Tracing mobilities regimes: The regulation of drug smuggling and labour migration at two airports in the Netherlands and Indonesia
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Chapter 3

Securitizing ‘risk flights’

Drug smuggler profiles, body searches, and the arrival of passengers from the Caribbean at Schiphol Airport

Introduction

It is 29 December 2009. At Paramaribo’s Johan Adolf Pengel Airport, Roy Narain checks in for the KLM flight that will take him home to the Netherlands. Roy is a Dutchman of Surinamese descent whose work as a real estate agent in both the Netherlands and Suriname requires him to fly between the two countries five or more times a year. At the check-in desk, Roy senses somebody is keeping an eye on him. Being a frequent traveller on this route, he recognizes one of the undercover police officers who observe the public and sometimes take people aside for extra checks. Roy leaves his hold baggage at the check-in desk and proceeds to the next checkpoint, where an official scans his hand baggage, asks him a few questions, and does a quick pat-down. Roy is allowed to proceed, passes the border police, and waits for boarding in the lounge. A few hours earlier, Dutch Customs at Schiphol accessed Roy’s passenger data and those of his fellow travellers in the airline’s database in order to do a risk analysis.

The flight takes about nine hours. Shortly after the plane has taxied to the parking slot at Schiphol Airport, Roy sees from his window that Dutch Customs officials have parked their cars on the airstrip to form a cordon around the airplane. At the unfasten seatbelts sign, Roy tries to get off the plane as quickly as possible to avoid ending up in a long queue at the checkpoints. As he moves through the aviobridge, Customs officials with sniffer dogs observe the passengers. The aviobridge leads travellers into a waiting room, a closed-off space with frosted-glass walls where most of the so-called ‘100% check’ takes place. Roy is one of the first travellers to reach the Customs desk. He shows his passport, and to his surprise the official doesn’t ask him any questions. Next, Roy’s hand baggage is scanned and he moves through a metal detector. Again, nothing suspicious is detected and he leaves the room to join the regular passenger flow in the transit area of the airport.

Roy proceeds to the regular border checkpoints and lines up for the passport check for EU citizens. When he enters the baggage claim area, a sign directs passengers from the Paramaribo flight to the fenced-off baggage belts 18 and 19. Passengers from other flights may notice these fences, but cannot see what happens behind them. Inside the fenced-off space, all Roy’s baggage goes through yet another x-ray scanner. Roy has brought his wife some spices from Suriname which are neatly packed in transparent Tupperware boxes. Packing them in tin foil, he thinks, might raise suspicion. A Customs official pulls Roy’s suitcase aside, has a short look at the contents, and then wishes him a pleasant day. Roy moves through the sliding doors to enter Schiphol Plaza, the public arrival hall. His son is waiting there to drive him home.
This is the first of two chapters that examine anti-drug-smuggling checks as a case study in the regulation of mobilities. In analysing this case, I will identify specific aspects of a mobilities regime. Air travellers from certain Caribbean countries – Suriname, the former Netherlands Antilles, Aruba and Venezuela – face anti-drug-smuggling checks on their way to and upon arrival at Schiphol Airport on a routine basis. The checks on movements between the Caribbean countries and the Netherlands are intended to facilitate international mobility while at the same time blocking movements that are considered malafide. Roy’s journey illustrates how the average traveller goes through several checkpoints where potential drug smugglers are filtered out of the passenger flow. In this chapter I discuss how this happens, by considering a number of technologies intended to identify drug smugglers and to detect drugs hidden on or in bodies. How do these technologies put people into categories and what effects do these classification practices have on travellers? Because malafide mobility in this case involves people as well as goods – many smugglers hide drugs on or in their bodies – most of the regulatory practices are complex and intrusive. I focus in particular on technologies that work at the micro level of the body and at the meso level of travellers’ movements. I examine how, as travellers move from the Caribbean to Schiphol Airport, their movements and bodies are classified, examined, and controlled in various ways, and how this creates a particular mobile subject. In discussing this case, the part of the Caribbean region I focus on is the Dutch Caribbean and Suriname.

Historical circuits

Both Suriname and the Dutch Caribbean are former Dutch colonies and there is a long history of mobility of people and goods between the countries. In the early 17th century, the Dutch arrived in the waters of the Caribbean for the first time, searching for salt-pans. Suriname and the Caribbean islands soon became important hubs in Dutch trade routes carrying sugar and slaves (Goslinga 1979). Decolonization was not until after World War II. In 1954, Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles became separate countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Suriname became fully independent in 1975, whereas Curacao, Sint Maarten, Aruba, and the islands that form the Caribbean Netherlands are still part of the Kingdom26. Inhabitants of these islands therefore have Dutch nationality. In 1975 each Surinamese could opt for either Dutch or Surinamese nationality. In the years following

26 Aruba was granted the status of an autonomous country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1986, which until 2010 consisted of the Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba. On 10 October 2010 the Netherlands Antilles as a country was dissolved. Curacao and Sint Maarten became autonomous countries within the Kingdom, and Bonaire, Sint-Eustatius and Saba became special Dutch municipalities and are now referred to as the Caribbean Netherlands.
independence, about 100,000 inhabitants (more than 25% of the population) left Suriname for the Netherlands. These Dutch of Surinamese origin now need a visa to enter Suriname, just as Surinamese now need a visa to visit the Netherlands.

Today, many people travel between the Caribbean\textsuperscript{27} and the Netherlands because of family ties or business. There are 18 scheduled flights per week between Paramaribo and Amsterdam and 32 between Curacao (the largest island of the Dutch Caribbean) and Amsterdam\textsuperscript{28}, with even more flights during holiday periods. The flight routes between the Netherlands and the Caribbean are among the oldest transatlantic flight routes on the globe. The accompanying picture shows the first KLM flight from Schiphol to Paramaribo, with final destination Hato airport in Curacao, in 1934 (a journey that took 8 days, with 6 stopovers!).


\textsuperscript{27} The Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, and Suriname will hereafter be referred to together as ‘the Caribbean’.

\textsuperscript{28} Scheduled flights for a week in March 2010. 18 flights per week between Paramaribo and Amsterdam means 9 inbound and 9 outbound, 32 flights per week between Curacao and Amsterdam means 16 inbound and 16 outbound.
Existing links between the countries facilitate not only the legal mobilities of tourism, family visits, and business trips, but also illegal mobilities. Suriname and the Dutch Caribbean islands are transit areas for cocaine produced in South America (Dienst Nationale Recherche 2005), and Schiphol Airport is a major gateway to Europe. The good transport connections and extended migration networks between Suriname and the Caribbean and the Netherlands and the fact that inhabitants of the Dutch Caribbean islands can enter the Netherlands without a visa make the routes attractive for drug smuggling. Drug smuggling via air travel relies primarily on an infrastructure of migrant networks (Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 28 192, no. 23). While the links between the countries make drug smuggling relatively easy, it is the borders that make it so worthwhile. After crossing the Dutch – and at the same time the European – border at Schiphol, the drugs sharply increase in value. These characteristics – transport and migration links combined with borders that create added value – are not unique to the Netherlands and its former colonies. Flows of contraband items – drugs in particular – also move from Jamaica to Britain (see Haughton 2007; Bowling 2010), and from French Guyana to France.

Policy responses: the emergence of an extraordinary mobilities regime

In the early 2000s, drug smuggling to Europe from the Caribbean via Schiphol became recognized by the Dutch government as a serious problem. One study on crime estimated the number of drug smugglers arriving at Schiphol from Curacao alone at 21,000 per year\(^{29}\) – which would be equivalent to more than 40 Boeing 747 passenger airplanes filled to capacity. Drug smuggling received a lot of media attention and was heavily debated in the Dutch Parliament. In 2001, the public prosecutor’s decision to release seven drug smugglers from custody and send them back to their country of origin was met with fierce opposition from Parliament (Boone 2005). The number of drug smugglers from the Netherlands Antilles in particular had risen so much that the capacity to prosecute and detain them had become insufficient. The chance of getting caught for drug smuggling was consequently very low. Even though those smugglers who were caught had their contraband confiscated, not all of them ended up in prison (Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 28192, no. 41, p. 3).

In an attempt to limit the flows of cocaine entering Europe via Schiphol, the Minister of Justice introduced a range of measures. In the ‘blueprint’ document outlining the

\(^{29}\) This estimate is based on the number of passengers who are refused boarding, the number of passengers who do not show up when a check is done at the airport, and the number of drug couriers arrested at 100% checks in relation to the mean number of flights per week from Curacao (Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 28192, no. 41, p. 10).
government’s proposed approach to combat drug smuggling, the Minister framed drug smuggling as a problem that impacted on the image and functioning of the Dutch authorities:

For some time already, Schiphol Airport has been used for illegally smuggling drugs into the Netherlands. At the end of last year, we witnessed such an increase in the number of drug couriers at Schiphol that it threatened the adequate functioning of the criminal justice system. As a result, the credibility of government action has been undermined at its core (Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28192, p. 7 [my own translation]).

The government took steps to increase the capacity of the judicial system and to improve procedures at Schiphol as well as at airports in the countries of departure (Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28192). Yet, a year later, the Minister concluded that the measures had yielded few results:

Because of the extent of the problems manifested and concentrated at Schiphol, the societal impact of these problems and because the measures taken do not sufficiently address these problems, we are faced with a highly exceptional situation at Schiphol that requires taking extraordinary measures (Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 28192, no. 23, p. 16 [my own translation]).

In using this phrasing, the government legitimized the creation of a mobilities regime for combating drug smuggling that includes a number of extraordinary control measures, such as the ‘100% check’ on ‘risk flights’ arriving from Suriname, the former Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, and Venezuela. The government’s blueprint document, in which the term ‘risk flight’ features for the first time, uses it to refer to flights with a ‘heightened risk of drug transport, whether by cargo, or by courier’ (Kamerstukken II 2001/02, 28192, p. 13 [my own translation]). A 100% check entails that all passengers, crew, baggage, cargo, and the airplane itself are checked systematically. It is important to note that the 100% check is in addition to the regular Customs and border checkpoints, and takes place in the transit part of the airport where people and their goods have not yet officially entered Dutch territory. The planes from ‘risk countries’ arrive at the E22 or G10 gates at Schiphol, two gates that are tailor-made for the 100% check. These gates are located at the very end of the E and G piers, which means that not many regular passengers will notice that special checks take place there.
This chapter does not attempt to judge the success or failure of the special measures. Instead, it shows how mobilities are regulated in the anti-drug-smuggling checks by classifying and examining travellers and their movements. The journey of the fictive traveller Roy Narain from Suriname to the Netherlands illustrates how travellers pass several checkpoints and borders where assessments take place – where passengers wait in order to be questioned, to have their bodies inspected, or their belongings scanned and bags opened.

Although all travellers on risk flights may be subjected to the 100% check, most of them, like Roy, will face only a little additional scrutiny. A small number of travellers, however, will be taken aside for a secondary check. These travellers will follow a different route and are not allowed to leave the waiting room at the gate. A Customs official will confiscate their passports and ask them to descend the stairs leading to an interrogation room on the ground level of the airport. Here people will be registered and wait until a Customs official calls them in. During the secondary check, Customs again assesses the credibility of people’s reasons for travel, and checks hand baggage and wallets. In exceptional cases, strip searches and cavity searches are performed. In case there are ‘sufficient grounds for suspicion’, or when there is evidence of drug smuggling, a Customs official with special authority arrests the traveller and hands him over to the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary, hereafter referred to as the ‘border police’. If the traveller is suspected of having swallowed drugs, the border police take him to the airport’s G pier, where an x-ray scan of the alimentary canal can be made. If the scan is clean, the traveller is released. In case the traveller refuses a scan, or scanning is impossible for medical reasons, the border police take him to the detention centre located on the airport grounds a few miles from the passenger terminals. In the detention centre, the traveller’s defecation is checked for cocaine capsules via a special drug toilet, and the traveller is released if he has ‘produced clean’, as the border police call it, two or three times. With this method, it can take up to several days to determine whether a person has swallowed drugs or not.

Traveller Roy Narain is based on various travel stories I collected from passengers on this route. The interviewees all live in the Netherlands, but many have Surinamese roots and some still have a Surinamese passport. They include Hindustan-Surinamese Dutch, Creole-Surinamese Dutch, Javanese-Surinamese Dutch, white Dutch, and people of mixed origin. While I chose to ‘create’ Roy Narain in order to be able to show what checkpoints people face, all other quotes and experiences of (anonymized) travellers in this chapter are real.

Here the accounts of travellers and lawyers on the one hand, and Customs on the other hand, diverge. Based on the new Customs act (since August 2008), Customs is authorized to do different types of strip searches, but when I interviewed Customs officials about this, they claimed that never happens. Another interviewee, a lawyer, said strip searches do take place.

Hereafter, although I refer to the traveller in general as a ‘he’, travellers as well as drug smugglers include women as well as men. For specific cases involving women, I will of course use ‘she’.

Koninklijke Marechaussee.

schoon produceren in Dutch.
I) Technologies of classification: swallow criteria and digital profiling

Drugs can be smuggled in many ways: in double layers of suitcases, in food products such as fruit or candies, or hidden inside the airplane itself. For all these types of smuggling, drugs can often be detected by specially trained dogs or by baggage scanners. Drugs that are hidden on or in human bodies, however, are harder to detect. It requires interviewing people and examining bodies – both their contours and their insides – and sometimes searching the body by a pat-down or a strip search. Drug swallowers are particularly hard to detect because technologies such as baggage scanners, pat-downs, and body searches cannot detect drugs in bodies. For this reason, drug couriers, and in particular swallowers, are filtered out of the flows of arriving passengers at Schiphol by means of profiling. This section discusses how mobility between the Caribbean and the Netherlands is regulated by screening technologies designed to classify (Bowker & Star 1999) certain travellers as being suspected of malafide intentions. Following Bowker and Star (1999), screening technologies should not be thought of as devices or machines only, but more generally as tools used to classify travellers, in this case as ‘malafide’ travellers or ‘bonafide’ travellers. These tools include scanning technologies, but also lists on paper, and interviews. In the next section I follow travellers from Suriname from the moment of disembarking at Schiphol up to the secondary check, looking at how the technologies target bodies and movements at micro and meso levels.

Profiling using swallow criteria

When a risk flight arrives at Schiphol Airport, Customs officials identify potential drug smugglers on the basis of a list of ‘swallow criteria’ (slikkerscriteria). This technology is part of the 100% check at the arrival gate. Because drugs smuggled into the Netherlands are goods, it is Customs that carry out the 100% check at the gate, and not the border police. The list of swallow criteria is intended to reflect the characteristics of drug smugglers. The exact content of the list is confidential, but the criteria cover themes such as travel documents (whether a ticket was paid with cash), travel data (travel route, amount of baggage in relation to duration of stay), appearance (sweating, chapped lips and bad breath), and behaviour (nervous behaviour, avoiding eye contact). In 2006 there were 21 criteria

35 Bowker and Star (1999), in studying race classification under Apartheid, mention combs as a technology to test how curly a person’s hair was.

36 The border police play a role only when a person is officially suspected of having smuggled drugs, and in pre-flight checks (see Chapter 4).
in total and travellers who met at least five criteria were deemed ‘potential swallowing suspects’ and taken aside for an additional interview by a Customs official (De Nationale Ombudsman 2006a).

Customs officials check for the criteria by observing the behaviour and appearance of travellers and doing short interviews at the gate. When a risk flight arrives at Schiphol Airport, Customs request all passengers to show their passports; they interview a certain number of them to see whether they fit the profile of a drug swallower. Travellers experience these interview questions as one of the most bothersome parts of the 100% check. The questions are about the purpose, length, and destination of the journey, and how the ticket was paid. Some travellers consider the questions a violation of privacy, particularly the questions about who paid for the ticket, what they were doing in Suriname, and their occupation. As one traveller put it:

‘I get annoyed. I earn my money in an honest way and I don’t need to render an account to anybody. But if you refuse to answer, you will get into more trouble and all that, you know?’

Looking back on his journey, another traveller also thought the questions were too private, but he nevertheless cooperated.

‘But in retrospect you think […]: it’s none of their business what I do in Suriname and what I am doing at this moment. And why I went there, and why not, and where I stayed, and what I have been up to […]. It’s none of their business!’

Although some travellers openly show their annoyance, most of them keep quiet. A middle-aged man explained how this works:

‘Inside I boil, but I know: if I do that [protest], I will get even more stressed up. There are people waiting for me, I want to go home.’

The 100% check is the final part of the journey home and most people are tired after the nine-hour transatlantic journey. They expect that making objections will only get them into trouble37.

37 In 2010, however, a traveller who had received a fine because he had refused to answer the questions appealed against that decision. The traveller was acquitted (Gerechtshof Amsterdam, 1-12-2010). In July 2012 the Supreme Court ruled that the acquittal was justified (Hoge Raad, 03-07-2012).
Securitizing ‘risk flights’

While most travellers cooperate in being classified, many say they feel uncomfortable. The fact that many travellers on this route have Dutch citizenship and Surinamese roots adds to the sensitive nature of the inspections. One traveller explains he does not like to be questioned, because ‘they can tell from my passport that I am from here.’ For these Surinamese Dutch travellers the Netherlands is their (new) home country, and they find it hard to understand why they are questioned upon arrival in their own country. Several travellers explicitly linked their uneasy feelings about the checks to the creation of difference.

‘They [the authorities] do not ask a Turk or Moroccan what he has done on vacation. So why do I need to give chapter and verse about it?’

One Surinamese Dutch man feels particularly strongly about it:

As a Dutchman, I have rights. One of these rights is the freedom to travel. At the German border, I do not get checked, why do I [get checked] arriving from Suriname? When I arrive from Egypt I don’t [get checked]. This goes against my feelings of justice!

The creation of difference by classifying flights from the Caribbean as ‘risk flights’ is not just experienced in terms of citizenship or belonging. The fact that all passengers on flights that depart from Suriname face addition scrutiny also makes some people feel they are automatically suspected, or as one traveller phrased it: ‘Each passenger from Suriname is suspected beforehand!’ Another traveller describes how the inspections make him into a traveller with bad intentions: ‘You’re simply a criminal when you arrive at Schiphol!’ It is important to note the exact phrasing these travellers use: when they are questioned by Customs, travellers are criminals, they are suspected. Reflecting on their recent experiences at the airport, the two travellers quoted above explain how the screening procedures at Schiphol create a particular type of traveller, or mobile subject (see Jensen and Richardson 2008). The technologies of classification that aim to make drug smuggling visible make travellers into (potentially) malafide mobile subjects. Many travellers explained they were not ‘against’ the special measures, but they were frustrated at being suspected automatically. Hence, for travellers, tensions arise especially in the context of the mobile subject that is created through the use of specific technologies of classification.
The ways people react to being classified

The swallower criteria and the fact that they are secret are highly contested. Travellers and NGOs have expressed their concern that certain people – people who travel alone, young people, and Creoles – are picked out more often than others, although the authorities deny that this is the case. In 2006, a report by the Ombudsman (De Nationale Ombudsman 2006a) revealed that one third of suspected (and therefore arrested) swallowers turned out, at a later stage of the checks, to be innocent. This led to questions in Parliament about the adequacy of the criteria, but the Minister of Justice responded that the criteria were evaluated on a regular basis and, where necessary, adapted (Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2005/06, no. 1932). Later that year, a number of Surinamese Dutch organizations and individuals challenged the swallower criteria and other procedures of the 100% check in court. The organizations argued that some of the criteria were discriminatory. For example, they argued that paying a ticket with cash is more common among Surinamese and Dutch of Surinamese descent than among other travellers, and that it should not automatically be considered suspicious behaviour. Also, having red eyes could be the result of the long transatlantic journey, instead of an indication of drug smuggling. The organizations therefore deemed the chance that an innocent traveller would fit several of the swallower criteria too large. The judge rejected the claim, but agreed that the percentage of suspects who later turned out to be innocent was high. Nevertheless, he held that in view of the aim of the 100% check, the check was not unlawful (Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 12-03-2007).

Not only the content of the criteria but also the confidential status of the list of swallower criteria is contested. The contestable construction of a category – in this case the drug swallower – is black boxed (see Bowker & Star 1999; Van der Ploeg 2012). The fact that the criteria drawn up by the public prosecutor are kept secret makes it almost impossible for travellers, lawyers, and NGOs to open them up for debate. The Ombudsman has inspected the criteria, but complied with the Minister of Justice’s request to keep the criteria confidential in order not to reduce the effectiveness of the checks: if the criteria became public, drug smugglers could adapt their strategies. This shows how classification may interact with the people classified (Hacking 2007). Hacking calls this a ‘looping effect’. As he explains: ‘New sorting and theorising induces changes in self-conception and in behaviour of the people classified. Those changes demand revisions of the classifications and theories, the causal connections, and the expectations’ (Hacking 1995, p. 370). The fact that drug smugglers adapt their strategies in response to the checks means that the government needs to regularly revise the criteria.
Securitizing ‘risk flights’

One could argue that the classification interacts not only with drug smugglers, but also with ‘regular’ travellers. Although the criteria are secret and travellers can only get a sense of them when they are questioned, they have a good idea what Customs are looking for. A Hindustani Surinamese woman:

‘[My husband and I] do not belong to the risk group. Usually they look at Creoles, dark-skinned people. And perspiration, whether you are nervous. And people who start to scold like ‘This is taking too long!’ or ‘Why this or that?’ And if you haven’t eaten anything on board they are obliged to pass that information on. And what I also know is that they know from experience who to pick out. There seem to be certain indications. What these are, I still don’t know. But it appears they follow you on camera. And the way you walk, that’s an indication of drug swallowing too.’

An entrepreneur who takes a holiday to Suriname each year together with his adult son knows that the two of them will be treated differently:

‘When my son [is travelling with me] – he’s a bit darker, and pretty broad and tall – it is completely different. Then our suitcases are turned inside out and they [Customs] act in a very different way. Then I almost want to say to him [my son]: ‘Hey, let’s walk apart.’ But of course as a father you don’t say that. Apparently he really attracts it. […] He gets asked the stupidest questions and then I sometimes lash out. I can’t take it when my son is harassed. Then I start to scold and make comments.

Travellers are conscious of their appearance, body language, and behaviour, and explained to me that it is important to ‘act normal’, and to try not to draw attention during the 100% check. A middle-aged couple described how it is all in the way you disembark the airplane and face the Customs officials: ‘self-assured, you’ve got nothing to hide’. Another traveller confesses he avoids looking the Customs official in the eye when he knows he is being observed, because he is afraid that eye contact will irritate him and trigger his anger about being checked, and therefore get him into trouble. His tactic in dealing with the checks, however, might have the opposite effect. Avoiding eye contact is one of the swallow criteria, so the man’s behaviour might draw an official’s attention. While all these examples demonstrate that travellers are very aware of being classified on the basis of swallow criteria, the recent introduction of digital profiling has gone largely unnoticed.
Digital profiling using passenger data

Profiling is a common practice in securitizing air travel, particularly as a means for identifying potential terrorists (Curry 2004). Curry explains that whereas earlier systems of profiling relied on face-to-face interactions, more recent profiling systems rely on ‘technologically intensive data mining’ (idem, p. 476). In the anti-drug-smuggling checks, similar to profiling using swallower criteria and interviews, digital profiling is intended to make visible and help identify suspicious routes and patterns of movements and behaviour, but it works in a different way. In a trial with Dutch airline KLM, Customs can ‘pull’ Passenger Name Record data from the airline reservation and departure control system38. The data can be accessed before a flight departs and used to do an automated risk analysis for drug smuggling (Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 23490 and 22112, no. 531). By combining or relating various elements from the passenger data, a computer program searches for deviations from ‘normal (travel) patterns’, for example the amount of baggage in relation to the duration of the stay (Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2010/11, no. 3536).

A major difference with face-to-face profiling is that with digital profiling, travellers’ data ‘arrive’ earlier than travellers’ physical bodies, and a computer program can make a risk analysis before Customs officials see the traveller in person. This should make the 100% check in the waiting room quicker and more effective, because when the passengers arrive Customs can focus on those people who fit the digital profile. Airlines benefit too, because the passenger flow will be quicker and the airplane and waiting room will be empty sooner, allowing the airline to let a new flight depart. For airlines, parking space at Schiphol is expensive, and when the regular 100% check is used it can take two hours before the plane and waiting room are empty and new passengers can board.

Whereas passengers who do not fit the drug smuggler profile may benefit from the use of digital profiling, those whose data are suspicious find themselves in a different position. Some of the consequences of digital profiling can be illustrated by the case of a Surinamese woman of Javanese descent who lives in the Netherlands. In the summer of 2007, Mrs Jacobs, as we will call her, flew home from Suriname, where she had attended her mother’s funeral. After disembarking from the airplane at Schiphol Airport, Mrs Jacobs showed her passport to the Customs official at the arrival gate. Without asking any questions, the official looked at the name in her passport and told her that she had been selected for a secondary check. Mrs Jacobs explained to the Customs official that she had attended her mother’s

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38 PNR data include the name of the passenger, the travel route, baggage information, information on travelling companions, and form of payment used (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2012).
funeral and showed the mourning card to the official, but the official did not respond. Mrs Jacobs became very emotional and started to cry when she was taken to a separate room. In the separate room she was searched and interviewed more extensively, but Customs officials found no evidence of drug smuggling. According to Customs she was released and allowed to enter the transit area 46 minutes after she had been selected (Douane West, 12-06-2008). Only after she had filed a complaint at Customs was Mrs Jacobs informed that she had been selected on the basis of a ‘profile order’. A profile order preselects a passenger on the basis of an automated analysis of passenger data. When the traveller identifies himself at the first checkpoint, the official on duty immediately recognizes the name and knows that the person has been selected for secondary checks. Customs explained that in Mrs Jacobs’ case, her passenger data had revealed that she was travelling on a ticket that had been booked shortly before the journey and had been paid for in cash. Also, she had only spent a short time in Suriname and the amount of luggage she was carrying did not correspond to the length of her stay. Furthermore, just a few weeks earlier she had spent another short time in Suriname (this time to attend an aunt’s funeral). It turns out that it is this ‘rhythm of mobility’ (Cresswell 2010, p. 24) that had made Mrs Jacobs suspect.

Hidden classification and automatic cooperation

In the case of digital profiling, people automatically and unknowingly cooperate in being classified. Similar to what Van der Ploeg (2012) has argued about biometric identification, the data are captured in a covert and distant way. When she booked her ticket, Mrs Jacobs did not know that her travel data would be used by Dutch authorities for a risk analysis. With interviews at the gate, on the other hand, people know they are being classified on the basis of the answers they give and their appearance. They also have the choice to cooperate or to refuse to answer the questions. In that sense, they have more control over the situation, for example by deciding to stay calm and presenting themselves as a ‘trusted traveller’. Several travellers explained the importance of this by recounting their encounters with Customs officials as a kind of game in which you could decide to ‘play along’, or even break the rules a bit. One traveller explains how he handles the interview questions:

‘I tell them: ‘So you want to know what I did in Suriname? Well, I was counting blades of grass! But now I’m tired and fed up. See you, goodbye!’ and then I walk on, because at that moment, I dominate [my emphasis]. And nobody will stop me then! Because then they understand.’
Although the questions upset him, this traveller manages to feel in control of the interaction. Hence, travellers are very aware that they provide information when they answer Customs officials’ questions, but they are not aware of the passenger data they have unknowingly provided. This automatic cooperation through digital profiling also poses questions about the responsibility to inform travellers. In this case, KLM does not notify travellers that they are sharing data with the Dutch authorities, nor do Customs officials inform travellers about it.

Digital profiling also changes the way ‘suspicious’ data are interpreted. Digital profiling entails automated interpretation, whereas in a person-to-person interaction, a human being – the Customs official – will interpret the answers, behaviour, and appearance. The person-to-person interaction also allows travellers to explain their ‘suspicious’ travel history. Mrs Jacobs tried to do this at the first checkpoint by showing the mourning card, but the profile order was already decisive. In a person-to-person interaction, an official has room for discretion in judging whether someone has a ‘plausible travel story’ (Heyman 2001), whereas in the case of digital profiling the judgement is made by the computer program. When passenger data are used for risk analysis, a traveller may have already been selected for a secondary check before she has physically arrived. Lyon discusses how the assessments and judgements made about data subjects depend on coded criteria. Computer codes help to put people into particular categories. As he states, ‘the “coded body” of a person who attempts to cross a national border may find that she is already welcome or already excluded on the basis of an identity that is established by the codes’ (Lyon 2003b, p. 24). As Lyon (2008) argues, ‘data doubles’, virtual identities located in networked databases (idem, p. 30), affect the travel of persons to which they refer.

Mrs Jacobs’ case shows how digital profiling changes classification and its effects in several ways. Digital profiling means that most people will be subjected to less harassment at the gate upon arrival, but also that people are largely unaware that they are being classified. An important question is to what extent people are in control of the information they (unintentionally) provide, especially when this information forms the basis for the way they are classified. Swallower criteria and digital profiling are expected to make the work of officials more effective and make things easier for ‘innocent’ travellers. Although the two technologies for classifying travellers as suspects use similar criteria, it is clear that each technology puts travellers into categories in a different way, and travellers experience the

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39 In the privacy policy section of their website, KLM does mention they share passenger data with United States and Canadian authorities in order to prevent and combat potential terrorism (http://www.klm.com/travel/nl_nl/customer_support/privacy_policy/privacy_policy.htm#p3, accessed 21-03-2012).
two technologies differently. While the secret nature of the swallower criteria excludes the possibility of public scrutiny, profiling with passenger data is even less visible.

We have now seen how swallower criteria and digital profiling aim to make visible suspicious routes and patterns of movements. In the subsequent phase of the checks, Customs and the border police subject suspected travellers to secondary checks to see if there is evidence of drug smuggling. These secondary checks target the contours and insides of bodies.

II) Making drugs visible: physical and virtual body searches

When the authorities suspect a passenger of being a ‘swallower’, a ‘pusher’ (who hides drugs in body cavities), or a ‘packer’ (who transports drugs on the body), body searches are carried out to look for evidence. Making concealed drugs visible is a complicated process because it entails touching bodies by pat-downs, visual inspection of dressed and naked bodies, visual inspection of body cavities, and inspection of the insides of bodies. The body search technologies discussed here aim at making visible drugs that are hidden both on and in human bodies. Such technologies include physical body searches and virtual body searches. Physical body searches consist of pat-downs, strip searches, and visual body cavity searches, whereas body scanners are used to do virtual body searches. In anti-smuggling checks, two types of body scanners are used: a scanner that works with millimetre waves and a scanner that works with x-rays. The waves of the first scanner bounce off the body and can only show contraband hidden in clothing or carried on bodies, whereas the x-rays of the second type of scanner penetrate the body and produce an image that can show swallowed contraband inside the body. The two scanners thus differ in what they make visible: body contours or body insides. This section first briefly describes the history of physical body searches that Customs officials carry out as part of the 100% check they are authorized to do, and then discusses how virtual body searches were introduced to make drugs visible in other ways.

A brief history of physical body searches by Customs

Physical body searches to detect drugs have always been contested, in particular body searches carried out by Customs officials, because any traveller can be subjected to these checks. As one lawyer put it: “[These] body searches are carried out on travelling people
who are not convicted and not restricted in their freedom, at a public airport (Hamer & Grijsen 2007). All passengers arriving on risk flights move through a metal detector and may get a pat-down. Those persons sent for secondary checks may undergo a more extensive body search that includes the removal of clothing and inspection of naked body parts.

Since the start of the 100% check, newspapers and other media have reported several cases of cavity searches on people who later turned out to be innocent, and such body searches soon became a topic of public debate. This debate was fuelled by the fact that until mid-2008 an elaborate and clear legal framework was absent: whereas the Customs Act allowed Customs officials to do physical body searches, there was no explanation in the Act of what a body search consisted of, and few safeguards were in place. In practice, body searches ranged from pat-downs, to inspection of the naked body, and sometimes visual inspection of upper and lower body cavities. One of the few safeguards was that the body searches needed to be carried out in a closed-off space by a person of the same sex, and that only persons in particular spaces, among which airports and means of transport in border zones (Algemene Douanewet, article 1:26), could be subjected to a body search. The Customs Act thereby makes the airport into an exceptional space where searches are allowed that would be deemed unacceptable if they were carried out in other spaces.

The main objection revolved around the issue of whether or not visual body cavity searches were a part of what Customs officials are authorized to do. Over the years, body searches have been challenged in court cases by innocent as well as convicted travellers and their lawyers. In particular, the question whether a visual body cavity search implies a search on or in the body became crucial in the discussion of whether or not such searches by Customs officials authorized. Several courts ruled that visual body cavity searches could be considered a search in the body and therefore did not belong to the 'check phase' by Customs to which any traveller at an airport may be subjected. Under Dutch law, body cavity searches can be carried out only on persons who have been arrested for an offence (Wetboek van Strafvordering, article 56). In the anti-drug-smuggling checks, people who are arrested enter the ‘search phase’ for which the border police are responsible. In this search phase, the Code of Criminal Procedure provided more safeguards for body searches than the Customs Act did for body searches in the check phase. The court ruled that it was unacceptable that persons whose body cavities were searched by Customs were in a worse

40 ‘Lijfsvisitaties worden toegepast op reizende, niet veroordeelde en niet in hun vrijheid beperkte personen op een openbare luchthaven’.
41 In the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvoordering), article 56, visual inspection of lower body cavities is considered a search in the body and needs to be carried out by a doctor.
position with regard to the protection of bodily integrity than persons who were arrested because they were suspected of having committed a crime (Gerechtshof Amsterdam 29-05-2008). In a number of rulings, the court called the visual body cavity search ‘very humiliating’ and awarded innocent travellers who had undergone a cavity search a higher than usual financial compensation for the time they had spent in detention (Rechtbank Haarlem 04-04-2005; Rechtbank Haarlem 10-08-2005). A critical report by the National Ombudsman in 2006 judged strip searches (the removal of clothing) unacceptable (De Nationale Ombudsman 2006a) and in 2007, the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that since visual body cavity searches were searches in the body, there was no legal basis for them to be carried out by Customs (Hoge Raad 29-05-2007). Later court cases, however, show that despite this judgment, such searches were continued (Gerechtshof Amsterdam 29-05-2008). Moreover, despite the criticism of body searches in the check phase, the Customs Act was adapted in August 2008 to widen the definition of body searches to include visual body cavity searches. The legally problematic practice of searches in the body by Customs officials thereby became legal. This means that any traveller entering the Netherlands on a risk flight can now be subjected to inspection of the naked body and upper and lower body cavities, although more safeguards are now provided.

The objections to body searches also led to a growing need to use different ways of seeing: scanning technologies in which images of bodies are interpreted that make the inspection of bodies less burdensome. Since 2004 the border police make use of an x-ray scanner, and in 2007 Customs introduced virtual body searches on a trial basis by a millimetre wave scanner that makes a scan of the body’s contours.

**Virtual body searches**

‘I told the Customs official who interviewed me that I would use the money that is spent on Customs personnel to buy a super scanner where travellers simply move through and which sees everything!’

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42 ‘Het hof is van oordeel dat niet aanvaard kan worden dat aan douanecontrole onderworpen personen, met betrekking tot de bescherming van de voormelde rechten, in een slechtere positie verkeren dan personen tegen wie ernstige bezwaren zijn gerezen en die worden verdacht van het plegen van strafbare feiten.’

43 Searches of the lower body (including visual body cavity searches) need to be carried out by a doctor or a nurse (on a doctor’s orders), and complete removal of clothing and searches of the lower body can only be carried out by permission of an official.
This statement by a Surinamese Dutch traveller illustrates that many people believe that scanning devices will make checks less burdensome for travellers, but also that scanners make possible ‘new ways of visualising and knowing bodies’ (Amoore & Hall 2009, p. 454). Currently, two different types of scanning technologies are used in the anti-drug-smuggling checks: the millimetre wave scanner and the x-ray scanner. Starting on a trial basis in 2007, the millimetre wave scanner was used by Customs to check passengers arriving on risk flights⁴⁴. Amsterdam Airport Schiphol explains that this scanner ‘uses harmless millimetre waves that bounce off the skin and do not enter the body’ (Amsterdam Airport Schiphol Security Scan Brochure). Following the test phase, in 2008 the new Customs Act authorized virtual body searches by means of equipment that can see through clothing as a legal way to do a body search.

How does this body scanner work? First, a passenger walks into the cabin and stands still on a designated spot. While the passenger raises his arms, the scanner goes round the body. The scanner makes an image of the body’s contours that is sent to a computer that analyses the image. The computer produces a standard image of a figure, indicates where on the body any objects are detected, and sends it back to Customs. On the basis of this image, the official decides whether or not this person needs a pat-down and on which parts of the body it should be conducted. The millimetre wave scanner is an alternative to the standard procedure of metal detector and pat-down. A millimetre wave scanner, however, can detect other materials than metals, which makes it particularly suitable for detecting drugs.


⁴⁴ Amsterdam Airport Schiphol uses the same scanner for general security control on departing passengers. In the anti-drug-smuggling checks the scanner is used specifically for detecting drugs.
Securitizing ‘risk flights’

The scanner shifts ways of seeing and inspecting travellers and their bodies. In the 100% check, the use of this scanner would reduce the need for pat-downs, which are often experienced as inconvenient. In the Customs Act (Algemene Douanewet, article 1:28) the scanning of bodies is called a ‘virtual body search’. Instead of an official touching or inspecting the body, it is now a computer that analyses an image of the body and sends the results back to the official. Body searches thereby become less physical, because officials do not need to touch passengers, and the seeing becomes less direct, because the image is analysed by software and the observer only sees an anonymized image of the body, instead of the body itself. Nevertheless, the scanner does not provide an alternative to all types of body searches Customs are authorized to do. The scanner cannot detect drugs that are fully hidden in body cavities; in such cases it does not provide an alternative to the contested cavity search.

The millimetre wave scanner is also unable to detect swallowed drugs, so for this purpose a second body scanner is used. This body scanner works with x-rays that penetrate the body. Whereas the millimetre wave scanner is especially designed for deployment at security checkpoints, x-ray scanners are a medical technology that can be used for detecting capsules with drugs. This means that medical personnel are needed to do the scanning and to interpret the images. Because exposure to x-rays presents a minor health risk, the scanner cannot be used as a standard tool on all arriving passengers. The x-ray scanner is therefore only used in the ‘search phase’, which is under the authority of the border police. A body scan with x-rays can only be made when a person is considered a suspect on the basis of swallow criteria and has been arrested as a potential swallower. In addition, the person’s consent is needed before a scan can be made.

The x-ray scanner is used as an alternative to ‘producing clean’ at the special drug toilets at Schiphol’s detention centre. Before the scanner was deployed in 2004, a suspected swallower could only prove his innocence by having his stools checked, for which people were detained for up to three days. In 2004, the placement of an x-ray scanner at the detention centre speeded up this process considerably: suspected swallowers could now voluntarily use the x-ray scanner, which would show whether or not they had swallowed drugs (De Nationale Ombudsman 2006a, p. 25). Still, for most travellers under suspicion who later turned out to be innocent, the process took five to eight hours from the time they arrived at Schiphol Airport (idem, p. 30). In 2007, a second x-ray scanner was placed at Schiphol Airport’s G pier – the pier where a 100% check takes place – to speed up the process further and to decrease inconvenience for travellers (Kamerstukken II 2006/07,
For innocent travellers this means a detour to the detention centre can be prevented. Still, to reach the point at which he can elect to use the x-ray scanner to prove his innocence, a traveller first needs to be arrested and be an official suspect.

Earlier in this chapter I discussed how use of digital profiling creates a data double that arrives at the border earlier than the physical traveller, and that this changed the way people are classified. In the case of using a body scanner, the data double consists of an image of the traveller’s body that is interpreted by a computer or a radiologist for signs of drug smuggling. How do examination practices change when it is body scanners that make images of the body, instead of officials performing physical body searches? The millimetre wave scanner can be expected to make checks faster and less inconvenient for travellers. A virtual body search requires less touching of bodies and makes visual inspection of bodies less direct. In addition, both types of scanners speed up screening procedures and make it possible to check more people in a more detailed way in less time. In short, scanners can be expected to make classification practices quicker and less burdensome for travellers.

Whereas issues of privacy and bodily integrity have often been discussed in relation to the use of body scanners, in the anti-drug-smuggling checks some of the alternative procedures, such as pat-downs, examination of the naked body, and checking stools, may be considered more burdensome by travellers and officials than body scanning. The body scanners make possible new ways of seeing and inspecting travellers in which the body is examined in a more distant way. With physical body searches travellers know what officials see and this is exactly what makes these procedures burdensome. But do travellers know what the scanners ‘see’? The use of two different types of body scanners has clearly led to confusion: some travellers who used the millimetre wave scanner were not sure whether that scanner would scan the insides or the contours of their bodies, and feared that the scanning was a risk to their health. Some travellers worried about who would view the images and where the images would circulate. A Surinamese Dutch man in his 60s said: ‘I don’t know what will happen to the image, how long they keep it, what they do with it, where it goes to’. Again, whether people are aware of what information they (unknowingly) provide, and whether they have control over their ‘data doubles’ seem to be important issues.
Data doubles on the move: the case of the black list

In the case of digital profiling, the data double ‘moves’ separately from the physical traveller and ‘arrives’ at Customs for a risk analysis hours before the real traveller disembarks. For a convicted drug smuggler, the relation between their own mobility and that of their data double becomes even more complex. Whereas the mobility of convicted drug smugglers is blocked via a black list, the data doubles of drug smugglers appear to be increasingly on the move. Since 2004, convicted drug smugglers are placed on a black list that is available to all airlines that provide direct flights between the Netherlands, the Dutch Caribbean islands, and Suriname. At check-in, if the airline sees that a person’s data match those on the black list, it will refuse to take this person on board as a passenger. A person will stay on the list – and thereby is forbidden to fly on risk flights – for three years, even if he has already served his time in prison. Whereas at the start of this trial, the black list was provided to Dutch airline KLM only, it soon was shared with the Surinamese airline SLM\(^{45}\) too, as well as with foreign authorities. The sharing of data with foreign airlines and authorities is meant to prevent drug smugglers from choosing a different airline or a different route because they know their name is on the black list used for Schiphol Airport. Since 2005 the black list is also linked to the Schengen Information System (SIS), a database used by the European Union that allows national border control and judicial authorities to obtain information on persons or objects. When a convicted Dutch drug smuggler travels to France or Spain, for example, he may get checked more intensively at the airport there because an alert has been issued in the SIS. In this way, data doubles not only ‘travel ahead’ and get classified, but also move to new places.

Lyon argues that data doubles travel within organizations and countries, but also across borders, and that they have ‘far greater rates of mobility than their real-life counterparts’ (Lyon 2008, p. 29). When data doubles start to travel, the data are no longer protected by the data-privacy regimes of the originating country (idem, p. 31). How easily do the data doubles of ‘risky’ travellers, namely those people whose names are on the black list, travel? Despite several critical recommendations by the Dutch Data Protection Authority\(^{46}\) (DPA) to the Minister of Justice, the pressure to share data with other parties – airlines as well as foreign authorities – is high. At the start of the trial, the DPA expressed concern that private companies (airlines) now received privacy-sensitive information. Dutch airline KLM has a special section on its website called ‘special security measures regarding routes to and from the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba and Suriname’ and explains what happens as follows:

\(^{45}\) Surinaamse Luchtvaartmaatschappij, or Surinamese Airlines.
\(^{46}\) College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (CBP).
The names of passengers who have disembarked at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and who have been found by the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary to be carrying illegal drugs will be recorded by the State of the Netherlands. The names of these persons shall also be given to KLM. On the basis of this information, KLM will be entitled to refuse to enter into any transport contract with these persons for a period of three years.


Sharing the black list with airlines from Suriname, Aruba, and Netherlands Antilles meant that personal information entered countries that did not have an appropriate level of privacy protection, and according to the DPA therefore required a license. When the Minister of Justice asked for a reconsideration, however, the DPA reformulated its recommendation and held that sharing the black list could be considered part of the carrier agreement of airlines with passengers, because airlines have a legitimate interest in guaranteeing safety and security in the air and in protecting themselves against complicity in drug smuggling (CBP, 05-04-2004). The sharing of data with United States authorities, on the other hand, was strongly criticized by the DPA and eventually was stopped after two years, when it became known that the US kept data for an unlimited period, instead of the three years that had been agreed upon, and used it for criminal analysis. These examples show that not just the ‘travelling ahead’ of a data double, but also the travelling of the data double while the person stays in place can have important consequences for the (future) travel of that person.

III) Conclusions

In the early 2000s, international mobility between the Caribbean and the Netherlands came to be seen as a problem by the Dutch government. The good transport links between the Caribbean and the Netherlands and the extensive migration networks, dating back to colonial times, turned out to facilitate not only legitimate travel, but also the smuggling of drugs. When travellers or goods cross borders, they often undergo a transformation in their (economic) value and meaning (Cunningham & Heyman 2004, p. 295; Kearney 2004) and this is particularly true for the transport of illegal drugs from the Caribbean to the
Netherlands. In order to curtail drug smuggling on this route, a mobilities regime has been introduced including extraordinary controls. Flights from Suriname, the former Netherlands Antilles, Aruba and Venezuela were all labelled ‘risk flights’ for drug smuggling, which entails that all airplanes, baggage, cargo, crew, and passengers on these flights are subjected to extra controls. In this chapter I examined practices of regulating mobilities by focusing on technologies of classification, examination and control, and the mobile subjects that are thereby created.

In Chapter 1 we saw how border scholars approach the border as a filter that differentiates mobilities, and as a site where blocking risky or undesirable movement goes along with encouraging or speeding up desirable movement. In a similar fashion, airport scholars have understood the airport as a filter, or as a difference machine. I argue that in order to understand how the filtering of mobilities takes place, we need to focus on the particular technologies used. In other words, examining these technologies helps us to understand how a mobilities regime entails particular ways of classifying, examining, and controlling mobilities. Upon arrival at Schiphol, every passenger on a risk flight is subjected to extra controls, but it is usually not obvious to the authorities who is a drug smuggler and who is not. Certain technologies are therefore used to find out who is a (potential) drug smuggler, and to detect drugs. I have discussed how swallower criteria and digital profiling are used to classify people as (potential) drug smugglers, how physical body searches and scanning of baggage and persons are used to examine people and goods in order to detect drugs, and how the black list was introduced to control the movement of convicted smugglers by preventively blocking their mobility on certain routes of travel.

Focusing on these technologies of classification, examination, and control allows us to be more specific about how travellers are screened in actual practice. As this chapter showed, some classification practices are secret and increasingly entail automatic (unknowing) cooperation. In addition, a number of more recently introduced technologies, such as digital profiling, body scanners, and the black list, work with ‘data doubles’ that are classified in terms of risk. While I showed that the creation of a data double that is classified and examined has real effects on the physical traveller, I also argued it is not by definition experienced by the physical traveller as negative. Examination of contours and insides of the body to detect drugs may be considered less intrusive when this is carried out with body scanners as compared to physical body searches, and digital profiling allows officials to do more targeted checks, thereby making the checks faster and less burdensome for the majority of passengers. However, when control over the data double is out of a traveller’s
hands, it also takes away the possibility to decide to cooperate, ‘play along’, or resist being classified or examined.

When drugs are hidden inside the body, and when data doubles are used for assessing travellers, the movement of passengers, drugs, and data doubles becomes intertwined. This implies that if we want to understand how mobilities are regulated in the case of anti-drug-smuggling checks, it is necessary, in the tradition of the mobilities paradigm, to understand mobilities as plural (Urry 2000). In order to understand the workings of the mobilities regime, we must examine the movement of data doubles alongside the examination of the movement of persons and drugs (see also Zureik & Salter 2005, p. 5). This also entails that the regulation of mobilities needs to be understood at different levels, from the level of the body that is being scanned, to the level of the international journeys that are being blocked by use of the black list.

As scholars who work on the politics of mobility have pointed out, we need to understand, in regulatory practices, how mobility gets meaning (Cresswell 2006), and how a particular mobile subject (Jensen & Richardson 2008) is created. This chapter discussed how mobility between the Caribbean and the Netherlands has become ‘risky’ mobility, and how, as a result, people arriving on risk flights are treated differently to people arriving on a non-risk flight. For some travellers, this results in a feeling that they are suspected automatically. Moreover, classifying travellers from the Caribbean as risky travellers becomes a particularly sensitive issue when added to existing social differences. Factors such as gender, class, and race are not part of the swaller criteria, but Surinamese organizations have nevertheless claimed that some of the swaller criteria are discriminatory. While the notion of a mobile subject helps us understand how a mobilities regime creates a particular kind of traveller, in this case a risky traveller, this need not be seen in a deterministic way. A mobilities regime does not prescribe how travellers experience their mobility, and neither does it determine their actions. As travellers move in the context of a particular mobilities regime, they may also react to classifications, agree to be interviewed, or resist having their bodies scanned.

In highlighting the technologies through which mobilities between the Caribbean and the Netherlands are regulated, I have suggested that classification and examination of travellers is not limited to the moment of arrival at the border at Schiphol Airport. The next chapter expands the examination of anti-drug-smuggling checks, and moves away from a focus on the border to examine where and when mobilities are regulated, and what actors are involved.