democracy rather than to Afrikaner nationalist ideals (Courtney Jung, 2000, p. 165). Like others, she emphasizes the dominance of class, race, and demography. She does acknowledge that among the right wing, a second ideological paradigm has emerged based on group rather than individual rights. This ideology explicitly incorporates Afrikaners in the global discourse of minority rights.²

A third macro approach is presented in studies on the TRC, and in the work of the committee itself (TRC, 1997). The TRC provided a framework for the cultural and moral restructuring of society (Krog, 1999; Minow, 1999). The premise of the work of the committee was that truth could heal a divided nation; its work was seen as complementary to the political negotiations and settlement. The committee was to address “the deeper meaning” of the word reconciliation: reconciliation as a process of confession, repentance,
cleansing, regeneration, reparation, and restoration (Boraine, 1995, p. 101). Through a reckoning with the past, the truth would be revealed, and a human rights culture would be established. The idea that Afrikaners’ culture had to change was central to the TRC. However, the process of change was envisioned through the metaphorical language of Christianity and psychology. Style, symbolism and vocabulary were drawn from the bible and the psychoanalytical register. The TRC elevated the goal of healing individuals—both victims and perpetrators—and society after the trauma of apartheid. The psychological language of healing casts the consequences of apartheid in terms of trauma. The TRC was to bring healing to the nation through public testimonies of victims and perpetrators in front of the commission (Minow, 1999, p. 61). Reconciliation also involved a change of heart; a commitment to right wrongs from the perpetrators.

The response of the Afrikaner community to the TRC, most studies conclude, has been more negative than any other group in South Africa (Gilliomee, 2001; Johnstone, n.d.; Krog, 1999; Theissen, 1996). However, the bigger problem is how the TRC conceptualizes cultural change. It conflates the national with the individual, the cultural with the religious, and the social with the psychological. Although people like James Gibson have done impressive research on the acceptance of truth among South Africans based on the work of the TRC, many researchers emphasize the limitations of the therapeutic value of the TRC for individuals (Gibson, 2006; Hayner, 2000; Krog, 1999). Minow argues that we actually know very little about the process of “societal healing.” What we do know, she argues, is that “victims, perpetrators, and bystanders stand in different relationships to the underlying events and to the prospect of healing” (Minow, 1999, p. 57). Minow warns of the application of psychological theories on the collective that have only been proven to work for individuals.

**Four Problems**

The economic, political, and cultural versions of the macro perspective reflect different thematic, analytical and even moral concerns. But they share their treatment of Afrikaners as a homogenous collective. They view Afrikaners from above; a distance that obscures internal variety. The representation of Afrikaners as “one” (people or volk) has deep roots in the political history of South Africa. However, the persistence of this homogenizing perspective in the literature, after the democratic transition, is unfortunate. If there is anything to learn from studying cultural and identity change among Afrikaners, it is in the variety of voices, the fragmentation of the nationalist narrative, and the intense public debate among Afrikaners about their place and role in the new South Africa. It is the unmaking and fracturing of the nationalist collective that reveals the dysfunctional mechanisms of change and the emotional rollercoaster of Afrikaner life in South Africa after apartheid. This is the first problem I want to address.
A second problem these studies share is that the macro perspective stresses the words and deeds of top-level politicians and the economic elite, over the lived realities of everyday Afrikaners. For too long the Afrikaners have been understood—in part by their own doing—as a homogeneous group that follows its leaders. The strength of the collective has been a hallmark of Afrikaner nationalism. But to probe the experiences of Afrikaners in the age of democracy is to capture the ambiguous contours of change. It is to explore beyond the media hype and beneath the rhetoric of politicians, into the lives of their constituents. To seek such voices is often to grapple with inconsistency and antagonisms. One must, for instance, grapple with the issue of gender. How do Afrikaner women cope with the transition? Is it different from the responses of their husbands, even though they have the same class position? Such questions demand a study below the macro level.

The third problem is not something these studies share but create together. Because the three macro perspectives developed separately and little interdisciplinary work is being done, they leave a large gap between materialist concerns and ideological developments. For instance, how does the experience of cultural change vary along class lines? Can one’s Afrikaner identity be replaced by a capitalist ideology? Studies on the TRC never refer to what has happened in the political economy; studies on the political economy do not approach questions about the burden of collective guilt or the problem of racism; the debate about changing political identities hardly seems to touch base with the experience of being “Afrikaner.” Indeed, for all that is written about the economic, political, and cultural transformations, few studies have intersected the study of culture with that of class and the emotional burden of the past. And yet, historically, it is the intersection of class and race in such questions that makes the study of South Africa so unique.

The fourth problem pertains to contradictions between these economic, political, and cultural accounts. If what happened, in political economic terms, was an “elite transition” why is there discontent among Afrikaners? If Afrikaner politics are declared dead, why did so little change? Are there different politics, which the terminology of resurgent nationalism and racism cannot capture? (Blaser, 2004; Grobbelaar, 1998; Kriel, 2006) A meso-level perspective can help to bridge the gap between the perspectives, but also look at issues of class, gender, and generation together. Is it easier for the economic elite to change its culture? Or is the Afrikaner lower middle class, given its closer racial contact and similar economic position, more easily affiliated with working-class blacks?

It is impossible to fully understand Afrikaners’ variety of responses to democracy from a macro perspective. Their responses have been neither as immobile nor monolithic as these perspectives suggest. Indeed, some Afrikaners have been creative and innovative in both adapting to and resisting
the new post-apartheid dispensation. The spectacular collapse of the National Party and traditional white politics has in part masked the continuity of white privilege and new manifestations of privilege and power. The loss of political power by no means determined a loss of economic or cultural power. Sweeping statements about an “elite transition,” “resurgent Afrikaner nationalism,” or continuing “racism” obscure more than they illuminate—at best, they only tell partial truths about the mindset of current-day Afrikaners and their place in post-apartheid South Africa. The character of the economic transition and the continuity of white resistance, economically and culturally, remained hidden. So many academics and the public alike were busy looking for “positive change” and “radical transformation” that those subtleties and unlikely continuities remained unreported.

2.3 PERSPECTIVES FROM BELOW

If we shift our attention away from the top and focus on the lives of ordinary Afrikaners, we see flexibility and a variety of responses. Recent micro studies on Afrikaners and whiteness root the identity work of ordinary whites in social and cultural analysis (Blaser, 2004; Vincent, 2008). Steyn’s work in particular shows how Afrikaners problematize their identity and are looking for creative redefinitions (Steyn, 2001, 2004, 2005). She exposes the multiple issues Afrikaners struggle with in relation to their ethnic identity: the recognition that they struggle; the confusion, self-pity, and nostalgia; the anxiety about loss of self, and the explicit and blunt rage against the new order; the face-saving device of (re)casting the Afrikaner as a victim in need of special attention; the quest for the essence of “Afrikaansness” and its redefinition as an indigenous culture by focusing on language, Christianity, history, sports and literature; the search for belonging and a way to organize themselves as a group; and the need of (international) protection. Steyn concludes that Afrikaner “white talk” plays a creative and aggressively constitutive role in identity formation.

While this study explores the shifting terrain of race and culture at the institutional level, it finds inspiration in the work of many others at the grassroots level. After apartheid, a new generation of scholars that studied race and identity moved beyond reproducing the identity categories of the apartheid system. They explored the complexity, contradictions and emotional tensions in the “identity work” of South Africans; the constant effort to locate themselves in relationship to others, and thereby change and move boundaries between “us” and “them.” (Ansell, 2006; Comaroff, 2009; R. Davies, 2009; Dolby, 2002; Mbembé, 2001; Norval, 1996; Wasserman & Jacobs, 2003). They have different emphases: Nuttall and Michael argue for the importance of cultural studies in the study of identity (S. Nuttall & Michael, 2000). Zegeye is more concerned with political identities (Zegeye, 2001). Alexander warns for the danger of culture studies that lack political
relevance and studies of political identities that lack roots in everyday experience (P. Alexander et al., 2006, p. 14). He advocates a broad sociological outlook.

Afrikaners’ identity struggles have also been connected to gender struggles. These gender studies show that during Afrikaner nationalism patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity played a central role (Morell, 2001; Swart, 2001). Apartheid South Africa was a system of segregated and competing patriarchies, where the patriarchy of Afrikaners mirrored the patriarchies in the Bantustans (Morrell, 1998). The white male was historically constructed as dominant, a defender, a leader, and associated with symbols of war, hardship, and the struggle of survival. In economic terms, he was privileged. Being white, male and Afrikaans meant for a long time being kept from poverty, with employment in the traditional Afrikaner preserves like the mines, the railways, the police, and the civil service; jobs that were handed down “from father to son.” After apartheid, Swart sees Afrikaner men in crisis: “Afrikaner masculinity moved from a hegemonic, indeed an exemplary identity, to a socially marginalized, and in many sectors, an actively dishonored identity” (Swart, 2001, p. 77). Epstein is more optimistic and predicts new and unpredictable ways of being men. She identifies institutions as having an important contextual role in shaping new identities (Epstein, 1998).

What these studies share is that they are inspired by scholars like Zygmunt Bauman and Stuart Hall, who argue that identities are socially constructed. They see identity not so much as essence, but as a “search” or “quest”—a process of becoming, as Zygmunt Bauman put it. They relate identity talk to uncertainty and a search for belonging and identification. They argue that we should focus on what the search for identity does for people and how we use the resources of history, language, and culture, but also economy in this process. Identity, Hall summarized this position, is more about becoming than being (Hall, 1996, p. 4).

The problem is that most micro studies do not analyze the institutional contexts in which identity discourses and narratives are created and reproduced. The recent studies of Steyn, Blaser, Morell, and Swart rely on a nuanced analysis of Afrikaner individuals and their narratives. Nevertheless, the studies ultimately are unsatisfying in their typologies of individuals. They lack the necessary context for these typologies to make sociological sense. The shaping of institutions like work, home, and school may privilege some identities and discursive strategies over others. Micro-perspective scholars like Steyn emphasize change, variety, and fragmentation but do not put in place a framework to understand newly emerging patterns. At times, they rely on the idea that identities are only memories or narratives about the past, without giving the institutional contexts their proper attention. Moreover, the lack of
context gives some of the studies a rather idiosyncratic character, that of an isolated story about a strange cultural tribe in a faraway place.

2.4 PERSPECTIVE FROM THE MIDDLE
The central question a meso perspective addresses is how average Afrikaners’ stories of transition and cultural adjustment connect to larger institutional shifts in society. In South Africa, the grand narratives of the transition obscure the developments and movements in the daily life of ordinary Afrikaners: the many small transitions in schools, at work and in the neighborhoods with a variety of outcomes for different groups. After all, culture, identity, and belonging are rooted in social and physical relationships at school, in the neighborhood, and in the workplace. Institutional spheres have their own dynamic, as sociologists Hochschild and Duyvendak show. They also stand in dynamic relationship to each other, when it comes to identity and belonging (Duyvendak, 2011; Hochschild, 1997). Change in the institutional sphere forces people to constantly recreate new ways of identifying. Ultimately, whether you are white or black, wealthy or middle class, man or woman, old or young often matters greatly in how you experience changes in society; the ways in which these identity categories intersect counts. An intersectional analysis looks at Afrikaners not as a monolithic whole but through the lenses of race, class, gender, and generation.

This study reflects the perspective from anthropologists such as Veena Das and Thomas Blom Hansen, and sociologists such as Arlie Hochschild and Jan Willem Duyvendak. They argue for the close attention to personal narratives within the context of their formation in communities and institutional spheres. They ask questions like: how are institutions implicated in allowing or disallowing voice? How do institutions and communities anchor feelings of belonging? (Das, 2000; Duyvendak, 2011; Hansen, 2006). If we discuss Afrikaners’ narratives in a recognizable place, say, in the institutional context of a desegregated school or a gated community, and analyze the narratives in an institutional framework, the portrait becomes not only more accessible, but also more vivid and useful. A view from the middle is able to combine insights from the macro level; for instance, how neoliberal developments have shaped institutions, with the microanalyses of individual identity narratives.

As a starting point, this study allows Afrikaners to speak for themselves. It probes the cultural and emotional experiences of Afrikaners as individuals in their own words. By closely examining their stories, we can identify emotional patterns that are not black and white but more accurately described by words such as “longing,” “resentment,” “yearning,” and “squirming.” Indeed, a descriptive language that is rich in emotional content and subtle in its analysis of new patterns. More than 150 interviews with various groups of
Afrikaners form the essential building blocks of this study. By giving Afrikaners a voice, I hope to not only capture their emotional turmoil and struggle to change, but also to do justice to their unique moral position. If we truly seek to understand Afrikaners—not to excuse or absolve them—then we must first discover how they understand themselves. For all their culpability for the crimes of the past, Afrikaners have rarely been studied without a prior judgmental perspective or through their own words (But see Crapanzano, 1986; H. B. Giliomee, 2010).

However, in order to understand and explain the variety of responses of Afrikaners, we need to analyze them within the institutional context of their daily lives. If we are to illuminate how Afrikaners experience the transition to democracy and how over a period of time, they absorbed the transformation, encouraged it, rejected it, and lived with it, we have to adopt a meso perspective. By embracing such a perspective, a compelling image can emerge about both the flexibility and limits of cultural change in the everyday lives of Afrikaners. As a group, they experienced change in a multitude of ways and this study aims to illustrate the arc of change. An institutional perspective allows for the analysis of the present, but also how institutions shape Afrikaners’ relationship to the past. Olick and Robbins use the term “social memory” to capture the varieties of forms through which the pasts shapes us (Olick & Robbins, 1998). They argue for the study of distinct sets of “mnemonic practices” in various institutional sites. Such an approach enables us to identify ways in which past and present are intertwined, without reifying a mystical group mind. It clarifies the relationship between the workings of social memory and power, class and contestation.

In post-apartheid South Africa, new and national “white politics” haven’t emerged out of Afrikaners’ protest (or that of other whites) against affirmative action, racial desegregation, and crime. The white minority is too small in numbers for such a concerted effort, the exception being the dominance of the Democratic Alliance at the regional level of the Western Cape (Besteman, 2008; Leon, 2008). Nevertheless, white Southerners’ response against the civil rights movement provides an interesting comparison, as detailed in recent historical studies about desegregation in the South in the 1950s and 1960s (Kruse, 2005; Lassiter, 2007) and studies by historians on whites’ protest against affirmative action (Deslippe, 2012). Although no historical or geographical analogy is exactly alike, these studies show how new white politics emerged out of institutional developments at the local level. In particular, this body of research shows how lower-middle-class whites bore the brunt of the consequences of early desegregation of public urban services like parks and pools, transportation and schools. The researchers located the origins of a new political language in the local experience of desegregation and the protests of lower-middle-class whites against the success of the civil rights movement. It is at the local level that the
protest language coalesced around the anti-government themes of privatization, individual rights, and color-blindness. The bottom-up social movement only later developed into the national Republican Party strategy of Nixon and Reagan, whose neoliberal policies were to serve the shrinking white majority in the United States.

The white Southerns’ new political language of privatization and individual rights, which emerged at the local and institutional levels, provides an interesting starting point for a new terminology for Afrikaner politics after 1994; a terminology that takes into account developments in the day-to-day life of the ordinary Afrikaner. I believe my institutional perspective is a good way to start. For example, the experience of educational desegregation, new forms of urban segregation, and protests against affirmative action might add up to new white politics. In post-apartheid South Africa, due to the focus on reactionary stands by Afrikaner extreme right-wing leaders (like Eugène Terre’blanche) and their hollow threats of violence, Afrikaner political opposition has been understood in old nationalistic terms, which aims to resist the new post-apartheid disposition. Opposition has been framed as a call to return to apartheid, Afrikaner nationalism, and the white racism of the past. Some Afrikaners, of course, do want to go back and a small group of Afrikaners did protest the transition to democracy violently with bloody and brutal consequences. But this was only a very small minority. The focus of this study is on the majority of Afrikaners who want to go forward. The challenge is to move away from using old essentialist analytical terms and categories for distinctly new situations.

2.5 CONCLUSION
In everyday life, Afrikaners after apartheid are embroiled in the formation of a neoliberal South Africa. The explorations of the experience of Afrikaners in different institutions detail how everyday life for all groups of Afrikaners has radically taken new shape—albeit very differently for different classes of Afrikaners. In this book, I theorize the institutional contexts of work, living and education in the introductory chapters of each part. The challenge is to work toward a new analytical language of understanding that also does justice to cultural and emotional change. This is a challenge that goes beyond the need for a new vocabulary to study race. It also goes beyond seeing Afrikaans reconceived as a kind of hip Creole, full of subversive nuance. Ultimately, understanding Afrikaners after apartheid is not only about the level of analysis, it is also about developing theoretical conceptual lenses. The challenge is to conceptualize a subtle analytical language to study Afrikaners in everyday institutional contexts and to capture and analyze their culture in their own words without relying on outdated critical concepts—but with an eye on the political dimension.
3. Understanding Afrikaners after Apartheid

3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the main concepts of this study. The challenge here is to develop conceptual lenses that allow asking empirical questions about the process of coming to terms with the past, and the present. Cultural trauma theory presents a dynamic framework to study the process of coming to terms with the past. The chapter begins with a discussion of the theory of Alexander and colleagues and how it can be used to study Afrikaners after apartheid, specifically to study intragroup differences in the interaction between culture and emotions among Afrikaners. However, Afrikaners also have to come terms with the present. Therefore, I contrast cultural trauma theory with three theoretical approaches that clarify the process of coming to terms with the present. Postcolonial theory emphasizes the prominence of emotional ambivalence among former dominant white settler communities. New racism theory suggests a transition from racial dominance and racial hate to racial discomfort and disgust among white South Africans after apartheid. Whiteness theorists stress the importance of the defense of privilege and emotional belonging for former dominant white minorities. I argue that in the end, the explanatory value of these theories for the struggle of Afrikaners is an open empirical question.

3.2 THE MEANING OF “COMING TO TERMS”
Since the formation of the TRC, the idea of coming to terms with the past is central to discussions about apartheid, and seen as the major impediment to a more democratic society (Meredith & Rosenberg, 1999). It is often used as the natural complement to the idea of trauma. “All South Africans face the challenge of coming to terms with the past,” president Nelson Mandela said at the beginning of the TRC, “in ways which will enable us to face the future as a united nation at peace with itself” (Mandela, 13 February 1996). In the final report of the TRC, Desmond Tutu did not question whether we have
come to terms with the past, but how. “It is this contemporary history—which began in 1960 when the Sharpeville disaster took place and ended with the wonderful inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically elected president of the Republic of South Africa—it is this history with which we have had to come to terms. We could not pretend it did not happen. Everyone agrees that South Africans must deal with that history and its legacy. It is how we do this that is in question—a bone of contention throughout the life of the commission, right up to the time when this report was being written. And I imagine we can assume that this particular point will remain controversial for a long time to come” (TRC, 1997, p. 1).

The concept of “coming to terms” was first popularized by the German sociologist Theodor Adorno, after World War II. Adorno was troubled with how the spell of the past remained in the present. In his essay on the meaning of coming to terms with the past (Was bedeutet die Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?), he actually criticized the usefulness of the terminology of “coming to terms” for perpetrator groups, like the Germans in post-war Germany. Shortly after the war, Adorno had started a research project that questioned the dominant attitude among Germans to deny guilt and desire to “forgive and forget.” Germans, Adorno concluded, wanted to put the past behind them and “get on with life.” Adorno argued that the idea of coming to terms with the past was inappropriate for Germans, with its double meaning of reconciliation and receiving articulation. Moreover, Adorno argued that the main problem in the 1960s was that National Socialism and its roots still existed within democracy. The guilt question is important, he said, but coming to terms with the present should be the main concern. Societal structures had not changed enough to believe the evils of National Socialism had gone away. He demanded more self-reflection from the Germans, and warned for new mechanisms that caused racial prejudices.

In post-apartheid South Africa, it is not always evident whether Afrikaners’ emotional turmoil is related to the past or the present, as I showed in the first chapter. Afrikaners really face two challenges: to come to terms with the past and to come to terms with the present. Adorno’s critical distinction, between people’s engagement with the past and the problem of ideological continuity in the present, is a good starting point to look at Afrikaners after apartheid from a cultural sociological perspective. His analysis suggests drawing a theoretical distinction between the process of coming to terms with the apartheid past and coming to terms with the democratic present. Like the Germans, Afrikaners are a perpetrators group. They have to come to terms with the apartheid past. However, Afrikaners are also confronted with their cultural habits and practices in the present, their loss of dominance, their racism, and their loss of position of white privilege.
Cultural sociology provides a rich set of theories and theoretical concepts to clarify both the process of coming to terms with the past and the present.

3.3 COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PAST

The most prominent analytical lens to study how people come to terms with the past is that of trauma. Recent theories use trauma as an analytic device to relate present suffering to past violence (Jeffrey C. Alexander, 2012; Caruth, 1996; Fassin et al., 2009). “Suffering” here is conceptualized broadly, as the emotional struggle to come to terms with the past. The concept of trauma is to connect, and connote, cultural and emotional processes in sociology, cultural studies, and anthropology (Erikson, 1976, 1995; Hayner, 2000; Jelin, 2003; Kaplan, 2005; Robben & Suárez-Orozco, 2000). Few sociological theorists have drawn this connection more eloquently and rigorously than Jeffrey Alexander and Ron Eyerman, with their theory of cultural trauma. Alexander and colleagues present a theory that addresses the dynamic of culture and emotions in the creation of cultural traumas (Jeffrey C Alexander et al., 2004).

Alexander believes that a cultural trauma occurs when “(M)embers of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves an indelible mark upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (Jeffrey C Alexander et al., 2004, p. 1). A cultural trauma is not a product of strained social relationships, as sociologist Kai Erikson originally suggested when he introduced the term “collective trauma.” Nor is a cultural trauma directly rooted in experience, like psychologists suggest. It is not even a product of remembrance, as some psychoanalytical historians argue. Cultural trauma theorists see trauma as incurred by culture and experienced collectively.

Cultural trauma theorists claim that they use the term cultural trauma empirically; a trauma is something that is socially constructed but also an emotional condition. According to Alexander and colleagues, crimes that lead to traumas can either be committed by collectivities or on collectivities, an assertion they demonstrate in their choice of case studies that include the cases of the Germans after World War II and the place of the Holocaust in American society (Jeffrey C Alexander et al., 2004; Eyerman, 2001; Eyerman, Alexander, & Breese, 2011). A cultural trauma, then, does not occur naturally but is constructed by society (Sztompka, 2000b). It is the emphasis on construction that sets their approach apart from mainstream psychological theories of trauma (Caruth, 1996).

Cultural trauma is a subjective condition of people but produced through social construction. This paradox is explained by Alexander as follows: a social crisis becomes a cultural crisis “if collective actors decide to represent social pain as a fundamental threat to their sense of who they are, where they
came from, and where they want to go (Jeffrey C Alexander et al., 2004, p. 3).”

To look at Afrikaners after apartheid through the lens of cultural trauma is seductive. Afrikaners are preoccupied by the stigma that apartheid has left. They seem to feel threatened in their collective identity: being Afrikaans has become for many a problem. As a group, they debate the meaning of apartheid but also the meaning of what it means to be Afrikaans. However, there are also some tensions in the theory of cultural trauma—three exactly—that need further elaboration.

**Three Tensions in Cultural Trauma Theory**

The first is that individualist and collectivist tensions run through cultural trauma theory, where theorists argue that trauma is experienced collectively (Jeffrey C Alexander et al., 2004). Cultural trauma theorists see trauma as indirectly incurred by culture, and make a leap from individual level phenomenon to the collective level by presupposing that culture has a mediating role between historical experience and subjective experience. Then how do we understand culture if it will have a traumatizing effect?

There is considerable disagreement among cultural sociologists about how culture and the search for meaning relates to behavior and action. Jeffrey Alexander endorses a Durkheimian idea about culture (Jeffrey C. Alexander, 2003, 2005; Jeffrey C Alexander et al., 2004; Wuthnow & Witten, 1988). It presents culture as a set of integrated symbols, beliefs, and ideas that are the result of social interaction between members of a group (Jeffrey C. Alexander, 1990; Durkheim, 1915). In Alexander’s view, culture consists of structures like myths and narratives that both constrain and enable action at the same time. The task of cultural sociologists, in this view, is to bring these unconscious cultural structures to light, show why they are meaningful, and illuminate their compulsive power.

By contrast, cultural sociologists Swidler, Tilly, Lamont, and DiMagio argue that even though culture is everywhere in the accounts people give, it is also diffuse, inconsistent, and unclear in its effects (DiMagio, 1997; Swidler, 1986, 2001; Charles Tilly, 2004). Rather than having a coherent worldview, people need enough beliefs to adapt to changing circumstances without losing the conviction that somehow the world makes sense. Culture helps people to find the right words, actions and rationales to express meaning and strategies of actions. Culture, in short, is a toolkit: a box full of tools for people to make sense of their lives in their accounts of everyday life (DiMagio, 1997; Swidler, 1986).

The difference between these approaches is illustrated in how they study collective and cultural identity. Collective identity, in cultural trauma theory, is defined in Durkheimian sociological terms, as the identity of a group as a *sui generis* entity (Durkheim, 1982). Being Afrikaner, as a cultural identity, can also
be defined more flexible. After all, identity is a perception of a shared status or relation; the social identity of a person as a group member (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Cultural identity categories are dynamically shaped through the formation of symbolic and social boundaries (Lamont, 2001; Lamont & Fournier, 1992). Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and space (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 168). Based on categories, people perform “boundary work” to define the “us” and the “them.” Social boundaries refer to objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources and social opportunities. Cultural identities structure the moral life of groups, and often they find their way into more durable and institutionalized forms of social difference—as we saw with apartheid. Cultural trauma theorists see culture as a coherent force that powerfully shapes people’s thoughts, identities, and actions. For others, culture is a much more fragmented phenomenon. Indeed, the two strands of thinking conceptualize culture very differently. In the first view, the idea that culture can cause a trauma is seductive, because a worldview can distort reality. In the second reading of culture, the suggestion that culture causes a collective trauma is unlikely; culture seems too fragmented and too flexible to have such a function. In the end, the two post-hermeneutic approaches leave the meaningfulness of culture as something to be explained (Kaufman, 2004). The question is how Afrikaners use culture to fabricate meaning in their lives.

The second tension in cultural trauma theory is its emphasis on the collective stigmatized condition and its deemphasizing of people’s ability to manage stigma. Cultural trauma theorists define cultural trauma as a subjective condition resulting from a mark on the collective identity of a group. However, to define cultural trauma as an “end condition” is sociologically unlikely. People have agency and will respond if their collective identity is stigmatized. Goffman was the first to connect stigma and social identity (Goffman, 1963). He defined stigma as an attribute that is deeply discrediting. In his pioneering study of stigma, he explored the structural preconditions of stigma and argued that the “tribal stigma of race” is the most important stigma.

Goffman had a subtle sociological eye and was a keen observer of the emotional uneasiness and anxiety that arises in the social interactions of the stigmatized, both inside the “normal” and the stigmatized. He argued that the stigmatized will attempt to correct its stigma, if he can, to counter status loss. Goffman maintained that the consequence of stigma is always context-dependent and should be seen in relational terms. More recently, cultural sociologists like Lamont have empirically demonstrated Goffman insights, and displayed the variety of cultural resources that people use to respond to
stigmatization, prejudice and discrimination. Lamont discusses a range of destigmatization strategies that minority groups mobilize, and how these strategies are enabled and constrained by cultural repertoires, institutions, and national ideologies (Lamont & Mizrachi, 2011). For sociologists like Goffman and Lamont, incurring a trauma is just one possible result of stigma.

The third tension within cultural trauma theory exists between cultural analysis and emotional explanations. Elsewhere, Alexander has stressed the important role of emotions in cultural sociology (Jeffrey C. Alexander, 2003). Cultural trauma theorists present the problem of cultural trauma explicitly as having both cultural and emotional dimensions. Their ambition clearly is to explain the emotional impact of historic events. However, because they define cultural trauma theory as applicable to both victims and perpetrators (and these groups are unlikely to experience the same emotions about the past) they have to be unclear about the actor’s emotional relationship to the historic event. The solution seems to be to speak of culture as a process of social construction when it comes to cultural trauma, but to fall back on structural representations of culture when they want to explain the function and origins of emotions.

The connection between cultural trauma and emotions can be clarified with the work of Arlie Hochschild. Her theory of emotion management conceptualizes culture’s influence on feelings as a set of social norms (Hochschild, 1979, 1983). Hochschild argues that people actively shape their emotions through their will. Such efforts go beyond simply controlling or suppression but exist of the active shaping of emotions cognitively, physically or verbally. She calls this emotion management: the conscious efforts people make to direct their feelings. However, Hochschild argues that we appraise our emotions not in the abstract but always in dialogue with our environment; society which demands we feel in a certain way. The set of social norms that determine how we are supposed to feel are called feeling rules: “a set of latent social rules” of which we are hardly conscious (Hochschild, 1979, p. 564).

Cultural and ideological change, Hochschild suggest, can lead to conflicting feeling rules. She writes, “Part of what we refer to as the psychological effect of ‘rapid social change’ or ‘unrest’ is a change in the relation of feeling rule to feeling and a lack of clarity about what the rule exactly is, owing to conflicts and contradictions between contending sets of rules” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 567). Hochschild identifies two mechanisms that cause the psychological effect of cultural change. First, the relationship between feelings and feeling rules changes, and this changes experience. Second, possible conflicts and contradictions arise between contending sets of rules. Cultural or ideological change thus leads to a lack of fit between what people feel and what they are supposed to feel (See also Thoits, 1989, p.
There is something intuitively right about Hochschild’s idea of conflicting feeling rules. For instance, Afrikaners, who used to take pride in their old flag that represented their country, can, in the post-apartheid situation, no longer take the same pride in the flag. In fact, they are asked to take pride in the new flag of South Africa. Nevertheless, her theory leaves two important aspects unclear.

The first aspect is that the demands for emotion management are very different for different groups in society. Hochschild herself discussed the differences for men and women in emotion management (Hochschild, 1983). But differences go beyond gender; people’s structural class position in society seems to matter greatly for the type and amount of emotion management. Kemper specifically criticized Hochschild for being vague about how emotion management is related to someone’s social location, power and status (Kemper, 1981; 1990, p. 215; Turner & Stets, 2005). It is not hard to imagine how the enforcement of new feeling rules and the disruption of daily praxis vary across the social structure, depending on power and status, and thus on class. In one of the few studies on class and emotions, Andrew Sayer argues that the experience of shame particularly varies across the social structure, with the lower classes experiencing the brunt of the burden of shame (Sayer, 2005).

A second aspect is that Hochschild never precisely defines what emotions are—and thus cannot explain whether the management of some emotions is harder than others. As I argued in the first chapter, emotions according to cognitive appraisal theory are related to what we find valuable in life, what gives our life personal meaning and it is through the process of appraisal that we determine what this is (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1998). Moreover, a cognitive appraisal theory suggests that every emotion has a specific cognitive pattern. This claim aligns well with Scheff’s argument that emotions should be named and defined in order to be usefully investigated (Scheff, 2000). Like Scheff, and also Barbalet, I therefore define different emotions before I explore their sociological workings (Barbalet, 2002). Ultimately, emotions tell people—and therefore researchers—how changes in surroundings affect them.

3.4 COMING TO TERMS WITH THE PRESENT

Afrikaners after apartheid confront a number of cultural and emotional challenges that are unique to their group, but are not directly related to coming to terms with the apartheid past. For instance, how to unlearn racism and grow adjusted to a life without white privilege? These questions are related to the ideology of Afrikaner nationalism, but at the same time they are about what it means to live in South Africa today. What makes a postcolonial society different from the Western world, particularly for a white minority that has lost political power? I address these questions under the header
“Coming to Terms with the Present”—a reference to what I see as the constant challenge for Afrikaners to face South Africa’s new democratic, post-apartheid reality. There are three theoretical strands I draw inspiration from: postcolonial theory, new racism theories, and whiteness studies. Each theoretical approach offers an alternative way of looking at Afrikaners after apartheid. They do not necessarily contradict the theory of cultural trauma. In fact, they can enrich the theory with complementary insights into how culture and emotions can be integrated in sociological analysis.

**Postcolonial Theory and Emotional Ambivalence**

Postcolonial theorists emphasize the uniqueness of the (post-)colonial context, and the consequences for the relationship of the political with the psychological (McCulloch, 1983). Fanon was the first to point to the unprecedented violent character of the colonial encounter, not just physical, but also cultural and psychological (Fanon, 1967, 1968). Racism, for instance, for Fanon was never a phenomenon that is just about economic or political inferiority. Rather, it was the transformation of economic inferiority into subjective inferiority for the black men, which concerned him.23 More recently, others emphasize the extreme asymmetries of power that remain in postcolonial countries like post-apartheid South Africa, and the racial gaps that separate affluence and poverty, and possession from dispossession (Bhabha, 1994; Mannoni, 1990; Young, 2001). To understand the consequences of these extremities, theorists like Fanon and Bhabha move continually between the registers of the sociopolitical and the psychological, to highlight the emotional tensions, ambivalences, and contradictions these extreme differences cause in postcolonial societies.

Postcolonial theory is not just explicitly psychological in it concerns; it also contends that the consequences of the (post-)colonial encounter cannot be understood without attending to their psychological effects (A. A. Cheng, 1997). Such an approach reveals the slipperiness of meaning in the postcolonial context; a result of the emotional ambivalences that characterize the social and racial relationships within postcolonial society. How does this relate to white South Africans? Where Fanon assumed that the white man projected his fears and guilt onto the black man, Bhabha sees the postcolonial situation typified by both desire and hate relations. It is exactly the mixture of emotions, Bhabha argues, the positive pull and negative push, which explains the emotional complexity of the white man’s desires. The psychological “production of difference” is marked by the uncertainty of the (post-)colonial relationship (Bhabha, 1994, p. 63). It is not the structure of meaning that defines postcolonial culture, but the wavering of meaning. Identifications in the postcolonial world are unsure and ambivalent. Anxieties and instability underlie postcolonial power relationships, and produce conflicting emotions that result in slippages of identity and identification.24
Postcolonial theory often suffers from obscure language use and a lack of empirical data. Its underlying psychoanalytic framework is outdated, and I do not want to defend it here. This is probably also the reason why sociology, traditionally, has not engaged with this strand of theorizing (Bhambra, 2007; Goldthorpe; McLennan, 2003). However, postcolonial theory presents a convincing and original argument about how and why emotions matter in the study of whiteness, race, and racism, and how they relate to the instability of cultural meanings. A postcolonial context of great socio-economic and power differences, like that of post-apartheid South Africa, creates emotional tension, uncertainty and ambivalence, even among the dominant race. This particularity of the postcolonial condition challenges a rigid (Western) sociological approach based on cultural ideas about trauma and feeling rules. Instead, it asks for attention to contradictions in peoples’ identifications, sliding of meaning in their stories, and tensions in representations.

NEW RACISM
In South Africa, racism is often still defined as prejudice and hate of the racial other. But white racism has evolved in the wake of worldwide struggles against racism and the official end of white superiority. Ideas about race and racism have changed, and theories on race and racism have shifted with them (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Mullings, 2005). Surveys in the United States, for instance, document a massive positive change in social norms that has taken place regarding race (Bobo, 1998; Bobo & Charles, 2009). The shift in racial norms and the disappearance of systematic racial classification has some doubt the significance and usefulness of the concept of racism and its analytical value. They argue that modern racism is merely the outcome of “cultural fixation or a residue of historical prejudice.” Such a critique is not sufficiently helpful. As Selznick and Steinberg argue, racism is notoriously recalcitrant in the face of historical, discursive, and institutional change (Steinberg, 1969). New racism theorists argue that racism is constantly made and remade and change simply proves the fluidity, mutability and historical contingency of racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000).

“Colorblind racism” defines new racism as a series of concealments and implicit statements. The essence of colorblind racism is that it “explains racial inequality as the outcome of nonracial dynamics” (Bonilla-Silva, 2006, p. 2). Also known as “unmarked racism” (F. V. Harrison, 2005) and “laissez-faire racism” (Bobo & Charles, 2009), the theory is rooted in the new way white people talk about race today; talk that often incorporates the oppositional language of the civil rights struggle. The new cultural discourse, with its emphasis on individual merit, freedom of choice, and cultural difference, facilitates the denial of racism because it conceals the “inner workings” of the social system by attributing contemporary inequality to individual culture or
meritocracy. The theory of symbolic racism, as proposed by David Sears, also theorizes the shift from open racial prejudices and racial hate to a new cultural talk characterized by conservative values and emotional uneasiness with blacks (See also Giroux for the shift from race to cultural talk Giroux, 2003). Sears studied the response of white Americans to affirmative action policies in the 1970s. He discovered a clear shift from white superiority thinking to an emphasis on traditional cultural values and cultural differences in response to new social norms about race and racism (Sears, Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman, 1997; Sears et al., 2000). Symbolic racism defines modern racism as a blend of anti-black sentiment and conservative values, particularly individualism, hard work, self-reliance and punctuality (Sears & Henry, 2003, 2005).

Anti-black sentiment is mostly understood as a spontaneous and direct negative affect; it does not necessarily reflect open hostility or hate but rather a mix of discomfort, uneasiness, disgust, and sometimes fear (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003, p. 5).

New racism theories like “colorblind racism” and “symbolic racism” predict rapid cultural change after apartheid among white South Africans. Moreover, if laws and social norms shift in society when it comes to race, these theories suggest that cultural change is accompanied by shifting emotional patterns and new feeling rules among white South Africans. There are indications that after apartheid, racism is undergoing an ideological transition in South Africa. Some have pointed to new “culture talk” that privileges culture over race in defining difference. Erasmus and Ansell show that the rhetoric of multiculturalism and colorblindness is now employed by South African whites to suggest that the playing field has leveled (Ansell, 2006; Erasmus, 2008). They link it also to opposition by whites to affirmative action, redistribution, and other forms of racial redress.

New racism theories have been critiqued for their empirical vagueness and their limited relevance. Indeed, the theories raise several questions: Can we call implicit racism still racism (Mullings, 2005)? Haven’t new forms of exclusion and dispossession become more important than racism? The first question is mainly a semantic question. As long as race is around, people have to confront how to give meaning to it. To define regular patterns of racial prejudice as racism is justified. The second question is harder to answer. New forms of exclusion have emerged, which are explicitly not built on racism but rather on class and spatial exclusion. For instance, Harvey points to gating and gentrification as processes of dispossession and accumulation that do not rely on racism (Harvey, 2004). Nevertheless, this does not mean racism does not exist anymore.

**Whiteness**

Whiteness studies focus on the various ways white people socially construct their racial identity, how they talk about it, and how they struggle with it...
Racism in whiteness studies is thus reconceptualized as the defense of white privilege, the culturally acceptable beliefs that defend social advantage based on race. This recognizes the structural or stratified nature of racial advantage without reducing race to class, and it takes racial consciousness seriously without analyzing it independently of social structure (Wellman, 1993, p. 25). In relationship to privilege, whiteness scholars emphasize the various ways in which whites negotiate the meaning of their skin color. Whites do so by minimizing, acknowledging, denying, embracing, or feeling guilty about its presupposed privileged status. White people’s assumptions concerning their own identity affect their (race) relationships and attitudes toward others. While early studies in the US made general claims about the invisibility of white privilege to white people, more recent work argues for the cultural, historical, and situational specificity of whiteness (Garner, 2006; McDermont, 2005). Whiteness means different things in different times and places, as studies in various cities and neighborhoods in the United States show (Hartigan, 1999; Kefalas, 2003; McDermott, 2006; Wray, 2006).

Although whiteness is often studied through a social constructivist lens, scholars argue that it is just as well a “way of feeling.” Ahmed, for instance, discusses the interplay of love and hate in the creation of whiteness (Ahmed, 2004, 2007). She points out how whiteness is celebrated through calls to love one’s heritage, belonging, and history. If whiteness is about excluding difference, Hook comments, it is difficult to image a more effective discursive warrant than that of love to do the job of exclusion (Hook, 2005a). More broadly, whiteness scholars suggest that feelings of belonging, nostalgia and collective memory should never be disconnected from the study of whiteness and racism, but critically examined in relation to one another (See also Gilroy, 2004; Hook, 2006). Hook argues that whiteness and emotions are often ambivalently connected through the instrumentalization of the past. Whiteness operates through emotional allusion and references to the past, and to artifacts and values of a less inclusive time and culture (Hook, 2005b). Emotions are used to selectively idealize aspects of the past while effectively erasing others. Tacit emotional references to a racist past are often used in combination with the outward commitment to nonracialism. Hook suggests that this gives whiteness and new racism something neurotic. Racism is openly disavowed but the racist past is tacitly invoked to create community in the present.

In South Africa, whites and Afrikaners were historically never unaware of their “whiteness.” White racial identity in South Africa has never been hidden, unacknowledged, invisible, or been taken for granted. As Helene Strauss notes, “(W)hiteness as dominant narrative has taken a “different guise” in South African context, where the settler minority never experienced
their whiteness and its attendant privileges as invisible” (Strauss, 2004). Rather, as Strauss argues, whiteness was practiced as a “culture of normativity” and as a “norm of universality.” However, after 1994 this has changed. Whiteness has become an ambivalent category (Steyn, 2001, 2004, 2005). While whiteness remains, at times, a resource and dominant in racial hierarchy, it has also been destabilized for its association with apartheid.

3.5 CONCLUSION

How do Afrikaners come to terms with the past, and how do they come to terms with the present? This chapter built on the recent cultural turn in sociology that wants to put culture more at the heart of sociological research and incorporate meaning making in a more systematic way in analysis. I argued that cultural trauma theory is a productive lens to understand Afrikaners after apartheid. The theory foregrounds the role of culture—the meaning making process—in producing a traumatic emotional condition. The theory combines the role of stigma, cultural analysis, and emotional explanation. I revealed several tensions in the theory, which I resolved by introducing a flexible concept of culture and identity; the concept of symbolic boundaries; calling attention to destigmatization strategies; and emphasis on emotional management of specific emotions.

My intersectional and institutional perspective, outlined in the previous chapters, demands a conceptualization of cultural trauma that allows for individual variety. Therefore, I defined culture not as a worldview or a structure, but as a toolkit. In my rendering of cultural trauma theory, a flexible conceptualization of cultural trauma still captures how culture can produce troublesome emotional conditions, without sacrificing individual differences. Moreover, I will be able to ask whether the burden of cultural trauma is divided unequally among Afrikaners. The boundary concept is a powerful tool to study cultural and identity change among Afrikaners. Boundaries vary across institutions and identity categories. Social distance, spatial distance, and symbolic distance interact in unpredictable ways. Pachucki et al. write that “institutions contextualize ethno-racial boundary-work, explain variations in how ethno-racial boundaries constrain the use of specific standards of worth.” This study presents a systematic comparison of how institutions structure boundary-work across a range of institutions (Pachucki, Pendergrass, & Lamont, 2007, p. 337). There has been little research on how boundary work is influenced by emotions, but I see this as a potentially rich area of cross-fertilization (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, p. 170). Do people draw stricter boundaries (less permeable) when they are fearful or shameful? What happens to a group with a stigma? There are class and gender questions here too: how does boundary-making differ between Afrikaner men and women, rich and poor? Which boundaries are drawn between Afrikaners?
In the second part of this chapter, I theorized what it means to come to terms with the present. I showed how the connection between culture and emotions plays a central role in postcolonial theory, new racism theories, and whiteness studies. Postcolonial theorists highlight the permanent emotional tensions within postcolonial societies. New racism theory demonstrates the rapid shift in cultural racism, from racial hate to racial uneasiness, and from explicit to implicit race talk. Whiteness scholars problematize privilege and identity and its interrelationship. These theories suggest that Afrikaners’ troublesome emotional condition is not necessarily only related to the past, but also with the permanent struggle to make sense of South Africa’s post-apartheid daily reality. Questions of racism or assumptions about white domination, central in new racism and whiteness studies, can also be translated into questions about which Afrikaners have become more inclusive or exclusive, in their definitions of self and other. In my study of different groups of Afrikaners, I focus both on the content and interpretive dimension of boundaries, and how they are shaped by and vary between institutions.

The theoretical conversation in this chapter, between approaches from cultural sociology and the sociology of emotions, in addition to postcolonial theory and racism studies, aimed to give this study a solid theoretical grounding. In the next few chapters, I will analyze Afrikaners’ “mental maps” and their “models for living” in different institutions through these conceptual lenses. This approach deserves a sound methodology and a solid methodological grounding.
4. Methodology

4.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I explicate the methodology and the methodological choices that underlie my research. I do this in three parts. In the first part, I build on insights from two strands of discourse analysis, discursive psychology and institutional discourse analysis, to explicate my own approach to discourse analysis, which also incorporates emotions. In the second part of this chapter, I juxtapose my discursive approach with intersectional analysis. It is through the intersection of class, gender, and generation that the working of cultural discourses and emotions reveals itself. In the third part, I interpret my case study approach, the case study choices, interview methods, several ethical considerations, and finally the limitations of this study.

4.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Discourse analysis studies how cultural knowledge is put to work. It is based on the idea that language profoundly shapes one’s cultural views of the world and one’s place in it, instead of only being a neutral medium mirroring it. An emphasis on language demands a discursive approach and a rationale underlying the discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is the study of “text” in its broadest sense. Discourse is a category that designates the broadly semiotic elements of social life and the intersubjective production of meaning (Moulaert & Jessop, 2009). Discourse, by definition, is what enables and constrains people. It enables by privileging some speakers over others. It constrains by having taboos and rituals, and by limiting the number of subject positions possible. Discourse analysis warns us to be skeptical of statements’ originality and people’s freedom of expression. It directs us also to what cannot be said. Discursive analysis is particularly useful when uncertainty and social contradictions undermine behavior and open new spaces for argumentation and rhetoric. In times of uncertainty, institutions and
Discourses are crucial to the social construction and determination of meaning and culture.

**Discourse as a Way of Seeing the World**

Discourse analysis emphasizes the role of written and spoken language in people’s constructing of the world, and the orientation of people toward social action (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Language is a dynamic form of social practice that shapes the social world and people’s identities, social relations, and understandings of the world. Discursive psychology, specifically, is about how people’s accounts of themselves, experiences, and events are established as solid, real, and stable, and how competing discourses are created as false and biased. It is about how people use identities as a resource and enlist them to accomplish the business of talk. Discursive psychologists use the concept of “interpretive repertoire” to emphasize that discourses are drawn upon in social interaction as flexible resources (Wetherell & Potter, 1992, p. 90).

Methodologically, discursive psychology focuses on specific instances in which utterances (the discourse) are oriented toward action. Meaning is dependent on the particular use to which an utterance is put. Variation in people’s expressions and attitudes, discursive psychologists say, is the rule rather than the exception. Inconsistencies in people talk double as rhetorical strategies. In fact, people do not have isolated attitudes but these are rather part of a larger system of meaning. Philips and Jørgensen argue that people give meaning to their experiences by virtue of the words that are available: “The resulting meanings contribute to producing the experience rather than being merely a description of the experience or an ‘after-the-event’ occurrence. Phenomena only gain meaning through discourses” (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002, p 103). Positioning is an integral part of meaning making processes. People construct accounts of themselves in interacting with others (B. a. H. Davies, R, 1990; Philips & Jorgensen, 1997).

The approach of discursive psychology dovetails nicely with subjectivist understandings of culture and ethnicity in sociology (Brubaker, 2004; Cerulo, 1997; DiMagio, 1997). Since constructivist accounts replaced objectivist approaches toward ethnicity, ethnicity is no longer defined in terms of objective commonalities, but in terms of participants’ beliefs, perceptions, understandings, and identifications. For all the postmodern talk about “fragmented” and “hyphenated” ethnic identities, individuals still identify “persons, actions, threats, problems, opportunities, obligations, loyalties, interests, and so on in racial, ethnic, or national terms rather than in terms of some other interpretive scheme” (Brubaker, 2004, p. 34). Although the connection between social categories and popular self-understanding has loosened, Brubaker suggests that we can nevertheless make cognitive assumptions about the way in which people parse, frame, and interpret their experience.
I propose to call this first perspective discourse as a way of seeing perspective on culture. This psychologically informed perspective sees culture (ethnicity and identity) not as something in this world but as a perspective on the world. It is a viewpoint from within. The perspective draws on discursive psychology and subjectivist approaches in sociology to emphasize that people see and interpret the world through particular schemata and frames. The perspective sees culture in action as a “toolbox” that people employ to explain their way of seeing and doing (Swindler, 1986). The center of interest is the individual’s uncertainty about the identification of the situation, the interpretative effort, and the discursive resources available (Jessop, 2001; Wagner, 1994, p. 274). It is the results of this effort that can make the situation a shared and common one.

Critical discourse analysts and critical psychologists have critiqued such an approach for its failure to incorporate power and the material and institutional contexts (Fairclough, 1992 (a), 1993; Hook, 2001, 2007). They argue that Foucault and Said, the founding fathers of discourse analysis, never limited their analysis to text and the analysis of people’s interpretative repertoire. “Foucault points out,” Hook wrote, “that the power in language links to, and stems from, external, material, and tactical forms of power” (Hook, 2001, p. 536). Foucault urged researchers to engage in a broad way with discourse. He asked questions such as: how do discourses make claims about reality? What counts as reasonable knowledge? Which discourses are possible? (Foucault, 1971, 1980; Hook, 2007). Said also looked beyond text and argued that we should not grant too much power to it. According to him, discourse analysts need to “move in and out of text” to understand the workings of discourse (Said, 1983). Ultimately, both Foucault and Said suggest there is no clear boundary between discursive and extra-discursive; the focus should be on the discursive effects of the material and the material effects of the discursive (Hook, 2005a, p. 30).

In Institutions and the Production of Discourse Perspective Discourse analysis is always about text and context, and connected to material relations. Discourses are anchored in material practices and institutionally supported. What we should study are the discursive qualities of the (supposedly) extra-discursive (Foucault, 1980; Hook, 2001). Analysis should not limit itself to the study of discourse as texts, interpretative repertoire, and the rhetorical strategies of speakers (Fairclough, 1993, p 25; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). As Hooks explains, Foucault and Said focused on three related issues: (1) the linkages between discourse and materiality; (2) the conditions of possibility; and (3) the historical circumstances (Foucault, 1977). Firstly, Foucault sees discourse as effect and as instrument. His focus was on the omission of knowledge, materiality and power in discourse, rather than on the language itself (Hook, 2001). Secondly, every discourse is a language of control; discourse is the thing that is done. Discourse analysis is
rooted in a skepticism toward all those rationales, explanations and statements that would validate themselves on the grounds of their proximity to a supposed truthfulness (Said, 1983, p.216). Thirdly, the goal of discourse analysis is to rediscover the origins of discourses, and to uncover its affiliations with institutions and agencies. Although discourse is a form of practice, we need to interrogate the present, and to examine its values and understandings.

The Foucauldian view of discourse fits well with recent sociological institutional approaches, which try to incorporate a discursive approach to explain the durability of institutions (Jessop, 2007; Powell, 1991). Institutions are defined as social practices that are regularly and continuously repeated, that are linked to defined roles and social relations, that are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and that have a major significance in the social structure (Jessop, 2001, p. 1220). Jessop emphasized how the shaping of institutions may privilege some identities and discursive strategies over others, and also the ways in which individuals or groups take account of this differential privileging (Jessop, 2001, 2004, 2007). He argued that institutions do not simply involve and influence the conduct of people, but that they also actively constitute identities, interests, and strategies. Institutions help to stabilize the cognitive, normative and emotional expectations of people by shaping and promoting a common worldview. Relations rather than isolated entities should be the primary unit of analysis for a discursive/institutional approach (Jessop, 2004).

I call this second discursive/institutional perspective the production perspective on culture. The emphasis of the analysis is on the (re)production of discourse through institutions. The analysis focuses on the way “culture talk” (but also “identity talk” and “race talk”) is produced and used in institutions and the public debate, often to achieve particular political or economic ends. It is a perspective from the outside. The analysis zooms in how particular issues are “culturized” or “ethnicized” for strategic purposes. Its analytical focus is on the politics of identity and the power dynamics behind discourses of culture. The goal is to map cultural discourses and to trace their outline and relations across a variety of discourse forms and objects.

The two discourse perspectives on culture are neither contradictive nor mutually exclusive, yet rarely used together. I argue they are very well compatible; the perspectives mostly have a different emphasis. Where the culture as a way of seeing perspective emphasis is on how culture resides inside people (in their way of speaking and seeing); the culture as production perspective emphasizes the (institutional) context in which this cultural worldview is produced. Each perspective has its strength and weaknesses. The production perspective is strong in analyzing institutional change but often overlooks the real influence of identity, ethnicity and culture in people’s lives. It too often suggests these concepts are only meaningful if used by
political actors for another purpose. On the other hand, cultural discourses of individuals cannot be productively analyzed without locating people in the wider institutional context.

**Discourse as a Way of Feeling**

The two discursive perspectives above do not include emotions. In the past, discourse theorists argued that emotions are too individualistic to matter for discourse analysis. However, today, most discourse theorists nuance the old hegemonic claims of discourse analysts like Foucault and Said (Foucault, 1980; Said, 1983). They acknowledge that discourse analysis often cannot explain why some discourses fail while others succeed in convincing the public (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). They emphasize the importance of institutional and subject variety. Nevertheless, they have problems measuring “resonance” with the public (Bröer & Duyvendak, 2009). How do we explain the psychological investment of people in particular discourses? Why do people position themselves, or invest in, particular discourses? I push my discursive perspective beyond cognition by incorporating emotions.

In chapter 3, I demonstrated how this study integrates the sociology of emotions and cultural sociology. I argue that culture, ethnicity and identity should also be seen as a way of feeling the world. I build on work by Scheff and Besnier, but also cultural psychologists such as Quinn and Strauss (Besnier, 1990, 1994; Quinn & Strauss, 2006; Scheff, 2000). Ethnic groups have similar ways of experiencing emotions around particular topics and similar patterns in dealing with them. This is related to the common language they have and the history they share, but also depended to the type of society they build and live in. Emotions effectively communicate belonging because emotional ties feel authentic and individual; they are experienced in a state prior to the interventions of social and symbolic meaning. Emotions, Hook shows, are a powerful way to communicate race and ethnicity precisely because their connection to representation is less fixed to a set of physical or discursive coordinates (Hook, 2006). Although emotions can be the same for people, I follow James Jasper to argue for methodological individualism when it comes to emotions. Cultural beliefs, identities, and emotions only have an effect through individuals.

4.3 An Intersectional Analysis

In this study, I systematically compare the experience of different groups of Afrikaners. They are compared along the axis and categories of class, gender, and generation. In other words, I look at Afrikaners through an intersectional lens. The intersectional approach originated from feminist studies and focused on the experiences of groups holding multiple disadvantaged status, like for instance black women (Crenshaw, 1993; King, 1988; Knapp, 2005). However, such a framework can also inform the analysis of privileged groups.
Cole argues that an intersectional analysis has three aims: first, it exposes diversity in social categories; second, it illuminates hierarchies in privilege; and third, it exposes commonalities cutting across categories. To identify and investigate explicitly the multiple identities that define white Afrikaans privilege disrupt assumptions of similarity and exposes variety and difference (Cole, 2009).

An intragroup comparison moves this study beyond the limits of a traditional group’s ethnography. Yet, the goal is not to arrive at a typology of different kinds of Afrikaners (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Steyn, 2001; Wellman, 1993). Instead, I want to analyze how categories of class, race, gender, and generation play a role in shaping cultural and identity through emotions. An intersectional analysis facilitates the ability to theorize and empirically investigate the ways social categories structure individual and social life across a culture. Rather than looking “downstream” to individual characteristics, intersectional analysis forces the researcher to look “upstream” to the different social locations people hold. Social practices that construct race, class, gender, and generation always involve hierarchy and inequality (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Risman, 2004). Cultural sociology often overlooks hierarchies of power or does not take them sufficiently into consideration. This is something I want to correct.

Intersectional analysis helps to unpack the concept of “cultural trauma.” It does so in three ways. First, it critically examines cultural explanations by “deconstructing” which patterns are truly cultural or rather, an effect of categories of gender, class, or generation. Second, an intersectional analysis not only compares different categories and their intersections, it also prevents us from a totalizing or determinative view of identity. Third, categories like class, gender, and generation shape the landscape of culture. Intersectional analysis is particularly productive when used in combination with cultural and emotional explanations. It strengthens the explanatory power of cultural analysis and exposes the different cultural and emotional mechanisms at work. Elster sees the idea of mechanism as intermediate between laws and description. Mechanisms, according to Elster, are “frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences” (J. Elster, 1999). Variation within a group can no longer simply be explained by “culture” or “emotions” but have to be explored in interaction. By comparing men to women or the rich to the poor within a culture, cultural mechanisms might be exposed for really being about emotions; and gender or racial discourses really about class. Intersectional analysis has to be precise to be fruitful.

4.4 CASE-STUDY APPROACH

This study uses a case-study approach. "A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009, p.18). Afrikaners, as a group and case study, are an atypical case in many perspectives: a white minority in Africa, which experienced a rapid drop in status and a dramatic loss of political power. But extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more basic mechanisms in a given situation (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2001).

This study also takes a case-study approach within a case study. I focus on a handful of case studies in different places. Shifting attention from case to case, and from institution to institution, allows a comparison of various groups of Afrikaners, and also reveals the disparate avenues through which change is lived. Work for instance highlights class differences, while school desegregation throws generational differences in sharp relief. Specifically, I study cultural change through the analysis of six cases in three institutional spheres. To select these six cases, I used the maximum variation approach, selecting in each institutional sphere the most different cases. Such an extreme comparison of cases exposes both similarities in the use of cultural discourse but also institutional variety.

A case-study approach of various institutional contexts helps illuminate the realities of white Afrikaner resistance and change in a number of ways. First, such a perspective best brings into focus the complex relationship between people and places, which are always their clearest at the local level. Second, the focus shifts from revisiting old and outdated categories to the emergence of new ways of talking and seeing. Indeed, my case-study approach affirms that production of white talk happens in the opposite direction than the apartheid era. The top-down approach of the National Party has been replaced by a cultural discourse shaped from the bottom up. Third, the local perspective illuminates not only the possibilities but also the limitations of reconciliation and white identity change.

**Selection of Case Studies**

This study has selected case studies within the institutional sphere of work, living, and education. I build my analysis on the many micro-studies that appeared after 1994 and looked at partial aspects of the transition on a small scale: Labor sociologist who studied the introduction of affirmative action and changes in the labor market (Part 2); geographers and planners who mapped the emergence of new urban forms (Part 3); and educationalists who studied integration and desegregation (Part 4). Together, these micro studies present a more complicated picture of the transition than the grand narratives, as discussed in chapter 2. Institutions impact people differently: schools influence the younger generation; the work sphere, at least in South Africa, is still dominated by men; and ideas of home and community tend to be dominated by females. Each institution had its own particular trajectory of change after 1994, in which different forces coalesced to produce a specific
outcome. These trajectories are discussed at the start of the different parts of my study.

The choice of specific institutions depended on political, theoretical and practical factors. Politically, it seemed to me, the institutions of work, living, and education were the most contested after the end of apartheid. In the South African economy, we saw the introduction of racial redress in the form of affirmative action and black economic empowerment that strongly impacted the white Afrikaner community. In the sphere of home, we saw the emergence of gated communities, particular popular among white South Africans, which remade the urban landscape. In schools, desegregation and racial integration provided significant challenges for white Afrikaners. Theoretically, if I were looking for signs of cultural change, therefore, a focus on the new generation and their school environment was logical. But the study of the younger generation needed a contrast. The older generation faced its own challenges both at work and in the home sphere, and it was interesting to imagine how these two spheres interacted. At work, the white Afrikaner was forced to integrate and work together with his or her black fellow South Africans. At home he possibly had more choices. Practically, it seemed, studying white Afrikaners in these particular contexts had considerable advantages related to the appropriateness of the cases, language, research interest, and access to the fieldwork sites.

In the work sphere, I decided to study two organizations active in the economic sphere instead of individual Afrikaners in specific economic sectors or workplaces. After all, I was interested in how cultural discourses among Afrikaners changed, newly created and reconstructed. After my exploratory fieldwork, two Afrikaner organizations seemed particularly successful and active after 1994. The first was the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (AHI), the former chamber of commerce for Afrikaners, which had survived the transition and now presented itself as a racially integrated organization. Solidarity, the former labor (or trade) union of white and most Afrikaans mineworkers, equally had survived the transition to democracy, and now was a prominent voice on labor issues in the media, often taking a stand in opposition of the AHI. I chose these two cases for several reasons. First, they were one of the few organizations that had survived the transition to democracy and seemed still successful and with influence. Second, they each represented a group of Afrikaners at opposites of the class spectrum, which allowed for good comparison. Third, both organizations still largely used the language of Afrikaans, a language that I learned to understand and use during the fieldwork. Fourth, they still represented a large constituency.

In the sphere of home and living, I chose to look at a case study of an upmarket gated community for a number of reasons. This was a choice to study the implication of gating in its most extreme form. But such a wealthy community was at the extreme end of the much broader movement toward
the securitization and gating of neighborhoods. This happened across the urban landscape in South Africa after apartheid. Particularly in the area of Gauteng, almost 90 percent of new urban development is gated in one way or another, with many old, wealthy neighborhoods also being closed (Lemanski, Landman, & Durington, 2008). Initially, the goal was to contrast this with a study of a poor white working-class neighborhood. But as my pilot research showed, little if anything had really changed in these neighborhoods (Teppo, 2004, 2008). My interviews with lower middle-class white Afrikaners showed that it was not the neighborhood they lived in that had changed, even if urban services had gotten worse. Their home and neighborhood were still perceived as a safe haven, compared to their experience at work. Rather, it was the city they worked in—the public sphere—that was increasingly experienced as scary, hostile, and dirty. Therefore, I have chosen to contrast the experience of home in a gated community, with the images of the city of the lower middle class.

In the institutional sphere of education, I have chosen two case studies of schools that lie at the extreme ends of the spectrum. At first, my aim was to select an elite Afrikaans school that was hardly integrated and compare it with a lower-middle-class Afrikaans school that was (more) racially integrated. As it turned out, most lower-middle-class schools are not “stably” integrated. Rather, they have moved rather quickly from being a segregated whites-only school to desegregation to resegregation, ultimately slowly turning into all-black schools with no white Afrikaans children. The lower-middle-class school I had selected, based on recommendations from South African educational experts, was such a school that had been integrated for a few years but was now rapidly desegregating. But this comparison turned out to be equally interesting, displaying in full view the effects of very moderate racial integration at elite Afrikaans schools, with the devastating impact of desegregation and resegregation on fragile lower-middle-class schools (Soudien, 2007).

The developments in each of the three institutional spheres are very different, but in all cases the focus is on Afrikaners and their views and feelings about change. Nevertheless, I choose to emphasize in each case a different and specific subgroup of Afrikaners. For instance, in the chapters on the two schools, I decided to focus solely on the students and not to cover much on the teachers. Also, to highlight gender differences, I focus on one gender group. Although in every case I researched both men and women, I chose to focus on one gender in the presentation of evidence, to draw the strongest contrasts. Data on the other gender group is used as comparison, without being (fully) presented in the study.

Some readers are skeptical about a case-study approach, for they feel this does not allow for generalizations. However, as Bent Flyvbjerg argues, it is simply not true that case studies are only good for generating hypotheses.
Case studies already prove the point what is happening and at stake, although they rather permit for analytical than statistical generalizations (Robson, 2002). I believe that it is often more important to clarify deeper causes behind a given problem than it is to describe symptoms of a problem and the statistical frequency of their occurrence (Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2001). Case studies focus on individual actors or groups and seek to understand the events from their perspective. As a corrective account to the grand theorizing about “cultural trauma” discussed in chapters 1 and 3, my approach shows that in the current media age, a detailed case-study approach at the meso level still has much explanatory value.

Access Negotiation

Afrikaners love to talk about their country, themselves, and the relation between the two. Nevertheless, they are weary of outside researchers coming in to interview, describe, and—presumably—judge them. What is more, organizations like the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, Solidarity, elite schools like De La Rey, and private communities like Golden Sun are extremely guarded against outsiders that might accuse their organization of racism, or even simply stir the “peace.” In other words, with all case studies negotiation access was an important issue. This presented two challenges. First, I had to tread carefully, introduce myself with the main players in the organizations, and, most of all, refrain from any judgmental stance. Second, I often described my research goals in very neutral terminology, never mentioning my interest in race relationships or racism (or the challenge to unlearn it!). Generally, I simply said I was interested in studying the challenge of Afrikaners in post-apartheid South Africa, in their culture, and identity. Although these terms, I felt, described my project accurately, I might have formulated my research questions more critically if I felt it would not have influenced access issues.

Nevertheless, whether I was interning at the labor union Solidarity, obtaining sensitive documents about AHI’s application to the TRC, or doing interviews during school time with students, I always received a surprising amount of cooperation and help. I had the impression that my gender, language affinity, academic status, and of course skin color strongly contributed to this access. The AHI, Solidarity, heads of schools, and even the board of the gated community and its staff are strongly male dominated. Particularly in the latter stage of my fieldwork, my command of Afrikaans improved and facilitated interactions at organizations such as Solidarity, where Afrikaans is the dominant language spoken. Afrikaners, in general, have high regard for academic titles. Many interviewees, actually, had their academic degrees framed and hanging in their office; all but a few of the interviewees showed great interest in my academic studies. The impression that my skin color mattered a great deal was ultimately tested when a female
student of mine, originally from Sudan, was denied permission at De La Rey school to even distribute surveys.

Access, finally, is not only about actually being able to obtain documents or interview people, but ultimately also about control over the interview and the questions. Chief executives of operations of large companies, heads of schools, and political operators at a labor union proved much more challenging to interview than young students, community residents, or labor union members. Aware of their image and sensitive political topics, they redirected or refused to answer several questions, and in general tried to steer the conversation. Over time, I improved my interview methods but I cannot say that the “access” at times was a good as I wanted it to be.

4.5 DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS
Three types of data have been collected and analyzed for this research: documents, observations, and interviews.

Documents and Observations
Throughout my research, I collected a range of documents at different places and organizations, including AHI, Solidarity, schools, and gated communities, as well as universities, government departments, and from private individuals. These documents included research reports, administrative data, meeting notes, archival materials, private letters, and media publications. I also collected various multimedia material, including documentaries, films, archival video material and photos, and digital maps. Observation can provide essential data in addition to documents and can help to corroborate secondhand accounts like interviews. In the end, few of this observation data were directly used in the book. But the observing did provided me with essential background information to frame my findings and illustrate my cases. Most of all, these participatory experiences helped me to understand and feel the experiences of the people I interviewed in a way I could have hardly imagined.

Conducting Interviews and Data Analysis
At the heart of this research is a body of interviews with over 160 Afrikaners. Interviewing is a rich method for the collection of data. Interviews are useful in understanding individuals’ perspectives and interpretation of events. During interviews, nonverbal data is conveyed through body language, sighs, and sounds. Practically, during my interviews, I followed the interview guide approach. This is a method by which topics are preselected to structure the interview. Such an approach allows for consistency and order during the interviews as well as variety, depending on individual accounts (Patton, 1990). My approach to interviewing is different from what is common in content analysis, both in interview style and aim of analysis (Krippendorff, 2004). Stylistically, semistructured interviews do not demand some type of
elusive objectivity of the interviewer. The approach encourages respondents to take a stance because this puts discourse in question. In interviews, leading questions are an essential part of the interaction. Analytically, discourse analysis does not aim to count or code words but ultimately explore the relation between language, meaning, and people’s psychological state (Phillips & Jørgensen, 2002). It codes interviews by identifying themes. I specifically looked for incongruities and inconsistencies, moments where the interaction between question and answer seems to go wrong; where the respondent repeats a statement, hesitates, falls silent, or changes in style (Fairclough, 1992 (a)). Incongruities, variations, inconsistencies, or self-contradictory statements in answers do not reflect errors but can signal different discourses and heightened emotional intensity.

The majority of interviews were conducted in Afrikaans, the native language of Afrikaners. During the fieldwork, my Afrikaans improved considerably, but I also got more confident to demand that people speak Afrikaans to me. Initially, the adolescents I interviewed were reluctant to speak Afrikaans. Many of the school cases were thus in English. But the other four cases were mostly done in Afrikaans and were transcribed by white Afrikaans students. Doing research in Afrikaans enriched my data considerably. The interviews were held in a variety of locations: at home, at their work, at school, in public spaces, and in their cars. They ranged in duration from 30 minutes to over 4 hours. Some people were interviewed more than once. Most interviews were taped, on the record, and later transcribed, although some interviewees desired anonymity. The interviews were conducted in three rounds with a range of people within the different institutional spheres.

Overview of Interviews
A first round of 50 interviews with South African researchers, journalists, writers, politicians, schoolteachers, and businessmen and -women, was done when I first visited the field. This helped initially to orient myself, to identity the different case studies, and to provide access to the different organizations. The information provided also greatly helped me to identity how different groups of Afrikaners understood their position and place in post-apartheid South Africa, and to see how great the differences really were. The second round of interviews, during my second field trip, involved both school cases. First, I interviewed officials of the department of education, heads of schools, teachers, and academics. Based on their information, I selected two schools and at both schools I interviewed administrators and teachers; in total, around 20 people. Following that, I conducted interviews with more than 20 students at both schools with both girls and boys. Although in the cases I focus on white Afrikaans adolescents in one particular class, I interviewed students in different classes and also included interviews with coloureds, black and white English students.
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In a third round of interviews, during my third field trip, I focused on the cases of work and home. Each of these cases was research from a slightly different angle related to my own position. For three months I interned at Solidarity. During that time, I also researched AHI while I lived for two months in a gated community in Pretoria. At Solidarity, I participated in meetings, had many informal conversations, observed, and even went along on road trips of the leadership. Next to this, I conducted more than 40 interviews with both staff members and members of the union, both male and female and from a variety of companies. The interviews with union members were conducted at the offices of Solidarity or at their respective companies; in particular Telkom and Eskom. The material I use for chapter 9 about the experience of living among the lower middle class is also based on these interviews. For the AHI case I interviewed over 20 board members, present and past, directors, and personnel. I also interviewed around 15 businessmen who were members of business organizations but not necessarily AHI. Finally, while living in the gated community, I participated in meetings, festivities, and security patrols, and interviewed over 40 people involved in the community, including homeowner association board members, personnel, real estate brokers, and residents. While again the focus was on white Afrikaners, I also interviewed several black and English white residents.

REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER

The choice to use interviews as my main data-collection method for this research brought along several challenges for me as a researcher. Interviews are most fruitful in an environment of trust and mutual respect between interviewer and interviewees. Before the interviews, I tried to build trust by explaining the scope and goals of my study, my interest in studying Afrikaners, and my consideration for the many challenges life in South Africa brought for its people—even if they were relatively wealthy. I stressed that everything that was said was confidential and anonymous and that I was not there to control or judge what they said. Most of all, I said that I wanted to understand their experiences, interpretations, and feelings.

During the interviews, I was often exposed to opinions, feelings, and judgments I did not share. The most difficult moments were when people solicited empathy or confirmation for views that I interpreted as racist. At best as I could, I remained neutral in such cases and did not allow for discussion or counter question. It is not always easy to stay focused and interested when racism appears. At the same time, I am convinced that if such talk is only dismissed and treated moralistically, the interview will not produce sincere results. My approach was to remain curious and interested. The goal was to always probe behind the racism, even though there is not always something behind it. If you want to seriously study and analyze Afrikaners, the racism should not be taken for granted but contextualized.
Too often in race research, the racist discourse is simply dismissed and never sufficiently problematized.

**Ethical Considerations**

At the end of each interview, I left time for the respondent to ask questions and discuss anything further. Many times the questions people had revolved around what I thought of their views and opinions. My approach was to never be dishonest about my own convictions, but also not to pass judgments or be disrespectful toward my interviewees. If you refuse to share your own opinions during the fieldwork, you can end up betraying people’s trust when you in the end write that you do not agree with them. Ultimately, I felt that none of the interviews ever ended in anything worse than a simple disagreement of opinions. Many Afrikaners, I experienced, welcomed an outsider’s perspective and a different opinion. In their own struggle to understand South Africa’s complicated reality and societal challenges, I experienced them as open to debate, if not always to alternative opinions.

**Limitations of the Study**

This study has a number of limitations, both small and large. Of the small limitations, I feel that, as a Dutch researcher, my growing understanding of Afrikaans had great advantages, which I initially did not fully explore. Doing most of my research in Afrikaans proved one of the most productive and insightful developments in the field. The level of intimacy, detail, and immediacy that my material gained was substantial. Of the larger limitations, the setup of research—with six case studies in three intuitional fields—always implied a tradeoff between time, resources, and the scope of the study. Often, I struggled with this tradeoff. I think my cases of the schools, Solidarity, and the gated community have been enriched by my observations and time spent at the research site. But for the case of the AHI, I did not have that luxury. I also solely focused on AHI’s national level, and did not have the time or resources to study the local level as much as I wanted. Furthermore, I regret I did not have the time to do a complete case study of an older lower-middle-class Afrikaner neighborhood. Instead, I had to settle for the material I had gathered through interviews about work. Although a balance in time and resources between cases was sometimes hard to realize, and is never completely equal, I do feel I achieved a successful balance.

4.6 **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have outlined three levels of analysis. The first is the study of discourse as a helpful theoretical and methodological tool to study cultural and identity change. It identifies the structuring qualities and changes in the different narratives about ethnic groups, which are helpful to incorporate a time perspective. But discourses as sole epistemology or level of analysis is problematic. Discourses are related, connected, and partly driven by concrete
institutions and circumstances. Changes in discourses are influenced and
shaped by institutions and the changing institutional field. Institutions
structure the way discourses change and also influence the way people have
access and use discourses.

The second level of analysis is institutions. Given my focus on the
production and reproduction of ethnicity, I have opted for the education,
work, and living as central structuring institutions. An institutional analysis
connects culture and identity discourses to the material and institutional
conditions of people and the power they can still exert. Only if we study the
various identity dynamics in the different spheres of education, work, and
living can we ultimately expose the connections between the processes of
reconciliation and culture and identity change and a changing institutional
context. Finally, in locating the process of Afrikaner culture and identity
change in its proper institutional context, the experience of Afrikaners
becomes less idiosyncratic and exceptional.

The third level of analysis is individuals. They use culture and identity
often in fragmented, contradictory, and reflective ways. People as social
beings not only have to make sense of their world and give it meaning, they
also have a natural need to belong. Further, while the way people talk tells us
a lot about them, the role of action and embodiment should not be
overlooked. People are acting, moral, and emotional beings. The way people
talk is often not in congruence with the way they act. Their social psychology
can often be inferred from their talk but also has to be studied and
conceptualized independently. To conclude, the approach taken here
acknowledges the large mediating role of language in people’s lives, but does
not reduce people to their talk. It links people’s use of discourses to their
daily functioning in institutions, and combines the individual study of
discourse and action with a focus on the individual and the collective and
individual psychology of people.